

THE

# POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

*NEWMAN*

London
HENRY FROWDE, M.A.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE
AMEN CORNER, E.C.

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*WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS*
*AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY*

BY

W. L. NEWMAN, M.A.
HON. LITT.D. CAMBRIDGE
FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, AND FORMERLY READER IN ANCIENT HISTORY
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

VOLUME III

**TWO ESSAYS**
**BOOKS III, IV, AND V—TEXT AND NOTES**

Oxford
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# PREFACE

## TO THE THIRD AND FOURTH VOLUMES.

My first words must be words of regret. The lamented death of Professor Susemihl not many months ago, which no one deplores more than I do, leaves a great gap in the ranks of Aristotelian scholars. His learning, his industry and powers of work, his thoroughness, and his acuteness will long be missed. The students of Aristotle's writings have abundant cause to be grateful to him, and none more so than myself. Even when I have differed from him most, I have always found his views suggestive and instructive. It was from him that I first learnt what the close study of a work of Aristotle's meant.

Of the friends who gave me assistance in the revision of the proofs of my first two volumes three—Mr. Alfred Robinson, Mr. R. L. Nettleship, and Mr. Evelyn Abbott—are, to my deep regret, no more. I have especially often missed the valued help of Mr. Alfred Robinson, whose death several years ago was a great loss to many besides myself.

Owing to weak health, the Warden of Wadham, Mr. G. E. Thorley, has, unfortunately for me, been unable to give me the assistance which he kindly gave me in the revision of the proofs of the first two volumes. Professor Bywater's suggestions have been but few—far fewer than I could have wished—but, on the other hand, I have gained a new and very valuable ally in Mr. Herbert Richards, whose Greek scholarship needs no

commendation from me, and who has most kindly found time to peruse all the proofs of the explanatory notes contained in the third and fourth volumes and to give me the benefit of his comments on them, which have been, I need not say, of great use to me, though I am alone responsible for the views expressed in this work. The references in the General Index under the name of Mr. Richards will suffice to show how many valuable suggestions I owe to him. For emendations of the text and transpositions not explicitly attributed to him I am responsible.

In five or six of the Additions and Corrections to Vols. I, II, and III placed at the end of Vol. III I have profited by some remarks on my commentary on the first two Books kindly sent me by Prof. Robinson Ellis in 1888 shortly after its appearance.

To all who have assisted me with information or suggestions in the correction of the proofs, and among them to the readers of the Press, my best thanks are due.

To Mr. F. G. Kenyon I am greatly indebted for the collation of MS. Harl. 6874 which I publish in an Appendix to my third volume. Many students have had cause to testify to his unvarying kindness and readiness to assist, and I can add my emphatic testimony to theirs.

I have not carried my collation of the Politics in $O^1$ (MS. 112, Corpus Christi College, Oxford) beyond the first two Books, but I have completed my collation of MS. Phillipps 891 (z), a manuscript of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation which, as will be seen from my critical notes (see for instance those on 1306 a 24 and 1315 b 31), occasionally offers excellent readings, found in no other MS. of the Latin Translation hitherto collated. It is throughout akin to a, though it sometimes differs from a, but the original reading of a has often been erased by a corrector, and where this has happened, the original

reading of z commonly remains intact and furnishes a probable clue to the original reading of a. I have again to thank the owner of the Phillipps Library, Cheltenham, for giving me every facility for the collation of this MS.

A list of the symbols and abbreviations used in the work will be found at the end of the fourth volume.

In my third and fourth volumes I have been able to refer to the English translation by Messrs. Costelloe and Muirhead of the volume of Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen which relates to Aristotle, and to the English translation by Messrs. Brooks and Nicklin of the first volume of Gilbert's Handbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer. The first volume of Gerth's edition of the Syntax of Kühner's Greek Grammar did not appear till my revision of the proofs of the third volume was almost completed. My references to Dittenberger's Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum are for a similar reason mostly to the first edition. The references in the first two volumes to Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften are to the first edition of the work, those in the third and fourth to the second edition, published in 1888.

NOVEMBER, 1901.

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# ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE POLITICS AND THE LATIN TRANSLATION OF WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE. II.

THE following remarks are in continuation of those contained in vol. ii. p. xli sqq. My object in them has especially been to study the characteristics of the two families into which the MSS. of the Politics fall and the errors to which they are most liable, and also to throw light on the methods of translation adopted in the *vetus versio*, in the hope that these inquiries may help us to discover the true reading in the many cases in which the MSS. of the two families offer different readings.

Omissions in $\Pi^1$.

It has long been observed (see vol. ii. p. lvii) that the MSS. of the first family ($\Pi^1$) are prone to omit both sentences and words. These omissions occur less often in some Books than in others. They are less numerous in the Sixth (old Fourth), the Seventh (old Fifth), and the Eighth (old Sixth) than in the other Books. Very few omissions occur between 1326 b and 1330 a (inclusive of these columns), none in 1332 b and 1333 a, 1334 a, 1338 a, and 1340 a.

Sentences are omitted in $\Pi^1$ owing to a similarity of ending in 1253 b 25, 1275 a 28, 1287 b 38, 1337 a 29, b 25, and 1299 a 8, owing to a similarity of the beginning in 1324 b 28 and 1311 b 37, and for no clear reason in 1275 a 11 and 1331 a 21.

Single words are still more often omitted in $\Pi^1$, and

especially small words, as I have pointed out in *Class. Rev.* 7. 305 (1893). Out of 184 omissions in $\Pi^1$ 117 are omissions of words of one syllable. 'If I do not err, καί is omitted in $\Pi^1$ twenty-four times in the course of the Politics, μέν eight and δέ nine times, τις and its parts six times, εἶναι five times, ἄν five times, and ἐκ thrice. $M^a$ $P^1$ omit the article thirty-five times, and τε eight times, and very possibly Γ did the like, though of this we cannot be sure, for the Vetus Interpres seldom renders τε, and, writing in Latin, of course seldom renders the article' (*Class. Rev.* ibid.). $\Pi^1$ are particularly prone to omit ἤ, καί, and the article, where these small words are repeated near together. See as to ἤ 1268 a 6, 1282 a 17, 1324 b 30, 1298 b 32, and 1305 a 32 (it is in these passages only that ἤ is omitted in $\Pi^1$); as to καί 1253 a 1, 25, 1255 a 5, 1259 b 31, 1260 b 17, 1263 a 23, 1264 a 16, 1317 b 6; as to the article 1265 a 12, 1266 b 3, 1268 a 17, 1269 a 38, 1272 b 28, 1279 a 34, 1282 a 40, 1285 a 6, 1325 a 8, 1331 b 5, 8, 1332 a 22, 1316 a 36.

Nor is it only sentences and words that $\Pi^1$ are apt to omit. These MSS. often omit syllables, mostly the first or last syllables of words—the first in 1262 a 30, 1273 a 10, 1283 a 11 (here, however, the ἀν- of ἀνισότητα is omitted because πᾶσαν precedes), 1285 b 36, 1342 b 32, and 1298 a 31; the last in 1268 b 16, 1276 b 20, 1278 b 40, 1283 b 20, 1287 b 19, 1335 b 35, and 1315 a 15. In 1336 b 20 and 1300 b 28 the first two syllables are omitted in $\Pi^1$. In 1335 b 4 and 1317 a 36 a syllable or more than a syllable is omitted from the middle of the word. The first letter of a word is clearly omitted in $\Pi^1$ in 1324 b 30 and 1315 b 18, and probably in 1265 b 19, 1297 b 7, and 1320 a 29; the last letter often disappears, especially when it is a ν or ς (see 1255 a 39, 1265 b 21, 1267 b 40, 1337 b 41, 1297 a 17, 1300 a 32, 1308 b 25, and 1309 a 31). On the other hand, two or three words are repeated in $\Pi^1$ in 1333 b 38 and 1297 a 24.

Omissions, etc. in $\Pi^2$.

Many omissions occur in $\Pi^2$ also, and some of them are omissions of a sentence or of more sentences than one.

Such omissions occur in 1334 a 37, 1337 b 16–20, 34–35, 1298 a 6, 1301 a 30–31, 1307 b 32–34, but they are easily explained, for they are caused by a similarity of ending. In 1292 b 32, if $\Pi^2$ are wrong in omitting the sentence omitted, they have not this excuse. In 1336 b 18 the words omitted by $\Pi^2$ are probably rightly omitted. Omissions of two words occur in 1285 b 16 (*αἱ πάτριοι*), 1326 b 32 (*τὸν ὅρον*), and 1335 a 37 (*δεῖ χρῆσθαι*): at least it seems likely that $\Pi^2$ are wrong in omitting these words. Omissions of a single word occur in 1259 a 37 (*μέρη*), 1276 a 33 (*ἔθνος*), 1288 b 16 (*ἔργον*), 27 (*ἀγαθὸν*), 1306 a 6 (*εὐθὺς*), and perhaps in 1304 b 6, where *αἰτίαι* may have dropped out after *αἱ*. Omissions of small words, and especially of *καί* and the article, are frequent in $\Pi^2$, though not nearly as frequent as in $\Pi^1$. Omissions of a syllable occur in $\Pi^2$ in 1294 b 26 (*ἄδηλος* for *διάδηλος*), 1314 b 7 (*δόξει* for *δόξειεν*), and 1320 a 38 (*συναθροίζων* $\Pi^1$, *ἀθροίζων* $\Pi^2$). It is not often that $\Pi^2$ can clearly be shown to omit a letter.

We note in $\Pi^2$ a certain tendency to substitute *o* for *ω* (e. g. in 1269 a 23, 1274 b 13, 1286 a 37, 1294 b 38, 1302 b 6, and 1317 a 39), and these MSS. substitute *ου* for *ω* in 1273 a 9 and 1314 a 18, and *ω* for *ου* in 1301 a 38 and 1307 a 38.

In five passages $\Pi^2$ have the aorist infinitive, while $\Pi^1$ (or at any rate $M^s P^1$, for the reading of $\Gamma$ is uncertain) have the present infinitive. These passages are 1260 b 36, 1267 a 35, 1284 a 5, 1332 b 1, and 1317 a 36.

Some errors in the MSS. go back to an early date; thus the errors of *φιΛίτια* for *φιΔίτια* in $\Pi^1$ (1271 a 27, 1272 a 2, b 34), of *Οὐσιῶν*, *Ουσίαι* for *Θυσιῶν*, *Θυσίαι* in $\Pi^1$ (1285 b 10, 16), and of *Δεῖ* for *Ἀεὶ* in $\Pi$ (1296 b 7) no doubt originated in days when uncials were in use. Errors of transcription of early date or otherwise.

Errors shared by all the MSS. and the Vetus Interpres must also have originated early. Under this head fall—

1274 b 7, *ἐπίσκεψιν* for *ἐπίσκηψιν*
1275 b 39, *καὶ* for *κἂν*
1276 b 9, *λέγοιμεν* for *λέγομεν* (or has *ἄν* been omitted?)

1278 a 34, *αὐτῶν* for *ἀστῶν* (*αὐτῶν* ΓΠ, but *ἀστῶν* Vat. Pal. and Codex Hamilton)
1280 b 4, *ἀδικήσωσιν* for *ἀδικήσουσιν*
1287 a 4, *βασιλείας* for *πολιτείας* (Julian seems to have read *βασιλείας*: see critical note)
1324 b 37, *δεσπόζον* for *δεσποστόν*
1327 a 21, *πολεμίους* for *πολέμους*
32, *ὑπάρχον* for *ὑπάρχοντα*
1337 a 1, *καλῶς* for *κακῶς*
1296 a 9, *πολιτειῶν* for *πολιτῶν*
1300 a 2, *ᾗ ἢ μισθὸς* for *ᾗ μισθοῦ*
1306 a 30, *σάμον* for *σῖμον*
1317 b 41, *ἐπὶ* for *ἔτι*.

Errors which we find in all extant MSS., though they were probably not present in the Greek text used by the Vetus Interpres, will also be of early date. Under this head fall—

1260 b 41, *ἰσότης* for *εἷς ὁ τῆς*
1266 b 2, *δὴ* or *δὲ* for *δ' ἤδη*
1278 b 20, *περὶ* for *παρὰ*
1283 a 7, *ὑπερέχειν* for *ὑπερέχει*.

Confusions of letters.

The mistakes which have given rise to these erroneous readings are mistakes easily made, and they frequently recur in the MSS. of the Politics. We often note a confusion of *ε* and *η* (as in 1274 b 7), of *ι* and *ει* (as in 1260 b 41), of *ω* and *ου* (as in 1280 b 4), of *παρά* and *περί* (as in 1278 b 20[1]), of *πόλις*, *πολίτης*, and *πολιτεία* (as in 1296 a 9), of *πολέμους* and *πολεμίους* (as in 1327 a 21). For the interchange of *κἄν* and *καί* reference may be made to 1282 b 8 and 1290 a 1, for that of *ο* and *οι* in 1276 b 9 to 1271 a 40 and to Vat. Pal. in 1275 b 10, and for that of *καλῶς* and *κακῶς* to 1294 a 7, while the change of *ἀστῶν* into *αὐτῶν*, of *Σῖμον* into *Σάμον*, and of *ἔτι* into *ἐπί* needs no explanation. The substitution of *ὑπάρχον* for *ὑπάρχοντα* is probably due to the omission of a *τ* over the last syllable of *ὑπάρχον*. That of *δεσπόζον* for *δεσποστόν* appears to point to a confusion of *στ* and *ζ*. The erroneous readings in the four

[1] This error may probably be due to the misreading of a contraction.

remaining passages (1287 a 4, 1300 a 2, 1266 b 2, 1283 a 7) are easily explainable.

Among other confusions of letters which are of frequent occurrence in the Politics may be mentioned those of *α* with *αι* (1290 b 19, 1309 b 37, 1318 a 3, 1322 b 37), of *αι* with *οι* (1268 a 11, 1274 b 14, 1285 a 24, b 5, 1339 a 1, 1294 a 37, 1313 b 39), of *αν* with *ον* (1274 a 4, 1280 a 29, 1338 a 31), of *οις* with *ους* (1292 b 36, 1309 b 14) and perhaps with *ων* (1272 a 29, b 16, 1302 b 30), of *α* with *εν*, which occurs in 1288 a 15 not only in $\Pi^2$, but also in Vat. Pal., and of *η* with *ει* and *ο* with *ω* and *ου*, which are too common to need illustration.

Errors in the MSS. arising from the use of ambiguous contractions and the like.

The variations of reading hitherto noticed have been due to errors of transcription, but many variations of reading in the MSS. are evidently due not to this cause, but to the occasional use in the MSS. copied by the scribes, or perhaps in the archetype, of ambiguous contractions or contractions easily misread or misinterpreted. Just as in the first of the four handwritings of the papyrus of the *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* *ο* written above the line stands indiscriminately for *-οι -ου -ον -οις* and *-ους* (see Sandys, *Ἀθ. Πολ.* p. xxxvi), so in the MSS. from which the existing MSS. of the Politics were copied the terminations of words, and especially of common words like the cases of *αὐτός* and *οὗτος*, were probably often represented by ambiguous contractions.

In 1337 a 28, where the true reading is *αὐτὸν*, $M^s$ has *ἀν* with *τ* added over it, and it is very likely that the Vetus Interpres found the same contraction in the Greek text used by him and took it to represent *αὐτῶν*, for his rendering is *ipsorum*. The next word in the same line is variously given by $P^3$ $\Pi^3$ as *αὐτοῦ*, by $M^s$ as *αὐτῶ*, and by $\Gamma$ $P^1$ as *αὐτῶ*, the fact probably being that the writers of all these MSS. had before them an ambiguous contraction (perhaps *αὐ* with *τ* over it). So in 1312 b 9 $P^{2.3}$ have *αὐ* with *τ* over it, and the other MSS. make more or less successful attempts to interpret this contraction, $\Gamma$ $P^1$ having *αὐτῆς* rightly, $M^s$ *αὐτῆς*, $P^4$ Ald. *αὐτοῦ*, and so forth. The same

thing holds of *οὗτος*. In 1297 a 1 $M^s$ has *τού* with *τ* over it, Γ $P^1$ *τούτω*, and the rest rightly *τούτους*, the ambiguous contraction reproduced in $M^s$ being interpreted with varying success by the rest.

In 1283 b 9 $M^s$ has *ὑπαρ'* with *χ* added over *ρ'*, $P^1$ *ὑπάρχει*, the rest rightly *ὑπάρχῃ*: in 1307 b 12 $M^s$ has *χειροτονησαν* with *τ* over *α* and $P^1$ *χειροτονήσαντας*, the true reading being *χειροτονήσοντα*: in 1335 a 27 $M^s$ has *πλη* with *θ'* over *η*, which Vet. Int. perhaps interprets, though wrongly, by his rendering *multum*: in 1303 b 33 $M^s$ has a symbol for the termination of the word which Vet. Int. renders *Estiaeis*: in 1309 b 28 $P^3$ has *ποιη* with *σ* over *η* and $M^s$ pr. $P^2$ *ποιήση*, the true reading being *ποιήσει*. It is probably owing to the use of an ambiguous contraction for *πάντας* that many MSS. have *πάνυ* in 1286 a 25, and we may explain in a similar way the frequent interchange in the MSS. of *πόλις πολίτης* and *πολιτεία* (see for instance Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* in 1326 b 5, 1304 a 17, and 1318 a 9), and the false reading *ἐπαινοῦμεν* in place of *ἐπαινοῦσιν* which we find in $\Pi^1$ in 1289 a 1 (cp. 1267 a 25, where $M^s$ has *ἐπιθυμοῦ* in place of *ἐπιθυμοῦσιν*, the reading of $P^1$, and *ἐπιθυμήσουσιν*, the reading of Γ $\Pi^2$, and 1258 b 4, where $\Pi^1$ have *ἐπορισάμεθα* and $\Pi^2$ *ἐπορίσθη*). The divergence of the MSS. in 1282 a 27, where $P^{2.3}$ etc. have *μέγιστον*, $M^s$ *μέγιστοι*, $P^{1.4}$ *μέγισται*, and Γ *μέγιστα*, may also be thus explained. For other possible instances of the same thing see the passages referred to in vol. ii. p. l, note 2.

That errors may have arisen from this cause at a very early date is clear from the fact that the papyrus of the *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* is full of contractions, though, according to Mr. Kenyon (Palaeography of Greek Papyri, p. 92), it is 'highly probable' that it was 'written not very far from the year 90'. If the writers of the MSS. of the Politics which have come down to us, or the writers of the MSS. they copied, have had to any large extent to expand contractions of the kind described above, skill will have been needed by them in the discharge of their function no less than fidelity. We must bear this in mind in reference to

the question of the comparative claims of the two families of MSS. There can be little doubt that they both descend from an archetype in which ambiguous contractions were occasionally, and perhaps frequently, used, and the question evidently arises, which set of copyists, those of the first or those of the second family, was the more successful in expanding these ambiguous contractions. This is a question which it is not easy to answer positively, but the presumption is in favour of the more careful copyists, and, if we may judge by a comparison of omissions, the copyists to whom we owe the MSS. of the second family did their work more carefully than those to whom we owe the MSS. of the first. It would be rash, however, to dogmatize as to the superiority of either of the two families of MSS. in passages which are likely to have been affected by this source of error.

Variations of reading of a less minute kind.

So far we have been concerned with variations of reading of a more or less minute kind. In not a few cases, however, the readings offered by $\Pi^1$ diverge widely from those offered by $\Pi^2$. The following list comprises most of the more marked and less easily explicable of these divergences:—

| | $\Pi^1$ | $\Pi^2$ |
|---|---|---|
| **Book I.** | | |
| 1254 a 15, | ὧν | δέ |
| 1255 a 24, | ὅλως ($\Pi^1$ $P^s$ $M^b$ $T^b$ $L^s$) | ἅμα |
| 32, | ἐξ ἀρχῆς | παντα χοῦ |
| b 26, | τούτων | τῶν τοιούτων |
| 1256 b 1, | κομίζονται | πορίζονται |
| 1258 b 27, | τέταρτον | τρίτον |
| **Book II.** | | |
| 1260 b 28, | τίς (Γ?) | ἢ |
| 1261 b 2, | τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκειν τὸ δ' (τόδ' Γ) ὡς ὁμοίους εἶναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς | ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκειν (or οἰκεῖν) ὁμοίους (or ὁμοίως) τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς |
| 1264 b 31, | δὲ | γὰρ |

| | $\Pi^1$ | $\Pi^2$ |
|---|---|---|
| 1265 a 4, | εἰς (Γ?) | πρὸς |
| 35, | ἕξιν | χρῆσιν |
| 1266 a 37, | ἀναγκαῖον added after εἶναι | ἀναγκαῖον omitted |
| 1267 b 26, | κόμης | κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ |
| 1268 b 5, | δίκης | κρίσεως |
| 1269 b 21, | τοιοῦτος ἐστίν | φανερός ἐστι τοιοῦτος ὤν |
| 1271 b 28, | κρῆτες | λύκτιοι |
| 1272 a 35, | ἔκ τινων | ἐκ τῶν |
| 1273 a 41, | ταύτην οὐχ οἷόν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν | ταύτην οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν |

## Book III.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1281 a 17, | δεῖ (Γ?) | χρὴ |
| 28, | σπουδαῖα | δίκαια |
| 1282 a 32, | μειζόνων | μεγάλων |
| b 5, | διορίσαι | δηλῶσαι |
| 1285 a 12, | γὰρ | γοῦν (οὖν $P^4$) |
| 1286 a 25, | πάντας $\Pi^1$ $P^4$ | πάνυ |
| 1287 a 31, | φθείρει or διαφθείρει | διαστρέφει |

## Book IV (VII).

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1326 a 21, | μερῶν | μορίων |
| 25, | οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ | ἀλλὰ μὴν |
| 1328 a 14, | νομίζουσι | ὑπολαμβάνουσι |
| b 15, | ἃ (Γ?) | ὧν |
| 1329 a 20, | μέρος | γένος |
| b 13, | δὲ | γὰρ |
| 1330 b 14, | ταύτην | τοιαύτην |
| 21, | οἰκείων | ἰδίων |
| 1332 b 40, | τὸν τοιοῦτον | τοῦτον τὸν |
| 1335 b 4, | παιδείας | παιδονομίας |
| 28, | δεῖ (Γ?) | χρὴ |
| 39, | καὶ | ἢ |
| 1336 b 20, | θετέον (θετητέον $M^s$) | νομοθετητέον |

## Book V (VIII).

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1337 a 36, | διὰ | περὶ |
| b 22, | εἴρηται (Γ?) | ἐλέχθη |

| | $\Pi^1$ | $\Pi^2$ |
|---|---|---|
| 1339 b 21, | *γὰρ* | *γοῦν* |
| 1340 b 7, | *δὲ* | *γὰρ* |
| 1341 b 1, | *ἴαμβοι* | *σαμβύκαι* |
| 1342 b 32, | *διάνοιαν* | *παιδείαν οἷον* |

## Book VI (IV).

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1289 a 5, | *ἢ* | *τοῦ* |
| 8, | *γὰρ* or *γὰρ δὴ* | *δὲ* |
| 1292 a 17, | *ὁ δῆμος οὗτος* | *ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος* |
| 1293 a 21, | *ἢ οἱ* | *εἰ μὲν* |
| 24, | *πολλῶν* | *ἄλλων* |
| b 24, | *ἀποδοθείσας* | *ἄρτι ῥηθείσας* |
| 1294 a 36, | *ἃ* | *ὧν* |
| 1298 b 13, | *τρόπον* | *διορισμόν* |
| 1300 b 30, | *παρόντι* | *παντὶ* |

## Book VII (V).

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1301 b 26, | *πανταχοῦ* $\Pi^1$ $P^2$ | *πάντων* |
| 1308 b 17, | *οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν* | *οὕτως ἄγειν* |
| 1310 b 17, | *αἱ τυραννίδες* | *τῶν τυραννίδων* |
| 1315 a 38, | *ἀφαίρεσιν* (Γ?) | *παραίρεσιν* or *παραίνεσιν* |

## Book VIII (VI).

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1317 b 17, | *τοιούτων* | *τούτων* |
| 1319 a 7, | *τοῖς παλαιοῖς* | *τοῖς πολλοῖς* |
| 1320 a 4, | *μηδ'* | *ἢ* |
| b 9, | *τὴν ταραντίνων* $P^1$, *τὴν ταραντίνων* followed by a lacuna $M^e$, *τὴν ταραντίνων ἀρχήν* Γ? | *τὰ ταραντίνων* |
| 1321 a 5, | *μάλιστα* | *κάλλιστα* |

Of the above sixty-two divergences twelve are due to a source of error which—and this has not, I think, been hitherto pointed out—especially affects the first family of MSS. I refer to the tendency of these MSS. to introduce a word into the text which they repeat from a neighbouring line, often the preceding or following line, the word thus

Tendency of the MSS., and especially of $\Pi^1$, to repeat a word or words from a contiguous line.

repeated sometimes extruding another word from the text and sometimes not doing so. Thus in $\Pi^1$—

in 1255 a 24 ἅμα is displaced by ὅλως probably repeated from 21;
in 1255 a 32 παντα χοῦ is displaced by ἐξ ἀρχῆς repeated from 30 sq.;
in 1265 a 35 χρῆσιν is displaced by ἕξιν probably repeated from ἕξεις;
in 1266 a 37 ἀναγκαῖον is added after εἶναι, being repeated from ἀναγκαίων in the preceding line;
in 1272 a 35 ἐκ τῶν is displaced by ἔκ τινων repeated from the preceding line;
in 1326 a 21 μορίων is displaced by μερῶν probably repeated from μέρος in the preceding line;
in 1328 a 14 ὑπολαμβάνουσι is displaced by νομίζουσι repeated from νομίζουσιν in the following line;
in 1329 a 20 γένος is displaced by μέρος perhaps repeated from 23;
in 1289 a 5 τοῦ is displaced by ἢ repeated from the preceding line;
in 1298 b 13 διορισμόν is displaced by τρόπον repeated from the preceding line;
in 1320 a 4 ἢ ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι is displaced by μηδ' ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι repeated from μηδ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν in 2.

In 1268 b 5 $\Pi^2$ appear to fall into a similar error, δίκης being displaced in these MSS. by κρίσεως repeated from the preceding line.

Occasionally all the MSS., and not those of the first or second family only, may be reasonably suspected of this error. Thus in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 39, where all the MSS. except Γ have δῆλον δὲ καὶ (Γ omits καὶ) τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας, the words καὶ τοῦτο are probably repeated by mistake from the preceding line. So again it is possible that in 2. 5. 1263 a 13, where almost all the MSS. have λαμβάνοντας, and in 2. 6. 1265 b 2, where all have περὶ τὰς πόλεις, they have suffered in a similar way, λαμβάνοντας being repeated from λαμβάνουσι in the following line and περὶ τὰς πόλεις from περὶ τὰς πόλεις in the preceding line. The same thing may have happened to all the MSS. in 2. 7. 1267 a 8, where ἐπιθυμοῖεν may have taken the place of ἀδικοῖεν through repetition from ἐπιθυμίαν, 6 (see explanatory note

on 1267 a 5), in 2. 8. 1268 b 1, where γεωργήσει may have displaced some other word owing to the presence of γεωργοῦντας in the preceding line, and in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 14, where πολιτείαν may be a repetition of πολιτείαν in 1329 a 12 and may have pushed out some other and more appropriate word (see explanatory note on 1329 a 13).

Γ $M^s$ are sometimes affected by this cause of error when $P^1$ escapes. Thus in 2. 6. 1265 b 11 ἄλλαις repeated from ἄλλων in the preceding line has displaced πλείσταις in Γ $M^s$, in 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 3 βέλτιον from the preceding line has displaced κάλλιον in $M^s$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *melius*), and in 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 25 τρόπον from the preceding line has displaced χρόνον in Γ $M^s$.

The MSS. of the second family are not free from this kind of error, though they have suffered much less from it than those of the first. We have already seen that in 1268 b 5 κρίσεως repeated from the preceding line probably takes the place of δίκης in $\Pi^2$. So again in 2. 4. 1262 b 33 $\Pi^2$ prefix εἰς to τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας because εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας occurs in the preceding line, and in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 35 $P^{2.3}$ add τὸ πλῆθος after δεῖ ποιεῖν because δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος occurs in the following line.

Twelve, then, of the sixty-two variations of reading which have been enumerated may be thus accounted for. Five others (1255 b 26, 1330 b 14, 1332 b 40, 1292 a 17, 1317 b 17) are due to an interchange of οὗτος and τοιοῦτος, four (1264 b 31, 1329 b 13, 1340 b 7, 1289 a 8) to an interchange of δέ and γάρ (the contractions being somewhat similar), and the eleven following to an interchange of not very dissimilar words— Other causes to which variations of the less minute kind are due.

1256 b 1, κομίζονται and πορίζονται
1282 b 5, διορίσαι and δηλῶσαι
1285 a 12, 1339 b 21 } γάρ and γοῦν
1287 a 31, διαφθείρει and διαστρέφει
1341 b 1, ἴαμβοι and σαμβύκαι
1293 a 24, πολλῶν and ἄλλων

1293 b 24, *ἀποδοθείσας* and *ἄρτι ῥηθείσας*
1300 b 30, *παρόντι* and *παντὶ*
1319 a 7, *τοῖς παλαιοῖς* and *τοῖς πολλοῖς*
1321 a 5, *μάλιστα* and *κάλλιστα*.

In two other passages (1271 b 28 and 1308 b 17) a gloss has probably displaced the true reading in $\Pi^1$, and in three (1335 b 4, 1336 b 20, and 1342 b 32) one or more syllables have been omitted in $\Pi^1$. The variations of reading in 1267 b 26 and 1269 b 21 are probably due to the tendency of $\Pi^1$ to omit words. In 1286 a 25 the substitution of *πάνυ* for *πάντας*, and in 1301 b 26 that of *πάντων* for *παντοῦ*, may well be due to ambiguous contractions. In 1258 b 27 the substitution of *τέταρτον* for *τρίτον*, though wrong, is natural enough, *τρίτον* having occurred in 25. In 1330 b 21 the substitution in $\Pi^1$ of *οἰκείων* for *ἰδίων* is explained in the critical note on the passage. In 1282 a 32 the interchange of *μειζόνων* and *μεγάλων* resembles that of *πλείους* and *πολλοὺς* in 1290 b 2, that of *βέλτιστον* and *βέλτιον* in 1333 b 7, and that of *φανερωτάτη* and *φανερωτέρα* in 1293 b 32. As to 1261 b 2 and 1273 a 41 something has already been said in vol. ii. pp. 234 sq. and lv. The following variations of reading remain, sixteen in number:—

| | $\Pi^1$ | $\Pi^2$ |
|---|---|---|
| 1254 a 15, | *ὃν* | *δέ* |
| 1260 b 28, | *τίς* (Γ?) | *ἢ* |
| 1265 a 4, | *εἰς* (Γ?) | *πρὸς* |
| 1281 a 17<br>1335 b 28 | *δεῖ* (Γ?) | *χρὴ* |
| 1281 a 28, | *σπουδαῖα* | *δίκαια* |
| 1326 a 25, | *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ* | *ἀλλὰ μὴν* |
| 1328 b 15<br>1294 a 36 | *ἃ* | *ὧν* |
| 1335 b 39, | *καὶ* | *ἢ* |
| 1337 a 36, | *διὰ* | *περὶ* |
| b 22, | *εἴρηται* (Γ?) | *ἐλέχθη* |
| 1293 a 21, | *ἢ οἱ* | *εἰ μὲν* |
| 1310 b 17, | *αἱ τυραννίδες* | *τῶν τυραννίδων* |
| 1315 a 38, | *ἀφαίρεσιν* (Γ?) | *παραίρεσιν* or *παραίνεσιν* |

| | $\Pi^1$ | $\Pi^2$ |
|---|---|---|
| 1320 b 9, | *τὴν ταραντίνων* $P^1$, *τὴν ταραντίνων* followed by a lacuna $M^s$, *τὴν ταραντίνων ἀρχήν* Γ? | *τὰ ταραντίνων* |

In seven of these passages (1260 b 28, 1265 a 4, 1281 a 17, 1335 b 28, 1281 a 28, 1335 b 39, 1337 b 22) words not themselves similar, but of similar meaning are interchanged, and in an eighth (1315 a 38) the interchange of *ἀφαίρεσιν* and *παραίρεσιν* may well be the result of accident. The divergences in the remaining eight (1254 a 15, 1326 a 25, 1328 b 15, 1294 a 36, 1337 a 36, 1293 a 21, 1310 b 17, 1320 b 9) are less easily explained.

Variations due to grammarian revisers of the text.

A certain number of variations of reading are probably due, as has been said already in vol. ii. p. liii, to grammarian revisers of the text. Thus, while both families use the nominative *μόναρχος* (1292 a 11, 15 and 1313 b 39), not *μονάρχης*, $\Pi^2$ use the oblique cases of *μόναρχος*, $\Pi^1$ almost always those of *μονάρχης*[1]. So again $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ have *ὀψοποιητική* in 1255 b 26, while $\Pi^2$ have *ὀψοποιική*, and in 1256 a 6 $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ have *κερκιδοποιητική*, while $\Pi^2$ have *κερκιδοποιική*. In 1289 b 32, again, $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ have *ὅπλον*, $\Pi^2$ *ἄνοπλον*. These differences of reading seem to be due to intentional correction, but others which are at first sight of a similar nature are probably due to accidental causes. Thus $\Pi^1$ inherit the form *φιλίτια* and $\Pi^2$ the form *φιδίτια*, the rival forms originating at the outset no doubt in the resemblance of Λ and Δ. It is probably also owing to accident that in 1280 a 29 $\Pi^2$ have *εἰσενέγκαντα* and $M^s$ $P^1$ (we cannot be certain as to Γ) *εἰσενεγκόντα*, in 1283 b 14 $\Pi^2$ *δόξαιεν* and $M^s$ $P^1$ *δόξειαν*, in 1285 a 24 and b 5 $\Pi^2$ *πάτριαι* and *ἑκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι* and $M^s$ $P^1$ *πάτριοι* and *ἑκούσιοί τε καὶ πάτριοι*, in 1292 b 9 $\Pi^2$ *εἴπαμεν* and $M^s$ $P^1$ *εἴπομεν*, in 1302 b 4 $\Pi^2$ *διὰ μικρότητα* and $M^s$ $P^1$ *διὰ σμικρότητα*, in 1307 a 31 $\Pi^2$ *ἐδύναντο*

[1] In 1312 a 29, however, $P^1$ has *τοῖς μονάρχοις* with $\Pi^2$, while Γ $M^s$ have *τοῖς μονάρχαις*. See also Additions and Corrections.

and $M^s$ $P^1$ ἠδύναντο, and in 1311 b 14 $\Pi^2$ νιεῖ and $M^s$ $P^1$ νίῳ. It is easy to confuse αν and ον, αι and οι, α and ο, ε and η. If in 1338 b 23 $M^s$ $P^1$ $L^s$ Ald. have λητρικὰ and $\Pi^2$ (except $L^s$ Ald.) λητικὰ, we remember that τ and τρ are easily confused, and that in 1336 b 30 $\Pi^2$ have θεατῶν and $\Pi^1$ θεάτρων.

When $\Pi^1$ and $\Pi^2$ offer different readings, $\Pi^2$ are probably to be followed more often than $\Pi^1$.

In cases in which the two families of MSS. offer different readings I am still of opinion, as I have been from the first, that the MSS. of the second family deserve our confidence more often than those of the first. The comparative merits of the readings offered by the two families vary from Book to Book, and in no Book does the first family stand the comparison as well as in the Second, yet even there it seems to me that the second family has the advantage. My reasons for so thinking have been given in an article which appeared in the *Classical Review* in July, 1893 (7. 304 sqq.).

Even where the readings of the first family receive the support of the Vatican Palimpsest, they are not always to be adopted. This will be evident on a reference to 1287 a 32, b 41, and 1288 a 13.

It has been pointed out in vol. ii. p. lix that not much weight attaches to readings supported by $M^s$ $P^1$ against the consent of $\Gamma$ $\Pi^2$, or to those supported by $\Gamma$ $M^s$ against the consent of $P^1$ $\Pi^2$. On the other hand (and this has not as yet, I think, been pointed out) readings supported by $\Gamma$ $P^1$ against the consent of $M^s$ $\Pi^2$ are very often correct. This will be found to be the case in the following passages:—

1261 a 14, διελεῖν $\Gamma$ $P^1$, διελθεῖν the rest;
1270 a 13, αὐτῆς $\Gamma$ $P^1$, αὐτὴν the rest;
1276 b 33, where $\Gamma$ $P^1$ add a sentence missing in the other MSS., except that in two it is added by correctors;
1282 a 32, ἄρχουσιν $\Gamma$ $P^1$, ἄρχωσιν $M^s$, ἔχουσιν $\Pi^2$;
1285 b 22, ὡρισμένοις $\Gamma$ $P^1$, ὡρισμένων the rest;
33, πλειόνων $\Gamma$ $P^1$, πλείονος the rest;
1327 b 34, om. καὶ $\Gamma$ $P^1$, not so the rest;
1334 a 37, $\Gamma$ $P^1$ add a sentence missing in the rest;
1335 b 11, ἐλευθέρων $\Gamma$ $P^1$, ἐλευθερίων the rest;

1340 b 14, *ἔστι* Γ, *ἐστι* $P^1$, *ἔχει* the rest;
1341 a 15, *κοινῶ* Γ $P^1$, *κοινωνῶ* the rest;
1289 a 17, *ἑκάστοις* Γ $P^1$, *ἑκάστης* the rest;
1290 a 1, *δὴ* Γ $P^1$, *δεῖ* the rest, except correctors in $P^{2.4}$;
1294 b 29, *τῶ* Γ $P^1$, *τῶν* the rest;
1295 b 34, *θέλω* Γ $P^1$, *θέλων* the rest;
1314 a 25, *μὲν οὖν* Γ $P^1$, *μὲν* the rest;
1316 b 1, *πολὺ* Γ $P^1$, *πολλοὶ* the rest;
1320 a 8, *φερομένων* Γ $P^1$ (*lege φερόμενον*), *φερόντων* the rest;
b 3, *ἀφιεμένους* Γ $P^1$, *ἐφιεμένους* the rest.

For passages in which the accentuation is corrected in Γ $P^1$ see critical note on 1293 a 28. It has already been remarked (vol. ii. p. xliii, note 3) that Demetrius Chalcondylas, the scribe of $P^1$, was a learned scholar and that many of the good readings peculiar to $P^1$ are probably emendations of his, and the question might be asked whether the good readings which $P^1$ shares with Γ were not suggested to Demetrius by a study of the *vetus versio*. How far it is likely that Demetrius would study the *vetus versio*, I am unable to say, but I doubt whether he owes these readings to it, for it is evident from passages like 1280 b 6, where the true reading is *διασκοποῦσιν* and $P^1$ has *διακοποῦσιν*, while Γ $M^s$ have *διακονοῦσιν*, that $P^1$ has a good independent tradition of its own. In 1297 a 1 and (if Sus.[1] is right, for in Sus.[2.3.4] the erroneous reading is ascribed to Γ $M^s$) in 1261 b 27 Γ $P^1$ agree in a false reading which $P^1$ is not likely to have borrowed from the *vetus versio*.

The true reading is often preserved by one, two, or three MSS. only.

In some passages of the Politics the true reading is preserved by one MS. only and in not a few by two or three: thus it is preserved by Γ in 1260 b 41, 1266 b 2, 1283 a 7 etc., by Γ $M^s$ in 1299 a 1, by Γ $P^4$ $L^s$ in 1299 a 2, by Γ Ald. corr.[1] $P^2$ in 1332 a 33, by $P^{2.3}$ Vat. Pal. in 1278 b 30, by $P^3$ and a correction in $P^2$ in 1304 b 28, by $P^4$ Ald. in 1286 b 33. We sometimes owe the true reading to quite inferior MSS. (e.g. in 1275 b 39, 1284 b 40, 1295 a 28, 1296 b 31, 1308 b 15, 1317 a 12, 1318 b 17, 1320 a 16).

Emendations of Aretinus.

Not a few good readings are due to the Latin translation of Aretinus (Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo, who was born in

1369 and died in 1444). They are probably conjectural emendations of his. Among them the following may be mentioned :—

1264 a 19, *ὑπομενοῦσι* (Γ Π *ὑπομένουσι*);
1337 a 14, *παιδεύεσθαι* (Γ Π *πολιτεύεσθαι*);
1339 a 20, *ὕπνῳ* (Γ Π *οἴνῳ*);
1296 a 9, *πολιτῶν* (Γ Π *πολιτειῶν*);
1299 a 14 (with 'ut videtur, corr.[1] P[1],' says Sus.[1], and corr.[1] P[1] means Demetrius Chalcondylas), *πολιτείαις* (Γ Π *πολιτεῖαι*);
b 36, *αὗται αἱ* (*αὐταὶ αἱ* Π[2], *αἱ αὐταὶ* Π[1]);
1300 b 4, *τό τε* (the rest *τὸ δὲ* or *τότε δὲ* or *τὸ τέ δὲ*);
1311 a 10, *τὸ τὸ* (the rest *τῷ τὸ* or *τῷ*);
1317 b 41, *ἔτι* (Γ Π *ἐπὶ*).

That the Fifth (old Eighth) and the Eighth (old Sixth) Books are incomplete, we have seen already (vol. ii. p. xxix). It is probable that something is wanting at the end of the Seventh (old Fifth) Book also. The question, however, to what extent ordinary lacunae occur in the text of the Politics is one of a different kind. That a small lacuna exists in the best MSS. in 1285 a 19 has already been noticed (vol. ii. p. lxvi). A somewhat larger one appears to occur in Γ Π in 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 4 after the word *ἀρετῶν* (see explanatory note on 1334 a 41). It seems likely that several omissions occur in the passage 1300 a 23–b 5. Words appear to have fallen out of the text in 1301 a 6, 1307 a 31, and 1320 b 35 also.

Lacunae.

Displacement of passages.

In two instances the transposition of passages has seemed to me to be called for: I have suggested the transposition of 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 3, *στασιάζουσι—7, ὄντες* to after *στασιάζουσι* in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39, and of 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 17, *μάλιστα δὲ—20, ἐπιθέσεις* to after *μεθύοντα* in 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 6.

Occasional traces of an editor's handiwork.

Traces of the handiwork of an editor piecing together disquisitions originally unconnected appear to be especially visible in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (see explanatory notes on 1289 b 27 and 1290 b 21–24). Prof. W. Christ remarks in the preface to his edition of the Metaphysics of Aristotle (p. xviii), 'Philosophus iis quae chartae iam

mandaverat haud contentus nova subinde in margine adiecit, quae qui post auctoris mortem eius libros divulgarunt parum circumspecte primariae orationi intexuisse videntur'. We may perhaps account in this way for the state in which we find the Third and Fourth Chapters of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (see vol. i. Appendix A and explanatory note on 1289 b 27).

Remarks on the *vetus versio.*

A few remarks may be added to what has already been said with regard to the translation of the Vetus Interpres in vol. ii. p. xli sqq. A further study of this translation has confirmed my impression (see vol. ii. p. lxiv) that he often misread his Greek text; thus for example in 1285 b 7 he renders *πορίσαι emerunt*, probably misreading it as *πρίασθαι*, in 1286 a 35 he renders *ὀργισθῆναι impetu ferri*, misreading it apparently as *ὁρμηθῆναι*, in 1330 a 11 he appears to misread *πάλιν* as *πᾶσιν*, in 1341 b 31 *τύπους* as *τρόπους*, in 1291 a 11 *κομψῶς* as *κούφως*, in 1319 a 24 *θυραυλεῖν* as *θηρεύειν*. It would be easy to add many other instances.

It should be pointed out that the Vetus Interpres often uses two different Latin words to render the same Greek word when it is repeated close together; thus in 1338 b 28 he renders *τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν eo solum quod ad eos qui non studuerant conabantur*, in 1295 b 30 his equivalent for *ἐπιθυμοῦσιν* is *desiderant* and in 31 *concupiscunt*, in 1295 b 32 *μήτ' ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι μήτ' ἐπιβουλεύειν* is rendered *neque insidias patiuntur neque fraudes moliuntur*: see also his renderings in 1303 b 14, 15 (*διάστασιν*), 1304 a 19, 20, 25 (*εὐδοκιμῆσαι*), 1321 a 21, 22 (*καθιστάναι*), and several other passages. This is not always so: thus in 1299 b 13 he translates *ἀρχάς* and *ἀρχήν* occurring in the same line *principatus* and *principatum*. On the other hand, he often uses one Latin word in rendering two Greek words occurring close together; thus in 1303 a 35, 36 he translates both *εἰσδεξάμενοι* and *ὑποδεξάμενοι suscipientes*, in 1304 a 21–24 he translates both *συντονωτέραν* and *ἰσχυροτέραν fortiorem*, in 1304 b 30, 33 both *συστάντες* and *ἀθροισθέντες* are represented by *coadunati*, in 1305 a 39, 40 *praeses* represents

προστάτης and *praesidem* τὸν ἡγεμόνα, and in 1306 a 5, 6 *conatus est* represents ἐνεχείρησε and *conantur* ἐπιχειροῦσι.

In rendering Greek words he often selects, if he can, a Latin word connected in meaning with the Greek; thus his equivalent for δήμευσις is *populatio* in 1298 a 6, for συμμαχία *compugnatio* in 1298 a 4, 26, for ἐλαττουμένου *minorata* in 1319 a 3, for ἀστυγείτονας *municipales vicinos* in 1330 a 17.

He sometimes retains the case of the Greek in his rendering, notwithstanding that in Latin it is wrong: so in 1299 b 33 we have *populi praeconsiliari* for τοῦ δήμου προβουλεύειν, in 1304 a 31 *habebat politiae* for εἶχετο τῆς πολιτείας, and in 1304 b 11, 12 *voluntariorum transmutant politiam* and *detinent involuntariorum* for ἑκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν and κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων: but this he does not always do.

In addition to the inexactnesses in translation mentioned in vol. ii. p. lxiii it may be noted that the Vetus Interpres often renders a verb as passive where it should be rendered as middle[1], and often renders the present tense by the future[2] and a future participle by a present participle[3]. He also sometimes renders the singular by the plural[4] and the plural by the singular[5], the comparative by the positive[6], the superlative by the positive[7] or the comparative[8], and the positive by the comparative[9] or the superlative[10].

[1] E. g. in 1332 a 27, 1288 b 31, 1289 a 14, 1290 b 4, 1297 b 8, 1298 b 27, 1305 a 16.

[2] E. g. in 1281 a 19, 1287 a 32, 1313 b 15, 16.

[3] E. g. in 1291 a 7 and 1298 a 19.

[4] E. g. in 1287 a 27 (*dant* for δίδωσιν), 1307 b 33 (*parvae expensae* for τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα), 1321 a 40 (*expensarum* for τῆς δαπάνης), 1322 a 19 (*divisi sunt* for διῄρηται).

[5] E. g. in 1338 b 11 (*speciem* for τὰ εἴδη), 1296 a 34, 35 (*democratiam* and *oligarchiam* for δημοκρατίας and ὀλιγαρχίας), 1303 a 14 (*verecundiam* for τὰς ἐριθείας), 1310 b 34 (*beneficium* for εὐεργεσίας).

[6] E. g. in 1283 a 35 (*generosi* for γενναιότεροι), 1287 b 9 (*multos* for πλείονας), 1331 a 30 (*eminenter* for ἐρυμνοτέρως), 1333 b 10 (*supergressivas* for πλεονεκτικωτέρας), 1298 a 36 (*mediocribus* for μετριωτέρων), 1299 b 12 (*facile* for ῥᾷον).

[7] E. g. in 1276 a 19 (*superficialis* for ἐπιπολαιοτάτη).

[8] E. g. in 1315 a 26 (*ampliori* for πλείστης).

[9] E. g. in 1330 a 41 (*recentiores* for εὐχείμεροι), 1293 a 30 (*plus* for πολύ).

[10] E. g. in 1292 b 29 (*necessariissimas* for ἀναγκαίας).

Since I wrote in vol. ii. p. lvi that, as Vet. Int. has *qui mutaverit* in 1269 a 18, he may have found not κινήσας, but ὁ κινήσας in his Greek text, I have discovered that *qui mutaverit* there probably stands simply for κινήσας (see critical note on 1340 b 24).

It has already been pointed out (vol. ii. p. lxiv) that the Vetus Interpres sometimes seeks to mend defects in his Greek text by slight conjectural alterations: to the cases already noticed may be added 1284 a 19 (where, finding δοκοῦσι omitted in his Greek text, as in $M^a P^1$, and being consequently unable to make sense of the passage, he translates διώκειν as if it were διώκουσι) and 1329 a 17, where for a similar reason he adds *videtur*.

Here and there in the MSS. of the *vetus versio*, as in those of the Politics, words find their way into the text from an adjacent line: thus in Sus.[1] p. 536. 3 *quod* is wrongly added after *aristocratiae*, being evidently derived from the following line (see also the readings of a in Sus.[1] pp. 296. 5 and 300. 4). Sometimes two alternative equivalents for a word stand together in the text of the translation: thus in 1283 a 9 two equivalents for κρεῖττον, *melior* and *valentior*, both appear in the text; the same thing perhaps happens in 1285 a 10 also, where ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ is rendered *promptus potens lege*, the two words *promptus* and *potens* being probably alternative renderings of ἔγχειρος.

It is often difficult to decide whether false renderings in the *vetus versio* are due to error on the part of the translator—for instance, to a misreading or mistranslation of the Greek text—or to corruption in the MSS. of the *vetus versio*. That they are sometimes due to the latter cause will be seen from the critical note on 1338 a 28. Corruption of the text may be suspected in 1270 a 35, *traiciebant* (*tradebant*?) *politiam* (μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας), 1275 a 20, *adiectionem* (ἔγκλημα: *obiectionem*?), 1331 a 2, *insultus* (τὰς πολιορκίας), 1335 a 16, *lexatur* (ἐπιχωριάζεται), 1305 b 17, *invalescens* (ἐπιθέμενος), 1318 b 3, *permittere* (συμπεῖσαι: *persuadere*?) and elsewhere.

## ON THE CONTENTS OF THE THIRD, FOURTH (SEVENTH), AND FIFTH (EIGHTH) BOOKS.

The Third Book.

THE Third Book is addressed to a wider class than the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth). It is addressed to the framers of all States, the Fourth and Fifth only to the framers of the 'best State'. Aristotle's aim in the Third Book is to point out how the State should be organized if its constitution is to be just, in the Fourth and Fifth how it should be organized if it is to be happy and to live the most desirable life.

Cc. 1–5.

The first five chapters of the Third Book are introductory to the rest. They are designed to show, (1) what is the minimum amount of rights which a citizen must possess if he is to be a citizen at all, and what further rights he will possess if he is to be a citizen in the fullest sense (cp. c. 5. 1278 a 35, λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν); (2) that each constitution awards these rights to different persons, that a democracy, for instance, awards them to a wider class than an oligarchy or an aristocracy, so that, while a citizen in a democracy may be a day-labourer lacking the virtue of a citizen, or even a person of illegitimate or semi-alien birth, a citizen under the best constitution will possess, if a ruler, the full virtue not only of a good citizen, but also of a good man. Thus there are many kinds of citizen; the citizen varies with the constitution and rises and falls as it rises and falls. And as the citizen rises and falls, so the *polis* rises and falls, for the *polis* is an aggregate of citizens.

Thus these five chapters prepare the way for the study

of the best constitution, to which we pass in the last chapter of the Third Book. They would, however, have been in fuller harmony with the remainder of the Book, if in the account which they give of the citizen the fact had been kept in view that the *polis* may be ruled by a king or a few 'best men'. We hear nothing in these chapters of the citizen of a kingship or of an aristocracy in which a few 'best men' rule. They imply that a citizen shares both in ruling and in being ruled, but is this true of the citizen of a kingship or of an aristocracy of the kind just mentioned? We might have expected the study of the citizen which they contain to include not only a study of the citizen in a State consisting of men more or less alike and equal, but also a study of the citizen in a State ruled by a king or a few 'best men'. In this expectation we are disappointed.

At the beginning of the Sixth Chapter we pass from the citizen and the *polis* to the constitution, the main subject of the Book, and indeed of the Politics. The question is now asked (1278 b 6) 'whether we are to hold that one constitution exists or more than one' (a question already answered by implication in c. 1. 1275 a 38 sqq. and c. 5. 1278 a 15), 'and, if more than one, what and how many there are and what differences exist between them'. In answer to this question we have first the division of constitutions into normal forms and deviation-forms, and then in c. 7. 1279 a 22 the question is again raised, 'how many constitutions there are and what they are', and we are told to study the normal constitutions first, for the deviation-forms will be manifest when these have been distinguished, the answer to the question how many constitutions there are coming in the shape of an enumeration of six constitutions. Cc. 6–7.

Of this classification of constitutions something has already been said in vol. i. pp. 214–225. Reference may also be made to *Class. Rev.* 6. 289 sqq., where I have pointed out that, though Aristotle has before him Plato's classification of constitutions in Polit. 297, 301 sqq., there are important differences between the two classifications. The

six constitutions of the Politicus, if we omit the best, are marked off from each other by their observance or non-observance of law, whereas the six constitutions of the Politics are distinguished by a different test, their aim; the three good constitutions make their aim the common advantage of the citizens, while the three bad ones aim at the advantage of the ruling individual or class. Aristotle's classification implies that this difference of aim suffices to make one constitution different in kind from another.

It is open to objection on more grounds than one. In the first place, it leaves out of sight the possibility that the One, Few, or Many, or two of them, may share supremacy (see note on 1279 a 27). Again, in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 39 sqq. we find that constitutions exist which are partly aristocratic, partly oligarchical, and others which are partly polities, partly democracies. These constitutions will be partly normal and partly deviation-forms; they do not, therefore, fall under any of the six heads. Thus the classification is not exhaustive. Again, we can conceive the existence of constitutions under which rule is exercised for the advantage of the rulers, but yet for the common advantage, or partly for the one end, partly for the other (see note on 1279 a 17). These also fall outside the classification. And then again we might ask whether a constitution which, while it aims at the common advantage, takes a low view of that common advantage, construing it for instance as the acquisition of wealth or empire, should not also be treated as a distinct constitution from one which seeks the common advantage and studies it in a nobler way. Aristotle would perhaps reply that a constitution of this kind does not really study the common advantage. Still it cannot be said to study the advantage of a section of the citizens only, and thus it appears to escape enumeration.

But in fact, as has been pointed out in vol. i. pp. 217–220, Aristotle tends on fuller consideration to rest the distinction between constitutions not on the number of rulers or the aim with which they rule, but rather on the attribute—virtue, wealth, free birth, etc.—which they raise to supremacy.

Even this basis of classification, however, proves hardly satisfactory, for the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy raise the same attribute—fully equipped virtue—to supremacy (6(4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq.), and oligarchy and tyranny both do homage to wealth (7(5). 10. 1311 a 10). Yet Aristotle distinguishes between the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy, and also between oligarchy and tyranny.

Passing on to the Eighth Chapter, we are told in c. 8. 1279 b 11 sq. that it is necessary to state at slightly greater length 'what each of these constitutions is', the constitutions referred to being apparently the three deviation-forms. Little is said of tyranny in what follows, but the nature of oligarchy and democracy is more fully explained, and we learn that the distinction between them is to be found not so much in the comparative number of those who rule in each as in the fact that the rich rule in the one and the poor (or the free-born) in the other. C. 8.

The Ninth Chapter is closely connected with the Eighth. It throws further light on the nature of oligarchy and democracy by examining the version of justice which underlies each of these constitutions and showing its inadequacy. The one claims more than its due for a superiority in wealth, and the other claims more than its due for an equality in free birth, neither wealth nor free birth being the end for which the *polis* is formed. The end for which the *polis* is formed is, in fact, good life, and those who contribute most to it have a better right to supreme power in the *polis* than the wealthy and free-born, if the two last-named classes are inferior in virtue. Thus the Ninth Chapter is a natural sequel to the Eighth, carrying its investigation of the nature of oligarchy and democracy further and using the conclusions as to the nature of these two constitutions arrived at in the Eighth; it also, however, forms an introduction to the discussions which follow, preparing the way for the inquiries of cc. 10–13 on the subject, 'what ought to be the supreme authority of the *polis*'? C. 9.

Cc. 10–11. This question, the central question in any inquiry respecting constitutions, for the main business of a constitution is to determine the supreme authority of the *polis* (c. 6. 1278 b 9 sq.), is discussed in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters, and the conclusion is arrived at in c. 11. 1282 b 1–13 that the supreme authority in a *polis* should be rightly constituted laws, or in other words laws adjusted to the normal constitutions (for such laws will be just), the magistrate or magistrates being supreme only in respect of matters which the law owing to its generality cannot regulate aright. We might suppose that the question 'what ought to be the supreme authority of the *polis*' was now finally answered,

Cc. 12–13. but two chapters follow, the Twelfth and Thirteenth, which upset or greatly modify the conclusion arrived at in c. 11, for they decide that in a certain case the supreme authority should not be laws of any kind, but the will of an absolute king raised above law.

There is much in these two chapters to suggest a doubt whether they were placed where they stand by Aristotle. They make an important modification in the conclusion arrived at in c. 11, and yet do not do this explicitly. Again, the transition from c. 11 to c. 12 is very abrupt. Then again, the two chapters are not heralded by any previous announcement, nor are they closed with any recapitulation of their results. This is suspicious, for previous announcements and recapitulations are often wanting in the Politics in the case of chapters or passages which look like subsequent additions or interpolations (e.g. 1. 11 : 2. 12. 1274 a 22–b 26 : 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 34–b 35). On the other hand, there are arguments to be urged in their favour. Some of these have been noticed in vol. i. Appendix C. The following may be added. The conclusion in favour of law arrived at in c. 11, which is upset or seriously modified by cc. 12 and 13, can hardly represent Aristotle's final and matured opinion, for it conflicts as much with the contents of c. 17 as with those of cc. 12 and 13. In both places we find a full recognition of the legitimacy under certain circumstances of an absolute kingship uncontrolled by law. We need

not, therefore, be surprised that the conclusions of c. 11 are modified in cc. 12 and 13. Then again, the mode in which cc. 12 and 13 refute the claims to exclusive supremacy preferred by the rich, the free-born, the good, and the many closely resembles that in which similar claims are refuted in the preceding chapters. Aristotle's plan throughout the Third Book is to refute exclusive claims to supremacy by arraying superior claims in opposition to them ; thus in the Ninth Chapter he refutes the claims of the rich and the free-born by setting up against them those of the good, and in the Eleventh he refutes those of the few best by setting up against them those of the many. In just the same way in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters he refutes the claims of the rich, the free-born, the good, and the many to exclusive supremacy by setting up against them those of a single individual of surpassing wealth, nobility, or virtue. Thus the method followed in these two chapters closely resembles that which has been followed in the chapters which precede them. As to the absence in them of a preliminary announcement and a recapitulation, the same thing is true of 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5–1334 a 10. We are not prepared by any preliminary announcement for the transition in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., nor indeed for that in 4 (7). 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. On the whole I still incline to think that the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters were placed where they stand by Aristotle.

Their teaching is important. We learn from them a lesson which we have not been taught before, and which Aristotle appears to have been the first to teach. This is that the same constitution is not in place under all circumstances. If the constitution is to be just, the supreme authority which it sets up ought not only to be one which will rule for the common advantage, but also that which justice requires to exist in the particular case, looking to the distribution among the members of the community of the attributes which contribute to the being or well-being of the *polis* (virtue, wealth, free birth, etc.). If the distribution of virtue and political capacity in a given

community is such as to call for an absolute kingship, an aristocracy or polity would be out of place in it, though both of these are normal constitutions, constitutions in which rule is exercised for the common advantage. And so again, if the distribution of virtue, wealth, free birth, etc., is such as to make a constitution just in which all classes share in rule, an absolute kingship would be out of place under those circumstances.

Another lesson which is especially insisted on in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters is that a bare superiority in one only of the attributes which contribute to the being or well-being of the *polis* does not confer a right to exclusive supremacy. Nothing but a transcendent superiority in virtue and political capacity does so. We remember that Aristotle has rested natural slavery in a similar way on a *vast* disparity between master and slave (1. 5. 1254 b 16 sqq.: cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq.). Where this great disparity does not exist, and the good, the rich, and the free-born coexist in a community, and the many taken as a whole are superior to the few, the constitution must allow a fair share of power to all these classes (3. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq.). Aristotle goes so far as to say (3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq.) that a constitution which gives exclusive supremacy to those possessed of a bare superiority in one attribute only is a deviation-form, and this he would apparently say even if the one attribute were virtue [1]. In the Seventh Chapter constitutions have been said to be deviation-forms in which the rulers rule with a view to their own advantage; now we are told that a constitution is a deviation-form in which the rulers claim exclusive supremacy on the strength of a bare superiority in one attribute only. Aristotle's account of a deviation-form in the Thirteenth Chapter is evidently not quite the same as that which he gives in the Seventh. According to the Thirteenth Chapter even an aristocracy may be a deviation-

[1] Yet it is allowed in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq. that those who excel in virtue have a plausible claim to be considered absolutely unequal.

form if the superiority in virtue to which it awards supremacy is a bare superiority only.

The discussion of kingship which follows in cc. 14–17 contains a passage, 1288 a 6–15, which may be intrusive or a subsequent addition, but it seems to be otherwise in correct order. We might have expected that more would be said about kingship than is said, and that Aristotle would follow up his study of it with a study of aristocracy. The kinds of kingship have been clearly distinguished, and why should not those of aristocracy be similarly enumerated? This is not done; on the contrary, Aristotle passes on to inquire in c. 18 which is the best of the normal constitutions, and he finds that the best is kingship or aristocracy, whence he infers that, as the citizen of the 'best State' is a good man, the citizen of a kingship or an aristocracy will be a good man, and a kingship or aristocracy will be brought into being by the education which produces good men. We expect him to proceed at once to inquire what education produces good men, but this, as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 293 sq., he does not do till the Thirteenth Chapter of the Fourth (old Seventh) Book. The drift of the Eighteenth Chapter of the Third Book evidently is that if we wish to study how a kingship or an aristocracy is to be brought into being, we shall best do so by studying how the best constitution is to be brought into being (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 31 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 2 sq., 31 sqq.). The chapter is apparently intended to account for the absence of an inquiry how a kingship or an aristocracy is to be brought into being and for the substitution in its place of an inquiry how the best constitution is to be brought into being and instituted. It evidently prepares the way for a study of the 'best State', though possibly for a different study of it from that which we possess in the Fourth and Fifth Books (the old Seventh and Eighth).

Cc. 14–17.

C. 18.

Aristotle's main aim in the Third Book is to correct and broaden the conceptions of justice on which Greek consti-

Remarks on the Third Book.

tutions were based, just as in the Fourth and Fifth (the old Seventh and Eighth) he seeks to correct and broaden Greek conceptions of happiness. He rises in the Third above the one-sidedness of oligarchy and democracy, just as in the Fourth and Fifth he rises above the one-sidedness of the Lacedaemonian State.

A marked characteristic of the Third Book is its union of tolerance for imperfect types of political organization with a clear recognition of what is best. Aristotle accepts the lower forms of the citizen and the constitution, but he also sets before us their higher forms. A defective citizen does not cease to be a citizen, nor a defective constitution to be a constitution. Any man is a citizen who possesses certain political rights, whether he is fit to have them or not, and any 'ordering of the supreme authority' is a constitution, even if it gives power to the wrong persons. Not only is the citizen not identical with the good man, but even the good citizen is not necessarily so. There are many grades of citizens and constitutions. As Aristotle holds that the *polis* exists to realize good life, we might have expected him to say that only those are citizens who are able and purposed to realize it, and only that a constitution which gives rule to those who will rule with a view to the realization of good life, but this he does not do. His wish evidently is not to deny the names of citizen and constitution to any type of citizen and constitution to which these names were given in the ordinary use of language, and yet to point to the type of citizen and constitution which best deserved the name.

The old Seventh and Eighth Books should be placed immediately after the Third, though they are not com-

The reasons why the old Seventh and Eighth Books should be placed after the Third have been adequately stated by Zeller (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 504) and others. The object of the Second Book, as we are told in its opening sentences, is to prepare the way for the inquiry what constitution is the best, and though, as has been already pointed out (vol. i. p. 226), the Third Book addresses itself to a different and

wider question, the inquiry what each constitution is, it prepares the way for the study of the best constitution (vol. i. p. 291), and its last chapter concludes with the words, 'we must now attempt to state with respect to the best constitution, in what way it comes into being and how it should be instituted', and with an unfinished fragment of the sentence with which the old Seventh Book begins. The inference is obvious that the old Seventh Book originally followed the Third in the MSS. It is not likely that Aristotle, after reaching the threshold of the inquiry as to the best constitution, and indeed actually beginning it, drew back again, and postponed its treatment till he had dealt in three Books (the old Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth) with the polity and the deviation-forms and with changes of constitution, thus parting this inquiry by a long interval from the Second and Third Books, with which it is so closely connected. The old Fourth Book, in fact, speaks of the inquiry into the best constitution as already over (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 30 sqq.), and though the inquiry on the subject which we possess may not have been written at the time when these words were penned, there seems to me to be little doubt that Aristotle intended to take up and deal with the question of the best constitution immediately after the Third Book.

pletely in harmony with it and the transition from the Third Book to the old Seventh leaves something to be desired.

It has, indeed, been suggested that the old Seventh and Eighth Books are an independent treatise, not originally designed to form part of the Politics, but the links between the old Seventh Book and the Second and Third are too numerous to allow of this supposition (see *Class. Rev.* 6. 291 sq.). No doubt, as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 292 sqq., the Third and the old Seventh Books do not dovetail into each other with perfect exactness. The transition from the one to the other leaves something to be desired, and the old Seventh Book is not quite in all respects what the Third Book leads us to expect it to be. To the defects of harmony to which reference has been made in vol. i. p. 292 sqq. this may be added, that while the opening chapters of the Third Book define the citizen

as one who has access to deliberative and judicial office, the younger citizens of the State sketched in the old Seventh Book have no share in deliberative and judicial functions. A difference appears also to exist between the best constitution as sketched in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, which must evidently be an aristocracy, and the account of aristocracy given in the Third Book. For though both in the best constitution of the former Book and in the aristocracy of the latter the rulers are a comparatively small number of men of high virtue, the reason why their rule is willingly accepted by the ruled is different in the two cases. In the one case it is willingly accepted because the ruled are men fitted to be ruled by rulers of this type as freemen should be ruled (3. 17. 1288 a 9 sqq.), whereas in the other it is willingly accepted because the rulers are older men, and because the ruled will become rulers in their turn on attaining a certain age. We hear nothing in the Third Book of the plan by which rule falls to men of superior age and is acquired by the ruled on the attainment of a certain age, nothing of these precautions for securing the willing submission of the ruled. The Fourth (old Seventh) Book appears to be written with a closer regard to what is practicable than the Third. It is conceivable that, as has been suggested in vol. ii. p. xxxi, note 2, the sketch of the 'best State' contained in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book is a second edition of an earlier sketch which was more completely in harmony with the teaching of the Third Book. But perhaps it is more likely that, some interval of time having elapsed between the composition of the two Books, Aristotle saw, when he came to depict the 'best State' in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, that some things of which he had dreamed in the Third were but dreams. Thus the absolute kingship of which we hear so much in the Third is dismissed in the Fourth as no longer practicable, and the aristocracy described in the Third assumes a more practicable form in the Fourth[1].

[1] See the late Prof. H. Sidgwick's remarks in *Class. Rev.* 6. 143, and my own in 6. 291 sq.

In writing the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books Aristotle has three States especially before him, the weak points of which he does his best to avoid. These are the two ideal States sketched by Plato in his Republic and Laws and the Lacedaemonian State. The main differences between Aristotle's 'best State' and these three States have already been pointed out in the first volume, and our recapitulation of them here need only be a brief and summary one.

In the Fourth and Fifth Books Aristotle has three States especially before him, Plato's two ideal States and the Lacedaemonian State.

Aristotle's first objection to the State of the Republic is that it does not realize happiness. None of its citizens are truly happy. The most desirable life is not realized in it, the life of fully equipped virtuous activity, for though the first or ruling class has virtue, it has not the equipment which is needed for virtuous action. How can it practise liberality, for instance, if it has no property? Another weak point of Plato's State is that the members of the second and third classes, though called citizens, are not really so, for they have no share in ruling. The citizens of the 'best State', according to Aristotle, should be 'able and purposed to *rule* and be ruled with a view to the life in accordance with virtue', and this the second and third classes of Plato's State are not. The citizens of the 'best State', again, should be men of full virtue, and this cannot be said of the members of Plato's third class, even if it can be said of those of his second. Another weak point dwelt on by Aristotle is that the second class will be discontented with its position, as it is permanently excluded from rule. Aristotle further objects to the communism of the Republic. He wishes the land of his 'best State' to be owned by the men of full virtue who are its citizens, though they will freely share the use of it and of all their property with their fellow-citizens and with others. In these and in other points his 'best State' diverges from the State of the Republic.

His objections to the State sketched in Plato's Republic.

It stands in marked contrast to the State of the Laws also. Its citizen-body and its territory are smaller. The life lived by its citizens is a more ideal life. It is not

To the State sketched in Plato's Laws.

simply 'temperate', but 'temperate and liberal', and its supreme end is not work, but leisure and contemplation, the *diagogê* which is the best employment of leisure. Its constitution differs from that of the State of the Laws. It is an aristocracy, not a polity inclining to oligarchy. It will not covertly favour the wealthier class in elections to offices. It will take stricter precautions against pauperism than the State of the Laws, placing a limit on the procreation of children, not merely on the number of the citizens.

To the Lacedaemonian State.

To the Lacedaemonian State Aristotle's 'best State' stands in a relation of far more decided contrast. Plato in the Republic and Laws had sought happiness in the right direction, though in Aristotle's opinion he had failed to secure it for his citizens. The Lacedaemonian State did not do so; it sought happiness in empire, and valued virtue not for its own sake, but only as a means to empire and external goods. This error led it into a further error; its laws and training developed only one kind of virtue, that through which empire is won, military virtue. A third error was that it failed to train its citizens to make a right use of leisure and to live for *diagogê* as well as work. All these errors will be avoided in Aristotle's 'best State'. It will be a State living for the highest end, for leisure and *diagogê* more than for work, for peace more than for war, for things noble rather than for things necessary or useful. Its education will be a preparation for a life of this kind; it will develope the virtues of justice, temperance, and wisdom as well as military virtue, and it will develope military virtue better than the Lacedaemonian education did, for it will not brutalize the young by an over-laborious gymnastic training. The dependent classes of the State, unlike those of the Lacedaemonian State, will be organized aright. Its slave-system will be so constituted as to secure the efficiency and submissiveness of the slaves. Its women will not be uncontrolled and uneducated, nor will they be allowed to rule the men. Its citizens will be neither too few nor too many, their numbers being kept at the proper level by a wise regulation of marriage and the procreation

of children and of the right to buy and sell, give and bequeath; there will be no extremes of wealth and poverty within their ranks, no undue love of honour or money; the State will be ruled by its best men, not by persons of no special excellence, and by statesmen who make peace rather than war their end, and who are not only men of action, but also men of philosophical aptitude, not by mere soldiers to whom war is the one thing worth living for. There will be no senate organized in a narrow oligarchical way, no ephorate with over-great powers. On minor contrasts we need not dwell.

Aristotle's teaching on the subject of education.

Our knowledge of Aristotle's views on the subject of education is imperfect. Education, according to him, should vary with the constitution (1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.: 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14 sqq.), yet the only scheme of education he gives us is that which is intended for the 'best State', so that we know little or nothing as to the kind of education which he would recommend under other forms of constitution than the best. That he wishes the State to concern itself with education in all forms of constitution is clear from 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 12 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.), where we are told that if the *êthos* which is appropriate to each constitution is not developed in the citizens—that is, the *êthos* which tends to the maintenance of each—the constitution will not last. The 'best State' for which his scheme of education is designed is a State very unlike those of the present day, for under Aristotle's best constitution the citizens are withdrawn from 'necessary activities' —the activities of agriculture, trade, and industry—in a way in which the men of modern States are not, and then again, a far longer gymnastic training was required in youth with a view to military efficiency in the Greece of Aristotle's day than is required in modern times. Thus we must be prepared to find much in Aristotle's scheme of education which is unsuitable to the present day. Still the broad principles on which it rests are not without interest even for ourselves.

We notice that his scheme includes no arrangements for the education of women and girls, notwithstanding what is said in 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq., or for the education of the non-citizen classes, notwithstanding what is said in 2. 5. 1264 a 36 sqq. The due regulation of education involves, in Aristotle's opinion, the regulation of marriage and of the rearing of infant children during the years in which education in the strict sense of the word cannot be said to have begun, and this is fully kept in view by Aristotle, but when school-training has commenced for the child, Aristotle confines his attention to it, though we learn from Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 325 C sqq. that there are many influences not included in school-training which then promote a child's growth in virtue. Aristotle does not attempt to direct or regulate these.

His scheme of education for the 'best State' represents to a large extent a reaction against prevailing notions of education. In his criticism of the actual education of Greece he distinguishes between the States which paid special attention to the education of the young and undertook the direction of it, and the majority of States, which left its direction to the parent and allowed the child to be taught what the parent pleased in the way he thought best.

Education in Greek States which did not undertake the direction of education.

In the latter class of States, to which Athens belonged, education was little better than a chaos. The parent's caprice was to a certain extent controlled by the general acceptance of four subjects of education—reading and writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing—but each parent was free to educate his children apart from the rest and to give a special prominence in their education to whichever of these subjects he preferred, so that there was no security for an identity of training, no enforcement of the principle that the citizen belongs to the State and not to himself, nor again was any care taken that the education given to children was in harmony with the constitution and favourable to its maintenance.

Marriage was left to a great extent unregulated, with the

result that children were often the offspring of over-young or over-old parents. The rearing of infancy was also left unregulated, nor were children's minds sufficiently protected from evil influences in the earlier years of life, the years in which, according to Aristotle, permanent tastes are formed. Not only were the games and nursery-tales of infancy often other than they should be, but children were allowed to be too much in the company of slaves[1] and were too much exposed to hearing indecent language and seeing indecent pictures and statues. Boys and youths were allowed freely to witness the performance of iambi and comedy. The subjects chosen for youthful study were studied with a wrong aim and in a wrong way. Reading, writing, and drawing were studied merely for their utility, and music for the pleasure it gave. Music was often studied in too technical a fashion with a view to the attainment of a skill in execution suitable rather to *virtuosi* than to citizens. The only subject studied with a view to virtue was gymnastic, which was thought to produce courage. We do not hear of any studies by which it was sought to develope other virtues. Education in these States was evidently too utilitarian[2] and too narrow in its aim; it needed to be made more capable of influencing the character as a whole and the reason.

Education in the Lacedaemonian State.

The States, on the other hand, which paid special attention to the education of the young and made it a matter of public concern erred in a somewhat different way. The

[1] This would only be true of the children of the better-to-do citizens, for we gather from 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sq. that the poorer citizens had no slaves.

[2] Aristotle's feeling as to utilitarianism in education may be gathered from his remark (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 1 sqq.) that the aim in the education of the young should be to fit them to do both work which is necessary and useful and work which is noble, but the latter more than the former. He treats as vulgar (*φορτικόν*) the preference of 'virtues thought to be useful and more productive of gain' to virtues of a higher kind (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9 sq.). In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 37 sqq. he hints, not without some quiet sarcasm, that reading and writing should not be studied with a merely utilitarian aim, but rather because studying them enables us to master other studies, and that drawing should not be studied to save us from being cheated in the purchase of household utensils, but because the study of it makes us scientific observers of physical beauty, adding that 'to seek what is useful everywhere does not at all befit great-souled and free-spirited men'.

We notice that his scheme includes no arrangements for the education of women and girls, notwithstanding what is said in 1. 13. 1260b 13 sqq., or for the education of the non-citizen classes, notwithstanding what is said in 2. 5. 1264a 36 sqq. The due regulation of education involves, in Aristotle's opinion, the regulation of marriage and of the rearing of infant children during the years in which education in the strict sense of the word cannot be said to have begun, and this is fully kept in view by Aristotle, but when school-training has commenced for the child, Aristotle confines his attention to it, though we learn from Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 325 C sqq. that there are many influences not included in school-training which then promote a child's growth in virtue. Aristotle does not attempt to direct or regulate these.

His scheme of education for the 'best State' represents to a large extent a reaction against prevailing notions of education. In his criticism of the actual education of Greece he distinguishes between the States which paid special attention to the education of the young and undertook the direction of it, and the majority of States, which left its direction to the parent and allowed the child to be taught what the parent pleased in the way he thought best.

Education in Greek States which did not undertake the direction of education.

In the latter class of States, to which Athens belonged, education was little better than a chaos. The parent's caprice was to a certain extent controlled by the general acceptance of four subjects of education—reading and writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing—but each parent was free to educate his children apart from the rest and to give a special prominence in their education to whichever of these subjects he preferred, so that there was no security for an identity of training, no enforcement of the principle that the citizen belongs to the State and not to himself, nor again was any care taken that the education given to children was in harmony with the constitution and favourable to its maintenance.

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result that children were often the offspring of over-young or over-old parents. The rearing of infancy was also left unregulated, nor were children's minds sufficiently protected from evil influences in the earlier years of life, the years in which, according to Aristotle, permanent tastes are formed. Not only were the games and nursery-tales of infancy often other than they should be, but children were allowed to be too much in the company of slaves[1] and were too much exposed to hearing indecent language and seeing indecent pictures and statues. Boys and youths were allowed freely to witness the performance of iambi and comedy. The subjects chosen for youthful study were studied with a wrong aim and in a wrong way. Reading, writing, and drawing were studied merely for their utility, and music for the pleasure it gave. Music was often studied in too technical a fashion with a view to the attainment of a skill in execution suitable rather to *virtuosi* than to citizens. The only subject studied with a view to virtue was gymnastic, which was thought to produce courage. We do not hear of any studies by which it was sought to develope other virtues. Education in these States was evidently too utilitarian[2] and too narrow in its aim; it needed to be made more capable of influencing the character as a whole and the reason.

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Lacedaemonian State was one of them. We do not learn from Aristotle whether more care was taken at Sparta than elsewhere to regulate marriage and the rearing of infants and to protect early childhood from corrupting influences, but we know that, at any rate after a certain age, the State took the education of the young into its own hands, withdrawing it from the control of the parent, and educating the boys together and in the same way and with a view to the welfare of the whole State, severing them to a great extent from home and from contact with slaves. So far it did well, but its gymnastic training was too severe and laborious, and here again, as elsewhere, the education given was too narrow, failing to train the whole man, and also too utilitarian, though it studied that which was useful to the State rather than that which was useful to the individual. Its aim was to develope the more utilitarian virtues (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9 sq.), the virtues which favour the acquisition of empire, not to develope all the virtues nor to develope virtue for its own sake. The Lacedaemonian training was not even the best training for war or the winning of empire; much less was it the best for the preservation of empire when won, for it did not develope justice or temperance or the intellectual excellence which enables men to use aright the leisure which follows the acquisition of empire, and saves them from degenerating under the influence of ease and plenty and peace. It was based on a systematic preference of that which is useful to that which is noble, of that which is lower to that which is higher, of that which is only a means to that which is the end. It taught men to prefer external goods and empire to virtue, the lower kinds of virtue to the higher, war to peace, and work to leisure.

Aristotle's conception of education.

Aristotle's aim in education is to develope the whole man—the body, the appetites (*ὀρέξεις*, including *θυμός*, *ἐπιθυμία*, and *βούλησις*: see note on 1334 b 19), and the reason—in such a way as to harmonize the three elements in a willing co-operation for the best end, a life spent in the exercise of all the virtues, moral and intellectual, and

especially the highest of them, those connected with the right use of leisure. In Aristotle's view he is a truly educated man who has learnt from youth upwards to love virtue for its own sake, and virtue not of one kind only, but of all, whose youthful love of virtue has been crowned with reason, and in whom reason, fully developed both on its practical and on its contemplative side and working for the best end, is mated with appetites which take pleasure in obeying it and with a body well prepared for the service of both. Aristotle's conception of education agrees with his conception of the man of full virtue (*σπουδαῖος*) as a man in whom many excellences are combined (3. 11. 1281 b 10 sqq.). He would not be satisfied with an education which merely brought the body and the lower appetites under the control of some higher appetite, such as the love of the good; the appetites must, indeed, be trained to love what is good, but that is not enough; they must be brought under the control of reason fully developed and directed to the best end[1].

As the body developes before the soul and the appetites of the soul before reason, the education of the body should come first, then that of the appetites, and then that of the reason, but the body must be so trained as to subserve the development of the soul, and the appetites so trained as to subserve the development of the reason. The body and the appetites are apparently conceived by Aristotle as trained by habituation (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.), or in other words by a repetition of acts resulting in a formed habit, whereas the reason is mainly trained by instruction (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 15 sq.: Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10 sq.). Thus training by habituation comes first, training by reason later (Pol. 5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.). We have been already told in the Nicomachean Ethics (10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.) that training by habituation must precede training by

[1] We miss in Aristotle's scheme of education any training specially designed to develope *activity* in accordance with virtue, though he lays stress on this as an element in happiness (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 22, 40 sqq.).

teaching, but the cause assigned there for this is not that reason developes later than the body and the appetites, but that training by teaching will not be effectual in producing virtue if it is not preceded by a long course of habituation beginning in childhood.

The education of the body.

The education of the body must, in Aristotle's view, be such as to make it a fit instrument for the soul; its growth must not be stunted nor its beauty impaired (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq.), it must not be subjected in early youth to toils so excessive as to enfeeble it for the work of after-years (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40 sqq.) or to brutalize the character (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.), nor must hard work be imposed on the body and mind simultaneously (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.), nor again must the training of the body be such as to unfit it for subsequent studies or to produce *βαναυσία* (5 (8). 6. 1341 a 6 sqq.).

The education of the appetites.

The education of the appetites—i.e. of *θυμός*, *ἐπιθυμία*, and *βούλησις*—must be such as to lead them to love the noble qualities of character which reason will later on give them additional reasons for loving, and thus to prepare them to render a willing obedience to reason when it developes. The appetites must, therefore, be habituated to take pleasure in the right things; the child must be watched and guided in its pleasures from infancy. A well-ordered gymnastic training must follow, not too laborious in early youth, and, midway in this, three years devoted to the study of reading, writing, drawing, and music. The musical training of the young should be such as to lead them to love ennobling melodies and the reproductions of mildness, courage, temperance, and other virtues which melodies contain, and so eventually to love these virtues themselves. Music should be the ally and precursor of reason, preparing the way for her before she appears, and beginning the wholesome discipline of the likings which she will later on carry to completion. No attempt must be made to hasten the development of reason, but, on the other hand, there must be nothing in the musical training of youth which will not be favourable to it; the use of the pipe (*αὐλός*) in

education, for instance, is not favourable to it (5 (8). 6. 1341 b 6), and therefore must be rejected.

So important a part of youthful education is the training of the appetites to feel pleasure in the right things represented by Aristotle to be, that we might be tempted to take it for the whole. But the training of the body and the reason are also essential parts of youthful education; indeed, Aristotle sometimes distinguishes παιδεία from habituation (e. g. in 3. 18. 1288 b 1 and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16), or in other words from the training of the appetites.

The education of the reason.

The direct education of the reason, which is to follow the education of the appetites, is not dealt with in the Politics as it has come down to us, though we may infer from 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 24 sqq. that it will be directed to the development both of the practical and of the contemplative reason, and will make the development of the latter its supreme end.

Remarks on the scheme by which Aristotle seeks to realize his conception of education.

Aristotle's conception of education commends itself to us more than the scheme by which he seeks to realize it. The amount of time which he devotes to gymnastic training appears to us to be disproportionately large. He surrenders to it all the years from seven to twenty-one with the exception of three. He does so partly because in ancient Greece, as we have seen, a long gymnastic training in youth was essential to full military efficiency, partly because without a suitably developed body neither the appetites nor the reason can be all that they should be, and partly because, as hard mental and bodily work must not be required of the young simultaneously, and bodily exercise is indispensable in youth for the growth and development of the body, mental work in youth must necessarily be confined within narrow limits. He is thus led greatly to shorten the amount of time devoted in youth to the work to which he attaches so much importance—that of training the appetites to take pleasure in the right things. For this kind of training he relies mainly on the study of music, and yet he allots to this study only a very small part of the first twenty-one years of life—

a fraction of the three years after puberty which he gives up to other studies than gymnastic. Does he not hope too much from this brief musical training? Can it do all that he expects it to do for the moral improvement of the boys who are to receive it? It may be doubted, indeed, whether it is by a study of particular subjects, such as music, that a love of what is noble is instilled into the young. Is it not rather by intercourse with a parent or teacher or friend whose example and influence win the heart to a love of goodness? Then again, does not Aristotle underrate the extent to which the reason is susceptible of cultivation in boyhood? He admits in 1. 13. 1260a 13 sq. that boys possess the deliberative element of the soul, though in an imperfect form. Why then should not this element receive more cultivation in youth than Aristotle provides for it? Some kinds of mental work, again, fall well within the range of the boyish mind; yet Aristotle makes no provision for the training of those intellectual aptitudes which boys may well possess. Is it quite clear that even in the education of the body and the appetites training by habituation will suffice by itself without an admixture of training by reason? Another question may well be asked. Does Aristotle's scheme of education call for enough effort from the young? Is not their 'distaste for everything unsweetened' too much studied in it? Would not a training which gave them more difficulties to face and to conquer develope in them more force of will and be more really useful to them? Does not education largely consist in acquiring the power and the will to do that which is distasteful to us, when it ought to be done?

# ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ'.

Τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἑκάστη καὶ 1274 b 32
ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτε
ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις· νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες
τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πρᾶξιν, οἱ δ' οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ 35
τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον· τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ
νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν·
2 ἡ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις. ἐπεὶ
δ' ἡ πόλις τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅλων
μὲν συνεστώτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον 40
ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος· ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθός ἐστιν,
ὥστε τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστί, σκε- 1275 a
πτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις· οὐ
γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην· ἔστι γάρ
τις ὃς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὢν ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολλάκις
3 οὐκ ἔστι πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλως πως τυγχάνοντας 5
ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, οἷον τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφε-
τέον· ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που πολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ
4 γὰρ μέτοικοι καὶ δοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὐδ' οἱ
τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ
δικάζεσθαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοι- 10
νωνοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει· πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν
οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν
5 ἀνάγκη προστάτην, ὥστε ἀτελῶς πως μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύτης
κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας τοὺς μήπω δι' ἡλι-
κίαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους 15

φατέον εἶναι μέν πως πολίτας, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ λίαν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει· δῆλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον)· ζητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸν ἁπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ λύειν. πολίτης δ' ἁπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁρίζεται μᾶλ- 6
λον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι διῃρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὥστ' ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διά τινων ὡρισμένων χρόνων· ὁ δ' ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα 7
μὲν οὖν ἂν φαίη τις οὐδ' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους, οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀρχῆς· καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριωτάτους ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχῆς. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδέν· περὶ ὀνόματος γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἔστω δὴ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἀόριστος ἀρχή. τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέ- 8
χοντας. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν· δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα διαφέρει τῷ εἴδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἧ τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν 9
εἴδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ
1275 b προτέρας οὔσας· τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας ἀναγκαῖον ὑστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας πῶς λέγομεν, ὕστερον ἔσται φανερόν). ὥστε καὶ τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶ 10
πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μέν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαῖον. (ἐν) ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν

ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς, ἑτέρα
11 δ' ἴσως ἀρχή τις ἑτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ
Καρχηδόνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαί τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας.
ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός· ἐν γὰρ
ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής
ἐστι καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλὰ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡρισμένος·
τούτων γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ
12 δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ
πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ᾧ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς
βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης
τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς
αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν· ὁρίζονται δὲ πρὸς 2
τὴν χρῆσιν πολίτην τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ
θατέρου μόνον, οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός· οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ
πλέον ζητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους. οὕτω
δὲ ὁριζομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροῦσί τινες τὸν
2 τρίτον ἐκεῖνον ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης. Γοργίας μὲν
οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος,
ἔφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὁλμοποιῶν πεποιη-
μένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πε-
3 ποιημένους, εἶναι γάρ τινας Λαρισοποιούς· ἔστι δ' ἁπλοῦν·
εἰ γὰρ μετεῖχον κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας,
ἦσαν πολῖται· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατὸν ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ ἐκ
πολίτου ἢ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οἰκησάντων ἢ κτι-
σάντων. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ὅσοι
μετέσχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν
ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολήν· πολ-
4 λοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. τὸ δ' ἀμ-
φισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον
ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως. καίτοι κἂν τοῦτό τις ἔτι προσαπορήσειεν,
ἆρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταὐτὸ δυναμένου 1276 a
5 τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἄρχοντάς
τινας ἀδίκως, οὓς ἄρχειν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ' οὐ δικαίως, ὁ

δὲ πολίτης ἀρχῇ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν τῆς
5 τοιᾶσδε ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὡς ἔφαμεν), δῆλον ὅτι πολί-
3 τας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ
μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισ-
βήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πόθ' ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ πότε
οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται
10 δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνιοι βούλονται 2
διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος,
οὔτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ
κρατεῖν οὔσας, ἀλλὰ οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. εἴπερ οὖν
καὶ δημοκρατοῦνταί τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὁμοίως
15 τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης
πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.
ἔοικε δ' οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς 3
ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν
αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας
20 ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν· ἐνδέχεται
γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τοὺς
μὲν ἕτερον τοὺς δ' ἕτερον οἰκῆσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν 4
πραοτέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως
λεγομένης ἐστί πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως)· ὁμοίως
25 δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε δεῖ
νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν· 5
εἷς γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἓν τεῖχος. τοιαύτη
δ' ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλὼν καὶ πᾶσα ἥτις ἔχει περιγραφὴν
μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως· ἧς γέ φασιν ἁλωκυίας τρίτην
30 ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ 6
μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἡ σκέ-
ψις· περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ
πότερον ἕθνος ἓν ἢ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν
πολιτικόν· ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον,
35 πότερον ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν
αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομέ-

νων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν
τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ ἀεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπι-
γιγνομένου νάματος τοῦ δ' ὑπεξιόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους
φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ
7 πόλιν ἑτέραν; εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ 1276 b
κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γιγνομένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει
καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν
καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν
ὁτὲ μὲν κωμικὸν ὁτὲ δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναί φαμεν, τῶν
8 αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν
ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἑτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον ᾖ τῆς
συνθέσεως, οἷον ἁρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἑτέραν εἶναι
9 λέγομεν, ἂν ὁτὲ μὲν ᾖ Δώριος ὁτὲ δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ
τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερὸν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν
αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ κα-
λεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸν ἔξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων
αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἑτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δίκαιον δια-
λύειν ἢ μὴ διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλῃ πολιτείαν
ἡ πόλις, λόγος ἕτερος.

Τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι **4**
πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου
σπουδαίου θετέον, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μήν εἴ γε τοῦτο
τυχεῖν δεῖ ζητήσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τινὶ πρῶτον
ληπτέον. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἷς τις τῶν κοινωνῶν ἐστίν,
2 οὕτω καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμέν. τῶν δὲ πλωτήρων καίπερ
ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐρέτης, ὁ δὲ
κυβερνήτης, ὁ δὲ πρῳρεύς, ὁ δ' ἄλλην τιν' ἔχων τοιαύτην
ἐπωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἑκάστου λόγος
ἴδιος ἔσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμόσει
πᾶσιν. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν
3 πάντων· τούτου γὰρ ἕκαστος ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁμοίως
τοίνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία
τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία·

διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ πλείω πολιτείας εἴδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον 4
μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, φανερόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἔστι διαποροῦντας ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ 5
ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἁπάντων σπουδαίων ὄντων εἶναι πόλιν, δεῖ δ' ἕκαστον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ἔργον εὖ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἂν
1277 a εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν
τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. ἔτι ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις, 6
ὥσπερ ζῷον εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχὴ ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πόλις ἐξ ἁπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων
συνέστηκεν εἰδῶν, ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἀρετήν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου. διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἁπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, φανερὸν 7
ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἆρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν
σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς 8
ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων υἱεῖς ἱππικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ "μή μοι τὰ κόμψ', ἀλλ' ὧν πόλει
δεῖ," ὡς οὔσάν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν. εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ 9
ἄρχοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἁπλῶς ἂν εἴη πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός,

τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς
10 οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖταί γε τὸ 25
δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου (δοκεῖ) ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικήν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ
11 πολίτου ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἕτερα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μαν- 30
θάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερ' ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, τοὐντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τις. ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τἀναγκαῖα λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον· θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. 35
12 λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονικὰς πράξεις. δούλου δ' εἴδη πλείω λέγομεν· αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείους. ὧν ἓν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνῆτες· οὗτοι δ' εἰσίν, ὥσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τοὔνομ' αὐτούς, οἱ ζῶντες ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἐστίν. διὸ παρ' 1277 b
ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν
13 δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἀρχομένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν μανθάνειν, εἰ μή ποτε χρείας χάριν 5
αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν μὲν δεσπότην τὸν δὲ δοῦλον· ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει
14 τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων· ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν, οἷον ἱππαρχεῖν ἱππαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν 10
στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα. διὸ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ
15 ἀρχθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων 15
16 ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ

ἄμφω, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς, καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δέ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἴδη ἔχουσα καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία (δόξαι γὰρ ἂν εἶναι 17
δειλὸς ἀνήρ, εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρεῖος εἴη ὥσπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία, καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός), ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι, τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν)· ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη· τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα 18
ἀληθής· ὥσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος. πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων·

5 Περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ἔτι λείπεταί τις τῶν ἀποριῶν. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ᾧ κοινωνεῖν ἔξεστιν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτους θετέον οἷς μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν, οὐχ οἷόν τε παντὸς εἶναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν (οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης)· εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θετέος ἕκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἢ διά γε τοῦτον τὸν λό- 2
1278 a γον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδ' οἱ ἀπελεύθεροι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες ὡσαύτως πολῖται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς οἱ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· πολῖται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις 3
ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ ξενικόν· διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν· ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἣν εἴπομεν λεκτέον οὐ παντός, οὐδ' ἐλευθέρου μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅσοι τῶν ἔργων

εἰσὶν ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν ἑνὶ λειτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινῇ βάναυσοι καὶ θῆτες. φανερὸν δ' ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις πῶς ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν· αὐτὸ γὰρ φανὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ πολιτεῖαι, καὶ εἴδη πολίτου ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλείω, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολίτου, ὥστ' ἐν μέν τινι πολιτείᾳ τὸν βάναυσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας, ἐν τισὶ δ' ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἣν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ᾗ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ἢ θητικόν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις θῆτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι πολίτην (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθέξεις τῶν ἀρχῶν), βάναυσον δ' ἐνδέχεται· πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀπεσχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις προσεφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος· ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἔν τισι δημοκρατίαις πολίτης ἐστίν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόθους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν γνησίων πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται πολίτας τοὺς τοιούτους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὕτω χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δ' ὄχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης, εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἴδη πλείω πολίτου, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν "ὡσεί τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην"· ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλ' ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοικούντων ἐστίν. πότερον μὲν οὖν ἑτέραν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν θετέον καθ' ἣν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἕτερος, κἀκεῖνος οὐ πᾶς ἀλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἢ δυνάμενος

εἶναι κύριος, ἢ καθ' αὑτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν κοινῶν
5 ἐπιμελείας·

6 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἢ πλείους, κἂν εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα
10 τῆς κυρίας πάντων· κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία· λέγω 2
δ' οἷον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι τοὐναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις· φαμὲν δὲ καὶ πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον ἐροῦμεν
15 λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὑποθετέον δὴ πρῶτον τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς. εἴρηται δὴ κατὰ 3
τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, ἐν οἷς περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, καὶ ὅτι φύσει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικόν,
20 διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας [οὐκ ἔλαττον] ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ κοινῇ 4
πᾶσι καὶ χωρίς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ
25 καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν. δῆλον δ' ὡς 5
καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ
30 γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς γε τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥᾴδιον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ 6
δεσποτεία, καίπερ ὄντος κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλῳ καὶ τῷ φύσει δεσπότῃ ταὐτοῦ συμφέροντος, ὅμως ἄρχει
35 πρὸς τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον οὐδὲν ἧττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου τοῦ

7 δούλου σώζεσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν. ἡ δὲ τέκνων ἀρχὴ καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης, ἣν δὴ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικήν, ἤτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν ἐστὶν ἢ κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀμφοῖν, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, οἷον ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κἂν αὐτῶν εἶεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν παιδοτρίβην ἕνα τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐνίοτ' εἶναι καὶ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερ-
8 νήτης εἷς ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης ἢ κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν· ὅταν δὲ τούτων εἷς γένηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει τῆς ὠφελείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμναζομέ-
9 νων εἷς γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ὤν. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ᾖ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μέν, ᾗ πέφυκεν, ἀξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινὰ πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἐσκό-
10 πει τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς ἄρχειν, οἷον εἰ συνέβαινεν ὑγιαίνειν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι νοσα-
11 κεροῖς οὖσιν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἴσως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἀρχάς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὗται μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἡμαρτημέναι καὶ πᾶσαι παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν· δεσποτικαὶ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν.

**7** Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσί, καὶ πρῶ-
2 τον τὰς ὀρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἔσονται φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταὐτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι

τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις· ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος. καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν 3
ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν πλειόνων δὲ ἑνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς· ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως· ἕνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν 4
κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν
1279 b ἠκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίγνεται. διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα. παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη- 5
μένων τυραννὶς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

**8** Δεῖ δὲ μικρῷ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τίς ἑκάστη τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν. ἔστι δὲ τυραννὶς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δεσπο- 2
τικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν ὦσι κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλ' ἄποροι. πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἶεν οἱ 3
πλείους ὄντες εὔποροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν ᾖ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἴ που † συμ-

βαίνῃ † τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείττους δ' ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ' ὀλίγον κύριον πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναί φασιν, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν
4 διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἄν τις συνθεὶς τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῇ δ' ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω προσαγορεύῃ τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ᾗ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὔποροι ὀλίγοι τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, δημοκρατίαν δὲ ἐν ᾗ οἱ ἄποροι πολλοὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, ἄλλην
5 ἀπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἄρτι λεχθείσας πολιτείας, τὴν ἐν ᾗ πλείους εὔποροι καὶ ἐν ᾗ ἐλάττους οἱ ἄποροι, κύριοι δ' ἑκάτεροι τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ μηδεμία
6 ἄλλη πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστίν; ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους ἢ πολλοὺς εἶναι κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλίγους, πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς
7 ῥηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς), ᾧ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἥ τε δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτός ἐστιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἄν τ' ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου
8 δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς· εὐποροῦσι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες· δι' ἃς αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.

Ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας 9
καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἅπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ'
2 οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις· καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ γάρ ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις. οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὑτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι

κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ 3
διῄρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς,
καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ
πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι,
μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ
αὑτοὺς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἑκα-
τέρους δίκαιόν τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἁπλῶς. οἱ μὲν 4
γὰρ ἂν κατά τι ἄνισοι ὦσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἴονται
ἄνισοι εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατά τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως
ἴσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτη- 5
μάτων χάριν ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνῆλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι
τῆς πόλεως ὅσονπερ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὥσθ' ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρ-
χικῶν λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον
μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν μνῶν τὸν εἰσενέγκαντα μίαν μνᾶν τῷ
δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγινο-
μένων)· εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἕνεκεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ 6
εὖ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἦν πό-
λις· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ
τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἕνεκεν, ὅπως
ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν
χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρ-
χηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἐστὶ σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς
μιᾶς ἂν πολῖται πόλεως ἦσαν. εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθῆκαι 7
περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν
καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ
1280 b τούτοις κοιναὶ καθεστᾶσιν, ἀλλ' ἕτεραι παρ' ἑκατέροις, οὔτε
τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ φροντίζουσιν ἄτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους,
οὐδ' ὅπως μηδεὶς ἄδικος ἔσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ
μοχθηρίαν ἕξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδική-
σουσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς 8
διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ᾗ καὶ φανερὸν
ὅτι δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομα-
ζομένῃ πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία

συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τόπῳ διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἄποθεν
συμμάχων, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καί, καθάπερ ἔφη Λυ-
κόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ'
9 οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ
τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ συναγάγοι
τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἕν, ὥστε ἅπτεσθαι τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ
Κορινθίων τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις. οὐδ' εἰ πρὸς
ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο· καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς
10 πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἐστίν. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν
χωρὶς μέν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἄποθεν ὥστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν,
ἀλλ' εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ
τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς
ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶεν
μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων,
11 οἷον ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ' οὕτω πω πόλις. διὰ
τίνα δή ποτ' αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς
κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἕκαστος
μέντοι χρῷτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς
ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον,
οὐδ' οὕτως ἂν εἶναι δόξειε πόλις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴπερ
12 ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῖεν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρίς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι
ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς
αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγ-
καῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων
τούτων ἁπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ
ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελέας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρ-
13 κους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα
κατοικούντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαί
τ' ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ
διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ
συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν,
14 ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν
κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς 1281 a

φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·

10 Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν, τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. ἢ γάρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ τὸν βέλτιστον ἕνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γάρ; ἂν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ πλείους εἶναι διανέμωνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν; ἔδοξε γὰρ νὴ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως. τὴν οὖν ἀδικίαν 2 τί χρὴ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἂν διανέμωνται, φανερὸν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἥ γ' ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι δίκαιον. ἔτι καὶ 3 τὰς πράξεις ὅσας ὁ τύραννος ἔπραξεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας δικαίας· βιάζεται γὰρ ὢν κρειττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τοὺς πλουσίους. ἀλλ' ἆρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἄρχειν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἂν οὖν κἀκεῖνοι ταὐτὰ ποιῶσι καὶ διαρπάζωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ δίκαιον; καὶ θάτερον ἄρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ὅτι πάντα 4 φαῦλα καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερόν· ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄρχειν δεῖ καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς· τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ' αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ' 5 ἕνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτο ὀλιγαρχικώτερον· οἱ γὰρ ἄτιμοι πλείους. ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις

ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον, ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἂν οὖν ᾖ νόμος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἡ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἠπορημένων; συμβήσεται γὰρ ὁμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος· **11** ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν ὀλίγους δέ, δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι καί τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, 2 τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελ- 1281 b τίους ἐκείνων, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὡς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὥσπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον τὸ πλῆθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ' 3 αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ 4 πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἑκάστου τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλούς φασι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνῆχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἕν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὶ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλ- 5 μόν, ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἕτερον μόριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἄδηλον, ἴσως δὲ νὴ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἁρμόσειε λόγος· καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν;), ἀλλὰ περί τι 6 πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δεῖ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν (τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν ὅσοι μήτε 7 πλούσιοι μήτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν)· τὸ μὲν γὰρ

μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἂν τὰ δ' ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτούς), τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν· ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην. λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς. 8 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττουσιν ἐπί τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἐῶσιν· πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι 9 συνελθόντες ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίοσι τὰς πόλεις ὠφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλίγης· χωρὶς δ' ἕκαστος ἀτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐστίν. ἔχει 10 δ' ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν ὅτι δόξειεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρῖναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἰάτρευκεν, οὗπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑγιᾶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ἰατρός. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
1282 a περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὥσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἰατρὸς δ' ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονι- 11 κὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γάρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσιν. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν 12 δόξειεν ἔχειν τρόπον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἑλέσθαι ὀρθῶς τῶν εἰδότων ἔργον ἐστίν, οἷον γεωμέτρην τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίων ἔργων καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ' οὔ τι τῶν εἰδότων γε μᾶλλον. ὥστε κατὰ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ 13 ἂν εἴη τὸ πλῆθος ποιητέον κύριον οὔτε τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν οὔτε τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς 14 διά τε τὸν πάλαι λόγον, ἂν ᾖ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες (ἔσται γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτὴς τῶν εἰδότων,

ἅπαντες δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίους ἢ οὐ χείρους), καὶ ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων οὔτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὔτ' ἄριστ' ἂν κρίνειεν, ὅσων τἄργα γιγνώσκουσι καὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, οἷον οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γνῶναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῇ κρινεῖ (χρῆται δ' ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαιτυμὼν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειέ τις ἂν οὕτω λύειν ἱκανῶς· ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς φαύλους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δ' εὔθυναι καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεις εἰσὶ μέγιστον· ἃς ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς δήμοις ἀποδιδόασιν· ἡ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. καίτοι τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς τυχούσης ἡλικίας, ταμιεύουσι δὲ καὶ στρατηγοῦσι καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἄρχουσιν ἀπὸ μεγάλων. ὁμοίως δή τις ἂν λύσειε καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν· ἴσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ' ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς ἄρχων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος· τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἕκαστος μόριόν ἐστι τούτων (λέγω δὲ μόριον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστὴν καὶ τὸν δικαστήν)· ὥστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ πλεῖον τὸ πάντων τούτων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανερὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἕτερον ὡς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἄν τε εἷς ἄν τε πλείους ὦσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι καθόλου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. ὁποίους μέντοι τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον, ἀλλ' ἔτι μένει τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη

καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δικαίους ἢ
ἀδίκους. πλὴν τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν 21
κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι τοὺς μὲν
κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους, τοὺς δὲ
κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας οὐ δικαίους.

**12** Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις
ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριω-
τάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, ἔστι δὲ
πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμ-
φέρον, δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι
γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς
διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν (τί γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ
δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναί φασιν)· ποίων δ' ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ 2
ποίων ἀνισότης, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν· ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν
καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ
παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμῆσθαι τὰς ἀρ-
χάς, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι
τυγχάνοιεν ὄντες· τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ
δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἔσται 3
καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν
ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέ-
χουσιν. ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; φανερὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν 4
ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων· τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν
τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέ-
ροις· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ
ἔργον ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν. εἰ
δὲ μήπω δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγα-
γοῦσιν ἔσται φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ εἴη τις ὑπερέχων μὲν κατὰ 5
τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολὺ δ' ἐλλείπων κατ' εὐγένειαν ἢ κάλλος,
εἰ καὶ μεῖζον ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἀγαθόν ἐστι τῆς αὐλητικῆς
(λέγω δὲ τήν τ' εὐγένειαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ
τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλέον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος
κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν, ὅμως τούτῳ δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντας

τῶν αὐλῶν· δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπε- 1283 a
ροχὴν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ'
6 οὐδέν. ἔτι κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν
ἂν εἴη συμβλητόν. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως
ἂν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς 5
ἐλευθερίαν. ὥστ' εἰ πλεῖον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος
ἢ ὁδὶ κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετῆς μέ-
γεθος, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα· τοσόνδε γὰρ [μέγεθος] εἰ
7 κρεῖττον τοσοῦδε, τοσόνδε δῆλον ὡς ἴσον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ
ἀδύνατον, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ 10
πᾶσαν ἀνισότητ' ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν (εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν
βραδεῖς οἱ δὲ ταχεῖς, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖον
τοὺς δ' ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἡ
8 τούτων διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμήν), ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλις συ- 15
νέστηκεν, ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν.
διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλεύ-
θεροι καὶ πλούσιοι. δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους τ' εἶναι καὶ τίμημα
φέροντας (οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πόλις ἐξ ἀπόρων πάντων, ὥσπερ
9 οὐδ' ἐκ δούλων)· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ 20
δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ
τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν, πλὴν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προ-
τέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι
καλῶς. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡ πάντα **13**
ἢ ἔνιά γε τούτων ὀρθῶς ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν 25
ἀγαθὴν ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισ-
βητοίησαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε
πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ἴσους ἕν τι μόνον ὄντας οὔτε
ἄνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθ' ἕν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς
2 τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρό- 30
τερον ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες,
ἁπλῶς δ' οὐ πάντες δικαίως, οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλεῖον
μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἡ δὲ χώρα κοινόν, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ
συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον· οἱ δ' ἐλεύ-

θεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων (πολῖται γὰρ μᾶλλον
οἱ γενναιότεροι τῶν ἀγεννῶν, ἡ δ' εὐγένεια παρ' ἑκάστοις
οἶκοι τίμιος. ἔτι διότι βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων, 3
εὐγένεια γάρ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ γένους). ὁμοίως δὴ φήσομεν
δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀμφισβητεῖν· κοινωνικὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν
εἶναί φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ᾗ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν
τὰς ἄλλας. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους· 4
καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίους εἰσίν, ὡς
λαμβανομένων τῶν πλειόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἆρ' οὖν
1283 b εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δ' οἷον οἵ τ' ἀγαθοὶ
καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολι-
τικόν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ, ἢ οὐκ
ἔσται; καθ' ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων 5
ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ (τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις
διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ
διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον)· ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν
αὐτὸν ταὐθ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον. εἰ δὴ τὸν 6
ἀριθμὸν εἶεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα
δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν,
εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ'
εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἅπαντας
τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δόξαιεν 7
γὰρ (ἂν) οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιοῦντες
ἄρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἴ τις
πάλιν εἷς πλουσιώτερος ἁπάντων ἐστί, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ
τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἕνα ἁπάντων δεήσει,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενείᾳ διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητούν-
των δι' ἐλευθερίαν. ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἴσως συμβήσεται καὶ 8
περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· εἰ γάρ τις εἷς ἀμεί-
νων ἀνὴρ εἴη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων
ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταὐτὸ δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν εἰ
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναί γε δεῖ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν

ὀλίγων, κἂν εἷς ᾖ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν πολλῶν κρείττους ὥσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἂν δέοι κυρίους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πλῆθος. πάντα δὴ ταῦτ' ἔοικε φανερὸν ποιεῖν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς ὀρθός ἐστι, καθ' ὃν ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀξιοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλήθη λόγον τινὰ δίκαιον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὡς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀθρόους. διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσί τινες, ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν· ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν. τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν· πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαί ἐστι, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν. εἰ δέ τίς ἐστιν εἷς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, ἢ πλείους μὲν ἑνὸς μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ' εἷς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων, ἄνισοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει· κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος· αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖος ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις πειρώμενος κατ' αὐτῶν· λέγοιεν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἅπερ Ἀντι-

σθένης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τὸν ὀστρα- 15
κισμὸν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· αὗται γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τὴν ἰσότητα μάλιστα πάντων,
20 ὥστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυφιλίαν ἤ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχὺν ὠστράκιζον καὶ μεθίστασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὡρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται 16
δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα καταλιπεῖν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργὼ
25 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτήρων. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλῳ συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἁπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περίανδρον εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμ- 17
φθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς
30 ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων ὁμαλῦναι τὴν ἄρουραν· ὅθεν ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγγείλαντος δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἄνδρας ἀναιρεῖν). τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον 18
συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν,
35 ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας· ὁ γὰρ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τρόπον τινὰ τῷ κολούειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οἱ 19
κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους καὶ
40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θᾶττον ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐταπείνωσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας), ὁ δὲ Περ-
1284 b σῶν βασιλεὺς Μήδους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπέκοπτε πολλάκις. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πάσας 20
ἐστὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβε-
5 βηκυῖαι πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοποῦσας τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν 21

καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· οὔτε γὰρ γραφεὺς ἐάσειεν ἂν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῷον, οὐδ' εἰ διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὔτε ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς, οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν μεῖζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἐάσει συγ-
22 χορεύειν. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὔσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογου-
μένας ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ
23 τὸν ὀστρακισμόν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω συστῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἰατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἂν συμβῇ, πειρᾶσθαι τοιούτῳ τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν. ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις·
οὐ γὰρ ἔβλεπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκείας συμφέρον,
24 ἀλλὰ στασιαστικῶς ἐχρῶντο τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκυίαις πολιτείαις ὅτι μὲν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστι, φανερόν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας
ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλ'
25 ἄν τις γένηται διαφερων κατ' ἀρετήν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου· παραπλήσιον
γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς. λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

Ἴσως δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους με- **14**
ταβῆναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας· φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον συμφέρει τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ βασιλεύεσθαι, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλ-
2 λον, ἢ τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει. δεῖ δὲ

πρῶτον διελέσθαι πότερον ἓν τὸ γένος ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἢ πλείους
1285 a ἔχει διαφοράς. ῥᾴδιον δὴ τοῦτό γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλείω
τε γένη περιέχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἷς
πασῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι 3
βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάν-
των, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τὴν χώραν, ἡγεμών ἐστι τῶν πρὸς
τὸν πόλεμον· ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς
βασιλεῦσιν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἷον στρατηγία τις 4
αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ ἀΐδιός ἐστιν· κτεῖναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ
μὴ ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς
πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ. δηλοῖ δ' Ὅμηρος· ὁ
γὰρ Ἀγαμέμνων κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἠνείχετο ἐν ταῖς ἐκ-
κλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν. λέγει γοῦν 5
"ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης, οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται
φυγέειν κύνας ἠδ' οἰωνούς· πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος." ἓν μὲν
οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου, τούτων δ' αἱ
μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἱρεταί· παρὰ ταύτην δ' ἄλλο 6
μοναρχίας εἶδος, οἷαι παρ' ἐνίοις εἰσὶ βασιλεῖαι τῶν βαρ-
βάρων. ἔχουσι δ' αὗται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν
τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί· διὰ γὰρ
τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἤθη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν
Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην,
ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.
τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτόν εἰσιν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ 7
τὸ πάτριαι καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι.* καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βα-
σιλικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· οἱ γὰρ πο-
λῖται φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοις τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους
ξενικόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἑκόντων, οἱ δ' ἀκόν-
των ἄρχουσιν, ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δ' ἐπὶ
τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακήν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα 8
μοναρχίας, ἕτερον δ' ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν, οὓς
καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν αἱρετὴ
τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ

9 νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἦρχον δ' οἱ μὲν διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὡρισμένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἵλοντό ποτε Μιτυληναῖοι Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ
10 Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἵλοντο τὸν Πιττακὸν ἔν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν· ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι "τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν πόλεως τᾶς ἀχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος Ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαινέοντες ἀολ- 1285 b
11 λέες." αὗται μὲν οὖν εἰσί τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἱρεταὶ καὶ ἑκόντων βασιλικαί· τέταρτον δ' εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους ἑκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι γιγνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον·
12 διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγίγνοντο βασιλεῖς ἑκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι. κύριοι δ' ἦσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαί, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον. τοῦτο δ' ἐποίουν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὀμνύοντες, οἱ δ' ὀμνύοντες· ὁ δ' ὅρκος ἦν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις.
13 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἦρχον· ὕστερον δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄχλων παραιρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάτριοι θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι μόνον, ὅπου δ' ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον εἶχον.
14 Βασιλείας μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμόν, μία μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους (αὕτη δ' ἦν ἑκόντων μέν, ἐπί τισι δ' ὡρισμένοις· στρατηγὸς γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικαστὴς ὁ βασιλεύς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ γένους ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἦν αἰσυμνητείαν προσαγορεύουσιν (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν αἱρετὴ τυραννίς), τετάρτη δ' ἡ Λακωνικὴ

τούτων (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς στρατηγία κατὰ γένος ἀίδιος)· αὗται μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαφέρουσιν 15 ἀλλήλων, πέμπτον δ' εἶδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ᾖ πάντων κύριος εἷς ὤν, ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη τῶν κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων οἰκονομία. σχεδὸν δὴ δύο ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἴδη βασιλείας περὶ ὧν σκεπτέον, αὕτη τε καὶ ἡ Λακωνική· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μεταξὺ τούτων εἰσίν, ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασιλείας, πλειόνων δ' εἰσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὥστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν 2 περὶ δυοῖν ἐστίν, ἓν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγὸν ἀίδιον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος,
1286 a ἢ οὐ συμφέρει· ἓν δὲ πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας (ἐν ἁπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασι- 3 λείας πολιτείας εἶδός ἐστιν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων. δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς 4 νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον οἱ νόμοι λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν, ὥστ' ἐν ὁποιᾳοῦν τέχνῃ τὸ κατὰ γράμματ' ἄρχειν ἠλίθιον· καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἰατροῖς, ἐὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ κινδύνῳ. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν 5 τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· κρεῖττον δ' ᾧ μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ ᾧ συμφυές. τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ἔχειν πᾶσαν. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βου-

λεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κάλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κεῖσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ᾗ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δεῖ κυρίους· ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἕνα τὸν ἄριστον δεῖ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας; καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλεύονται καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὗται δ' αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. καθ' ἕνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὀστισοῦν ἴσως χείρων· ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἑστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἁπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἷς ὀστισοῦν. ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολύ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ δ' ἑνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἢ τινος ἑτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο μὴ ῥᾴδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶεν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἷς ἀδιαφθορώτερος ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες; ἢ δῆλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάσουσιν, ὁ δὲ εἷς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετέον ἴσως ὅτι σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνος ὁ εἷς. εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίαν θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς βασιλείαν, αἱρετώτερον ἂν εἴη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἂν ᾖ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατ' ἀρετήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις. ἔτι δ' ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρους γιγνόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, 12
ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εὔλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας· ἔντιμον
γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραν-
νίδας μετέβαλλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν·
αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι' αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἰσχυρότε-
ρον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστ' ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι
δημοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς 13
πόλεις, ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἔτι γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν παρὰ
δημοκρατίαν. εἰ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι
ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἕξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ
τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων ὁποῖοί τινες
ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὢν τοῖς 14
τέκνοις. ἀλλ' οὐκέτι τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον πιστεῦσαι· χαλεπὸν γάρ,
καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. ἔχει δ'
ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν
μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχύν τινα περὶ αὐτόν, ᾗ δυνήσεται
βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πῶς ἐνδέχεται
τὴν ἀρχὴν διοικεῖν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύριος, μη- 15
δὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, ᾗ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους.
τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν 16
διορίσαι (δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχύν, εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην τὴν
ἰσχὺν ὥστε ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω
τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἧττω, καθάπερ οἵ τ' ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς
ἐδίδοσαν, ὅτε καθισταῖέν τινα τῆς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν αἰσυμ-
νήτην ἢ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ' ᾔτει τοὺς φύλακας,
συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας)·
1287a. **16** Περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα
πράττοντος ὅ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν καὶ ποιητέον τὴν σκέ-
ψιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἔστιν
εἶδος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρ-
χειν ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν ἀίδιον, οἷον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ
ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως·

τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, καὶ περὶ
2 Ὀποῦντα δὲ κατά τι μέρος ἔλαττον)· περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβα-
σιλείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει πάντα κατὰ
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς—δοκεῖ δέ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ
φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπου
συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἡ πόλις· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ
αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν
εἶναι, ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφὴν ἢ
ἐσθῆτα βλαβερὸν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς
3 τιμάς, ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τοὺς ἴσους· διόπερ οὐδὲν
μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοίνυν
ὡσαύτως. τοῦτο δ' ἤδη νόμος· ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν
ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα
4 τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τινας ἄρχειν
βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς
νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναί τινας ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕνα τοῦ-
τον εἶναί φασι δίκαιον ὁμοίων γε ὄντων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν
ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος
5 ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος
ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν
τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ
πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον
κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν
μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε
γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ
τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.
6 τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος, ὅτι τὸ
κατὰ γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱρετώτερον
7 χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φι-
λίαν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρνυνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς
κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς
πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς δια-

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φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν
ζητήσαιεν ἂν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονταί γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς 8
1287 b οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ-
μναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς
διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περί τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον
ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ νόμος τὸ
μέσον. ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμ- 9
ματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμ-
ματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ
ἔθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει
ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας,
ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα
καταστῆσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον 10
ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δί-
καιος, τοῦ δὲ ἑνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ
"σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω" καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, "τοιοῦ-
τοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες." εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ
ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος
ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβη-
τεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν.
ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ 11
δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον
τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄρι-
στον· περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοθετῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων
ἐστίν. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄν-
θρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ
ἕνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαι- 12
δευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπόν τ' ἴσως ἂν εἶναι
δόξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἴδοι τις δυοῖν ὄμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοαῖς
κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολ-
λοῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν
αὐτῶν καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας· τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ
αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες 13

οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι κἀκείνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, ὥστ' εἰ τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἴεται δεῖν ὁμοίως. ἃ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασι- 35
λείαν λέγουσι, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτ' ἐπὶ μέν 17
τινων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δέ τινων οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον· τυραννικὸν δ' οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ὅσαι παρεκβάσεις εἰσίν· 40
2 ταῦτα γὰρ γίγνεται παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον 1288 a
ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν
3 ἀμείνων ᾖ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον· 5
εἴρηται δέ πως ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ βασιλευτὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν.
4 βασιλευτὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι 10
δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικόν, δυνάμενον ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα
5 τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς. ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν 15
ἄλλων ἕνα τινὰ συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων
6 καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον, οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ προφέρειν εἰώθασιν 20
οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες, οἵ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικάς (πάντῃ γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτήν),

ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ 7
φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν δή που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν,
οὔτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος
ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν
ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ 8
τοιούτῳ, καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς.
περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον
οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πῶς,
**18** διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμὲν εἶναι τὰς
ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τούτων δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ
τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομουμένην, τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ συμβέβη-
κεν ἢ ἕνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος ὑπερέχον
εἶναι κατ' ἀρετήν, τῶν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ' ἄρχειν
πρὸς τὴν αἱρετωτάτην ζωήν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοις
ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ πολίτου
τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ
διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνήρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συστή-
σειεν ἂν τις ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην, ὥστ' ἔσται
1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη ταὐτὰ σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον
ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν. διωρισμέ- 2
νων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς
ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.
[ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσή-
κουσαν σκέψιν]

## Δ' (Η').

1288 b 5 Ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν
1323 a 14 προσήκουσαν σκέψιν [περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα
15 ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη] διορίσασθαι
πρῶτον τίς αἱρετώτατος βίος. ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ
τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτείαν· ἄριστα γὰρ
πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρ-

2 χόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μή τι γίγνηται παράλογον. διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον
ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώτατος βίος, μετὰ
δὲ τοῦτο πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος. νομί-
σαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτε-
ρικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.
3 ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρός γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητή-
σειεν ἂν ὡς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν
τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν
4 τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηδὲν
μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης
μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας
μυίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηδενός, ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ
πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἕνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα
τοὺς φιλτάτους φίλους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν
οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινό-
5 μενον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἂν συγ-
χωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.
τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἱκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὁποσονοῦν,
πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάν-
6 των τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἡμεῖς
δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ῥᾴδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν
ἔργων διαλαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ
φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις,
καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ 1323 b
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ
ἦθος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν,
περὶ δὲ τὴν ἕξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, ἢ τοῖς
ἐκεῖνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις
ἐλλείπουσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπουμένοις
7 εὐσύνοπτόν ἐστιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ
ὄργανόν τι· πᾶν δὲ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν, ὧν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
ἢ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῖς
ἔχουσιν· τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἕκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὅσῳ περ ἂν

ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι, εἰ δεῖ καὶ τούτοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον. ὅλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ἥπερ εἴληφε διάστασιν ὧν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμιώτερον καὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἱρετὰ καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχήν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς αἴτιον ταὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστίν)· ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν· οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὔτ' ἀνδρὸς οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὧν μετασχὼν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστω πεφροιμιασμένα τῷ λόγῳ (οὔτε γὰρ μὴ θιγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατόν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους· ἑτέρας γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα· νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετὰ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν

1324 a

μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὕστερον, εἴ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχάνει μὴ πειθόμενος)·

Πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἑνός τε ἑκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, λοιπόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὖ τίθενται ἐφ' ἑνός, οὗτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐὰν ᾖ πλουσία, μακαρίζουσιν· ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην ἂν εἶναι φαῖεν· εἴ τέ τις τὸν ἕνα δι' ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη δύο ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἓν μὲν πότερος αἱρετώτερος βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος, ἔτι δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν θετέον καὶ ποίαν διάθεσιν πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἱρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον αἱρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προῃρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ πάρεργον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο δὲ ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης· ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῴη μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμολογούντων τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἱρετώτατον, πότερον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἱρετὸς ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικός τις, ὃν μόνον τινές φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτους τοὺς δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν φαίνονται προαιρούμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν· λέγω δὲ δύο τόν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τόν γε εὖ φρονοῦντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον καὶ κοινῇ τὴν πολιτείαν. νομίζουσι δ' οἱ

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

μὲν, τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γιγνόμενον μετ' ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ· τούτων δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἕτεροι τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες, μόνον γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν, ἐφ' ἑκάστης γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις
1324 b ἢ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτευομένοις. οἱ μὲν οὖν 8
οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαίμονά φασιν. παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτος ὅρος καὶ τῶν νόμων, ὅπως δεσπόζωσι τῶν πέλας. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην 9
ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως εἴ πού τι πρὸς ἓν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονται πάντες, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέτακται σχεδὸν ἥ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος. ἔτι δ' ἐν 10
τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη τετίμηται δύναμις, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θρᾳξὶ καὶ Κελτοῖς· ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινές εἰσι παροξύνοντες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν ὅσας ἂν στρατεύσωνται στρατείας· ἦν δέ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν νόμος τὸν 11
μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεζῶσθαι τὴν φορβειάν· ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῇ τινὶ σκύφον περιφερόμενον τῷ μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότι πολέμιον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἴβηρσιν, ἔθνει πολεμικῷ, τοσούτους τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμίων· καὶ ἕτερα δὴ παρ' ἑτέροις ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα πολλά, 12
τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἄγαν ἄτοπον ἴσως εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἀρχῇ καὶ δεσπόζῃ τῶν πλησίον καὶ βουλομένων καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικόν, ὅ γε μηδὲ 13
νόμιμόν ἐστιν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως ἀλλὰ

καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δ' ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆρας.

14 ἀλλ' ἐοίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἴεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἕκαστοι οὕ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες· αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς

15 δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποστόν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δεῖ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυσίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτόν· ἔστι δὲ θη-

16 ρευτὸν ὃ ἂν ἄγριον ᾖ ἐδεστὸν ζῷον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γ' ἂν καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμων, ἣ πολιτεύεται δηλονότι καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαί που καθ' ἑαυτὴν νόμοις χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ἧς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων·

17 μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνου χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς πῶς

18 μεθέξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας. διοίσει μέντοι τῶν ταττομένων ἔνια νομίμων· καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἑκάστους χρηστέον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κἂν ὕστερον τύχοι τῆς προσηκούσης σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν·

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον **3** αἱρετώτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμάζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τόν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου

βίον ἕτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετώτατον, οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηδὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταὐτόν) ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ δὲ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων· τοῦτο 2 γὰρ ἀληθές· οὐδὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλῳ, ᾗ δοῦλος, χρῆσθαι σεμνόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δεσποτείαν οὐκ ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον διέστηκεν ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον τοῦ φύσει δούλου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν 3 οὐκ ἀληθές· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. καίτοι τάχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖ 4 τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παῖδας πατρὸς μήθ' ὅλως φίλον φίλου μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἱρετώτατον, τὸ δ' εὖ πράττειν ἄριστον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν, εἴπερ ὑπάρ-
1325 b ξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἱρετώτατον· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτίθενται 5 τοῦτο ψεῦδος· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων· ὥστε ὁ παραβαίνων οὐδὲν ἂν τηλικοῦτον κατορθώσειεν ὕστερον ὅσον ἤδη παρεκβέβηκε τῆς ἀρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ (ἐν) μέρει, τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις 6 καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλόν. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ᾖ κρείττων κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτῳ

καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ' οὐ μόνον ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἣν ἔσται πρακτικός. ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γιγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξίς τις· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ' αὑτὰς πόλεις ἱδρυμένας καὶ ζῆν οὕτω προῃρημένας· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· πολλαὶ γὰρ κοινωνίαι πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς πόλεώς εἰσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ἑνὸς ὁτουοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν ἄριστον ἑκάστῳ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φανερόν ἐστιν·

4 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφροιμίασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον ποίας τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἄνευ συμμέτρου χορηγίας. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι καθάπερ εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ οἷον περί τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἷον ὑφάντῃ καὶ ναυπηγῷ, δεῖ τὴν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείαν οὖσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν αὕτη τυγχάνῃ παρεσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ

τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσαν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον 4 τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὡσαύτως, ὅσην τε εἶναι καὶ ποίαν τινὰ ταύτην. οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλεῖστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν εὐδαίμονα πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἀγνοοῦσι ποία μεγάλη καὶ ποία μικρὰ πόλις. κατ' 5 ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὥστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστ' ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην, οἷον Ἱπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ ἰατρὸν εἶναι μείζω φήσειεν ἄν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ 6 μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ δεῖ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντας, οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος τοῦτο ποιητέον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἴσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλ' ὅσοι πόλεώς εἰσι μέρος καὶ ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μορίων· ἡ γὰρ τούτων ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ πλήθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, ἐξ ἧς δὲ βάναυσοι μὲν ἐξέρχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὁπλῖται δὲ ὀλίγοι, ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν μεγάλη τε πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γε ἐκ τῶν 7 ἔργων φανερὸν ὅτι χαλεπόν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον, εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὁρῶμεν οὖσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὅ τε γὰρ 8 νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν εἶναι, ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως· θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν· ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλις ἧς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς 9 ὅρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάν-

10 των, ζῴων φυτῶν ὀργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἕξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως, ὁτὲ δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται πλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίοιν, εἰς δέ τι μέγεθος ἐλθὸν ὁτὲ μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιήσει τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὁτὲ δὲ 1326 b
11 διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἡ δὲ πόλις αὔταρκες), ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις· πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὑπάρχειν· τίς γὰρ στρατηγὸς ἔσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλήθους, ἢ τίς κῆρυξ μὴ Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρώτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ τοσούτου πλήθους ὃ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν
12 ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν· ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλῆθος εἶναι μείζω πόλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ εἰπομεν, ἀόριστον. τίς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν ῥᾴδιον. εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων,
13 ἄρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ' ἀξίαν ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποῖοί τινές εἰσι, τοὺς πολίτας, ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, φαύλως ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις· περὶ ἀμφότερα γὰρ οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, ὅπερ ἐν
14 τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερῶς. ἔτι δὲ ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις ῥᾴδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας· οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους. δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνοπτος. περὶ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·

Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. περὶ 5
μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινά, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν· τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παν-

τοφόρον· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς
30 αὔταρκες. πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ὥστε δύνασθαι
τοὺς οἰκοῦντας ζῆν σχολάζοντας ἐλευθερίως ἅμα καὶ σω-
φρόνως. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὅρον εἰ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγομεν, 2
ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτή-
σεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίνῃ ποιεῖσθαι
35 μνείαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν
αὐτήν· πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφισ-
βητήσεις διὰ τοὺς ἔλκοντας ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν
ὑπερβολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλισχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν
τρυφήν. τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν (δεῖ δ' ἔνια 3
40 πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐμπείροις), ὅτι χρὴ
μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον.
1327 a ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον ἔφα-
μεν εἶναι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν· τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον τὸ
εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν
εἰ χρὴ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχήν, πρός τε τὴν θάλατταν προσήκει
5 κεῖσθαι καλῶς πρός τε τὴν χώραν. εἷς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς 4
ὅρος· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοινὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων
ἁπάντων· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν
παραπομπάς, ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, κἂν εἴ τινα
ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυγχάνοι κεκτημένη τοιαύτην,
10 εὐπαρακόμιστον.

6 Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον
ὠφέλιμος ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ βλαβερά, πολλὰ
τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιξενοῦσθαί τινας
ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένους νόμοις ἀσύμφορον εἶναί φασι πρὸς
15 τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν· γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ
ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους
ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ' εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι
καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ 2
πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέ-
20 χειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκ ἄδηλον.

3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ῥᾷον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους
εἶναι δεῖ κατ' ἀμφότερα τοὺς σωθησομένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν
καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν· καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμέ-
νους, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄμφω δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρ-
4 ξει μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν. ὅσα τ' ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ
παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα
τῶν γιγνομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν· αὐτῇ
γὰρ ἐμπορικήν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν·
οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσόδου
χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν· ἣν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης
μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ' ἐμπόριον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τοιοῦτον.
5 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις
καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν
πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε πόρρω λίαν,
ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι,
φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι διὰ τῆς
κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δέ
τι βλαβερόν, φυλάξασθαι ῥᾴδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας
καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμίσγεσθαι δεῖ
6 πρὸς ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὲν
βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τινὸς πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ
μόνον αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίον τισὶ δεῖ καὶ φοβεροὺς 1327 b
εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὥσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ
7 θάλατταν)· περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως
ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως· εἰ μὲν γὰρ
ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύ-
την τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον.
τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν
ὄχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν γὰρ
8 αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατι-
κὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζευόντων ἐστίν, ὃ κύριόν ἐστι καὶ
κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας· πλήθους δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοίκων
καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργούντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι

καὶ ναυτῶν. ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισίν, οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι τριήρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεων καὶ 9
θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἔστω διωρισμένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους, τίνα μὲν
7 ὅρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἴπομεν, ποίους δέ τινας τὴν φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ, νῦν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν δὴ κατανοήσειεν ἄν τις τοῦτό γε, βλέψας ἐπί τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμούσας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διείληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη 2
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μέν ἐστι πλήρη, διανοίας δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἄθυμα δέ, διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ 3
τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει· καὶ γὰρ ἔνθυμον καὶ διανοητικόν ἐστιν· διόπερ ἐλεύθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ 4
τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη [καὶ] πρὸς ἄλληλα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ [τε] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ διανοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. ὅπερ γάρ 5
φασί τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς
1328 a δύναμις ᾗ φιλοῦμεν. σημεῖον δέ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος προσηκόντως 6
τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν·

σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεο.

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμός.

7 οὐ καλῶς δ' ἔχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας· πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ εἶναι χρὴ τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας. τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἴρηται

8 πρότερον, ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον· παρ' οἷς γὰρ ὀφείλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὅθεν εἴρηται "χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν" καὶ "οἵ τοι πέρα στέρξαντες, οἵδε καὶ πέρα μισοῦσιν."

9 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισται σχεδόν (οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διά τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως)· ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων **8** τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταὐτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως, ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν,

2 οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς, ἐξ ἧς ἕν τι τὸ γένος. ἓν γάρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἄν τε ἴσον ἄν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν, οἷον εἴτε τροφὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν

3 εἴτε χώρας πλῆθος εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν· ὅταν δ' ᾖ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἕνεκεν τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκεν, οὐδὲν ἓν γε τούτοις κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον ὀργάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς· οἰκία γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται κοινόν,

4 ἀλλ' ἔστι τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἡ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεώς ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἕνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδε-

5 χομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ

ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως
ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς, τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ
40 μηδέν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλεως εἴδη καὶ
διαφορὰς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους· ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι'
1328 b ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες τούς τε βίους ἑτέρους ποιοῦν-
ται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτί ἐστιν 6
ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη· καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πό-
λεως, ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη (ἃ) ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον
5 τοίνυν τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν 7
γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοι-
νωνοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὅπλα πρός τε τὴν
ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀδικεῖν
10 ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ
πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὑτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς, πέμπτον
δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν
ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαιότατον
κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς
15 ἀλλήλους. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα 8
πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλῆθός ἐστιν οὐ τὸ τυχόν,
ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὔταρκες, ὡς φαμέν, ἐὰν δέ τι τυγ-
χάνῃ τούτων ἐκλεῖπον, ἀδύνατον ἁπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοι-
νωνίαν εἶναι ταύτην)· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας 9
20 ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν· δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν τ' εἶναι πλῆθος,
οἳ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχι-
μον, καὶ τὸ εὔπορον, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων
καὶ συμφερόντων·

**9** Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι
25 κοινωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαν-
τας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους
καὶ δικάζοντας) ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους
ὑποθετέον, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν.
οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτείᾳ. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, 2

ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων, καὶ μὴ πάντας
πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πο-
λιτείας ἑτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι
3 πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοὐναντίον. ἐπεὶ
δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη
δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων, τὴν δ'
εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται
πρότερον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευο-
μένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ
μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάναυσον βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον δεῖ
ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννὴς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς
4 ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας
ἔσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς 1329 a
καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πο-
λεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ
κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς
πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πότερον ἕτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετέον ἢ
5 τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι
τρόπον μέν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ ἑτέροις.
ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρας ἀκμῆς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν
δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἑτέροις· ᾗ δὲ τῶν ἀδυ-
νάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους
ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους ἀεί, ταύτῃ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς· οἱ γὰρ τῶν
ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν.
6 λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν
πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἅμα δέ· ἀλλ', ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, ἡ
μὲν δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις
ἐστίν, οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον
7 εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ
μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ (εἶναι) περὶ τούτους· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ
εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι. τὸ γὰρ
βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν γένος ὃ
μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν ἐστιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς

ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγ- 8
καῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἢ] περιοίκους. λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος. φανερὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε 9
βάναυσον ἱερέα καταστατέον· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς· ἐπεὶ δὲ διῄρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει δὲ τήν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον. ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ 10
πόλις οὐ συνίσταται, καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται (γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν ἀεί, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος)·

10 Ἔοικε δ' οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διῃρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη
1329 b τὴν πόλιν καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν· ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γὰρ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἔτι καὶ νῦν, τά τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἴγυπτον Σεσώστριος, ὡς φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην. ἀρχαία δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ 2
τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγιοι τῶν ἐκεῖ κατοικούντων Ἰταλόν 3
τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτρίας, ἀφ' οὗ τό τε ὄνομα μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλοὺς ἀντ' Οἰνωτρῶν κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰταλίαν τοὔνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὖσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὁδὸν ἡμι-

σείας ἡμέρας. τοῦτον δὴ λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομάδας τοὺς Οἰνωτροὺς ὄντας ποιῆσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους ἄλλους τε αὐτοῖς θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστῆσαι πρῶτον. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινὲς χρῶνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις. ᾤκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν Ὀπικοὶ καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν Αὔσονες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον Χῶνες, τὴν καλουμένην Σιρῖτιν· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες Οἰνωτροὶ τὸ γένος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν γέγονε πρῶτον, ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους ἐξ Αἰγύπτου· πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὔλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὔξησιν· ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἴεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον· ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτόν ἐστιν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιότατοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασι καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἰρημένοις ἱκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα πειρᾶσθαι ζητεῖν.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἑτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ πόσην τινὰ χρὴ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν· περὶ δὲ τῆς διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργούντων, τίνας καὶ ποίους εἶναι χρή, λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κοινὴν φαμεν εἶναι δεῖν τὴν κτῆσιν, ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς γινομένην κοινήν, οὔτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς. περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὖ κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν συνδοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν

πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεώς ἐστιν. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν εἰς δύο μέρη 11
διῃρῆσθαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινὴν τὴν δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν διῃρῆσθαι δίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατιάς, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλήρων ἑκάστῳ νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν· τό τε γὰρ ἴσον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους ὁμονοητικώτερον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον 12
ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους ἔχθρας, οἱ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλόν. διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις νόμος ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τοῖς ὁμόροις μὴ συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἴδιον οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλεύσασθαι καλῶς. τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν 13
ἀνάγκη διῃρῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχήν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρός τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶεν χρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύσιν. τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν [ἰδίους] ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι ἰδίους τῶν κε- 14
κτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινούς. τίνα δὲ δεῖ τρόπον χρῆσθαι δούλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς δούλοις ἆθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.

**11** Τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς ἠπείρου τε καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἁπάσης ὁμοίως ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εἴρηται πρότερον· αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας, πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς ὑγίειαν (αἵ τε 2

γὰρ πρὸς ἕω τὴν ἔγκλισιν ἔχουσαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα τὰ πνέοντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ὑγιεινότεραι, δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν· εὐχείμεροι γὰρ αὗται μᾶλλον)· τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον, ὑδάτων τε καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλῆθος οἰκεῖον, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῦτό γε εὕρηται διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν ὑποδοχὰς ὀμβρίοις ὕδασιν ἀφθόνους καὶ μεγάλας, ὥστε μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον· ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ περὶ ὑγιείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικούντων, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κεῖσθαι τὸν τόπον ἔν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι, καὶ τούτου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέργως. οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διόπερ ἐν ταῖς εὖ φρονούσαις δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ πάνθ' ὅμοια μήτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων ᾖ ναμάτων, χωρὶς τά τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ τόπων τῶν ἐρυμνῶν, οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαις· οἷον ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικόν, δημοκρατικὸν δ' ὁμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἂν εὔτομος ᾖ καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἱπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας τοὐναντίον, ὡς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον· δυσέξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχεται γάρ, ἄν τις οὕτω κατασκευάζῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς ἃς καλοῦσί τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν ὅλην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὔτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους·

οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον ἕξει καλῶς.
περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρε- 8
τῆς ἀντιποιουμένας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν,
καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλω-
πισαμένας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ 9
πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειρᾶσθαι σώζεσθαι διὰ
τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ
ἐνδέχεται πλείω τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόντων καὶ
τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δεῖ
σώζεσθαι καὶ μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν
ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰητέον εἶναι πολε-
1331 a μικωτάτην, ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὑρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ
βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας.
ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀξιοῦν 10
καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περιαιρεῖν τοὺς
ὀρεινοὺς τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις μὴ
περιβάλλειν τοίχους ὡς ἀνάνδρων ἐσομένων τῶν κατοικούν-
των. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γε δεῖ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν 11
περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξεστιν ἀμφοτέρως
χρῆσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἐχούσαις τείχη καὶ ὡς μὴ
ἐχούσαις, ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημέναις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον
ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχῃ τῇ
πόλει πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τάς τε
ἄλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπιτι- 12
θεμένοις ἐπιμελές ἐστι δι' ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν, οὕτω
τὰ μὲν εὕρηται τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοὺς
φυλαττομένους· ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθεσθαι
τοῖς εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις.

**12** Ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συσσι-
τίοις κατανενεμῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τείχη διειλῆφθαι φυλακτη-
ρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ
προκαλεῖται παρασκευάζειν ἔνια τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις

2 τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἂν τις διακοσμήσειε τὸν τρόπον, τὰς δὲ τοῖς θείοις ἀποδεδομένας οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια ἁρμόττει τόπον ἐπιτήδειόν τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἤ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρη-
3 στον. εἴη δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἵαν καὶ περὶ
4 Θετταλίαν ὀνομάζουσιν, ἣν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἣν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὠνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε βάναυσον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τοιοῦτον παραβάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων (εἴη δ' ἂν εὔχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
5 ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα· πρέπει γὰρ διῃρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἄρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρουσία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευ-
6 θέρων φόβον)· τὴν δὲ τῶν ὠνίων ἀγορὰν ἑτέραν τε δεῖ ταύτης εἶναι καὶ χωρίς, ἔχουσαν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον τοῖς τε ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης πεμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ †πλῆθος† διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς, εἰς ἄρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια περὶ τὴν τῶν
7 ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' ἀρχείων ὅσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περί τε γραφὰς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἀγορᾷ μὲν δεῖ καὶ συνόδῳ τινὶ κοινῇ κατεσκευάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγοράν ἐστι τόπος· ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ
8 πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις. νενεμῆσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς

ἄρχουσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὑλωροὺς οἱ δὲ ἀγρονόμους, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακὴν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νενεμημένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἥρωσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβο- 9
λογουμένους καὶ λέγοντας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργόν ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ χαλεπόν ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. διὸ περὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τό γε ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν,

**13** Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ ἐκ ποίων δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ δύ' ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς 2
γίγνεται τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, τούτοιν δ' ἐστὶν ἓν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἓν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὑρίσκειν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφωνεῖν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἔκκειται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἔθεντο φαῦλον, ὁτὲ δὲ ἑκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οἷον περὶ ἰατρικήν· οὔτε γὰρ ποιόν τι δεῖ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον εἶναι σῶμα κρίνουσιν ἐνίοτε καλῶς, οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὅρον τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιητικῶν· δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμφότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις)· ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται 3
πάντες, φανερόν, ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνειν, τοῖς δὲ οὔ, διά τινα φύσιν ἢ τύχην (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χο-
1332 a ρηγίας τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάττονος μὲν τοῖς ἄμεινον διακειμένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῖς χεῖρον), οἱ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ 4
ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ'
ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄριστ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἄριστα δ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν,

δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι, μὴ λανθάνειν. φαμὲν
δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος,
ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην
6 οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς. λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
τἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δ' ἁπλῶς τὸ καλῶς· οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δι-
καίας πράξεις αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρε-
τῆς μέν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως
ἔχουσιν (αἱρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων
μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ
7 τὰς εὐπορίας ἁπλῶς εἰσὶ κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ἕτερον κακοῦ τινὸς αἵρεσίς ἐστιν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις
τοὐναντίον· κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις.
χρήσαιτο δ' ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ νόσῳ καὶ
ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον
ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς
ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ᾧ διὰ τὴν
8 ἀρετὴν τὰ ἀγαθά ἐστι τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ
τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας
ἁπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἴτια
τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμ-
πρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῷτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.
ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, τὰ
9 δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατ' εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα
τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν, ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία· κυρίαν γὰρ
ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν· τὸ δὲ σπουδαίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι
τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν
σπουδαία γε πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας
τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους· ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται
10 μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γί-
νεται σπουδαῖος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους
εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἱρετώτερον·
ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας. ἀλλὰ μὴν
11 ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ τρία δὲ

ταῦτά ἐστι φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῴων, οὕτω καὶ ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἔνιά τε οὐδὲν ὄφελος
1332 b φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γάρ ἐστι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν 12
τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ
καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον. ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις· πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον. τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἵους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλον- 13
τας εὐχειρώτους ἕσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον,
τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἤδη παιδείας· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες.

**14** Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, τοῦτο δὴ σκεπτέον, εἰ ἑτέρους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ
βίου· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον 2
διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντας ὑπερβολήν, εἶτα κατὰ
τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὥσπερ 3
ἐν Ἰνδοῖς φησὶ Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον διαφέροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. τό τε γὰρ ἴσον ταὐτὸν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, καὶ χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν 4
βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν· τοσούτους τε εἶναι

τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι κρείττους πάντων τούτων, ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβήτητον. πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσι, δεῖ σκέ-
5 ψασθαι τὸν νομοθέτην. εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. 35
ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα αὐτὸ τῷ γένει ταὐτὸ τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει, τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν· ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ οὐδεὶς καθ' ἡλικίαν ἀρχόμενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττων, ἄλλως τε καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον, ὅταν τύχῃ τῆς 40
6 ἱκνουμένης ἡλικίας. ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἑτέρους. ὥστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἑτέραν 1333 a
εἶναι. τόν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναί φασι δεῖν πρῶτον. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴρηται λόγοις, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχομένου.
7 τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναί φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐλευ- 5
θέρων. διαφέρει δ' ἔνια τῶν ἐπιταττομένων οὐ τοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκα. διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκούντων διακονικῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλὸν διακονεῖν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτω διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ' αὑτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ 10
8 τίνος ἕνεκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν ἀρχόμενόν τε δεῖν γίγνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὕστερον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γίγνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ 15
9 τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς. διῄρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' αὑτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὑτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον. ὧν φαμὲν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθ' ἃς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς λέγεταί πως. τούτων δ' ἐν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διαιροῦσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς 20
10 φαμὲν οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς λεκτέον. αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ

βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον· διῄρηταί τε διχῇ καθ' ὅνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαι-
25 ρεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικός ἐστι λόγος ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός. ὡσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δηλονότι· 11 καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίονος αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τοῦθ' αἱρε-
30 τώτατον, οὗ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου. διῄρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς 12 ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς σχολὴν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά. περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν 13 αἵρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξε-
35 σιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἕνεκεν. πρὸς πάντα μὲν τοίνυν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετητέον, καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν 14
40 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων διαιρέσεις· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πο-
1333 b λεμεῖν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τἀναγκαῖα καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ μᾶλλον. ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παῖδας ἔτι ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται
5 παιδείας. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν 15 Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς πολιτείας, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαντες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὔτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν
10 πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ὕστερόν τινες γραψάντων 16 ἀπεφήναντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν· ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἄγανται τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπόν, ὅτι

πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν· ἃ
καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὐέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξε-
17 λήλεγκται νῦν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων
ζηλοῦσι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὅτι πολλὴ χορηγία γίγνεται
τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται τὸν
τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος τῶν γρα-
φόντων περὶ (τῆς) πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι
18 πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἦρχον· καίτοι δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ
νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαί-
μονες, οὐδ' ὁ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ
μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος
πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν κα-
19 λῶς. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἣν
δεῖ τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην· τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς
ἄρχειν ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ'
ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομί-
ζειν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ
τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν· ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην.
20 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο πει-
ρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν·
ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Παυσανίᾳ τῷ βασιλεῖ, καίπερ
ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμήν. οὔτε δὴ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιού-
των λόγων καὶ νόμων οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὠφέλιμος οὔτε ἀληθής ἐστιν.
21 ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ, τόν (τε) νομοθέτην
ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τήν τε τῶν
πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν οὐ τούτου χάριν δεῖ μελετᾶν, ἵνα κατα-
δουλώσωνται τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλ' ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ
δουλεύσωσιν ἑτέροις, ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς
ὠφελείας ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο- 1334 a
22 τείας· τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ
δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ
τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν
ἕνεκεν τάξῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα τοῖς

λόγοις· αἱ γὰρ πλεῖσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σώζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται. τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀφιᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες. αἴτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν.

15 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπάρχειν· τέλος γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου, σχολὴ δ' ἀσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν 2 καὶ διαγωγήν, ὧν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀσχολίᾳ. δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως ἐξῇ σχολάζειν· διὸ σώφρονα τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικήν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως δοῦλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρίας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 3 δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρόνοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ 4 πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἴ τινές εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταί φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις· μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ 5 σπουδαίαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέχειν, φανερόν. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι

ἀγαθούς, εἰρήνην δ' ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώ-
6 δεις. διὸ δεῖ μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις τὴν ἀρε- 40
τὴν ἀσκεῖν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλ-
λων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν 1334 b
ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διά τινος ἀρε-
τῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν
τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν . . . καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν, φανερὸν
ἐκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον. 5
7 τυγχάνομεν δὴ διῃρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους
καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μέν τινας εἶναι χρὴ τὴν
φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παι-
δευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ
πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχε- 10
ται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-
8 θέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίων ἦχθαι. φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτό
γε πρῶτον μέν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ'
ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους, ὁ
δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς 15
τούτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐθῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν
9 μελέτην, ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δύ' ἐστίν, οὕτω
καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρῶμεν δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ
λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἕξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν,
ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστιν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς· ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα 20
πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ
10 λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βού-
λησις, ἔτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊοῦσιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι
πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν 25
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα τὴν
τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἕνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ
τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

Εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως **16**
βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γένηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν 30

ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὄντας
χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν. δεῖ δ' 2
ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτούς
τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλι-
35 κίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνά-
μεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,
ἢ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μή (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στά-
σεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς)· ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν
τῶν τέκνων διαδοχήν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς 3
40 ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν
πρεσβυτέροις ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν
1335 a πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις), οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι
(πολλὴν γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν· ἥ τε γὰρ αἰδὼς ἧττον ὑπάρ-
χει τοῖς τοιούτοις ὥσπερ ἡλικιώταις, καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν
ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς)· ἔτι δ', ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο 4
5 μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχῃ πρὸς
τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ταῦτα
συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὥρισται τέλος 5
τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ
τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ
10 γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεύξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν εἰς
τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συν- 6
δυασμὸς φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζῴοις
ἀτελῆ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ
τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ταὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν καὶ
15 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν
πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζεται τὸ νέους συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτε-
λεῖς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματά εἰσιν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις 7
αἱ νέαι πονοῦσί τε μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους· διὸ
καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν γενέσθαι τινές φασι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν
20 τοῖς Τροιζηνίοις, ὡς πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμί-
σκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κο-
μιδήν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδό- 8

σεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνουσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, ἐὰν ἔτι τοῦ σπέρματος αὐξανομένου ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ γὰρ τούτου τις ὡρισμένος χρόνος, ὃν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθύον ἔτι 9 (ἢ μικρόν). διὸ τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς δ' ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα [, ἢ μικρόν]· ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσί τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται 10 τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πότε δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἴρηται, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι οἷς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶνται καλῶς καὶ νῦν, ὁρίσαντες χειμῶνος τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην. 11 δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν τά τε παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν· οἵ τε γὰρ ἰατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων ἱκανῶς λέγουσι, καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νοτίων 1335 b 12 ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποίων δέ τινων τῶν σωμάτων ὑπαρχόντων μάλιστ' (ἂν) ὄφελος εἴη τοῖς γεννωμένοις, ἐπιστήσασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας, τύπῳ δὲ ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν χρήσιμος ἕξις πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τεκνοποιίαν, οὔτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοπονητικὴ λίαν, 13 ἀλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἕξιν, πεπονημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίοις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἕνα μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἕξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐλευθέρων πράξεις. ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἀνδράσι 14 καὶ γυναιξίν. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, μὴ ῥᾳθυμούσας μηδ' ἀραιᾷ τροφῇ χρωμένας. τοῦτο δὲ ῥᾴδιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καθ'

ἡμέραν τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπείαν τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμήν. τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν τοὐναντίον τῶν σωμάτων ῥᾳθυμοτέρως ἁρμόττει διάγειν· ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχούσης ὥσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων, ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, ἐὰν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύῃ, μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· ὡρίσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν δέ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διώρισται, πότε ἄρχεσθαι χρὴ τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἁρμόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν ὡρίσθω· τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῆ γίνεται καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῆ. διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμὴν· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἥνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν. ὥστε τέτταρσιν ἢ πέντε ἔτεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγιείας χάριν ἤ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἔστω μὲν ἁπλῶς μὴ καλὸν ἁπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ᾖ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις, περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας ἐάν τις φαίνηται τοιοῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμίᾳ ζημιούσθω πρεπούσῃ πρὸς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν.

15 16 17 1336 a

**17** Γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἴεσθαι μεγάλην εἶναι διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν, ὁποία τις ἂν ᾖ. φαίνεταί τε διά τε τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἐπισκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν οἷς ἐπιμελές ἐστιν ἄγειν τὴν

πολεμικὴν ἕξιν, ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα τροφὴ μάλιστ'
2 οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀοινοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἔτι
δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσας ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τηλικούτων συμ-
φέρει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπαλό- 10
τητα χρῶνται καὶ νῦν ἔνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μη-
χανικοῖς, ἃ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές. συμ-
φέρει δ' εὐθὺς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν
παίδων· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς
3 πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρ- 15
βάρων ἔθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γιγνό-
μενα ψυχρόν, τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα μικρὸν ἀμπίσχειν, οἷον
Κελτοῖς. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐθίζειν, εὐθὺς ἀρχο-
μένων βέλτιον μὲν ἐθίζειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἐθίζειν·
εὐφυὴς δ' ἡ τῶν παίδων ἕξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν 20
4 ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρώτην συμφέρει ποιεῖ-
σθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτῃ παραπλη-
σίαν· τὴν δ' ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἐτῶν,
ἣν οὔτε πω πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν· οὐδεμίαν
οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὔξησιν ἐμποδί- 25
ζωσιν, δεῖ δὲ τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὥστε διαφεύγειν
τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων· ἣν χρὴ παρασκευάζειν καὶ δι'
5 ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδιᾶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς
παιδιὰς εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρους μήτε ἐπιπόνους μήτε ἀνει-
μένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ 30
τοὺς τηλικούτους, ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσι
παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς
τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολ-
6 λὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδασομένων. τὰς δὲ διατά-
σεις τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ 35
κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὔξησιν·
γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασίᾳ τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ
τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, ὃ
7 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ

τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τήν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλι-
1336 b κίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. εὔλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως 8
μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὁτιοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς), μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον· ἐὰν δέ τις φαίνηταί τι λέγων ἢ πράττων τῶν 9
ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἠξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἀτιμίαις κολάζειν καὶ πλη- 10
γαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ γραφὰς ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς 10
ἄρχουσι μηδὲν μήτε ἄγαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος [τοὺς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἱκνουμένην] καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεούς.
τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὔτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας θεατὰς νομοθε- 11
τητέον, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ᾗ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γιγνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἡ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας.
νῦν μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν παραδρομῇ πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον· 12
ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ 13
κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκριτής· οὐδενὶ γὰρ πώποτε παρῆκεν ἑαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ὡς οἰκειουμένων τῶν θεατῶν ταῖς πρώταις ἀκοαῖς. συμβαίνει δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς

τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων·
14 πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς
νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μάλιστα δ' αὐτῶν ὅσα
ἔχει ἢ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν. διελθόντων δὲ τῶν πέντε
ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ δεῖ θεωροὺς ἤδη γίγνεσθαι
15 τῶν μαθήσεων, ἃς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτούς. δύο δ' εἰσὶν
ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διῃρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ
τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ μέχρι ἥβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν ἀφ'
ἥβης μέχρι τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδο-
μάσι διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ
κακῶς, δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἑπακολουθεῖν· πᾶσα 1337 a
γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλεῖπον βούλεται τῆς φύ-
16 σεως ἀναπληροῦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητέον
τάξιν τινὰ περὶ τοὺς παῖδας, ἔπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινῇ
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ' ἴδιον τρόπον (ὃ
γίγνεται καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων), τρίτον δὲ
ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην.

## Ε' (Θ').

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον περὶ
τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσειεν, καὶ γὰρ
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γιγνόμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς πο-
2 λιτείας (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάστην παιδεύεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἦθος
τῆς πολιτείας ἑκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν
πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρα-
τικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ
τὸ βέλτιστον ἦθος βελτίονος αἴτιον πολιτείας), ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ προπαιδεύεσθαι
καὶ προεθίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἑκάστων ἐργασίας, ὥστε δῆλον
3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις. ἐπεὶ δ' ἓν τὸ τέλος
τῇ πόλει πάσῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ
τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέ-

λειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὃν τρόπον νῦν ἕκα-
στος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μάθησιν
ἰδίαν, ἣν ἂν δόξῃ, διδάσκων. δεῖ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν
ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν. ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν 4
αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς
πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως· ἡ δ' ἐπιμέλεια
πέφυκεν ἑκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέ-
λειαν. ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ
γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ
ταύτην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην
2 κοινὴν ποιητέον, φανερόν· τίς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία, καὶ πῶς
χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖ-
ται περὶ τῶν ἔργων· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι
δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν
βίον τὸν ἄριστον, οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν
πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος· ἔκ τε τῆς ἐμ- 2
ποδὼν παιδείας ταραχώδης ἡ σκέψις, καὶ δῆλον οὐδὲν πό-
τερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα
πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κρι-
1337 b τάς τινας)· περί τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὁμολογούμε-
νον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶ-
σιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν αὐτῆς).
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, 3
οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διῃρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων
ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ
μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ
βάναυσον. βάναυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ 4
τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ
τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ
σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ 5
τάς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι
χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνι-
κὰς ἐργασίας· ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα-

πεινήν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μέν τινος ἐνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν 6 πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἔνοχον ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκεν πράττει τις ἢ μανθάνει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν δόξειεν ἂν πράττειν. αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν· ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παιδεύειν εἰώ- 3 θασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικήν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἀνδρίαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν 2 ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ μόνον ἄσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν 3 εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ αἱρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον ὅ τι ποιοῦντας δεῖ σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας· τέλος 4 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδιὰν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις χρηστέον ταῖς παιδιαῖς (ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἡ δὲ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστιν· τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ παιδιὰς εἰσάγεσθαι καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρῆσιν, ὡς προσάγοντας φαρμακείας χάριν· ἄνεσις γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάπαυσις· τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἔχειν 1338 a αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ζῆν 5 μακαρίως. τοῦτο δ' οὐ τοῖς ἀσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοῖς σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολῶν ἕνεκά τινος ἀσχολεῖ τέλους ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστίν, ἣν 5

οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἡδονῆς οἴονται πάντες εἶναι. ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἕκαστος καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, ὁ δ' ἄριστος τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι 6
δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν μανθάνειν ἅττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύτας τὰς μαθήσεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν 7
μουσικὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδ' ὡς χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ τὰ γράμματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλάς· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα κάλλιον· οὐδ' αὖ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκήν (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὁρῶμεν γιγνόμενον ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς)· λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ 8
διαγωγήν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτήν· ἣν γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν. διόπερ Ὅμηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν

ἀλλ' οἷον †μὲν† ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην,

καὶ οὕτω προειπὼν ἑτέρους τινάς, "οἳ καλέουσιν ἀοιδόν," φη- 9
σιν, "ὅ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἅπαντας." καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν (ὁ) Ὀδυσσεὺς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι διαγωγήν, ὅταν εὐφραινομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων "δαιτυμόνες δ' ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκουάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ ἥμενοι ἑξείης." ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὶ παιδεία τις 10
ἣν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερόν ἐστιν· πότερον δὲ μία τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὗται καὶ πῶς, ὕστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ 11
ὁδοῦ γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔχομέν τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων· ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον,

οἷον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰς
12 ἐνδέχεσθαι γίγνεσθαι δι' αὐτῶν μαθήσεις ἑτέρας, ὁμοίως 40
δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὠνίοις μὴ δια-
μαρτάνωσιν, ἀλλ' ὦσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν
ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἢ μᾶλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ 1338 b
περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρή-
σιμον ἥκιστα ἁρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευ-
13 θέροις. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν πρότερον τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἢ τῷ λόγῳ
παιδευτέον εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἢ τὴν διά- 5
νοιαν, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τοὺς παῖδας γυμνα-
στικῇ καὶ παιδοτριβικῇ· τούτων γὰρ ἡ μὲν ποιάν τινα ποιεῖ
τὴν ἕξιν τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τὰ ἔργα.

Νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμε- 4
λεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λω- 10
βῶμεναι τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ
δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἥμαρτον τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, θη-
ριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν
2 μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε
πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον 15
τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν· εἴ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρί-
σκουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν
ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ
3 μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἤθεσιν. πολλὰ
δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρω- 20
ποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον
Ἀχαιοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἠπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἕτερα,
τὰ μὲν ὁμοίως τούτοις τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἃ λῃστρικὰ μέν ἐστιν,
4 ἀνδρίας δ' οὐ μετειλήφασιν. ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας
ἴσμεν, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπε- 25
ρέχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ
τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἑτέρων· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους
γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνον μὴ
5 πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν. ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηριῶδες

δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐδένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός. οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ 6 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγώγους ποιήσαντες, βαναύσους κατεργάζονται κατά γε τὸ ἀληθές, πρὸς ἕν τε μόνον ἔργον τῇ πολιτικῇ χρησίμους ποιήσαντες, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χεῖρον, ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος, ἑτέρων. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων 7 κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν· ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν· σημεῖον γὰρ οὐ 8 μικρὸν ὅτι δύνανται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὀλυμπιονίκαις δύο τις ἂν ἢ τρεῖς εὕροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς νενικηκότας ἄνδρας τε καὶ παῖδας, διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσκοῦντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων· ὅταν δ' ἀφ' 9 ἥβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γένωνται, τότε ἁρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν, ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, τοὐναντίον γὰρ ἑκάτερος ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἐμποδίζων ὁ μὲν τοῦ σώματος πόνος τὴν διάνοιαν, ὁ δὲ ταύτης τὸ σῶμα)·

1339 a

**5** Περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνια μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρότερον, καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται τοῖς λόγοις οὓς ἄν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα 2 ἔχει δύναμιν ῥᾴδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἅμα παύει μέριμναν, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ 3 χρῶνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνῳ καὶ μέθῃ καὶ μουσικῇ·

τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις), ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον
πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ
ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν
μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαί-
4 ρειν ὀρθῶς, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς
φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων). ὅτι
μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδη-
λον· οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ
μάθησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγήν γε παισὶν ἁρμόττει
καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις· οὐδενὶ γὰρ
5 ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν ἡ τῶν παί-
δων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ
τελειωθεῖσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἂν ἕνεκα δέοι
μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ
Μήδων βασιλεῖς, δι' ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιούντων μεταλαμβάνειν
6 τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον
ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην
τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον.
εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν
ὄψων πραγματείαν αὐτοὺς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλ'
7 ἄτοπον. τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἤθη
βελτίω ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ'
οὐχ ἑτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, 1339 b
ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύ-
νανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ
8 χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν εἰ πρὸς εὐημε-
ρίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῇ· τί δεῖ μαν- 5
θάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκο-
πεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ
γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀείδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς, ἀλλὰ
καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ
9 ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος. ἀλλ' ἴσως περὶ μὲν 10
τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον, ἡ δὲ πρώτη ζήτησίς ἐστι πότε-

ρον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγήν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἥ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς 10
ἐστι, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τίς ἐστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν)· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψι- 11
λὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελῳδίας (φησὶ γοῦν καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι "βροτοῖς ἥδιστον ἀείδειν"· διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι παιδεύε-
σθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆ τῶν 12
ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἁρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς παιδιαῖς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀλλὰ καὶ
διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἂν εἴη διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ ταύτης ἡδοναῖς. συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι 13
τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος· ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονήν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων
ἔχειν ὁμοίωμά τι· τό τε γὰρ τέλος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐσομένων χάριν αἱρετόν, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐδενός εἰσι τῶν ἐσομένων ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γεγονότων, οἷον πόνων καὶ λύπης. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γίγνε- 14
σθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην ἄν τις εἰκότως ὑπολάβοι τὴν αἰτίαν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἔοικεν—οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε 15
1340 a τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς

ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἥθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλής), ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν.
16 τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοί τινες τὰ ἤθη γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα ποιοί τινες, φανερὸν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἑτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἤθους
17 πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηδὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ
18 ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν, ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι
19 τοιούτων), ὁ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον (οἷον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ δι' ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον τούτῳ καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν, οὗ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ,
20 ἡδεῖαν εἶναι), συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἤθεσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἁπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἠρέμα (σχήματα γάρ ἐστι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γιγνόμενα
21 σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ

περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς
νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γρα-
φέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἠθικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέ-
λεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι φανε- 22
ρόν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούον-
τας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον
πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως
1340 b καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλου-
μένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς
τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς
ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθου-
σιαστικοὺς δ' ἡ φρυγιστί· ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ 23
τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ
μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος
ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν
φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας. ἐκ 24
μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι δύναται ποιόν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
ἦθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν,
δῆλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς νέους.
ἔστι δὲ ἁρμόττουσα πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην ἡ δι- 25
δασκαλία τῆς μουσικῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν
ἀνήδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἑκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει
τῶν ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. καί τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἁρμονίαις
καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι· διὸ πολλοί φασι τῶν σοφῶν οἱ
μὲν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δ' ἔχειν ἁρμονίαν.

**6** Πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ χει-
ρουργοῦντας ἢ μή, καθάπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον.
οὐκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίγνε-
σθαι ποιούς τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἐν
γάρ τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶ μὴ κοινωνήσαντας
τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς 2
παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγὴν

οἴεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδόασι τοῖς παιδίοις ὅπως χρώμενοι ταύτῃ μηδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν· οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τοῖς νηπίοις ἁρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων, ἡ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγὴ
3 τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων· τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις οὐ χαλεπὸν διορίσαι, καὶ λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς φάσκοντας βάναυ-
4 σον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν μετέχειν δεῖ τῶν ἔργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ νέους μὲν ὄντας χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γινομένους τῶν μὲν ἔργων ἀφεῖσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι·
5 περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως ἣν τινες ἐπιτιμῶσιν ὡς ποιούσης τῆς μουσικῆς βαναύσους, οὐ χαλεπὸν λῦσαι σκεψαμένους μέχρι τε πόσου τῶν ἔργων κοινωνητέον τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν, καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυθμῶν κοινωνητέον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὀργάνοις τὴν μάθησιν
6 ποιητέον, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ λύσις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τρόπους τινὰς τῆς μουσικῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μήτε ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις, μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάναυσον καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρή-
7 σεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὕστερον. συμβαίνοι δ' ἂν περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συντείνοντα διαπονοῖεν, μήτε τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων, ἃ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν
8 ἀγώνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ ἂν δύνωνται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνια ζῴων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις χρηστέον.

οὔτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλο τεχνικὸν 9
ὄργανον, οἷον κιθάραν κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ
ὅσα ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἀκροατὰς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ τῆς μουσικῆς παι-
δείας ἢ τῆς ἄλλης· ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς
χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μά-
θησιν. προσθῶμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ πρὸς 10
παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αὔλησιν.
διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ
τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶ-
τον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γιγνόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπο- 11
ρίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, ἔτι τε πρότερον
καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων,
πάσης ἥπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιζη-
τοῦντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἤγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις.
καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί τις χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ηὔλησε τῷ 12
χορῷ, καὶ περὶ Ἀθήνας οὕτως ἐπεχωρίασεν ὥστε σχεδὸν οἱ
πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μετεῖχον αὐτῆς· δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ
πίνακος ὃν ἀνέθηκε Θράσιππος Ἐκφαντίδῃ χορηγήσας.
ὕστερον δ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον
δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν
συντεῖνον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἀρχαίων, 13
οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα
τοῖς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἑπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ
1341 b σαμβῦκαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεόμενα χειρουργικῆς ἐπιστήμης.
εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων
μεμυθολογημένον· φασὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν εὑροῦσαν ἀπο-
βαλεῖν τοὺς αὐλούς. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ διὰ 14
τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποιῆσαι δυσχεράνασαν
τὴν θεόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν
οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως· τῇ δὲ Ἀθηνᾷ τὴν ἐπι-
στήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὀργά- 15
νων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὴν τεχνικὴν παι-

δείαν, τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας (ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν· καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι· πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· ὁ γὰρ θεατὴς φορτικὸς ὢν μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικήν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτούς τε ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις)·

Σκεπτέον δ' ἔτι περί τε τὰς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] πότερον πάσαις χρηστέον ταῖς ἁρμονίαις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς ἢ διαιρετέον, ἔπειτα τοῖς πρὸς παιδείαν διαπονοῦσι πότερον τὸν αὐτὸν διορισμὸν θήσομεν ἢ †τρίτον δεῖ τινὰ ἕτερον, ἐπειδὴ† τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, τούτων δ' ἑκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λεληθέναι τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελῆ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὔρυθμον.

2 νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν μουσικῶν ἐνίους καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ἐμπείρως ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν καθ' ἕκαστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσομεν ζητεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις παρ' ἐκείνων, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωμεν, τοὺς τύπους
3 μόνον εἰπόντες περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσί τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες, καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων οἰκείαν ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος τιθέασι, φαμὲν δ' οὐ μιᾶς ἕνεκεν ὠφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειόνων χάριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἁπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον—τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν, πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν), φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν 1342 a

αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἑτέρων χειρουργούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. ὃ 4
γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἧττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν· ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὁρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν 5
καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὅλως παθητικούς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἑκάστῳ, καὶ πᾶσι γίγνεσθαί τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις 6
ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι (χρῆσθαι) θετέον τοὺς τὴν [θεατρικὴν] μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς (ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατὴς διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν· εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρε- 7
στραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἑκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον· διόπερ ἀποδοτέον ἐξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιούτῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς μουσικῆς)· πρὸς δὲ παιδείαν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τῶν 8
μελῶν χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ δωριστί, καθάπερ εἰπομεν πρότερον· δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ κἄν τινα ἄλλην ἡμῖν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας. ὁ 9
δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μόνην καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας

τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αὐλόν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν 1342 b
ἡ φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἥνπερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις·
10 ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά. δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποίη-
σις· πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις
μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν δ' ἁρμο- 5
νιῶν ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον,
οἷον ὁ διθύραμβος ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον.
11 καὶ τούτου πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνε-
σιν ταύτην ἄλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν
τῇ δωριστὶ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς Μυσοὺς οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν, 10
ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν
12 προσήκουσαν ἁρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες
ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστ' ἦθος ἐχού-
σης ἀνδρεῖον. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν
ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φαμέν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην 15
ἔχει τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἁρμονίας, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ
13 Δώρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. εἰσὶ
δὲ δύο σκοποί, τό τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ
δυνατὰ δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πρέποντα ἑκά-
στοις· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὡρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς 20
ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον οὐ ῥᾴδιον ᾄδειν τὰς συντόνους ἁρμο-
νίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλικού-
14 τοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο (τῷ) Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ
τὴν μουσικήν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας ἀποδοκι-
μάσειεν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς, 25
οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἥ γε
μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον) ἀλλ' ἀπειρηκυίας. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν
ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιού-
15 των ἁρμονιῶν ἅπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἔτι
δ' εἴ τίς ἐστι τοιαύτη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἣ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παί- 30
δων ἡλικίᾳ διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἔχειν ἅμα καὶ
παιδείαν, οἷον ἡ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεπονθέναι μάλιστα τῶν
ἁρμονιῶν . . . δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς ποιητέον εἰς τὴν
παιδείαν, τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον . . .

# CRITICAL NOTES.

## BOOK III.

**1274 b 33.** Vet. Int. renders *ποτε* by *quidem*, as in 1276 a 18 and 1286 a 1. **40.** Vet. Int. has *et* for *δὲ*, as in 1291 b 40, *βραχέων δὲ*.

**1275 a 11.** *καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει* om. $\Pi^1$. **19.** *γὰρ* ΓΠ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *δὲ* Ar. Conring, Sus. See explanatory note. **20.** *ἔγκλημα*] Vet. Int. *adiectionem* (*obiectionem?*). Ἔγκλημα is rendered *accusatio* in 1264 a 27 and 1268 b 19, the two other passages of the Politics in which it occurs. *δεόμενον*] Vet. Int. *opportunam*, as in 1323 b 30 and in Rhet. 1. 2. 1357 a 9 and 2. 7. 1385 a 20 (Dittmeyer, Quae ratio inter vetustam Aristotelis Rhetoricorum translationem et Graecos codices intercedat, p. 50). **24.** *διῃρημένα* ΓΠ Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. *divisi*): *διωρισμένα* Scaliger, Sus. See explanatory note on 1275 a 23. **27.** *ἂν φαίη* Γ $P^{1\,4\,6}$ Vat. Pal., *φαίη* $M^s$, *ἀντιφαίη* $P^{2\,s}$ etc. Göttling conj. *ἂν ἀντιφαίη*. But in Eth. Nic. 3. 8. 1117 a 14, where the MSS. have *ἀντιπαθεῖν*, Heylbut (Aspas. Comm. Praef. p. x) and Bywater accept *ἂν παθεῖν* from Aspasius. See also Stallbaum's critical note on Plato, Gorg. 481 D, where he restores *ἂν φῇ* from the best MSS. in place of the vulg. *ἀντιφῇ*. **28.** *καίτοι . . ἀρχῆς* om. $\Pi^1$. **37.** *ᾗ*] Vet. Int. *secundum quod*, which may represent *ᾗ* (see critical note on 1280 a 24), though *qua* is a more usual equivalent for it in Vet. Int. (see e. g. 1279 a 11 and 1286 a 23).

**1275 b 7.** I follow Coray and Sus. in adding *ἐν* before *ἑνίαις*: cp. c. 11. 1282 a 27, *ἃς ἐν ἑνίαις πολιτείαις*, where $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ omit *ἐν*, and 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 27, *ἢ κατασκευάσαντας ἀρχεῖον οἷον ἐν ἑνίαις πολιτείαις ἐστίν*, where $\Pi^2$ om. *ἐν*. **13.** *ἀλλὰ . . γὰρ*] Vet. Int. *sed*, but this stands for *ἀλλὰ γὰρ* here, as in 1282 b 8 and 1323 b 36. *Γὰρ* om. $P^1$ $Q^b$ and over an erasure $P^4$. **16.** *ἀποδέδοται* Π: Vet. Int. *attribuitur*, as in 1299 a 26. In 1285 a 6 *ἀποδέδοται* is rendered *attributa sunt*, but it is doubtful whether Vet. Int. found

ἀποδίδοται in Γ in the passage before us and in 1299 a 26, for he renders πέπονθε by *patitur* in 1294 b 17. **17.** $M^s$ $P^1$ omit the second περὶ, but see critical note on 1331 b 24 and explanatory note on 1284 a 35. **21.** δὲ] δὴ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.: all MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined but three (h k z) have *etiam*, which stands for δὴ in 1277 b 16 and 1292 b 10; h k z have *autem*. I follow Sus. in reading δὲ. πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν] Vet. Int. *secundum usum*: did he find κατὰ in Γ? **25.** δὲ $\Pi^1$ $P^2$ Sus.: δὴ $P^3$ $\Pi^3$ Bekk. **26.** ἐκεῖνον] Vet. Int. *hunc* (τοῦτον Γ?). **30.** εἶναι γάρ τινας Λαρισοποιούς (εἶναι γάρ τινας λαρισσοποιούς ΓΠ Vat. Pal.) is bracketed by Ridgeway and Sus., and Camerarius (Interp. p. 112) would read Λαρισαιοποιούς in place of Λαρισοποιούς. See explanatory note on 1275 b 26. **32.** ἦσαν $\Pi^1$ Ald. Vat. Pal. Sus. and over an erasure $P^4$: ἦσαν ἂν $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Bekk. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ $M^s$ $P^{1\,2\,3}$ Vat. Pal. etc. Sus.$^4$: καὶ γὰρ οὐ $P^4$ etc. Bekk.: Vet. Int. *neque enim*, which perhaps represents καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ. **33.** ἐκ om. $P^1$ and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *quod ex cive mare aut femina*). **34.** 'ἐκεῖνο Victorius et vir doctus in marg. Aldinae Monacensis . . . ἐκείνην aut ἐκείνη $M^s$, ἐκείνην $P^2$ etc. et pr. $P^1$ (rasura super ει) et pr. $P^4$ et corr. $P^3$, ἐκεῖνοι pr. $P^3$ (ut videtur) et editores inde a Victorio et Morelio posteaque ἔχουσι eidem editores,' Sus.$^3$, who reads ἐκεῖνο and ἔχει. Vet. Int. *illi magis habent*. **35.** Richards would add οὓς after οἷον, a suggestion which well deserves to be recorded, though I am not sure that any change should be made in the text. **39.** κἂν Bekk.$^2$ Sus.: καὶ Π Bekk.$^1$ It is not easy to say what Vet. Int. found in his Greek text, for he has *equidem et cum hoc adhuc aliquis dubitabit*: perhaps καίτοι καὶ τούτῳ τις ἔτι προσαπορήσειεν. As to the omission of ἄν by Γ Π see critical note on 1283 b 14. τοῦτό $L^s$ Ald. pr. $M^s$ Bekk. Sus., τούτῳ Γ $P^{1\,2\,3\,4}$.

**1276 a 4.** τῆς om. $M^s$ $P^1$: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. **5.** ἔφαμεν $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: φαμέν Γ $M^s$. **14.** καὶ δημοκρατοῦνταί τινες] Vet. Int. *in democratiam versae fuerunt* (or *fuerint*) *quaedam*, a rendering which it is hard to explain. We cannot be sure that καὶ was omitted in Γ, for Vet. Int. often fails to render καί: *in* may, however, stand for κατὰ installed in the place of καὶ. Does *versae fuerunt* stand for ἐτράποντο repeated from τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον? **21.** Sus. brackets τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, but compare the similar repetition of τὴν χώραν in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 33 (where Sus. brackets τὴν χώραν), and of τῶν ἠθῶν in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 33 sq. (where Sus. brackets the first τῶν ἠθῶν). **25.** τὸν αὐτὸν]

τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον $P^{4\,6}$ Bekk. and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *eundem locum*). As to additions of this kind in $P^{4\,6}$ see critical note on 1329 a 1. **33.** ἔθνος om. $\Pi^2$ and in a lacuna $P^1$.

**1276 b 9.** λέγομεν Albertus Magnus, Leonardus Aretinus, Morelius, Bekk., Sus.: λέγοιμεν Γ Π. Should ἄν be added after ἑτέραν and λέγοιμεν be retained? **14.** μεταβάλῃ] μεταβάλλῃ $\Pi^3$ Bekk. **30.** διὸ $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: διόπερ Γ $M^s$. **33.** τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν is found only in Γ $P^1$ Ar., corr.$^3$ $P^2$ (in paler ink than the MS.), and marg. $P^4$: τὴν, however, is omitted in pr. $P^1$ and supplied by the scribe in the same ink as the MS.; it is also written above the line in marg. $P^4$: we cannot be sure that it was added in Γ. **36.** ἀλλὰ om. $M^s$ Vat. Pal. pr. $P^1$, but not Γ (as Sus. says), for Vet. Int. has *quin immo*, which represents οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ in 1278 b 21 and 1323 b 6. **39.** αὐτὸν $\Pi^2$ Bekk., autou Vat. Pal., αὐτὸν Γ (Vet. Int. *ipsum*): ἑαυτὸν $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus. **40.** ἐπεὶ δὲ $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Ar., ἐπεὶ δ' Bekk., ἐπειδὴ δὲ $P^1$, ἐπειδὴ Γ $M^s$ Sylburg, Thurot, Sus.: Thurot and Sus., however, place ἐπειδὴ . . . πολίτας before δεῖ, 38.

**1277 a 8.** κτῆσις is bracketed by Bernays. See explanatory note. **12.** ἁπλῶς om. $\Pi^1$. **17.** ἄρχοντος] τοῦ ἄρχοντος $\Pi^3$ Bekk. φαίνονται παιδευόμενοι] Vet. Int. *videntur erudiri*, which stands for φαίνονται παιδευόμενοι: cp. 1338 a 20 and 1339 a 2. **20.** δὲ $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: δὴ $\Pi^1$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *itaque*). Vat. Pal. has ειδεαυτη. **24.** ἴσως om. $\Pi^1$. τυραννοῖ] τυραννεῖ $M^s$ $P^1$ pr. $P^2$ (corrected in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int. has *quando non tyrannizat*, which probably represents ὅτε μὴ τυραννεῖ. **26.** After or (with Bernays) before δοκίμου we should probably supply δοκεῖ: compare the omission of δοκοῦσι before διώκειν in $\Pi^1$ in 3. 13. 1284 a 19. I prefer this change to Dr. Jackson's ingenious suggestion of δοκεῖ που in place of δοκίμου (adopted by Sus.$^{3a}$). **30.** ἕτερα Coray: ἀμφότερα Γ Π: ἄμφω ἕτερα Bernays, who translates 'Beide müssten Verschiedenes (lernen).' Ἀμφότερα from the next line, however, may perhaps have taken the place of ἕτερα. **32.** τοὐντεῦθεν $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk., κἀντεῦθεν Γ $P^1$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *et hinc*), κατένθεν $M^s$. **34.** λέγομεν, ἃ Lamb.: λεγόμενα Γ Π. Heylbut in his report of the readings of Vat. Pal. (*Rhein. Mus.* 42. 103) does not note any variation in 34 from the reading of Sus.$^3$ (λέγομεν, ἃ), but this may be an oversight. Sus.$^{3a}$ takes the reading of Vat. Pal. here to be that of Γ Π, λεγόμενα. **39.** αὐτούς] See explanatory note on 1277 a 38.

**1277 b 2.** *πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι*] Vet. Int. *antequam fuisset demus.* *Γενέσθαι* is rendered by *fuisse* in 1329 b 9 and by *esse* in 1288 a 16, just as *ἐγένετο* is rendered by *fuit* in 1297 b 16, 1303 b 38, and 1304 a 5. **14.** *ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι* $\Pi^1$ Sus. See critical note on 1288 a 13. The words are found in both orders (see e.g. 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2, 1277 a 26 sq., b 20). **20.** *ὥσπερ*] *ὡς γὰρ* Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^1$. **23.** *λάλος* $\Pi^1$ Bekk., *ἄλλος* $P^{2\,3}$ etc., *ἄλλως* Ald., *ἄλαλος* $P^4$. See explanatory note on 1277 b 22. *κοσμία*] z has *ornata* without any erasure (with c h k l m n and rec. a), which is probably right, for *κοσμεῖν* is rendered by *ornare* in Vet. Int. in 1323 b 3, 1314 b 37, and (in z) 1321 a 37: b g Sus. *ordinata.* **29.** *ὥσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποιὸς* $\Pi^1$ Sus. $\Pi^2$ are probably right, for in 1278 a 37 Γ Π have *ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων.* A similar variation occurs in 1293 b 17, where $\Pi^2$ have *εἰς ἀρετήν τε καὶ δῆμον* and $M^s$ $P^1$ (Γ?) *εἴς τε ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον*, and in 1302 a 31, where $\Pi^2$ have *περὶ ὧν δέ*, and $M^s$ $P^1$ (Γ?) *περὶ δὲ ὧν.* See critical note on 1300 b 17 and cp. also 1326 b 4, where $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ have *ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις*, and $P^{2\,3\,4}$ *ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαίοις.*

**1278 a 11.** *τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων*] See explanatory note. **12.** *κοινῇ* $\Pi^1$ Sus.: *κοινοὶ* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. **26.** *μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς*] *μὴ μετέχειν ἀρετῆς* Γ $M^s$. Vet. Int. has *non participare virtute*, but in a z the words *principatu fortes interpres* are added after *virtute.* It has not been pointed out that the three words are probably a corruption of '*principatu fortasse*' *interpres*, a suggestion by the translator that *principatu* should be read in place of *virtute*, in which he was undoubtedly right. **32.** Vet. Int. does not translate *δὲ*. Vat. Pal. has *δοχλου* with Π. *παραιροῦνται*] Vet. Int. *eligunt*, which probably represents *προαιροῦνται* (cp. 1325 b 25 and 1341 b 26). Vet. Int. may have found this reading in Γ; it is more likely, however, that he misread his Greek text. **34.** *αστων* Vat. Pal., *ἀστῶν* codex Hamilton collated by Dr. H. Rabe, confirming a conjecture of Perizonius (ad Ael. Var. Hist. 6. 10), *αὐτῶν* Γ Π. The two words are often confused in the MSS.: thus $\Pi^1$ have *αὐτούς* in place of *ἀστούς* in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 32, and in Oecon. 2. 1346 b 27 the MSS. have *αὐτῶν* in place of *ἀστῶν.* **36.** Sus.$^{3\,a}$: '*ὥσπερ* . . . 38, *μετέχων* post 40, *ἐστίν* Vaticanum et pr. $P^1$ et corr. $P^4$, 37, *ὡσεί* . . . 38, *μετέχων* ibidem $\Pi^2$ Ar., 37, *ὥσπερ* . . . *μετέχων* ibidem Γ $M^s$, verum ordinem restituit corr.$^1$ $P^1$' (i.e. Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of $P^1$, in the same ink as the MS.). **37.** *ὡσεί*] Vet. Int. *ac si*,

just as he has *ac si* for ὥσπερ κἂν in 1312 a 26. **40.** Schneider (followed by Sus.) may well be right in adding ἀρετὴν after τὴν αὐτὴν (cp. c. 4. 1277 a 20, where $\Pi^1$ omit ἀρετὴ after ἡ αὐτὴ), but ἀρετὴν is omitted in 1. 13. 1260 a 24 and 3. 13. 1283 a 40.

**1278 b 1.** ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων om. $\Pi^1$, but Vat. Pal. agrees with $\Pi^2$ in adding the words. **3.** κἀκεῖνος Γ $M^s$ $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. *et ille*): Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of $P^1$, has first written κἀκεῖνος and then corrected it to κἀκείνης, adding, however, ο above η (see Sus.[1]). $\Pi^1$ Sus. add δ' after κἀκεῖνος or κἀκείνης. ἢ δυνάμενος εἶναι κύριος is added by $\Pi^1$ $P^2$ Vat. Pal., but omitted by pr. $P^{3\,4}$ (add. marg. $P^{3\,4}$). **7.** κἂν εἰ $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. (κἂν εἰ πλείους om. $M^s$): καὶ εἰ $P^1$ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *et si plures*), but *et si* appears to represent κἂν εἰ in 1326 a 17, 1340 a 37, and 1341 a 19. **12.** δημοκρατικαῖς] z has *democratiis*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *democraticis*. **14.** τούτων] z has *horum*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *eorum*. **15.** δὴ] δὲ pr. $Q^b$ Bekk. **17.** δὴ $\Pi^2$ (except $P^4$), Bekk.: δὲ $\Pi^1$ $P^4$ Sus. Vat. Pal. has δη. κατὰ] καὶ κατὰ $P^1$ corr. $P^4$ Bekk. **19.** καὶ ὅτι Π Vat. Pal. Sus., ὅτι Bekk.: Vet. Int. fails to render καὶ, but this he often fails to do (see vol. ii. p. lxiii). ὁ is added before ἄνθρωπος in $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *homo* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain): om. $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal.: see critical note on 1253 a 2, and Stallbaum on Plato, Rep. 619 B, γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος. **20.** παρ' ἀλλήλων] παρ' ἀλλήλων Γ (Vet. Int. *ab invicem*): περὶ ἀλλήλων $M^s$ $\Pi^2$ and pr. $P^1$, also Vat. Pal. βοηθείας] πολιτείας Γ $M^s$ Vat. Pal. $\Pi^1$ Vat. Pal. omit οὐκ ἔλαττον and are probably right: see Heylbut in *Rhein. Mus.* 42. 108, who urges that the meaning intended to be expressed by οὐκ ἔλαττον here is always expressed by οὐχ ἧττον, οὐδὲν ἧττον, in Aristotle's writings (e.g. in 2. 6. 1265 a 26, 3. 11. 1282 a 6 etc.), while ἔλαττον on the contrary always means what is smaller in number, time, or space. **25.** καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν] These words are placed after αὐτοῦ by $\Pi^1$ Vat. Pal., but after μόριον by $\Pi^2$. Bekker's text is συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ (ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον) καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον κ.τ.λ. **27.** ὑπερβάλλῃ $M^s$: ὑπερβάλῃ $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Vat. Pal.: ὑπερβάλλει $P^{1\,4}$: it is uncertain what reading Vet. Int. found in his Greek text, for his rendering is *excedatur*. **30.** ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς γε] z adds *et* before *principatus*, thus giving an equivalent for καὶ, which the other MSS. of Vet. Int. do not. γε add. $P^{2\,3}$ Vat. Pal. **40.** ὥσπερ] ὡς $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. *ut*). Vat. Pal. has ωσπερ. $\Pi^1$ often omit

small words, and these MSS. (or at any rate $M^s$ $P^1$) omit *περ* also in 1317 a 23.

**1279 a 2.** *ἕνα*] *εἶναι* $\Pi^1$, but not Vat. Pal. **3.** *εἶναι* om. $\Pi^1$, but not Vat. Pal. **12.** *αὐτοῦ* $P^1$ Ald. Bekk. Sus.: the other MSS. and Γ *αὐτοῦ*. **20.** *καὶ* after *πᾶσαι* $\Pi^3$ Bekk., but see explanatory note on 1281 a 26. **25.** *τὸ πολίτευμα* $M^s$ $P^1$ Vat. Pal. Sus.: $\Pi^2$ Bekk. omit *τὸ*: the reading of Γ is uncertain. **27.** *ὀλίγους*] z has *paucos*, but *paucum*, the reading of the other MSS. of Vet. Int., may perhaps be right, for $M^s$ has *ὀλίγον*. **34.** *τῶν* before *ὀλίγων* om. $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ, but not Vat. Pal. **37.** *πολιτεύηται*] Vet. Int. *vivit* (*politice vivit*?: cp. 1267 b 29, 1255 b 37).

**1279 b 15.** *τι* om. $\Pi^1$, but $\Pi^1$ often omit *τις* and its parts (see critical note on 1288 a 16). **22.** †*συμβαίνῃ*†] *συμβαίνῃ* $M^s$ $P^{2\,3}$ etc.: *συμβαινηι* Vat. Pal.: *συμβαίνῃ* Bekk.[1]: *συμβαίνει* $P^{1\,4}$ Bekk.[2] Sus. (compare the reading of these two MSS. in 1278 b 27). Vet. Int. *accidat*, which might stand for either reading (see critical notes on 1253 a 22, b 26). See explanatory note on 1260 b 31. Meister (Das Colonialrecht von Naupaktos, p. 291 sqq.) defends the use of *αἱ* with the subjunctive (*αἱ ἀνχορέε* = *αἱ ἀνχωρέῃ*) in a Locrian inscription from Naupactus (Hicks, Manual, No. 63: Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr., ed. 2, No. 229), but the verb is there used, as he remarks, in a future sense, which is hardly the case here, and even if this were otherwise, the difference of dialect would have to be taken into account. **26.** *κἂν τις* $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *ἐάν τις* $M^s$: Vet. Int. *si quis*, which may represent either *ἐάν τις* or *κἂν τις*, for *si* stands for *κἄν* in 1282 b 8, 1298 b 23, and 1309 b 9: *κἂν εἴ τις* Sus. **28.** *προσαγορεύῃ* Morelius Bekk.: *προσαγορεύει* Vat. Pal. $Q^b$ $T^b$ Ald.: *προσαγορεύοι* $M^s$ $P^{1\,2\,3}$ etc. Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *appellet* what was the reading of Γ. **32.** Sylburg and Bekker add *οἱ* before *εὔποροι*. **38.** Sus. adds *διὰ* after *συμβαίνει* and reads *διαφοράς* in place of *διαφορᾶς* in 39, but see explanatory note. **39.** *γίνεσθαι* Π: *γίγνεσθαι* Vat. Pal.

**1280 a 15.** *φαῦλοι κριταὶ* $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal.: *κριταὶ φαῦλοι* $\Pi^1$. See explanatory note on 1275 a 32. For similar transpositions cp. 1277 a 1 (*ἀρετὴ μία* $\Pi^1$: *μία ἀρετὴ* $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal.), 1281 a 27 (*φαῦλα πάντα* $\Pi^1$: *πάντα φαῦλα* $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal.), 1323 b 19 (*αἱρετὰ πέφυκε ταῦτα* $\Pi^1$: *ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἱρετὰ* $\Pi^2$), 1326 b 8 (*ζῆν εὖ* $\Pi^1$: *εὖ ζῆν* $\Pi^2$), 1290 b 8 (*μόρια πλείονα* $\Pi^1$: *πλείονα μόρια* $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal.), 1294 a 22 (*ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος ἀρχαῖος* $\Pi^1$: *ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή* $\Pi^2$), 1320 a 23 (*ἐκκλησίας ὀλίγας* $\Pi^1$: *ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας* $\Pi^2$). In 1322 a 31 it is $\Pi^2$ that place the

substantive before the adjective (*ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι* $\Pi^2$: *ἐν μείζονι δὲ σχήματι* $\Pi^1$). See critical note on 1282 a 40, and cp. 1311 a 22, where $\Pi^2$ have *τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν* (except $P^4$, which omits *τῶν*), and $\Pi^1$ *τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας.* **24.** *ἐλευθερίᾳ*] *ἐλευθερίη* $M^8$, *ἐλευθερία* or *ἐλευθερίη* Γ (Vet. Int. *secundum libertatem*, and *secundum pecunias* in 1280 a 23 represents *χρήμασιν*), *ἐλευθέριοι* $\Pi^2$, *ἐλευθεριοι* with the first *ι* above the line Vat. Pal., *ἐλεύθεροι* $P^1$. Sus. ascribes the introduction of *ἐλευθερίᾳ* into the text to Vict., whose first edition appeared in 1552, but Sepulveda's translation, which appeared in 1548, already has the rendering *ut libertate* (p. 83 b). **28.** *ἴσον*] Vet. Int. *aequum*, not *aequale*: so *ex aequo* stands for *ἐξ ἴσου* in 1318 a 8. **29.** *μνῶν* Π Vat. Pal.: Vet. Int. *talentis*, though *mnam* for *μνᾶν* and *mnas* or *minas* for *μνᾶς* in 2. 8. 1268 b 13, 14. *εἰστενέγκαντα* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *εισεναγκαντα* Vat. Pal.: *εἰσενεγκόντα* $M^8$ $P^1$ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *intulit* what the reading of Γ was. 'In Attic inscriptions only the later form *ἐνέγκας* occurs, not *ἐνεγκών*' (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 147). **31.** *τοῦ ζῆν*] Vet. Int. *ipsius vivere*: for this rendering of the article cp. 1286 b 19, where *ipsam multitudinem* stands for *τὸ πλῆθος*, 1290 a 34, 1292 a 12, 1301 b 34, and many other passages. See critical note on 1258 a 2. *μόνον ἕνεκεν* $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *ἕνεκεν μόνον* Γ $M^8$ Sus.: *ἕνεκεν* om. pr. $P^1$. **34.** *ἕνεκεν*] *ἕνεκα* $M^8$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ: *ἕνεκεν* $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus. **36.** *Τυρρηνοὶ*] *τυρηννοι* Vat. Pal., *τυρηννοὶ* $P^4$, *τύραννοι* $P^{2\,3}$. So in 1329 b 18 $M^8$ $P^{2\,3\,4}$ have *τυρηνίαν*. The form *Τυρρηνικός* appears in an Attic inscription of B. C. 350–300 (Meisterhans, p. 76).

**1280 b 2.** *τοῦ* om. $M^8$ $P^1$ Vat. Pal. and perhaps Γ, possibly rightly: Vet. Int. *neque quales quosdam esse oporteat alteros alteri curant.* **4.** *ἕξει*] *ἕξειν* $P^{2\,3}$ etc.: *ἕξει* $\Pi^1$ $P^4$ Vat. Pal. The mistake is a frequent one: see critical notes on 1283 a 7 and 1286 a 30. *ἀδικήσουσιν* Morelius, *ἀδικήσωσιν* Π Vat. Pal.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *iniuste agant* what was the reading in Γ, for Vet. Int. has *habeat* for *ἕξει.* **5.** *πολιτικῆς* om. $\Pi^1$. **6.** *διασκοποῦσιν* $\Pi^2$: *διακοποῦσιν* pr. $P^1$ (corrected in a paler ink than the MS.), *διακονοῦσιν* Γ $M^8$ Vat. Pal. **8.** *γίνεται* Π: *γιγνεται* Vat. Pal. **9.** *ἄποθεν*] See critical note on 1262 a 29. In *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 22, l. 28 *ἄπωθεν* is the form used. **10.** *συμμάχων* Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *συμμαχιῶν* Conring, Sus. See explanatory note on 1280 b 8. **13.** *συναγάγοι*] *συνάγοι* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. So in 1317 a 36 $M^8$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ have *συνάγειν*, $\Pi^2$ *συναγαγεῖν.* **18.** *ἄποθεν*] See critical note on

1262 a 29, where, however, Vat. Pal. should have been stated to have *απωθεν* here, not *αποθεν*. **19.** *εἴησαν* $P^1$ Vat. Pal.: *εἰ ἦσαν* the other MSS. and Γ (Vet. Int. *si essent*). **23.** *που* Π Vat. Pal. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *quidem*, which represents *ποτε* in 1274 b 33 and *πως* in 1286 a 12): *πω* Ar. Bekk. Sus. **30.** *ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι* $Π^2$ Bekk., *η πολις ουκ εστιν* Vat. Pal.: *οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις* $Π^1$ Sus. **34.** *τελέας* $M^s$ $P^1$ Vat. Pal. Sus.: *τελείας* $Π^2$ Bekk.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. **35.** *καὶ* Γ Π: *η* Vat. Pal. **37.** *φρατρίαι*] See critical note on 1264 a 8. **40.** *δὲ ἡ* Γ Π Vat. Pal.: *δὴ ἡ* or *δὴ* Sus.

**1281 a 3.** *χάριν* $Π^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: om. Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^1$. Sus. brackets it. **16.** *γὰρ* $P^1$ $Π^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: *γὰρ ἂν* Γ $M^s$ (z omits *utique* representing *ἄν*, but probably wrongly). **17.** *χρὴ* $Π^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *δεῖ* $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *oportet* which reading he found in his Greek text, for in 1263 b 30 and 1289 a 1 *oportet* represents *χρὴ* and in 1342 b 15 *oportere* represents *χρῆναι*, while *oportet* often elsewhere represents *δεῖ* (e.g. in 1262 b 2–7). In 1335 b 28 again $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ have *δεῖ* and $Π^2$ *χρὴ*. *ληφθέντων* Γ Π (Vet. Int. *acceptis*): *λειφθεντων* Vat. Pal. **21.** *τοῦτον* Γ Π: *τουτων* Vat. Pal. **25.** *ταὐτὰ*] *ταῦτα* Γ Π: Vat. Pal. does not give breathing or accent. Sus. ascribes the reading *ταὐτὰ* to Vict. and Lamb. followed by Montecatino, and it is true that Vict. and Lamb. have *haec eadem* and Montecatino (vol. iii. p. 138) *eadem*, but I find the rendering 'li medesimi danni' ('the same losses') in Bernardo Segni's Italian translation of the Politics (p. 147, ed. 1549), which was published before either of Victorius' editions or the translation by Lambinus appeared. **27.** *πάντα φαῦλα* $Π^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *φαῦλα πάντα* $Π^1$ Sus. See critical note on 1280 a 15. **28.** *δίκαια* $Π^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: *σπουδαῖα* $Π^1$. **36.** *ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν*] These words are placed after *ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον* in $P^1$ $Π^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk., but before these words in Γ $M^s$. Sus.$^{3a}$ (1894) places the words in the following order—*ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι φαῦλον ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον*. But the order of $P^1$ $Π^2$ Vat. Pal. seems to me preferable. No doubt it interposes *ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον* between *ἄνθρωπον* and *ἔχοντα*, but as to that see explanatory note on 1276 a 28. **41.** *δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι κ.τ.λ.*] See explanatory note on 1281 a 40.

**1281 b 1.** *οὐ* $Π^1$ $P^4$, *ὁ* $P^{2\,3}$ etc. **5.** *συνελθόντων* $Π^1$ pr. $P^{2\,3}$ Sus., *συνελθόντας* $P^4$ etc., corr.$^1$ $P^{2\,3}$ (same ink as MSS.), Bekk. **7.** *τὰ*

περὶ τὰ ἤθη Γ in place of περὶ τὰ ἤθη (Vet. Int. *quae circa mores*). περὶ is added before τὴν διάνοιαν by $M^s$ and perhaps by Γ (Vet. Int. *circa intellectum*), but this is not certain, for Vet. Int. often repeats prepositions (see critical note on 1253 a 36). **8.** κρίνουσιν] κρίης Γ $M^s$. **13.** κεχωρισμένων] κεχωρισμένον Γ (Vet. Int. *separatum*), καὶ χωρισμένον $M^s$. **25.** μηδέν] μηδὲ ἓν suggested by Sus. with a query, μηδὲ ἓν $P^1$, μὴ δὲ ἓν $M^s$, μηδέεν $P^{2\,3}$, μηδ' ἓν $P^4$, μηδεὲν Ald. **30.** πολεμίων] Vet. Int. *seditionis*. **42.** ὁ is added before ἰατρός in $M^s$ $P^1$ followed by Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. *iste autem est medicus*). $M^s$ $P^1$ are probably wrong: see explanatory note on 1253 b 11 and Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq., and cp. c. 4. 1277 b 15, αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, and 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32, αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων.

**1282 a 5.** καὶ is placed not after but before τοιοῦτοι in $M^s$ $P^1$, followed by Sus.: Vet. Int. does not render it in either place. The authority of $M^s$ $P^1$ unsupported by Γ is small, and it is probably better to follow $\Pi^2$ and to place καὶ after τοιοῦτοι, taking it to mean 'in connexion with wellnigh all the arts, as well as in connexion with the medical art.' **7.** καὶ om. $\Pi^1$, but καί is very frequently omitted in $\Pi^1$. **10.** εἰ γὰρ καὶ] Vet. Int. *et enim si*, which probably stands for εἰ γὰρ καὶ and not for καὶ γὰρ εἰ, for *et si* stands for εἰ καὶ in 1282 b 38 and 1322 b 8. **11.** As to οὔ τι see explanatory note on 1282 a 10. **17.** $\Pi^1$ om. ἢ before βελτίους, but these MSS. are apt to omit ἤ when it is followed by a second ἤ, as in the passage before us. This happens in 1268 a 6, 1324 b 30, 1298 b 32, and 1305 a 32, as well as here. The same thing holds also of καί. See also critical note on 1331 b 24. **18.** μόνον Π: μόνος Γ (Vet. Int. *solus*). Sus.$^{1\,2}$ μόνος, Sus.$^{3\,4}$ μόνον. I incline to retain μόνον: cp. c. 13. 1284 a 34, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν. **21.** κρινεῖ] κρίνει $\Pi^1$. **27.** μέγιστον $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Bekk.: μέγιστοι $M^s$, μέγισται $P^{1\,4}$, μέγιστα Γ Sus. (Vet. Int. *maxima*). ἐν om. $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ, though Vet. Int. has *in quibusdam politiis* (see critical note on 1275 b 7). **32.** ἄρχουσιν Γ $P^1$, ἄρχωσιν $M^s$: ἔχουσιν $\Pi^2$ (so in 41 $\Pi^2$ have ἐχόντων for ἀρχόντων). μεγάλων $\Pi^2$ Bekk., μειζόνων $\Pi^1$ Sus. **40.** τὸ before πάντων om. $M^s$ $P^1$, and probably also Γ, for Vet. Int. does not render it, though he renders τὸ before τῶν. πάντων τούτων $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: τούτων πάντων $\Pi^1$ Sus. So in 1332 b 31 $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ have πάντων τούτων: Γ $M^s$ τούτων πάντων. πάντων τούτων is the more usual and less emphatic order (see *Class. Rev.* 10. 106), but $\Pi^1$ have a leaning

to inversions of this kind (see critical note on 1280 a 15). Ταῦτα πάντα ('every one of these things') is used when emphasis is called for (e.g. in 1268 b 3, 1281 a 13, 1291 a 16, 1309 a 39, 1321 b 38), which does not seem to be the case in the passage before us.

**1282 b 5.** διορίσαι $\Pi^1$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *determinare*): δηλῶσαι $\Pi^2$ Bekk. $\Pi^1$ are probably right: cp. 1287 b 16 sq. **8.** καὶ $\Pi^2$ Bekk., κἂν $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus.: Vet. Int. *si* (which however a b z Alb. omit) may perhaps stand for κἂν, as in 1279 b 26, 1298 b 23, and 1309 b 9. **15.** δὲ $\Pi^2$ Bekk., δὴ $\Pi^1$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *itaque*).

**1283 a 4.** μᾶλλον] See explanatory note. **7.** ὑπερέχει corr. $P^1$ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *excedit*): ὑπερέχειν the rest. But the addition of a final ν is a common error of the MSS. (see critical notes on 1280 b 4 and 1286 a 30). **8.** I follow Sus. in bracketing μέγεθος: see explanatory note on 1283 a 6. **10.** καὶ om. $\Pi^1$, but see critical note on 1282 a 7. **11.** ἀνισότητ' $\Pi^2$, except $P^4$ (which has ἀνισότητα), ἰσότητ' $M^s$, ἰσότητα pr. $P^1$ (corrected in a paler ink), ἰσότητα or ἰσότητ' Γ (Vet. Int. *aequalitatem*). **17.** τ' om. $M^s$ $P^1$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. does not render τε, but then he seldom does so). **27.** ἴσον $\Pi^1$, ἴσων $P^2$ ('ut videtur,' Sus.[1]) $P^3$ etc. **32.** τὰ om. $M^s$ $P^1$: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *ad conventiones* what was the reading in Γ. **36.** οἷκοι] Vet. Int. *habetur*. **37.** δὴ Π: of Susemihl's MSS. of the Vet. Int. only two (g k) have *autem* representing δὲ, while five have *etiam*, which stands for δή in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1292 b 10: z has *autem etiam*. Sus. seems to go too far in assuming that Γ had δὲ.

**1283 b 2.** τι om. $\Pi^1$, but $\Pi^1$ often omit τις and its parts (see critical note on 1288 a 16). **14.** δόξαιεν γὰρ (ἂν)] δόξαιεν γὰρ $\Pi^2$, δόξειαν γὰρ $P^1$, δόξειε γὰρ $M^s$. We cannot tell from Vet. Int. *videbuntur enim* whether Γ had δόξαιεν γὰρ or δόξειαν γὰρ. Δόξαιεν may be right, for δόξαι (opt. of δοκεῖν) occurs in 3. 4. 1277 b 21, and δόξαιεν in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 a 1. ἂν om. Γ Π (as in 1275 b 39), add. Coray Bekk.[2] Sus. $\Pi^1$ omit ἄν in 1267 a 40, 1297 a 41, and 1313 a 20; it is not therefore surprising that Γ Π should now and then omit it. See Bon. Ind. 41 b 4 sqq. **20.** τοῦτο ἴσως or τοῦτ' ἴσως $\Pi^2$, τούτοις $\Pi^1$, but here $\Pi^1$ omit the last syllable, as (e.g.) in 1276 b 20 (κοινῶν for κοινωνῶν) and 1335 b 35 (ὡς for ὥστε).

**1284 a 5.** παρασχέσθαι $\Pi^2$ Bekk., παρέχεσθαι $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *exhiberi* what was the reading in Γ. For other variations of a similar nature see Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* on 1260 b 36, 1267 a 35, 1332 b 1, and 1317 a 36. **19.** αὗται

γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν Π², αὗται γὰρ δὴ διώκειν $M^s$, and probably Γ, though Vet. Int. has *hae enim utique persecuntur*, ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ διώκειν $P^1$, where ταύτας and δεῖ are in all likelihood conjectural emendations of Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS., intended to remedy the flaw caused by the omission of δοκοῦσι in the archetype of $Π^1$. **37.** τῷ $P^{1\,2\,3}$, τὸ the other MSS. and Γ (Vet. Int. *scilicet prohibere*). κολούειν $P^1$ and marg. $P^{2\,3}$: κωλύειν the rest and Γ. **41.** παρὰ $Π^1$ $P^4$, the rest περὶ.

**1284 b 11.** τι om. $Π^1$, but see critical note on 1288 a 16. **13.** μονάρχους $Π^2$ Bekk., μονάρχας $Π^1$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *monarchas*). **20.** ἐγίγνετο $P^{2\,3\,4}$: ἐγίνετο Bekk. Sus. with the rest. **29.** γὰρ δή] Vet. Int. *enim*, as in 1328 a 5 and probably in 1303 a 11. **31.** ἀξιοῖεν $P^1$ $Π^2$, ἀξιοῖμεν Γ (Vet. Int. *velimus*), ἀξιοῖ μὲν $M^s$. **32.** ὅπερ ἔοικε] Vet. Int. adds *et* before *videtur*, his equivalent for ἔοικε, but see critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, and 1264 a 9. **40.** δεῖ δὲ $Π^3$ Bekk. Sus., δεῖ δὴ Γ $M^s$ $P^{1\,2\,3}$. **41.** ἐν τὸ $Π^2$ Bekk., ἕν τι $Π^1$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *unum aliquod genus*). αὐτῆς $Π^1$ Bekk. Sus., αὐτῶν $Π^2$.

**1285 a 6.** τοὺς om. $M^s$ $P^1$: the reading of Γ is uncertain. $Π^1$ often omit the article. **8.** αὐτοκρατόρων Π Bekk.[1]: the translation of Vet. Int. is *ducatus quidam exercitus imperialis*, and hence Vict. Schn. Bekk.[2] and Sus. read αὐτοκράτωρ, though it is just possible that *imperialis* is in the genitive in agreement with *exercitus* and represents αὐτοκρατόρων. See explanatory note on 1285 a 7. **9.** ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ] Leonardus Aretinus does not translate these words. His rendering is (MS. Ball. 242), *vitae enim necisque alicuius non habet potestatem, nisi dum bellum gerit, ut etiam apud antiquos fuisse videtur.* Nor does Giph. translate ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ. Bekk.[2] brackets the words. Sus. and Bernays bracket βασιλείᾳ, and it is true that the word may easily have been repeated from βασιλεία two lines above, but on the whole I incline to retain it (see the explanatory note for my interpretation of the passage). Bywater would read ἕνεκα δειλίας in place of ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ, while Jackson would omit these words and transpose ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις to take their place (Sus.[4]). **10.** ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ] Vet. Int. *promptus potens lege*, but z and pr. a omit *promptus*, which is probably an alternative reading for *potens*, the equivalent for ἔγχειρος Γ. In just the same way in 1283 a 9 two alternative renderings of κρεῖττον (*melior* and *valentior*) have together found their way into the text of Vet. Int. ὁ γὰρ ἀγαμέμνων $Π^2$ Bekk.: ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *Agamemnon enim* which reading he found in Γ. The reading of

$\Pi^2$ is probably right, the Agamemnon of the epic being referred to: Bywater adds *τοῦ* before *Ἕκτορος* in Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 20. Cp. c. 16. 1287 b 14, where $\Pi$ have *τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος*. **12.** *γοῦν* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus. (except $P^4$, which has *οὖν*), *γὰρ* $\Pi^1$. So in 1339 b 21 $\Pi^2$ have *γοῦν* and $\Pi^1$ *γὰρ*. **13.** *μάχης*] *νοήσω* pr. $P^1$, *μάχης νοήσω* corr.$^1$ $P^1$ (in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int. *quem ego videro fugientem e proelio*. Here $\Gamma$ $P^1$ appear to complete the sense from a gloss. **18.** *παραπλησίαν*] *παραπλησίως* $P^{4\,6}$ etc. pr. $P^2$. **19.** *τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ* Sus., *τυραννίσι καὶ κατὰ* $\Gamma$ $M^s$, *τυραννίσι κατὰ* $P^1$ and a corrector of $P^2$ in paler ink than the MS., *τυραννι* and after a lacuna *κατὰ* $P^2$ pr. $P^2$, *τυραννικὴν εἰσὶ δ' ὅμως κατὰ* $P^{4\,6}$ $L^s$ Q $M^b$ $U^b$ (as to these MSS. see critical note on 1253 a 12), *τυραννικῇ, εἰσὶ δ' ὅμως κατὰ* Ald. Bekk. A short lacuna evidently existed in the archetype of the best MSS., and this has been filled up (perhaps conjecturally) in $P^{4\,6}$ $L^s$ Q $M^b$ $U^b$. **20.** *ἤθη*] *ἔθνη* $\Pi^2$. **24.** *πάτριαι* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *πάτριοι* $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *patria* which reading he found in $\Gamma$. See critical note on 1285 b 5. **25.** *τὴν αὐτὴν* $\Pi$: *τοιαύτην* or *τὴν τοιαύτην* $\Gamma$ (Vet. Int. *talem*). **35.** *μιτυληναῖοι* $\Pi$. The MSS. have *μιτυλήνη, μιτυληναῖοι* in almost every passage of Aristotle's writings in which these words occur: Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 12, however, is an exception, for there the best MSS. have *μυτιληναῖοι*. Pr. $P^3$ has *μυτιλήνην* in 1304 a 4. *Πιττακὸν*] *φιττακὸν* $\Pi^1$ and also in 38 and 39. In 1274 b 18 all MSS. have *πιττακὸς*. The form ΦΙΤΤΑΚΟC appears on imperial coins of Mytilene (Head, Hist. Num. p. 488). Φ sometimes takes the place of $\Pi$ in Attic inscriptions; thus in some of them we find the form *φαρθένος* in place of *παρθένος* (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 79). As to the same confusion in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in *Journ. Hell. Studies*, 15. 299. **36.** *φυγάδας*] The reading *profugas* in Vet. Int. is probably right, for a stands alone in reading *profugos* (z has *profugas*): cp. 1303 a 35. **39.** *τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν κ.τ.λ.*] See explanatory note.

**1285 b 2.** *διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί*] So Sus. after Sepulveda: *διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικαὶ εἶναι δεσποτικαί* $\Gamma\Pi$. Sepulveda's note is (p. 99), 'herilia, quoniam tyrannica. Sic legitur in graecis exemplaribus quaecunque mihi videre contigit, sed lectio videtur esse transposita, quae commodius habitura videretur, si sic esset—tyrannica, quoniam herilia.' There is little doubt that he is right: compare the corresponding sentence 1285 a 23 sq. and also 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq. **5.** *ἑκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *ἑκούσιοί τε*

(M$^{s}$ *ἑκούσιοί τε*) *καὶ πάτριοι* M$^{s}$ P$^{1}$ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *voluntariae et patriae* which reading he found in Γ. The fem. form *ἑκούσιος* is more commonly used in Aristotle's writings than *ἑκουσία* (in 1313 a 5 all MSS. have *ἑκούσιον ἀρχήν*), and this is the case in Greek literature generally (Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 1. 537), but K$^{b}$ has *ἑκούσιαι* in Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 b 24, *καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν*, and the fem. *ἑκουσίας* occurs in Plato, Rep. 603 C, and *ἑκουσία* in Plato, Laws 925 A. The fem. form *πατρία* is also less often used in Aristotle's writings than *πάτριος* (in 1285 a 33 all MSS. have *πάτριος*), but in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 all MSS. have *τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας*. Plato uses the fem. *πάτριαι* in Laws 759 A. **7.** *πορίσαι*] Vet. Int. *emerunt*, which probably represents *πρίασθαι*, a misreading or mistake in Γ for *πορίσαι*. **10.** *θυσιῶν*] *οὐσιῶν* Π$^{1}$, and so in 16 *οὐσίαι* Π$^{1}$ for *θυσίαι*, readings which indicate that the archetype of these MSS. was written in uncial characters (see Sus.$^{1}$ p. xiv, and critical notes on 1271 a 27 and b 25). **12.** *ἐπανάτασις* P$^{2}$ Ald. corr. P$^{3}$, *ἐπανάστασις* M$^{s}$ P$^{1\,4}$ pr. P$^{3}$: we cannot be sure from Vet. Int. *elevatio* which reading he found in Γ, but perhaps he may have found *ἐπανάτασις*, for in 1302 b 33 he renders *ἐπανάστασις* *insurrectio*. **13.** *καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν*] See explanatory note. **16.** M$^{s}$ adds *αἱ πάτριαι* and P$^{1}$ *αἱ πάτριοι* before *οὐσίαι*, which wrongly takes the place of *θυσίαι* in Π$^{1}$, and Vet. Int. has *patriae substantiae: αἱ πάτριοι* (or *πάτριαι*) is omitted in Π$^{2}$ Bekk. That the *ἄρχων βασιλεύς* at Athens, who was more or less the representative of the ancient kings, had to do with *πάτριοι θυσίαι*, we see from *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 57: cp. Plato, Polit. 290 E. But whether these two words are rightly added by Π$^{1}$ before *θυσίαι* is doubtful. The language of Plutarch in Quaest. Rom. c. 63 makes rather in favour of their omission—*ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἐμετρίαζον* (*οἱ βασιλεῖς*) *ἀλλ' ἦσαν ὑπερήφανοι καὶ βαρεῖς, τῶν μὲν Ἑλλήνων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν ἐξουσίαν αὐτῶν περιελόμενοι μόνον τὸ θύειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπέλιπον*—but Π$^{2}$ occasionally omit words or parts of words wrongly (these MSS., for instance, are undoubtedly wrong in omitting *μὴ* in 1335 b 25 and in reading *αἱ* for *αἰτίαι* in 1304 b 6), and I incline on the whole to accept the reading of Π$^{1}$ here, though it is no doubt possible that *αἱ πάτριοι* is a gloss. **22.** *ὡρισμένοις* Γ P$^{1}$, the rest *ὡρισμένων*. *τε* is added after *στρατηγός* in M$^{s}$ P$^{1}$, and possibly was added in Γ also, but this is uncertain, for, as usual, Vet. Int. gives no rendering for it. **33.** *πλειόνων* Γ P$^{1}$ corr.$^{1}$ P$^{2\,3}$ (i. e. corrections in P$^{2\,3}$ in the same ink as the MSS.): *πλείονος* M$^{s}$ Π$^{2}$. **36.** *παμβασιλείας*] *βασιλείας* Π$^{1}$, but Π$^{1}$ occasionally omit the first

syllable of words, e. g. in 1342 b 32 (*διάνοιαν* for *παιδείαν οἷον*) and 1273 a 10 (*τάξαντα* for *τὰ δόξαντα*). **39.** *μέρος* Π¹ P²·³ Bekk., *αἱρεσιν* P⁴·⁶ Lˢ Sus. 'Κατὰ *μέρος* fortasse corruptum in Pol. 3. 15. 1285 b 39' (Bon. Ind. 456 a 24).

**1286 a 1.** *ποτε* is added after *πότερον* in Π¹ (Vet. Int. *quidem*, which represents *ποτε*, for *πῶς ποτὲ* is rendered *qualiter quidem* in 1276 a 17). It is probably a blundered dittography of *πότερον*. **9.** *δοκοῦσι* the third Basle edition of Aristotle, followed by Bekker: *δοκεῖ* Γ Π Sus., who prefers (with Göttling) to correct *οἱ νόμοι*, the reading of Γ Π in the next line, to *ὁ νόμος*. Either change may be right: that of Bekker avoids the transition from *νόμων*, 9, to *ὁ νόμος*, 10, and then back to *νόμους* in 15, but it may be urged on the other hand that there is a similar transition from *νόμοι* to *νόμος* in 1292 a 32 sq. **12.** *καὶ*] *καὶ πως* Γ P¹ Sus., *καὶ πῶς* Mˢ. Is not *πῶς;* a marginal query by some perplexed reader which has crept into the text? **13.** *τετρήμερον* P¹ Π² Bekk., *τριήμερον* Γ Mˢ Sus. In 1304 b 12 and 1305 b 27 Π¹ wrongly substitute *τριακοσίων* and *τριακοσίοις* for *τετρακοσίων* and *τετρακοσίοις*, an error which occurs also in the MSS. of Lysias Or. 30. 8 and elsewhere. On the other hand, in 1258 b 27 Π¹ have *τέταρτον* in place of *τρίτον*. In Hist. An. 5. 19. 553 a 10 all Bekker's MSS. have the form *τετραήμερον*. **14.** *αὑτοῦ* Γ Sus. (Vet. Int. *in suo periculo*), *αὐτῷ* Mˢ, *αὐτοῦ* the rest and Bekker. **25.** *πάντας* Π¹ P⁴: *πάνυ* P²·³·⁶. **30.** *κρίνει*] *κρίνειν* Mˢ Π². See critical notes on 1280 b 4 and 1283 a 7. **35.** *ὀργισθῆναι*] Vet. Int. *impetu ferri*. He may have misread *ὀργισθῆναι* as *ὁρμηθῆναι* (see Schn.). **38.** *εἰ δὲ δὴ*] Vet. Int. *si autem*, which may possibly stand for *εἰ δὲ δὴ*: cp. 1292 b 32 and 1295 a 34. *τοῦτο μὴ* Π² Bekk.: *μὴ τοῦτο* Π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1280 a 15.

**1286 b 1.** *δὲ πάντες*] *δ' ἄνδρες* Γ Mˢ. **7.** *ὁμοίους*] *ὁμοίως* Γ Π² (Vet. Int. *similiter*). **10.** *οἰκοῦντας*] Vet. Int. *habitabant*, but Vet. Int. sometimes substitutes the indicative for the participle, e. g. in 1329 b 4, where he has *lege statuit* for *νομοθετήσαντος*, in 1333 a 18, where he has *potest* for *δυνάμενον*, and in 1305 a 24, where he has *seditionem movit* for *στασιάσας*. **14.** *γιγνόμενοι*] *γενόμενοι* Mˢ P¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *facti* whether Γ had *γενόμενοι* or *γιγνόμενοι*. **15.** Vet. Int. does not translate *ποθεν*, but neither does he translate *που* in 1288 a 25. **17.** *μετέβαλλον* Mˢ Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *transmutabantur*): *μετέβαλον* P¹ Bekk.² Sus. **21.** *ἔτι*] Vet. Int. *iam* (*ἤδη* Γ?). **24.** *ὁποῖοί* Γ P¹ Julian (ep. ad Themist. p. 261 A) and corr. P², *οποιοι* Vat. Pal.,

ὁποῖοι $M^s$, ὁποῖόν $P^3$ Ald. and pr. $P^2$, ὁποίων $P^4$ $L^s$ $Q^b$ $T^b$. **25.** τοῖς om. Julian. **29.** αὐτόν the third Basle edition of Aristotle, αὐτόν Γ Π. ἢ] ἢ Γ $P^{1\,4}$, η Vat. Pal., ἡ the rest. **31.** καὶ is added before κατὰ in $\Pi^2$, but omitted in $\Pi^1$ Vat. Pal. **32.** αὑτοῦ Γ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *suam voluntatem*), αὐτοῦ Π. **33.** φυλάξει $P^4$ Ald., φυλάξεται $M^s$ $P^1$, φυλάξαι $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Vat. Pal.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *custodiet* whether he found φυλάξει or φυλάξεται in Γ, for τοὺς φυλαττομένους in 1331 a 16 is rendered *custodientes* by Vet. Int., while in 1285 a 26 φυλάττουσιν is rendered *custodiunt*. **36.** ἑκάστου] Vet. Int. *ea quae singulorum*, where *singulorum* may possibly represent ἑκάστων, not ἑκάστου, for *singularum* represents ἑκάστων in 1337 a 20 and *singulis* ἑκάστοις in 1295 a 38. Did Vet. Int. find τὴν added before ἑκάστων (or ἑκάστου) in Γ? **40.** συρακοσιοις Vat. Pal.: συρακουσίοις all other MSS. except $P^4$, which has συρακουσίος. In Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 b 16 $A^c$ has συρακοσίους (συρακουσίους $Y^b$ $Z^b$, συρρακουσίους Q). In Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 38, however, all MSS. have συρακούσιοι, and in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 8 the MSS. have συρακούσιοι, except pr. $P^s$, which has συρακόσιοι. We know from inscriptions (Meisterhans, pp. 21, 75, ed. 2) and from coins that Συρακόσιοι is the correct form.

**1287 a 4.** πολιτείας Victorius and Camerarius (Interp. p. 138), followed by Bekker and Sus.: βασιλείας Γ Π Vat. Pal. Julian (Ep. ad Themist. p. 261 A) appears to have read βασιλείας, for he says, ἐξῆς δὲ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ νόμον λεγομένου βασιλέως διεξελθών, ὅς ἐστιν ὑπηρέτης καὶ φύλαξ τῶν νόμων, καὶ τοῦτον οὐδὲ βασιλέα καλῶν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος (sc. βασιλείας?) οἰόμενος. **9.** πάντα Π Vat. Pal.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *principatur omnibus* whether he found πάντα or πάντων in Γ: πάντων Julian, Sus., πᾶν Cod. Voss. of Julian (according to Hertlein). **10.** ἑαυτοῦ Π: αὐτοῦ Julian, αὑτοῦ Hertlein. See explanatory note. Vet. Int. adds *dicendum* after ὁ βασιλεύς from a gloss λεκτέον which appears in $P^2$. δέ om. Julian. τὸ add. Julian after οὐδέ. **11.** τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν $P^1$ $\Pi^2$: τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα Γ $M^s$. ὅπου—ἡ πόλις om. Julian. **13.** καὶ—φύσιν om. Julian. **15.** τὰ Sus. following the better MSS., τὸ Bekk. following $P^4$ and others of the less good MSS. **16.** τοίνυν om. $\Pi^1$ but not Vat. Pal. οὐδὲν Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.: οὐδένα Bernays, Sus. **23.** ὁμοίων $\Pi^1$ Bekk. Sus.: ὁμοίως $\Pi^2$. **25.** ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι] So $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. (ἐφιστησιν Vat. Pal.): παιδεύσας om. $M^s$ $P^1$: Vet. Int. *sed universale lex instituit*, which probably stands for ἀλλὰ τὸ καθόλου ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι, though ἐφιστάναι is

not once rendered by Vet. Int. *instituere* in the Politics (it is rendered *insistere* in 1336 b 25). Τὸ *καθόλου* may probably have been a gloss in Γ (Sus.$^3$); the words *ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας* were either wanting in Γ or left untranslated by Vet. Int. **27.** Vet. Int. adds *omnia* before his equivalent for *ἐπανορθοῦσθαι*. He has *dant* for *δίδωσιν* and may have found *διδόασιν* in his Greek text, but he is not always faithful to the number which he finds in his Greek text (e.g. in 1338 b 11 and 1296 a 34, 35). *ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ*] Vet. Int. *quodcunque videbitur*, as in 1318 a 28. The more usual equivalent is *quodcunque videatur*. **28.** Π Vat. Pal. have *ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους*. Vet. Int. *qui quidem intellectum iubet principari videtur iubere principari deum et leges* (thus he fails to render *οὖν* and seems to have found *νοῦν* in Γ in the place of *νόμον*). The Vossian MS. of Julian has *ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους*: thus it wrongly omits *δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν* and has (no doubt rightly) *τὸν νοῦν μόνους* in place of *τοὺς νόμους*. **30.** *ἢ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία κ.τ.λ.*] Vet. Int. *quando enim concupiscentia tale et furor principatum habuerit* (or *habuit*), *tandem et optimos viros interimet*, representing possibly *ὅτε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχον, τέλος καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθερεῖ* (or *διαφθείρει*, for Vet. Int. sometimes renders the present by the future, e.g. in 1281 a 19). M$^8$ has *ὅ τε* in place of *ἢ τε*, as Γ apparently had *ὅτε*. See next note. **31.** *ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας* Π$^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθείρει* M$^8$ P$^1$ (except that pr. P$^1$ has *φθείρει*) Sus. As to Vet. Int. see preceding note. In 1336 a 10 the correct reading *διαστρέφεσθαι* has been corrupted in Π$^1$ into *διαφέρεσθαι*, and *διαστρέφει* appears to have been corrupted in these MSS. here in a somewhat similar way. Julian has *καὶ ὁ θυμὸς διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας*, omitting *ἄρχοντας*, but otherwise agreeing with Π$^2$. **32.** *νοῦς ὁ νόμος* Π$^2$: *ὁ νοῦς νόμος* M$^8$ Vat. Pal. Julian pr. P$^1$: we cannot be sure from Vet. Int. *intellectus lex est* which reading he found in Γ. **34.** *καὶ* om. Vat. Pal. possibly rightly: it is bracketed by Sus. But see explanatory note. **38.** *ἐπήρειαν*] Vet. Int. *affectum*. He does not understand the word. In Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 14, 18 and 2. 4. 1382 a 2 *ἐπηρεασμός* is rendered *epireasmus*, and in Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 17 *ὁ ἐπηρεάζων qui epireazil*. **39.** *πιστευθέντας* Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.$^1$: *πεισθέντας* Schn. Bekk.$^2$ Sus. and perhaps Γ. Vet. Int. has *persuasos ab inimicis* for *πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς*, and this probably represents *πεισθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς*, for

πιστευθέντες is represented elsewhere in the Politics by *crediti* (1305 a 22, 28) or *credibiles facti* (1310 b 16), and nowhere by *persuasi*, while πεισθῶσιν is represented by *persuadeantur* in 1332 b 7.

**1287 b 4.** γὰρ Γ Π Vat. Pal.: δὲ Thurot, Sus. **6.** ὥστ' εἰ $\Pi^1$ Vat. Pal. (ὥστε εἰ $M^s$), Eucken, Sus., ὥστε $\Pi^2$ Bekk. See Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 64. **8.** πολλὰ om. $\Pi^3$ pr. $P^3$. **14.** ἐρχομένω $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: ἐρχομένων Γ $M^s$ Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. *simul duobus venientibus*). **17.** γε is added in $M^s$ $P^1$ Vat. Pal. and possibly was added in Γ, though Vet. Int. does not render it, for he seldom renders γε. δυνατός] Vet. Int. *potuit*, but see above on 1286 b 10. **18.** ὡς—κρίνειεν is placed in $\Pi^2$ wrongly before ἐπεὶ, 17. **19.** ἐπειδὴ Bekk.: νενομοθετῆσθαι Coray and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *lege statuta iam* which reading he found in Γ. **22.** νομοθετῆσαι Π Vat. Pal. *esse*), but this is not certain, for Vet. Int. often renders the active by the passive. **26.** τ' ἴσως $\Pi^1$ Vat. Pal. Sus.: δ' ἴσως $\Pi^2$ Bekk. **27.** δυοῖν] See explanatory note. **29.** μόναρχοι $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: μονάρχαι $\Pi^1$ Sus. **30.** αὐτῶν Morelius, Bekk., Sus., and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *sibi*): αὐτὸν Π. τῇ ἀρχῇ] τῆς ἀρχῆς Casaubon, Richards, probably rightly (cp. 33). **31.** αὐτοῦ Sus.$^3$, αὐτοῦ Γ Π Bekk.$^1$, αὐτοῖς Bekk.$^2$ The Aldine edition of the Scholia Graeca in Aristophanem, in quoting ἄτοπον, 26—συνάρχους, 31, on Acharn. 92 (ed. Didot, p. 390), gives αὑτοῖς, but this quotation may have been interpolated by the editor of the Aldine, the Cretan Marcus Musurus, as to whose interpolations in these Scholia see Dindorf's preface in Didot's edition of them, p. iv. In that case this reading would no doubt be a conjectural emendation by Musurus. As to αὑτοῦ, see explanatory note. **38.** δεσποστὸν Sylburg, Bekk.: δεσποτὸν $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal.: δεσποτικὸν $\Pi^1$ Sus. (two MSS. of the Vet. Int., however, a z, have *despotum*). Compare 1324 b 39, where $P^{4\,6}$ $L^s$ have δεσποτικῶν and the other MSS. δεσποτῶν, the true reading being δεσποστῶν. καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν Sus.). **39.** Richards would add τοῦτο after (καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτὸν $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: om. $\Pi^1$ δίκαιον. **41.** τὰ is added before παρὰ φύσιν in $\Pi^1$ Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. *quae praeter naturam*).

**1288 a 6.** ἤδη om. $\Pi^1$, but these MSS. occasionally omit ἤδη: see critical note on 1268 b 21. **9.** z has *aristocratica autem multitudo* for ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος (with rec. b), whereas all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined have *aristocratia*. **10.** Vict. and Bekk.$^2$ bracket πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν, but then the

rulers in an aristocracy cease to be a part of τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν πλῆθος. Sus. prefers to bracket πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον, but this course is open to the same objection. In reality the ἀριστοκρατικὸν πλῆθος includes both rulers and ruled, as we see from c. 18. 1288 a 35 sqq. **12.** ἡγεμονικῶν] Vet. Int. *praesidibus*, which stands for ἡγεμόνων (see 1303 b 28, 1305 a 40, 1313 b 29, and 1316 b 18), but it is possible that Vet. Int. mistook the reading in Γ and that this was ἡγεμονικῶν, not ἡγεμόνων. **13.** $\Pi^2$ add καὶ ἐν before ἐγγίνεσθαι, but $\Pi^1$ Vat. Pal. Sus. omit καὶ ἐν, Vat. Pal. reading ενγιγνεσθαι. Bekk.[1] brackets καὶ ἐν, and Spengel and Bekk.[2] bracket πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ἐγγίνεσθαι, but a πλῆθος which is a fit subject for Polity is not necessarily exclusively composed of πολεμικοί: it is rather under the sway of πολεμικοί (cp. c. 7. 1279 b 2, διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν). Καὶ ἐν (ἐν?) is probably an intimation that the copyist found ἐνγίνεσθαι in the text which he was copying in addition to ἐγγίνεσθαι. πολεμικὸν $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus., πολιτικὸν $\Pi^1$ Vat. Pal. Πολιτικὸν probably comes from the preceding line. ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. Bekk., ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι Γ $P^1$ Sus., καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι $M^s$. See critical note on 1277 b 14. **15.** εὐπόροις $\Pi^1$ Bekk. Sus., ἀπόροις $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. ἢ γένος $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: ἤ γένος Γ $M^s$: ἦ γένος Sus. τῶν ἄλλων should probably follow, not precede, ἕνα τινά: the two words may, however, have been placed where they stand in order to avoid the hiatus in ἢ καὶ ἕνα τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων, or they may be repeated (a common blunder) from τῶν ἄλλων, 17. **16.** τινὰ om. $\Pi^1$, but see critical notes on 1273 b 27, 1279 b 15, 1283 b 2, 1284 b 11, and 1324 a 37. **22.** πάντη $\Pi^1$, if Vet. Int. *penitus* stands for πάντη, παντηι Vat. Pal., πάντῃ Sus.: πάντες $\Pi^2$ Bekk. **24.** ἀλλὰ καὶ Γ Schn. Sus. (Vet. Int. *immo*, which represents ἀλλὰ καὶ in 1282 a 20—a fact which has hitherto escaped notice): ἀλλὰ $M^s$ $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. **27.** τὴν om. $M^s$ $P^4$ $Q^b$ $T^b$ and possibly Γ, followed by Bekker. **29.** τοῦτον om. $\Pi^1$, but see critical note on 1257 b 24. **39.** τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal.: τῆς ἀρίστης πόλεως $M^s$ $P^1$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *optimae civitatis*). So in 1260 b 23 $\Pi^2$ have τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης, while $M^s$ $P^1$ and probably Γ have τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, and in 1331 a 5 $\Pi^2$ have ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις, while $M^s$ $P^1$ and probably Γ have ταῖς ἰδίαις οἰκήσεσι. It should be noticed that in 1288 b 3 Π Vat. Pal. have περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς ἀρίστης. **40.** διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν] z has *per eadem* rightly (with g alone of the MSS. of Vet. Int. collated by Sus.): all the other MSS. have *per eandem*.

**1288 b 3.** δὲ Π, δὴ Vat. Pal. perhaps rightly: Conring had already conjectured δή. **5.** *ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν*, which is evidently a slightly different version of the opening words of the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, is added by Γ Π Vat. Pal. at the end of the Third, except that $P^{4\,6}$ $L^{8}$ omit *τὸν μέλλοντα* and substitute *γὰρ* for *δή*. In one of the best MSS. of the Metaphysics, $A^{b}$, the closing words of one Book are often repeated in the opening words of the next: see Christ's preface to his edition of the Metaphysics, p. vii.

## BOOK IV (VII).

**1288 b 5.** See critical note at the close of the Third Book.

**1323 a 16.** *πρῶτον* $P^{1}$ $\Pi^{2}$ Bekk.: *πρότερον* Γ $M^{8}$ Sus. **20.** *ὁμολογεῖσθαι* Π: Vet. Int. *confessum esse*, but he may probably have found *ὁμολογεῖσθαι*, not *ὡμολογῆσθαι*, in his Greek text (compare his renderings in 1262 b 6, where he has *arbitratus est* for *οἴεται*, and 1273 b 39). **27.** *χρή* om. $\Pi^{2}$. **29.** *παραπετομένας*] Vet. Int. *volantes*, but this may probably stand for *παραπετομένας*, not *πετομένας*, for he has *dicens* for *προειπών* in 1338 a 26, *pascentes* for *ἐπιμένοντας* in 1305 a 26, *peccare* for *διαμαρτάνειν* in 1338 a 41, 1288 b 37, and 1297 a 7, *laborare* for *διαπονεῖν* in 1339 a 8 and 1341 b 22, and *labores* for *φιλοπονίαις* in 1338 b 25, to mention no other examples. **30.** *τοῦ* is added after *ἢ* in $M^{8}$ $P^{1}$: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *comedere vel bibere* whether he found this *τοῦ* in Γ. **32.** *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα*] Vet. Int. *similiter autem et quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant sic imprudentem*, where Sus. thinks that the translator has rendered a gloss. **40.** *διαλαμβάνειν* $\Pi^{2}$ Bekk.[1]: *διαβαίνειν* $\Pi^{1}$ (Vet. Int. *provenire* should probably be *pervenire*, the reading of Sus., which no doubt stands for *διαβαίνειν*, though *διαβέβηκεν* in 1272 b 21 is rendered *transivit*): *λαμβάνειν* Lamb. Bekk.[2] Sus. See explanatory note on 1323 a 39.

**1323 b 6.** *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ* Γ (Vet. Int. *quin immo*) $\Pi^{2}$: *οὐ μὴν* $M^{8}$ pr. $P^{1}$. **8.** *ὧν*] Vet. Int. *eorum*, which perhaps should be *eorum quorum*, or simply *quorum*. **9.** *αὐτῶν* om. $\Pi^{1}$. *Αὐτοῦ* is omitted by $\Pi^{1}$ in 1301 a 8. **15.** *εἴληφε* $\Pi^{2}$ Bekk.[1]: *εἴληχε* $\Pi^{1}$ Bekk.[2] Sus. **17.** *τιμιώτερον*] Vet. Int. *pretiosior*: see critical note on 1267 b 1. **23.** *συνωμολογημένον*] z has *confessum* with all the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, and this is probably the correct

reading: Sus. follows a, which has *concessum*. See critical note on 1323 a 20. **27.** τοῦτ' Γ in place of ταῦτ', the reading of Π (Vet. Int. *hoc*). **41.** ἑκάστῳ $P^2$ Bekk.: ἑκάστου the rest, except that $P^4$ $V^b$ Ald. and pr. $P^3$ $S^b$ omit καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστου (or ἑκάστῳ): ἑκάστου Sus.

**1324 a 10.** ὅσοι τε] All the MSS. of Vet. Int. except z have *quicunque*: z *quicunque autem*. See critical notes on 1330 b 4, 1332 a 42, and 1336 a 5. **12.** εἴ τέ τις] Vet. Int. *si etiam aliquis*, where τε is rendered (it is not often rendered by Vet. Int.) and rendered by *etiam*, as in 1327 a 25. **14.** πότερος] πότερον Γ (Vet. Int. *utrum*): $M^s$ has a contraction which may represent πότερον (see Sus.[1]). **22.** γὰρ is omitted in Γ $P^{4\,6}$ $L^s$ Bekk. See critical note on 1272 b 36. **31.** λέγω δὲ δύο] We expect λέγω δὲ τοὺς δύο (cp. 1307 a 10, λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δῆμον καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν). The natural meaning of λέγω δὲ δύο surely is 'and I call the political and the philosophical lives two.' There *was* a question whether these lives were two or only one (cp. 28 sq. and Plato, Gorg. 500 D), but this can hardly be Aristotle's meaning here. Should τοὺς be added before δύο? **33.** γε Spengel Sus., τε $M^s$ $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε. **35.** ἕκαστον and τὴν πολιτείαν $\Pi^2$ Bekk., ἑκάστῳ and τῇ πολιτείᾳ $\Pi^1$ Sus. **37.** τινὸς om. $\Pi^1$, but see critical note on 1288 a 16.

**1324 b 3.** παρ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ.] $\Pi^2$ omit καὶ before τῶν νόμων, which I add with Congreve ($P^{4\,6}$ omit ὅρος also): παρ' ἐνίοις δ' οὗτος καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος Γ $M^s$ Sus.: παρ' ἐνίοις δ' οὗτος καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος τῶν νόμων $P^1$. **8.** πολέμους $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: πολεμίους $\Pi^1$. **16.** ἀπεκταγκότα and **18.** ἀπεκταγκότι] In 16 $P^{1\,5}$ have ἀπεκτονότα, pr. $P^3$ (correxit margo recens) ἀπεκτανκότα, $P^{4\,6}$ ἀπεκτακότα, $M^s$ ἐπταικότα, and in 18 $M^s$ $P^{1\,4\,6}$ have ἀπεκτακότι, pr. $P^3$ (correxit recens) ἀπεκτανκότι, $P^5$ ἀπεκτονότι: $P^2$ has the forms given in the text (Sus.[2]). It is not absolutely certain that ἀπεκτακότα and ἀπεκτακότι should not be read, for we find ἀπεκτακότες in Polyb. 11. 18. 10 and ἀπεκτακώς in some MSS. in Polyb. 3. 86. 10, but the authority of $P^{2\,3}$ is in favour of ἀπεκταγκότα and ἀπεκταγκότι, and ἀπεκτάγκασι occurs in Menand. Μισούμενος, Fragm. 8 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 173) and ἀπεκταγκώς in some MSS. (followed by Hultsch) in Polyb. 3. 86. 10 (see Kühner, Ausf. gr. Gr., ed. Blass, 2. 468, and Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, p. 395). Cp. Moeris (ed. Bekk. p. 189), ἀπέκτονεν Ἀττικοί, ἀπέκταγκεν Ἕλληνες. **20.** καταπηγνύουσι] Vet. Int. *commassant*, which probably represents καταπυκνοῦσι: he may have misread καταπηγνύουσι. **28.** ἀλλὰ . . . ὁρῶμεν om. $\Pi^1$. **30.** τὸ ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι $\Pi^2$, τὸ πεῖσαι ἢ τὸ

ἰάσασθαι $M^s$ $P^1$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *suasisse aut sanasse*); but see critical notes on 1282 a 17 and 1298 b 32. **37.** δεσπόζον and οὐ δεσπόζον Γ Π Bekk. Giph. (p. 893) δεσποτόν and οὐ δεσποτόν: Stahr, Sus. δεσποστόν and οὐ δεσποστόν, probably rightly. **39.** δεσποστῶν Lamb. (also a recent correction in $P^6$, but this corrector probably reproduces the conjecture of Lamb.: cp. 1332 a 41): Sepulveda had already translated the words *iis duntaxat qui tali imperio sunt idonei*, and Segni, *à chi è atto à servire*: δεσποτικῶν $P^{4\,6}$ $L^s$, δεσποτῶν the rest (Vet. Int. *despotibus*).

**1325 a 5.** δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι $P^4$ Bekk. Sus.: δῆλον ὅτι ἄρα $P^{1\,2\,3}$ $Sb$ $Vb$, δηλονότι ἄρα $M^s$, and these MSS. may possibly be right; I would follow them if I was aware of any parallel to this use of δηλονότι. **8.** τοῦ before σπουδαίου om. $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ. **18.** ἀποδοκιμάζουσι] z has *reprobant*, not *reprobrant* as Sus. (is this a misprint?). **25.** τό $P^3$ Bekk. Sus., τῷ $M^s$ $P^{1\,2\,4}$, τῷ Ald. **28.** δεσποτείαν] δεσποτικήν $P^1$ and possibly Γ, for a c have *despoticam*, z *despoticiam*, and b *despociam*: *despotica*, however, represents δεσποτεία in 1253 b 19. **29.** αὐτὸ τὸ corr.$^1$ $P^2$ (i.e. the scribe of $P^2$ in the same ink as the MS.), αὖ τὸ Γ $P^{14}$, αὐτὸ $M^s$ Ald., αὐτῷ $P^3$ pr. $P^2$. **36.** ὥστε οὐ δεῖ] Sus. reads *e conj.* δεῖν in place of δεῖ, but cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 5, where the *indirecta oratio* is similarly abandoned, though Aristotle is describing the views of others. **39.** ὑπολογίζειν, the third Basle edition of Aristotle, followed by Sus. $Sb$, a MS. of very little authority, which Bekker follows, has ὑπολογεῖν: all the other MSS. ὑπολογιεῖν. The existence of the word ὑπολογεῖν is doubtful, for in Theopomp. Com., Inc. Fab. Fragm. 31 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 822: 5. cxx) the true reading is not ὑπολογεῖν but ὑπολέγειν. The active ὑπολογίζειν is, however, extremely rare (see Liddell and Scott, s.v.). Richards doubts ὑπολογίζειν, especially with a genitive, and suggests that ὑπόλογον ἔχειν should be read in place of it.

**1325 b 3.** ψεῦδος is not rendered by Vet. Int. **7.** ἐν is added before μέρει by Thurot and Sus. **20.** αὐτῶν Vict. Bekk. Sus.: αὐτῶν Γ Π. **22.** καὶ before πράττειν om. Π$^1$ and Julian, Ep. ad Themist. p. 263 D, but Π$^1$ often omit καί, and other errors occur in Julian's quotation. **37.** γενέσθαι] Vet. Int. *fore*, but this probably stands for γενέσθαι, as *esse* stands for γενέσθαι in 1288 a 16. συμμέτρου] Vet. Int. *moderata*: elsewhere σύμμετρος is rendered by *commensuratus* (1327 b 6, 1298 b 25). Συμμετρία is always rendered by *commensuratio*. *Moderatus* represents μέτριος in 1267 b 13, *moderatius* μετριώτερον in 1313 a 20, and *moderate* μετρίως in 1315 b 15, so that

*moderata* may stand for μετρίας here, though μέτριος is more usually rendered by *mediocris*. **38.** προϋποτεθεῖσθαι] Vet. Int. *praesupponi*, just as he renders διηρῆσθαι by *dividi* in 1330 a 24, διωρίσθαι by *distingui* in 1330 b 15, and κατεσκευάσθαι by *constitui* in 1331 b 10.

**1326 a 2.** αὕτη $\Pi^1$ Sus.: αὐτὴ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. **6.** πόσους τε] Vet. Int. *quos quot*, but perhaps two alternative readings have here together found their way into the text. **7.** ὅσην Π Bekk.[1] (Vet. Int. *quantam* may stand for either ὅσην or πόσην): πόσην Sylburg, Bekk.[2], Sus.: see explanatory note on 1326 a 5. **10.** ποία is added before μικρὰ in Γ $M^s$ Bekk. Sus.: om. $P^1$ $\Pi^2$. **14.** οἰητέον om. $\Pi^1$. **18.** ποιητέον Camerarius (Interp. p. 279), Bekk.[2], Sus.: οἰητέον Γ Π. **21.** μορίων $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: μερῶν $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *partibus* which reading he found in Γ. Μερῶν in $M^s$ $P^1$ may be repeated from μέρος in the preceding line: this kind of error occurs not infrequently in $\Pi^1$. **25.** ἀλλὰ μὴν $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ $\Pi^1$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *non solum sed*). **29.** τε om. $M^s$ $P^1$: the reading in Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. seldom translates τε. **34.** πόλις $P^1$ $\Pi^2$: πόλιν Γ $M^s$ Bekk. Sus. See explanatory note. **36.** πόλεως $\Pi^1$ Sus.: πόλεσι $\Pi^2$ Bekk.

**1326 b 4.** ἐν τοῖς μὲν $P^{2\,3\,4}$ etc. Bekk.: ἐν μὲν τοῖς $M^s$ $P^1$ Ald. Sus. **12.** ῥᾴδιον] All MSS. of Vet. Int. but z have *facile est*, but z omits *est*. **19.** ἐν τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ τῇ λίαν] Vet. Int. *in ea quae valde multorum hominum* (ἐν τῇ πολυανθρώπῳ τῇ λίαν Γ?). I doubt, however, whether Vet. Int. found in his Greek text a different reading from that which we have in the MSS., for in 1302 b 28 he has *eos qui sine ordine et sine principatu* for τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας, and in 1310 b 21 he has *conditores populi et prospectores* for τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας. He seems now and then to allow himself a little laxity in his rendering of substantives in *-ία*. **32.** τὸν ὅρον om. $P^{3\,4}$ pr. $P^2$, but erroneous omissions occur occasionally in the MSS. of the second family (e.g. of μὴ in 1335 b 25 and of ἔργον in 1288 b 16), though not so often as in those of the first family, and here τὸν ὅρον can hardly be spared, for it would be difficult to supply it from 23. **34.** συμβαίνῃ] z has *accidit* probably rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *accidet*. **36.** αὐτήν] Richards suggests whether αὐτῆς should not be read, but perhaps αὐτήν is defensible: see explanatory note on 1326 b 35.

**1327 a 5.** μὲν] μὲν οὖν Schn. Sus. See, however, explanatory note. **12.** πολλὰ] πολλοὶ Camerarius (Interp. p. 283) and perhaps $M^s$ and pr. $P^1$ (see Sus.[1]), followed by Bekk.[2] Sus., πολλὰ Γ' $\Pi^2$ Bekk.[1]

**20.** τὴν χώραν] See explanatory note on 1327 a 19. **21.** πολέμους Sylburg, Bekk., Sus.: πολεμίους Γ Π. **23.** Susemihl (Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, lxxix. (1894), p. 273) thinks that J. Argyriades in his Διορθώσεις εἰς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους Πολιτικά I. (Athens, 1893) is right in bracketing πρὸς, but see explanatory note. **32.** ἐπεὶ δὲ $\Pi^1$ Bekk. Sus.: ἐπειδὴ $\Pi^2$. ὑπάρχοντα καὶ Welldon, Sus.: ὑπάρχοντα Congreve, ὑπάρχον καὶ Γ Π Bekk.[1], ὑπάρχειν καὶ Schn. Bekk.[2] **34.** τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ $M^s$ $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.[3 4], except that $P^4$ has αὐτὸν: νέμειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἄστυ Γ Sus.[1 2] (Vet. Int. *ut neque occupetur ipsum municipium*).

**1327 b 11.** τῆς ναυτιλίας] Vet. Int. *navigium*, though elsewhere he rightly translates the word *navigatio*. **13.** καὶ before τοῦτο om. $\Pi^1$ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of καί. **14.** Ἡρακλεωτῶν] See explanatory note. **15.** κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν] Vet. Int. *aedificata civitate magnitudine aliis contractiore* (z *artiore*), which appears to represent κεκτισμένης πόλεως τῷ μεγέθει ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέρας. **16.** πόλεων Γ Π Bekk.[1]: πόλεως Congreve, Sus. Bekk.[2] brackets καὶ **17.** διωρισμένα] διωρισμένον $L^s$ $P^6$ Ald. corr. $P^4$, Bekk.[2]: for the reading of pr. $P^4$ see Sus.[1] and Sus.[4]: but these MSS. have little authority. For ἔστω διωρισμένα cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 39, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων. **28.** $\Pi^1$ add μὲν after ἀρχόμενα, probably repeated from the preceding line. **31.** βέλτιστα Π: Vet. Int. *maxime*. **34.** $M^s$ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. add καὶ before πρὸς ἄλληλα: Γ $P^1$ omit it, probably rightly. Sus. brackets it: the reading of Γ is uncertain, om. $M^s$ $P^1$ Bekk.[2]: Sus. brackets it: the authority of $\Pi^1$ in for Vet. Int. seldom translates τε. But the authority of $\Pi^1$ in omissions of τε is weak, for these MSS. often omit it. Τε may be merely a blundered dittography of the first syllable of the next word κέκραται. It can hardly be accounted for here in the way in which Stallbaum accounts for its presence in Plato, Meno 72 E, Phaedo 63 C, and Hipp. Maj. 282 B.

**1328 a 2.** αἴρεται] z *tollitur*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *attollitur*. But I doubt whether z is right here. **5.** σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχου] So Bergk, probably rightly, though Γ Π have οὐ in place of σὺ and all MSS. but Γ $P^6$ have περὶ in place of παρὰ: ἀπάγχεο $P^{2\,3\,6}$ $L^s$ Ald. Bekk., ἀπάγχετο $P^4$, ἀπάγχεαι $P^1$ Sus., ἀπέγχεαι $M^s$, *a lanceis perforationes* Vet. Int., whatever that may represent (z has *alancenis perforati omnes* with a dot under the second *n* of *alancenis* to expunge it). Vet. Int. has *enim* here for γὰρ δή, as in 1284 b 29.

**13.** δεῖν $\Pi^2$, δεῖ $M^s$, δέ pr. $P^1$: Vet. Int. does not render it. **14.** ὑπολαμβάνουσι $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: νομίζουσι $M^s P^1$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *putant*, which is his equivalent for νομίζωσι in 1302 a 25): νομίζουσι has evidently slipped in here from the line below and displaced ὑπολαμβάνουσι. **15.** χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν $\Pi^1$, Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 5. 480 D, Sus. (πολέμιοι in place of πόλεμοι Γ): χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἀδελφῶν $\Pi^2$ Bekk. In 1338 a 25 $\Pi^1$ give an unmetrical version, and in 1253 b 36 Γ $M^s$. **16.** πέρα $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: πέραν $M^s P^1$ Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. οἵδε Gomperz, Sus.$^{3a}$: οἱ δὲ Γ Π Bekk. (except that $P^4$ omits δὲ). **18.** ὁπόσην $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ, perhaps rightly (see critical note on 1326 a 7): the rest πόσην. **22.** ταὐτά Γ$\Pi^2$ Bekk.$^2$ Sus., ταυτά $M^s P^1$, ταὐτά Bekk.$^1$ **26.** δεῖ $\Pi^1 P^4$, δὴ the rest. ταὐτὸ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus., τοῦτο $\Pi^1$. **28.** δ' ἥ $\Pi^1$, δ' ᾗ Bekk. Sus., δὴ $\Pi^2$. **40.** τοῦ $\Pi^2$ Bekk., and probably Γ: τῶ $M^s P^1$, τῷ Sus.: Vet. Int. *palam quod hoc causa quare fiant civitatis species*, which probably represents δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ (not τῷ) γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη (cp. 1305 a 10, where αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίνεσθαι is rendered *causa autem quare tunc quidem fiebat*).

**1328 b 4.** ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη (ἃ) ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν] ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη, διὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν $M^s P^1$ Sus., who, however, marks a lacuna after διὸ: ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *in his utique erunt, propterea quod necessarium existere*. Cp. 1333 b 20, where *propterea quod exercitati fuerunt* represents διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι, 1282 b 5, 1338 a 39, 1339 b 34, 41, 1295 a 15, and many other passages. Vet. Int. renders διό by *propter quod*, not *propterea quod*. I supply ἃ before ἀναγκαῖον, which might easily drop out: διὰ τὸ is of course impossible and διὸ seems to me unsatisfactory. **11.** Schn. Bekk.$^2$ Sus. add τὰς before πολεμικάς, but see explanatory note. **21.** παρασκευάσουσι $P^{2s}$ Bekk. and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *qui praeparent*): παρασκευάζουσι $M^s P^1 \Pi^3$ Sus. **22.** ἀναγκαίων] See explanatory note on 1328 b 22. **29.** ταὐτὸ Sus.: τοῦτο Γ Π Bekk. **32.** μὲν om. $\Pi^1$, but these MSS. often omit μέν. **41.** τὴν ἀρετὴν $M^s P^1$ Sus.: ἀρετὴν $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. $M^s P^1$ may be right, for in 1329 a 1 Π have τῆς ἀρετῆς. See critical note on 1332 a 22. οὐδὲ δὴ $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: οὐδὲ δεῖ $\Pi^1$ Sus. On οὐδὲ δή see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 45.

**1329 a 1.** $P^4 L^s$ Ald. add πολίτας after ἔσεσθαι, but these MSS. have little authority. For similar additions in them intended to complete the sense see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35,

1304 a 15, and 1332 a 30. **6.** δὲ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: δὴ $\Pi^1$. **11.** τοῖς αὐτοῖς Bekk. Sus.: τοὺς αὐτούς Γ Π. Camerarius, commenting on τοὺς αὐτούς, remarks (Interp. p. 295), 'ἐλλειπτικῶς, scilicet εἶναι δεῖ. Eosdem esse oportet utrosque, id est quibus ambo munera mandentur. Καταλληλότερον esset, si scriberetur τοῖς αὐτοῖς, nimirum ἀποδοτέον, quod supra autor communiter posuerat.' If τοὺς αὐτούς were retained, I should prefer to supply, not εἶναι δεῖ (with Camerarius), but θετέον τοὺς προπολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ κρίνοντας (cp. 5). **13.** τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην] See explanatory note. **16.** ἐστίν] Lamb. Bekk.[1] would exchange the places of this ἐστίν and εἶναι, 17. **17.** εἶναι is transferred by Camerarius to after τούτους, 18, and by Sus. to after δεῖ, 18. Vet. Int. adds *videtur* after his rendering for εἶναι, but it is not likely that he found δοκεῖ in his Greek text; he sometimes seeks to mend defects in it by conjectures (see vol. ii. p. lxiv): cp. also his addition of *vivere* in 1265 a 34. Welldon reads δίκαιόν ἐστιν, perhaps rightly. **18.** δεῖ (εἶναι)] Vet. Int. *oportet esse* (δεῖ εἶναι Γ?): δεῖ without εἶναι Π. Bekker adds εἶναι. See explanatory note on 1329 a 17. **20.** γένος $\Pi^2$ Bekk., μέρος $\Pi^1$ Sus. Μέρος may possibly come from 23, μέρος τι. **26.** ἢ before περιοίκους is found in Γ Π, but Sus. is probably right in bracketing it: cp. c. 10. 1330 a 28 sq. **27.** ἱερέων Γ $L^s$ Ald., ἱερῶν the rest: ἱερέων Bekk. Sus. **33.** αὐτοὺς] Sus. αὐτοὺς? There is something to be said for this suggestion (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24, τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὑτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις παρίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς), but on the whole I incline to retain αὐτοὺς. **34.** τούτοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον] τούτους Γ Bekk.: τούτοις nearly all other MSS., so far as they have been examined. Ταῖς ἱερωσύναις Γ Π Bekk. Bekker may be right in reading τούτους and ταῖς ἱερωσύναις: cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 16, διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι θετέον τοὺς τὴν [θεατρικὴν] μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς, where, however, χρῆσθαι should probably be added before θετέον, and Isocr. Busir. § 15, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ἱερωσύνας κατέστησε. But as almost all MSS. have τούτοις, not τούτους, it seems better to substitute τὰς ἱερωσύνας for ταῖς ἱερωσύναις: ἀποδοτέον thus regains its usual meaning. **38.** δὴ Γ Π Bekk., δὲ Schn. Sus.

**1329 b 2.** δὲ is added after ἔτι in $\Pi^1$. **4.** νομοθετήσαντος] Vet. Int. *lege statuit*, but see critical note on 1286 b 10. **10.** μεταβαλόντας] Vet. Int. *transsumentes*, which represents μεταλαβόντας (cp. 1326 b 21, 1328 a 27, and 1339 a 35). **13.** γὰρ $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: δὲ $\Pi^1$ Sus. **18.** τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν] Vet. Int. *quod quidem apud*

*Tyrreniam*, which may possibly represent τὸ μὲν πρὸς τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ, for *apud* represents πρός with the dative in 1331 b 10 and 1322 a 26. As to Τυρρηνίαν see critical note on 1280 a 36. **21.** Χῶνες $\Pi^1$, Χάωνες $P^{2\,3\,4}$ etc. The name of the race is Χῶνες and the name of their country Χώνη in Strabo, p. 255: cp. Χώνων, Strabo, p. 264, and Χωνίαν, Strabo, p. 654, and Lycophron, Alex. 983. Σιρῖτιν Göttling, Bekk.[2], Sus.: σύρτιν $M^s$ $P^{1\,2\,4}$ etc.: σύρτην pr. $P^2$, *Syrtem* Vet. Int. 'It seems certain that we should read Σιρῖτιν for Σύρτιν: Lycophr. Alex. 983' (the late Sir E. H. Bunbury in Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, Art. Chones). **30.** καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας] z has *et qua* (should be *quae*) *circa politias*: all Susemihl's MSS. of the Vet. Int. have *et circa politias*. **34.** εἰρημένοις] See explanatory note on 1329 b 33.

**1330 a 1.** τῇ χρήσει] z has *usu*, perhaps rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *usui*. **2.** γινομένην] See explanatory note on 1330 a 1. **10.** τῶν ἰδιωτῶν] Vet. Int. *propriam* (ἰδίαν Γ?). **14.** τὰς ἐσχατιάς] Vet. Int. *proprias necessitates*. **20.** διὸ παρ' $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus., διόπερ $M^s$ $P^1$, διὸ or διόπερ Γ (Vet. Int. *propter quod*). **22.** τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων] Vet. Int. *eorum quae ad ipsos proeliorum*; πόλεμος is rendered by *proelium* in 1297 b 19 also. **28.** δεύτερον δὲ] z has *secundo autem*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *et secundo autem*. **30.** τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι ἰδίους $P^4$ $L^s$ probably rightly. Almost all other MSS. as well as Γ add ἰδίους before ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις: Γ omits ἰδίους after εἶναι. **36.** αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν] See explanatory note. **37.** πρὸς om. $\Pi^1$. δὴ om. $\Pi^2$ Bekk. **38.** αἵ τε $P^4$ Ald. etc., ἅτε $P^{2\,3}$ etc., αἱ $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *quae*), but Vet. Int. rarely renders τε. **41.** Coray and Sus. add αἱ before κατὰ βορέαν, but see explanatory notes on 1330 a 40 and 1330 b 10. εὐχείμεροι] Vet. Int. *recentiores*.

**1330 b 2.** μὲν after αὐτοῖς om. $\Pi^1$. **4.** τε] Vet. Int. *autem* (δὲ Γ?). The same thing occurs in 1336 a 5 and 1332 a 42 (see also critical note on 1324 a 10). **6.** ὀμβρίοις $P^5$ $S^b$ and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *per praeparationem susceptaculorum aquarum imbrium*), ὀμβρίους $M^s$ $P^{1\,2\,3\,4}$ etc. ὕδασιν] ὕδατος $P^2$. **7.** πόλεμον] Vet. Int. *multitudinem*: did he misread πόλεμον as πλῆθος, or did he find πλῆθος in Γ? **12.** χρώμεθα] Vet. Int. *utuntur*. **14.** τοιαύτην $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: ταύτην $\Pi^1$ Sus. **16.** μήτ' Π Bekk. Sus., μηδ' Coray. See critical notes on 1257 b 12 and 1293 a 9. τοιούτων $\Pi^1$ $P^{4\,6}$ $L^s$ Bekk.[2] Sus.: τούτων the rest, followed by Bekk.[1] **18.** τῶν om. $M^s$ $P^1$: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. **21.** ἰδίων] οἰκείων $\Pi^1$ (Vet. Int. *familiarium*,

which no doubt represents *οἰκείων*, as in 1336 a 8 and 1312 b 13): *οἰκείων*, however, is probably a corruption of *οἰκιῶν*, an alternative reading for *οἰκήσεων*, which has displaced *ἰδίων*. **22.** *μὲν* om. $\Pi^1$, as often elsewhere. **23.** *καὶ* om. $\Pi^1$ Sus., but the authority of $\Pi^1$ is very weak in omissions and especially in omissions of *καί*. **24.** *ἱπποδάμειον* $M^s P^1$ Bekk. Sus.: *ἱπποδάμιον* $\Pi^2$: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *domativum equorum* which reading he found in Γ. $\Pi^2$ have *ὀρινοὺς* wrongly for *ὀρεινοὺς* in 1331 a 5. **27.** *τούτων ἀμφοτέρων* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. (cp. c. 13. 1331 b 37 and 2. 7. 1266 a 33): *ἀμφοτέρων τούτων* $\Pi^1$ Sus. (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19). **28.** *γεωργοῖς*] See explanatory note. **31.** *καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον* $\Pi^2$: $\Pi^1$ add *πρὸς* before *κόσμον*, but wrongly in all probability: cp. Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 23, *καὶ πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ διαγωγήν*, and Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 22, *καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγάς*, and 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 18, *καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν*, and see explanatory note on 1284 a 35. See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 451. 1. **32.** *τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένας πόλεις*] z has *virtuti contrafactas civitates*: perhaps *contrafactos* (Sus.) is a misprint.

**1331 a 2.** *πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας*] Vet. Int. *ad insultus*, yet in 1267 a 37 he translates *τῆς πολιορκίας* correctly by *obsidione*. *Insultus*, if right, will therefore hardly represent *πολιορκίας*, but what it represents is doubtful. **5.** *ὀρεινοὺς* $M^s P^1$: *ὀρινοὺς* $\Pi^2$: the reading of Γ is uncertain. *ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *ταῖς ἰδίαις οἰκήσεσι* $M^s P^1$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *propriis habitationibus*). See critical note on 1288 a 39. **10.** *ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημέναις* Γ Π Bekk.[1]: *τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις* Aretinus' translation, followed by Bekk.[2] and Sus. But it is more natural to speak of cities as *κεκτημέναι τείχη* than of peoples: cp. 9, *ἐχούσαις*, and 1330 b 32 sq. **21.** *δῆλον . . . φυλακτηρίοις* om. $\Pi^1$. *αὐτὰ* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. (it forms part of the passage which $\Pi^1$ omit): *αὐτὸ* Bonitz, Sus. **24.** *θείοις* Γ Π (except $P^4$, which has *θεοῖς*), Bekk.[1]: *θεοῖς* Bekk.[2] Sus., who says however in Qu. Crit. p. 409 n. 'at forsitan *θείοις* servare liceat.' **25.** *ἀρχείων*] *ἀρχῶν* $P^{4\,6}$ $L^s$ Ald., *ἀρχαίων* the rest, except $P^5$, which has *ἀρχείων*. **30.** *ἐρυμνοτέρως*] Vet. Int. *eminenter*, but Vet. Int. often renders the comparative by the positive (e.g. in 1283 a 35, 1287 b 9, 1333 b 10, and 1340 a 42). **32.** *ὀνομάζουσιν* Γ Π Bekk.[1]: *νομίζουσιν* Lamb. Bekk.[2] Sus. and apparently Bonitz (Ind. 487 b 51). See however explanatory note on 1331 a 31. **34.** *τοιοῦτον* $M^s$ $\Pi^2$ etc. Bekk.: *τῶν τοιούτων* $P^1$ and possibly Γ, for a z have *talium*, though the seven other MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined have

*talem*. Sus. reads *τῶν τοιούτων*, against the weight of MS. authority, it would seem. See critical notes on 1336 b 8 and 1314 b 26. **39.** *τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους* $P^1$ $\Pi^2$, *τὰ δὲ πρεσβύτερα* $M^s$, *τὰς δὲ πρεσβυτέρας* Γ? (Vet. Int. *matronas autem*).

**1331 b 4.** †*πλῆθος*†] Should *προεστὸς* be read? Cp. Plato, Rep. 428 E, *τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι*, and 564 D, *τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς* (i. e. *τῆς πόλεως*). *εἰς ἱερεῖς, εἰς ἄρχοντας*] Schneider and Bekk.[2], following others, add *καὶ* before the second *εἰς*, perhaps rightly (cp. c. 14. 1333 a 30). Welldon reads *καὶ* in place of the second *εἰς*. But, if *πλῆθος* is retained, some further change would appear to be necessary—the substitution (with Sus.) of *ὁπλίτας* or *στρατιώτας* for the second *εἰς*, or the addition of *καὶ ὁπλίτας* (with Welldon) after *καὶ ἄρχοντας*. Perhaps, however, *πλῆθος* should be *προεστὸς*, and the classes referred to by Aristotle are those at the head of the State, which do not include the hoplites. **5.** *καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια*] Should *τὰ* be added before *τῶν*? See, however, explanatory note on 1285 b 12, *τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις*. *τὴν* om. $M^s$ $P^1$ and probably Γ, but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of the article. **8.** *τὴν* after *ἄλλην* om. $M^s$ $P^1$: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. **13.** *νενεμῆσθαι* $\Pi^1$ corr. $P^2$ Bekk.[1] Sus., *νενεμμῆσθαι* over an erasure $P^4$, *μεμμῆσθαι* $P^3$ pr. $P^2$ etc. Bekk.[2] **16.** *ἀναγκαῖον*] z has *necessarium*: is *necessariam* in Sus. a misprint? **24.** *ἐκ* before *ποίων* om. $\Pi^1$ Bekk.[2] Sus. So in 1275 b 17 $M^s$ $P^1$ have *ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ τινῶν*, where the rest have *ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν*, and in 1275 b 32 $P^1$ and perhaps Γ have *τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἢ πολίτιδος*, where the rest have *τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἢ ἐκ πολίτιδος*: so again in 1271 a 17, *διὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν*, $M^s$ and perhaps Γ omit the second *διὰ*, in 1336 a 14, *καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις*, $M^s$ $P^1$ omit the second *πρὸς*, and in 1340 a 6, *εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν*, $M^s$ $P^1$ omit the second *πρὸς*. See also the readings in 1322 b 32, where $\Pi^1$ omit *περὶ*. See critical note on 1282 a 17. The first family of MSS. have little authority in omissions, and especially in the omission of small words. **26.** *πολιτεύσεσθαι* Coray Bekk.[2] Sus. probably rightly: *πολιτεύεσθαι* Π. Vet. Int. has *civitatem quae debet esse beata et politizare bene*, which leaves it uncertain what reading he found in Γ. The letter *σ* is easily added or omitted between two vowels in verbs (see critical notes on 1255 b 24, 1274 a 5, 1298 b 20), as well as at the end of words. See Mr. T. W. Allen in *Journ. Hellenic Studies*, 15. 278, 281, 296, and 297. **27.** *ἐν τῷ τὸν σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος*

*τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς*] z has *in eo quod est intentionem et finem actionum poni recte*, which is probably correct: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. omit *est*. **31.** *ἔκκειται*] z has *iacet* rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *latet*. *καλῶς* $M^s$ $\Pi^2$: *καλὸς* Γ $P^1$ (Vet. Int. *bona*). Sus.[3] ascribes the reading *καλὸς* to Γ $M^s$, but this is probably a misprint for Γ $P^1$ (see Sus.[1 2 4]). **32.** *ὁτὲ* Π, except $P^4$, which has *ὅτε*, and $P^2$, which has *ἐνίοτε* and is followed by Bekker. **34.** *γὰρ* om. $\Pi^1$, but probably wrongly: see critical note on 1272 b 36, and compare the omission of *γὰρ* by Γ $P^{4\,6}$ $L^s$ in 1324 a 22. **41.** *τύχην ἢ φύσιν* $\Pi^2$ and perhaps $M^s$, followed by Bekker: *φύσιν ἢ τύχην*, Γ $P^1$ Sus., an order which suits *δεῖται γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* well, though on the other hand in Plato, Laws 747 C (which is probably present to Aristotle's memory here) we have *εἴτε χαλεπὴ τύχη προσπεσοῦσα εἴτε καὶ φύσις ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη*. For a similar interchange in the order of two words see critical notes on 1333 b 36 and 1318 b 4.

**1332 a 4.** *τὴν* om. $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ, but omissions of the article in these MSS. have little weight. **8.** *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς* $\Pi^1$ Sus., but see explanatory note on 1332 a 7. **13.** *καὶ* is added before *ἀναγκαῖαι* in Γ $M^s$. **17.** *αἱρεσίς*] See explanatory note on 1332 a 16. **22.** *τὴν* before *ἀρετὴν* om. $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ: contrast the reading of these MSS. in 1328 b 41. Their authority in omissions of the article is small. **23.** *τὰ* before *ἀγαθά* is bracketed by Reiz and Sus., and omitted by Bekk.[2] Sus. places a full stop after *ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά* and reads *δῆλον δὴ* in place of *δῆλον δ'*, but not, I think, rightly. *Δῆλον δὲ . . . ἁπλῶς* is part of the paragraph introduced by *καὶ γὰρ*, 21. **29.** *κατ' εὐχὴν* Γ Π Bekk., *κατατυχεῖν* Cor. Sus. **30.** *αὐτὴν* is added after *γὰρ* in $P^4$ $L^s$ Bekk., but see critical note on 1329 a 1. **32.** $M^s$ $P^1$ add *τῆς* before *τύχης*: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found *τῆς* in Γ. See critical note on 1270 b 19. In 30 we have *ἡ τύχη* (as in c. 1. 1323 b 28 and Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 18), but in c. 12. 1331 b 21 sq. we have *τύχης* (*ἔργον*), not *τῆς τύχης*, and in 1273 b 21 Π have *ἀλλὰ τουτί ἐστι τύχης ἔργον*, not *τῆς τύχης*. It is unlikely therefore that $M^s$ $P^1$ are right. The best MSS. omit *τῆς* before *τύχης* in 1258 b 36. Cp. also 1323 b 27–29. **33.** $M^s$ $P^1$ are probably right in adding *γε* after *σπουδαία*: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *at vero* whether he found *ἀλλὰ μὴν* or *ἀλλὰ μήν . . . γε* in his Greek text, for he renders both the one and the other by *at vero* (see e. g. 1286 a 16 and 1287 a 41). *τῷ* Γ Ald. corr.[1] $P^2$ (i. e. a correction in $P^2$ in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int.

*at vero studiosa civitas est in cives participantes politia studiosos esse*: the rest τὸ. **41.** οὕτω Γ $M^{s}$ $P^{1}$ $\Pi^{2}$ Ar. pr. $P^{5}$: εἶτα Lamb., followed by Bekk. and Sus. (also a recent correction in $P^{5}$, as to which see critical note on 1324 b 39). **42.** τε Π Bekk.: Vet. Int. *autem*; hence Sus. reads δὲ in place of τε, but see critical notes on 1324 a 10, 1330 b 4, and 1336 a 5.

**1332 b 1.** μεταβαλεῖν $\Pi^{2}$ Bekk.: μεταβάλλειν $M^{s}$ $P^{1}$ Sus. and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *transmutari*). See for similar variations critical note on 1284 a 5. **8.** τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν] τὴν μὲν φύσιν δὴ $M^{s}$ pr. $P^{1}$ and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *quod quidem utique natura*, where *utique* represents δή. **10.** ἐθιζόμενοι $\Pi^{1}$ Bekk. Sus.: ἐθιζόμενα $\Pi^{2}$. **13.** δὴ $\Pi^{2}$ Bekk.: εἶναι altered into δὴ $P^{1}$: ἤδη Γ $M^{s}$ Sus. **30.** βουλόμενοι] See explanatory note on 1332 b 29. **36.** διαίρεσιν] αἵρεσιν Γ Π Bekk.: διαίρεσιν Leonardus Aretinus, who translates *natura enim ostendit quemadmodum haec distinguenda sint.* Διαίρεσιν (which Bonitz approves, Ind. 18 b 52) is probably right: cp. 16, τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην, and c. 9. 1329 a 17, ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν (referring to the same matter), and c. 17. 1337 a 1, δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἑπακολουθεῖν. ΔΙ might easily drop out before ΑΙ. αὐτὸ $P^{2\,3\,4}$ etc.: αὐτῶ $M^{s}$ and after τῷ Γ, om. $P^{1}$: αὐτῷ Bekk. and (between brackets) Sus. **37.** ταὐτὸ $\Pi^{2}$ Sus.: ταὐτῶ $M^{s}$ pr. $P^{1}$, om. Γ: ταὐτὸν Bekk. Vet. Int. *natura enim dedit electionem faciens eidem generi hoc quidem iunius, hoc autem senius.* τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ] τοτὲ μὲν . . . τοτὲ δὲ $M^{s}$ $P^{1}$. **40.** τοῦτον τὸν $\Pi^{2}$ Bekk.: τὸν τοιοῦτον $\Pi^{1}$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *talem*). See critical note on 1292 a 17.

**1333 a 18.** δυνάμενον] Vet. Int. *potest*, but see above on 1286 b 10. **32.** καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. **40.** τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων διαιρέσεις] διαιρέσεις Γ Π Bekk. (δι' αἱρέσεις $P^{4}$), αἱρέσεις Coray. In 1318 a 16 Schn. Bekk.[2] and Sus. seem right in reading αἱρέσεων in place of διαιρέσεων (unless with Lamb. we should read ἀρχαιρεσιῶν), and Sus. follows Coray in reading αἱρέσεις here. The change is not without plausibility, especially if we compare Isocr. De Pace § 106, τὰς αἱρέσεις τῶν πραγμάτων, but both Bekk.[2] and Bonitz (Ind. 180 b 38) retain διαιρέσεις, and I incline on the whole to follow them, particularly looking to 30 sqq., διῄρηται τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά. **41.** Vet. Int. fails to render μὲν, but he fails to render μὲν in μὲν γὰρ in 1300 b 34 also.

**1333 b 2.** δὲ before πράττειν om. $\Pi^{1}$ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. in the omission of small words is weak. **7.** βέλτιον

$\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *βέλτιστον* $\Pi^1$ Sus. **8.** *πάσας* om. $\Pi^1$. **15.** *εὐέλεγκτα*] z has *facile et redarguibilia*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *facile arguibilia*. The addition of *et* in z is wrong, but *redarguibilia* may well be right, for *ἐξελήλεγκται* immediately after is rendered *sunt redarguta* and in 1330 b 34 *ἐλεγχομένας* is rendered *redargutas*, though in 1308 a 1 *ἐξελέγχεται* is rendered *arguuntur*. **16.** *νῦν* om. $\Pi^1$. **17.** *ζηλοῦσι* Γ Π: *ζητοῦσι* Camotius, Bekker (approved by Sus.), but see explanatory note. *τὸ* $\Pi^1$ $P^{2\,3}$ Sus., *τῶν* $\Pi^3$ Bekk. **18.** *θίβρων* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *θίμβρων* $\Pi^1$ Sus. 'Praestare videtur forma *θιβρός*, qua usus est Nicander, Alex. 568 . . . Eandem varietatem in scriptura nominis proprii *Θίμβρων* et *Θίβρων* deprehendas' (Meineke, Analecta Alexandrina, p. 128). See also Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 65, who finds only the form *Θίβρων* in Attic Inscriptions. For the frequent interchange of *βρ* and *μβρ* in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in *Journ. Hell. Studies* 15. 275. **20.** Schneider, Bekk.$^2$, and Sus. are probably right in adding *τῆς* before *πολιτείας*. **21.** *ἐπειδὴ νῦν γε* Γ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *quoniam nunc quidem*): *ἐπειδή γε νῦν* $M^s$ $P^1$. **30.** *τὸ* Π Bekk.$^1$ Sus.: *τῷ* Scaliger, Bekk.$^2$ Γ probably had *τὸ*, for Vet. Int. translates *ad principari super vicinos*, whereas he commonly translates *ἐπί* with the dative by *in* or *super*. **33.** *διώκειν*] z has *persequi* probably rightly, for this is the word by which Vet. Int. renders *διώκειν*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *prosequi*. **36.** *λόγων* (om. $P^4$) *καὶ νόμων* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *νόμων καὶ λόγων* $\Pi^1$ Sus. See critical note on 1331 b 41. **37.** *ταὐτὰ* $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Bekk. Sus., *ταῦτα* $\Pi^1$ $P^4$ etc. *τόν* (*τε*) *νομοθέτην*] I follow Thurot and Sus. in adding (*τε*) after *τόν*. **41.** *ζητῶσι*] Vet. Int. *zelent* (*ζηλῶσι* Γ?).

**1334 a 3.** *ὅπως . . . 4, σχολάζειν* om. Γ $M^s$, and Vet. Int. seeks to heal the defect by rendering *τάξῃ ordinis* (see vol. ii. p. lxiv sq.). **8.** *ἀφιᾶσιν* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus., *ἀνιᾶσιν* $M^s$ and also $P^1$, if Sus.$^{1\,2}$ and the 1882 edition of Sus.$^3$, confirmed by St. Hilaire in his edition of the Politics published in 1837 (vol. ii. p. 94), are to be trusted, though the 1894 reprint of Sus.$^3$ ascribes the reading *ἀνιᾶσιν* to Γ $M^s$ only. It is difficult to tell from Vet. Int. *rubiginem contrahunt* what reading he found in his Greek text; he may possibly have found *ἐφιᾶσιν*, for in 1278 a 27 *προσεφέλκεται* is rendered *contrahitur*. There is much to be said for *ἀνιᾶσιν*: cp. Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 14, *ὁπηνίκα δὲ οὗτος οὐ πρυδίδωσι τὴν πενίαν, οὐδὲ ὡς βαφὴν ἀνίησι τὴν πάτριον πενίαν*: Pollux 1. 44, *ἔστι δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀνεῖται βαφῆς*: and Theophr. Hist. Plant. 5. 5. 1, *τὰ δὲ μοχθηρὰ σιδήρια δύναται τέμνειν τὰ σκληρὰ* (sc.

τῶν ξύλων) μᾶλλον τῶν μαλακῶν, ἀνίησι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μαλακοῖς ὥσπερ εἰλέχθη περὶ τῆς φιλύρας, παρακονᾷ δὲ μάλιστα ταῦτα. But the weight of MS. authority appears to be on the side of ἀφιᾶσιν. **14.** ὑπάρχειν Γ Π Bekk.: ὑπερέχειν Sus. not, I think, rightly. **19.** σώφρονα is bracketed by Sus., and it is true that Aristotle adds no proof of the indispensability of σωφροσύνη in the acquisition of necessaries, as he does in regard to ἀνδρία and καρτερία, but that it is indispensable we have seen in the explanatory note on 1334 a 19 (cp. also 1334 a 24). **28.** πολλῆς οὖν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. **30.** ἀπολαύοντας] Vet. Int. *frui* (ἀπολαύειν Γ?). **36.** τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς om. pr. $P^3$: τοῖς . . . 38, χρῆσθαι om. $M^8$: ἔτι . . . 38, χρῆσθαι om. $\Pi^2$. Γ $P^1$ omit nothing, but pr. $P^1$ has τῷ μὴ in 37 in place of τὸ μὴ. Bekker omits τὸ.

**1334 b 2.** γενέσθαι] See explanatory note on 1334 a 41 *sub fin.* **3.** ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note on 1334 a 41. τε] τὰ $P^1$. Vet. Int. adds before *haec*, his equivalent for ταῦτα, the words *quam quae belli*, which represent ἢ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and $M^8$ has τὰ πολέμου in the same place, but here a gloss has crept into the text of Γ $M^8$, for $P^2$ gives in red ink the gloss τὰ πολεμικά. **12.** ἐῶν om. Γ $M^8$ pr. $P^1$. ὁμοίων Γ $M^8$ $P^{2\,3\,4}$ pr. $P^1$: ὁμοίως two or three inferior MSS. and marg. $P^1$, followed by Bekk. Sus. **28.** καὶ is added after δὲ in $M^8$ $P^1$ Sus.: om. $\Pi^2$ Bekk. and perhaps Γ, for z and almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. consulted by Sus. omit *et*. **27.** τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus., τοῦ δὲ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς $P^1$, τοῦ δὲ τοῦ τρίτου τῆς ψυχῆς $M^8$: Vet. Int. *huius autem eorum quae animae* = τοῦ δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. **30.** γένηται $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: γίνηται $M^8$ $P^1$ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *fiant* which reading he found in his text, for *fiunt* stands for γένωνται in 1303 b 20. See critical note on 1339 a 13. **39.** τῶν om. $P^{2\,3}$. λίαν om. $\Pi^1$.

**1335 a 2.** γὰρ after τε om. $\Pi^1$. **5.** μετέβημεν] Vet. Int. *devenimus*. **12.** τὴν before τεκνοποιΐαν om. $\Pi^2$ $P^5$ Bekk., but probably wrongly: cp. 31, 39, 1335 b 23, 41, 1265 a 40, b 7, 1270 a 40. The article is absent only in 1335 b 7, 29. **13.** ἔκγονα $M^8$ $P^1$ Bekk.$^2$ Sus.: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found ἔκγονα or ἔγγονα in his text: ἔγγονα $\Pi^2$ Bekk.$^1$, but in 1335 b 30 all MSS. have ἔκγονα, and the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of the form ἔγγονος, though many of ἔκγονος, from the genuine writings of Aristotle. See Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 83, on the two forms: the form ἔκγονος is the more common in Attic inscriptions. **14.** ταὐτὸ τοῦτο $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: αὐτὸ τοῦτο $M^8$ $P^1$ Sus.,

τοῦτο αὐτὸ perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *hoc ipsum*). **16.** ἐπιχωριάζεται $\Pi^2$ Bekk. probably rightly (see explanatory note), ἐπιχωριάζει $M^s$ Sus. and after a lacuna pr. $P^1$. Vet. Int. has *lexatur* (z *et laxant*: pr. a *ālatur*); possibly *allocatur* or *allaudatur* ('is allowed') is the true reading, representing ἐπιχωριάζεται. **18.** *al* νέαι $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: ἔνιαι Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^1$. πονοῦσί τε $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: τε πονοῦσι $M^s$ $P^1$: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for, as usual, Vet. Int. does not translate τε. **23.** εἶναι om. $\Pi^1$, but these MSS. occasionally omit εἶναι. **25.** δὲ om. $\Pi^1$, but these MSS. often omit δέ. **26.** σπέρματος] See explanatory note on 1335 a 24. **27.** πληθύον] $M^s$ has a contraction which perhaps stands for πλῆθος, and Vet. Int. has *multum* (= πολύ). Göttling and Sus. are probably right in transposing ἢ μικρόν, 29, to after ἔτι, 27. **29.** As to [ἢ μικρόν] see on 27. **30.** τοσούτω $\Pi^1$ $P^{2\,3}$, followed by Bekk. Sus.: τούτω the rest. **32.** τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς $M^s$ $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Sus.: Vet. Int. *his quidem erit inchoante akmes*, which probably stands for τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένης ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, and this is Bekker's reading. Sus. believes ἀρχομένης to be right, though he leaves ἀρχομένοις in his text. **37.** δεῖ χρῆσθαι οἷς $\Pi^1$ Sus. (χρᾶσθαι in place of χρῆσθαι $M^s$ $P^1$): ὡς in place of δεῖ χρῆσθαι οἷς $\Pi^2$ Bekk. The reading of $\Pi^1$ may be no more than an explanatory gloss on ὡς which has crept into the text and taken the place of ὡς, a thing which sometimes happens to this family of MSS. (see critical note on 1255 b 12), but it is also true that $\Pi^2$ occasionally omit, though less often than $\Pi^1$, and I incline on the whole to think that $\Pi^2$ are in fault here. **39.** δὲ $\Pi^1$ Sus.: δι' altered into δὴ $P^2$, δὴ the rest followed by Bekker.

**1335 b 3.** μάλιστ' (ἄν)] μάλιστα ἄν $M^s$ (if Schoell, who collated $M^s$ for Susemihl, is right): μάλιστα Γ $P^1$ $\Pi^2$ Bekk.[1]: μάλιστ' ἄν Cor. Bekk.[2] Sus. 'In Graecis codicibus non raro scribitur vitiose ἥκιστα, μάλιστα pro ἥκιστ' ἄν, μάλιστ' ἄν' (Madvig, Adversaria Critica, 1. 41). **4.** παιδονομίας $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: παιδείας Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^1$. **5.** Sus. adds δεῖ before εἰπεῖν. **6.** οὐδὲ Coray, Bekk., Sus.: οὔτε Π. See explanatory note on 1272 b 38. **7.** κακοπονητική] κακοποιητική $M^s$ pr. $P^1$: Vet. Int. *male habens* (κακεκτική Γ?). **10.** τῶν ἐλευθέρων Γ $P^1$ Sus.: the rest, followed by Bekk., τῶν ἐλευθερίων. **11.** ταὐτα $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: ταὐτὸ Γ $M^s$ Sus., ταυτὸ $P^1$. καὶ is added before ἀνδράσι in $\Pi^1$ Sus. **15.** τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμήν] Vet. Int. *his quae sortitae sunt eum qui de generatione honorem*, but whether he found ταῖς εἰληχυίαις in his Greek text is doubtful. **18.** τὰ γεννώμενα $\Pi^1$ Bekk.[2] Sus. (Vet. Int. *quae generantur*): τὰ γενόμενα $\Pi^2$ Bekk.[1] See critical note on

1256 b 13. **19.** *καὶ* is added before *τὰ φυόμενα* in $\Pi^3$ Bekk. **20.** *γιγνομένων* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.[1], *γινομένων* $M^s$ Bekk.[2]: *γενομένων* $P^1$ Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. *genitorum*). **21.** *ἐὰν* om. $\Pi^1$ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is small in omissions, and especially in omissions of small words. *τῶν ἐθῶν*] z alone of the MSS. of the Vet. Int. which have been examined has *suetudinum*: all the rest have *gentium* representing *τῶν ἐθνῶν*, but probably a had *suetudinum* originally, for its present reading *gentium* is written over an erasure in a recent hand (see Sus.[1]). Schn. and Sus. take Leonardus Aretinus to have found *ἐθνῶν* in his Greek text in place of *ἐθῶν*, but his rendering, as it stands in MS. Ball. 242, is *in aliis vero si mores institutaque civilatis prohibeant natos exponere*, which seems to point to *ἐθῶν*, not *ἐθνῶν*. **22.** *κωλύῃ*] *κωλύῃ* $P^{2\ 4}$ etc. and a recent hand in $P^3$ (Bekk. *κωλύῃ*), '*κωλύοι* (ut videtur) pr. $P^{3'}$ (Sus.), *κωλύει* $\Pi^1$ Sus., but corr.[1] $P^1$ (i. e. a correction in $P^1$ in the same ink as the MS.) gives *κωλύῃ*. *ὡρίσθαι* Γ, a correction in the margin of $P^1$, and corr.[1] $P^2$ (i. e. a correction in $P^2$ in the same ink as the MS.) Sus., *ὥρισθαι* $M^s$, *ὁρισθῆναι* pr. $P^1$, *ὥρισται* the rest followed by Bekker. **23.** *δεῖ* Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^{1\ 3}$ Sus., *δὴ* the rest followed by Bekker. **24.** *συνδυασθέντων* Π: Vet. Int. *combinatis*, but it is doubtful whether Γ had *συνδυασθεῖσιν*, for in 1336 a 9 Vet. Int. renders *τηλικούτων* by *tantillos*. **25.** *μὴ* om. $\Pi^2$. **28.** *χρὴ* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *δεῖ* $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus. and possibly Γ (see however critical note on 1281 a 17). **30.** *καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων* Π: Vet. Int. *sicut et iuniorum*: Sus. is inclined therefore to read *καθάπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων*, but see critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, 1264 a 9, and 1284 b 32. **31.** *τῶν γεγηρακότων* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: *τῶν γηρασκόντων* $M^s$ pr. $P^1$: Vet. Int. *decrepitorum*, which probably represents *τῶν γεγηρακότων*. **35.** *ὥστε* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: *ὡς* $\Pi^1$ (Vet. Int. *ut... oportet*), but a correction in $P^1$ in the same ink as the MS. gives *ὥστε*. **39.** *ἢ* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *καὶ* $\Pi^1$ Sus.

**1336 a 5.** *φαίνεταί τε* $P^1$ $\Pi^2$, *φαίνεται τὲ* $M^s$: Vet. Int. *apparet autem* (*φαίνεται δὲ* Γ?). But see critical notes on 1324 a 10, 1330 b 4, and 1332 a 42. **6.** *ἄγειν* $M^s$ $P^1$ and perhaps Γ, for Vet. Int. has *inducere*, and though *ἄγειν* is usually rendered by *ducere* and sometimes by *adducere* in Vet. Int., it is rendered by *inducere* in 1306 a 3. Vict. placed *εἰσάγειν* in his text, taking *inducere* in Vet. Int. to represent *εἰσάγειν*, which no doubt it sometimes does (e.g. in 1320 a 14), but it does not always do so. No MS. appears to have *εἰσάγειν*: $P^{2\ 3\ 4}$ etc. have *ἀεὶ*. *Ἄγειν* may be right: cp.

Aristot. Fragm. 627. 1584 a 16, *τὸν δὲ ἀρξάμενον τῆς ᾠδῆς Ἀριστοτέλης Ἀρίωνά φησιν εἶναι, ὃς πρῶτος τὸν κύκλιον ἤγαγε χορόν.* *Λαβεῖν* (Plato, Rep. 591 B) or *ἔχειν* (Phaedr. 268 E), in addition to *εἰσάγειν*, would be possible alternatives for *ἄγειν*. **7.** *πλήθουσα* Π, but the word is not included in the Index Aristotelicus and does not appear to occur elsewhere in Aristotle's writings: *πληθύουσα* Vict. Bekk. and Sus. probably rightly (Sus., however, does not place it in his text). *Πλήθειν* occurs 'in Attic Prose only in the phrase *ἀγορᾶς πληθούσης, ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ* etc.' (Liddell and Scott); it is a poetical word; still it *may* have been used by Aristotle, for *πόσις* also (1253 b 6 and 1335 b 41) and *τιμαλφεῖν* (1336 b 19) are poetical words. **9.** *τηλικούτων* $M^s P^{1\,2\,3}$ etc. Bekk. Sus.: *τηλικούτω* $P^{4\,6} L^s$: Vet. Int. *tantillos*, but it is doubtful whether he found *τηλικούτους* in Γ (see critical note on 1335 b 24). **10.** *διαστρέφεσθαι* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus., *διαφέρεσθαι* $\Pi^1$ (for Vet. Int. has *defluere*, which perhaps should be *diffluere*), except that pr. $P^1$ had *διαφέρθαι*. See critical note on 1287 a 31. **14.** *καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: $M^s P^1$ omit the second *πρὸς* (see critical note on 1331 b 24): about Γ we cannot be certain, for Vet. Int. commonly repeats the preposition in sentences of this kind, whether he finds it in the Greek or not (see critical note on 1253 a 36). **17.** *ψυχρόν* is bracketed by Sus., who follows $P^1$ corr. $P^4$ in reading *ψυχρὸν* in place of *μικρὸν*. *ἀμπίσχειν* $M^s P^{1\,4}$ Bekk. Sus., *ἀμπισχεῖν* $P^{2\,3}$. **18.** *ἀρχομένων* $\Pi^{1\,3}$ Sus.: *ἀρχομένω* $P^{2\,3}$, *ἀρχομένῳ* Bekk. **20.** *ἕξις* is here represented by *habitudo* in Vet. Int., and not, I think, elsewhere in the Politics. **23.** *ἡλικίαν*] Vet. Int. *aetati* (*ἡλικίας* Γ?). **24.** *ἣν*] Vet. Int. *in qua* (*ἐν ᾗ* Γ?: cp. 1336 b 21). **26.** *δὲ* om. $\Pi^1 P^4$ Bekk. **34.** *σπουδασομένων* Cor. Sus.: *σπουδασομένων* or *σπουδασθησομένων* Γ (Vet. Int. *studendorum*): *σπουδαζομένων* Π Bekk. In 1328 b 21 some MSS. have *παρασκευάζουσι* and others *παρασκευάσουσι*, so that *σπουδαζομένων* might easily take the place of *σπουδασομένων*. *διατάσεις*] Vet. Int. *cohibitiones*: cp. 39, where *διατεινομένοις* is rendered *qui cohibentur*. **35.** *καὶ* Π Bekk.: Vet. Int. *in ploratibus*, so that he probably found *κατὰ* in Γ, which Sus. reads instead of *καὶ*. *τοὺς* is added before *κλαυθμοὺς* in $M^s P^1$ Sus.: whether in Γ also, is uncertain. **38.** *τοῖς πονοῦσιν*] *τοῖς πνεύμοσιν*? Ridgeway (see the 1894 edition of Sus.$^s$), a suggestion which I cannot follow Susemihl in adopting. See for the force of *τοῖς πονοῦσιν* explanatory note on 1336 a 37.

**1336 b 2.** *ἀπολαύειν* $M^s P^1$ Sus., *ἀπολαβεῖν* Γ (Vet. Int. *absumere*),

ἀπελαύνειν Π² Bekk. **8.** ἀνελευθερίαν] τῶν ἀνελευθέρων $P^6$ $L^a$ Ar. Ald. Bekk.² and pr. $P^4$, τῶν ἀνελευθερίαν corr. $P^4$. Τῶν ἀνελευθέρων is evidently a correction intended to suit the false reading ἀπελαύνειν. See critical note on 1340 b 14. For καὶ before τηλικούτους z has *etiam* probably rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *et*. **8.** τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων Π² Bekk.: ἀπηγορευμένον Π¹ Sus. See critical notes on 1331 a 34 and 1314 b 26. **14.** ἔστω $P^1$ Ar. Bekk. Sus., ἐστι Γ $M^a$ Π². **18.** [τοὺς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἀκινουμένην]. These words, which I have bracketed, are found in $M^a$ $P^1$ and are inserted by Sus. in his text: Vet. Int. has *eos qui habent aetatem amplius provectam*, which probably represents Bekker's reading, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν, a reading found only in $P^5$ and there probably adopted from the Vet. Int. (πλέον over an erasure in $P^6$): Π² omit the words, reading πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεούς, and I incline to think that Π² are right, and that the words added in $M^a$ $P^1$ and also those added in Γ $P^6$ are merely a gloss intended to complete the sense, which has crept from the margin into the text. The MSS. of the first family occasionally admit glosses into their text (see vol. ii. p. lvii). Ἔτι in the reading of $M^a$ $P^1$ I do not understand. **19.** καὶ γυναικῶν om. Γ $M^a$ pr. $P^1$. τιμαλφεῖν Π² Bekk. Sus.: τιμαλφᾶν $M^a$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ. **20.** νομοθετητέον Π² Bekk., θετητέον $M^a$, θετέον Γ $P^1$ Sus. (Vet. Int. *ponendum*): εἶναι ἑατέον conj. Jackson. **24.** τούτων] τοῦτον $P^1$ and after ἐν παραδρομῇ: τοῦτον before these words $P^4$ Ald.: τούτων after ἐν παραδρομῇ Γ $M^a$ Ar. Sus., before these words the rest followed by Bekker. **27.** ἴσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. **30.** θεατῶν Π² corr. $P^1$ Bekk.: θεάτρων Γ $M^a$ pr. $P^1$ Sus. See critical note on 1338 b 23. **35.** ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν] Vet. Int. *infectionem aut inhaesionem*, but probably these are two alternative readings, both of them incorrect, which have taken the place of *infensionem*, the true equivalent for δυσμένειαν, while *malitiam*, the true equivalent for μοχθηρίαν, has been omitted. The original rendering of Vet. Int. probably was *aut malitiam aut infensionem*. **36.** ἤδη om. Π¹. **38.** τὴν before παιδείαν om. $M^a$ pr. $P^1$ and possibly Γ. μετὰ] See explanatory note on 1336 b 37. **39.** μέχρι ἥβης Π² Bekk.: μέχρις ἥβης $M^a$ $P^1$ Sus. and possibly Γ. In 1319 b 12, on the other hand, $M^a$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ have μέχρι before a vowel: Π² μέχρις. In Attic inscriptions μέχρι does not become μέχρις before a vowel (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 180). Phrynichus'

rule is *μέχρις καὶ ἄχρις σὺν τῷ ς ἀδόκιμα· μέχρι δὲ καὶ ἄχρι λέγε.* In the *Ἀθ. Πολ.* this rule is observed, as will be seen from Dr. Sandys' Index. In Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1149 b 13, however, $K^b$ and all the MSS. appear to have *μέχρις ἐνταῦθα.*

**1337 a 1.** *κακῶς* Muretus, Bekk.[2] Sus.: *καλῶς* Γ Π Bekk.[1] In 1294 a 7 $Π^1$ have *καλῶς* wrongly in place of *κακῶς*. **7.** *δεῖ*] *δεῖται* $M^s$: Vet. Int. *oportet esse* (*δεῖ εἶναι* Γ?).

## BOOK V (VIII).

**1337 a 14.** *δεῖ γὰρ*] Vet. Int. *oportet autem* (*δεῖ δὲ* Γ?). *παιδεύεσθαι* Ar. Sus. (Aretinus' translation being *oportet enim ad singula gubernandi genera disciplinam accommodari*): *πολιτεύεσθαι* Γ Π Bekk. In 1341 a 1 *πολιτευομένοις* is erroneously read in Γ $M^s$ in place of *παιδευομένοις*, and the same mistake appears to occur here. **18.** *βέλτιστον*] *βέλτιον* $M^s$ Ar. Sus. Bekk.[2]: the rest *βέλτιστον* followed by Bekk.[1] Bonitz (Ind. 403 a 15 sqq.) appears to accept *βέλτιστον*, comparing Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 29 sq. **27.** *ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν*] Vet. Int. *simul autem neque oportet putare civium ipsorum aliquem sibi esse*, so that Γ probably had *αὐτῶν αὑτῷ* in place of *αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ*. $P^1$ has *αὐτὸν αὑτῶ*: $M^s$ an ambiguous contraction in place of *αὐτὸν*, followed by *αὐτῶ*: almost all the other MSS. have *αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ*. **29.** *μόριον . . . πόλεως* om. $Π^1$. **34.** *κοινὴν* $Π^2$ Bekk.: *κοινῆ* $P^1$, *κοινῆς* or *κοινῶς* Γ Ar. (Vet. Int. *communiter*), *κοινῶς* $M^s$ (Sus. *κοινῇ*). **36.** *περὶ* $Π^2$ Bekk.: *διὰ* Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^1$ Sus. See explanatory note. **40.** *οὐδὲν* $P^{2\,3}$ etc. Bekk.: *οὐδενὶ* $Π^1$ $P^4$ Sus.

**1337 b 5.** *ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα κ.τ.λ.*] See explanatory note. *ἐλευθέρων*] Schneider conjectures *ἐλευθερίων*, and perhaps Γ had *ἐλευθερίων*, for Vet. Int. has *liberalibus*. **6.** *ἀνελευθέρων*] *ἀνελευθερίων* $P^1$ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *illiberalibus*, but *illiberalis* commonly represents *ἀνελεύθερος*). **11.** *ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν* is bracketed by Sus., who says in Qu. Crit. p. 418, 'si *διάνοια* pars animae est, expectas *ἦθος* pro *ψυχὴν*,' but for the use of *ψυχή* in the sense of *ἦθος* compare (with Bonitz, Ind. 866 a 3) c. 5. 1340 a 6; cp. also c. 7. 1342 a 22, *εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν* (i. e. *τῶν βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν*) *αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως.* An objection to the addition of these words not noticed by Sus. is that there is no reference to them in 11–15, as there is to *τὸ σῶμα* and *τὴν διάνοιαν*,

but for a similar inexactness of reference cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 33 sqq. and other passages. **12.** *τε* om. $M^s P^1$ and possibly Γ, but $\Pi^1$ often omit *τε*. **16.** '*τὸ δὲ . . .* 20, *ἀνελεύθερον* om. $P^{2\,3\,6}$ $C^c$ $Sb$ $T^b$ $L^s$ Ald. pr. $P^4$ (suppl. marg. $P^4$),' Sus.[1] *τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν* $M^s P^1$ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *assiduare autem*): om. pr. $P^5$ in a lacuna, *προσεδρεύειν δὲ* a recent correction in $P^5$ followed by Bekker. But $P^5$ is a MS. of little or no authority and a recent correction in $P^6$ counts for even less than the MS. **17.** *πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν* $M^s P^1$ marg. $P^4$ Sus.: the words fall within the passage omitted by $\Pi^2$: Vet. Int. *ad perfectionem*, which may perhaps represent *πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν* (though Vict. and Bekk. take it to represent *πρὸς τὸ ἐντελὲς* and adopt this reading), for Vet. Int. translates *εἰς ἀκρίβειαν* by *ad certitudinem* in 1331 a 2, *ἀκρίβειαν* by *certitudinem* in 1328 a 20, and *τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ* by *diligentia* in 1274 b 7, and he may well have used a third equivalent here. *εἰρημέναις*] *ῥηθείσαις* $P^5$. **18.** *ἕνεκεν* $M^s$ $P^1$ Sus.: *χάριν* $P^6$ Bekk.: $\Pi^2$ omit 16–20: Vet. Int. *gratia* may represent either *ἕνεκεν* or *χάριν*. **19.** *τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ* $M^s P^1$ Sus.: *αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ* $P^5$ Bekk.: Vet. Int. *ipsius quidem enim gratia* may represent either reading. *τῶν* is added before *φίλων* in $P^5$. **20.** *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*] *ταὐτὸ τοῦτο* Richards. *πράττων* $M^s P^1$ Bekk. Sus.: *πράσσων* $\Pi^2$: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. *πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους* $\Pi^1$ Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note on 1255 b 2): $\Pi^2$ Bekk. have *δι' ἄλλους πολλάκις*. **22.** *ἐλέχθη* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *εἴρηται* $M^s P^1$ Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *dictum est*). **25.** *τὴν μὲν . . . γραφικὴν* om. Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^1$. **34.** *τῆς . . .* 35, *σχολάζειν* om. $\Pi^2$. *τέλος* Γ Π, except that $P^6$ has *τελευταῖον*: *ὅλως* Vict. Bekk. See explanatory note on 1337 b 34. **36.** *ἀναγκαῖον*] See explanatory note on 1337 b 35. **41.** *καιροφυλακοῦντας* $\Pi^2$: *καιροφυλακοῦντα* $\Pi^1$ Sus.: *καιροφυλακτοῦντας* $P^5$ Bekk. *προσάγοντας* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *προσάγοντα* $\Pi^1$ Sus.

**1338 a 8.** *αὐτῶν* Γ and $\Pi^2$ (except $P^4$ Ald., which have *αὐτῶν*) Bekk. Sus.: *αὐτὴν* $M^s$ pr. $P^1$, *αὐτῶν* a correction in $P^1$ in the ink of the MS. **10.** *τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν*] See explanatory note on 1338 a 9. **16.** *καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν* is bracketed by Sus., 'nisi corruptum potius est *μάθησιν*' (Sus.). **25.** $\Pi^1$ place *καλεῖν* after *ἐπὶ δαῖτα*. See critical note on 1328 a 15. Vet. Int. translates the line *sed est quidem velut ad epulas vocari congaudere. Vocari* may well represent *καλεῖν* (see vol. ii. p. lxiii, note 6), and *congaudere* probably stands for some corruption of *θαλείην* or else for a marginal gloss *συνευφραίνεσθαι*. As to †*μὲν*† see explanatory note on 1338 a 24. I propose to read *μόνον* in place of it. **26.** *οἱ κα-*

λέουσιν] See explanatory note on 1338 a 24. **27.** ὅ] ὡς $\Pi^1$ (Vet. Int. *tanquam delectantem omnes*): ὃς $P^4$. I add ὁ before Ὀδυσσεὺς because the Homeric Odysseus is referred to. **28.** ὅταν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. *quando gaudentibus hominibus 'congregati super tecta audiunt philomenam sedentes deinceps,'* where *congregati* should perhaps be *convivati*, and *philomenam philomelam*. He appears either to have found ἀηδόνος in his Greek text in place of ἀοιδοῦ or to have misread ἀοιδοῦ as ἀηδόνος. **31.** ἀναγκαίαν $\Pi^1$ Bekk. Sus., ἀναγκαῖον $\Pi^2$. **33.** μία $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus., μίαν $\Pi^1$. τὸν ἀριθμὸν $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: τῷ ἀριθμῷ $M^s$ $P^1$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *numero*), Sus.

**1338 b 1.** ἢ μᾶλλον] ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Reiz, Thurot, Sus.: μᾶλλον ἢ Postgate. See explanatory note. θεωρητικὸν $\Pi^1$ Bekk. Sus.: θεωρητικὴν $\Pi^2$. **3.** ἁρμόττει $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: ἁρμόζει $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ, Sus. $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ have ἁρμόζουσα in 1288 b 24, where $\Pi^2$ Vat. Pal. have ἁρμόττουσα, and the forms ἁρμόσει, ἁρμόσειε are of course used by all MSS., but I have not noticed any other passages in the Politics in which the form ἁρμόττειν is not used in all the MSS. 'In Attic inscriptions ἁρμόττω is the only form in use: ἁρμόζω is nowhere found' (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 141). ἐλευθέροις] See explanatory note. **4.** πρότερον corr.$^1$ $P^1$ (i. e. a correction in $P^1$ in the same ink as the MS. and therefore probably by the writer of it, Demetrius Chalcondylas): πότερον Γ Π. **5.** εἶναι om. $\Pi^1$, but these MSS. often omit εἶναι, and here the omission of εἶναι suits the erroneous reading πότερον, 4. **11.** τά τε εἴδη] Vet. Int. *et speciem*, but see critical note on 1287 a 27. **23.** ληστρικὰ $M^s$ $P^1$ $L^s$ Ald. (the reading of Γ is uncertain), λῃστρικὰ Sus.: ληστικὰ $P^2$, λήϊστικα pr. $P^3$, ληστικα rec. $P^3$, λῃστικὰ Bekk. Λῃστρικὰ may be right, for in 1256 b 1, 5 (the only other passages of Aristotle to which the Index Aristotelicus refers for either of these words) the form used is λῃστρικός. Τ and τρ are easily confused; thus in 1336 b 30 $\Pi^2$ have θεατῶν and $\Pi^1$ θεάτρων, and in 1274 a 39 we find γραφήν in $\Pi^2$ in place of ταφήν. On the whole, therefore, I incline to follow $M^s$ $P^1$ and to read λῃστρικὰ. Both forms, however, appear in the text of Thucydides—λῃστικός in three passages and λῃστρικός in two (see Von Essen's Index). **26.** καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς $\Pi^1$ Sus.: καὶ τοῖς γυμνασίοις καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀγῶσι $\Pi^2$ Bekk. **28.** τῷ μόνον] μόνον τῷ Reiz, Richards, but possibly μόνον is here displaced as οὐ μόνον sometimes is, e. g. in De An. 3. 6. 430 b 4 sq. (Bon. Ind. s. v. μόνος). **30.** οὐδὲ γὰρ $\Pi^1$ Sus.: οὐ γὰρ $\Pi^2$ Bekk. It is more likely that οὐδὲ

has been changed into *οὐ* than that *οὐ* has been changed into *οὐδέ*. Compare the readings in 1293 a 7 and see critical note on 1261 b 7. *οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων*] Vet. Int. *neque aliarum ferarum aliqua*, but whether he found *τι* added in Γ after *θηρίων* may well be doubted. Vict. and Bekk. add it without necessity. **33.** *ἀπαιδαγώγους* $M^s$ $P^{1\,3\,4\,5}$ $S^b$ $T^b$ Ald. Sus.: *ἀπαιδαγωγήτους* $P^2$ Bekk. In Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 11 (the only other reference for either word given in the Index Aristotelicus) all MSS. have *ἀπαιδαγώγητος*.

**1339 a 1.** *δύνανται* $\Pi^1$ $L^s$ Ald. Sus.: *δύναται* $P^{2\,3\,4}$ etc. Bekk. See explanatory note. **5.** *γένωνται* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: *γίνωνται* $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *fiunt*). **11.** *διηπορήκαμεν* $M^s$ $P^1$ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *dubitavimus*), Sus.: *διηπορήσαμεν* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. **13.** *γένηται* Π: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain (Vet. Int. *fiat*): *γίνηται*? Sus. But cp. 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 29 sq., where $\Pi^2$ and possibly Γ have *ὅπως γένηται*. **14.** *εἴπειεν* $P^2$ Bekk. Sus.: *εἴποιεν* the rest: the reading of Γ is uncertain. **18.** *οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων*] z has *neque studiosorum*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *neque studiosorum sunt*. *ἅμα παύει μέριμναν* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.[1]: *ἅμα μέριμναν παύει* $\Pi^1$ Sus.: *ἀναπαύει μέριμναν* Göttling, Bekk.[2] perhaps rightly (cp. Eurip. Bacch. 332 sqq. Bothe, quoted in explanatory note on 1339 a 17). **20.** *ὕπνῳ* Ar., Reiz, Bekk.[2], Sus.: *οἴνῳ* Γ Π Bekk.[1]. *Οἶνος* and *ὕπνος* are often interchanged in the MSS.: see Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 393. **22.** *τι* om. $M^s$ $P^1$, but not Γ (Vet. Int. *secundum aliquid*). **23.** *παρασκευάζει*] *παρασκευάζειν* Γ $M^s$. **24.** *δύνασθαι* om. Γ $M^s$. **25.** *καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν*] See explanatory note on 1339 a 26. **29.** *γε παισὶν* $P^1$, *τε παισὶν* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.[1], *παισὶν* $M^s$: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. seldom renders *γε* or *τε* (he has *deductionem pueris* here). I read *γε παισὶν* with $P^1$ Coray and Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 15): see explanatory note and *Class. Rev.* 7. 305, note 1. Bekk.[2] reads [*τε*] *παισὶν*. **30.** *οὐθενὶ* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *οὐδὲν* $M^s$ $P^1$: *οὐδὲ* Γ (Vet. Int. *neque*). $\Pi^1$ make the same mistake in 1255 a 39. **33.** *δέοι* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: *δεῖ* Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^1$ (Vet. Int. *oportet*). **35.** *δι'* om. $P^2$ Bekk. **39.** Richards may well be right in adding *τὰ* before *περὶ*. See explanatory note. **40.** *ἂν* om. $\Pi^1$, but these MSS. occasionally omit *ἄν*.

**1339 b 4.** *εἰ* $\Pi^1$ $P^4$, *εἴη* the rest. **21.** *γοῦν* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *γὰρ* $\Pi^1$ Sus.: see critical note on 1285 a 12. **26.** Vet. Int. translates *ἀλλὰ καὶ* by *sed*, as in 41. **33.** *δὲ* om. Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^1$. **37.** *οἷον* om. Γ $M^s$ pr. $P^1$.

**1340 a 6.** $M^s$ $P^1$ omit the second *πρὸς*. See critical note on

1331 b 24. **12.** Vet. Int. gives no equivalent for *ἀκροώμενοι*, a b m leaving a lacuna before the equivalent for *τῶν μιμήσεων*: Γ probably omitted *ἀκροώμενοι* in a lacuna, for pr. $M^s$ omits *ροώμενοι* in a lacuna. **13.** pr. $M^s$ leaves a lacuna between *χωρὶς* and *ῥυθμῶν* in which *τῶν* has disappeared, and there was probably a lacuna in the same place in Γ, for several MSS. of the Vet. Int. leave a lacuna between the equivalents for *χωρὶς* and *ῥυθμῶν*, but whether Γ omitted *τῶν* it is impossible to tell from Vet. Int. *rhythmis*. **27.** *καὶ αὐτὴν* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.[1] Sus.: *κατ' αὐτὴν* $M^s$ $P^1$, *καθ' αὐτὴν* Γ (Vet. Int. *secundum se*). As to *αὐτὴν ἐκείνην* see explanatory note. **31.** See explanatory note. **34.** *ταῦτ'* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *τοῦτ'* $\Pi^1$ Sus. *ἐπὶ* $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: *ἀπὸ* $\Pi^1$ Sus. Ἐπὶ appears to be right: see Plut. Sympos. 9. 15. 2, quoted in explanatory note on 1340 a 34. **36.** *παύσωνος* $\Pi^1$ Bekk. Sus., *πάσωνος* $P^{2\,3\,5\,6}$ etc. and pr. $P^4$. But in Poet. 2. 1448 a 6 $A^c$ has *παύσων* and in Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 a 20, where some MSS. have *πάσωνος* or *πάσσωνος*, E has *παύσωνος*. The artist referred to in this passage of the Metaphysics was a sculptor, and Pauson was a painter, but he may have been a sculptor also. For the frequent interchange of *a* and *αυ* in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in *Journ. Hell. Studies*, 15. 289. **37.** *κἂν εἴ*] Vet. Int. *et si*, but see critical note on 1278 b 7. **41.** *καὶ μὴ*] z has *et non*: all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *sed non*.

**1340 b 6.** *παιδείαν* Ar. Bekk. Sus., *παιδιὰν* Γ Π. **7.** *δὲ* $\Pi^1$ Sus.: *γὰρ* $\Pi^2$ Bekk. **8.** *τὰ* om. $\Pi^5$ pr. $P^1$: Bekk.[2] brackets it. **10.** *ἐλευθεριωτέρας*] Vet. Int. *liberiores* (*ἐλευθερωτέρας* Γ?). **11.** *ποιόν τι*] z has *qualem quendam* in agreement with *morem animae*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *qualem quandam*. **14.** *ἔστι* or *ἐστι* Γ, *ἐστι* $P^1$: *ἔχει* the rest. *ἁρμόττουσα*] *ἁρμοζόντως* $P^4$ $L^s$ Ald. to suit the false reading *ἔχει*. See critical note on 1336 b 3, where these MSS. similarly correct *ἀνελευθερίαν*. **16.** z has *natura* rightly for *φύσει*: is *naturae* in Sus.[1] a misprint? **17.** As to *ἡδυσμένων* see explanatory note on 1340 b 16. **20.** *τοὺς* is wrongly added before *αὐτοὺς* in $\Pi^1$: z has *eos* for *τοὺς αὐτοὺς*, but the other MSS. of Vet. Int. are probably right in reading *eosdem*. **22.** *δὴ* $P^{1\,2\,3}$: *δὲ* the rest (Vet. Int. *autem*), followed by Bekk. and doubtfully by Sus. **24.** *μὴ κοινωνήσαντας*] Vet. Int. *eos qui non communicaverunt*, but this may well stand for *μὴ κοινωνήσαντας*: cp. 1281 a 30, where *qui non honorantur* stands for *μὴ τιμωμένους*, 1335 a 24, where *quae usae fuerunt* stands for *χρησάμεναι*, 1336 a 39, where *pueris qui cohibentur* stands for *τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις*,

and 1322 a 4, where *qui sustinent* stands for ὑπομείναντες. See critical note on 1269 a 18, though I have now little doubt that *qui mutaverit* there stands not for ὁ κινήσας but for κινήσας. **26.** ἀρχύτου $\Pi^2$ Bekk. and a correction in $P^1$ in the same ink as the MS.: ἀρχύτα $M^s$ pr. $P^1$ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *Archytae* which form he found in his text. It is doubtful whether Aristotle wrote Ἀρχύτα, for though in 1311 b 4 all MSS. but one or two have δέρδα, they have ἀμύντου in the preceding line, and we find ἰσμηνίου in Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 4 and εὐαγόρου in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399 a 4. In Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 23, again, all MSS. have χαρώνδου, not χαρώνδα as in Strabo, p. 539. As to the usage in Attic inscriptions Meisterhans (Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 94) reports, 'Foreign personal names ending in -as in Athenian public documents of the fifth and fourth century B.C. form the genitive in -ου, not -α (Περδίκκου, Ἀμύντου, Ἀρύββου, and so forth). On the other hand -α occurs in a private inscription in the name of an Athenian (Χαιρεδήμου Φιλέα in an Attic inscription of the fifth century B.C.).' On the whole the chances are in favour of ἀρχύτου. In the nominative we have ἀντιμενίδης, not ἀντιμενίδας, in 3. 14. 1285 a 36, and ἑλλανοκράτης, not ἑλλανοκράτας, in 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 17, though the forms in -as are the local forms. **32.** καὶ om. $\Pi^1$. **39.** γενομένην $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: γινομένην $M^s$ $P^1$: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *factam* which reading he found in his Greek text, for in 1337 a 13 *factum* stands for γιγνόμενον.

**1341 a 8.** πρὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note on 1341 a 7. **13.** καὶ om. $\Pi^1$ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions and especially in omissions of καί. **15.** κοινῷ Γ $P^1$ rightly: the rest κοινωνῷ. **18.** τι is added in $\Pi^1$ Sus. after ἄλλο. **19.** ἕτερόν ἐστιν $\Pi^2$ (except corr. $P^4$, ἄλλο ἕτερόν ἐστιν) and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *alterum est*), for Vet. Int. usually renders ἕτερος by *alter* and ἄλλος by *alius*: ἄλλο ἐστιν $M^s$ $P^1$, ἄλλο ἔστιν Sus. Ἄλλο is probably repeated from the preceding line. **29.** τὴν which Bekker omits before ἀρετήν is omitted only in a few MSS. of little authority. **33.** αὐτὸς om. $\Pi^1$.

**1341 b 1.** σαμβῦκαι Göttling, Bekk., Sus.: σαμβύκαι $\Pi^2$: ἴαμβοι $\Pi^1$. **2.** εὐλόγως] z has *rationabiliter* rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *rationaliter*. **3.** δὴ om. $\Pi^1$. **4.** Vet. Int. has *enim* for μὲν οὖν (or possibly μὲν, for pr. $M^s$ omits οὖν in a lacuna), but see critical note on 1252 a 24. **11.** αὐτοῦ Γ (Vet. Int. *suimet*) Bekk. Sus.: αὐτοῦ Π. **19–26.** I retain δ' after σκεπτέον, thinking that its

presence in the text is due simply to the fact that owing to the long parenthesis, 10–18, Aristotle has forgotten that his protasis needs an apodosis. I bracket *καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν*, because, as Bonitz points out (Aristot. Stud. 2 and 3, p. 97 sq.), there is no such limitation in the solution of the problem given in 1342 a 1 sqq. Πρὸς παιδείαν has probably been repeated from the line below. In 22 sq., *ἢ τρίτον δεῖ τινὰ ἕτερον*, there is much to be said for the emendation of Sus., *ἤ τινα ἕτερον, τρίτον δέ*, but if we adopt this reading, it will be necessary, as Sus. sees, in order to obtain an apodosis, to translate *καὶ*, 25, 'also,' or else, which Sus. prefers, to expunge it. I feel inclined to suggest a greater change. Should not *τρίτον δεῖ* be bracketed and *ἔτι δὲ* be read in place of *ἐπειδή*? Τρίτον δὲ (altered into *τρίτον δεῖ*) may be nothing more than a marginal gloss which has crept into the text, just as *πρῶτον μὲν* has done in some MSS. in 1265 a 21. I have obelized *τρίτον . . . ἐπειδὴ* to indicate that the soundness of the text is doubtful. I thought better of the state of the text in 19–26 when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, than I do now. **23.** z has *quoniam autem* for *ἐπειδὴ* (*ἐπεὶ δὲ*?): the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *quoniam*. **36.** *μέρος* Γ Π Bekk.: *μέλος* Tyrwhitt, Sus. possibly rightly. **38.** *καὶ* is added after *γὰρ* in $P^{1\,2\,4}$. **40.** *τρίτον δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] See explanatory note.

**1342 a 1.** *οὐ . . . χρηστέον* om. $\Pi^1$. **8.** *ἐκ τῶν δ'* $M^8$ $P^{1\,2\,3}$ Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain: *ἐκ δὲ τῶν* $P^{4\,6}$ $L^8$ Ald. Bekk. **10.** *καθισταμένους* $P^3$ $\Pi^3$ Bekk. Sus.: *καθισταμένας* Γ $M^8$ $P^2$ pr. $P^1$ (Vet. Int. *restitutas*). **11.** *δὴ*] Vet. Int. *autem* (*δὲ* Γ?). **15.** *καθαρτικὰ* Γ Π Bekk.: *πρακτικὰ* Sauppe, Sus. See explanatory note. **17.** *χρῆσθαι θετέον* Spengel, Sus.: *θετέον* Γ $M^8$ $P^2$ pr. $P^1$ corr. $P^4$: the rest *θεατέον*. **18.** *θεατρικὴν* om. Γ $M^8$ $P^1$ and pr. $P^2$ (it appears as a red-ink gloss in $P^2$). Sus. brackets it. The Index Aristotelicus does not give any other instance of the use of the word *θεατρικός*. **24.** *παρακεχρωσμένα* $P^3$ $\Pi^3$ Bekk. Sus.: *παρακεχωρημένα* $M^8$ $P^2$ pr. $P^1$ and probably Γ: z has *discretae* perhaps rightly (see Sus.[1], p. 368), and this no doubt represents *παρακεχωρημένα*. **34.** *καταλείπει*] Vet. Int. *admittit*.

**1342 b 10.** *τοὺς μύθους* Γ Π: *τοὺς Μυσοὺς* Schn. Bekk.[2] Sus. probably rightly. **17.** *τοῖς νεωτέροις*] See explanatory note on 1342 b 16. **17.** *εἰσὶ δὲ*—**34.** *τὸ πρέπον*. See explanatory note. **19.** *ἑκάστοις* $P^5$, followed by Bekk. and Sus.: *ἑκάστους* the rest: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *quae decent singulos* what reading he found in Γ. **21.** *χρόνον* $P^{3\,5}$ $\Pi^3$ and perhaps $M^8$ (rightly, cp.

1329 a 33): the rest, including probably Γ (Vet. Int. *per tempus*), have χρόνου. Bekk. reads χρόνον, Sus. χρόνου. **23.** (τῷ) Σωκράτει] So J. C. Wilson followed by Sus.: σωκράτει Π. We expect τῷ Σωκράτει, as the Socrates of the Republic (398 E) is referred to. If in Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 30 we have ὁ γὰρ λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, in Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 b 8 (the same quotation) we have ὁ Σωκράτης. **26.** As *petulantia impetuosum* is the equivalent for βακχευτικὸν in Vet. Int., the parenthesis in Sus.[1] p. 371 which ends after *magis* should begin before *petulantia*, not before *impetuosum*. **29.** Schn. Cor. and Göttling place a colon, not a full stop, after τοιούτων, but see explanatory note. **33.** ἢ is added after ἁρμονιῶν by $P^1$ and corr.[1] $P^2$ (i.e. a correction in $P^2$ in the same ink as the MS.), followed by Sus., who however places the mark of a lacuna after ἢ. Göttling reads ἦ in place of ἢ, comparing 2. 10. 1272 b 9. Schn. and Cor. omit ἢ and add οὖν after δῆλον. **34.** I follow Vet. Int., Sus., and others in indicating a lacuna after πρέπον: see vol. ii. p. xxix.

# NOTES.

## BOOK III.

**32. Τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἑκάστη καὶ ποία τις.** C. 1. 1274 b.
Attention has already been called (above on 1274 b 26) to the absence of any connecting particle. Πολιτείας is probably not the acc. plur., as some take it to be, but the gen. sing. as in 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, *ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας*, 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40, *τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν*, 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35, *τῶν ἀποφαινομένων περὶ πολιτείας*, and 2. 12. 1273 b 27, *τῶν δὲ ἀποφηναμένων τι περὶ πολιτείας*: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 14, *καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας*, and Pol. 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 8, *ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν*. From what has been said at the end of the First and the beginning of the Second Book we expect to be invited here to inquire into the nature of the best constitution, not into the nature of each constitution (see vol. i. p. 226), but the programme of the Politics given at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics contemplates an inquiry into the due structure of each constitution, and it is clear from Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 12, *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας*, that Aristotle intends to study all constitutions, not the best only.

**τίς ἑκάστη καὶ ποία τις.** This inquiry is taken up in the Sixth and following chapters. The question *τίς καὶ ποία τις* is characteristic of Science (Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 29, *καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς*). The distinction between *τίς* and *ποία τις* recurs in Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 21 sqq. and 1. 3. 1253 b 7 sq. As to its nature, if we refer to Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 12, *ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις*, we shall be tempted to take *τίς* in the passage before us as asking what is the *genus*, and *ποία τις* as asking what is the *differentia*, but it would seem that the answer to *τίς* is rather the definition, while the answer to *ποία τις* is given in further illustrative details, and that the sense

of the words is 'what is the nature of each and how each may be described.' Cp. Plato, Gorg. 448 E, ΠΩΛ. *οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην, ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλλίστη;* ΣΩ. *καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ, ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν*: Aristot. Metaph. H. 3. 1043 b 23, *ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουν ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μέν ἐστιν, οὗ, ὅτι δ' οἷον κασσίτερος.* Cp. also Plato, Symp. 201 E, Euthyphr. 11 A, Meno 71 B, Rep. 328 E, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 13, *τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποιόν τι* (sc. *ἡ ἡδονή*), where Ramsauer thinks that *ἡ ποιόν τι* is added because Aristotle feels that he fails in what follows to give a precise definition of pleasure. In Plato, Rep. 557 B sqq. in answer to the question *ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη πολιτεία* a description of a State democratically governed is given.

**33. περὶ πόλεως** is of course to be taken, not with *σκέψις*, but with *ἰδεῖν*.

**34 sqq.** Aristotle gives three reasons for inquiring into the nature of the *πόλις* before passing on to the *πολιτεία*:—1. The nature of the *πόλις* is a disputed question. 2. The statesman and the lawgiver are concerned with the *πόλις*, hence an inquiry into its nature is not only needed but belongs to the province of the *πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη*. 3. The constitution (which is the subject of his treatise) is an ordering of those who dwell in the *πόλις*. As to the first reason, see c. 3. 1276 a 6 sqq. and notes, and compare also (with Eaton) Thuc. 3. 62. 4 sq. As to the second reason, cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 7 sqq., *δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην* (i. e. *τὴν ἀρετήν*) *μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι*, where a similar reason is given for the study of virtue. As to the third, we learn from c. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq., 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7 sqq. what kind of ordering a constitution is (Sus.[2], note 432 b: Sus.[4], 1. p. 354). Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of the *πόλις* and the citizen helps him to answer the question which he takes up later on, what a *πολιτεία* is, because it discloses that the *πόλις* is an aggregate of citizens, or in other words of men possessing access to office and therefore either actual or possible rulers, and thus leads on to the conclusion arrived at in c. 6, that the *πολιτεία* is an ordering of the *offices* of the *πόλις* and especially of its supreme office (1278 b 8 sq.). The fact that the *πόλις* consists of actual or possible rulers also suggests the further conclusion that it is

a κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων (c. 6. 1279 a 21), and that in the normal πολιτεία the kind of rule exercised is not the rule of a master over his slaves but rule for the common good. Thus the inquiry into the nature of the πόλις and the citizen is fruitful of important results. It also incidentally discloses the existence of a plurality of constitutions differing from one another. It will be observed that Aristotle conceives the statesman to be concerned only with the πόλις, not with the ἔθνος, an error into which he was possibly led in part by the use of the word πολιτικός to designate a statesman. The ἔθνος, whether in the form of an aggregate of cities or of villages, certainly deserved to be carefully studied by him. See as to the ἔθνος vol. i. p. 39 and note on 1326 b 3.

**34.** νῦν, 'as it is,' without any special reference to the time at which Aristotle is writing.

**36.** τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν. Bonitz (Ind. 629 b 29) groups this passage with Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1105 a 10, ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ, and Metaph. K. 1. 1059 b 16 sqq.

τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου, often mentioned in the Politics in combination: see Bon. Ind. 488 b 11, where 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 4, 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 27, and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 35 are referred to. See also Plato, Polit. 309 C.

**38.** ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ πόλις κ. τ. λ. The πόλις is a compound in the sense of being a whole composed of many parts. Not all compounds are wholes: see Metaph. Z. 17. 1041 b 11 sqq., which, following Grote (Aristotle 2. 348), we may thus paraphrase—'Compounds are of two sorts—aggregates like a heap (mechanical) and aggregates like a syllable (organic or formal). In these last there are not merely the constituent elements, but something else besides. The syllable *ba* is something more than the letters *b* and *a*; flesh is something more than fire and earth, its constituent elements . . . This "something more" is the essence of each compound—the First Cause of existence to each.' A whole is a compound of the second kind; in it, as in a syllable, there is over and above the constituent elements an essence which is its First Cause. 'Voce ὅλον Aristoteles fere significat id quod per certam formam definitum ac consummatum est; cf. Metaph. I. 1. 1052 a 22, τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἔχον τινὰ μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος: Δ. 6. 1016 b 12, ἂν μή τι ὅλον ᾖ, τοῦτο δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἔχῃ ἕν: M. 2. 1077 a 28:

M. 8. 1084 b 30' (Bonitz on Metaph. Λ. 1. 1069 a 18). A whole is in fact a kind of ἕν (see the passages referred to in Bon. Ind. 223 a 25 sqq.), and thus, while the πόλις is termed a whole here and in 1. 2. 1253 a 20 and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., it is termed an ἕν in 2. 2. 1261 a 29. It is implied in the passage before us that there are wholes which are not composed of many parts, or perhaps of parts at all. A monad, a point, and a sound (φθόγγος) are given in Diog. Laert. 3. 107 as instances of things which are not compound. Are these wholes? As to the method of examining the parts in order to learn the nature of the whole, see above on 1252 a 17. The parts of the πόλις are here taken to be citizens: for other uses of the term see vol. i. pp. 98, 495, and Appendix A.

41. ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθός ἐστιν. Τι πλῆθος is explained in 1275 b 20 by πλῆθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν. On this account of the πόλις see vol. i. p. 226 sq., and for other accounts of it given in the Politics, vol. i. p. 283 sq. Compare with the passage before us Justin 2. 12. 14, Themistocles ... persuadet omnibus patriam municipes esse, non moenia, civitatemque non in aedificiis, sed in civibus positam.

1275 a. 1. τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστί. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 448 E, ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν.

3. ἔστι γάρ τις κ.τ.λ. For instance the βάνανσος, who was not a citizen in the full sense in the Theban oligarchy (c. 5. 1278 a 25: 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 28) or probably in oligarchies based on birth, though he would often be so in oligarchies based simply on a property-qualification (c. 5. 1278 a 21 sqq.).

5. τοὺς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Ἄλλως πως, 'in some other sense than the proper one,' opposed to κυρίως or οἰκείως: cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 23, ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 11, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων (i. e. τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ διωκομένων καὶ ἀγαπωμένων) ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. Ποιητοὶ πολῖται were excluded at Athens from the archonship and from priesthoods ([Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 92), and often did not reside within the State which made them citizens: thus Dion was a ποιητὸς πολίτης of the Lacedaemonian State (Plut. Dion, cc. 17, 49). See as to ποιητοὶ πολῖται Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 184 sqq.

**7. οὐ τῇ οἰκεῖν που.** See explanatory note on 1260 b 41. 'In the Athenian use of language a resident alien was described in contrast to a citizen, not as a demot, but as a dweller in a deme—e. g. in Corp. Inscr. Att. 1. 324 we read *Τεῦκρος ἐν Κυδαθηναίῳ οἰκῶν*' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 170=Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 177). Whether the resident alien was termed *μέτοικος, πάροικος, ἔνοικος, κάτοικος, σύνοικος,* or *ἔποικος* (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 294. 1), his designation always expressed residence. Cp. Herondas 2. 94, *ἅπασι τοῖς οἰκεῦσι τὴν πόλιν ξείνοις.*

**8. οὐδ' οἱ κ.τ.λ.,** 'nor are those citizens who, [as metoeci usually do,] share in political rights to the extent of undergoing trial and suing.' It would have been more regular if Aristotle had continued *οὐδὲ τῷ τῶν δικαίων μετέχειν κ.τ.λ.*

**10. τοῦτο,** i.e. *τὸ τῶν δικαίων μετέχειν οὕτως ὥστε κ.τ.λ.*

**τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν,** who are obviously not citizens of the State in which they possess these rights. *Ἀπό* denotes the cause or origin of the association (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.).

**11. ταῦτα,** i.e. *τὸ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι,* and so *τούτων,* 12. The parenthetic remark, *καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει,* seems needless, but for equally needless parenthetic remarks see c. 11. 1282 a 36 sqq. and c. 12. 1282 b 39.

**πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.,** 'nay in many places,' etc., so that in these places metoeci are still further removed from citizenship than in places in which they completely share in these rights. *Μὲν οὖν* has nothing to answer to it. It is here used in the sense of 'nay,' as in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399a 15, 23. 'To what exact extent the resident aliens at Athens were obliged to allow themselves to be represented by their *προστάτης* we have no means of saying, but it can be shown that they could plead their cause before a judicial tribunal themselves: this is proved by the speech of Demosthenes against Dionysodorus, where the speaker is a resident alien... In Herondas 2, again, the *πορνοβοσκός,* who pleads in person before a Coan court of justice, is obviously a *μέτοικος,* vv. 15, 40, 92 sqq.' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 170=Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 177 sq.).

**12.** For *νέμειν προστάτην,* 'to take,' or 'choose,' 'a patron' (Liddell and Scott), cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 53, *καὶ τοὺς μὲν μετοίκους τοιούτους εἶναι νομίζομεν, οἵους περ ἂν τοὺς προστάτας νέμωσιν,* and Pollux 8. 35, *τῶν οὐ νεμόντων προστάτην μετοίκων.*

**13.** τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας, 'of the kind of association which has just been described,' i. e. of the association which goes no further than a right to sue and be sued.

**14.** ἀλλὰ καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but [we may dismiss these from consideration], just as,' etc.

**15.** ἐγγεγραμμένους, i. e. at Athens in the ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον, or list of citizens kept by the demarch, as to which see note on 1336 b 37. Boyhood is usually made to cease not, as here, on entry in this list, but at puberty (see note on 1333 b 3).

τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους. Cp. Plut. Tit. Flaminin., c. 21, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γήρως ἀπτῆνα καὶ κάλουρον ἀφειμένον ζῆν χειροήθη τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀποκτείνας, and Plato, Rep. 498 C, ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι κ.τ.λ. It would seem that after a certain age old citizens were excused attendance at the assembly and the dicasteries, unless we take Aristotle to refer merely to their exemption from military service, as to which see Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 40 and Diod. 14. 74. 1 sq. That attendance at the meetings of the assembly was to a certain extent compulsory at Athens, we see from Pollux 8. 104, though the rich seem often to have escaped attendance (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 8). Giphanius (p. 292) compares the 'senes depontani, seu de ponte deiiciendi, ut vocabant Romani,' who were excluded from the bridge which led to the Septa, the place where the comitia voted: see as to them Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht 3. 401. 3, and other passages referred to by Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 167. 9.

**16.** φατέον εἶναι μέν πως πολίτας, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ λίαν. Λίαν qualifies ἁπλῶς in the sense of 'very' or 'quite': cp. [Plato,] Eryx. 393 E, ὅπως ἂν βέλτιστα λίαν πράττοι τά τε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ πράγματα καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων. Λίαν alone (without any ἁπλῶς) stands in contrast to πως in De Part. An. 3. 7. 669 b 36 sqq.

ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας κ.τ.λ. Supply φατέον εἶναι. For the case of προστιθέντας see Jelf, Gr. Grammar, § 613, Obs. 5, and cp. c. 3. 1276 b 10, 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 21 sqq., and 1324 a 2 sq. In 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 3, however, we have ἐπιστήσασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον κ. τ. λ. 'The dative and the accusative of the agent are both allowed with the verbal in -τέον' (Goodwin, Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb, ed. 2, § 926).

**17.** ἀτελεῖς. Cp. c. 5. 1278 a 4, where οἱ παῖδες are said to be πολῖται ἀτελεῖς, and therefore πολῖται ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.

**19. ζητοῦμεν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Vict. 'quaerimus enim hic civem simpliciter, et qui nullam quasi culpam in se contineat, quam oratione corrigere oporteat, ut factum est in superioribus generibus civium.' Ἔγκλημα must here mean, not 'accusation,' but 'culpa' ('defect': Sus. 'Mangel'), for if we construe 'accusation,' the accusation will be said to 'need correction,' which is not the sense required. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) marks off the use of ἔγκλημα in this passage from its ordinary use. 'Frohberger on Lys. 10. 23 quotes Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 34: Lys. 16. 10: Polyb. 2. 52. 4: Demosth. 1. 7, in all which passages ἔγκλημα seems practically to mean "offence"' (Richards). **Γάρ, 19,** probably refers not to what immediately precedes but to the general sense of the preceding passage (like ἐπεὶ . . . γε in 2. 7. 1267a 12, where see note), and especially to the clause suppressed in 14 ('we may dismiss these from consideration'). Οἱ ἄτιμοι καὶ φυγάδες are referred to as also being πως πολῖται, being so far citizens that their disqualification was in the case of some ἄτιμοι incomplete, and in the case of all ἄτιμοι and φυγάδες reversible (see Schömann, Antiq. Iur. Publ. Graec. pp. 199, 234). For τὸν ἁπλῶς πολίτην cp. Antiphanes, Τριταγωνιστής (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 121), τὴν ἀληθῶς μουσικήν. Καὶ, 20, 'also,' not 'both.'

**22. πολίτης δ' ἁπλῶς κ.τ.λ.** Ἁπλῶς is to be taken with πολίτης. For τὸν ἁπλῶς πολίτην, 19, followed by πολίτης δ' ἁπλῶς here, see note on 1276 b 28. As to κρίσεως, see vol. i. p. 230, note 1. Κρίσις here seems to mean ἡ τῶν δικαίων κρίσις (Plato, Laws 766 D). A Greek hardly felt himself to be a citizen if he was excluded from all share in judicial functions (Plato, Laws 768 B, ὁ γὰρ ἀκοινώνητος ὧν ἐξουσίας τοῦ συνδικάζειν ἡγεῖται τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι). Ἀρχή is a wider term than κρίσις and is made in what follows to include κρίσις (e.g. in 1275 b 18 sq.).

**23. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι διῃρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον,** 'now of magistracies some are severed in point of time,' i.e. their tenure is severed, they cannot be held continuously. So Bernays, 'ein Theil der Aemter freilich erleidet zeitliche Unterbrechung.' For the contrast of διῃρημένος and συνεχής cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 29, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ διῃρημένων, and Phys. 4. 4. 211 a 29. Compare also ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ χρόνον in Metaph. M. 8. 1084 b 14 sqq. Mr. Welldon translates, 'some offices of State are determinate in point of time,' but can other passages be produced in which διαιρεῖσθαι bears this meaning? It would be easier to explain the passage thus if we read with Scaliger and Sus. διωρισμέναι in place of διῃρημέναι.

**24.** ὥστ' ἐνίας μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 37 sq. Ἐνίας μέν should have been followed by ἐνίας δέ, but it is in fact followed by ἥ, 25: compare the way in which in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 24 ἡ μέν is followed by ἢ ὅταν, 28, and in Poet. 3. 1448 a 21, 23, ὁτὲ μέν is followed by ἥ. See also note on 1338 b 1. The Lacedaemonian admiralship could not be held twice by the same person (Xen. Hell. 2. 1. 7), and the same was the case with many offices at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 62 *sub fin.*). At Thurii at one time a repeated tenure of the office of stratêgus by the same individual was prohibited except after an interval of five years (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 7). See on this subject Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 206. 1 (=Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 215. 4) and 2. 320. 1.

**26.** ὁ δ' ἀόριστος. We expect *al* δ' ἀόριστοι, but see note on 1258 b 26.

τάχα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἀλλά, 29. Οὐδ' ἄρχοντας, 'not even magistrates, [to say nothing of their being magistrates unlimited in respect of time].' Philocleon in the Vespae of Aristophanes will not hear of the function of dicast not being a magistracy: see Vesp. 548–551 (Didot), 575,

ἆρ' οὐ μεγάλη τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καταχήνη;

and 619 sqq. Plato in the Laws (767 A: cp. 768 C) holds that if a dicast is not in strictness a magistrate, he is in a sense a magistrate, and an important one too, on the day on which he decides a lawsuit. Cp. Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 233, ἀνὴρ γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἐν πόλει δημοκρατουμένῃ νόμῳ καὶ ψήφῳ βασιλεύει. But dicasts and magistrates were no doubt commonly distinguished: Strabo, for instance (p. 665), speaks of δικασταί and ἄρχοντες, and Aristotle himself in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book distinguishes between ἀρχαί and τὸ δικαστικόν (6 (4). 14. 1297 b 41 sqq.). When he speaks otherwise in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 8 sq., he is referring to oligarchical constitutions in which the judge was really a magistrate. A member of the assembly, on the other hand, would be less likely to claim to be a magistrate. In c. 11. 1282 a 34 Aristotle says that dicasts and members of the Boulê and the assembly are not magistrates, but parts of a magistracy.

**27.** τοὺς τοιούτους, 'the above-mentioned,' i.e. dicasts and members of the assembly.

**28.** διὰ ταῦτ', by reason of their being dicasts and members of the assembly.

**τοὺς κυριωτάτους.** Cp. c. 11. 1282 a 25 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 4 sqq., and see Philocleon's description in the Vespae of the greatness of his own position as dicast. The deliberative is described as 'supreme over the constitution' in 6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1 and 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 31 sq. (cp. 2. 6. 1264 b 33 sq.).

**29. περὶ ὀνόματος γὰρ κ.τ.λ.,** 'for the dispute is about a name, for the difficulty arises from the fact that there is no single word in use to designate that which a dicast and a member of the assembly have in common, [and to tell us] what we ought to call the functions of both.' Cp. Meteor. 1. 4. 341 b 15, *ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς καπνώδους διακρίσεως. Τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν* is perhaps added because *ἀνώνυμος* has much of the sense of *ἄδηλος*, which is coupled with it in Metaph. Z. 7. 1033 a 13, *ὧν δ' ἡ στέρησις ἄδηλος καὶ ἀνώνυμος.* Compare, however, also such sentences as 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, *πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται*, and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5, *ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει κ.τ.λ.*

**31. διορισμοῦ χάριν,** 'distinctionis causa' (Bon. Ind. 200 a 60, where 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 and Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1195 a 27 are referred to).

**32. ἀόριστος ἀρχή.** When an adjective and substantive are without the article, the substantive is usually in the Politics placed first and the adjective second (cp. for instance 1275 b 18, *ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς*, c. 4. 1276 b 17, *ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου*, and 1277 a 33, *ἀρχὴ δεσποτική*), but now and then we find the reverse order adopted, e.g. in the passage before us and in c. 11. 1281 b 35, *ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν.* When under these circumstances the adjective is placed first, it is usually intended to be emphasized. **Πολύς** and some other adjectives are exceptions to this rule; they commonly precede the substantive with which they agree (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 25: 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 27, 30), and are placed after it when they are emphatic (3. 16. 1287 b 29: Plato, Phaedr. 274 E, *ἃ λόγος πολὺς ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν*: Demosth. in Lept. c. 162).

**τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας,** those who share as *ἀόριστοι ἄρχοντες*, in tacit contrast to 1275 a 8, *οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι.* Cp. c. 9. 1280 b 25, *οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες.*

**33. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης κ.τ.λ. Πολίτης=** *διορισμὸς τοῦ πολίτου.* We are told in fact later that the definition

of the citizen which rests on extraction fails to suit persons whom nevertheless all would hold to be citizens (1275 b 32). Ἐφαρμόττειν is a word often used by Aristotle, but it would seem to be rather a poetical than a prose word, and it does not appear to occur in Plato, Thucydides, or the Attic orators, nor indeed in Xenophon, unless the Agesilaus is his work.

**34.** δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν . . . **1275 b 5,** πολιτείαν. See vol. i. p. 242 for an interpretation of this passage. The πολιτεῖαι are the ὑποκείμενα of the citizen because they are the 'res ad quas refertur' πολίτου 'notio et a quibus suspensa est' (Bon. Ind. 798 b 59, cp. 799 a 16). I follow the interpretation of Bonitz, as do also Prof. Jowett (Politics, 2. 106) and Prof. J. A. Stewart (*Class. Rev.* 9. 455 sq.).

**35.** τῶν πραγμάτων is probably a partitive genitive after οἷς.

**36.** καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 a 19–23: Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1218 a 1 sqq.: Metaph. B. 3. 999 a 6 sqq.: and see Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 256, note 103 (esp. p. 259).

**37.** ᾗ τοιαῦτα, i.e. in the case before us 'as citizens.' The citizen of the best constitution and the citizen of an extreme democracy may have much in common with each other as animals, but little or nothing as citizens.

1275 b. **1.** τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 652 a 51 sqq.) groups with the passage before us Categ. 12. 14 b 4 sqq. (see Waitz on 14 a 26) and Metaph. B. 2. 997 a 12, where προτέρα is conjoined with κυριωτέρα. Cp. also Pol. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης (πολιτείας), and Plut. Sympos. 2. 3. 3, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τοῦ ἀτελοῦς φύσει πρότερον εἶναι τὸ τέλειον, ὡς τοῦ πεπηρωμένου τὸ ὁλόκληρον καὶ τοῦ μέρους τὸ ὅλον.

**2.** τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has, however, already used the term παρεκβάσεις (2. 11. 1273 a 3).

**5.** ὁ λεχθείς. Cp. 1275 a 32. 'He who shares in the ἀόριστος ἀρχή of the dicast and the member of the assembly.'

ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστα. These words are to be taken together.

**7.** (ἐν) ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, sc. πολιτείαις. Δῆμος appears here to mean 'a people gathered in an assembly,' 'a body of ecclesiastae' (cp. c. 11. 1282 a 34 sqq., where ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής is said to be a μόριον of ὁ δῆμος), while ἐκκλησία means the institution itself, the assembly.

**8.** συγκλήτους, such as, for instance, the 5000 at Athens, whom the 400 were to call together whenever they pleased (Thuc. 8.

67. 3). The contrast drawn implies that it was of the essence of an *ἐκκλησία* to meet at regular intervals, and not merely when the authorities of the State chose to convoke it. Compare the Pregadi at Venice. 'C'est le nom qu'on donnait aux sénateurs, parce que dans l'origine, alors qu'il n'existait pas de jour fixe pour leurs séances, on allait à domicile *prier* chaque membre de vouloir bien se rendre au Palais Ducal' (Yriarte, Vie d'un Patricien de Venise, p. 78). Schömann (Antiqq. Iuris Publ. Graec. p. 82, note 6) refers to the *ἐπίκλητοι* instituted by Lysimachus at Ephesus (Strabo, p. 640, *ἦν δὲ γερουσία καταγραφομένη, τούτοις δὲ συνήεσαν οἱ ἐπίκλητοι καλούμενοι καὶ διῴκουν πάντα*), but the nature of these *ἐπίκλητοι* is obscure. Perhaps we should compare with them the *ἐπείσκλητοι* of *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 30. l. 21 sqq. (ed. Sandys). The members of the council of the Aetolian League were called *ἀπόκλητοι* (see as to them Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 28. 4). *Σύγκλητοι* would be officials, not *ἀόριστοι ἄρχοντες*.

**κατὰ μέρος**, 'by sections': cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 1, *τοσοῦτοι δ' ἕτεροι καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος (τρόποι)*, opposed to *τὸ πάντας κρίνειν*. Lambinus adopts a different interpretation, 'et lites controversiasque alias alii cognoscunt ac disceptant,' and so Vict. and Bonitz ('aliam alius magistratus,' Ind. 455 b 7), but this rendering seems inconsistent with 11, *τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα*, for this does not appear to have been the plan followed at Carthage.

**9. οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας.** This is confirmed by Plut. Apophth. Lac. Eurycratidas, *διὰ τί περὶ τὰ τῶν συμβολαίων δίκαια ἑκάστης ἡμέρας κρίνουσιν οἱ ἔφοροι.*

**10. ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχή τις ἑτέρας.** E.g. the kings (Hdt. 6. 57, *δικάζειν δὲ μούνους τοὺς βασιλέας τοσάδε μοῦνα· πατρούχου τε παρθένου πέρι, ἐς τὸν ἱκνέεται ἔχειν, ἢν μή περ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὴν ἐγγυήσῃ, καὶ ὁδῶν δημοσιέων πέρι*).

**11. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ.** See note on 1273 a 19.

**13. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'however [we need not give up] our definition of a citizen, as it admits of correction' (Mr. Welldon).

**14. ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις**, i.e. other than democracy, as in 6. Surely, however, an assembly and dicasteries will exist in a polity? An assembly, indeed, appears to have existed in some oligarchies also, though members of it were required to possess a high property-qualification (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.) or it was made harmless in some way (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq.), and not only an

assembly, but dicasteries of which the poor were at any rate nominally members (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 16 sqq.).

**15.** ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡρισμένος, literally 'he who is limited [in point of time] in respect of his office,' i.e. the holder of office for a limited period. Cp. Plut. Pericl. c. 10, *ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐξοστρακισμὸς ὡρισμένην εἶχε νόμῳ δεκαετίαν τοῖς φεύγουσιν.*

**16.** τούτων, i.e. *τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡρισμένων.*

τισίν, as at Carthage, so far at least as judicial authority is concerned, for a share of deliberative authority was accorded at Carthage to the popular assembly (2. 11. 1273 a 6 sqq.). In many oligarchies, probably, the power of deliberating about all matters and trying all suits was possessed by a part or the whole of the holders of office.

**17.** περὶ τινῶν. This would be characteristic of an aristocracy or a polity rather than an oligarchy (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 5 sqq.: 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq.).

**18.** ᾧ γὰρ ἐξουσία κ.τ.λ. Participation in either deliberative or judicial office is, it would seem, enough to constitute a citizen: thus if, as in some oligarchies, e.g. that of Heracleia on the Euxine (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 34), the dicasteries are recruited from those outside the ruling class, the members of them would be citizens. Aristotle's view that full citizenship is constituted by access to deliberative and judicial office is quite in harmony with his description of the deliberative and judiciary of a State as 'parts of the State in an especial sense' (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.). In c. 5. 1278 a 35, however, we are told that *ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν*—not simply *ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς*—is *ὁ μάλιστα πολίτης.* Still it would seem that a man may be a full citizen without access to *αἱ ἀρχαί* strictly so called, for at Malis *οἱ ὁπλιτευκότες* were citizens, though they were not eligible for *αἱ ἀρχαί* (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 14). Whether the mere right to elect magistrates, which is distinguished from deliberative authority in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., would be sufficient in Aristotle's view to constitute citizenship, may be doubted. We gather from 3. 14. 1285 a 25 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 that there are citizens in States ruled by kings, but Aristotle nowhere explicitly takes account of such citizens, nor does he explain their position.

**19.** ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, 'of the State in which he possesses these rights': cp. c. 3. 1276 a 15 and c. 11. 1281 b 29 sqq.

**20.** πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς. So too in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 24, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16, *πρὸς ζωὴν αὔταρκες*, but in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 8 we have *αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν* (cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 28 sqq. and Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 10 sq.), and this is the exacter statement.

**21.** ὁρίζονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. After giving his definition of a citizen C. 2
Aristotle now proceeds to point out the weakness of a rival definition. The citizen was commonly defined as descended from two citizen-parents. Those who defined citizenship thus could appeal to laws existing at Athens (vol. i. p. 227) and Byzantium ([Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 b 26 sqq.) and to the general feeling throughout Greece, that those descended from two citizen-parents were *γνήσιοι πολῖται* (c. 5. 1278 a 30). Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 297. 2) traces this feeling at Oreus, Cos, Rhodes, and elsewhere. Not only citizenship but other things also were held to pass most surely by descent from both parents—e. g. virtue (Eurip. Fragm. 524,

*ἡγησάμην οὖν, εἰ παραζεύξειέ τις*
*χρηστῷ πονηρὸν λέκτρον, οὐκ ἂν εὐτεκνεῖν,*
*ἐσθλοῖν δ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν ἐσθλὸν ἂν φῦναι γόνον*),

nobility (1. 6. 1255 a 36 sqq.), and physical strength (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 4, *νομίζων ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἰσχυρῶν καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα ἐρρωμενέστερα γίγνεσθαι*).

πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν, in tacit opposition to *πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν*: cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 9 sq.

**23.** οἷον is here explanatory (see above on 1255 b 38).

οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'while others even carry this requirement further, for instance to the extent of two, three, or more ancestors.' Cp. c. 13. 1283 a 33, *οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων· πολῖται γὰρ μᾶλλον οἱ γενναιότεροι τῶν ἀγεννῶν*. Liddell and Scott compare Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4. 47, *ὃς οὐδὲ εἰς τρίτον πάππον ἀνενεγκεῖν ἔχει τὸ γένος*: cp. also Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 4 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 229), *ἀριθμοῦσίν τε τοὺς πάππους ὅσοι*. It was usually in connexion with sacred offices that a pedigree of this kind was required (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 321. 1: cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., No. 371), but civil offices were sometimes subject to a similar restriction—thus the Thesmothetae at Athens (Aristot. Fragm. 374. 1540 a 39 sqq.) and the *τιμοῦχοι* at Massalia (a senate of 600 life-members which ruled the State, Strabo, p. 179) were required to be *διὰ τριγονίας ἐκ πολιτῶν γεγονότες*—and we learn from the passage before us that some even denied the name of citizen to those who had not these advantages of descent. A still narrower

view prevailed at one time at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera, where the only persons regarded as ἐλεύθεροι were the descendants of the original settlers (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq.). Dio Chrysostom, on the other hand, sensibly remarks (Or. 41, 2. 181 R), τὸ γὰρ ἀπωτέρω δυοῖν βαθμοῖν ('further back than one's grandfather,' Liddell and Scott) ζητεῖν τὸ γένος οὐδαμῶς ἐπιεικές· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς εὑρεθήσεται πόλεως. In a similar spirit a slave of three generations (τρίδουλος, Soph. O. T. 1062 sq., cp. ἑπτάδουλος) was thought to be especially a slave. We read of ὁ ἐκ τρι[γο]νίας [ὢν] μυροπώλης in Hyperid. c. Athenogen. col. 9. 3.

**25. πολιτικῶς.** Cp. Poet. 6. 1450 b 7 and Polyb. 5. 33. 5, οὐδ' ἐφ' ὅσον οἱ τὰ κατὰ καιροὺς ἐν ταῖς χρονογραφίαις ὑπομνηματιζόμενοι πολιτικῶς εἰς τοὺς τοίχους, where Schweighäuser explains 'populari, vulgari, simplici ratione, nude, sine arte,' and [Xen.] Ages. 8. 7, ἀκουσάτω δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ πολιτικοῦ καννάθρου κατῆει εἰς Ἀμύκλας ἡ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ. 'Compare also the πολιτικὰ ὀνόματα of Isocr. Evag. § 10' (Richards).

**ταχέως.** Cp. Plut. Pericl. c. 13, ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν εὐχέρεια καὶ ταχύτης οὐκ ἐντίθησι βάρος ἔργῳ μόνιμον οὐδὲ κάλλους ἀκρίβειαν.

**ἀποροῦσί τινες τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον ἢ τέταρτον,** 'some raise a question as to that third or fourth ancestor.' The 'third ancestor' is apparently the great-grandfather. For this 'anticipatory accusative,' see Dr. Holden on Xen. Oecon. 18. 9, and other passages. Antisthenes may have been one of these τινες, for we know that his extraction was made a subject of reproach to him, and a rejoinder of this kind would be quite in his vein (compare his rejoinder in Diog. Laert. 6. 4). It is interesting to note that he was a disciple of Gorgias, of whose views we hear in 26 sqq.

**26. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** 'Gorgias of Leontini, indeed, partly perhaps in a questioning way' (cp. ἀποροῦσι, 25), 'partly in a spirit of banter, said that as those are mortars which have been made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have been made by the handicraftsmen, for that there were certain Larissa-making handicraftsmen; but [there is nothing to raise any question about;] the matter is simple,' etc. Τῶν δημιουργῶν must be translated 'the handicraftsmen' and δημιουργούς must be supplied after Λαρισσοποιούς, and then the added explanation, εἶναι γάρ τινας Λαρισσοποιούς, which Ridgeway and Sus. would omit, is not otiose. The 'Larissa-making handicraftsmen' referred to are of course the magistrates (δημιουργοί) of Larissa, the word δημιουργός meaning both 'handi-

craftsman' and 'magistrate.' We expect Λαρισαιοποιούς in place of Λαρισοποιούς, and Camerarius reads Λαρισαιοποιούς, but since a city = its citizens, 'Larissa-makers' = 'makers of Larissaeans,' and Λαρισοποιούς, which (or rather Λαρισσοποιούς) is the reading of Γ Π Vat. Pal., may be used in preference to Λαρισαιοποιούς, partly because it is nearer in form to δλμοποιούς, and partly to convey a hint that the making of Larissaeans had been on so large a scale that it virtually amounted to a making of Larissa. Gorgias said that every one was a citizen who was made a citizen by the duly empowered magistrates, and thus went to the length of acknowledging all those as citizens who were made citizens by the authorities of the State, whatever the rights conferred on them; Aristotle, on the contrary, looks not merely to the persons who confer citizenship, but also to the rights conferred; if these are the rights which constitute citizenship, the persons made citizens are citizens, but not otherwise. He probably objects to Gorgias' view because according to it ποιητοὶ πολῖται would be citizens. But Gorgias' view was in his opinion so far correct that it did not base citizenship on extraction, but traced it to the action of the State. It was quite in the spirit of Gorgias' philosophical teaching to make out that citizens and the State were manufactured, artificial products. He himself was a ξένος at Larissa, and was no doubt not sorry to banter the Larissaean nobles on their pride of birth (compare Matt. iii. 9, 'And think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father, for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham'). We have seen that the word δημιουργός meant 'handicraftsman' as well as 'magistrate.' A line of Leonidas of Tarentum (Anth. Pal. 6. 305),

τὼς Λαρισσαίως κυτογάστορας ἑψητῆρας,

lends some colour to the view that a further *équivoque* lurks in the saying of Gorgias, and that Λαρισαίους may well have borne two meanings in the minds of his hearers, 'Larissaeans' and 'pots,' but as the late Dr. Thompson has pointed out (see Prof. Ridgeway, *Camb. Philol. Trans.* 2. 136), it is not clear that Λαρισαῖος without a substantive could mean 'pot,' for it is linked with ἑψητήρ in the epigram, and indeed, if it could, we should expect Λαρισαιοποιούς in the clause which follows: Λαρισσοποιούς, however, as has been said, is the reading of all the MSS. and of Vet. Int. The saying loses little or nothing, if this additional subtlety is withdrawn from

it. Larissa was oligarchically governed, but it is perhaps hardly likely that even there the demiurgi of the State had the uncontrolled right of admitting citizens; more probably they acted under a commission empowering them to admit to citizenship persons who fulfilled certain conditions prescribed by the State. See Szanto, Das griech. Bürgerrecht, p. 30 sq. Prof. Ridgeway (*Journal of Philology*, 15. p. 164) makes the not improbable suggestion that the addition to the citizen-roll of Larissa to which Gorgias' saying refers was necessitated by the blow which the city received in B. C. 404 from Lycophron of Pherae (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 4). It would seem from 35 that it was not preceded by any change of constitution. Gorgias was well known for his irony (Rhet. 3. 7. 1408 b 19, *ἡ δὴ οὕτω δεῖ ἡ μετ' εἰρωνείας, ὥσπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ*). We see from Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 31 that *εἰρωνεία* implies slight contempt. Whether Meineke, Fragm. Comicorum Anonymorum, 183 (Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 649),

*τῶν πολιτῶν ἄνδρας ὑμῖν δημιουργοὺς ἀποφανῶ,*

has anything to do with Gorgias' saying, is more than I will undertake to decide.

**32.** *καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατὸν* κ.τ.λ., 'for it is not even possible [much less the fact] that the test of descent from a citizen-father or mother should apply in the case of those who were the first to dwell in the city or to found it,' and yet these would be citizens in an especial degree: compare 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 12 sq. and an inscription quoted by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 167. 3, in which a Halicarnassian named Nireus is honoured *διά τε τὴν ἀπὸ* [*τ*]*ῶν κτιστῶν καὶ τυρα*[*νν*]*οκτόνων τῆς πόλε*[*ω*]*ς καθ' ἑκα*[*τ*]*έρους τοὺς* [*γ*]*ονεῖς αὐτοῦ εὐγενίαν*: also Diod. 14. 98. 1, *Εὐαγόρας ὁ Σαλαμίνιος, ὃς ἦν μὲν εὐγενέστατος, τῶν γὰρ κτισάντων τὴν πόλιν ἦν ἀπόγονος.* Susemihl translates 'auf die ersten Ansiedler *und* Staatsgründer,' but *ἤ* appears to distinguish between being the first to dwell in a city and being the first to found it. In 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38, the only other passage in Aristotle's writings (except a fragment) to which the Index Aristotelicus gives a reference for the word *κτίζειν*, *κτίσαντες* is used of kings who founded cities, and I am inclined to think (with Sepulv. Vict. Lamb. and Giph.) that it is used in a similar way in the passage before us of the *κτίσται* of cities, who, while they would no doubt be themselves among *οἱ πρῶτοι οἰκήσαντες*, would be marked off from them by being their chiefs and leaders. *Κτίζειν* is especially used of these *κτίσται* or *οἰκισταί*, or else of the mother-

city, though it is occasionally used of the whole body of original settlers, as for instance in Thuc. 5. 16. 3. For *οὐδὲ δυνατόν*, cp. c. 15. 1286 b 21, *οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον*, and c. 16. 1287 a 10, *οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν*. I follow Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) in taking *ἐφαρμόττειν* here as intransitive, as in 1275 a 33, but it is quite possible that Sus., Liddell and Scott, and others are right in taking it as transitive.

**34.** *ἀλλ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ.*, 'but perhaps this case lends itself more to debate, the case of those who acquired the rights of citizens after a change of constitution, such a creation of citizens, I mean, as that which Cleisthenes enacted at Athens, for he enrolled in the tribes many aliens and slave metoeci.' The question whether citizens who acquired citizenship after a change of constitution are citizens is a more difficult one than that just discussed, because the new citizens in this case are not made citizens by duly empowered magistrates of the old constitution, but by the introducer of the new one; besides, the citizens admitted by Cleisthenes were aliens and slave metoeci, and aliens and metoeci are the very opposite of citizens (c. 5. 1277 b 39). Euripides had made one of the characters of his Erechtheus say (Fragm. 362. 11 sqq.),

> *ὅστις δ' ἀπ' ἄλλης πόλεος οἰκίζει πόλιν,*
> *ἁρμὸς πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλῳ παγείς,*
> *λόγῳ πολίτης ἐστί, τοῖς δ' ἔργοισιν οὔ.*

As to *ἐκεῖνο* see critical note. For *ἔχει ἀπορίαν*, cp. Phys. 8. 2. 253 a 7, *μάλιστα δ' ἂν δόξειε τὸ τρίτον ἔχειν ἀπορίαν*, and 1. 3. 186 a 8, *μᾶλλον δ' ὁ Μελίσσου* (λόγος) *φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τἆλλα συμβαίνει· τοῦτο δ' οὐδὲν χαλεπόν*: also Pol. 3. 11. 1281 a 41 and 3. 12. 1282 b 22. For *οἷον Ἀθήνησιν ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης* cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 16, *οἷον καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν*, and for *ἐποίησε*, 'enacted,' 2. 12. 1274 b 7. *Οἷον κ.τ.λ.* explains *μετέσχον*. A suggestion, however, which well deserves notice, that *οὗς* should be added after *οἷον*, has been recorded in the critical note on 1275 b 35. For the plural in *τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολήν*, cp. Diod. 11. 55, *μετὰ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν τυράννων τῶν περὶ Πεισίστρατον*, Thuc. 8. 68, *ἐπειδὴ οἱ τύραννοι κατελύθησαν*, Polyb. 3. 22. 1, *μετὰ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων κατάλυσιν*, and the words *μετὰ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέων* (referring to the dethronement of the Ptolemies) in an inscription found at Philae and published in the *Athenaeum* for March 14, 1896. The displacement of the dynasty is expressed by the plural, as in 'pulsis regibus,' Tac. Hist. 3. 72. This is the sense which

the plural seems to bear in the passage before us, though *οἱ τύραννοι* is often loosely used where an act of only one of the tyrants is referred to (e.g. in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 19. l. 13 and c. 20. l. 2, and in Demosth. c. Mid. c. 144). *Ἐφυλέτευσε* is stronger than *πολίτας ἐποιήσατο* would have been. As to *δούλους μετοίκους* see vol. i. p. 231 note. Cp. also [Plato,] Alcib. 1. 119 A, *ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων δοῦλον ἢ ἐλεύθερον εἰπέ, ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι*, where it is implied that the *ξένοι* include slaves, and Hecataeus, Fragm. 318 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 24). Bernays (Heraklit. Briefe, p. 155) takes *ξένους* and *δούλους* as both of them adjectives and *μετοίκους* as the substantive common to them, referring to Aristoph. Eq. 347 Didot,

*εἴ που δικίδιον εἶπας εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου,*

which shows that the term *ξένος μέτοικος* was a recognized one, but on the other hand *ξένοι* and *μέτοικοι* are often distinguished (e.g. in c. 5. 1277 b 39), and perhaps it is hardly likely that Cleisthenes confined himself to enfranchising resident aliens. His object was to strengthen his own party among the citizens, the democratic party, and this was most effectually done by enrolling aliens and slave metoeci, for they were sure to side with him against the *γνώριμοι*. At any rate they would not hold with the *συνήθειαι* at which he sought to strike a blow (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 26). Towards the close of the Peloponnesian War Athens enrolled not only metoeci but aliens also as citizens (Diod. 13. 97. 1). Not all aliens were absolute aliens; some were sons of a citizen-father by a mother not of citizen-birth, like the *ξένοι* mentioned in c. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq. Those aliens and metoeci who had a touch of servile blood in their veins would be most unwelcome as citizens, for we learn in c. 5. 1278 a 33 that citizens of servile origin were the first to be extruded when the State could afford to get rid of them. How hateful the measure of Cleisthenes must have been to many, we see from Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 41, *πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δεινῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν γινομένων καὶ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἠτυχηκότων, μάλιστ' ἄν τις ἤλγησε καὶ ἐδάκρυσεν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως συμφοραῖς ἡνίχ' ὁρᾶν ἦν τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δ' ἀτίμους ἐντίμους· ὃς πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτόχθων εἶναι καὶ ἐλεύθερος ἐσεμνύνετο.* The 'happy city' of Lucian's Hermotimus, in which all are *ἐπήλυδες καὶ ξένοι, αὐθιγενὴς δὲ οὐδὲ εἷς* (c. 24), is in designed contrast to the generally accepted ideal. The making of slaves and aliens citizens was a measure often resorted to by tyrants (see

vol. i. p. 547, note 2: Diod. 11. 72. 3, 14. 7. 4) and by extreme democrats (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 48).

**37.** τὸ δ' ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους. Cp. c. 16. 1287 b 35.

**1.** ἆρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, 'whether, if a man is not justly a citizen, he is not in fact no citizen at all.' This Aristotle will not admit: compare the line he takes in Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 17 sqq. Cicero, on the contrary, in De Legibus 2. 5. 11–2. 6. 14 denies that faulty laws are laws at all. 1276 a.

ὡς ταὐτὸ δυναμένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. For the use of τε in sentences of this kind cp. c. 4. 1277 a 20 sq. and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 1. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19, *ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.*

**4.** ἀρχῇ τινί, i.e. *ἀρχῇ βουλευτικῇ ἢ κριτικῇ* (c. 1. 1275 b 18).

**7.** τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν, in c. 1. 1274 b 34 sq. C. 3. The question whether these citizens are justly citizens or not is connected with the question whether they were made citizens by the State or not, a question which some identify with the question whether the constitution under which they have become citizens is based merely on force or exists for the common advantage, and if we deny that the acts of a tyrant or an oligarchy are acts of the State on the ground that the tyranny or oligarchy is based merely on force and does not exist for the common good, we must say the same thing of the acts of any democracy which is in the same position, so that we shall deny that those who are created citizens by a democracy of this kind are justly citizens. Aristotle appears to hint that the democracy introduced by Cleisthenes was a democracy resting on force and not for the common good, and that on the principle laid down by the persons to whom he refers the aliens whom Cleisthenes made citizens were not justly citizens, but he does not adopt the view that the acts of a constitution not for the common good are not acts of the State.

**10.** τότε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for then some are not willing to discharge either (public) contracts on the plea that the tyrant, not the State, received the loan, or many other obligations of a similar kind, holding that some constitutions are based on superior force and are not for the common advantage, [and that the acts done by the authorities they constitute are consequently not acts of the State].' These persons probably regarded democracies as in an especial degree constitutions for the common advantage: compare Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 76, where it is argued that democracies, unlike

oligarchies, are governed by laws conceived in the interest of the citizens. Our own use of the words 'republic' and 'commonwealth' indicates the prevalence of a cognate view (see Sir J. R. Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 173). For an instance in which a public contract ran a risk of being thus repudiated, see vol. i. p. 231 sq. Οὔτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων perhaps refers to the quashing of acts and judicial decisions; this happened after the fall of the Thirty at Athens (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 39: Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 56: Andoc. De Myst. c. 87). Questions of a similar nature have found their way into modern English law-courts. 'Given a revolutionary government which has been recognized by foreign States as a government *de facto*, but which has since been superseded by a more legitimate *régime*, are its acts and contracts to be held valid or not by the courts of those foreign States, as far as concerns the subjects over which they have jurisdiction? This was the issue which Mr. Justice Kay had to decide yesterday in the case of "The Republic of Peru *v.* Dreyfus"' (*Times*, Feb. 21, 1888, where a report of the case will be found). This case, it will be noticed, applies only to revolutionary governments *recognized by foreign States*.

**12.** τῷ κρατεῖν οὔσας. Cp. De Gen. An. i. 18. 723 a 31, εἰ τοῦτο θήσομεν οὕτως ὅτι οὐ τῷ ἀπελθεῖν ἀπό τινος τὸ θῆλυ, and such expressions as φύσει εἶναι or τὰς βίᾳ πράξεις (Plato, Polit. 280 D).

**14.** δημοκρατοῦνται κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, i.e. τῷ κρατεῖν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. Cp. Thuc. 8. 53. 1, Ἀλκιβιάδην καταγαγοῦσι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατουμένοις, and Plato, Polit. 291 E, δημοκρατίας γε μήν, ἐάν τ' οὖν βιαίως ἐάν τε ἑκουσίως τῶν τὰς οὐσίας ἐχόντων τὸ πλῆθος ἄρχῃ, καὶ ἐάν τε τοὺς νόμους ἀκριβῶς φυλάττον ἐάν τε μή, πάντως τοὔνομα οὐδεὶς αὐτῆς εἴωθε μεταλλάττειν.

ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ., 'we must say that the acts of the authorities set up by this constitution are to just the same extent and no more acts of this State as those proceeding from the oligarchy and the tyranny.' For ὁμοίως καί cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 6, ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους ('no better than'). Τῆς πόλεως ταύτης, i.e. the State of the τινες referred to: cp. c. 11. 1281 b 29, ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην, and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 40. For τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας (πράξεις) see Liddell and Scott s.v. ἐκ iii. 3, and see note on 1302 a 4. Cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 6, τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰς παρ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν, and Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 76, τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἀδικίαν.

**17. ἔοικε δ' οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'but the inquiry [to which we have just referred] seems to be cognate to this question, on what principle we ought to say that,' etc. With Sepulveda, Bernays, and Welldon I take *πῶς ποτὲ κ.τ.λ.* to explain *τῆς ἀπορίας*, 19, this seems to be the more natural interpretation, though it is true that *τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης* might refer to Looking to *τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης*, and not *ὁ λόγος*, as Sus. of those who are in power under a constitution resting on force and not for the common advantage are acts of the State and should be fulfilled by those who are in power after a change of constitution is cognate to the question under what circumstances the State is to be regarded as the same or not the same. He decides (1276 b 10 sqq.) that after *any* change of constitution the State is not the same, but that the question as to the fulfilment of contracts is a separate one. As to *πῶς ποτέ*, see Liddell and Scott, who refer to Soph. *ἀποροῦσι*, 8. O. T. 1210.

**19 sqq.** 'The mode of dealing with this problem which lies nearest to hand is in connexion with the site and its inhabitants, for the site and the inhabitants may be divided into two or more sections, and some of the inhabitants may dwell on one site, and some on another.' *Μὲν οὖν* is taken up by *μὲν οὖν*, 22, but it is difficult to say where the answering particle is to be found. For *ἐπιπολαιοτάτη*, cp. Rhet. 3. 10. 1410 b 21, *διὸ οὔτε τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ* (*ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα καὶ ἃ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι*) *κ.τ.λ.* The words *ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους* have been interpreted in two ways. Vict. explains them, 'contingit enim ut locus distinctus sit, hominesque eodem pacto separati, ita ut hi hanc, alii vero aliam sedem habeant.' Mr. Welldon, on the other hand, translates, 'it is possible that the inhabitants should be divorced from the site and should come to dwell in different sites.' Perhaps the former interpretation is to be preferred. As an instance of some inhabitants dwelling on one site and others on another, we may take the *διοίκισις* of Mantineia by the Lacedaemonians (Paus. 8. 8. 9, *ὡς δὲ εἶλε τὴν Μαντίνειαν* ('Αγησίπολις), *ὀλίγον μέν τι κατέλιπεν οἰκεῖσθαι, τὸ πλεῖστον δὲ εἰς ἔδαφος καταβαλὼν αὐτῆς κατὰ κώμας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διῴκισε*). The question then is—will a change of this kind have destroyed the identity of the *πόλις*? Aristotle's somewhat curt answer is that the word *πόλις* is used in many different senses, and that it is easy to solve the question if

that is borne in mind. His meaning perhaps is that if we take πόλις in the sense of 'an aggregate of human beings or citizens,' the Mantineans after the διοίκισις will still constitute the same State as before, but if we take it in the sense of 'an aggregate of human beings or citizens gathered on a given site,' they will no longer do so.

**24. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and similarly [one might raise the question] in the case also in which the inhabitants occupy one and the same site, when we ought to consider the πόλις to be one.' Are we to say that it is one, however large the site may be and however varied in race the inhabitants, provided only that it is enclosed within one and the same wall?

**26. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν**, 'for surely it is not one πόλις in virtue of its walls.' For γὰρ δή, cp. c. 9. 1280 b 24 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 32.

**27. εἴη γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἓν τεῖχος.** Aristotle probably remembers a famous taunt of the Athenians addressed to the Lacedaemonians, which is recorded in the Funeral Oration ascribed to Lysias, c. 44, *ὕστερον δὲ Πελοποννησίων διατειχιζόντων τὸν Ἰσθμόν . . . ὀργισθέντες Ἀθηναῖοι συνεβούλευον αὐτοῖς, εἰ ταύτην τὴν γνώμην ἔξουσιν, περὶ ἅπασαν τὴν Πελοπόννησον τεῖχος περιβαλεῖν.* A line in the Temenidae of Euripides (Fragm. 730) ran,

*ἅπασα Πελοπόννησος εὐτυχεῖ πόλις.*

Polybius (2. 37. 9 sqq.) implies that in his day Peloponnesus was virtually one city, having the same magistrates, etc., the only want being a common wall.

τοιαύτη, 'like Peloponnesus with a wall round it.' Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 3 sqq.

**28. καὶ Βαβυλὼν . . . 30. πόλεως.** As to Babylon, see note on 1326 b 3. The walls of Babylon according to Herodotus (1. 178) were 480 stadia in circumference, according to Ctesias (Diod. 2. 7) 360 stadia, and according to Cleitarchus (Diod. ibid.) 365 stadia. A still larger circuit of wall (1500 stadia) was to be found after Aristotle's time at Antiochia Margiana (the modern Merv), if we could trust Strabo (p. 516). Herodotus (1. 191) says that owing to the size of Babylon, when the outer part of it had been taken, the inhabitants of the centre were unaware of the fact and continued to celebrate a festival till they learnt it; he does not mention that the interval amounted to three days. Here, as in 2. 3. 1262 a 18 sqq., 3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq., and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17 sq. (see notes on these passages), Aristotle mentions a circumstance also mentioned

by Herodotus, but mentions it with a slight variation. He may possibly quote Herodotus from memory. Megalopolis was taken by Cleomenes 'before the Megalopolitans were aware of the fact' (Plut. Cleom. c. 23), but then Megalopolis was 'a great desert' (Polyb. 2. 55. 2: 5. 93. 5). For the omission of *πόλις* after *πᾶσα* see note on 1266 b 1; its omission is facilitated by the occurrence of the word *πόλεως* in the next line. For the interposition of *καὶ πᾶσα . . . πόλεως* between *ἧς* and its antecedent *Βαβυλών*, cp. Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 3, *ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔστι τι ὃ περιέχει, καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἕκαστον, ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.*, where *καὶ τοῦτο παρ' ἕκαστον* is interposed. *Τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου* is interposed in a somewhat similar way in Pol. 3. 4. 1277 a 22 sqq., and *καὶ κεκαλλωπισμέναι* in Aristoph. Lysistr. 43 Didot,

*αἱ καθήμεθ' ἐξανθισμέναι,*
*κροκωτὰ φοροῦσαι καὶ κεκαλλωπισμέναι*
*καὶ Κιμβερίκ' ὀρθοστάδια καὶ περιβαρίδας.*

**31. εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος**, cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 4, *καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ πονηρά.*

**32. περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους . . . 34. πολιτικόν.** Supply *συμφέρει* after *τό τε πόσον.* The question *πότερον ἔθνος ἓν ἢ πλείω συμφέρει* is probably suggested by the mention of Peloponnesus, of which Herodotus says (8. 73), *οἰκέει δὲ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἔθνεα ἑπτά.* As to this question see vol. i. p. 295, note 1, where it has been pointed out that it is not dealt with in 4 (7). 4, though the proper size of the *πόλις* is discussed there. The *πόλις* consists *ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν* (1. 2. 1252 b 27), and a question might naturally be raised whether it should not also consist of more *ἔθνη* than one. The colony of Thurii had been recruited from a variety of sources (Diod. 12. 10. 4: 12. 11. 3), and Plato had seen advantages in a citizen-body derived from more quarters than one (Laws 708).

**34. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.** With the discussion of the question of the identity of the *πόλις* which commences here should be compared the remarks of Plutarch on the same subject in De Sera Numinis Vindicta, c. 15: Plutarch, however, does not seem to have had this passage of the Politics before him. The question of identity had long been raised in reference to the individual. The speculations of Heraclitus and his doctrine of the flux of all things had drawn attention to this question, and Epicharmus had made a character in one of his comedies point to the increase and decrease in size which takes place in human beings and ask how this increase and

decrease was compatible with personal identity, and how a man whose identity had changed could be called on to pay his debts. See Diog. Laert. 3. 10–11, and Bernays' essay on 'Epicharmos und der *αὐξανόμενος λόγος*' in his Gesammelte Abhandlungen 1. 109–117, and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 461. 1. Compare also the remarks of Diotima in Plato, Symp. 207 D. Aristotle is concerned in the passage before us not with the question of the identity of the individual, but with the question of the identity of the *πόλις*. In dealing with this question as with others, he steers a midway course. He agrees neither with Isocrates, who held that States are immortal (De Pace § 120), nor with those who held that change in the individuals composing them destroyed their identity; their identity is according to him destructible, but it is destroyed by a change of constitution, not by a change of individuals.

**37. ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς κ.τ.λ.** Heraclitus had denied that they were the same (Fragm. 41 Bywater, *ποταμοῖσι δὶς τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης· ἕτερα γὰρ (καὶ ἕτερα) ἐπιρρέει ὕδατα*, and Fragm. 81, *ποταμοῖσι τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμεν*). But Aristotle holds that the constant change of the watery particles of which a river is composed does not prevent its remaining the same. A river, however, is different from a *πόλις*. It is not an *ὅλον* or a *σύνθεσις*, like a *πόλις* or an *ἁρμονία* or a *χορός*, the identity of which depends on the arrangement of the parts (Metaph. Δ. 26. 1024 a 6, *ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ ὅσα ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ' ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἂν μὴ μεταφορᾷ*). A river will remain the same so long as its particles consist of water, but a *πόλις* will not remain the same, so long as it consists of men of the same stock, if meanwhile a change should occur in its *σύνθεσις* or *πολιτεία*.

**40. διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν**, i.e. *διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων*.

**τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἑτέραν**, 'but the State different [if there is a change of polity]' (Mr. Welldon, following Bernays).

1276 b. **2. κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας**, 'a sharing of citizens in a constitution.' Bekker places a comma after *πολιτῶν*, but I follow Susemihl's punctuation: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 36, *κοινωνούντων ἁπάντων μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως*. In c. 4. 1276 b 29 the *πολιτεία*, not the *πόλις*, is said to be a *κοινωνία* (see note on 1276 b 28).

**γιγνομένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφερούσης.** We may have here a mere tautology, like those collected by Vahlen in his note on

Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, but perhaps it is more likely that διαφερούσης refers to changes less complete than a change of kind.

3. ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν κ.τ.λ. The πολιτεία represents the εἶδος τῆς συνθέσεως (7) in the case of the πόλις and thus constitutes its identity: compare the passages from the Topics which Bonitz (Ind. 729 a 51 sq.) groups with the passage before us—Top. 6. 13. 150 b 22, ἔτι εἰ μὴ εἴρηκε τὸν τρόπον τῆς συνθέσεως· οὐ γὰρ αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ γνωρίσαι τὸ εἰπεῖν ἐκ τούτων· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὕτως ἐκ τούτων ἑκάστου τῶν συνθέτων ἡ οὐσία, καθάπερ ἐπ' οἰκίας· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὁπωσοῦν συντεθῇ ταῦτα, οἰκία ἐστίν, and 6. 14. 151 a 23, οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ σύνθεσιν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις προσδιοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοῦν συντεθέντων τούτων σὰρξ γίνεται, ἀλλ' οὑτωσὶ μὲν συντεθέντων σάρξ, οὑτωσὶ δ' ὁστοῦν. For the notion that a change of laws might affect the identity of a πόλις, compare Plato Com., Fragm. 42 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 692). According to Plut. De Ser. Num. Vind. c. 15 the identity of the πόλις remains μέχρις ἂν ἡ ποιοῦσα καὶ συνδέουσα ταῖς ἐπιπλοκαῖς κοινωνία τὴν ἑνότητα διαφυλάττῃ.

4. ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν κ.τ.λ., 'as we say that a chorus also appearing at one time as a comic, and at another as a tragic, chorus is not the same.' 'The tragic chorus consisted of three files (στοῖχοι) of five men each and of five ranks (ζυγά) of three men each; the comic chorus of four files of six men each and of six ranks of four men each' (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 205, A. Müller, Die gr. Bühnenalt., where Pollux 4. 108–9 is referred to). Thus the εἶδος τῆς συνθέσεως was different in the case of a tragic and comic chorus. The numbers of the two kinds of chorus were also different, and, as Mr. Richards points out, it is remarkable that Aristotle takes no notice of this. He implies that in a Dorian and a Phrygian 'harmony' the sounds may be the same, but that even then the εἶδος τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν φθόγγων will be different. It is not quite clear what this means. Does it mean that the sounds will be arranged in a different order? It is still less easy to say how a political constitution is an εἶδος τῆς συνθέσεως of the elements of the πόλις. Does Aristotle mean that in each constitution the citizens of a πόλις are arranged in a different way—that in an aristocracy the best men are at the head and in an oligarchy or democracy the rich or the poor? Perhaps so: compare 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 25 sqq. and 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 17, in the latter of which passages he appears to imply that a constitution is a διάθεσις πόλεως.

5. **τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων.** We expect rather *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* than *ἀνθρώπων*, but cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 7, *ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν*: 1. 2. 1252 b 9, *ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν*: 1. 8. 1256 a 10, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ*. Yet in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20 we have *καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον*.

6. **πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν.** *Σύνθεσιν* is the wider term. For *πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν*, cp. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 8, *πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν*.

7. **ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον ᾖ τῆς συνθέσεως.** Not *τὸ εἶδος*, for with *ἕτερος*, as with *ὁ αὐτός* (see above on 5), the subject of the sentence often is without the article: cp. c. 4. 1277 b 13, 17, 24, 30 sq., and c. 6. 1278 b 13 sq.

9. **λέγομεν.** See below on 1277 a 37.

**εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον** recurs in 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 10.

10. For **λεκτέον . . . βλέποντας**, see note on 1275 a 16.

11. **ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν κ.τ.λ.** According to Thuc. 6. 4. 5 (see however Freeman, Sicily 2. 115 and 486 sqq.), Zancle received the name Messana from Anaxilas of Rhegium when he expelled the Samians and peopled the city afresh. On the other hand, Catana retained its name, when Dionysius the Elder replaced its citizens by Campanians (Diod. 14. 15), and so did the Trachinian Heracleia, though its inhabitants were changed by the Thebans in B.C. 395 (Diod. 14. 82. 6, 7). The name of Corinth was replaced by that of Argos in B.C. 393 during the supremacy of a faction, though the inhabitants were unchanged (Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 6, *ὁρῶντες δὲ τοὺς τυραννεύοντας, αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ ἀφανιζομένην τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ ὄρους ἀνεσπάσθαι καὶ Ἄργος ἀντὶ Κορίνθου τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζεσθαι*).

C. 4. **16 sqq.** Aristotle passes on from defining the citizen to examine the nature of his virtue, just as after defining the slave he goes on in 1. 13. 1259 b 21 sqq. to ask what is the virtue of the slave. He has there found that the virtue of the woman, child, and slave is not *τελεία ἀρετή*, but relative to the head of the household, and now he asks in effect whether the virtue of the citizen is *τελεία ἀρετή*, and whether it is identical with the virtue of the good man. Thucydides (2. 42. 2–4) makes Pericles argue in his Funeral Oration that those who had fallen gloriously fighting for their country were *eo ipso* proved to be good men, for their service to the State outweighed and cast into the shade all private faults. It is not, however, so much in correction of views of this kind

as in correction of the teaching of Socrates that the Fourth Chapter is written. Socrates had taught the unity of virtue, claiming that virtue is one and the same in all who possess it. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that virtue varies with the work a person has to do, and that, as a citizen's work is relative to the constitution, his virtue varies with the constitution. To identify the virtue of the good citizen with that of the good man is therefore to ignore the difference between one constitution and another. It is also to ignore the difference between the ruling and ruled citizen in the best of constitutions. See vol. i. p. 234 sqq. as to the contents of the Fourth Chapter. Looking to the definition of a citizen which Aristotle has already given, we might expect him to say that the virtue of a citizen consists in the ability to deliberate and judge well, i.e. to rule well. But we learn in the Fourth Chapter that the work of a citizen consists not only in ruling but also in being ruled, and therefore that his virtue consists in knowing not only how to rule but also how to be ruled, with this limitation, however, that the only kind of rule which he needs to know is that which is exercised over freemen. To learn this he must be ruled first and rule afterwards—a principle which is not forgotten when Aristotle comes to construct his 'best State' (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sqq.). One remarkable conclusion, it should be noted, results from the Fourth Chapter. This is that the good man cannot be a good citizen (in the sense of contributing to the preservation of the constitution) in any constitution but the best without ceasing to be a good man in the strict sense of the words. The justice of Socrates, for instance, is not the imperfect kind of justice which tends to the preservation of a democracy (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq.). But is Aristotle's account of good citizenship correct? Is not he a good citizen whose influence tends to the improvement of a constitution rather than he whose influence tends to its preservation? May not a man be all the better as a citizen because he is morally and intellectually somewhat in advance of the constitution under which he lives? Is a good citizen bound to do what contributes to the preservation of that constitution, even if it is a tyranny or an extreme democracy or oligarchy? See note on 1337 a 27.

**18.** ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly': see above on 1271 a 20.

**19.** For τύπῳ τινί, 'in some sort of outline,' cp. Plato, Phileb. 61 A, τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι σαφῶς ἢ καί τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ λεπτέον, and 32 B,

and Laws 718 C and 802 D sq., and for *τύπῳ τινὶ λεπτέον*, Aristot. Top. 1. 7. 103 a 7, *ὡς τύπῳ λαβεῖν*.

For *πρῶτον* in the sense of *πρότερον*, see below on 1323 a 16.

**21.** *τῶν πλωτήρων* is in strictness in the gen. after *ἑκάστου*, 24.

**22.** *ὁ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* For the relative rank of these personages cp. Aristoph. Eq. 541 Didot,

*καὶ πρὸς τούτοισιν ἔφασκεν*
*ἐρέτην χρῆναι πρῶτα γενέσθαι, πρὶν πηδαλίοις ἐπιχειρεῖν,*
*κἄτ' ἐντεῦθεν πρῳρατεῦσαι καὶ τοὺς ἀνέμους διαθρῆσαι,*
*κἄτα κυβερνᾶν αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ,*

a passage already referred to by Camerarius (Interp. p. 114). As to the *κυβερνήτης*, cp. c. 6. 1279 a 3.

**24.** *δῆλον ὡς κ.τ.λ.* Translate, with Bernays (see also Sepulveda's note on 'perfectissima cuiusque ratio,' p. 77 b), 'it is clear that the most exact definition of the virtue of each will be special to the man.' As to *λόγος*, 'definition,' see Bon. Ind. 434 b 6 sqq., where it is pointed out that *λόγος* is sometimes used in a wider sense than *ὁρισμός*, and as to the contrast of *ἴδιος* and *κοινὸς λόγος*, see Bon. Ind. 339 a 55 and vol. i. p. 242 note.

**25.** *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμόσει πᾶσιν.* The phrase recurs in De An. 2. 3. 414 b 22, *γένοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ' οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος.* *Ὁμοίως δέ*, 'but equally.'

**26.** *ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Plato, Laws 961 E, *ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν νηῒ κυβερνήτης ἅμα καὶ ναῦται τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῷ κυβερνητικῷ νῷ συγκερασάμενοι σώζουσιν αὑτούς τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ναῦν;* and Demosth. Phil. 3. c. 69, *ἕως ἂν σώζηται τὸ σκάφος . . . τότε χρὴ καὶ ναύτην καὶ κυβερνήτην καὶ πάντ' ἄνδρα ἐξῆς προθύμους εἶναι, καὶ ὅπως μήθ' ἑκὼν μήτ' ἄκων μηδεὶς ἀνατρέψῃ, τοῦτο σκοπεῖσθαι.* Giph. refers to Cic. Epist. Ad Fam. 12. 25. 5.

**28.** *ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία.* Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 19 sqq. 'The safeguarding of the association' seems hardly to answer to 'the safeguarding of the voyage'; we expect rather 'the safeguarding of the successful working of the State'; and though the *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία* is often, as here, identified with the *πολιτεία* (compare for instance 2. 1. 1260 b 27 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 35), the *πόλις* is more usually said to be the *κοινωνία* (e.g. in c. 3. 1276 b 1). For the structure of the sentence, in which (with Stahr, Bern., Sus., and others) I take *κοινωνία* to be the subject and *ἡ πολιτεία* the predicate, cp. c. 6. 1278 b 10,

*κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία*: c. 7. 1279 a 25 sqq.: and c. 13. 1283 b 41, *πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν· πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ.* See also note on 1275 a 22.

**33.** *τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα κ.τ.λ.* Supply *ἀγαθόν* with *εἶναι*: cp. 35, *τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ*. Compare the line of an unknown elegiac poet quoted in Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 34,

*ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί,*

and Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1237 a 30, *ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος*: also Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3, *τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν. Τελεία ἀρετή* in the passage before us probably means *ἀρετὴ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα*. It turns out, indeed, on further investigation (1277 b 18 sqq.), that the virtue of the good man is not strictly one, but has two forms, the virtue of the ruler and the virtue of the ruled. As to *φαμέν*, see below on 1277 a 14.

**34.** *μὲν οὖν* is answered by *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά*, 36, as in 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 4 sqq. (Sus.[1] Ind. Gramm. s. v. *Μέν*), and also in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.

**36.** *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.*, 'not but that it is possible in another way also to go over the same argument in reference to the best constitution by raising questions and debating them.' 'In another way,' because hitherto the best constitution has not been made the subject of the inquiry. For *ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον*, cp. Phys. 8. 5. 256 a 21 (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 267 a 39), *ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον ἔστιν ἐπελθεῖν*. Lamb. translates, 'veruntamen etiam alio modo eandem rationem pertractare et persequi licet de optima reipublicae administrandae forma dubitantibus': thus he seems to take *διαποροῦντας* with *περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας* (as do apparently Stahr and Bernays), but not, I think, rightly. *Διαποροῦντας* (here = *διερχομένους τὰς ἀπορίας*, Bon. Ind. 187 b 11) is added to indicate to us the mode of investigation which Aristotle is about to adopt. That Aristotle 'goes over the same argument' we shall see if we bear in mind that he has just shown that the good citizen will not necessarily be a good man under any and every constitution, and now goes on to show that this is true of the best constitution also. For *κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον* cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 10 and 2. 8. 1269 a 13, and (with Bonitz, Ind. 772 b 19) Meteor. 1. 3. 340 a 15.

**37.** *εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 'for if it is impossible that a State should consist of members all of whom are good, and yet each member

must discharge his function well, and this proceeds from virtue, [so that, though all will not be good, all will possess virtue, i.e. the virtue of the citizen,] still, as it is impossible that all the citizens should be alike, there would not be one form of virtue belonging to the good citizen and to the good man; for the virtue of the good citizen ought to belong to all (for it is necessarily only in that way that the State will come to be the best State), but the virtue of the good man cannot possibly belong to all, unless all the citizens in the good State must necessarily be good, [which we have declared to be impossible].' It is implied that the citizens will not be alike if they all possess the virtue of a citizen, but that they will, if they possess in addition the virtue of a good man. The virtue of the good man is one, whereas the virtue of the good citizen varies with the function discharged. Compare 2. 2. 1261 a 24, *οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων*, a doctrine which may also be traced in 3. 12. 1283 a 18 sq. and 3. 11. 1281 b 34 sqq., and indeed in Fragm. 21 of the Aeolus of Euripides,

*δοκεῖτ' ἂν οἰκεῖν γαῖαν, εἰ πένης ἅπας*
*λαὸς πολιτεύοιτο πλουσίων ἄτερ;*
*οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά,*
*ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥστ' ἔχειν καλῶς,*

where Euripides perhaps has before him Heraclitus' doctrine of the harmony of contraries. But is it Aristotle's view that the citizens of the 'best State' cannot all be good men? This does not seem to be his view in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq., where we are told that all the citizens of the 'best State' will be good men (compare 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 9, where it appears to be implied that there may be States in which all the citizens are good men). Either we must admit a discrepancy between the passage before us and these passages and leave it unexplained, or we may seek to explain it by saying (with Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 209, note 2: see my first volume, p. 236, note 2) that the passage before us is merely aporetic, or by supposing that the word 'citizen' is used in the passage before us (as seems sometimes to be the case, see vol. i. Appendix B) in a wider sense than in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.

**39.** *ἀπ' ἀρετῆς*, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 12 and Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 22 sqq.

1277 a. **5.** *ἔτι κ.τ.λ.* This is a further thrust. In 1276 b 37–1277 a 5 it has been argued that though all the citizens of the best State will

be good citizens, they will not all be good men, but now it is argued that they will not all be good citizens in the same way —one will be a good citizen in the way in which a ruler is a good citizen, and another a good citizen in the way in which a ruled person is a good citizen—and thus the virtue of all the citizens will not be the same, so that if the various forms of the virtue of the citizen are not identical with each other, they cannot all be identical with the virtue of the good man. This argument leads directly up to what follows in 1277 a 12 sqq., and I cannot agree with Susemihl that it ought to be bracketed as an interpolation. I did not see the relation in which 1277 a 5–12 stands to 1276 b 37–1277 a 5 so clearly when I wrote vol. i. p. 236 as I do now. See also Prof. J. A. Stewart's remarks in defence of the genuineness of 1277 a 5–12 in *Class. Rev.* 9. 456.

**8. κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου.** Bernays brackets *κτῆσις*, and I do not feel sure that he is wrong. If we retain the word, Aristotle's meaning will apparently be that ownership of property consists of master and slave, or in other words implies the existence of an owner and a slave. Surely, however, ownership implies the existence of *things* owned as well as of *persons* owned?

**9. ἄλλων ἀνομοίων εἰδῶν,** such as ruling and ruled citizens, and soldiers in contrast with deliberators and judges.

**11. ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου.** As the tragic chorus marched into the theatre in its five ranks and three files (see above on 1276 b 4), its left-hand file was turned to the audience and its right-hand file to the stage; the left-hand file was consequently the most conspicuous of the three files. The *κορυφαῖος* was third in this file, the two *παραστάται* second and fourth, and the two *τριτοστάται* (Metaph. Δ. 11. 1018 b 27) first and fifth. See on this subject C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 206 sq. (A. Müller, Die gr. Bühnenalt.). For the absence of the article before *κορυφαίου* see note on 1285 b 12.

**12. διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἁπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή,** sc. *ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου*, for here the question raised in 1276 b 17 receives an answer.

**13. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἔσται τινὸς κ.τ.λ.,** 'but will not the virtue of the good citizen and the good man be the same in a particular citizen?' By *τινός* is evidently meant *ἄρχοντος*, cp. 20 sqq. For the absence of the article before *ἀρετή*, see note on 1276 b 5.

**14. φαμὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ.,** 'we say that a good ruler (of any kind) is

good and prudent, and the man who is capable of ruling a State (1278 b 3 sqq.) must necessarily be prudent.' To be *ἀγαθός* is not the same thing as to be *φρόνιμος* (cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 a 14, *ὁ μᾶλλον ἂν ἕλοιτο ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ*), though one cannot be *φρόνιμος* without being *ἀγαθός* (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 36), or indeed really *ἀγαθός* without being *φρόνιμος* (1144 b 16, 31). Cp. c. 11. 1281 b 4, *ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως*. As to *δή*, see note on 1252 a 24. *Φαμέν* seems to be used by Aristotle when he recalls some well-known principle of his philosophy (as in 1. 2. 1253 a 9, *οὐδὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ*), or repeats what he has already said in the same treatise (as in 3. 18. 1288 a 32) or in another (as in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7, *φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς*), or gives utterance to some generally accepted view. *Φαμέν* may here possibly refer to 1. 13. 1260 a 17, *διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν* (i. e. *μετὰ φρονήσεως*, see note on this passage), where the head of a household is referred to, but the view was a commonly accepted one (Xen. Hipparch. 7. 1, *παντὶ μὲν οὖν προσήκει ἄρχοντι φρονίμῳ εἶναι*, where the rule is applied to generals of cavalry: Plato, Rep. 433 C: Isocr. De Antid. § 71: Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 22). If every ruler needs to be *φρόνιμος*, the ruler of a State does so especially; indeed we are told in Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 23 that *πολιτικὴ* and *φρόνησις* are the same habit. Cp. Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 22, *ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Βάττον . . . εἰς Λιβύην ἔπεμψαν οἰκιστήν, ὅτι τραυλὸς μὲν ἦν καὶ ἰσχνόφωνος, βασιλικὸς δὲ καὶ πολιτικὸς καὶ φρόνιμος*.

16. **καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς κ.τ.λ.**, 'and indeed the very education of a ruler some make out to be different (from that of a ruled person),' i. e. not only his virtue, but the training by which it is imparted; or possibly not only the virtue of the fully-developed ruler, but his very education, which begins in childhood and is the first step in his development. Aristotle quite agrees that if the rulers are to be throughout life different from the ruled, their education will be different (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq.), but the rulers of his best State, unless it takes the form of an Absolute Kingship, will be ruled first and rulers afterwards (1332 b 25 sqq.).

17. **ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται κ.τ.λ.**, 'as in fact we see that the sons of kings are taught riding and the art of war.' For *καὶ φαίνονται*, see note on 1262 a 18. Compare Plut. De Adul. et Amic. c. 16, *Καρνεάδης δὲ ἔλεγεν ὅτι πλουσίων καὶ βασιλέων παῖδες ἱππεύειν μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εὖ καὶ καλῶς μανθάνουσι*: Strabo p. 730, *μέμνηται δ' Ὀνησίκριτος καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ Δαρείου τάφῳ γράμμα τόδε, "φίλος ἦν τοῖς*

*φίλοις· ἱππεὺς καὶ τοξότης ἄριστος ἐγενόμην· κυνηγῶν ἐκράτουν· πάντα ποιεῖν ἠδυνάμην*": Plut. Pyrrh. c. 8, *καὶ ὅλως τοῦτο* (strategy) *μελετῶν ἔοικε καὶ φιλοσοφῶν ἀεὶ διατελεῖν ὁ Πύρρος, ὡς μαθημάτων βασιλικώτατον κ.τ.λ.* The sons of the great at Athens were trained in riding (Isocr. Areopag. § 45: Plato, Meno 93 D, 94 B), but not Greek boys in general, as would seem from the passage before us and from 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 23 sqq.; Persian boys, on the contrary, were taught to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth (Hdt. 1. 136).

**19. καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ κ.τ.λ.** Occasionally (here for instance and in 1. 13. 1260 a 29), but not always (see 1. 6. 1255 a 36), Aristotle ascribes to the dramatic poet himself a saying placed by him in the mouth of one of his characters. The fragment before us is from the Aeolus and is preserved in a completer form by Stobaeus, Floril. 45. 13 (Eurip. Fragm. 16 Nauck),

*λαμπροὶ δ' ἐν αἰχμαῖς Ἄρεος ἔν τε συλλόγοις*
*μή μοι τὰ κομψὰ ποικίλοι γενοίατο,*
*ἀλλ' ὧν πόλει δεῖ, μεγάλα βουλεύοιντ' ἀεί.*

The lines are no doubt spoken by King Aeolus and relate to the princes his sons. Thus they are quite to the point. In *τὰ κομψά* Euripides probably has in view the varied subtleties which had been introduced into Greek education in the days which followed the repulse of the Persian invasion (5 (8). 6. 1341 a 28 sqq.), whether connected with musical art or with such subjects as geometry and astronomy (for in Xen. Mem. 4. 7 Socrates thinks it necessary to prescribe limits to these studies) and dialectic and philosophy. See note on 1337 a 39. Mr. Richards compares Thuc. 1. 84. 5, *μὴ τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες, τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ ἐπεξιέναι.* In *ὧν πόλει δεῖ κ.τ.λ.* Euripides is thinking partly of prowess in arms, cp. Probl. 27. 5. 948 a 31 sqq.: Eurip. Suppl. 855 Bothe, 881 Dindorf,

*ὁ δ' αὖ τρίτος τῶνδ' Ἱπομέδων τοιόσδ' ἔφυ·*
*παῖς ὢν ἐτόλμησ' εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὰς*
*Μουσῶν τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μαλθακὸν βίου,*
*ἀγροὺς δὲ ναίων, σκληρὰ τῇ φύσει διδοὺς*
*ἔχαιρε πρὸς τἀνδρεῖον, εἴς τ' ἄγρας ἰὼν*
*ἵπποις τε χαίρων, τόξα τ' ἐντείνων χεροῖν,*
*πόλει παρασχεῖν σῶμα χρήσιμον θέλων,*

Eurip. Fragm. 284. 16 sqq., 362. 25 sqq., and a fragment of the Phaedo or Phaedrias of Alexis (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 497),

*μάχιμος γὰρ ἀνήρ, χρήσιμος δὲ τῇ πόλει.*

Compare also Antiphon, Tetral. 2. 2. 3, *ἐδόκουν μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε ταῦτα παιδεύων τὸν υἱὸν ἐξ ὧν μάλιστα τὸ κοινὸν ὠφελεῖται, ἀμφοῖν τι ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν ἀποβήσεσθαι*, where teaching boys how to hurl the dart is referred to. But Euripides probably has especially before him the teaching of Protagoras of Abdera, who claims in Plato, Protag. 318 D sqq. that he does not, like Hippias of Elis, carry boys back to the arts from which they have just escaped and make them study calculation, astronomy, geometry, and music, but teaches *εὐβουλία περί τε τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν*. Cp. Gorg. 491 A sq., where Callicles expresses similar views.

**20.** **ἄρχοντος παιδείαν.** Cp. 2. 11. 1273 a 31, *ἁμάρτημα νομοθέτου*.

**ἀρετή**, not *ἡ ἀρετή*, see note on 1276 b 5.

**23.** **τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου.** See note on 1276 a 28.

**24.** **καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ.** *Διὰ τοῦτο*, because the virtue of a citizen is different from that of a ruler, a citizen having, at any rate occasionally, to become a private man, a part which Jason did not know how to play. The first question which arises as to this saying of Jason's is as to the meaning of *ὅτε μή* here. *Ὅτε μή* is used with the optative in Hom. Il. 13. 319 and 14. 247 sq., etc. and Odyss. 16. 197 in the sense of 'unless,' or, according to Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 512. 4 b, 'except when,' and Bern. and Sus. render it 'unless' in the passage before us (Bern. 'er habe nichts zu essen, wenn er nicht Tyrann sei': Sus.[4], 'he must starve if he were not on the throne'). But if *ὅτε μή* meant 'unless' here, should we not have had *πεινῆν ἄν* rather than *πεινῆν*? I incline, therefore, to translate *πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ* either 'he was a starving man except when he was tyrant' or (as Mr. Welldon) 'he was a starving man whenever he was not tyrant' (cp. Thuc. 2. 15. 2, *ὁπότε μή τι δείσειαν*). The second of these two renderings is open to the objection that it implies that Jason was more than once tyrant of Pherae and that his tenure of the tyranny was not continuous, a fact which we do not learn elsewhere, and as the first is less open to this objection and also has the merit of giving the same meaning to *ὅτε μή* in the passage before us as it bears in Homer, perhaps it is to be preferred. A further question is whether Jason meant by *πεινῆν* literal starvation (his ignorance of the art of being a private man making it impossible for him to maintain himself in that capacity), or starvation in a metaphorical sense (compare such expressions as 'auri sacra fames'). I incline to

the latter view. A man who does not possess the virtue of an *ἀρχόμενος* is not thereby incapacitated for earning a living as a ruled person; he is only incapacitated for *τὸ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς*. As to Jason see vol. i. p. 237, note 1. Isocrates (Philip. § 65) describes Dionysius the Elder as 'desiring monarchy in an irrational and frenzied way.' 'The Venetian chronicler says of Giovanni Frangipane,' who had resigned the position of Count of Veglia and had retired to Venice, '"He was no more able to live in a free city than night can abide the rising of the sun"' (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 3. 135).

**ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ.** '*Ὅτε μή* is always found in the best authors with the optative' (Liddell and Scott s.v. *ὅτε*).

**25. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖταί γε κ.τ.λ.** *Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε*, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. *Ἐπαινεῖται*, 'id est, virtus est: habitus enim laudabiles virtutes vocamus, ut ipse ait in fine libri primi Ethicorum' (Sepulveda, who here refers to Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 9, *τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν*). Compare also Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 1 and 2. 7. 1108 a 31, *ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων*. Thus the transition from *ἐπαινεῖται*, 25, to *ἡ ἀρετή*, 26, is an easy one. Agesilaus was praised for knowing both how to rule and how to be ruled (e.g. in Xen. Ages. 2. 16); Lysander, on the other hand, is described by Plutarch (Lysand. c. 20) as *τὸν οἴκοι ζυγὸν οὐ φέρων οὐδ' ὑπομένων ἄρχεσθαι*. Plato had said (Laws 942 C), *τοῦτο καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ μελετητέον εὐθὺς ἐκ τῶν παίδων, ἄρχειν τε ἄλλων ἄρχεσθαί θ' ὑφ' ἑτέρων*.

**26. καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου (δοκεῖ) ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς.** Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Laws 643 E, *τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης*. *Δόκιμος* takes the place of *τέλεος* and *καλῶς* of *μετὰ δίκης*. As to the insertion of *δοκεῖ* see critical note.

**28. τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἄμφω**, i.e. *τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς*.

**29. οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως.** *Ἄμφω*, the two aptitudes just referred to. Aristotle hints that the citizen must in fact possess two different kinds of virtue unequal in praiseworthiness (see vol. i. p. 237). He here anticipates the conclusion which he is slowly approaching. So Sepulveda, who has a note on 'Non eodem modo utrumque laudabitur,'—'non erit eadem virtus.'

**ἐπεὶ οὖν . . . 32. κατίδοι τις.** 'Since then it is occasionally held that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things and not the same, and that the citizen [who is both ruler and ruled] should understand both and share in both, one may see at a glance the further course of the inquiry.' The next step in it is to point out that the citizen should not learn the work of all kinds of ruled persons. Armed with this principle, we are able to reconcile the two contradictory views. Aristotle here, as often elsewhere, sets two conflicting opinions side by side and brings them into collision, in order to show that each contains an element of truth. One view is that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things; the other is that the citizen, who is in part a ruler, should learn both how to rule and how to be ruled, or in other words should learn the same things as the ruled. Both of these views are partly true. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens, and therefore the citizen, should not learn the work of unfreely ruled persons. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn the same things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens should learn to be ruled as a freeman is ruled. Thus the truth lies midway, Aristotle thinks, between the two opinions. For *τοὐντεῦθεν*, cp. c. 5. 1278 a 13, *ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις*, and Plato, Symp. 217 E, *μέχρι μὲν οὖν δὴ δεῦρο τοῦ λόγου καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ πρὸς ὀντινοῦν λέγειν, τὸ δ' ἐντεῦθεν κ.τ.λ.* In Polit. 271 B, *τὸ γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν, οἶμαι, χρὴ ξυννοεῖν· ἐχόμενον γάρ ἐστι κ.τ.λ.*, it is explained by *ἐχόμενον* (as in Aristoph. Eq. 131 sq. Didot by *μετὰ τοῦτον*): cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 6. 1223 a 1 sq.

**31. ἀμφότερ' ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν.** This reversal in the order of words (a kind of Chiasmus) is not uncommon in the Politics. Compare for instance c. 14. 1285 b 30, *ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη*: 1. 1. 1252 a 4, *μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἢ πασῶν κυριωτάτη*: 3. 6. 1278 b 11, *λέγω δ' οἷον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι τοὐναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις*: 3. 11. 1281 b 11 sq.: 3. 17. 1288 a 3 sq.: 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 18, *ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι τὸν μὲν ζέφυρον τοῦ βορέου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὖρον*: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19–21: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 22 sq. See Kaibel, Stil und Text der *Πολιτεία Ἀθηναίων* des Aristoteles, p. 100, for similar instances from that work. The occasional occurrence in the Politics of this studied arrangement of words affords an argument

against the view that it is a pupil's hasty report of Aristotle's lectures.

**33.** ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τἀναγκαῖα λέγομεν, 'and by this we mean the kind of rule which obtains in connexion with necessary services.' Τἀναγκαῖα = τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἔργα, cp. τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν in 2. 9. 1269 a 35. Λέγομεν, in much the same sense as λέγω, 36, though perhaps the 'we' in λέγομεν is the 'we' of a teacher (cp. c. 1. 1275 b 3, 19). The term δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή is not always used by Aristotle in the sense of 'the rule which obtains in connexion with necessary services'; it is not, for instance, in 3. 14. 1285 a 22. It should be noticed that by explaining δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή as ἡ περὶ τἀναγκαῖα ἀρχή Aristotle is enabled to represent even freemen who do necessary work (e.g. βάναυσοι) as subject to δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή, and not merely absolute slaves.

**34.** ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον. In the case of δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή the ruler does not need to know how to do the things that the ruled do, but only how to use their services. Hence in this form of rule he does not need to learn how to be ruled in order to learn how to rule; he does not need to be a slave first in order to be a good master. In the case of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή, on the other hand, the ruler *does* need to know how to do what the ruled does, or in other words how to be ruled, for it is thus that he learns to be a good ruler. In δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή all that the ruler needs to know is how to use the services of slaves, and even this he hardly needs to know, for this knowledge has nothing exalted about it (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 24 sqq.: 1. 7. 1255 b 33 sqq.), and a master may dispense with it by employing a steward (1. 7. 1255 b 35 sqq.). But if in δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή the ruler does not need to know how to do the things that slaves do, still less does he need to be able to do them for another. Doing them for another stands on a far lower level than merely doing them and is fit only for slaves (cp. 1277 b 5 and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.).

**37.** δούλου δ' εἴδη πλείω λέγομεν. Δούλου takes up ἀνδραποδῶδες, 35. Aristotle adds this in order to show that he regards as ἀνδραποδῶδες, not only the work of actual slaves, but also that of βάναυσοι τεχνῖται and χερνῆτες generally. Λέγομεν is probably here used in the same sense as in 34, not in that in which it is used in c. 3. 1276 b 9, where it seems to mean 'men commonly say.' The βάναυσος τεχνίτης and the θής are implied to be closely allied to

the slave in 1. 13. 1260a 40 sqq.: 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 21: 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 13.

38. ὧν κ.τ.λ. Ὧν refers to τῶν ἐργασιῶν according to Bonitz, Ind. 377 a 7. For ἓν μέρος κατέχουσιν, he (ibid.) compares 6 (4). 8. 1294a 17 sqq. Χερνής is a rare, and apparently a poetical, word: χειροτέχνης is the equivalent word in Attic prose.

οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κ.τ.λ. Montecatino's conjecture of αὐτῶν or αὐτό for αὐτούς is a tempting one (Richards would read αὐτοῖς), and one or other of these emendations may well be right, but it is also possible that as εἰσίν immediately precedes, we are intended to supply εἶναι from it with αὐτούς, for Aristotle often omits εἶναι when it can readily be supplied from a neighbouring εἶναι, ἐστιν, or εἰσιν, e. g. in 2. 12. 1273 b 40, 3. 4. 1276 b 20 sq., 1277 b 26 sq., 3. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq., 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sq., and 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 17 sq.; indeed, he sometimes omits it where this is not the case (see notes on 1260 a 14 and 1327 a 34, and Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7). Bonitz (Ind. s.v. σημαίνειν) compares Phys. 4. 7. 213 b 30, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ποτέρως ἔχει δεῖ λαβεῖν τί σημαίνει τοὔνομα. As to the derivation of χερνής see Liddell and Scott s.v. To live by manual labour allied a man to the class of slaves (1. 11. 1258 b 38: 1. 5. 1254 b 17 sqq.: 1. 13. 1259 b 25).

1277 b. 1. ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἐστίν. Cp. Solon, Fragm. 13. 49,

ἄλλος Ἀθηναίης τε καὶ Ἡφαίστου πολυτέχνεω
ἔργα δαεὶς χειροῖν συλλέγεται βίοτον.

In the passage before us βάναυσοι τεχνῖται are included under χερνῆτες, whereas in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18–25 τὸ χερνητικόν is distinguished from τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας. Aristotle speaks of ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης, not simply ὁ τεχνίτης, because not all τεχνῖται are χερνῆτες. In Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 6 sqq. physicians and generals appear to be included under τεχνῖται. He sometimes, however, uses the word τεχνίτης 'ad significandos opifices' (see Bon. Ind. s. v. τεχνίτης).

διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. Διό, because they are slaves (cp. c. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq.). Kaissling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 72) remarks that the use of πρίν here with an infinitive after a negative principal clause is contrary to the general rule. In παρ' ἐνίοις Aristotle probably refers especially to Athens. If so, it would seem that handicraftsmen were excluded from office at Athens not only in the early days when it was confined to Eupatridae (Plut. Thes. c. 25: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 8), but even down to the time when the

'ultimate democracy' was introduced (the time of Pericles or later). According to the *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, c. 13, however, the board of ten archons appointed in the year after the archonship of Damasias included two demiurgi. Was Aristotle aware of this? That the fourth and lowest of the property-classes, *τὸ θητικόν*, was excluded by Solon from office is well known (2. 12. 1274 a 21: Plut. Solon c. 18). Did handicraftsmen belong to this class under Solon's legislation, even if they owned land enough to place them in one or other of the three higher classes? At Ragusa the artisans 'had no voice at all in the government, and were not admissible to any office' (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 309).

**3.** *τὰ μὲν οὖν* κ.τ.λ. *Μὲν οὖν* here, as in 2. 9. 1270 b 17 and elsewhere, is answered by *ἀλλά* (7). Sus. brackets *τὸν ἀγαθόν*, and it is true that the question with which we have been concerned from 1277 a 29 onwards has been what the citizen and ruler should learn, not what the good man should learn. But the capability of rendering to another servile service has been said to be *ἀνδραποδῶδες* in 1277 a 35, and as the opposite of *ὁ ἀνδραποδώδης* is *ὁ ἐπιεικής* (Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 17 sqq.: cp. 10. 6. 1177 a 6 sqq.), Aristotle's first thought is that this capability is not one which should be acquired by *ὁ ἀγαθός*, his next that it should not be acquired by *ὁ πολιτικός* (who is *φρόνιμος*, 1277 a 15, and therefore *ἀγαθός*), and his next that it should not be acquired by the good citizen. Compare the story of the captive Spartan youth in Plut. Apophth. Lac. Obscur. Vir. § 35, 234 B, who replied *Οὐ δουλεύσω*, when a specially humiliating service was demanded of him.

**5.** *εἰ μή ποτε* κ.τ.λ., 'except occasionally to satisfy some need arising for him in relation to himself, for then it no longer happens that the one party (the party to whom the service is rendered) comes to be a master and the other (the party who renders the service) a slave.' A man who learns to do servile work for himself does not learn to do it for a master, and it is to the good man or good citizen learning to become a slave and to serve a master that Aristotle objects. 'Si quis usus sui gratia sordidum opificium discat, ut Alfonsus dux Ferrariensis, qui singulari industria et artificio aenea tormenta bellica conficere sciebat, is, quia sibi, non alteri, servit, non debet servus more artificum appellari' (Sepulveda). So Bern., 'ausser etwa für seinen persönlichen Bedarf, weil in diesem Falle das Herrn- und Sclavenverhältniss

nicht mehr stattfindet.' Vict., however, explains *οὐ γὰρ—δοῦλον* otherwise, 'si deberet qui regit haec discere, futurum esse ut distingui non possit servus ab ero,' and so Mr. Welldon, who translates, 'else the relation of master and slave ceases to exist,' and Mr. Richards, 'a citizen should not be thoroughly familiar with the *ἔργα* of a slave, for then the difference between a master and a slave vanishes.' I prefer the interpretation of Sepulveda and Bernays. *Αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν* (a phrase recurring in 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 12 and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 13) is to be taken with *χρείας χάριν*: cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 10, *ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὑτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς.* For *χρείας χάριν*, cp. Thuc. 1. 136. 6, *καὶ ἅμα αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκείνῳ χρείας τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὸ σῶμα σώζεσθαι ἐναντιωθῆναι.* For the thought, see note on 1337 b 19, and cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31, *καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν*: also Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 15, *ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἀντισθένους μνημονευόμενον· θαυμάσαντος γάρ τινος εἰ δι' ἀγορᾶς αὐτὸς φέρει τάριχον, Ἐμαυτῷ γε, εἶπεν· ἐγὼ δ' ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας εἰ κεράμῳ παρέστηκα διαμετρουμένῳ . . . Οὐκ ἐμαυτῷ γε φημὶ ταῦτ' οἰκονομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῇ πατρίδι*, where Plutarch makes a notable advance on the older view. It should be noticed that Aristotle's language in the passage before us is carefully guarded; the doing of menial work, even for one's own behoof, is only permitted if it is occasional, not habitual, and in satisfaction of a need.

7. **ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ.**, 'but there is a kind of rule which men exercise over those like themselves in birth and free, for it is of this nature that we say the political rule (the rule which obtains between citizens) is, which [unlike the rule over slaves] the ruler *ought* to learn while being ruled.' *Ἄρχει*, sc. *ὁ ἄρχων*. That political rule is exercised over men free and equal, we see from 1. 7. 1255 b 20. Citizens are alike in birth, even though some of them are more nobly born than others, but kings are superior in birth to those over whom they rule (3. 13. 1284 a 11 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12), and the master of a slave is of course superior in birth to his slave. When Aristotle says in 1. 12. 1259 b 15 that the king is the same *τῷ γένει* as those over whom he rules, he probably means 'in race.' Pericles was already familiar with the contrast between rule over freemen and other kinds of rule (cp. Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 17, where we read that he said to himself, *ἀναλαμβάνων τὴν χλαμύδα, Πρόσεχε, Περίκλεις· ἐλευθέρων ἄρχεις,*

Ἑλλήνων ἄρχεις, πολιτῶν Ἀθηναίων), and Lysander also, who said, when the Spartan harmost Callibius raised his staff to strike the athlete Autolycus, that 'he knew not how to rule over freemen' (Plut. Lysand. c. 15).

**10. στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα.** For the absence of *καί* before *στρατηγεῖν* see critical note on 1260 a 26, and cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 16, *μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας.* Καὶ *ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα* is added to show that one should not only have been under the command of a general before one becomes a general, for this might be said of a private soldier, but should have risen from the rank of a private to that of a lochagus, and from that rank to the rank of a taxiarch (compare the saying ascribed to the comic poet Crates by Aristophanes in Eq. 541 Didot, quoted above on 1276 b 22, and the principle underlying the *ordo magistratuum* at Rome). That the lochagus was subordinate to the taxiarch, we see from 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 1 sqq.: see also Liddell and Scott, s.v. *ταξίαρχος*.

**11. διὸ λέγεται κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle probably refers to a saying ascribed to Solon, *ἄρχε πρῶτον μαθὼν ἄρχεσθαι* (Diog. Laert. 1. 60), which Plato may have before him in Laws 762 E (quoted in vol. i. p. 238, note 1). Cp. also Cic. De Leg. 3. 2. 5 and M. Antonin. Comm. 11. 29. Καὶ *τοῦτο*, 'this also,' for Aristotle has already said that one should learn to rule freemen by being ruled, and now he goes further and says that it is not possible to rule them well without having been ruled. Alcibiades' experience of being ruled was probably far too short, for he figures as a leading statesman at Athens at a comparatively early age. Even good rulers have been thought to have lost somewhat through too rapid a rise in early life. Some traced Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's 'exceeding masterfulness' to this cause. 'He was pushed up the easiest possible incline to almost the top of the ladder of diplomatic rank before he was twenty-four' (S. Lane-Poole, Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 1. 80).

**13. τούτων δὲ ἀρετῇ μὲν ἑτέρα κ.τ.λ.** *Τούτων*, i. e. *τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀρχομένου τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχήν.* Cp. 1. 13. 1259 b 32 sqq. Μέν, 'while,' as often elsewhere.

**14. ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι.** *Δύνασθαι* is a wider term than *ἐπίστασθαι*: knowledge is only one of the conditions of capability. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 2. 25, *εἰσὶ δέ τινες τῶν Χαλδαίων οἱ ληζόμενοι ζῶσι*

*καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπίσταιντο ἐργάζεσθαι οὔτ' ἂν δύναιντο, εἰθισμένοι ἀπὸ πολέμου βιοτεύειν.*

15. **ἀρετή.** For the absence of the article before *ἀρετή* see note on 1253 b 11.

16. **ἐπ' ἀμφότερα,** 'on both sides,' i.e. both as ruler and as ruled: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1143 a 35, *καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα,* and Plut. Lycurg. c. 18, *ἐκοινώνουν δὲ οἱ ἐρασταὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῆς δόξης ἐπ' ἀμφότερα* (i.e. both when their repute was bad and when it was good).

**καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω,** i.e. *τὸ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχήν.* Thus Aristotle's 'best State,' which is composed of *σπουδαῖοι* (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.), is also composed of men who have learnt to rule well by being ruled (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 2) and who interchange ruling and being ruled (1332 b 25 sqq.). As to *καὶ . . . δή* see above on 1253 a 18.

17. **καὶ εἰ κ.τ.λ.,** 'and if the temperance and justice appropriate to a ruler differ in kind [from the temperance and justice appropriate to a person ruled but free], for the temperance and justice of a person ruled but free are also different in kind [from those of a ruler], it is clear that the good man's virtue, for instance his justice, will be of two kinds,' [for the good man must have the virtue which fits him to rule and also the virtue which fits him to be ruled.] That the virtue of the ruler is different in kind from that of the ruled we have seen in 1. 13. 1259 b 32–1260 a 24, a passage with which that before us is nearly connected. For the suppression in 17 of 'from the temperance and justice appropriate to a person ruled but free,' cp. 1277 a 16, *καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος,* where 'from that of the ruled' is suppressed, and [Plut.] Consol. ad Apollonium, c. 23, *ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι ὁ ἄωρος θάνατος, ὡς πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει* (sc. *τοῦ ὡραίου*). For the ellipse in *καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δέ* see the examples collected by Bonitz, Ind. s.v. *γάρ* (146 a 50 sqq.), and especially Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 21, *περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν· τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων* (sc. *πολλοὶ ἁμαρτάνουσιν*) *ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.* So here with *καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δέ* we must supply *ἕτερόν ἐστιν εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης,* or possibly, as Mr. Richards suggests, *ἔστι σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνης.* For the absence of the article before *ἀρετή* in *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή,* see note on 1285 b 12, *τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις.* Aristotle had assumed for a moment in an aporetic

argument (1276 b 33) that the virtue of the good man is of one kind only, but he now arrives at a different conclusion. Plato had already so far distinguished the virtue of the ruler from that of the ruled as to say that *φρόνησις* exists only in the ruler (Rep. 433 C), but neither he nor Protagoras had drawn any distinction between the temperance and justice of the ruler and the same qualities in the ruled, when they said (Plato, Rep. 431 E–432 B, 433 D: Protag. 324 D–325 A) that justice and temperance should be possessed by all classes in the State. Aristotle's principle is that ruling differs in kind from being ruled, and that therefore the virtue of the ruler differs in kind from the virtue of the ruled (1. 13. 1259 b 37 sq.). I do not remember any other passage in Aristotle's writings in which this view is expressed with equal distinctness. He appears in what follows to connect the difference between the courage and temperance of the man and the woman with the more active and arduous nature of the functions of the man in household management.

**20.** καθ' ἃ, cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 13, *δύναμιν καθ' ἣν ἔσται πρακτικός.*

**ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ.** This has been already said in 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sqq., where we are told that these virtues in the man are *ἀρχικαί* and in the woman *ὑπηρετικαί.* In Poet. 15. 1454 a 22 we read *ἔστι γὰρ ἀνδρεῖον μὲν τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁρμόττον γυναικὶ τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι,* but $A^c$ has *τῶι* in place of the second *τό* with a blank space before it large enough for two letters, and Vahlen conjectures *οὕτως.* The article is absent before *σωφροσύνη* in *γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία,* just as it is often absent in similar sentences where *ὁ αὐτός* occurs: see above on 1276 b 5, 7, and 1277 a 13, and cp. 24, *ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός.*

**22.** καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγαθός. Looking to *δειλός,* 22, which is the opposite of *ἀνδρεῖος,* we might expect to find *ἀκόλαστος,* the opposite of *σώφρων,* in place of *λάλος,* and Susemihl on the strength of 'inhonesta' in Leonardus Aretinus' translation places *ἀκόλαστος* in his text, but *λάλος* is probably right. *Λάλος* is often opposed to *κόσμιος,* e.g. in Philem. *Ἀδελφοί,* Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 5),

*οὐκ, ἂν λαλῇ τις μικρόν, ἐστὶ κόσμιος,*
*οὐδ' ἂν πορεύηταί τις εἰς τὴν γῆν βλέπων·*
*ὁ δ' ἡλίκον μὲν ἡ φύσις φέρει λαλῶν,*
*μηδὲν ποιῶν δ' ἄσχημον, οὗτος κόσμιος.*

*Λάλος,* it is true, is found only in $\Pi^1$, but $\Pi^2$ (except $P^4$, which has

ἄλαλος) have ἄλλος, which is frequently found in MSS. as a misreading for λάλος (see for instance Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 858: 3. 567). L. Schmidt has shown (Ethik der alten Griechen, 1. 313) how nearly akin *κοσμιότης* is to *σωφροσύνη*. Compare with the passage before us Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 364 (Nauck),

*ἄλλος γυναικὸς κόσμος, ἄλλος ἀρσένων.*

**24. ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** For the transition here from *ἀρετή* to *οἰκονομία*, compare what Meno says in Plato, Meno 71 E, *εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σώζουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός*. Aristotle evidently has this passage before him, and probably also Xen. Oecon. 7. 25, *ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ φυλάττειν τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα τῇ γυναικὶ προσέταξε, γιγνώσκων ὁ θεὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὸ φυλάττειν οὐ κάκιόν ἐστι φοβερὰν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πλεῖον μέρος καὶ τοῦ φόβου ἐνέβαλε τῇ γυναικὶ ἢ τῷ ἀνδρί*. Compare also [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 26–1344 a 8. The account given there and in the passage before us of the household management of the man as being concerned with acquiring is, however, at issue with the usual teaching of Aristotle on the subject, which is that household management has to do with using: see above on 1256 a 11. To acquire is more difficult than to keep and demands a higher type of virtue (Demosth. Ol. 2. 26, *πολὺ γὰρ ῥᾷον ἔχοντας φυλάττειν ἢ κτήσασθαι πάντα πέφυκεν*: Dio Cass. Hist. Rom. 52. 18. 5, *καὶ μακρῷ τὸ φυλάξαι τι τοῦ κτήσασθαι ῥᾷόν ἐστι· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ τἀλλότρια προσποιήσασθαι καὶ πόνων καὶ κινδύνων δεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα σῶσαι βραχεῖα φρονήσεως ἀρκεῖ*).

**25. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη**, 'and moral prudence [is the only virtue which has not two kinds, for it] is the only virtue which is peculiar to the ruler.' This sentence is a continuation in a rough way of 18–21. The fem. form ἴδιος is used here, as in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 12 and De Part. An. 2. 7. 652 b 2, in all three cases before a word commencing with a vowel (see note on 1283 a 33). Bonitz (Ind. 472 b 44) gives a number of instances in which the word *μόνος* is placed at the end of a sentence, among them Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 20. As to the ruler's need of *φρόνησις* see above on 1277 a 14. It has been already said (above on 17) that Plato treats *φρόνησις* as peculiar to the ruler in Rep. 433 C, a passage which Aristotle also has before him when he ascribes *δόξα ἀληθής* to the ruled. Compare Timaeus 51 D sqq. and the contrast between ruler and ruled in Laws 734 E sq. Yet in Laws 632 C Plato speaks of instituting guardians of the laws, *τοὺς μὲν διὰ*

φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας, so that in the State of the Laws there were to be rulers without φρόνησις, armed only with true opinion (see as to this vol. i. pp. 437, 449). For the effect of 'true opinion respecting what is noble and just and good and the contrary' on the character of the members of a State, see Plato, Polit. 309 C sqq. Bonitz (Ind. 203 b 52) refers to Aristot. περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως 1. 450 a 15, διὸ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶν ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν ἢ φρόνησιν, where the distinction reappears.

**26.** ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἶναι see notes on 1260 a 14 and 1277 a 38.

**28.** ἀρχομένου δέ γε κ.τ.λ., 'but as to a person ruled, his virtue is not moral prudence but true opinion, for the ruled person is like a flute-maker, while the ruler is a flute-player, who uses what the flute-maker makes.' The reason assigned seems at first sight to be no reason at all, till we recall 1. 8. 1256 a 5 sqq. and 1. 10. 1258 a 21 sqq., where the art that makes is explained to be ministerial (ὑπηρετική) and subordinate to the art that uses. The ruled person is similarly ministerial to the ruler, and hence has a merely ministerial kind of virtue. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 13. 1246 b 11, ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ τῇ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρῆται. Compare also (with Sus.[2], Note 499) Plato, Rep. 601 D, οἷον αὐλητής που αὐλοποιῷ ἐξαγγελεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν, οἳ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσει, and (with Prof. Jowett) Cratyl. 388 sqq. (esp. 390 B sqq.). Γε in δέ γε qualifies ἀρχομένου: see Liddell and Scott s. v. γε *sub fin.*

**31.** καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα. The virtue of a good citizen has been shown to be the same as the virtue of the good man in the case of the citizen of the best State who is possessed of φρόνησις, or in other words who is capable of ruling. For πῶς, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 41 sqq.

**34.** ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The question raised here is probably suggested by the mention in c. 4. 1277 b 1 of the fact that in some States handicraftsmen had no share in office till the 'ultimate democracy' came into being. Cp. Polyb. 10. 17. 6, where οἱ πολιτικοί are distinguished from οἱ χειροτέχναι. But surely handicraftsmen even in those States shared in the ἀόριστος ἀρχή access to which, according to c. 1. 1275 a 30 sqq., suffices to make a man a citizen? Aristotle now seems to require that the citizen shall share not merely in ἀόριστος ἀρχή, but in ἀρχαί strictly so called **C. 5.**

(35 sqq.). He appears to hold that if a citizen does not do so, he cannot be said to possess the virtue of a citizen (36). Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of citizen-virtue results, in fact, in a change in his standard of citizenship; at any rate we are told in 1278 a 35 that *ὁ μάλιστα πολίτης* is to be found in *ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν*.

**37.** *τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν*, 'the virtue which we have ascribed to the citizen' (cp. 1278 a 9, *πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἣν εἴπομεν*), i. e. the virtue which fits men both to rule and to be ruled.

**οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης.** *Οὗτος*, i.e. *ᾧ μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν*. The addition of *οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης* seems unnecessary, but it is quite in Aristotle's manner: cp. c. 1. 1275 a 11, and the addition of *οἱ μὲν γὰρ θορυβὰ ἔχουσιν, οἱ δ' ὑστέρας* in De Gen. An. 3. 5. 755 b 20 sqq., and see notes on 1282 a 36 and b 39.

**38.** *ἐν τίνι μέρει θετέος ἕκαστος;* 'in what class are we to place the individual handicraftsman?' For *ἐν τίνι μέρει* see Liddell and Scott s. v. *μέρος*. Compare Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 23, *εἰ σκέψαισθ' ἐν τίνι τάξει ποτ' ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ οὗ τὸ ψήφισμα εἴρηται, πότερα ξένος ἢ μέτοικος ἢ πολίτης ἐστίν*.

**39.** *διά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον*, 'by reason of this statement at any rate,' i.e. the statement that *βάναυσοι* are not citizens nor metoeci nor aliens. Cp. Metaph. Λ. 10. 1075 a 25, *ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι*.

1278 a. **2.** *τῶν εἰρημένων*, i. e. citizens metoeci and aliens.

**τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθὲς κ.τ.λ.** The preceding sentence has pointed to the conclusion that *βάναυσοι* are not citizens, and *γάρ* introduces a justification of this conclusion. For the thought cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.

**4.** *οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες*, 'not even the children, [though they come nearer to being citizens than handicraftsmen do].' For what follows cp. c. 1. 1275 a 14 sqq. The sons of citizens are said to be citizens *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, because they are citizens not absolutely but 'on an assumption'—the assumption, namely, that they will become citizens when they grow older.

**6.** *ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις κ.τ.λ.* For the use of *μὲν οὖν* here see note on 1265 b 12. It is answered by *δέ*, 8. The sense is—'Nay, in ancient times the handicraftsmen *were* in some States slaves or aliens, but the best State will not go so far as to make them slaves, it will refuse to make them citizens' (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 33 sqq.). Handicraftsmen would be especially likely to be slaves in military States (Xen. Oecon. 4. 3, and Plut. Lycurg. et

Num. inter se comp. c. 2, *αὐστηρὰ δὲ ἡ Λυκούργειος (διάταξις) καὶ ἀριστοκρατική, τὰς μὲν βαναύσους ἀποκαθαίρουσα τέχνας εἰς οἰκετῶν καὶ μετοίκων χεῖρας, αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς πολίτας εἰς τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ τὸ δόρυ συνάγουσα*). In maritime and commercial States like Corinth, where handicraftsmen were less despised, there would be less eagerness to keep them outside the citizen-body. When Solon offered citizenship at Athens to persons immigrating with their families for the practice of a handicraft (Plut. Solon c. 24), he bade farewell to the old-fashioned policy of keeping handicraftsmen slaves and aliens, and aided in the creation of that numerous body of handicraftsmen, the existence of which made it possible for Themistocles a century later to build and equip a fleet (Diod. 11. 43. 3). That handicraftsmen were often strangers in early days is implied in Hom. Odyss. 17. 382 sqq., and it appears that the first makers of the peplos of Athena were two aliens, Aceseus of Patara and Helicon of Carystus (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 22), but, according to Büchsenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 321), we do not read in Homer of slaves employed in handicrafts.

**7. διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν.** That handicraftsmen were often aliens in Plato's day is implied in Laws 848 A, *τὸ δὲ τρίτον δημιουργοῖς τε καὶ πάντως τοῖς ξένοις.* Cp. also Andoc. ap. Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1007, where we read about Hyperbolus *ὡς δὲ ξένος ὢν καὶ βάρβαρος λυχνοποιεῖ*, and Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 31, *ἡμεῖς δ' ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ ταινίας πωλεῖν καὶ ζῆν οὐχ ὁντινα τρόπον βουλόμεθα· καὶ εἴ σοί ἐστι τοῦτο σημεῖον, ὦ Εὐβουλίδη, τοῦ μὴ Ἀθηναίους εἶναι ἡμᾶς κ.τ.λ.* Even at Athens most handicraftsmen may have been slaves or aliens as late as the time of Aristotle, though the Athenian citizen-body undoubtedly comprised a large number of *βάνανσοι*.

**9. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.** For this use of *ἀλλά* in the sense of 'at any rate' in an apodosis after a conditional clause introduced by *εἰ* or *ἐάν*, see Bon. Ind. 33 a 42 sqq., and cp. Phys. 8. 6. 258 b 32–259 a 4.

**10. λεκτέον οὐ πάντὸς κ.τ.λ.**, sc. *εἶναι*: see above on 1277 a 38.

**11. τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων κ.τ.λ.** The expression *τῶν ἀναγκαίων* presents much difficulty. It is possible that the word *ἀναγκαίων* has been repeated by a scribe's mistake from the preceding sentence and has displaced some other word (perhaps *ἄλλων*, which Bernays would read in place of it). Another possible view is Prof. Postgate's (Notes, p. 26), who construes *τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων* 'and with respect to necessary services,' but the sentence certainly reads as if *τῶν*

ἀναγκαίων were masculine. If we take it as masculine, we may translate 'the necessary people,' so termed in contradistinction to 'those who are quit of necessary services,' and compare 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 15, τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις βοσκήμασιν. It is thus that Lambinus appears to interpret τῶν ἀναγκαίων, for his rendering is 'eorum autem qui operibus et muneribus necessariis funguntur.' Τὰ τοιαῦτα = τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἔργα. In speaking of slaves as rendering services to an individual, Aristotle forgets the case of public slaves.

**12.** οἱ δὲ κοινῇ κ.τ.λ. Compare their name δημιουργοί.

**13.** ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις, 'starting from this point and carrying our investigation a little further.' So we have in Meteor. 1. 3. 340 b 14 δεῖ δὲ νοεῖν οὕτως καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρξαμένους. Ἐντεῦθεν should probably be taken, as Susemihl takes it, with μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις, and not with φανερόν, as Bernays, followed by Mr. Welldon, takes it.

**14.** αὐτῶν, i. e. βάναυσοι and θῆτες.

αὐτὸ γὰρ φανὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆλον, 'for that which has been said is enough by itself, when once made known, to render this manifest.' Aristotle probably refers in τὸ λεχθέν to what has been said in c. 1. 1275 a 38 sqq. For φανέν, cp. Plato, Gorg. 508 E, ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις οὕτω φανέντα, and Soph. O. T. 848,

ἀλλ' ὡς φανέν γε τοὔπος ὧδ' ἐπίστασο,

and Trachin. 1. Aristotle evidently has in his mind a familiar proverb αὐτὸ δείξει: cp. Plato, Protag. 324 A, εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐνθυμῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό σε διδάξει, ὅτι οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται παρασκευαστὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν: Critias 108 C, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οἷόν ἐστιν, αὐτό σοι τάχα δηλώσει: Hipp. Maj. 288 B: Eurip. Orest. 1101 Bothe, 1129 Dindorf,

εἶτ' αὐτὸ δηλοῖ τοὔργον, ἢ τείνειν χρεών:

Androm. 261 Bothe, 265 Dindorf (for other references to Euripides see Liddell and Scott s. v. σημαίνω 1. 2): Aristoph. Lysistr. 375 Didot: Cratin. Πυλαία, Fragm. 9 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 114). See also *Rhein. Mus.* 42. 400.

**16.** καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολίτου. Cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 3 sq.

**18.** οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 25 sqq. Ἣν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικήν, for ἀριστοκρατία in the truest sense of the word implies something more than the

award of office according to virtue; it implies a constitution under which all the citizens, or at any rate all the citizens capable of rule, are men of full excellence (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 31, *ἃς καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατίας.*

**20.** *κατ' ἀξίαν* is here associated with *κατ' ἀρετήν*, but we must not identify the two expressions. *Ἀξία*, as Hildenbrand has already pointed out (Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie 1. 294), attaches not only to virtue, but to property and to every other attribute which gives its possessor a special importance in relation to the life of the State. *Τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον* is commonly contrasted with *τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσον* (e.g. in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.), whence we infer that constitutions not based on *τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσον*, for instance oligarchy, are based in a sense on *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον*: indeed, democracy itself, though commonly represented as resting its claims on *τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσον* (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.), is sometimes implied to rest them on *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον* (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq.: cp. Pol. 3. 17. 1288 a 20 sqq.). Wealth, virtue, high birth, education, and even *ἐλευθερία*, confer *ἀξία* (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq.). That the wealthy, the well-born, and the free-born have a real, and not merely a fancied, claim on the score of *ἀξία*, results, I think, from Pol. 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq. Their claim, however, cannot compare with that of men superior in virtue (3. 9. 1281 a 4 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq.), and hence *κατ' ἀξίαν* is especially and most truly used in the Politics, as it is in the passage before us, of *ἀξία* conferred by virtue (see 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 15: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33).

**οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq.: also Xen. Oecon. 4. 3, *καὶ ἀσχολίας δὲ μάλιστα ἔχουσι καὶ φίλων καὶ πόλεως συνεπιμελεῖσθαι αἱ βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι (τέχναι)· ὥστε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσι κακοὶ καὶ φίλοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ταῖς πατρίσιν ἀλεξητῆρες εἶναι.*

**22.** *μέν*, 'while,' as often elsewhere.

**23. ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν κ.τ.λ.** Not so, however, surely in the first kind of Oligarchy (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39–b 2). For *τιμημάτων μακρῶν* cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 1 and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 4: also 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 16 and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11.

**24. πλουτοῦσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle perhaps has in his mind Hom. Odyss. 17. 386, where *δημιοεργοί* are referred to,

> *οὗτοι γὰρ κλητοί γε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν,*
> *πτωχὸν δ' οὐκ ἄν τις καλέοι τρύξοντα ἑ αὐτόν.*

Still Plato (Rep. 406 C) contrasts *οἱ δημιουργοί* with *οἱ πλούσιοί τε καὶ εὐδαίμονες δοκοῦντες εἶναι*. *Καί* intensifies *οἱ πολλοί*, 'quite the majority.' See Stallbaum's notes on Plato, Rep. 562 C and Laws 630 A.

**25.** *ἐν Θήβαις δὲ* κ.τ.λ., 'but in Thebes,' etc. Bern. translates *δέκα ἐτῶν* 'seit zehn Jahren' ('since ten years previously'), Sus. 'zehn Jahre lang' ('for the space of ten years'). In support of Bernays' rendering Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 418. 8 b, may be referred to. In Aristoph. Lysistr. 280 the Latin translation contained in Didot's Aristophanes renders *ἐξ ἐτῶν ἄλουτος* 'inde a sex annis illotus.' But I should prefer Susemihl's rendering of *δέκα ἐτῶν* if parallel passages from Aristotle's writings can be adduced in support of it. It is conceivable, though perhaps hardly likely, that *διά* has dropped out before *δέκα*. *Ἀπεσχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς* appears to mean 'abstained from selling in the agora.' Aristotle no doubt refers to the time when Thebes was under an oligarchical constitution; he contrasts the oligarchy which existed at Thebes with other forms of oligarchy under which it was possible for a handicraftsman to find his way into office, and evidently prefers the strictness of the Theban oligarchy: cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26, *τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἤτοι . . τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις ἢ, καθάπερ Θηβαίοις, ἀποσχομένοις χρόνον τινὰ τῶν βαναύσων ἔργων* κ.τ.λ. (It would seem, if we compare this passage with that before us, that abstaining from the practice of a handicraft and abstaining from selling in the agora were much the same thing; handicraftsmen would appear to have both manufactured their goods and sold them in the agora, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26–30). Xenophon may perhaps refer to Thebes as well as to the Lacedaemonian State when he says in Oecon. 4. 3, *καὶ ἐν ἐνίαις μὲν τῶν πόλεων, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν ταῖς εὐπολέμοις δοκούσαις εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔξεστι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενὶ βαναυσικὰς τέχνας ἐργάζεσθαι*. Many oligarchies went further and enacted laws forbidding holders of offices to engage in any lucrative occupation (7 (5). 12. 1316 b 3 sqq.). *Νόμος ἦν* is probably emphatic, as in 2. 9. 1270 b 3; there was no concealment in the way in which Thebes excluded *βάνανσοι* from office, as there was in the methods followed by some States (1278 a 38 sqq.).

**26.** *ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις* κ.τ.λ., 'but on the other hand in many constitutions,' etc. Here we pass from one extreme to another, from the extreme strictness of the Theban oligarchy to

the extreme laxity of other constitutions. Aristotle evidently holds, in full agreement with current opinion, that to make aliens citizens was worse than making handicraftsmen citizens. The constitutions to which he refers were no doubt extreme democracies (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6–19), and it is noticeable that Aristotle does not charge even them with commonly admitting absolute aliens to citizenship, whatever they might do at special crises (see note on 1275 b 34); he speaks in the passage before us of 'some of the class of aliens' (*τῶν ξένων*, not *τοὺς ξένους*), and refers in particular to 'persons born of a citizen-mother and an alien father,' i. e. half-aliens. As he distinguishes these half-aliens from *νόθοι*, he would seem to regard them as born in wedlock. These half-aliens would differ much among themselves; the alien parent would be in some cases a Greek, in others an European or Asiatic barbarian, and a barbarian of high or low position. Cimon was the son of a Greek father and a Thracian princess, Themistocles of a Greek father and a Thracian or Carian woman of less exalted position, and this would be much the commoner case. Many half-aliens would probably be the offspring of marriages between poor citizen-women and rich metoeci (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 299. 1). Similar differences would exist in the ranks of the *νόθοι*. The term *νόθος* was used in strictness to designate those who were not born in wedlock, even if they were descended from citizen-parents (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 190). Thus a *νόθος might* be more purely Athenian than the half-aliens of whom we have been speaking, for he might be the offspring of an illicit connexion between Athenians of full citizen status. Far more frequently, however, he would be the offspring of an illicit connexion between an Athenian citizen and a slave-woman; occasionally he might be the offspring of an illicit connexion between an Athenian woman and a slave. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 299. 1) holds that in the passage before us Aristotle intends to identify the *νόθοι* with *οἱ ἐκ δούλου ἢ δούλης* (33), but perhaps we need not take him to assert that these constituted the whole class of *νόθοι*: they were no doubt the largest and least welcome portion of it. The distinction between *ξένοι* and *νόθοι* is not always maintained: see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 297. 2, who refers to Pollux 3. 21, *νόθος δὲ ὁ ἐκ ξένης ἢ παλλακίδος . . . τὸν δὲ νόθον καὶ ματρόξενον ἔνιοι καλοῦσιν*, and to Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 213.

**29.** *οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ* κ.τ.λ. *Ἐπεί*, 'as' or 'seeing that.' The

passage implies that all States which made aliens and bastards citizens did so for want of genuine citizens, a statement which seems to conflict with 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq., where we are told that the founders of extreme democracies adopted measures of this kind, not because they could not help themselves, but with the view of making the demos strong. Aristotle leaves cases of this nature out of sight, for his object in the passage before us is to prove that States only make aliens and bastards citizens when they are forced by necessity to do so, and that, in fact, even the States which do this practically confess that some types of citizen are less authentic than others (vol. i. p. 241). Ποιοῦνται, 'make for themselves': contrast ποιήσει, 1278 a 8, and ποιοῦσιν, 34, and compare for a similar transition c. 16. 1287 b 29–31. Τοὺς τοιούτους, i. e. ξένους καὶ νόθους. It would seem from Oecon. 2. 1346 b 13–29 that at Byzantium the law requiring both parents to be citizens was relaxed at a time of merely financial pressure.

31. οὕτω χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις, 'they have laws of this nature' (literally, 'they have their laws thus'): cp. Aristot. Fragm. 155. 1504 a 25, πολλοὶ δὲ οὕτω χρῶνται τῶν βαρβάρων.

32. εὐπορούντες δ' ὄχλου κ.τ.λ. The occurrence of δέ in the apodosis here after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί raises a very difficult question. There is no doubt that in the writings of Aristotle, as in those of other Greek authors, δέ not unfrequently occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by εἰ, when the apodosis or some part of it is opposed in sense to the protasis: see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 770. 1 a. We have instances of this in 3. 16. 1287 b 11 sqq.: Metaph. B. 4. 999 a 26 sqq.: Phys. 4. 8. 215 b 13 sqq. But the question is whether δέ occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί in the genuine writings of Aristotle. It occurs after a protasis introduced by ὡς in the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics (1349 b 12, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔταξε, σφάζεσθαι ὅσα δεῖ τῆς ἡμέρας, οἱ δὲ πάλιν ἱερόθυτα ἐποίουν, referred to in Bon. Ind. 167 a 38), but Bonitz (Ind. 167 a 34 sqq.) and Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 31) hold that in the genuine writings of Aristotle δέ does not occur in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί, and Sus.[3] reads δή in the place of δέ in the passage before us. Neither Bonitz nor Eucken, however, notice this passage: see Bonitz' discussion of the question in Aristot. Studien, 3. 124 sqq., and Eucken's in De Partic. Usu, pp. 26–31. When in 3. 12. 1282 b 14 sqq. a long string of sentences connected

by δέ and introduced by ἐπεί is followed, as it would seem, by an apodosis in 21 introduced by δέ, ποίων δ' ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ποίων ἀνισότης, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, the presence of δέ in the apodosis may be accounted for by the anacoluthic character of the sentence. The same reason may be given for the occurrence of δέ in the apodosis after a string of sentences introduced by ἐπεί in Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 3–14, where the best MSS. have δέ in 10, though the Vet. Int., supported by a few MSS. not of the best type, gives no equivalent for it. In the passage before us we make a nearer approach to the structure of the passages in which δέ occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by εἰ, for in this passage, as in those, there is an opposition in sense between the protasis and the apodosis, but here again the passage may be anacoluthic, the insertion of the parenthesis, διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὕτω χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις, serving to break the grammatical connexion and leading to the addition of δέ in εὐπορούντες δ' ὄχλου. But whether we regard the passage as anacoluthic or as a real instance of the occurrence of δέ in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί, there is no need to follow William of Moerbeke in omitting δέ or to substitute δή for it.

κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται. Aristotle appears to be speaking of a gradual change in the law of citizenship, not of such purgations of the citizen-lists as occurred at Athens after the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13) and in B.C. 444 (Plut. Pericl. c. 37) and 346 (Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 2. 289 sq.).

**33.** τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης. As to this class see above on 1278 a 26, and cp. Diod. 1. 80. 3, νόθον δ' οὐδένα τῶν γεννηθέντων νομίζουσιν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐξ ἀργυρωνήτου μητρὸς γεννηθῇ, where Diodorus is speaking of the Egyptians. If Antiochus' account of the Partheniae of the Lacedaemonian State (ap. Strab. p. 278) is true, and they were the sons of slaves, their enforced emigration to Tarentum would be an illustration of what Aristotle says here. The children of slaves were commonly thought to be morally below the mark (Eurip. Fragm. 966: Theogn. 537–8).

εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, i. e. sons of a citizen-mother by an alien, not a slave, father (Jowett). It will be noticed that sons of a citizen-father by an alien, not a slave, mother were usually the last to be excluded.

**34.** τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν. See above on 1275 b 21. For ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν see below on 1310 b 5 and critical note on 1301 b 35.

**ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Μὲν οὖν is not answered by ἀλλά, 38; it has, in fact, nothing answering to it, unless we take it to be eventually answered by δέ in 1278 b 6, ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται. In 1278 a 34–40 we have a summary of the results of the fifth chapter introduced by μὲν οὖν, and in 1278 a 40–b 5 a summary introduced by another μὲν οὖν of the results of the fourth chapter, this second μὲν οὖν finding an answer in 1278 b 6, ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται. No doubt the fourth and fifth chapters form to a certain extent a connected whole, for the fifth chapter is added by way of supplement to the fourth, it being necessary to explain that there are citizens in whose case the definition of the citizen's virtue given in c. 4 does not hold good, but still there is much awkwardness in the arrangement by which a summary of the results of the fourth chapter is added at the end of the fifth, all the more so as we have already had a brief mention (hardly a summary) of the results of the fourth chapter at the end of that chapter (1277 b 30 sqq.). It is doubtful whether the summary in 1278 a 40–b 5 is not an interpolation by some editor. It is not quite exact: see vol. i. Appendix B, and note on 1285 b 27. As to εἴδη πλείω πολίτου, there are citizens who share in office and there are citizens who do not share in office except under certain constitutions.

**36. ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** Καί, 'for instance,' as in 1. 12. 1259 b 8. The quotation is from Hom. Il. 9. 648 and 16. 59, where Achilles complains of Agamemnon's treatment of him. Aristotle quotes the words as if Achilles meant 'excluded from office' by ἀτίμητος. The transition was easy for Greeks from the idea of exclusion from office to that of being dishonoured (cp. c. 10. 1281 a 29 sqq. and Thuc. 6. 38. 5).

**37. ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ κ.τ.λ.** Bonitz (Ind. s. v. μέτοικος) refers to Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1233 a 28, διὸ καὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι μικρόψυχον, εἴ τις μέτοικος ὢν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' ὑπείκει, ἀλλ' εἴ τις εὐγενὴς ὢν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν. Cp. also Isocr. Paneg. § 105 and Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 6.

**38. ἀλλ' ὅπου κ.τ.λ.**, 'but where exclusion from office is concealed, [there is a bad motive present, for] this concealment is practised by those who resort to it with a view to deceive those who dwell in the same State.' Aristotle uses the expression τῶν συνοικούντων, not τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, because those who are excluded from office can only be said κοινωνεῖν τῆς οἰκήσεως, like metoeci and slaves (c. 1. 1275 a 7). How hateful a thing it was

to deceive one's fellow-citizens appears from the remark of Solon to Peisistratus (Plut. Solon, c. 30), *οὐ καλῶς, ὦ παῖ Ἱπποκράτους, ὑποκρίνῃ τὸν Ὁμηρικὸν Ὀδυσσέα· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ποιεῖς τοὺς πολίτας παρακρουόμενος, οἷς ἐκεῖνος τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξηπάτησεν αἰκισάμενος ἑαυτόν.* At Athens to deceive the people was a crime (Hdt. 6. 136: Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 97). To wrong *σύνοικοι* is especially dangerous (Isocr. Panath. § 178). Most oligarchies openly excluded the many from office (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 33 sqq.), but there may have been some oligarchies, and certainly there were aristocracies, in which an attempt was made to conceal their exclusion from them (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq.). To these aristocracies, as Susemihl has already remarked (Sus.[2], Note 518: Sus.[4], 1. p. 379), Aristotle probably here refers.

**40.** *πότερον μὲν οὖν* κ.τ.λ. As to this summary see above on 34. For the omission of *ἀρετήν*, cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 24, and see vol. ii. p. li. note 4.

**2.** For the added explanation *ὅτι* κ.τ.λ. cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 6 sq. 1278 b. The sentence, if complete, would apparently run, *ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ σπουδαῖος πολίτης ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ* κ.τ.λ.

**3.** *κἀκεῖνος οὐ πᾶς*, 'and not every citizen in which the two are the same.'

*ὁ πολιτικός*. With the account given of the *πολιτικός* here compare Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 11, where the word *πολιτικοί* is conjoined with *ἄρχειν ἱκανοί*. *Οἱ πολιτικοί* are distinguished from *οἱ δημοτικοί* in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 24, from *οἱ ἐργαστικοί* in Polyb. 10. 16. 1, from *οἱ χειροτέχναι* in Polyb. 10. 17. 6, and from *οἱ δημιουργοί* and *οἱ ῥήτορες* in Plato, Apol. 23 E (cp. Diog. Laert. 2. 39). In 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11, *ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός*, Aristotle substitutes *ἄρχοντος* for *πολιτικοῦ*.

**4.** *καθ' αὑτόν*. Sus.[2] (Note 521: Sus.[4], 1. p. 380) holds that Aristotle is thinking of *ὁ βασιλικός*, but we have been concerned in c. 4 with statesmen who understand both ruling and being ruled, and the reference probably is to magistracies held singly and not in conjunction with others: cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 109, *ἀλλ' ἴσως καθ' αὑτὸν μὲν ἄρχων φαῦλος ἦν, μετὰ πλειόνων δ' ἐπιεικής.* Cp. also c. 11. 1282 a 40, *τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων.*

*τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας*. Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. 8. 4, *οἵ γε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστατεύοντες καὶ τῶν δημοσίων ἐπιμελόμενοι.* In 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 7 we have *ἡ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια.*

C. 6. 6. Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The question raised in c. 1. 1275 a 1, *τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστί*, has now been answered, and in strictness (cp. 1274 b 38 sqq.) the next question is *τί ποτε ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις*, but this has been answered already in c. 1. 1275 b 20, and Aristotle passes on at once to the question as to the nature of each constitution which he has marked out for consideration in the first sentence of the Third Book. The citizen has been defined by access to office, and as access to office is regulated by the constitution, the question whether there are more constitutions than one, and, if so, how many there are and what differences exist between them, is 'next' (*τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα*) dealt with. Aristotle prefixes to his discussion of these questions (see c. 7. 1279 a 22 sqq.) an inquiry into two preliminary ones, what is the true end for which the *πόλις* exists, and what is the true nature of political rule. At the close of this inquiry he no longer troubles to ask whether there are more constitutions than one (he has, indeed, already assumed this in c. 5. 1278 a 15), but asks at once (c. 7 *init.*) how many there are.

7. κἂν εἰ πλείους. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 61) remarks that *κἂν εἰ* is often used just as *καὶ εἰ* might be. 'Id iam apud Platonem, Demosthenem, alios invenitur, sed apud nullum saepius quam apud Aristotelem . . . Inveniuntur loci, ubi nihil impedit, quominus *ἄν* ex verbo *κἄν* ad apodosin referamus' (he refers among other passages to De An. 2. 10. 422 a 11 sq.), 'sed multo saepius omnino nulla apodosis est ad quam *ἄν* referri possit, maxime in Politicis, in quibus, ut exemplum afferam, saepe compluribus rebus enumeratis postremo loco verbis *κἂν εἰ* aliquid additur quod magis generale est (cf. Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 38) . . . Sed etiam aliis rationibus *κἂν εἰ* eodem modo atque *καὶ εἰ* usurpatur' (Eucken cites the passage before us and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 16 sqq.). 'Simili modo *κἂν εἰ* etiam in ceteris scriptis adhibetur, sed saepius praeter Politica in Metaphysicis tantum, rarius in ceteris, maxime in Rhetoricis, ubi semel (1. 1. 1354 a 25) usurpatur.'

8. διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσίν, 'what are the differences between them': cp. Hist. An. 1. 1. 487 a 11, *αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν ζῴων εἰσὶ κατά τε τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς πράξεις* κ.τ.λ. This question is dealt with in c. 7, where the normal and the deviation-forms of constitution are distinguished, and also in c. 8. 1279 b 39 sqq. But it receives further consideration in the Sixth Book: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 31, *ἔτι δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφοραὶ (τῶν πολιτειῶν) καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει.*

ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. Giphanius, Heinsius, and Bernays, fol-

lowed by Sus. and Mr. Welldon, are probably right in translating, 'now a constitution is an ordering of a State in respect both of its other magistracies and especially of the magistracy which is supreme over everything' (*πάντων* is probably neuter, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 26). Compare Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 27, *τὰ δὲ κύρια διῄρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας· ὅσαι γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύριά ἐστιν.* See vol. i. p. 243, note 1, for other accounts in the Politics of the nature of a constitution. That implied in 3. 3. 1276 b 1 sqq., that it is the *εἶδος τῆς συνθέσεως* of the elements of the *πόλις*, should not be lost sight of. See note on 1276 b 4.

**10.** *κύριον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* *Γάρ* introduces a proof that the constitution is an ordering of the supreme magistracy. It is so because it is an ordering of the *πολίτευμα* and varies as this varies, and the *πολίτευμα* is the supreme authority of the State. *Τὸ πολίτευμα*, 'the supreme authority,' whether One Man or a Few or Many (cp. c. 7. 1279 a 25 sqq., and see vol. i. p. 243, note 2), usually not an individual, but a number of individuals, and thus we read of *οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ πολιτεύματος* in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 15 (cp. 24, *τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας*). It was, however, possible to be a member of the *πολίτευμα* and yet not to share in the greatest magistracies, as we see from 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 12, *καταλύονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ἑτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐμποιῶσιν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὀλίγου ὄντος τῶν μεγίστων ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν οἱ ὀλίγοι πάντες.*

**11.** *πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία*, 'and the supreme authority virtually is the constitution.' With Sepulv., Vict., Giph., Heinsius, and Stahr I take *πολίτευμα* to be the subject of the sentence (for the absence of the article before *πολίτευμα* see above on 1276 b 28). Lamb., however, translates, 'civitatis autem administrandae forma, quam politiam diximus a Graecis appellari, est administratio seu gubernatio civitatis'; thus he makes *ἡ πολιτεία* the subject of the sentence, and Bernays appears to do so too, for he translates, 'die regierende Klasse bestimmt sich nach der Regierungsform' ('the governing class is determined by the form of government'). This rendering suits well with 8–10, but not so well with what follows in 11 sqq., and I prefer the other interpretation. Aristotle proves that the constitution is especially an ordering of the supreme authority by showing that the nature of the supreme authority is decisive of the character of the constitution, from which it follows that the main business of the constitution is to fix the supreme authority. The two words *πολιτεία* and *πολίτευμα* are interchanged

in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 6, καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, and in 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 14 sqq., where τῆς πολιτείας δι' ὀλίγων οὔσης answers to τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὀλίγου ὄντος.

**12.** For the omission of πόλεσι after ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς see above on 1266 b 1. We rather expect ταῖς ὀλιγαρχικαῖς to follow.

**13.** φαμὲν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and we say that the constitution also (as well as the πολίτευμα) of these' (i. e. of those who live under the supremacy of the demos and those who live under the supremacy of the few) 'is different.' It is not quite clear whether in φαμέν Aristotle refers to himself and his school or (as Bernays thinks) to the common use of language (cp. c. 7. 1279 a 33, καλεῖν εἰώθαμεν). Perhaps ἐροῦμεν in the next line rather points to the former interpretation.

**15.** τῶν ἄλλων, 'the others' (in opposition to τούτων), i. e. those who live under the supremacy, not of the demos or the few, but of some other supreme authority. Or possibly 'the other constitutions.' Susemihl takes the words in the latter way, and he may be right.

**ὑποθετέον δὴ κ.τ.λ.** We must ascertain the end for which the State exists and the various kinds of rule exercised in relation to man as a member of society before we can say how many forms of constitution there are or discriminate the normal forms from the deviation-forms. For in the normal forms the true end is aimed at and the true kind of rule exercised, and in the deviation-forms neither is the case.

**16.** τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς. We are concerned here only with the kinds of rule exercised in relation to man (not in relation to the lower animals), and still further, only with such as have to do with human beings as associates in life, therefore with those kinds of rule only which are connected with the Household, Village, and State.

**17.** κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους. As to οἱ πρῶτοι λόγοι see vol. ii. p. xx sqq., and cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 71, where Isocrates, speaking of his own address to Nicocles, uses the words, ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ προοιμίῳ καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις λεγομένοις. The reference in the passage before us is to 1. 2. 1253 a 1 sqq.

**19.** καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'among other things this also, that' etc. The passage commencing here, together with c. 9. 1280 b 36 sqq. and perhaps 1. 2. 1252 b 12 sqq., seems to have been known to and used by an interpolator of Strabo, p. 419, where we read, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπίνοια αὕτη τῆς τε τῶν πόλεων κτίσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἱερῶν ἐκτιμήσεως· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ πόλεις συνήεσαν καὶ κατὰ ἔθνος φυσικῶς κοινωνικοὶ ὄντες καὶ

*ἅμα τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων χρείας χάριν, καὶ εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ κοινὰ ἀπήντων διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας, ἑορτὰς καὶ πανηγύρεις συντελοῦντες· φιλικὸν γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοτραπέζων ἀρξάμενον καὶ ὁμοσπόνδων καὶ ὁμωροφίων· ὅσῳ δὲ πλεῖον καὶ ἐκ πλειόνων ἐπεδήμει, τοσῷδε μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ὄφελος ἐνομίζετο.* Μέν ('while') is answered by *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά*, as in c. 13. 1284 b 4 sqq. and in the cases noted above on 1276 b 34. For the absence of the article before *ἄνθρωπος* see note on 1253 a 10 and critical note on 1253 a 2.

**21. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.**, 'not but that the common advantage also brings them together, so far as a share in good life falls to the lot of each.' See above on 1252 b 27 sqq., and for the limiting clause, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 38, *συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς* (i. e. *εὐδαιμονίας*), *τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ μηδέν*, and Plato, Rep. 421 C, *ἐατέον ὅπως ἑκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.*

**23.** As to **μὲν οὖν** see above on 1252 b 27 sqq. Τοῦτο, i. e. *τὸ ζῆν καλῶς*. For the thought cp. c. 9. 1280 a 31 sqq., where however it seems to be implied that men do not come together to form the State for the sake of life alone, which does not agree with 24 sqq.

**24. συνέρχονται δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Αὐτοῦ, 'alone' (see note on 1338 b 25). Contrast [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 1343 a 10, *πόλις μὲν οὖν οἰκιῶν πλῆθός ἐστι καὶ χώρας καὶ χρημάτων αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν· φανερὸν δέ, ὅταν γὰρ μὴ δυνατοὶ ὦσι τούτου τυγχάνειν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ κοινωνία.*

**25. ἴσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'for perhaps there is an element of what is noble in life even if we take it by itself.' Ἔνεστι is probably not to be taken with *κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον* as if *κατά* meant 'in'; it means rather 'in respect of,' and *τῷ ζῆν* should be supplied with *ἔνεστι*. In order to show that *τὸ ζῆν* may be the end with which the *πόλις* is formed and maintained, Aristotle shows that *τὸ ζῆν* has in it two characteristics of the end of human action, *τὸ καλόν* and pleasurableness: cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 17, *καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν.* Compare with the account of *τὸ ζῆν* in the passage before us Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 19, *τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως*, 1170 a 25 sqq., and b 1: Eth. Nic. 9. 7. 1168 a 5 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 25 sqq. Aristotle follows here in the track of Sappho, Fragm. 79,

> *ἐγὼ δὲ φίλημ' ἀβροσύναν, καί μοι τὸ λάμπρον*
> *ἔρος . . . ἀελίω καὶ τὸ κάλων λέλογχεν,*

where Clearchus of Soli, who has preserved the fragment (ap. Athen. Deipn. 687 a: Clearch. Sol. Fragm. 4 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 304), adds, *φανερὸν ποιοῦσα πᾶσιν ὡς ἡ τοῦ ζῆν ἐπιθυμία τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶχεν αὐτῇ*, and in *ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κ.τ.λ.* in the track of Aeschylus, Fragm. 171,

*τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίον, ὃς λύπας φέρει;*

(where we should read with Nauck *ᾧ βίος*, or possibly *ὃς βίος*, or, with Richards, *βίοτον, ὃς*), and Soph. Aj. 473,

*αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἄνδρα τοῦ μακροῦ χρῄζειν βίου,*
*κακοῖσιν ὅστις μηδὲν ἐξαλλάσσεται.*

Cp. also Aesch. Fragm. 392, Soph. Fragm. 445, 867, and Bacchylides 1. 30 sqq. For *τοῦ καλοῦ μόριόν τι*, cp. c. 9. 1281 a 9, *μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι*, and 1. 11. 1258 b 28 sq. For *τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον*, cp. Rhet. 2. 17. 1391 a 32, *τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθά*.

**27.** *δῆλον δ' ὡς* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps designedly refers to *οἱ πολλοί* rather than to *οἱ σοφοί*, thinking that their views are a better guide to what is natural (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 2 sqq. and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 15 sqq.), but he might have said the same thing of some *σοφοί*: see as to the last days of Antisthenes and Speusippus Diog. Laert. 6. 18 sq. and 4. 3. For *οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων* cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 24.

**30.** *ἀλλὰ μήν . . . γε*, 'but certainly' (see above on 1271 a 20).

*τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους*, 'the forms of rule commonly spoken of.' Bonitz (Ind. 424 b 40) compares Categ. 12. 14 a 26, *πρότερον ἑτέρου ἕτερον λέγεται τετραχῶς*, and 14 b 9, *οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τρόποι τοῦ προτέρου σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν*. He adds that Bernays translates the words otherwise ('die in Betracht kommenden Weisen der Herrschaft'), and refers to Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 53. Bonitz' translation seems to me to be the right one.

**31.** *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις* κ.τ.λ. *Ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* are literally 'external inquiries,' i.e. probably inquiries external to philosophy, cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 22, *ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν*. See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 114 sqq. (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 110 sqq.) for a full discussion of the meaning of the expression (also Grote, Aristotle, 1. 63 sqq., and Sus.[4], 1. p. 561 sqq.). Zeller remarks (p. 119. 2: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4) that if we give an extended meaning to the 'we' of *διοριζόμεθα* in the passage before us, it is possible to take *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* here as referring to views advanced outside the

Aristotelian school in the intercourse of ordinary life, but that the use of the term in other passages makes it probable that Aristotle here also refers to writings of his own of a popular kind (possibly to the *πολιτικός* and the *περὶ βασιλείας*).

**32.** **ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 2. There is a striking resemblance between the passage before us and Dio Chrys. Or. 14. 439 R.

**37.** **ἡ δὲ τέκνων ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ.** *Οἰκονομικὴ ἀρχή* is here used in a sense exclusive of *δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή*, though undoubtedly the rule of the master over the slave is usually treated in the Politics as a part of *οἰκονομικὴ ἀρχή* (cp. for instance 1. 3. 1253 b 1 sqq. and 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq., and see Sus.[3], Note 529: Sus.[4], 1. p. 383). We must bear in mind that Aristotle's use of the word *χρηματιστική* also varies (see note on 1256 a 1), and that the free members of the household are its members in an especial sense, so that in 1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq. the only members of the household mentioned are husband and wife, father and child. Thus in 1. 2. 1252 b 20 (cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.) the household is said *βασιλεύεσθαι*, though the rule of its head over his slaves is of course not a kingly rule. Cp. Hom. Odyss. 1. 397, where the *οἶκος* is distinguished from the *δμῶες*,

*αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν οἴκοιο ἄναξ ἔσομ' ἠμετέροιο*
*καὶ δμώων οὕς μοι λήισσατο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς.*

Younger brothers and sisters may be referred to in *τῆς οἰκίας πάσης* ('the household as a whole,' see above on 1253 b 33, *πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης*, and cp. also 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 34, *πάντα τὸν δῆμον*). In Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 8–17 (cp. 5. 15. 1138 b 7 sq.), *τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον* is distinguished from *τὸ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον*, but is explained as existing between husband and wife only, not between father and child also.

**38.** **ἦν δή.** Δή 'vim relativi urguet,' and means 'just' or 'exactly' ('eben' or 'gerade,' Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 43).

**39.** **ἢ κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀμφοῖν**, sc. *ἀγαθοῦ*.

**40.** **ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας**, sc. *εἶναι*.

**2.** **κἂν αὐτῶν εἶεν**, i. e. *κἂν αὐτῶν χάριν εἶεν ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ἡ γυμναστική*. 1279 a. See Schneider's note.

**οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει κ.τ.λ.** Bonitz (Ind. 338 a 33) groups this passage with Metaph. Δ. 12. 1019 a 17, *ἡ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὖσα ὑπάρχοι ἂν ἐν τῷ ἰατρευομένῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἰατρευόμενος*.

**3.** **ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Plato, Rep. 341 C–D, which Aristotle here slightly corrects.

**4.** **ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης κ.τ.λ.** takes up *ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας*

τέχνας, 1278 b 40: here as elsewhere (see above on 1252 b 27 sqq.) μὲν οὖν 'usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur.'

8. γίνεται, 'comes to be': see above on 1252 b 7 and 1264 a 14.

παιδοτρίβης ὤν, 'though he is a training-master.'

διὸ κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i.e. because rule over a household and the rule which is exercised in the arts is essentially for the good of the ruled, and only accidentally and in certain cases for the common good of ruler and ruled) men imply by their acts that rule in a State also is essentially for the good of the ruled, inasmuch as they claim that all should hold office in turn, at any rate when the constitution rests on a basis of equality, thus treating office as a burden which should be borne in turn by all. No doubt this is not the case now—on the contrary, men seek to be perpetually in office, inasmuch as office brings great gains—but we must judge by what was the case formerly, when the state of things was natural. It may be asked how, if ruling is a burden to the ruler, perpetuity of rule, such as exists in a kingship, is fair to the ruler. Aristotle would perhaps reply that the perpetual ruler receives a *quid pro quo* in 'honour and reward' (see vol. i. p. 244, note 4). In τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς State-offices are referred to in contradistinction to such positions of command as those of the captain of a ship or a physician (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 37 and 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 19).

9. ὅταν ᾖ κ.τ.λ. The suppressed nom. to ᾖ is ἡ πόλις or ἡ πολιτεία, probably the latter, for συνεστηκυῖα points rather to it (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 25: 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 33, b 16, etc.), though we have in 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 36 περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως. For κατ' ἰσότητα συνεστηκυῖα, cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην.

10. πρότερον μέν κ.τ.λ. Πρότερον, 'in former times.' As Susemihl has already pointed out (Sus.[2], Note 532 b: Sus.[4], 1. p. 384), Aristotle has before him Isocrates' picture of Athens in the days when the Areopagus was strong (Areopag. § 24)—αἴτιον δ' ἦν τοῦ ταῦτα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν καὶ μὴ περιμαχήτους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅτι μεμαθηκότες ἦσαν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τῶν μὲν οἰκείων ἀμελεῖν τοῖς δ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἐπιβουλεύειν, μηδ' ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν διοικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστοις ὑπαρχόντων, ὁπότε δεήσειε, τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐπαρκεῖν, μηδ' ἀκριβέστερον εἰδέναι τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχείων προσόδους ἢ τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων γιγνομένας αὐτοῖς· οὕτω δ' ἀπείχοντο σφόδρα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ὥστε χαλεπώτερον ἦν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις εὑρεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἄρχειν ἢ νῦν τοὺς μηδὲν δεομένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐμπορίαν ἀλλὰ λειτουργίαν (cp. 11, λειτουργεῖν)

*ἐνόμιζον εἶναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν, οὐδ' ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας ἐσκόπουν ἐλθόντες εἴ τι λῆμμα παραλελοίπασιν οἱ πρότερον ἄρχοντες, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.* Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 145, and De Antid. § 145: also Hdt. 1. 97. 2.

**11.** **λειτουργεῖν.** Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 35 sqq. and Andoc. De Myst. c. 132. *Λειτουργεῖν* stands in contrast to *ἄρχειν*, 10.

**12.** **πάλιν** answers to *πρότερον* in *ὥσπερ πρότερον κ.τ.λ.*, as it answers (coupled with *ἔπειτα*) to *πρῶτον* in 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 28 sq.

**13.** **τὰς ὠφελείας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς.** This repeats Isocrates' phrases quoted above on 10 from Areopag. § 24, *ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν διοικεῖν* and *τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχείων προσόδους*: cp. also De Antid. § 145, *τῶν μὲν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ὠφελιῶν τῶν ἐντεῦθεν γιγνομένων.* Profits derived from office are distinguishable from those derived from public property, for they would often come in the shape of bribes from individuals. It would seem from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 20 sqq. that in an oligarchy, at all events, not all offices were lucrative.

**14.** **βούλονται συνεχῶς ἄρχειν,** as at Thurii (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 6 sqq.). Compare the reference to *οἱ συνεχεῖς οἵδε* in Demosth. Prooem. 55, p. 1461. The repeated tenure of the same office was no doubt often forbidden or discouraged in democracies, but even where that was the case, men might be perpetually in office, if they held different offices.

**17.** **φανερὸν τοίνυν κ.τ.λ.** For *ὅσαι μὲν . . . αὗται μέν* compare (with Sus.[1] Ind. Gramm. s. v. **Μέν**, p. 629 foot) 28–29 and 1. 5. 1254 b 16–19: cp. also 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 454 a 23, where De Gen. et Corr. 1. 1. 314 a 8–9 is compared. *Τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον*, i.e. *τῶν πολιτῶν* (cp. 31 sq. and c. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq.). As to Aristotle's distinction of *ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι* and *παρεκβάσεις*, see vol. i. p. 215 sq. Is it not, however, possible that in some cases the rule of the holder or holders of supreme power, though exercised exclusively in their own interest, may nevertheless be for the common advantage? Gibbon remarks (Decline and Fall, c. 5) that 'the true interest of an absolute monarch generally coincides with that of his people. Their numbers, their wealth, their order, and their security are the best and only foundations of his real greatness; and were he totally devoid of virtue, prudence might supply its place, and would dictate the same rule of conduct.' Is it not also possible that there are constitutions in which the rulers rule partly for their own and partly for the common advantage?

And are there not cases in which it is impossible to legislate for the advantage of all, the interest of one section of the population (for instance, producers or consumers) being entirely opposed to that of another? In 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 39 sqq., again, we find constitutions mentioned which are partly aristocratic, partly oligarchical in their organization, and others which are partly organized as polities, partly as democracies. These constitutions then will be partly normal, partly deviation-forms.

**18.** κατὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, 'according to the standard of that which is absolutely just.' Τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον (cp. Soph. Fragm. 699, τὴν ἁπλῶς δίκην) is opposed to δίκαιόν τι in c. 9. 1280 a 22, and to τὸ ἰδίᾳ συμφέρον καὶ δίκαιον in c. 13. 1284 b 24 sq. Τὸ δίκαιον, by which is no doubt meant τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, is identified with τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον in c. 12. 1282 b 17. It is because the normal constitutions conform to the end for which the State came into being, and adjust their mode of rule to that which should prevail in communities of freemen, that they are pronounced normal according to the standard of absolute justice. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sqq.

**20.** For the place of πᾶσαι, see note on 1281 a 26.

C. 7. **23.** πρῶτον τὰς ὀρθὰς αὐτῶν. We find in fact that the normal constitutions are described first in 1279 a 25—b 10. On the other hand, in a later Book (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 31 sqq.) the study of the Polity, and indeed of the lower forms of Aristocracy, is designedly postponed till Democracy and Oligarchy have been studied.

**26.** πολίτευμα δὲ κ.τ.λ. With all the translators and commentators, so far as I have observed, I take πολίτευμα to be the subject of the sentence. For the absence of the article, see above on 1276 b 28 and 1278 b 11.

**27.** ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς. Aristotle leaves out of sight the possibility that the One, Few, and Many, or two of them, may share supremacy.

**28.** τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον, as in 33 and 37, not τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον, as in 17 and 1278 b 21. Cp. Plut. Phocion c. 21, Arat. cc. 10, 24, where τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον occurs.

**30.** τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 712 E and 832 B–D. Supply συμφέρον with τὸ ἴδιον.

**31.** ἡ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for [they deviate from the true standard, inasmuch as they do not admit all the citizens to a share of advantage,

and] either those who share in the constitution are not to be called citizens or they should share in the advantages derivable from it.'

**33.** καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν κ.τ.λ. Kingship exists for the protection of the ἐπιεικεῖς against the demos (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq.), but still it rules for the common advantage. Ideally Kings are guardians both of the rich and of the demos against wrong (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.). Polybius (6. 4. 2), on the other hand, rests the distinction between Kingship and Tyranny on the willingness or unwillingness of the subjects, but this criterion comes to much the same thing as that of Aristotle (see 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 19–23).

**34.** τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἀρχήν from μοναρχιῶν (cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 24 sq., where νόμος must be supplied from νομοθέτης).

**35.** τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν. Cp. c. 18. 1288 a 33 sqq.: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq., 40 sq.: Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 33 sqq.

**36.** ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς, i. e. τῆς πόλεως, cp. 4. (7). 2. 1324 a 15, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως. In 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 19 we have τὸ γὰρ βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως. A definition of Aristocracy by its aim is most in harmony with the method of c. 7: thus Kingship (33), Polity (37), and the παρεκβάσεις (1279 b 6 sqq.) are all classified by their aim in c. 7. Perhaps another object with which this alternative definition of ἀριστοκρατία is added is to include such aristocracies as those described in Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 33 sqq. and 1366 a 5, where the ruling class is οἱ φαινόμενοι ἄριστοι (cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sqq.). The similarity of the language used here to that used in c. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq. should be noticed.

**37.** ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. The name πολιτεία was already used to designate democracy (Harpocr. s. v. πολιτεία. ἰδίως εἰώθασι τῷ ὀνόματι χρῆσθαι οἱ ῥήτορες ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τε ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν Φιλιππικοῖς, where the reference probably is to Isocr. Paneg. § 125 and Demosth. Phil. 2. c. 21).

**39.** συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, i.e. 'it happens reasonably' that it bears the common name of all constitutions. It seems likely that we should supply these words, but it is by no means easy to explain why Aristotle thinks that this happens reasonably. Giph. (p. 335) explains the matter thus—'cur autem huic reipublicae potius acciderit id quam aliis, ut suo vacans nomine dicatur communi, rationem reddit Aristoteles; quia vix accidat ut multi virtute praediti bonum

spectent publicum: facilius unus aut pauci reperiuntur tales, multi difficillime. Quare factum est ut regnum et aristocratia essent nota vocabula, multorum respublica vix esset nota et proinde nomine vacans,' and he refers in confirmation of this to 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 39 sqq., where we are told that the polity was of rare occurrence. (Mr. Mark Pattison takes a somewhat similar view in a note written in his copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics—'*συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως*, viz. that this form should appropriate to itself *κατ' ἐξοχήν* the term which is common to all the forms, viz. *πολιτεία*, as it must be more rare than either of the other forms, in proportion as it is more difficult to find many virtuous than to find few or one.') I am myself inclined to suggest whether Aristotle's meaning is not rather this—it happens reasonably that the polity is called by the name common to all constitutions, and not by a special name indicative of exalted virtue in the rulers, such as Kingship (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 41 sq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq.) or Aristocracy, because the Many who rule in the polity will not be possessed of exalted virtue. I can hardly think that Bernays' view of the passage is right, but it deserves mention. He refers *συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως* to what follows, not what precedes, translating these words 'bei diesem Verfassungsstaat tritt nun naturgemäss folgendes Verhältniss hervor.' It would be more possible to refer *συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως* to what follows if we could suppose that the passage is anacoluthic, and that, when Aristotle began his sentence, he intended to write *συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον εἶναι τὸ προπολεμοῦν*, but being led to interpose after *συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως* the parenthetic explanation *ἕνα μὲν γὰρ—γίγνεται*, prefixed *διόπερ* to the postponed completion of his sentence, thus making it anacoluthic. But this is hardly a likely supposition. The probability is that *συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως* refers to what precedes, not to what follows. Schmidt and Sus., on the other hand, transpose 1279 b 3, *καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα*, to before *συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως*, but not, I think, rightly. These words seem to me to be better placed where they stand in the MSS.

40. *πλείους δ' ἤδη* κ.τ.λ., 'but when we come to a larger number of men, it is difficult that they,' etc. See as to *ἤδη* note on 1268 b 21.

1279 b. 1. *ἠκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν*, 'to be perfected in respect of every kind of virtue.' Compare such phrases as *τέλεος πρὸς ἀρετήν* (Plato, Laws 678 B, 647 D), and cp. Plut. De Solertia Animalium

c. 4, *τῶν θηρίων αἰτιᾶσθαι τὸ μὴ καθαρὸν μηδ' ἀπηκριβωμένον πρὸς ἀρετήν*: Plato, Laws 810 B, *πρὸς τάχος ἢ κάλλος ἀπηκριβῶσθαι*. For *πᾶσαν ἀρετήν*, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 5, *τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα*.

**ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν.** Obviously we are not intended to carry on *χαλεπὸν ἠκριβῶσθαι πρός*, as we might naturally do, for this would give a false sense: what we must carry on is *ἐνδέχεται ἠκριβῶσθαι πρός*. Compare Metaph. 1. 7. 1057 a 37, *τῶν δὲ πρός τι ὅσα μὴ ἐναντία, οὐκ ἔχει μεταξύ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστίν· τί γὰρ ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἐπιστητοῦ μεταξύ; ἀλλὰ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ* (sc. *ἐστὶ μεταξύ*), and Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 6, *τοιγαροῦν οὐ συμβλητὸν κατὰ τοῦτο, οἷον πότερον κεχρωμάτισται μᾶλλον, μὴ κατά τι χρῶμα, ἀλλ' ᾧ χρῶμα· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λευκόν* (sc. *συμβλητόν ἐστιν*).

**2. αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίγνεται,** 'for this kind of virtue arises in a mass of men.' See note on 1330 b 38.

**3. μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα.** Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1, 2. 6. 1265 b 28, and 3. 17. 1288 a 12 sq.

**5. τυραννὶς μὲν βασιλείας.** In 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sqq. tyranny is implied to be a *παρέκβασις* of the *παμβασιλεία*.

**6. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 2 sqq. and Thuc. 1. 17. 'It is but justice to Meg Dods to state that though hers was a severe and almost despotic government, it could not be termed a tyranny, since it was exercised upon the whole for the good of the subject' (Sir Walter Scott, St. Ronan's Well, p. 13). The Scholiast on Aristophanes, speaking of the terms *βασιλεύς* and *τύραννος*, remarks (Acharn. 61), *χρῶνται δὲ ἀδιαφόρως ἔνιοι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. Ἱέρωνα μὲν βασιλέα Πίνδαρος καλεῖ τὸν Συρακουσίων τύραννον, Εὔπολις δὲ ἐν Δήμοις εἰσάγει τὸν Πεισίστρατον βασιλέα.*

**7. ἡ δ' ὀλιγαρχία κ.τ.λ.** We should naturally supply *ἐστὶ μοναρχία*, but of course *ἐστί* only must be supplied.

**9. τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν,** 'that which profits the whole body of citizens': cp. Plato, Rep. 442 C, *τοῦ ξυμφέροντος ἑκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων*. Cp. also Laws 715 B and 875 A–B.

**11. τίς ἑκάστη τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστίν,** i.e. apparently the three deviation-forms (cp. 16–19), though tyranny soon drops out of view. For the question *τίς ἑκάστη* cp. c. 1. 1274 b 32. C. 8.

**12. τῷ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι κ.τ.λ.** Cp. De Caelo 2. 5. 287 b 28 sqq. and Anal. Post. 2. 13. 96 b 35—97 a 6.

**14. τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν.** See note on 1281 a 26.

**15.** δηλοῦν, 'to make fully manifest': see note on 1253 a 10.

**16.** ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'now tyranny is, as has been said' (in c. 7. 1279 b 6 and c. 6. 1279 a 21) 'a form of monarchy ruling over the political association as a master rules over his slaves.' Τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας appears to be in the genitive after δεσποτική (see Liddell and Scott, s. v. δεσποτικός, who compare 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 19 and Xen. Oecon. 13. 5). In c. 6. 1279 a 21 the πόλις is said to be an association of freemen; hence tyranny is evidently wrong and receives no further consideration.

**17.** ὀλιγαρχία δὲ κ.τ.λ. This agrees with Plato, Rep. 550 C, except that Plato adds that the poor have no share in office.

**18.** κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 24, 33, 6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1, and 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 32.

δημοκρατία δὲ κ.τ.λ. In the first form of democracy the law refuses to give supremacy either to rich or to poor, still, as the poor are in a majority, supremacy necessarily falls as a matter of fact to them (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 31–38).

**19.** οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλ' ἄποροι. This shows that the ἄποροι in the Politics are not altogether without property, but have not much property. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 20, where οἱ ἄποροι are opposed to οἱ ἔχοντες τίμημα, and 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sqq. They must not be confused with οἱ λίαν ἄποροι and οἱ σφόδρα πένητες, of whom we read in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32 sqq., 2. 9. 1270 b 9, and 1271 a 30, but they do not appear commonly to have had any slaves (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sqq.), and unless they received pay from the State (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), they were obliged to work hard for the support of themselves and their families (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 4 sqq.). As to οἱ πένητες see note on 1297 b 6.

**20.** πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. Sepulv. 'est autem prima de definitione controversia,' and so Vict. Giph. Bern. and Sus. ('the first difficulty affects the definition'): Lamb., however, 'prima autem difficultas ac dubitatio ad superiorem distinctionem pertinens est haec.' The former interpretation is probably to be preferred. For the absence of the article with πρώτη ἀπορία, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30, δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. For πρός, cp. c. 13. 1283 b 13, ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν, and Metaph. Z. 6. 1032 a 6, οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι πρὸς τὴν θέσιν ταύτην φανερὸν ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ λύονται λύσει. The definition of oligarchy and democracy given in the foregoing (c. 7.

1279 b 6—c. 8. 1279 b 19) has represented the former as a constitution in which a few rich rule and the latter as a constitution in which many poor rule, and has failed to make it clear whether both characteristics (the fewness and the wealth of the rulers in the case of oligarchy, and their numbers and poverty in the case of democracy) are essential features of the two constitutions, or, if not, which of them is so. This question, however, requires an answer. A similar inquiry as to the nature of oligarchy and democracy occurs in 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 30 sqq. (where, however, no reference is made to the earlier discussion), but the inquiry contained in the chapter before us is far the more satisfactory of the two. See note on 1290 a 30. It should be noticed that though constitutions in which the rich, being a majority, rule on the ground of their wealth are here implied to be oligarchies, and constitutions in which the poor, being a minority, rule are implied to be democracies, no place is made for oligarchies and democracies of this type in the classification of forms of oligarchy and democracy contained in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.

**22.** †συμβαίνῃ†. See above on 1260 b 31, and critical note on 1279 b 22.

**32.** *τὴν ἐν ᾗ πλείους εὔποροι*, 'that in which there is a majority of rich men.' For *τὴν ἐν ᾗ* Bonitz (Ind. 495 a 14 sq.) compares Anal. Post. 1. 24. 85 b 36, *ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὅσα αἴτια οὕτως ὡς οὗ ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ.*

**38.** *διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ.* With *τὰς ῥηθείσας* I supply *αἰτίας* (not *πολιτείας*, as Bernays), and take these words to refer to *πλῆθος* and *ὀλιγότης*, translating thus—'hence' (i. e. because *πλῆθος* and *ὀλιγότης* are accidents and not *differentiae*) 'it also does not happen that the causes we have mentioned' (*πλῆθος* and *ὀλιγότης*) 'come to be causes of a difference between oligarchy and democracy.' Prof. Jowett (Politics 2. 124) and Prof. J. A. Stewart (*Class. Rev.* 9. 456) have anticipated me in this view of the passage. One *αἰτίας* is made to serve for two, much as one *μετέχειν* is made to serve for two in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 35, *ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος* (sc. *μετέχειν*), *μετέχειν μέντοι δυναμένους σχολάζειν.* See also note on 1326 a 34. For *αἰτίας διαφορᾶς* cp. 1280 a 5 and 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 33, *τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἐν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας.* A definition of a thing must not be built on a distinguishing feature which is only an accident and not present in every case (Top. 6. 6. 144 a 23, *σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει τῷ ὁριζομένῳ ἡ*

διαφορά· οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπαρχόντων ἐστί, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ γένος· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὴν διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν).

1280 a. 1. μέν, answered by ἀλλά, 3, marks the antithesis between that which is necessary and τὸ συμβεβηκός: it is on the former that the real διαφορά between oligarchy and democracy rests.

διὰ πλοῦτον, cp. 5, δι' ἃς αἰτίας (i. e. εὐπορίαν καὶ ἐλευθερίαν) ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας, and Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1161 a 2, οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις.

C. 9. 7. Ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον κ.τ.λ., 'we must first ascertain what distinguishing principles of oligarchy and democracy men put forward' [before we go on to examine their soundness], 'and what is the oligarchical and the democratic version of what is just.' Cp. c. 6. 1278 b 15, ὑποθετέον δὴ πρῶτον, and 7 (5). 2. 1302 a 17, ληπτέον καθόλου πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ. Liddell and Scott render ὅρος in passages like that before us as 'end' or 'aim,' comparing Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 2 sqq., but perhaps its meaning here is rather 'mark' or 'distinguishing principle' ('id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur,' Bon. Ind. 529 b 44): cp. Plato, Polit. 292 A.

8. τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. For the absence of the article before δημοκρατικόν, cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 37, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν.

9. πάντες is explained by Sus. as here = ἀμφότεροι. See Sus.[4] on the passage before us and on 1273 a 8. So in 40 πᾶσιν means 'for both': for this use of πάντες, 'ubi de duobus tantum agitur,' see Bon. Ind. 571 b 50 sqq.

ἅπτονται δικαίου τινός. Bonitz (Ind. 89 b 56) compares Eth. Eud. 2. 10. 1227 a 1, εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἅπτονταί γέ πῃ τῆς ἀληθείας: De Gen. et Corr. 1. 7. 324 a 15, ἅπτεσθαι τῆς φύσεως. Cp. also Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 21, καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ λίαν ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅπῃ ψαύει τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ μυθῶδες. Δικαίου τινός, 'a just ground of claim,' 'a principle which is in a degree just.' Δίκαιόν τι is here contrasted with τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον, as in 22 with τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον.

10. μέχρι τινός, '[only] to a certain point': see note on 1282 a 36.

11. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. To show that the views of democrats and oligarchs as to what is just are only partially correct, Aristotle takes first a view prevalent among democrats and then (in

12) a view prevalent among oligarchs, and points out that neither is completely true. For *οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι*, cp. c. 12. 1282 b 18, Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 12, *εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν*, and Eurip. Phoeniss. 513 Bothe (547 Dindorf),

*σὺ δ' οὐκ ἀνέξει δωμάτων ἔχων ἴσον,*
*καὶ τῷδ' ἀπονεμεῖς; κᾆτα ποῦ 'στὶν ἡ δίκη;*

**ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις.** Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 11 sqq.

**12. καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι.** Cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 1, where see note.

**14. ἀφαιροῦσι**, 'take away,' 'strike off': *ἀφαιρεῖν* is here, as often elsewhere, opposed to *προστιθέναι*. It would seem, however, from 19, *τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι*, that the advocates of oligarchy and democracy did not ignore the fact that the determination of what is just involves a question of persons, but that they each gave a different answer to this question and, as it turns out, a wrong one.

**15. σχεδὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.** For the thought cp. c. 16. 1287 b 2 sq. and Xen. Hell. 5. 3. 10, *λεγόντων δὲ τῶν κατελθόντων, καὶ τίς αὕτη δίκη εἴη, ὅπου αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δικάζοιεν, οὐδὲν εἰσήκουον.*

**16. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and so, since what is just is relative to persons and is divided in the same way in respect of the things distributed and the persons who receive them' (i. e. since a just allotment of things to A and B will correspond with and follow the just claims of A and B respectively), 'as has been said before in the ethical discussions, they agree as to the equality of the thing, but differ as to the equality of the persons.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 14–24, and esp. 20, *καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς.* For *διῄρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κ.τ.λ.*, cp. (with Jackson and Stewart) Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 b 3, *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός· διῄρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ἃ* (i. e. if the one person stands to the other in the proportion of two to one, a just distribution will make the things stand to each other in the same proportion). Both in this passage and in that before us we have the perfect, not the present—*διῄρηται*, not *διαιρεῖται*: as to this use of the perfect see Vahlen on Poet. 5. 1449 b 9 (p. 114), quoted below on 1282 b 24. I have translated *τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι*, 'they agree as to the equality of the thing, but differ as to the equality of the persons,' but there is a further question what these words exactly mean. Perhaps 'they agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing,

but differ as to what constitutes equality in the persons.' For *τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα* cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19, *τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας*.

**20. διότι.** '*Διότι* non raro usurpatur pro verbo *ὅτι*, veluti . . . Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a 20 (quamquam ibi causalem vim habere potest),' observes Bonitz, Ind. 200 b 43 (see his remarks in 45 sqq.). Bernays and Susemihl render *διότι* by 'because' in the passage before us, but I incline (with Bonitz and Mr. Welldon) to the rendering 'that': *διότι* may well be used in place of *ὅτι* because *ἅρτι* precedes.

**22. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 28 sqq., which agrees with what is said here. Cp. also Plato, Protag. 331 E, *ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κἂν πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχῃ τὸ ὅμοιον*.

**24. ἐλευθερίᾳ.** See vol. i. p. 248, note 1, as to the meaning of this word.

**25. τὸ κυριώτατον** evidently is the aim with which the *πόλις* was founded.

**εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1131 b 29, *καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα*, and 8. 16. 1163 a 30 sqq.

**τῶν κτημάτων.** See above on 1258 a 33.

**26. ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνῆλθον.** *Κοινωνία* is possible without *τὸ συνελθεῖν*: cp. 1280 b 17 sqq., and esp. 1280 b 25.

**27. ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος.** Cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. *Οὐ γὰρ εἶναι κ. τ. λ.*, sc. *φασί*, appears to explain *ὁ λόγος*.

**30. οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγινομένων,** 'neither of the original sum nor of the accruing profits,' for Bernays can hardly be right in rendering these words 'whether it be the first founders of the company or their successors' ('mögen es nun die ersten Begründer der Gesellschaft oder deren Rechtsnachfolger sein'). These words seem to be epexegetic of *τῶν ἑκατὸν μνῶν*, 29, and to be, like them, in the gen. after *μετέχειν*. Sharing in the hundred minae includes sharing not only in the sum originally contributed, but also in the profits accruing from it. The word *ἐπιγένημα* is often used in the Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus in the sense of 'surplus.' Cp. also *ἐπέλαβεν* in 1. 11. 1259 a 27 sq.

**31. εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἕνεκεν κ.τ.λ.** Yet in c. 6. 1278 b 24 we are told *συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ*, and in 1. 2. 1252 b 29 the *πόλις* is said to come into existence for the sake of life, though it exists for the sake of good life. The protasis which

begins here expires in 36 sqq. without being succeeded by an apodosis. If an apodosis had followed, it would evidently have been to the effect of *διόπερ ὅσοι κ.τ.λ.*, 1281 a 4 sqq.

**32.** *καὶ γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ.* For *τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων* see above on 1254 b 23, and cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 57, line 31. Slaves do not share in *εὐδαιμονία* (compare—with Mr. Congreve—Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1177 a 8, *εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου*), nor in life in accordance with *προαίρεσις*: in this they might share without sharing in *εὐδαιμονία* (they might live, for instance, in accordance with a vicious *προαίρεσις*, which would not bring them *εὐδαιμονία*). That slaves have not *προαίρεσις*, we see from Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 12 (cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 6, *καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν*). The citizen of the best State is *ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν*, and no citizen can act the part of a citizen without *προαίρεσις*. The notion of a 'city of slaves' is as old as Hecataeus (Fragm. 318: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 24), and there was a proverb *ἐστὶ καὶ δούλων πόλις, ἐπὶ τῶν πονηρῶς πολιτευομένων* (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 411) and a counter-proverb *οὐκ ἔστι δούλων πόλις· διὰ τὸ σπάνιον εἴρηται* (ibid. 1. 324, 433). Just as there were those who knew where to look for the mythical land 'where mice eat iron' (Herondas 3. 75: Crusius, Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas, p. 73), so there were those who found a 'local habitation' for 'the city of slaves.' Hecataeus said that it was in Libya (Fragm. 318), and was followed by Ephorus (Paroem. Gr. 1. 433, note: cp. 2. 371); others placed it in Crete or Egypt; in a fragment of the *Σερίφιοι* of the elder Cratinus (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 133) we read

> *εἶτα Σάκας ἀφικνεῖ καὶ Σιδονίους καὶ Ἐρεμβούς,*
> *ἔς τε πόλιν δούλων, ἀνδρῶν νεοπλουτοπονήρων,*
> *αἰσχρῶν, Ἀνδροκλέων, Διονυσιοκουροπυρώνων,*

on which see Meineke's note, and cp. Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 506. On the other hand, Anaxandrides, who was a senior contemporary of Aristotle, placed in the mouth of one of the characters of his *Ἀγχίσης* the lines (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 162),

> *οὐκ ἔστι δούλων, ὦ 'γάθ', οὐδαμοῦ πόλις,*
> *τύχη δὲ πάντα μεταφέρει τὰ σώματα,*

and perhaps they are present to Aristotle's memory here. Meineke (Fr. Com. Gr. 5. xl) refers to Lehrs, Ep. Qu. p. 85 on the subject,

might appeal from their decision to a third State (*ἔκληητος πόλις*). What the provisions of the *σύμβολα* between Etruria and Carthage were, we have no means of knowing. As to *σύμβολα* see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 1. 2. 432, ed. Thumser, and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 432 sqq., and Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 380 sqq. *Γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας*, for not all alliances were in writing (Polyb. 3. 25. 3).

**40.** *ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀρχαὶ* κ.τ.λ. Peloponnesus is regarded by Polybius (2. 37) as in his day all but one *πόλις*, inasmuch as it had the same laws, weights and measures, and coinage, and also the same magistrates, councillors, and dicasts, the only thing wanting being a common wall. *Πᾶσιν*, 'for both,' see above on 1280 a 9. *Ἐπὶ τούτοις* is rendered by Sus. and Welldon 'to secure these objects' (cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 14), but Bonitz (Ind. 268 b 8) groups this passage with 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 22, *τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις τεταγμένας*, and evidently interprets *ἐπὶ τούτοις* 'over these things,' 'charged with jurisdiction over these matters.' I incline on the whole to follow Bonitz. Cf. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 37, *ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἀρχαὶ πλείους εἰσίν.*

1280 b. **1.** For the construction, if *τοῦ* is omitted before *ποίους* (with $M^a$ $P^1$ Vat. Pal. and perhaps Γ), cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1232 b 6, *καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος τί δοκεῖ ἐνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν*, but the construction with the genitive is far more usual. For the thought cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 29, *τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν.* That members of the same State seek to make each other good had been pointed out in a famous passage of the discourse of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 327 A sq., where the speaker says, *λυσιτελεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή.*

**5.** *περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας.* *Πολιτικῆς*, not *συμμαχικῆς*. The word is emphatic, and there can be little doubt that Γ $M^a$ pr. $P^1$ are wrong in omitting it. These MSS. are prone to omit words; they also give the next word *διασκοποῦσιν* in a corrupt form. For *ἀρετῆς πολιτικῆς* cp. 1281 a 6, *κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις*, where, as in the passage before us, *κατ' ἀρετήν* follows in the next line, and 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 42, *τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν* (where see note). Cp. also Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 232, *αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐ κυκλίων χορῶν κριταὶ καθεστηκότες, ἀλλὰ νόμων καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς*, and Plato, Protag. 322 E. We expect *οἱ μιᾶς πόλεως πολῖται* in place of *ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας*,

but Aristotle probably remembers that not all *πόλεις* cared for the promotion of virtue in their citizens. Hence he prefers to appeal here, as he does in 2. 5. 1263 a 31 sq. and Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 a 18 sqq., to the practice of those who care for *εὐνομία*, or in other words of those who are truly *πολιτικοί*, for *εὐνομία* is the end of the political science (see above on 1253 a 37, and Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 14, Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 b 18), and of any *πόλις* which deserves the name (6 sqq.). For *διασκοπεῖν*, 'to consider carefully,' cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 16, where it is contrasted with *συντόμως εἰπεῖν*, and Thuc. 7. 71. 6.

**6.** *ἢ καὶ φανερὸν* κ.τ.λ. For the construction *περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι* κ.τ.λ., Bonitz (Ind. 275 a 43 sq.) compares Hist. An. 3. 3. 513 a 14, *εἴ τινι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμελές*, and Metaph. E. 2. 1026 b 4. Not all *πόλεις* are regarded by Aristotle as making the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.: Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12, *ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς*: 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32), but he evidently thinks that all *πόλεις* which deserve the name should do so. Still, even where the *πόλις* failed to do this, much was done for virtue by other agencies at work within it, as we see from the address of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 325 C sqq. So that Aristotle's view that a *πόλις* omitting to make the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern becomes a mere 'alliance' does not seem to be altogether true.

**8.** *γίνεται γὰρ* κ.τ.λ., 'for otherwise,' etc. Sus., following Conring, reads *συμμαχιῶν* in place of *συμμάχων*, which is the reading of Γ Π, but *τῶν ἄποθεν συμμαχιῶν* is an awkward phrase needing to be justified by parallel instances, and we should probably supply *τῆς συμμαχίας* before *τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἄποθεν συμμάχων*. Cp. Plato, Rep. 375 A, *οἴει οὖν τι . . . διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίου σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεανίσκου εὐγενοῦς;* We have perhaps in *συμμάχων* a similar irregularity to that which often occurs in comparisons (see note on 1267 a 5, *μείζω ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων*, and cp. Meteor. 1. 4. 342 a 30, *σημεῖον δ' ἡ φαινομένη αὐτῶν ταχυτὴς ὁμοία οὖσα τοῖς ὑφ' ἡμῶν ῥιπτουμένοις*, and Xen. Cyrop. 5. 1. 4, *καὶ τοίνυν ὁμοίαν ταῖς δούλαις εἶχε τὴν ἐσθῆτα*). For *τῶν ἄποθεν συμμάχων* cp. Plut. Aquae et ignis comparatio, c. 11, *τῶν ἔξωθεν συμμάχων*.

**10.** *καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη* κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 389. As to the sophist Lycophron see above on 1255 a 32, and see Sus.[2], Note 552 (Sus.[4], 1. p. 393). In Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 10 he is

spoken of as a writer. 'Ο *σοφιστής* is added to distinguish this Lycophron from others who bore the same name. This view of the object of law was inherited by Epicurus: see Zeller, Stoics Epicureans and Sceptics, Eng. Trans., p. 462 sq., who refers to Diog. Laert. 10. 150, *τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι*: Stob. Floril. 43. 139, *οἱ νόμοι χάριν τῶν σοφῶν κεῖνται, οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶσιν, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἀδικῶνται*: Lucr. 5. 1143 sqq. To Schopenhauer 'the State is in essence nothing more than an institution designed for protection against external attacks directed against the whole and against internal attacks made by individuals on each other' (see the references in Frauenstädt's Schopenhauer-Lexikon 2. 343 sq.).

**12. ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους.** *Καὶ δικαίους* is added partly to explain *ἀγαθούς*, partly to sharpen the contrast with *τῶν δικαίων* in the preceding line. In much the same way we have *ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν* in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36, where *καὶ δικαιοσύνην* is added because Aristotle is about to prove that *ἀρετή* relative to the constitution exists by proving the existence of *δικαιοσύνη* relative to the constitution. Another reason for adding *καὶ δικαίους* in the passage before us may be that bravery is often connoted by *ἀγαθός* more than anything else (see note on 1338 b 31). Cp. Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1461, *ἐξ ἰδίων σπουδαίων καὶ δικαίων ἀνδρῶν*, Plato, Protag. 327 B, *ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή*, Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36, and Poet. 13. 1453 a 8.

*ὅτι δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον*, i. e. that the *πόλις* is not really a *πόλις*, if it does not care for the promotion of virtue. Aristotle proves this by showing that nothing short of participation in good life constitutes a *πόλις*, or at any rate what would be accepted as a *πόλις* by close inquirers (*οἱ ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦντες*, 1280 b 28)—that unity of site is not enough, even if combined with intermarriage, nor nearness, or even unity, of site combined with the exchange of products and laws for the punishment of persons wronging each other in that exchange.

**14. τοὺς τόπους**, 'the sites of two cities.'

**16. ἐπιγαμίας**, plural, as in 36 and in Rhet. 1. 14. 1375 a 10, and these are the only passages in Aristotle's writings in which the Index Aristotelicus notes the occurrence of the word.

*τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων*, 'one of those acts of communion which are characteristic of States.' As to the right of intermarriage see Hdt. 5. 92 and Thuc. 8. 21, referred to by Eaton,

passages which show that it did not always exist between members of the same *πόλις*. See also Plut. Thes. c. 13, from which it would seem that it did not exist between the two Attic demes Pallene and Hagnus, whether permanently or not, we are not told. Nor was it exclusively possessed by members of the same *πόλις*, for it was often granted by Greek States to the citizens of States on friendly terms with themselves (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 378 sq.). The word *κοινώνημα* occurs occasionally in Plato's writings, but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in those of Aristotle.

**19.** **ἀλλ' εἶησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν κ.τ.λ.**, 'but they had laws for the sake of preventing the infliction of mutual wrongs.' For the 'genetivus causalis et finalis,' *τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν*, see Bon. Ind. 149 b 13 sqq. Cp. Oecon. 1. 4. 1344 a 8, *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν νόμοι πρὸς γυναῖκα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀδικοῖτο.*

**20.** **οἷον εἰ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle has in his mind Plato's supposition in Rep. 369 A sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10 sqq. **Καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶεν μύριοι** is added, because he is not content with the four or eight members which Plato had implied were enough to constitute a *πόλις*, and wishes to place the *αὐτάρκεια ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις* of the imagined community beyond all question.

**25.** **οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες**, i. e. *κοινωνοῦντες ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας*. Cp. c. 1. 1275 a 32, *τοὺς οὕτω μετέχοντας*.

**26.** **καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.** We expect the optative of *βοηθεῖν* in place of *βοηθοῦντες*, but Aristotle continues the sentence as if *χρώμενοι μέντοι ταῖς ἰδίαις οἰκίαις ὥσπερ πόλεσιν* had preceded, and not *ἕκαστος μέντοι χρῷτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει.*

**28.** **τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν.** Cp. Demosth. Olynth. 1. 21, *ὡς δοκεῖ καὶ φήσειέ τις ἂν μὴ σκοπῶν ἀκριβῶς.*

**30.** **τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν.** **Τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν**, like *τῆς μεταδόσεως*, is dependent on *χάριν*: it is not dependent on *κοινωνία*.

**32.** **οὐ μὴν οὐδέ** 'his tantum locis inveni, Pol. 1280 b 32, Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 a 13' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 10).

**33.** **ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία κ.τ.λ.** Supply (with Bernays and others) *ἤδη πόλις ἐστίν*. Aristotle often insists, as he does here, that the necessary conditions of a thing are not the thing (this is implied, for instance, in c. 5. 1278 a 2 sq. and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.). What is exactly meant by the phrase 'the communion of

households and families in living well'? It stands in opposition to 25, *ἕκαστος μέντοι χρῶτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει*, and means that the several households and families do not live well singly, each within itself, but that they, as it were, throw their 'living well' into a common stock so that all share in it, and live well as members of a larger whole, the *πόλις*. The dative *καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι* designates the sharers: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, *πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς*, and see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61 sqq. for instances of a similar dative. The *πόλις* is not an union of single individuals but of *οἰκίαι* and *γένη* (= *κῶμαι*): cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 27 sqq., 2. 5. 1264 a 5 sqq., and the closing sentences of the interpolation in Strabo, p. 419, quoted above on 1278 b 19.

**35.** *τοῦτο*, i.e. *ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία κ.τ.λ.*

**36.** *διὸ κ.τ.λ.* 'Hence,' i. e. because *ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία* cannot be realized without dwelling in the same place and intermarrying, or in other words without *τὸ συζῆν*, various forms of *τὸ συζῆν* came into being in States. *Κηδεῖαι, φρατρίαι, θυσίαι*, and *διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν* bring together the households and *γένη* of which the *πόλις* consists, and enable them to realize 'communion in good life.' The omission of any mention of the tribe is significant. It was probably too large, and at Athens too scattered, to be of much value as a means of *τὸ συζῆν*. There may well have been some who regarded *τὸ συζῆν* as the end of the State (cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1234 b 22, *τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργον εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι φίλους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ' ἀλλήλων*): hence the pains which Aristotle takes to point out that it is only a means to that end. Compare his language in c. 6. 1278 b 20 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 19, *ἔνιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίγνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα καὶ συνουσίας. πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐοίκασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον.* There was a risk that the *πόλις* might be regarded as existing for the sake of pleasure like *θίασοι* and *ἔρανοι*, or at any rate might be bracketed with marriage and the phratry as a means primarily to *τὸ συζῆν*. Aristotle is all the more anxious to show that the end of the *πόλις* is not *τὸ συζῆν* but *τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, because he is thus enabled to draw the conclusion which he draws at the end of the chapter, that virtuous men have a claim to a larger share in the *πόλις* than the rich or the *ἐλεύθεροι*. Just as Plato had spoken of festivals in Laws 653 D as a means by which men correct

and complete their education (cp. 828 A, where he takes up the subject of festivals for treatment immediately after that of education), so Aristotle regards affinities and phratries and sacrifices and ways of passing time pleasantly together as aiding in the realization of a 'communion in good life.' Another use of social ties of this kind was that they served to protect the individual from wrong, as we see from Plato, Laws 729 E, *ἔρημος γὰρ ὢν ὁ ξένος ἑταίρων τε καὶ ξυγγενῶν ἐλεεινότερος ἀνθρώποις καὶ θεοῖς*, but a reference to this would not be to the point here. Compare the enumeration of social ties in Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 23, *ἡμεῖς δέ, οἷς ἱερὰ καὶ τάφοι προγόνων ὑπάρχουσιν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι καὶ διατριβαὶ καὶ συνήθειαι μεθ' ὑμῶν ἐλευθέριοι καὶ γάμοι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ κηδεσταὶ καὶ τέκνα κ.τ.λ.* I take *διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν* to mean 'modes of passing time belonging to social life': cp. (with Bonitz, Ind. 710 a 38) Eth. Nic. 4. 13. 1127 a 17, *ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται. Διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν* are tacitly contrasted with *διαγωγαί* not *τοῦ συζῆν*, such as, for instance, solitary contemplation. I prefer this interpretation to those of Stahr ('Vereine für den Zweck heiterer Geselligkeit') and Bernays ('Belustigungen zur Beförderung des Zusammenlebens'), in which *τοῦ συζῆν* is taken to mean 'for the purpose of social life.' Common sacrifices and festivals were all the more necessary to ancient City-States, because their citizens usually dwelt scattered over the territory, and not concentrated in the city, like those of many mediaeval City-States.

**38.** *τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον.* The point of this remark, which is not at first sight evident, becomes so if we translate, 'but that which has just been mentioned' (i. e. *τὸ συζῆν*) 'is the business of friendship, [not the end of the *πόλις*].'

**40.** *κωμῶν* is added in explanation of *γενῶν* (cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 16 sqq.).

**1.** *τοῦτο*, i. e. *ζωὴ τελεία καὶ αὐτάρκης.* 1281 a.

*ὡς φαμέν*, cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 a 38, *εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.*

**4.** *διόπερ κ.τ.λ.* Compare 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq. *Τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν*, i. e. *τὴν τῶν καλῶν πράξεων χάριν συνεστηκυῖαν κοινωνίαν.*

**8.** *ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Πάντες* here means 'both,' as in 1280 a 9, and *μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου*, 'only a part of what is just.' For the suppression of 'only' see below on 1282 a 36.

**11.** *Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ.* So far the question discussed has been who have the best claim to a superior share in the *πόλις*, but C. 10.

now Aristotle asks what the supreme authority of the State should be, for we have been told in c. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq. that the nature of the constitution depends on the award made of supreme authority in the State. In the discussion which commences here Aristotle probably has before him Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq., where Pericles is compelled by Alcibiades to admit that a law imposed by force whether by a tyrant, the few, or the many, is not law but lawlessness. Compare also Plutarch, Ad Princ. Inerudit. c. 4, *οἱ παλαιοὶ οὕτω λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσι καὶ διδάσκουσιν, ὡς ἄνευ δίκης ἄρχειν μηδὲ τοῦ Διὸς καλῶς δυναμένου.*

**12.** For **ἢ γάρ τοι** Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 72) compares Phys. 8. 3. 254 a 18, adding that *τοι* appears to belong to *ἤ*, not to *γάρ*.

**13.** For the juxtaposition of **ἕνα πάντων** cp. c. 13. 1283 b 18, c. 14. 1285 a 2, c. 16. 1287 a 11, and 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 15.

**ἢ τύραννον.** If we hold that the Good should be supreme, then we shall have to allow that the One Best should be supreme, and so again, if we hold that the rich should be supreme, we shall have to allow that the One Richest, or in other words a tyrant, should be supreme: cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22, *εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι, τυραννὶς (καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἷς ἔχῃ πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος).*

**ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν.** Compare the very similar sentence in 2. 8. 1268 b 3, *ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν*, where also we have the emphatic order *ταῦτα πάντα* ('every one of these things'). See critical note on 1282 a 40.

**14. ἂν οἱ πένητες κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 24 sqq. and Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 43 sqq. *Τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;* 'is this not unjust?' The answer to this question is given by a supporter of the supremacy of the Many—'No, for by Zeus it was justly decreed by the supreme authority'—to which Aristotle replies, 'Then what are we to say is the extreme of injustice, if not this?' *Δικαίως*, not 'with full legal validity' (as Sus. 'auf durchaus rechtsgültige Weise'), but 'justly,' for what the supreme authority decides is *ipso facto* just. *Δικαίως* is severed from *ἔδοξε*, the word which it qualifies, for the sake of emphasis: see notes on 1255 a 21, 1265 b 15, and 1323 a 36, and Holden on Xen. Oecon. 2. 8. Vict. and some others take *τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως* together ('summam potestatem habenti iuste'), but not, I think, rightly. *Νὴ Δία* occurs also in c. 11. 1281 b 18, but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other

instance from Aristotle's writings. In both these passages the expression is used asseveratively to introduce a statement which may be strongly affirmed.

**17.** πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, 'and again, taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty.' For πάντων ληφθέντων see above on 1254 b 15, and cp. λαμβανομένων, c. 13. 1283 a 42. Bernays, followed by Susemihl, translates these words 'nachdem [den Reichen] Alles genommen worden,' but I cannot think that they are right. Mr. Welldon translates rightly, 'take the whole body of citizens.' Aristotle here, in fact, turns to consider the case of the Many despoiling the Few of their property, whether those Few are rich or poor.

**19.** ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἥ γ' ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ., 'but certainly it is not virtue that destroys the thing which possesses it,' so that the measures of spoliation just referred to cannot be the outcome of virtue. Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 15, *ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν*, and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 12 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 235),

*μειράκιον, οὔ μοι κατανοεῖν δοκεῖς ὅτι*
*ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἕκαστα κακίας σήπεται.*

**20.** οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, *τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις*. The just is the political good (c. 12. 1282 b 16), and 'the good of each thing preserves it' (2. 2. 1261 b 9: cp. Plato, Rep. 608 E sqq.).

**21.** καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον, i. e. the law by which supreme authority is given to the majority, no less than that by which supreme authority is given to the poor. So we read in c. 17. 1288 a 14, *κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς*. Where a depreciatory meaning is intended to be conveyed, as perhaps here, *οὗτος* is often placed by Aristotle after its substantive—e. g. in 2. 3. 1262 a 13, 2. 6. 1265 b 16, 18, 1266 a 1, 2. 9. 1271 a 1, 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 28, and 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 23. But *οὗτος* is often placed after its substantive where this is not the case.

**22.** ἔτι καὶ τὰς πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This was the greatest of paradoxes, for a tyrant was commonly regarded as the incarnation of injustice (4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35 sqq.: Plato, Rep. 344 A).

**26.** διαρπάζωσι. Bernays takes *διαρπάζειν* to be here used absolutely ('rauben'), but Susemihl supplies *τὸ πλῆθος* ('das Volk plündern'), and Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) *τὰ κτήματα τοῦ πλήθους*. I incline to follow Bonitz (see also Liddell and Scott), for Aristotle some-

times introduces a necessary word later than we expect: see for instance 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 31 and 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 1, where δύνασθαι comes in late; also 2. 6. 1264 b 35 (*μετέχουσι*), 3. 6. 1279 a 20 (*πᾶσαι*), 3. 8. 1279 b 15 (*τι*), and 1. 2. 1252 a 33 (*φύσει*).

**28.** τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, who will not plunder anybody. As to the danger arising from a mass of ἄτιμοι see note on 1281 b 28.

**34.** ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Plato, Laws 713 E sqq., where States are advised to place themselves under the rule of law, since a god is no longer forthcoming, as in the days of Cronus, *εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἢ ὀλιγαρχία τις ἢ καὶ δημοκρατία ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι τούτων δεομένην, στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀνηνύτῳ καὶ ἀπλήστῳ κακῷ νοσήματι ξυνεχομένην, ἄρξει δὴ πόλεως ἥ τινος ἰδιώτου καταπατήσας ὁ τοιοῦτος τοὺς νόμους . . . οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή.* Cp. also c. 15. 1286 a 16 sqq. Long before Plato, however, Pittacus had declared in favour of the rule of law (Diod. 9. 27. 4: Diog. Laert. 1. 77). See below on 1286 a 7.

**36.** ἂν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Plato had omitted to guard himself by explaining that the rule of law which he recommended must be the rule of good law. 'The Englishman in America will feel that this is slavery—that it is *legal* slavery, will be no compensation, either to his feelings or his understanding' (Burke, Speech on American Taxation: Works, ed. Bohn, 1. 433). Burke goes still further elsewhere when he says that 'bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.' Aristotle, however, finds in the Sixth Book (6 (4). cc. 4–5) and elsewhere a great difference between democracies or oligarchies in which law (i. e. democratic or oligarchical law) is supreme and those in which it is not.

C. 11. **40.** ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Λύεσθαι has been translated in many different ways. Vict. translates δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι 'videretur solvi,' and Lamb. 'videatur esse expeditum ac solutum.' Bernays translates the words in what I take to be a similar way ('scheint sich befriedigend zu erledigen'). Bonitz appears to explain λύεσθαι here as 'to be refuted' (which is also the rendering of Mr. Welldon), for in Ind. 439 a 20 sqq. he groups the passage before us with passages (Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 b 6: Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 27 and 7. 13. 1153 a 29) in which the word bears this meaning, but, if we interpret λύεσθαι thus, it seems to be little in harmony with the words which follow immediately. Sus. translates 'gegen die angeregten Bedenken vertheidigen zu lassen' ('to be susceptible

of defence against the doubts raised about it'), but it is not easy to get this meaning out of the Greek, and he does not seem himself to be satisfied with his rendering, for he holds that the text is unsound in λύεσθαι—ἀλήθειαν. If we retain λύεσθαι, I should be disposed to follow Vict. in his rendering of the word and to translate, 'but [the apparent paradox] that the Many ought rather to be supreme than the Few Best would appear to receive a solution' (cp. Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 a 19, *ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτω τ' ἐνδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτως, ἐκ νυκτὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, λύοιτ' ἂν ταῦτα*, where Bonitz explains 'diremptae sunt hae quaestiones,' and Grote, Aristotle, 2. 377, 'we may consider the problem as solved'). But there is some strangeness in *ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.* followed by λύεσθαι in this sense, and I strongly suspect either that some word has dropped out before or after λύεσθαι, such as δεῖν, or that λύεσθαι is corrupt. Perhaps we should read λείπεσθαι ('to remain as a possible alternative') in place of it. The Few Best had found a panegyrist in Heraclitus (Fragm. 111 Bywater, *τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν; [δήμων] ἀοιδοῖσι ἕπονται καὶ διδασκάλῳ χρέωνται ὁμίλῳ, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πολλοὶ κακοὶ ὀλίγοι δὲ ἀγαθοί· αἱρεῦνται γὰρ ἓν ἀντία πάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέναον θνητῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ὅκωσπερ κτήνεα*: cp. Eurip. Fragm. 358,

*(ἐσθλοὺς ἐγὼ)*
*ὀλίγους ἐπαινῶ μᾶλλον ἢ πολλοὺς κακούς,*

where *ἐσθλοὺς ἐγώ* is added *e conj.*, but probably rightly, by Hense, and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16, *οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ὀρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς*). But it is especially because Plato in the Republic had placed his ideal State in the hands of the Few Best (see Rep. 503 A sqq.) that Aristotle takes pains both here and in c. 13. 1283 b 20–35 to show that if superior virtue gives a claim to political power, the Many have solid claims on that ground to such political power, at any rate, as they can exercise when gathered in an assembly and converted as it were into a single human being. We must not take him, however, to assert that a constitution in which the Few Best and a popular assembly of good type divide the powers of the State between them in this fashion is the best possible constitution; on the contrary, the best constitution is that in which all the citizens are men of complete excellence (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). His aim in the Eleventh Chapter, as in the Ninth, is in the main a negative and critical one—to overthrow the exclusive claims of the Few Best, just as in

the Ninth he overthrows the exclusive claims of the rich and the ἐλεύθεροι.

**41.** καί τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν. See above on 1275 b 34.

**42.** κἄν. 'Ipsum κἄν non sequente εἰ ita usurpatur ut a simplice καί vix distinguatur' (Bon. Ind. 41 a 36, where instances of this are given).

τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here probably remembers Hom. Il. 13. 237,

ξυμφερτὴ δ' ἀρετὴ πέλει ἀνδρῶν καὶ μάλα λυγρῶν.

1281 b. **1.** σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ. See vol. i. p. 293.

ὅμως stands in opposition to ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ. Compare its use in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς, and in De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 7 sqq., in both which passages the opposition is of a similarly indirect character.

**2.** ἐκείνων, 'the Few Best.'

οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστον. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 12.

οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 15. 1286 a 29, ὥσπερ ἑστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἁπλῆς: Hesiod, Op. et Dies 722 sq.: St. Jerome, Epist. 26, c. 4.

**4.** πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων κ.τ.λ., 'for each of them, numerous as they are, may have a share of virtue and prudence, and the Many, when they have come together, just as they become one man with many feet and many hands and many senses, may likewise become one man with many excellences of character and intelligence.' Supply ἐνδέχεται from 1 with ἔχειν, 4. Ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως is taken up by τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, 7. For συνελθόντων, where συνελθόντας might have been used (it is the reading of some of the less good MSS.), see notes on 13 and 1335 b 19, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 6. 744 a 15 sqq. and De Gen. et Corr. 1. 4. 319 b 10 sqq. As to the gain of having many eyes, ears, hands, and feet, see c. 16. 1287 b 26 sqq. The Lacedaemonians dedicated a statue of Apollo with four hands and four ears, as he had appeared to the combatants in a battle near Amyclae (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 22 : 2. 264); the Erinnys is conceived by Sophocles (Electr. 488) as having many hands and feet; we read of beings like Geryon (see vol. i. p. 256, note 5, and Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 795 C); and Aristotle imagines the same multiplicity extended to moral and intellectual gifts. He perhaps remembers in the passage before us Aristoph. Ran. 675 Didot,

*Μοῦσα, χορῶν ἱερῶν ἐπίβηθι καὶ ἕλθ' ἐπὶ τέρψιν ἀοιδᾶς ἐμᾶς,*
*τὸν πολὺν ὀψομένη λαῶν ὄχλον, οὗ σοφίαι*
*μυρίαι κάθηνται.*

Compare also Eurip. Bacch. 359 Bothe (427 Dindorf),

*σοφὰν δ' ἀπέχειν πραπίδα φρένα τε περισσῶν παρὰ φωτῶν·*
*τὸ πλῆθος ὅ τι τὸ φαυλότερον*
*ἐνόμισε χρῆταί τε, τόδε τοι λέγοιμ' ἄν,*

and Xen. Cyrop. 4. 3. 21, where Chrysantas says that the mounted horseman gets the advantage of his horse's ears and eyes as well as his own, and thus comes to be something better than a centaur, for a centaur has only two eyes and two ears. The thought that the Many gathered in an assembly become, as it were, one man recurs in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 11 sqq. Plato had already (Rep. 493 A sqq.) compared the Many under these circumstances to a *θρέμμα μέγα καὶ ἰσχυρόν*, but had regarded the opinions of this great creature, whether on questions of drawing, or music, or politics (493 D), as the reverse of wise, and the Sausage-seller in the Equites of Aristophanes (752 sqq. Didot) finds the Athenian Demos far cleverer at home than in the Pnyx (cp. Demosth. Prooem. 14. p. 1427). On the other hand, bodies of men acting as a whole have sometimes been credited by good observers with a superiority to the individuals composing them taken singly. Thus 'Canning used to say that the House of Commons as a body had better taste than the man of best taste in it, and I am very much inclined to think that Canning was right' (Letter of Lord Macaulay, Feb. 1831: Life and Letters, 1. 174). 'The quick and correct feeling of the House of Commons as a body is very striking' (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in 1820: Life by S. Lane-Poole, 1. 294). The House of Commons, it is true, is a more or less picked assembly. Compare, however, also Plin. Epist. 7. 17. 10, opinor, quia in numero ipso est quoddam magnum conlatumque consilium, quibusque singulis iudicii parum, omnibus plurimum.

7. **τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.** For the distinction between *τὰ ἤθη* and *ἡ διάνοια*, which evidently repeats *ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως*, 4, Bonitz (Ind. 185 b 61) compares 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 38 sq.

**διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον κ.τ.λ.**, 'hence' (i. e. because they possess as a Whole these manifold excellences of character and intelligence) 'the Many [not only are better than the Few, but] also judge better both works of music and works of the poets.' Socrates was of a different opinion (Diog. Laert. 2. 42: 3. 5), and Plato also (Rep.

493 A sqq.: Laws 670 B, *γελοῖος γὰρ ὅ γε πολὺς ὄχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γιγνώσκειν τό τε εὔαρμοστον καὶ εὔρυθμον καὶ μή*, and 700 A–701 B). Aristotle here (speaking to some extent aporetically) echoes the compliments which it was the fashion for comic poets to shower on their audiences (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 51: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 192),

*χαῖρ', ὦ μέγ' ἀχρειόγελως ὅμιλε, ταῖς ἐπίβδαις,*
*τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτὴς ἄριστε πάντων.*

**10. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ κ.τ.λ.**, 'but it is just in this that men of complete excellence differ from each individual of the Many.' I follow Vict. Giph. Bern. and Sus. in my rendering of *διαφέρουσιν*. Sepulv. Lamb. and Welldon render it 'are superior to,' but the former rendering suits 16 sq. and 19 sq. better. Plato had claimed (Rep. 484 sqq.: compare the picture drawn of Theaetetus in Theaet. 144 A sq.) that there was an union of many great qualities in the philosophic nature, and Aristotle says the same thing of the *σπουδαῖος*. For *οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν* cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 316, *τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν*.

**11. ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ.**, 'as indeed men say that beautiful persons differ from those who are not beautiful and pictures done by art from the original objects.' For other instances of the chiasmus which we note in *ὥσπερ*, 11—*ἀληθινῶν*, 12, see note on 1277 a 31. For *τῶν ἀληθινῶν*, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 19, *τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις*. Sus.[2] (Note 566: Sus.[4], 1. p. 399) has already referred to the remark addressed by Socrates to Parrhasius in Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 2, and Vict. and Giph., followed by many others, to the mode in which Zeuxis obtained the ideal of womanly beauty which he depicted in his Helen. See Brunn, Geschichte der griech. Künstler 2. 80, 88 (referred to by Vahlen and Sus.), and Overbeck, Antiken Schriftquellen Nos. 1667–9, where Cic. De Invent. 2. 1. 3 is quoted, tum Crotoniatae publico de consilio virgines unum in locum conduxerunt et pictori, quam vellet, eligendi potestatem dederunt. Ille autem quinque delegit . . . Neque enim putavit omnia quae quaereret ad venustatem in corpore uno se reperire posse ideo quod nihil simplici in genere omnibus ex partibus perfectum natura expolivit.

**13. ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε**, 'since if we conceive them' (i. e. *τὰ συνηγμένα εἰς ἕν*) 'to be separated from each other.' Here, as often elsewhere (see above on 1254 b 34), *ἐπεὶ . . . γε* 'justifies what precedes by pointing out what would result if the contrary were

the case.' As to the genitive absolute *κεχωρισμένων*, see Bonitz on Metaph. A. 9. 990 b 14, *νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος*. 'Omissi in genitivis absolutis subiecti exempla ex Aristotele congessit Waitz ad Hermen. 10. 19 b 37, ex aliis scriptoribus Krüger, Gr. Gr. § 47. 4, 3. Usurpantur autem genitivi absoluti, cum per leges grammaticas videatur participium ad nomen quoddam ipsius enunciati primarii referendum fuisse (*νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος* idem quod *νοεῖν τι φθαρέν*), quo maiore vi participium, seiunctum illud ab enunciatione primaria, pronuncietur, cf. Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 561, Krüger l. l. § 47. 4, 2. Exempla Aristotelica contulit Waitz ad An. Pr. 2. 4. 57 a 33.' Thus in the passage before us *κεχωρισμένον* might well have taken the place of *κεχωρισμένων*, and this reading is actually given by Γ and in a blundered form by $M^a$, but *κεχωρισμένων* is certainly right. Waitz on De Interp. 10. 19 b 37 compares among other passages Probl. 35. 4. 965 a 1, *τὰ σώματα θιγγανόντων ψυχεινότερά ἐστι τοῦ θέρους ἢ τοῦ χειμῶνος*: see also Bon. Ind. 149 b 37 sqq.

**15.** *εἰ μὲν οὖν* κ.τ.λ. *Μὲν οὖν* here introduces a slight qualification of what has been said (see above on 1252 b 27 sqq. and 1253 a 10): it is answered by *ἀλλά*, 20. For *περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος*, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12, *ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους*, and other passages in which the two words are used in much the same sense, e. g. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24 sq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sq. The almost tautological repetition is for the sake of emphasis (see notes on 1323 b 29 and 1325 b 10). Aristotle probably remembers a remark of Socrates recorded in Diog. Laert. 2. 34, *πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἀξιόλογον πλῆθος ἔφασκε* (Σωκράτης) *ὅμοιον εἴ τις τετράδραχμον ἐν ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωρὸν ὡς δόκιμον ἀποδέχοιτο*, and see vol. i. p. 256, note 1.

**18.** For *νὴ Δία* see above on 1281 a 14.

*ἐνίων*, sc. *δήμων*, and so *ἔνιοι*, 20.

*ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς* κ.τ.λ., 'for [if we claimed that every kind of demos possesses this superiority over the Few Good,] the same argument would hold in the case of brutes also, [which is absurd:] and yet what difference is there, so to speak, between some kinds of demos and brutes?' Aristotle refers in *ἔνιοι* especially to cases in which the demos is composed of *βάναυσοι ἀγοραῖοι* and *θῆτες*, and is therefore of a servile type (cp. 1282 a 15, *ἂν ᾖ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες*, and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24 sqq.). The *βάναυσος* and the *θής* have been ranked with slaves in c. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq., and the slave comes very near to the brute (1. 5. 1254 b 24 sqq.). The Many had been compared to brutes by Heràclitus (Fragm. 111, quoted above on

1281 a 40), by Plato (Rep. 496 C sq.), and by Aristotle himself (Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 19 sq.).

**21.** διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τούτων κ.τ.λ. The question referred to is that raised in c. 10. 1281 a 11, *τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.* Isocrates had already declared for a similar solution of the question (Areopag. § 26, *ὡς δὲ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, ἐκεῖνοι διεγνωκότες ἦσαν ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν δῆμον ὥσπερ τύραννον καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων, τοὺς δὲ σχολὴν ἄγειν δυναμένους καὶ βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ οἰκέτας . . . καίτοι πῶς ἄν τις εὕροι ταύτης βεβαιοτέραν ἢ δικαιοτέραν δημοκρατίαν, τῆς τοὺς μὲν δυνατωτάτους ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις καθιστάσης, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὸν δῆμον κύριον ποιούσης;*). 'Half the interest of the chapter before us lies in this, that in it Aristotle supports the views of Isocrates against those of his master Plato. There are no doubt some expressions in the passage just quoted of which Aristotle would not approve; he would also, it would seem, wish the magistracies to be in the hands of the Few Best rather than of *οἱ σχολὴν ἄγειν δυνάμενοι καὶ βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένοι*, though this is not quite clear, for in 1282 a 31 sq. he connects the *ἐπιεικεῖς* of 1282 a 26 with the possession of high property-qualifications.

**24.** ὅσοι μήτε πλούσιοι κ.τ.λ. For the omission of *εἰσίν* see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 5, *καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς*, is compared among other passages. For *ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν*, 'possess no ground of claim in respect of virtue,' cp. 2. 5. 1264 b 8 sqq. and Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 33, *μηδὲ ἔχων ἀρετῆς ὁμολογούμενον ἀξίωμα καὶ δόξης.*

**25.** τὸ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If we supply *φήσειεν ἄν τις εἶναι* with *οὐκ ἀσφαλές* from *λύσειεν ἄν τις*, 22, we shall thus be able to explain the infinitives *ἀδικεῖν ἄν* (which Sus., following Rassow, would alter into *ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη*) and *ἁμαρτάνειν*. Aristotle is still expressing the views which the imaginary *τις* of 22 might entertain. See notes on 1259 a 39 and 1280 a 27. Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 51, explains these infinitives as 'dependent on the thought contained in what precedes,' and refers to Waitz on Hermen. 19 a 23. The strong language here used as to the *ἀφροσύνη* and *ἀδικία* of the Many as individuals recalls the language of the Persian Megabyzus in Hdt. 3. 81, *ὁμίλου γὰρ ἀχρηίου οὐδέν ἐστι ἀξυνετώτερον οὐδὲ ὑβριστότερον*, and that of Plato in Rep. 496 C sq., where *μανία* and *ἀδικία* are ascribed

to them; Aristotle himself, if he were expressing his own views, would perhaps use milder terms.

**28.** τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν. Supply ἀρχῆς with μεταδιδόναι and μετέχειν, and εἶναι with φοβερόν. For the risks attending the presence in a Greek State of many ἄτιμοι see [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 12 sq. and Plut. Ages. c. 30. Cp. also 2. 12. 1274 a 17, μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου (i. e. τοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν) κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος, and 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq.

**31.** λείπεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν, cp. c. 1. 1275 b 18, ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς, where κριτικῆς = δικαστικῆς, as appears from 1275 b 16, τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ δικάζειν. Hence τὸ κρίνειν in the passage before us probably means 'judging,' but as Aristotle is speaking of functions exercised by the whole demos gathered in one assembly, and not broken up into a number of dicasteries, he must refer to the judicial functions which fell to the popular assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 3 sqq.). When the holders of magistracies are said in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq. βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρίνειν καὶ ἐπιτάττειν, the word κρίνειν is used in a different sense. In saying that, if the ἐλεύθεροι are excluded from the greatest offices, the only remaining course is to give them rights of deliberating and judging, Aristotle forgets that it would be possible to admit them to minor offices, a course suggested by him under certain circumstances in 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 27 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.

**32.** Σόλων. Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 15–21, Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 7, and Plut. Solon, c. 18. As Solon gave the assembly no more power than this, it is difficult to understand why he took the trouble to institute a Boulê of 400 to aid it in the performance of these light duties. Aristotle points out in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq. the risks besetting oligarchies in which οὐχ οὗτοι αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντές εἰσιν. Was not the Solonian constitution exposed to similar risks? Contrast with Solon's policy that of the founder or founders of the Lacedaemonian Ephorate; this great office was made accessible to all the citizens. It is possible that Solon legislated on this subject in intentional opposition to them. The passage before us reads as if Solon was the first to give the right of electing magistrates to τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν at Athens. If this is Aristotle's meaning, we must suppose that in 2. 12. 1273 b 41 sqq., where he says that Solon found the magistrates already appointed by election, he means that, though they were thus appointed before Solon's time,

they were not elected by the people. On the question whether Aristotle's statements as to Solon here and in 1282 a 25 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 15 sqq. are reconcilable with *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 8, *τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐποίησε* (sc. *ὁ Σόλων*) *κληρωτὰς ἐκ προκρίτων, [ο]ὓς [ἑκάσ]τη προκρίνειε τῶν φυλῶν· προὔκρινεν δ' εἰς τοὺς ἐννέα ἄρχοντας ἑκάστη δέκα, καὶ τού[τοις] ἐ[πεκ]λήρουν* (or *καὶ [ἐκ] τού[των ἐκλ]ήρουν*), Gilbert (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 136. 1) and Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 275. 1) take opposite views, the former thinking that they are and the latter that they are not. To me the latter view seems to be the true one.

**τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν.** Hippodamus allowed the demos in his ideal State the right of electing the magistrates (2. 8. 1268 a 11), but (so Aristotle thinks) excluded the cultivators and artisans from the most important offices (1268 a 20 sqq.). In some oligarchies the demos, though excluded from office, had the right of electing the magistrates (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.).

**τάττουσιν ἐπί τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 151, *ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς πράξεις σὲ τάττουσι, νομίζοντες τούτων μὲν σὲ κἄλλιστ' ἂν ἐπιστατῆσαι κ.τ.λ.* (Liddell and Scott s. v. *τάσσω* ii. 1). Aristotle speaks here as if to give the Many the right of electing the magistrates was equivalent to giving them deliberative authority; he distinguishes the two things, however, in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq. As to *ἐπί τε κ.τ.λ.* see note on 1284 a 35.

**34. κατὰ μόνας.** See vol. i. p. 257, note 2, and cp. Plato, Polit. 292 B, *κατὰ πρώτας.* The expression probably includes magistracies administered by Boards in addition to those held by single individuals.

**35.** For the order of the words in **ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν** see note on 1275 a 32.

**μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίοσι,** cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20, *βουλεύσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινῇ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους.* Dr. Arnold has already compared the passage before us with Thuc. 6. 18. 6, where Alcibiades says, *καὶ νομίσατε νεότητα μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲν δύνασθαι, ὁμοῦ δὲ τό τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνυ ἀκριβὲς ἂν ξυγκραθὲν μάλιστ' ἂν ἰσχύειν.* See also above on 1276 b 37.

**36. ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφή.** Food in a more or less raw state, standing in need of some further working-up to fit it for consumption, is termed 'impure food' in De Gen. An. 1. 20. 728 a 26, *ἔστι γὰρ τὰ καταμήνια σπέρμα οὐ καθαρὸν ἀλλὰ δεόμενον ἐργασίας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ*

περὶ τοὺς καρποὺς γενόσει, ὅταν ᾖ μήπω διῃτημένη (διηττημένη Z, followed by Aubert and Wimmer, 'sifted through,' from διαττάω), ἔνεστι μὲν ἡ τροφή, δεῖται δ' ἐργασίας πρὸς τὴν κάθαρσιν· διὸ καὶ μιγνυμένη ἐκείνη μὲν τῇ γονῇ, αὕτη δὲ καθαρᾷ τροφῇ, ἡ μὲν γεννᾷ, ἡ δὲ τρέφει. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 a 14, τῆς μὲν οὖν πρώτης τροφῆς περίττωμα φλέγμα καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ φλέγμα τῆς χρησίμου τροφῆς περίττωμά ἐστιν· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι μιγνύμενον τροφῇ καθαρᾷ τρέφει καὶ πονοῦσι κατανα-λίσκεται. In Athen. Deipn. 109 c a καθαρὸς ἄρτος, or 'loaf of pure meal,' is opposed to a συγκομιστὸς ἄρτος, or 'loaf of unbolted' (i. e. 'unsifted') 'meal,' and in Hippocr. De Victus Ratione (vol. i. p. 673 Kühn) καθαρὰ ἄλευρα are opposed to συγκομιστὰ ἄλευρα. Aristotle evidently thinks that a large quantity of pure and impure food together is more nutritious than a smaller quantity of pure food. He was much interested in questions about diet (Plut. Alex. c. 8, δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ φιλιατρεῖν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ προστρίψασθαι μᾶλλον ἑτέρων Ἀριστοτέλης, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν θεωρίαν ἠγάπησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοσοῦσιν ἐβοήθει τοῖς φίλοις καὶ συνέταττε θεραπείας τινὰς καὶ διαίτας, ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν λαβεῖν ἔστιν).

**39.** πρώτην μέν is taken up by ταύτην μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 1282 a 23, and answered by ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης, 24. Compare with this ἀπορία the remark ascribed to Anacharsis in Plut. Solon, c. 5 *sub fin.*, ἔφη δὲ κἀκεῖνο θαυμάζειν ὁ Ἀνάχαρσις ἐκκλησίᾳ παραγενόμενος, ὅτι λέγουσι μὲν οἱ σοφοὶ παρ' Ἕλλησι, κρίνουσι δὲ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς, and the argument ascribed to him in Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 7. 55–59.

**41.** I have not traced elsewhere the construction ποιῆσαι ὑγιᾶ τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης, though Liddell and Scott give ὑγιασθεὶς τοῦ τραύματος from Anon. ap. Suid. s. v. ὑγιασθείς.

**42.** οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ἰατρός. $M^{a}$ $P^{1}$ and possibly Γ add ὁ before ἰατρός, but probably wrongly: see above on 1253 b 11 and cp. c. 4. 1277 b 15, αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, and 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32. See also Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq.

ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἔχει. For similar omissions of ἔχει see Bon. Ind. 306 a 16 sqq.

**1.** τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. See note on 1297 b 20. 1282 a. The two words are conjoined also in 1. 9. 1257 a 4 and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 21.

**3.** ἰατρὸς δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and we give the name of physician to the executant, and to the man of directing skill, and thirdly to the man who is merely cultivated in the science.' For the contrast of δημιουργός and ἀρχιτεκτονικός, cp. Polyb. 8. 9. 2, Ἱέρωνος μὲν χορηγοῦ

γεγονότος, ἀρχιτέκτονος δὲ καὶ δημιουργοῦ τῶν ἐπινοημάτων Ἀρχιμήδους. In 1. 3. 1253 b 38 the ἀρχιτέκτων is contrasted with the ὑπηρέτης and in Metaph. A. 1. 981 a 30 sqq. and b 31 sq. with the χειροτέχνης. As to ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην, Coray compares Plato, Protag. 312 B, οἷαπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου· τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἑκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει, and Bonitz (Ind. 558 a 4), De Part. An. 1. 1. 639 a 1, περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδείαν τινά· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων.

4. εἰσὶ γάρ κ.τ.λ. See critical note on 1282 a 5.

7. τὴν αἵρεσιν, 'the election' of magistrates and other masters of an art, as well as the review of their conduct.

8. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἑλέσθαι ὀρθῶς κ.τ.λ., 'for choosing rightly also [no less than judging rightly] is the work of those who know the particular science or art.' The force of καί is here retained in καὶ γάρ. Compare the remarks of Cicero in Pro Plancio 3. 7 and 4. 9.

10. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for if in the case of some kinds of work and some arts some non-scientific persons also *do* share in the ability to make a good choice, they do not do so in a higher degree than the scientific.' Supply τοῦ ἑλέσθαι ὀρθῶς with μετέχουσι. Coray, followed by Bekk.², would read οὔ τοι in place of οὔ τι, but οὔ τι seems to be right here: see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 70, who remarks, 'hoc videtur praemittendum esse, οὔτοι ita distare ab οὔτι, ut illud sententiam restringi significet, cum τὶ ad οὐ addito nihil aliud nisi particulae negantis vis prematur.' See also Bon. Ind. 539 b 18 sqq. The passage before us was perhaps present to the memory of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in De Thucyd. iud. 4, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰς Ἀπελλοῦ καὶ Ζεύξιδος καὶ Πρωτογένους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γραφέων τῶν διωνομασμένων τέχνας οἱ μὴ τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχοντες ἐκείνοις ἀρετὰς κρίνειν κεκώλυνται· οὐδὲ τὰ Φειδίου καὶ Πολυκλείτου καὶ Μύρωνος ἔργα οἱ μὴ τηλικοῦτοι δημιουργοί· ἐῶ γὰρ λέγειν, ὅτι πολλῶν ἔργων οὐχ ἧττων τοῦ τεχνίτου κριτὴς ὁ ἰδιώτης.

15. ἂν ᾖ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες. In a passage of the Laws (701 A) which Aristotle probably has before him here Plato had said that the θεατροκρατία which sprang up at Athens after the Persian War would have mattered less if the demos had consisted of ἐλεύθεροι ἄνδρες.

**18.** περὶ ἐνίων, sc. τεχνῶν. Aristotle would not say this of geometry, for instance.

μόνον ὁ ποιήσας. See critical note.

**20.** ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 601 D, *οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἑκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζῴου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρείαν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ᾖ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός;* Οὕτω. *Πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἑκάστῳ ἐμπειρότατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ᾧ χρῆται· οἷον αὐλητής που αὐλοποιῷ ἐξαγγελεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν οἳ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν· ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσει*, and Cratyl. 390. Yet if the user is a better judge of the excellence of some articles than the maker, it does not follow that some users are not better judges than others.

**22.** καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαιτυμὼν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. For the thought see vol. i. p. 258, note 1. Cp. also Alexis, Fragm. Λίνος (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 444),

*καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑποκριτῶν πολὺ*
*κράτιστός ἐστιν ὀψοποιός, ὡς δοκεῖ*
*τοῖς χρωμένοις, τῶν δ' ὀψοποιῶν ὑποκριτής.*

**25.** δοκεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This probably refers to Plato, Laws 945 B sqq.: see vol. i. p. 258.

**26.** αἱ δ' εὐθυναι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 25, *τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν* κ.τ.λ.

**27.** ὥσπερ εἴρηται, in 1281 b 32.

**28.** As to τοῖς δήμοις and ἡ ἐκκλησία, see above on 1275 b 7.

**29.** καίτοι κ.τ.λ. introduces a proof that members of the assembly, etc., are φαῦλοι (26). So much mixed up is the conception of φαυλότης and ἐπιείκεια with wealth and poverty. It is here implied that the Boulê is not one of *αἱ μέγισται ἀρχαί*, whereas in 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30–b 17 it is grouped with the offices of stratêgus and euthynus and logistês and counted among the most important magistracies. Notwithstanding what is said here, a high property-qualification was sometimes required for membership of the assembly, and sometimes none at all (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.). At Athens no one could be a member of the Boulê or the Heliaea till he was thirty years of age (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 265, 392), but Aristotle would perhaps regard this as *ἡ τυχοῦσα ἡλικία*. We read of Solon in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 7, *τὰς μ[ὲν οὖ]ν ἀρχὰς ἀπένειμεν ἄρχειν ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ζευγιτῶν, τοὺς*

*ἐννέα ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ταμίας . . . τοῖς δὲ τὸ θητικὸν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδωκε μόνον.* Solon, in fact, required the *ταμίαι τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς* to be Pentacosiomedimni, and the law was the same in Aristotle's day, but it was no longer observed (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 47 *init.*: c. 7 *sub fin.*: c. 8. l. 7). It does not appear that there was any property-qualification for the office of stratêgus at Athens, for the stratêgi are said to be elected 'from all' (Gilbert, ibid. p. 230).

**33.** **καὶ ταῦτ'**, i. e. the giving of greater powers to men possessed of a small property-qualification only and youthful in years than to men possessed of a high property-qualification, no less than the giving to unskilled persons of the right to elect magistrates and to review their conduct in office.

**36.** **μόριόν ἐστι τούτων**, 'is only a part of these.' For the suppression of 'only' cp. c. 9. 1281 a 9, c. 11. 1282 b 4, and c. 15. 1286 b 8, and see notes on 1336 b 26, 1340 a 34, and 1292 a 32.

**λέγω δὲ μόριον κ.τ.λ.** This explanation seems unnecessary, but see above on 1277 b 37 and below on 1282 b 39. See also Vahlen on Poet. 13. 1453 a 4.

**40.** **πάντων τούτων**, i. e. the members of the demos, the Boulê, and the dicastery.

**τὸ τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους κ.τ.λ.** Cp. c. 5. 1278 b 4, *κύριος ἡ καθ' αὑτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας.*

1282 b. **1.** **ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία**, i. e. the discussion on the *ἀπορία* raised in c. 10. 1281 a 11, *τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.* This discussion has made it clear that the check of law is necessary to prevent the Many or the Few committing injustice, and that law must be just law if it is to do this.

**4.** **περὶ τούτων**, 'only about those things' (see above on 1282 a 36).

**ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν**, 'are wholly unable.'

**7.** **τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν**, i. e. *τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.*

**8.** **ἀλλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'but it must needs be also that as the constitutions [to which laws belong] are bad or good and just or unjust, so the laws also are the same—this, however, is clear that the laws must be adjusted to the constitution, [not the constitution to the laws]—but if this is so, it is evident that laws in accordance with the normal constitutions must necessarily be just and laws in accordance with the deviation-forms not just.' For the view that laws vary with constitutions, cp. Plato, Laws 714 B sq. Cp. also 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 13, *πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς*

*νόμους*. Demosthenes insists on this also: see Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 79, where Demosth. c. Androt. c. 30 is referred to, *ἄξιον τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸν θέντα τὸν νόμον ἐξετάσαι Σόλωνα, καὶ θεάσασθαι ὅσην πρόνοιαν ἐποιεῖτο ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἐτίθει νόμοις τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ὅσῳ περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ἐσπούδαζεν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ οὗ τιθείη τὸν νόμον*, and also Demosth. in Lept. cc. 105–109, where the variation of the laws respecting rewards under different constitutions is traced. Sus. has already referred to Isocr. Areopag. § 14, *ταύτῃ* (i. e. *τῇ πολιτείᾳ*) *καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι, καὶ πράττειν οὕτως ἑκάστους οἵανπερ ἂν ταύτην ἔχωσιν. Εἰ τοῦτο* (11), sc. *φανερόν ἐστι*.

**14 sqq.** Aristotle's inquiries have so far led him to the conclu- **C. 12.**
sion that the true supreme authority is to be found in 'laws in accordance with the normal constitutions,' and we expect him (see vol. i. p. 259) to go on and ask what laws are in accordance with the normal constitutions, but perhaps he feels that he has not yet sufficiently studied how normal or just constitutions should be organized, and that till he has done this he cannot decide what laws are in accordance with them. At all events, instead of asking this question, he makes a new start in the Twelfth Chapter and learns from a renewed inquiry into the nature of Political Justice, (1) that a just or normal constitution will recognize in its distribution of power all attributes which contribute to the being and well-being of the State, and not one of them only, and (2) that under given circumstances the conclusion at which he has arrived in favour of the supremacy of law does not hold good, and that Justice may require that the State shall be ruled not by law, but by the will of an Absolute King supreme over all law. To this extent then the conclusion reached at the end of c. 11 needs to be modified. In teaching that account ought to be taken of other things besides virtue in the award of political power, and that superiority in virtue alone, unless it is transcendent, gives no just claim to exclusive political supremacy, Aristotle differs from the language held by Plato in Laws 756 E–758 A, and especially 757 C, where we read of the nobler of the two kinds of *ἰσότης* (*ἡ ἀληθεστάτη καὶ ἀρίστη ἰσότης*), *τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζοσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζους, τοῖς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον· ἔστι γὰρ δή που καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν ἀεὶ τοῦτ' αὐτό, τὸ δίκαιον*. He probably has

also before him Rep. 540 D, *ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι, τῶν μὲν νῦν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν . . . τὸ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμάς, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντές τε καὶ αὔξοντες αὐτὸ διασκευωρήσωνται τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν.* Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 35.

**Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Here begins a long string of protases introduced by *ἐπεί*, which lack an expressed apodosis to take them up: compare 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq. The virtual apodosis perhaps comes in 21, *ποίων δ' ἰσότης κ.τ.λ.*, unless we supply after *τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον* 'we shall do well to inquire what the just is.' Compare Magn. Mor. 1. 1. 1182 b 1, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε πολιτικὴ βελτίστη δύναμις, ὥστε τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν.* For *ἀγαθόν* (not *τὸ ἀγαθόν*) see Stallbaum on Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E. For *μάλιστα* see note on 1252 a 4. That *τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθόν* is *τὸ δίκαιον* might be guessed from Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, *διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις*, taken with 1261 b 9, *καίτοι τό γε ἑκάστου ἀγαθὸν σώζει ἕκαστον.* As to *ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις*, '*ai μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις* idem fere sunt ac *τέχναι* et *ἐπιστῆμαι*, itaque saepe *δύναμις* vel coniungitur cum verbis *τέχνη*, *ἐπιστήμη* vel pro synonymo usurpatur' (Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq.). The three terms are already used in conjunction by Isocrates in Panath. § 30, *ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω.*

**17. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον,** 'and by the just I mean that which is for the common advantage.' Cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 19, *ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία).* Aristotle adds this remark because he has already explained in c. 6 that the common advantage is the end for which the State originally comes into being and the end of all normal constitutions: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 27 sq.

**18. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.** Cp. c. 9. 1280 a 11 (where see note). By *ἴσον τι* is probably meant *ἴσον κατ' ἀναλογίαν*: cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 26, *πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον.*

**19. τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν.** The reference appears to be to Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 9 sqq. Popular opinion is distinguished from 'philosophical inquiries' very much as in Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 22, *ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν*: cp. De Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 4, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.* See Bon. Ind. 821 a 18 sqq., and cp. Plato, Symp. 218 A, *τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.*

**20.** τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, 'for that which is just is a thing and has to do with persons,' or, in other words, justice involves an assignment of a thing to persons.

**22.** ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν, 'for this inquiry is productive of questions and of philosophical speculation on politics.' For ἔχει see above on 1268 b 24. It is a merit in inquiries to give rise to aporetic discussion: see above on 1275 b 34. Bonitz (Ind. 820 b 58 sqq.) compares Phys. 1. 2. 185 a 17, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὔ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἴσως ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν διαλεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν· ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν ἡ σκέψις*, and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 12, *ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικήν, λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καιρόν, ὅ τι περ οἰκεῖον ἦν τῇ μεθόδῳ*. Cp. also 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 30.

**23.** ἴσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has before him the discussion in Plato, Gorg. 490 B sqq. He may possibly have thought that Plato lent some countenance to the view criticized by him when he said of true Justice in Laws 757 C, *τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ*, yet it is likely that Plato's language in Rep. 454 C (esp. *ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα*) suggested to Aristotle the distinction between attributes contributing to the work to be done and others. See also below on 27.

**24.** νενεμῆσθαι, not *νέμεσθαι*: cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16: 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13: 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 16: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 10. Compare also 1. 13. 1260 a 4, *ὑφήγηται*, and 3. 9. 1280 a 16, *διήρηται* (see note). 'Saepe quidem in physicis maxime metaphysicisque libris cum aliorum verborum tum huius ipsius *ἀκολουθεῖν* formae praeteriti ponuntur vix ut praeteriti temporis notionem persentias, velut ut huius quidem verbi exemplа pauca ponam, *ταύτῃ δ' ἠκολούθηκε (τῇ καρδίᾳ) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν καλουμένων σπλάγχνων ἕκαστον· ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς γὰρ ὕλης συνεστᾶσιν*, De Part. An. 2. 1. 647 a 34' (Vahlen on Poet. 5. 1449 b 9).

**25.** μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι τυγχάνοιεν ὄντες. For this 'abundantia contraria copulandi,' see Vahlen on Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, who refers among other passages to Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 41, *ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον*.

**26.** τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. *Καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν* is added in explanation of *τὸ δίκαιον* (see note on 1257 b 7) and to show that the kind of *τὸ δίκαιον* referred to is that which rests on *ἀξία*, for

there is another kind of τὸ δίκαιον (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3, καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν). That this kind alone is truly just we see from 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16, οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

27. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. In correcting this error (cp. 1283 a 11–14) Aristotle probably has before him a saying of Solon (Diod. 9. 2. 5, ὁ Σόλων ἡγεῖτο τοὺς μὲν πύκτας καὶ σταδιεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀθλητὰς μηδὲν ἀξιόλογον συμβάλλεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς σωτηρίαν, τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέροντας μόνους δύνασθαι τὰς πατρίδας ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις διαφυλάττειν), a saying which Xenophanes virtually repeats in the well-known lines (Fragm. 2. Bergk),

οὔτε γὰρ εἰ πύκτης ἀγαθὸς λαοῖσι μετείη
οὔτ' εἰ πενταθλεῖν, οὔτε παλαισμοσύνην,
οὐδὲ μὲν εἰ ταχυτῆτι ποδῶν, τό πέρ ἐστι πρότιμον
ῥώμης ὅσσ' ἀνδρῶν ἔργ' ἐν ἀγῶνι πέλει,
τοὔνεκεν ἂν δὴ μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίῃ πόλις εἴη·
σμικρὸν δ' ἄν τι πόλει χάρμα γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῷ,
εἴ τις ἀεθλεύων νικᾷ Πίσαο παρ' ὄχθας·
οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχοὺς πόλεως

(cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 1 sq.). Plato had lent some momentary countenance to the opposite view in Laws 744 B (see vol. i. p. 260, note 1), but he anticipates Aristotle in Laws 696 B, οὐ γὰρ δὴ δεῖ κατὰ πόλιν γε εἶναι τὰς τιμὰς ὑπερεχούσας, ὅτι τίς ἐστι πλούτῳ διαφέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὅτι ταχὺς ἢ καλὸς ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ἄνευ τινὸς ἀρετῆς οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἧς ἂν σωφροσύνη ἀπῇ (where he perhaps remembers the saying of Solon and the lines of Xenophanes), except that Aristotle thinks that the rich man has a better claim to office than the swift or handsome or strong man. The Ethiopians were said to make the biggest and strongest man among them their king (Hdt. 3. 20: Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 4 sqq.) or else the handsomest (Athen. Deipn. 566 c: Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 142 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 463), other barbarians honoured swiftness of foot in the same way (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 138: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. ibid.), and Euripides had put in the mouth of one of his characters the lines (Fragm. 1035),

ὅστις κατ' ἰσχὺν πρῶτος ὠνομάζετο
ἢ τόξα πάλλων ἢ μάχῃ δορὸς σθένων,
τοῦτον τυραννεῖν τῶν κακιόνων ἐχρῆν.

Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and 4 (7).

14. 1332 b 16 sqq. as if a great physical superiority conferred a title to rule.

**30.** φανερὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων. Cp. c. 13. 1284 b 7, δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν.

**31.** τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle first takes the case in which the essential attribute (skill in flute-playing, in the illustrative parallel which he has chosen) is shared by several individuals in an equal degree, and he says that these individuals must be awarded flutes of equal excellence; extraneous qualifications like that of high birth must not be allowed to turn the scale in favour of any one of them (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 8, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν· οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλόν). He next passes on (34 sqq.) to the case in which one individual possesses the essential attribute in a far higher degree than the rest, and as to this case he tells us that no inferiority of this individual in respect of higher but non-essential things must lead us to deny him the superior award of flutes which is his due.

**35.** ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγαγοῦσιν, 'if we push it still further.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 22, δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ: Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 8, μικρὸν προαγαγόντες τὸν λόγον.

**38.** εἰ καὶ μεῖζον κ.τ.λ. How little respect was felt for the art of flute-playing, we see from 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 18 sqq.

ἕκαστον here takes the place of ἑκάτερον, as in Poet. 6. 1449 b 25 (see Vahlen's note on this passage: he says 'ἑκάστου hic ut alibi est pro ἑκατέρου' and refers to his Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 50).

**39.** λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. For this really needless explanation see above on 1277 b 37 and 1282 a 36.

κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν, 'if we compare the two ratios,' i. e. the ratio in which noble birth and beauty excel the art of flute-playing and the ratio in which the surpassing flute-player excels his fellows. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 31, ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις.

**2.** In place of τοῦ πλούτου we expect τοῦ κάλλους, but see below 1283 a. on 1323 b 35.

**3.** ἔτι κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον κ.τ.λ., i. e. the λόγος of the imagined opponent in 1282 b 23 sqq. Things that differ very much are not commensurable (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 18, τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς, and 1133 a 19, διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως

εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγή, where πως = πρὸς τὴν χρείαν: Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 3 sqq.).

4. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος. Montecatino (vol. iii. p. 191) translates, 'si magis imperiorum et principatus civitatis esse particeps debet,' etc., and so Sus.[4], 'for if a given bodily stature [confers political privileges] more [than a certain amount of wealth or good birth].' These interpreters apparently supply δεῖ μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, or something similar, with μᾶλλον (cp. 1282 b 23 sqq.). Stahr, on the other hand, translates, 'denn wenn eine bestimmte Körpergrösse für irgend etwas höheren Werth verliehe (confers a higher value for anything whatever),' and Bernays, 'denn wenn z. B. einem gewissen Maass von Körpergrösse im Vergleich zu Reichthum und freier Geburt irgend etwas in höherem Grade zukommt.' Prof. Ridgeway brackets μᾶλλον, and another critic would read ἐνάμιλλον in place of it, and Sus.[4] mentions these suggestions, though he still retains μᾶλλον in his text. I am myself inclined to supply ἀγαθόν with μᾶλλον from the preceding sentence ('more a good'), and to translate, 'for if a given amount of size is more a good than [a given amount of some other good, such as wealth or free birth].'

καὶ ὅλως ἂν κ.τ.λ., 'size would also generally' (i.e. apart from its amount) 'be capable of being matched against wealth and free birth.'

6. ὥστ' εἰ κ.τ.λ., 'and so, if this man excels in size more than this man in virtue' (or in other words, if this man's amount of size is superior to this man's amount of virtue), 'and size generally' (i. e. apart from questions of amount) 'is superior in a higher degree than virtue, everything would be comparable [whatever its amount], for if such an amount is better than such an amount, such an amount will evidently be equal.' I have followed Sus. in bracketing μέγεθος, 8, which may have been repeated by mistake from the preceding line, though it is possible that instead of bracketing μέγεθος we should read ἀγαθόν in place of it. The difficulty of retaining μέγεθος arises from this, that, if we do so, we have to translate, 'for if such an amount of size is better than such an amount [of something else], such an amount will evidently be equal,' and it is doubtful whether we have any right to supply 'of something else.' Aristotle probably means by εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα, 8, that all *goods* would be comparable, not everything, for this is all that his argument proves. For τοσόνδε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., cp. Phys. 7.

4. 248 a 11, *εἰ δή ἐστι πᾶσα* (sc. *κίνησις*) *συμβλητὴ καὶ ὁμοταχὲς τὸ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἴσον κινούμενον, ἔσται περιφερής τις ἴση εὐθείᾳ, καὶ μείζων δὴ καὶ ἐλάττων.* Κρεῖττον in 9 must mean 'better.'

9. **ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον.** See above on 3.

10. **καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν,** 'in the case of things political also,' no less than *ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων* (1282 b 30). For *τὰ πολιτικά*, cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 11.

11. **εἰ γὰρ . . .** 14. **τὴν τιμήν.** Here the fragment of Xenophanes quoted in part above on 1282 b 27 is especially present to Aristotle's mind. Οὐδέν is to be taken with δεῖ, as in Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 27, *οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν.* Τὴν τιμήν, 'the honour which falls to them.'

13. **ἡ τούτων διαφορά,** 'the superiority possessed by these men.'

14. **ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ.** Ἐν τούτοις is 'in respect of these things': cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 1, *ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴωνται ὑπάρχειν* (sc. *αὐτοῖς*) *ἐν τούτοις ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν*, and Poet. 2. 1448 a 16, *ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ τραγῳδία πρὸς τὴν κωμῳδίαν διέστηκεν.* See also Stallbaum on Plato, Gorg. 452 E, *καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἰατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην.* The *πόλις* is regarded by Aristotle as composed of wealth, free birth, nobility, culture, etc.: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, *ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα πόλις ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ· λέγω δὲ ποιὸν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσὸν δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν.*

16. **τῆς τιμῆς,** cp. *τὴν τιμήν*, 14, which answers to *τῶν ἀρχῶν*, 11.

17. **δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.,** '[for free birth and wealth are things of which the *πόλις* is composed,] for' etc. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 21 (quoted above on 1276 b 37). In 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33 Aristotle mentions *τὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὃ καλοῦμεν εἰσπόρους*, as a necessary part of a State. It is true that in Crete the State defrayed the liturgies which were elsewhere borne by rich men (see above on 1272 a 17), and that this might have been made the general rule, but even then rich men would be needed to contribute to the eisphora. Aristotle says nothing about *οἱ εὐγενεῖς*, though he has mentioned them in 16, probably because he includes them under *οἱ ἐλεύθεροι* (cp. 33 sqq.).

**τίμημα φέροντας,** i.e. contributing to the State a rateable quota of property. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 20, *τοῖς ἔχουσι τίμημα*, and for *φέρειν*, 2. 5. 1263 a 3, *τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν.* For the contrast implied here between *οἱ ἄποροι* and *οἱ τίμημα φέροντες*, see note on 1279 b 19.

18. **οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ.** See above on 1276 b 37 and 1280 a 32. Is there a tacit reference here to the latter passage, in which it was

shown that there could not be a πόλις wholly composed of slaves? If so, we have something to add to the other evidence (see vol. i. Appendix C) that cc. 12 and 13 were placed where they stand by Aristotle.

**19. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq. (where military prowess and judicial virtue are again mentioned together) and 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 18 sqq. Tyrtaeus had long ago said (Fragm. 12. 15),

> *ξυνὸν δ' ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πόληί τε παντί τε δήμῳ,*
> *ὅστις ἀνὴρ διαβὰς ἐν προμάχοισι μένῃ*
> *νωλεμέως κ.τ.λ.,*

and as to justice Protagoras had gone farther than Aristotle, for he makes it essential to the very existence of a State (Plato, Protag. 324 D sq., and 326 E, *τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν*).

**21. πλὴν κ.τ.λ.** For the contrast here drawn between *εἶναι πόλιν* and *οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς*, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 6 sqq.

C. 13. **24. πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβητοίησαν.** *Ζωὴ ἀγαθή* is taken as the standard in 1. 8. 1256 b 32, and said to be the end which the lawgiver should set before him in 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 7 sqq. *Παιδεία* and *ἀρετή* are here conjoined as in Plato, Laws 757 C, and in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 29 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26 sqq. *Παιδεία*, 'culture,' is connected with aristocracy in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24 sq., where the offices in an aristocracy, which are usually said to be filled *ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων* (3. 7. 1279 a 35), are said to be filled *ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων*. In 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq. it is opposed to *βαναυσία* and treated as a note of oligarchy (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 37). Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. *ἀμφισβητέω*, notes the rare occurrence of *ἀμφισβητοίησαν*, adding however that *ἀμφισβητοίην* occurs in Plato, Euthyd. 296 E, and *ἀμφισβητοῖεν* in Menex. 242 E (see also Demosth. Prooem. 46. p. 1453 for *ἀμφισβητοῖεν*). *Ἀμφισβήτησειεν* is used in Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 24 and 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 12.

**26. καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον**, in c. 9. 1281 a 4 sqq.

*ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* This has been already said in substance in c. 9. 1280 a 21 sqq., and it is repeated in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. For *πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν*, 'to have an equal share with others of everything,' cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 30, *ἵνα ἴσον ᾖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τῆς λειτουργίας*, and Eurip. Phoeniss. 513 Bothe, 547 Dindorf,

> *σὺ δ' οὐκ ἀνέξει δωμάτων ἔχων ἴσον;*

Τὰς τοιαύτας πολιτείας, i. e. constitutions which give an equal amount of everything to those who are equal in one thing only, or which give an unequal amount of everything to those who are unequal in one thing only. The reason why such constitutions must necessarily be παρεκβάσεις is that they contravene τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον (cp. c. 6. 1279 a 17 sqq.).

**29.** εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. This was said in c. 9. 1280 a 9 sqq. Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Aristotle's original intention probably was, after interposing an explanation of the grounds on which the different claimants base their claims, to continue, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἤδη σκεπτέον, εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ. In adding this explanation, however, he allows his attention to be diverted and the strict sequence of the passage to be broken (just as in 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq.), and thus it happens that μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Μὲν οὖν here, as elsewhere, introduces a more particular and detailed treatment of the subject.

**30.** ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες, ἁπλῶς δ' οὐ πάντες δικαίως. For the repetition of πάντες, cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 1, φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον.

**31.** οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. In the passage 31–42 Aristotle bears in mind the rule which he has laid down in c. 12. 1283 a 14 sq. that claimants for political power must rest their claims on attributes entering into the composition of a State. The different claimants are represented as doing so. This is indicated by κοινόν (32), πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον (32), πολῖται μᾶλλον (34), οἶκοι τίμιος (36), βελτίους (36), and κοινωνικὴν ἀρετήν (38). Κοινόν, 32, 'a public thing,' or in other words, one of the things which are essential to the State: cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5 sqq. Compare also Eth. Nic. 8. 16. 1163 b 5, οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. It is implied in the passage before us that the rich will be owners of land, and this may have commonly been the case in Greece; still there were other forms of wealth besides wealth in land (2. 7. 1267 b 10 sqq.), and most of Nicias' wealth was in silver (Plut. Nic. c. 4).

**32.** ἔτι κ.τ.λ. So the Syracusan Athenagoras, though he was the leader of the demos, admits that the rich are the best custodians of money (Thuc. 6. 39): that this was a common view we see from such passages as Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1429 a 34, τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους

ἔστιν ἰδεῖν νομίζοντας τοὺς πλουτοῦντας δικαιοτέρους εἶναι τῶν πενομένων, and Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 21 sqq. (cp. also Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 92 Nauck). Aristotle does not agree with this view; he requires virtue in a custodian of money (7 (5). 9. 1309 b 6 sqq.).

33. οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς κ.τ.λ., 'and the free-born and noble claim as not being far from each other, inasmuch as [if the free-born claim on the strength of their citizenship,] those who are better born are citizens in a higher degree than the low-born, and nobility is in every State locally prized; and again because it is likely that those descended from better ancestors will be better, seeing that nobility is excellence of race.' The ἐλεύθεροι and the εὐγενεῖς are classed together in 1283 b 16 as οἱ κατὰ γένος ἀξιοῦντες ἄρχειν: the εὐγενεῖς are in a superlative degree what the ἐλεύθεροι are in a positive degree (cp. 1283 b 19 sq.). In some places the word ἐλεύθερος appears to have been used to designate the noble (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq.), none but οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας being accounted ἐλεύθεροι. The well-born were citizens in a higher degree than the low-born, for they could reckon more generations of citizen descent, and this was with many a test of citizenship (c. 2. 1275 b 21 sqq.). The fact that nobility is παρ' ἑκάστοις οἴκοι τίμιος is insisted on, because this shows it to be of importance to the πολιτικὴ κοινωνία, and therefore a just ground of claim. Its champions might have gone further and urged that Greek nobility is recognized everywhere (1. 6. 1255 a 32 sqq.), but this would not have been equally to the point. The sophist Lycophron would not admit that nobility belonged to the class of τίμια καὶ σπουδαῖα (Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 9 sqq.). The fem. form τίμιος is used in the passage before us (possibly because it is followed by ἔτι: see note on 1277 b 25): in De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 24 we have περὶ μὲν ἐκείνας (sc. τὰς οὐσίας) τιμίας οὔσας καὶ θείας. For ἔτι διότι βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων, cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 b 29, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παιδεία· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι. For the definition of εὐγένεια as ἀρετὴ γένους cp. Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 22, ἔστι δὲ εὐγενὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετήν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως· ὅπερ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενέσιν, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖς· φορὰ γὰρ τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γιγνομένοις, καὶ ἐνίοτε ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διά τινος χρόνου ἄνδρες περιττοί, κἄπειτα πάλιν ἀναδίδωσιν ('deficit,' Bon. Ind. s.v. ἀναδιδόναι): Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b

18 sqq.: Aristot. Fragm. 85. 1490 b 43, *ἡ μὲν εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρετὴ γένους, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ σπουδαῖον· σπουδαῖον δ' ἐστὶ γένος ἐν ᾧ πολλοὶ σπουδαῖοι πεφύκασιν ἐγγίνεσθαι.* These passages show that *ἀρετὴ γένους* means 'excellence of race' in the sense that the race to which the *εὐγενής* belongs has produced in the past a number of virtuous men (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33, *ἢ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένους*), so that the *εὐγενής* stands at any rate a better chance of being virtuous than one who is not *εὐγενής*. We must bear in mind that this definition of *εὐγένεια* is here placed in the mouth of *οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς*, who would be likely to take the most favourable view of *εὐγένεια*. We see from Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 34 that *εὐγένεια* did not, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, necessarily imply descent from ancestors remarkable for virtue; it might imply only descent from ancestors remarkable for wealth or other social advantages; nor did it necessarily imply a frequent occurrence in the family of virtuous individuals, but only of individuals distinguished in some way or other (*ἐπιφανεῖς*). Cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 88. Still the view that *εὐγένεια* is *ἀρετὴ γένους* is not far from that of Aristotle. In the Rhetoric (2. 15. 1390 b 22 sqq.), as we have seen, it is distinctly adopted by him, though he holds that, owing to the occurrence from time to time of degeneracy in families, most *εὐγενεῖς* are men of little worth. Compare the view taken in the fragments of the possibly genuine *Περὶ εὐγενείας* (Aristot. Fragm. 82–85. 1490 a 1 sqq.). Here, however, we find (1490 a 31 sqq.) a reference to the contention that *οἱ ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων* may be *εὐγενεῖς* no less than *οἱ ἐκ πάλαι ἀγαθῶν* (cp. Julian, Or. 2. p. 81 B, *φασὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων εὐγενεῖς*), and in the Politics Aristotle seems to adopt as his own the doctrine that *εὐγένεια* implies descent from ancestors not only virtuous but rich (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 21, *ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή*: 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 3).

**37.** *ὁμοίως δὴ* κ.τ.λ., 'we shall say then that in a similar way virtue also prefers a just claim, for we say that justice, which is necessarily accompanied by all the other virtues, is virtue operative in social relations [and therefore essential to the State: so that virtue as a whole has as good a claim to recognition as justice].' I take the antecedent to *ᾗ* to be *τὴν δικαιοσύνην*, not *κοινωνικὴν ἀρετήν*. For the omission of *ἀρετάς* after *τὰς ἄλλας*, cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 24: 3. 5. 1278 a 40. Aristotle introduces his own view with *δή*, just as he introduces it with *οὖν* in c. 3. 1276 a 13 sqq. For *ὁμοίως*, cp.

1283 b 16, 19, 31: it is not to be taken with δικαίως. That justice is virtue operative in social relations we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25–1130 a 5, and from the definition of virtue ascribed with whatever truth to Plato in Diog. Laert. 3. 91, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη (αἰτία) τοῦ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δικαιοπραγεῖν: cp. also Plut. De Defect. Orac. c. 24, εἰσὶν οὖν ἐκτὸς ἕτεροι θεοὶ καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὓς χρῆται (ὁ θεὸς) ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς ἀρεταῖς· οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρῆσίς ἐστι δικαιοσύνης ἢ χάριτος ἢ χρηστότητος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλους. That there is a close connexion between justice and the other virtues, we see from Aristot. Fragm. 75. 1488 b 5, ap. Plut. De Stoic. Repugn. c. 15, (ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ γ̄ περὶ δικαιοσύνης . . .) Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀντιγράφων οὗ φησιν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι, τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔσης τέλους, ἀναιρεῖται μὲν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, συναναιρεῖται δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἑκάστη, and from Plato, Laws 631 C, ἐκ δὲ τούτων (i. e. φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης) μετ' ἀνδρείας κραθέντων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη.

40. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here, as Eaton points out, Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 488 D.

42. λαμβανομένων. Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 17, πάντων ληφθέντων.

ἆρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Gorg. 490 B, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι ἄνθρωποι κ.τ.λ. Ἆρ' οὖν is repeated in πότερον for the sake of clearness, the parenthetic sentence λέγω δὲ . . . πολιτικόν having intervened: compare the way in which δῆλον ὅτι takes up δῆλον ὡς in 1283 b 17 sqq. after an intervening hypothetical sentence.

1283 b. 2. οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς. The article is omitted before εὐγενεῖς because the rich and noble are classed together in contradistinction to the good: cp. 1283 a 33, οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς.

ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, 'and further outside their ranks a mass composed of citizens.' Πολιτικόν is added because there is such a thing as a non-citizen πλῆθος (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἴσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων).

4. καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 27, καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων: 2. 6. 1265 b 29, κοινοτάτην τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 5, τὸ μέσον ἑκατέρου τιμήματος τούτων: Sallust, Bell. Iugurth. 19. 7, pleraque ex Punicis oppida, and 30. 4, unam ex tam multis orationem eius.

5. τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, 'for it is just in respect of the supreme authority they constitute that they differ from each other' (Bernays).

6. τῷ διὰ πλουσίων. For the omission of the article, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24, *οἷον ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ τῶν ἐλευθέρων*, and see note on 1310 a 6.

8. ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον. These constitutions settle the matter in their own way, but still we persist in asking how it ought to be settled. *Ταῦτα* refers to *οἵ τ' ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν*: for the gender, see above on 1263 a 1.

9. εἰ δὴ ... 13. ἐξ αὐτῶν. 'Well, if those who possess virtue are quite few in number, in what way should we determine the question? Or perhaps we should [not trouble about their number in itself, but] consider the expression "few" in relation to the work they have to do, [and ask] whether they are able to govern the State, or whether they are numerous enough to constitute a State?' Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 47) and Susemihl think that this paragraph should be transposed so as to precede *εἰ δέ τίς ἐστιν*, 1284 a 3, but it seems to me to be in its right place. The discussion of the question just raised is introduced by *δή*, as often elsewhere (e. g. in c. 4. 1277 a 14–16 and c. 15. 1286 a 7 sqq.). *Τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον*, 10, takes up *πῶς διοριστέον*, 9. Aristotle's first impulse is to challenge the claims of the good to rule on the score of the smallness of their number, as he has already done in c. 10. 1281 a 28 sqq. But he drops this ground of attack, probably because he feels that paucity is no bar to a claim to rule. Even a single individual may have a just claim to rule, if his virtue is transcendent. Hence he passes on in 13 sqq. to deal with another objection, the discussion of which brings out this fact. The claims of the good have a weak point which they share with those of the rich and noble. Just as the claims of the rich and noble to rule may be defeated by those of one man who is richer or nobler than all the rest, so the claims of the good may be defeated by those of one man who is better than all the rest. And the claims of the Many may be defeated in a similar way. If this superiority of One Man or of a Few not numerous enough to constitute a State is overwhelming, the fact that they are not numerous enough for

this must not stand in the way of our giving him or them supreme authority.

**16.** οἱ κατὰ γένος, i. e. *οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς.*

δῆλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'Aliquoties enunciatio per ὡς introducta per ὅτι continuatur, e.g. in Phys. 6. 2. 233 a 13 sq.: 1. 7. 190 b 17 sqq.: 8. 7. 260 a 23 sqq.' (Bon. Ind. 872 a 1). For the repetition of δῆλον, see vol. ii. p. li, note 6. For the thought, cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq. Εἷς πλουσιώτερος ἁπάντων seems to have been almost a proverbial expression: see Plut. Solon, c. 14, *πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν διὰ μέσου πολιτῶν, τὴν ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ νόμου μεταβολὴν ὁρῶντες ἐργώδη καὶ χαλεπὴν οὖσαν, οὐκ ἔφευγον ἕνα τὸν δικαιότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασιν*: Plut. De Cupid. Divit. c. 7, *ἤ, καθάπερ λέγουσιν, εἷς ὁ πονηρότατος ἐν τῷ γένει γενόμενος καταφάγῃ τὰ πάντων.* In Pausan. 7. 12. 1 we read *βεβαιοῖ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς ἄρ' ἦν καὶ πῦρ ἐς πλέον ἄλλου πυρὸς καῖον, καὶ λύκος ἀγριώτερος λύκων ἄλλων, καὶ ὠκύτερος ἱέρακος ἱέρακος πέτεσθαι.*

**17.** κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq.

**18.** For the juxtaposition of τὸν ἕνα and ἁπάντων, see notes on 1281 a 13 and 1285 a 3.

**23.** οὐκοῦν κ.τ.λ., 'therefore if the Many also really ought to be supreme because they are stronger' (*κρείττους*, not *ἀμείνους*) 'than the Few.' Cp. 1283 a 40 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 489 E sqq. (Eaton). For εἰ . . . γε, cp. Plato, Rep. 433 C, *εἰ δέοι γε κρῖναι.*

**27.** πάντα δὴ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Ὅροι are here 'criteria,' such as wealth or virtue, on the strength of which men claim political supremacy. Plato had already used the expression ὀρθὸς ὅρος in Polit. 293 C, *ταύτῃ θήσομεν, ὡς οἶμαι, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ, τοῦτον ὅρον ὀρθὸν εἶναι μόνον ἰατρικῆς καὶ ἄλλης ἠστινοσοῦν ἀρχῆς.* Aristotle's conclusion is not convincing. It does not follow that a claim is bad because it does not hold under all circumstances.

**30.** καὶ γὰρ δή, 'for surely.'

**31.** For κυρίους τοῦ πολιτεύματος, an expression which does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Politics, cp. Diod. 15. 45. 2, *τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιστασίας κυρίοις γεγονόσι τοῦ πολιτεύματος.*

**32.** ἔχοιεν ἄν is in the plural, though τὰ πλήθη is neuter, possibly because Aristotle is thinking of the individuals of whom τὰ πλήθη are composed (cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 2, *ἐφ' αἷς τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουσιν*). He often, however, uses a plural verb with a neut. plur. nominative, even where this explanation does not hold good: see Waitz on Anal. Pr. 2. 26. 69 b 3, and Bonitz on Metaph. A. 4. 985 a 27.

τὰ πλήθη, as in 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 2 and Diod. 9. 24. 2, *οὐ μὴν τὰ πλήθη κατεπλάγη αὐτοῦ τὴν βαρύτητα*: so also in Plato, Gorg. 452 E and Soph. 268 B (Liddell and Scott).

35. ἀθρόους, not *ἀθρόον*: cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 14, *οἶκος . . . οὓς κ.τ.λ.*

διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. *Καί* appears to mean that we are not only led to the conclusion stated in 27 sqq., but are enabled to solve an *ἀπορία* which is raised by some persons. *Τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον*, 'on this basis,' i. e. on the basis of a recognition of the claims both of the Better and of the Many. Who were the persons who raised this *ἀπορία*? It is difficult to say, though some approach is made to the question by the disputants in Plato, Gorg. 488 B sqq.: cp. also 483 B, *ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί· πρὸς αὑτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι κ.τ.λ.*, and Laws 757 D. Andocides says in c. Alcib. c. 6, *καίτοι ταῦτα διέγνωσται ἄριστα τῶν δογμάτων, ἃ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἁρμόττοντα μάλιστα τυγχάνει καὶ πλείστους ἐπιθυμητὰς ἔχει.*

38. τίθεσθαι. We expect rather *τιθέναι* (Harpocr. s. v. *θέσθαι, ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων λέγεται ὡς ἔθηκε μὲν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἔθετο δὲ ὁ δῆμος*). So we have *ἐτίθει νόμον* in 2. 8. 1268 a 6: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 36.

39. ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν, i. e. when the Many taken collectively are better than the Few. The contrary case is dealt with in 1284 a 3, *εἰ δέ τίς ἐστιν εἷς κ.τ.λ.* Bern. and Sus. take *ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν* with *ἐνδέχεται ἀπαντᾶν*, thus making the sentence *ἀποροῦσι*, 36 . . . *πλειόνων*, 39, parenthetical, but the length of the parenthesis by which on this view these words are parted from the words which they qualify makes against this interpretation, and it seems preferable to take them, as Bekker and others do, with *ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες κ.τ.λ.*

40. τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως, 'but [the advantage of neither is to be studied exclusively, for] we must determine that which is correct and normal in a fair and equal fashion.' For *ληπτέον*, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 36, *τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον*. 'Omnino *λαμβάνειν* est animo concipere, ita quidem ut modo investigandi (Waitz ad Anal. Post. 1. 4. 73 a 24), modo inveniendi cognoscendi definiendi intelligendi vim habeat' (Bon. Ind. 422 b 38). *Ἴσως* is used in the sense of 'equally' in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 22, *κληρωτοὺς ἴσως ἐκ τῶν μορίων.*

τὸ δ' ἴσως ὀρθὸν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 7. 1279 a 31 sq. Plato had already said the same thing, as Giph. points out, p. 371: cp. Cic. De Offic.

1. 25. 85, omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt duo Platonis praecepta teneant: unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quaecumque agunt ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum; alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Cicero perhaps refers to Plato, Rep. 420 B. Solon claimed that he had endeavoured to be fair both to the Few and to the Many (Fragm. 5).

**42. πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ.** For the absence of the article, see note on 1276 b 28. Compare with the form of the sentence which commences here 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 7, *ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἕκαστος καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, ὁ δ' ἄριστος τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων.* The statement that the citizen in general is he who shares in ruling and being ruled is based on c. 4: in c. 1, on the other hand, the citizen is defined as *ᾧ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς.*

1284 a. **1. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην,** 'and to suit the best': cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, *διῄρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.* Aristotle takes it for granted here that the citizens of the 'best State' will both rule and be ruled, and thus anticipates the conclusion at which he arrives after a discussion in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq.

**3. τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν.** For virtue is the main source of 'the most desirable life,' which the citizens of the best State are said to live in 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 30 sqq.

**εἰ δέ τίς ἐστιν εἷς κ.τ.λ.** This sentence is closely connected with what precedes; it deals with the contrary case to that supposed in *ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν*, 1283 b 39. The sense is, 'but if there is one man or a few of transcendent virtue, we must not treat them as citizens on a level with the rest, or expect them to be content with ruling and being ruled; their part is to rule.' To insert 1283 b 9–13 between *πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν* and *εἰ δέ τίς ἐστιν εἷς κ.τ.λ.*, as Sus. does, is to destroy the connexion. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 540 D, *ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς κ.τ.λ.*

**4. μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως.** These words are added because Aristotle is now dealing only with the case in which the Good exist in the same community with those possessing other attributes essential to the State (cp. 1283 a 42 sqq.). If the Good are numerous enough themselves to constitute a State, as in

the case of the State sketched in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books, then the State will consist of equals, and they may each of them be treated as part of it and subjected to law.

**6.** *τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικήν.* Translate (with Bern. and Sus.) here and in 10, 'their political capacity,' and *τῇ δυνάμει*, 13, 'in capacity.' So Plut. Cic. c. 4, *ἀνεκίνει τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν.* Sepulveda explains, 'facultatem civilem vocat quicquid opis in homine est quod faciat ad civilem societatem iuvandam tuendamque, sive administrandam.' *Δύναμις πολιτική* answers to *δυνάμενος*, 2, as *ἀρετή* answers to *προαιρούμενος*. For the distinction implied between virtue and political capacity, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq., where virtue is distinguished from *δύναμις τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς*, and 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq., where it is distinguished from *δύναμις ἡ πρακτικὴ τῶν ἀρίστων*. *Δυνάμει* is used in a different sense, that of 'political influence,' in 20, and *πολιτικὴ δύναμις* often bears this sense (e. g. in Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 33 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 473 D), but not, I think, here.

**8.** *οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως*, i. e. we must not treat them as mere fellow-citizens of the rest (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 20), and expect them to take their turn with the rest of ruling and being ruled. Men of this transcendent excellence stand to their inferiors as a whole stands to its part (3. 17. 1288 a 26 sqq.).

**9.** *ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων. Τῶν ἴσων* refers to 1283 b 40, *τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν λεκτέον ἴσως*. 'Classic authorities always use the future middle *ἀδικήσομαι* as passive in place of *ἀδικηθήσομαι*' (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective s. v.).

**10.** *ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις* stands in tacit contrast to *θεὸν ἐν θεοῖς*. A god among men is in a position of transcendent superiority not enjoyed by a god among gods. For the meaning of *θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις*, cp. Plut. Alex. c. 51, "*οὐ δοκοῦσιν,*" *εἶπεν,* "*ὑμῖν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ὥσπερ ἐν θηρίοις ἡμίθεοι περιπατεῖν;*" *Θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις* was a proverbial expression: cp. Theogn. 339,

*χοὔτως ἂν δοκέοιμι μετ' ἀνθρώποις θεὸς εἶναι,*
*εἴ μ' ἀποτισάμενον μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου,*

and (with Crusius, Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas, p. 3) Antiphanes, *Τριταγωνιστής* (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 121),

*θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἦν*
*ἐκεῖνος, εἰδὼς τὴν ἀληθῶς μουσικήν.*

See Crusius ibid. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 360 C.

**11.** ὅθεν, because treating them as part of a State involves injustice.

**12.** καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν, 'legislation no less than treating men as part of a State.' Aristotle still has the lawgiver in view whom he has imagined in 1283 b 36 sqq., and is still advising him as to the course he should adopt. If men of the type described exist in the State, he must abstain from meddling with them; he must not attempt to fetter them by legislation.

τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, 'equals both in race and in capacity.' Gods are superior to men in both these respects: as to kings, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12. Proportional equals are no doubt included under τοὺς ἴσους: we may infer this from Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 26, τοῦτο δὲ (i. e. τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον) ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς. Contrast with this view of law as existing only between equals or proportionate equals the Stoical view set forth by Cicero in De Legibus 1. 7. 23, est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius estque et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio est communis. Quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est.

**13.** κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος. This expression recurs in St. Paul, Galat. v. 22–23, ὁ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ Πνεύματός ἐστιν ἀγάπη χαρὰ εἰρήνη . . . κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, where the meaning of κατά is no doubt 'against,' but of κατά in the passage before us among others Bonitz says (Ind. 368 a 34), 'saepissime per κατά τινος ea res significatur de qua aliquid dicitur vel cogitatur.' See for instance 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 2, ὅπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν. Still Aristotle may remember here the expression of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 488 D, where he says of the Many, οἱ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, and κατά may be used (and not περί, as in περὶ τοὺς ἴσους, 12) because unfavourable laws are especially thought of, laws, for instance, enforcing on the persons referred to an equality of rights (cp. κατ' αὐτῶν, 15). I incline to think that 'against' is nearer to the meaning of κατά here than 'concerning.' Bern. Sus. and Welldon translate in a more neutral fashion 'for.'

**14.** αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 2, *οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον.* This is as much as to say that they are Absolute Kings. The Persian King was a law to the Persians (Plut. Artox. c. 23, *χαίρειν ἐάσαντα δόξας Ἑλλήνων καὶ νόμους, Πέρσαις δὲ νόμον αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ δικαιωτὴν αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν ἀποδεδειγμένον*). This explains the exclamation of Anaxarchus to Alexander, when the latter had murdered Cleitus and was lying speechless from remorse, *οὗτός ἐστιν Ἀλέξανδρος, εἰς ὃν ἡ οἰκουμένη νῦν ἀποβλέπει· ὁ δὲ ἔρριπται κλαίων ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον ἀνθρώπων νόμον καὶ ψόγον δεδοικώς, οἷς αὐτὸν προσήκει νόμον εἶναι καὶ ὅρον τῶν δικαίων* (Plut. Alex. c. 52). So Xenophon (Cyrop. 8. 1. 22) says of his Cyrus, *τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώποις ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι καὶ τάττειν ἱκανός ἐστι καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ κολάζειν.* It was claimed in Justinian's time that to the power of the Roman Emperor *αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς τοὺς νόμους ὑποτέθεικε, νόμον αὐτὴν ἔμψυχον καταπέμψας ἀνθρώποις* (Nov. 105. c. 4, quoted by Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 713. 2, ed. 1).

**15.** λέγοιεν γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ. Coray remarks on this passage, "*ἐντεῦθεν ὁ μῦθος, ἢ μᾶλλον τὸ μύθου λείψανον τοῦτο, προσετέθη τῇ Συναγωγῇ τῶν Αἰσωπείων μύθων* (*Μύθ.* 347 *ἐμῆς ἐκδόσεως*)." See Fabulae Aesopicae, ed. Halm, Fab. 241. The lions asked the hares, 'Where are your claws and teeth?' (Camerarius, Interp. p. 132). Cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 4, *ἀεὶ γὰρ ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἱ ἧττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν,* and the words of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 483 E, *πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπᾴδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες, καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.* Cp. also Philemon, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 3 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 32),

*ἅπαντες οἱ λέοντές εἰσιν ἄλκιμοι,*
*δειλοὶ πάλιν ἐξῆς πάντες εἰσὶν οἱ λαγοί.*

Antisthenes may have related the fable here alluded to in his 'Cyrus, or on Kingship,' a work mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, 6. 16. Had he before him a version of the fable of the Lion and the Wild Ass (Babrius, Fab. 67) in which lions and hares joined in hunting and fell into a dispute as to the division of the spoil? Compare the fragment of the lyrical poet Cydias preserved by Plato, Charmides 155 D, *ἐνόμισα σοφώτατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὃς εἶπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἄλλῳ ὑποτιθέμενος, εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρεῶν· αὐτὸς γάρ μοι ἐδόκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου θρέμματος ἁλωκέναι.* See Bergk on Cydias, Fragm. 1.

17. διὸ καὶ τίθενται κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i.e. from a sense of the immense superiority of certain men) 'States democratically constituted also institute the ostracism [in addition to adopting other democratic measures] for the reason which has been mentioned' (i.e. because they feel that these men are too superior to the rest to be treated as equals). It appears indeed later on (35) that oligarchies also got rid of over-powerful individuals, and in a less humane way than democracies, for they exiled them and put them to death. The democratically constituted States referred to include (in addition to Athens) Argos (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18), Miletus, and Megara (Schol. Aristoph. Eq. 855). At Syracuse the ostracism was for a time represented by the petalism, which, it may be noted, would seem to have been introduced when the constitution of Syracuse was not a democracy, but what Aristotle variously terms an ἀριστοκρατία (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 8) or a πολιτεία (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.). The account given in the passage before us of the object of the ostracism resembles that given in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. and (in substance) the more detailed account given in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 22, and it is probably correct. It is accepted by Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1. 188 sqq. and by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 151 sq., though Grote (Hist. of Greece, 3. 197 sq.) and Susemihl (Sus.[2], Note 603: Sus.[4], 1. p. 415) conceive the object of the ostracism to have been to put an end to dangerous rivalries between two leading statesmen by removing one of them beyond the limits of the State. Aristotle's account of its object receives confirmation from Thuc. 8. 73. 3, from Philochorus, Fragm. 79 b (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 396), and from Diod. 11. 55 and 19. 1 (compare Diodorus' account of the object of petalism, 11. 86. 5–87. 2). See also Plut. Aristid. c. 1, Pericl. c. 7, and Themist. c. 22. At Athens, however, and probably elsewhere (cp. 1284 b 20, τὰς πόλεις), the ostracism ceased after a time to be used for the object for which it was instituted and was perverted into an instrument of faction (στασιαστικῶς, 22). Aristides was not ostracized because he was disproportionately powerful, but because he was an opponent of whom Themistocles wished to be rid. Damon the musician was not ostracized because he was dangerous to the State, but because he was a friend of Pericles. Aristotle regards the original object of the ostracism as not wholly illegitimate. He would indeed prefer that the constitution and the laws should be so framed as to prevent the rise within

the State of any disproportionately powerful person (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 10–18)—with this end in view he would avoid creating great offices held for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 18 sqq., b 10 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 20 sqq.), and would seek to equalize property (2. 7. 1266 b 14 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.) and to increase the number of the moderately well-to-do (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 1–5)—but, if measures of this kind should fail of their object, he recommends (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 19) that any sentence of removal inflicted on disproportionately powerful men shall be a sentence of removal beyond the limits of the State, in other words he recommends something very like the ostracism. That both the petalism and the ostracism had the evil effect of discouraging the participation of the more distinguished citizens in political life, we see from Diod. 11. 87. 3 sqq. and from Plutarch's Life of Pericles (c. 7). If there is any truth in Plutarch's view that in choosing the side of the Many Pericles was influenced to some extent by a dread of the ostracism, the institution gave a decisive turn at that moment to the constitutional development of Athens.

**19.** αὗται γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'for these, I suppose, are thought to pursue equality more than anything else': cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 3 sqq. Aristotle says 'are thought,' because democracies pursue only one kind of equality, arithmetical equality, and lose sight of equality based on desert (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sqq.). 'Even now one discovers a tendency in the United States, particularly in the West, to dislike, possibly to resent, any outward manifestation of social superiority. A man would be ill looked upon who should build a castle in a park, surround his pleasure-grounds with a high wall, and receive an exclusive society in gilded saloons' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3. 315).

**20.** διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυφιλίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχύν. Cp. Soph. O. T. 540,

> ἆρ' οὐχὶ μῶρόν ἐστι τοὐγχείρημά σου,
> ἄνευ τε πλήθους καὶ φίλων τυραννίδα
> θηρᾶν, ὃ πλήθει χρήμασίν θ' ἁλίσκεται;

Plato, Rep. 434 B, ἔπειτα ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ πλούτῳ ἢ πλήθει ἢ ἰσχύϊ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τοιούτῳ εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολεμικοῦ εἶδος ἐπιχειρῇ ἰέναι: Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13, οἱ μὲν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς εὐτυχημάτων ὄντες, ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ φίλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. That the possessor of these advantages was not unlikely to be ostracized, we see from what is said of Pericles in Plut. Pericl. c. 7, πλούτου δὲ καὶ γένους προσόντος αὐτῷ

λαμπροῦ καὶ φίλων, οἱ πλεῖστον ἠδύναντο, φοβούμενος ἐξοστρακισθῆναι. We learn what Aristotle means by τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχύν from Plut. Aristid. c. 1, τῷ δ' ὀστράκῳ πᾶς ὁ διὰ δόξαν ἢ γένος ἢ λόγου δύναμιν ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλοὺς νομιζόμενος ὑπέπιπτεν, though he may perhaps hint that even virtue, as in the case of Aristides, was a cause of ostracism at Athens.

**21.** μεθίστασαν, the technical word used in cases of ostracism: cp. Philoch. Fragm. 79 b (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 396), τοῦτον ἔδει . . . ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἔτη δέκα: Diod. 11. 55. 1: [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 6. The same word is used of the banishment of involuntary homicides (Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 45, τῶν ἐπ' ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ λέγει μεθεστηκότων). It is used in contrast to φυγαδεύειν and is a milder term than even ἐκβάλλειν.

**22.** χρόνους ὡρισμένους. Cp. c. 14. 1285 a 34 and 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 27. Ten years, or, according to Philoch. Fragm. 79 b, originally ten, and afterwards five. Diodorus (11. 55. 2) makes the term five years. In the petalism it was five (Diod. 11. 87. 1). A temporary absence from the State would not indeed make the ostracized person less wealthy or less well-born, but it would sever him from his friends and followers, and so tend to diminish his influence.

μυθολογεῖται δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Sus.[2], Note 604 (Sus.[4], 1. p. 416), who refers to Pherecydes of Leros, Fragm. 67 (ap. Schol. Apollon. 1. 1290: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 88), Ἀντίμαχος ἐν τῇ Λύδῃ φησὶν ἐκβιβασθέντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα διὰ τὸ καταβαρεῖσθαι τὴν Ἀργὼ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἤρωος. Τούτῳ καὶ Ποσείδιππος ὁ ἐπιγραμματογράφος ἠκολούθησε καὶ Φερεκύδης, and Apollodor. Biblioth. 1. 9. 19, Φερεκύδης αὐτὸν ἐν Ἀφέταις τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἀπολειφθῆναι λέγει, τῆς Ἀργοῦς φθεγξαμένης μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τούτου βάρος. See also Prof. Robinson Ellis' note on Catullus 64. 23, where the expression 'mater' probably refers to the Argo—'the idea is not unnatural in itself and agrees with the recurring representations of the Argo as an animate being (Ἀργώ a proper name, like Eido, Hypso, Aphro, Brimo, Ioulo), possessed of voice and reason and in part divine. Philo Iud. vol. ii. p. 468 (quoted by Nauck, Fr. Aesch. 20), οὐδ' ἡ Ἀργὼ ναυαρχοῦντος Ἰάσονος ἐπέτρεπεν ἐπιβαίνειν οἰκέταις μεμοιραμένη καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ λογισμοῦ, φύσις οὖσα φιλελεύθερος· ὅθεν καὶ Αἴσχυλος ἐπ' αὐτῆς εἶπε· Ποῦ δ' ἐστὶν Ἀργοῦς ἱερὸν αὔδασον (rather αὐδάσον) ξύλον; Apollod. 1. 9. 19' (quoted above), 'cf. 1. 9. 24, places which all seem to refer to the piece of speaking timber (αὐδῆεν δόρυ) which Athene built into the cut-water, and which

Apollonius describes as urging the start from Pagasae (i. 525) and warning the Argonauts to expiate the murder of Absyrtus by a visit to Circe (iv. 580 sqq.).'

**23.** διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, 'for a similar reason': cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 19 and 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 6 and b 17. Not τὴν τοιαύτην, as in 18.

**26.** διὸ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας, 'among others those who blame.' In τοὺς ψέγοντας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Sosicles the Corinthian and the speech which he is represented in Hdt. 5. 92 to have addressed to the representatives of the Lacedaemonians and their allies gathered in council, in which, while recounting the misdeeds of the tyrants of Corinth, he dwelt especially on the hint given by Thrasybulus tyrant of Miletus to Periander tyrant of Corinth to get rid of the men who overtopped the rest. Compare Eurip. Suppl. 433 Bothe, 447 Dindorf,

πῶς οὖν ἔτ' ἂν γένοιτ' ἂν ἰσχυρὰ πόλις,
ὅταν τις, ὡς λειμῶνος ἠρινοῦ στάχυν,
τόλμας ἀφαιρῇ καπολωτίζῃ νέους;

Herodotus, as has been said, makes Thrasybulus give the hint to Periander, whereas Aristotle here makes Periander give the hint to Thrasybulus, but any one who compares the two narratives will see that the story as told by Aristotle is a shortened version of that of Herodotus. How then are we to account for the inversion in it of the parts played by Periander and Thrasybulus? We have already noticed other instances in which a slight divergence from a narrative of Herodotus is observable (see above on 1262 a 19 and 1276 a 28), and the same thing occurs again in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17 sq. Aristotle's memory may have betrayed him, as it did in the mention of Hector in Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 33 (see below on 1285 a 12) and of Calypso in Eth. Nic. 2. 9. 1109 a 31, where Hom. Odyss. 12. 219 is referred to, but, if this was so, the slip must have been something more than a mere momentary one, for it recurs in 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20. It is natural that Aristotle should credit Periander with the advice, for he believed that many of the traditional maxims of tyranny came originally from Periander (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 36). We notice that Herodotus, a Greek of Asia Minor, ascribes the famous hint to a tyrant of Miletus, while Aristotle, a Greek of Europe, ascribes it to a tyrant of Corinth. For the dative Θρασυβούλῳ dependent on the substantive συμβουλίαν, cp. De Part. An. 2. 17. 660 a 35, καὶ χρῶνται τῇ

γλώττῃ καὶ πρὸς ἑρμηνείαν ἀλλήλαις, and see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61 sqq. In 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20 we have τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμα.

**28.** τὸν πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας. For the order of these words, cp. 1284 b 8, τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας, and c. 12. 1282 b 31, τῶν ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην, and see Vahlen on Poet. 15. 1454 b 16, τὰς ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποιητικῇ.

**30.** ὁμαλῦναι. Ὁμαλύνειν is a rare word, but it is used by Plato in Tim. 45 E.

**35.** καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας. In sentences of this kind the preposition is usually repeated in the Politics before the second substantive (e. g. in 1. 8. 1256 b 17 we have καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν), and this is so whether 'both . . . and' is expressed by καὶ . . . καί or by τε . . . καί, but sometimes the preposition is not thus repeated (e. g. in the passage before us and in 38: in 2. 12. 1274 b 24: 3. 11. 1281 b 33: 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 20: 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 19: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 29 and b 25 sq.: see also critical note on 1330 b 31). I have not noticed that the preposition is similarly omitted in the Politics when ἤ . . . ἤ, οὔτε . . . οὔτε (or μήτε . . . μήτε), εἴτε . . . εἴτε, or πότερον . . . ἤ are used, except that in 3. 1. 1275 b 17 $M^{s}$ $P^{1}$ omit the second περί in ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν.

**37.** τρόπον τινά. See above on 1255 a 13.

**38.** οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως. Cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 187, οἱ τῆς ψήφου νυνὶ γεγονότες κύριοι.

**39.** οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. It is clear from this that the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians were the most powerful States of the Athenian alliance. They had been the leaders in the transfer of the headship of the maritime league against Persia from the Lacedaemonians to Athens (Plut. Aristid. c. 23). Miletus was no longer their equal. We read in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 24, πεισθέντες δὲ ταῦτα καὶ λαβόντες τὴν ἀρχὴν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) τοῖς τε συμμάχοις δεσποτικωτέρως ἐχρῶντο πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Σαμίων· τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐῶντες τάς τε πολιτείας παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄρχειν ὧν ἔτυχον ἄρχοντες. This remark is obviously not true of the period subsequent to the revolt and subjugation of Samos in B. C. 440, and it probably refers to the Athenian Confederacy in its earlier days before it was converted into an Empire. If we understand it thus, it is not inconsistent with the passage before us. But it is not easy to say what were the infractions of treaties to which Aristotle

alludes. He appears to refer to humiliations inflicted by Athens on Samos, Chios, and Lesbos at a comparatively early period of her ascendency, 'as soon as she had taken a firm grip of her rule.' He can hardly refer, therefore, to humiliations which followed the suppression of revolts, for Samos did not revolt till B.C. 440, nor Mytilene till B.C. 428, nor Chios till B.C. 412. Besides, he seems to be speaking not of humiliations brought about by disloyalty on the part of these States, but of humiliations prompted by Athenian jealousy of their greatness. Athens may have prohibited wars between one of these States and other members of her alliance (see the speech of Hermocrates in Thuc. 6. 76)—it was a prohibition of this kind that led to the revolt of Samos (Thuc. 1. 115)—or demanded the removal of fortifications (compare the case of Chios in B.C. 425, Thuc. 4. 51), or meddled with their territory (as in the case of Thasos, Thuc. 1. 100). No doubt, the Mytilenean envoys in Thuc. 3. 9 sqq. (see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 6. 309), speaking in B.C. 428, do not charge Athens with any infractions of treaties; on the contrary, they speak of their State having been 'honoured' by Athens, and ascribe their revolt to fear of ultimate subjugation, not to actual wrongs inflicted on Lesbos in the past. Still Plutarch implies in Aristid. c. 25 (where he perhaps follows the same authority as Aristotle does in the passage before us, for he uses the words, *ὕστερον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ἄρχειν ἐγκρατέστερον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκβιαζομένων*, cp. Thuc. 1. 76. 1) that Athens was guilty of infractions of treaties in her relations with her dependent allies, and it is likely enough that Samos, Chios, and Lesbos did not escape. That a time did come when Athens changed her original easy-going headship into a firm imperial control, we see from Thuc. 6. 76 and Diod. 11. 70. Diodorus (who may here represent Ephorus, a witness likely to be favourable to the dependent allies, as he belonged to the Aeolic Cyme) dates the commencement of this change from the time when Athens became aware that the Lacedaemonians had abandoned all thought of attempting to regain the headship of the maritime league by war. This happened as early as B.C. 475, if Diodorus' chronology is to be trusted (Diod. 11. 50. 8).

**41. ὁ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle probably refers not only to severities inflicted by the Persians on the Medes, Babylonians, and others after the suppression of revolts (see as to Babylon Hdt. 1. 183 and 3. 159 and Arrian, Anab. 3. 16. 4 and

7. 17. 2), but also and more especially to unprovoked evidences of distrust like that mentioned in Diod. 11. 6. 3, *τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἀναλαβὼν (ὁ Ξέρξης) ἦκεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Θερμοπύλαις Ἕλληνας προτάξας ἁπάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν Μήδους, εἴτε δι' ἀνδρείαν προκρίνας αὐτοὺς εἴτε καὶ βουλόμενος ἅπαντας ἀπολέσαι· ἐνῆν γὰρ ἔτι φρόνημα τοῖς Μήδοις, τῆς τῶν προγόνων ἡγεμονίας οὐ πάλαι καταπεπονημένης*: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 69, *μισθὸν δὲ καὶ τούτοις* (i. e. *τοῖς φρουροῖς*) *Βαβυλωνίους ἔταξεν* (*ὁ Κῦρος*) *παρέχειν, βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς ὡς ἀμηχανωτάτους εἶναι, ὅπως ὅτι ταπεινότατοι καὶ εὐκαθεκτότατοι εἶεν.* Egypt is probably referred to in *τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς*: cp. Diod. 17. 49, *οἱ γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι, τῶν Περσῶν ἠσεβηκότων εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ βιαίως ἀρχόντων, ἄσμενοι προσεδέξαντο τοὺς Μακεδόνας.* Compare Plato's picture of Persian rule in Laws 697 D, which explains Alexander's triumph.

1284 b. **2. πεφρονηματισμένους.** 'A word occurring in the Politics alone of Aristotle's writings, but not very uncommon there, is *φρονηματίζεσθαι*. It occurs later in Polybius and is certainly un-Attic. It is entirely absent from the *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, where *θαρρεῖν* takes its place' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der *Πολιτεία Ἀθηναίων* des Aristoteles, p. 37).

**ἐπέκοπτε.** *Ἐπικόπτω* is a rare word; the passage before us is, so far as I know, the earliest prose passage in which it occurs. It is a technical term of arboriculture, to 'lop' or 'pollard' (Theophr. Caus. Plant. 5. 17. 3, *περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπικοπῆς καὶ τῆς κολούσεως ἐν ὀλίγοις ἡ σκέψις . . . καλοῦσι δ' ἐπικοπήν, ὅταν ἀφαιρεθείσης τῆς κόμης ἐπικόψῃ τις τὸ ἄκρον*), and its metaphorical meaning in the passage before us agrees pretty closely with that of *ἐταπείνωσαν* in 1284 a 41.

**3. περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς,** 'with regard to all constitutions, even the normal ones.' Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 32, *καὶ ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστι τροφὴ τοῦτο* (i. e. *τὸ ὕδωρ*), *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ξηροῖς.* We gather from 25 sqq. that the best constitution will expel, if necessary, men who are disproportionately superior in wealth or political influence, though not men disproportionately superior in virtue. As to the importance of *συμμετρία* in the members of a State, see 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 33 sqq.

**4. μέν** is answered by *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά*, as in c. 4. 1276 b 34, c. 6. 1278 b 19, and 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 39 sqq.

**5. πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι.** The opposition between *πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι* and *τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοπούσας* will be noticed. The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of the use of *ἀποσκοπεῖν* by Aristotle. *Ἐπισκοπεῖν* is also rare in the sense in which it is used in 6. It is not perhaps necessary to supply

*ἀγαθόν* from the next line with *τὸ ἴδιον*: cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 30. 1437 a 36, *καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἕνεκά τινος ἰδίου δοκεῖ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος δημηγορεῖν* (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 339 a 22).

7. **δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.** Cp. c. 12. 1282 b 30. **Τοῦτο**, i.e. the fact that a part of a whole which is disproportionate to the whole to which it belongs is not tolerated.

8. **οὔτε** is here followed by **οὔτε** and **οὐδὲ δή** ('nor yet surely'). See above on 1272 b 38, and compare the somewhat similar sequence in c. 17. 1288 a 24 sqq. In the passage before us the change from *οὔτε . . . οὔτε* to *οὐδὲ δή* is enough to cause the future *ἐάσει* to take the place of the optative *ἐάσειεν ἄν*.

10. **οὔτε ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν κ.τ.λ.** We must apparently supply *ἐάσειεν ἂν ὑπερβάλλειν τῆς συμμετρίας*.

13. **ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν κ.τ.λ.** '[The teacher of a chorus does not fall out with his chorus because he excludes from it a disproportionately excellent singer, for his rule over his chorus is beneficial to it, as being exercised for the advantage of the ruled (c. 6. 1278 b 39 sqq.),] and thus, so far as this practice at any rate is concerned, there is no reason why monarchs should not be in harmony with the States they rule, if, when they resort to it, their rule is beneficial to their States.' For *μέν solitarium* see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. **Ταῖς πόλεσιν** I take to mean 'the States ruled by them': cp. 33, *ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν*. For *τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς*, cp. 21, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 26, *τὰς οἰκείας γυναῖκας*.

15. **διὸ κ.τ.λ.**, 'hence in relation to acknowledged superiorities the argument in favour of the ostracism is not without a certain element of political justice.' **Διό** introduces an inference from the fact that constitutions which aim at the common good and practitioners of the arts resort to measures akin to the ostracism. Whatever restores the symmetry of the constitution is in a certain degree just. **Κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχάς** (cp. 26, *οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλ' ἄν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετήν*) is added to exclude the application of the ostracism to cases in which there is no acknowledged superiority (such, for instance, as that of Hyperbolus). For the phrase *τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχάς* cp. Plato, Rep. 569 B and Meno 96 B, and Isocr. Hel. § 12. **Ὑπεροχάς** is in the plural because there are more kinds of superiority than one (Bon. Ind. 793 a 40, '*ὑπεροχαί*, i.e. varia *τῆς ὑπεροχῆς* genera'); there is superiority in

virtue, in wealth, in command of friends, in birth, and so forth. For *ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τὸν ὀστρακισμόν*, cp. c. 9. 1280 a 27.

17. **βέλτιον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** 'True, it is better,' etc. The same thing is said in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq. For the means by which Aristotle would effect this, see above on 1284 a 17.

19. **δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς κ.τ.λ.** On the proverb *δεύτερος πλοῦς*, see Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 359 and 2. 24, where the lines of Menander are quoted (*Θρασυλέων*, Fragm. 2, ap. Stob. Floril. 59. 9: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 139),

*ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστι δήπου λεγόμενος,*
*ἂν ἀποτύχῃ τις οὐρίου, κώπαισι πλεῖν*

(*οὐρίου* Grotius, *πρῶτον, ἐν* or simply *ἐν* MSS.: see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 5. cclii). *Ἂν συμβῇ*, sc. *τὸ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἰατρείας. Διορθοῦν*, sc. *τὴν πολιτείαν.*

20. **ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις**, 'which did not come about in connexion with the States' (see note on 1327 b 7), a softened way of saying 'which was not done by the States.' Greek States did not use the ostracism to heal a defect in the constitution.

22. **τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς**, plural in the sense of 'acts of ostracizing.'

*ἐν μὲν οὖν* κ.τ.λ., 'in the deviation-forms of constitution, then, that the practice of removing persons disproportionately superior is of advantage to each form severally and just according to their several views of justice, is evident, and perhaps this also is evident that it is not absolutely just.' It is not absolutely just, because it is resorted to in the interest of the holders of power, not in the common interest of all the citizens (4 sq.). *Μὲν οὖν* is answered by *ἀλλά*, 25.

26. **οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν.** *Τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν* is emphasized by being placed before *τὴν ὑπεροχήν*: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 18, *τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν*, and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 25, *τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη*, and 34, *τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατιῶν αἱ μεταβολαί.*

27. **ἰσχύος** must mean 'political strength': cp. 1284 a 21, *ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχύν.*

28. **ἄν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετήν.** Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 16, *συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετήν.*

**οὐ γὰρ δὴ** κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt remembers, as Vict. points out, Heraclitus' indignant censure of the Ephesians for their expulsion of Hermodorus (see vol. i. p. 263, note 2). Compare the language ascribed to the Persian King when Themistocles was driven from Greece to his court (Plut. Themist. c. 28, *μακαρίσας δὲ*

*πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἑαυτόν, ὡς ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ μεγίστῃ, καὶ κατευξάμενος ἀεὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις τοιαύτας φρένας διδόναι τὸν Ἀρμάνιον, ὅπως ἐλαύνωσι τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κ.τ.λ.*). Athens was popularly credited with 'envy of the good,' as we see from the epitaph on Aeschylus in Anthol. Pal. 7. 40,

*τίς φθόνος, αἴ αἴ,*
*Θησείδας ἀγαθῶν ἔγκοτος αἰὲν ἔχει;*

Theseus was believed by some to have been ostracized at Athens (Theophr. Fragm. 131). A current proverb ascribed a similar jealousy to the Megarians—*μηδέποτε μηδεὶς Μεγαρέων γένοιτο σοφώτερος* (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 528). Observe that *ὁ τοιοῦτος* recurs four times in 28–34. This is probably intentional. As to repetitions of this kind see notes on 1331 b 18, 1317 b 5, 1307 a 14, and 1325 b 11, and compare the frequency with which *τοῖς ἤθεσιν* or *τῶν ἠθῶν* recurs in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 28–39.

**30. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.** 'Αλλὰ *μὴν . . . γε*, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. Supply *φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν*. A question then arises as to the construction and punctuation of the sentence. Hampke (followed by Sus., though not without a good deal of hesitation) places *παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν* in a parenthesis, and takes *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς* with *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου* (*φαῖεν ἂν δεῖν*), but Susemihl doubts with some reason whether, if we adopt this view of the construction of the sentence, *μερίζοντες* should not be *μερίζοντας*. In any case perhaps the more natural course is (with Bernays) to take *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς* with what immediately precedes, i. e. with *παραπλήσιον . . . ἀξιοῖεν*, and not with *ἀλλὰ . . . τοιούτου*. But then the further question arises, what is the meaning of *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς*? Some have fancied that there is a reference to the 'distribution of offices' by Zeus among the other gods, when he had won supremacy in heaven (cp. Hesiod, Theog. 881–5, 112, and Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 228 sqq.), and have translated the passage, 'for to do so would be much the same thing as if men were to claim to rule over Zeus, distributing the offices (as he did when he succeeded to power).' But it is not likely that this is the meaning of the words. A different interpretation is suggested by the passage in which the conclusion arrived at here is repeated, c. 17. 1288 a 24, *οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν δή που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ*

πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς. Compare with this passage 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 23–27 and 3. 16. 1287 a 16–18, and we shall find that the three passages lend support to Bernays' rendering of μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς, 'by a rotation in their tenure of the offices' ('gemäss einem reihenweisen Wechsel der Aemterbekleidung'), in which he is anticipated by Sepulveda, who however erroneously supplies οἱ θεοί as the nom. to ἀξιοῖεν. Sepulveda, in fact, explains the passage in his commentary thus—'simile, inquit, esset ac si Dii statuerent inter se, ut sic per omnes aut aliquos ipsorum iret imperandi vicissitudo, ut Iuppiter modo imperium teneret, modo esset sub imperio, quod esset absurdissimum.' But does μερίζειν bear this sense in any other passage? I am not aware that any such passage has been produced, and till it has, it will be safer to translate μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς in the ordinary way, 'distributing the offices,' i. e. distributing them among themselves and Zeus, and treating him as on a level with themselves in the matter of ruling, or, in other words, as partly ruling and partly ruled, instead of making him sole ruler. Cp. 1284 a 9, ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων. I take μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς to mean the same as ἀξιοῦντες αὐτὸν τῶν ἴσων. In Aristoph. Aves 467 sq. and 1225 sqq. (Didot) the Birds go further and claim to rule over Zeus and the gods without giving them even a turn of office. Bonitz remarks (Ind. 41 a 31) on the construction παραπλήσιον κἂν εἰ 'insolentior videtur usus formulae κἂν εἰ ubi καί pertinet ad vocabulum similitudinem significans (παραπλήσιον, ὅμοιον, τὸ αὐτό),' as in the passage before us, with which he compares Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 7 sqq. and (a passage very similar in structure to ours) περὶ ἀναπνοῆς 9. 475 a 11, παραπλήσιον γὰρ συμβαίνει κἂν εἴ τίς τινα τῶν ἀναπνεόντων πνίγοι, τὸ στόμα κατασχών. The difficulty of getting the better of Zeus was proverbial (Hom. Il. 1. 396 sqq. and 8. 209 sq.), and indeed the difficulty of ruling over the gods (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 10 sq., already referred to by Eaton: Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 49, 356 sqq., Pers. 749: Hom. Il. 8. 18 sqq.: Aristoph. Plut. 141 sqq. Didot: Diod. 17. 41. 1).

**32.** λείπεται τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. When willing obedience is rendered to a man, it is a sign that he is a natural King (Xen. Cyrop. 5. 1. 24 sqq.). Cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 10, ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική· τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς. Is the passage before us present to Milton's memory in the address to Cromwell in the Defensio Secunda,

where we read, 'We all willingly yield the palm of sovereignty to your unrivalled ability and virtue, except the few among us who are either ... or who do not know that nothing in the world is more pleasing to God, more agreeable to reason, more politically just, or more generally useful, than that the supreme power should be vested in the best and the wisest of men' (Prose Works, i. 288 Bohn)?

**33. βασιλέας διδίους.** 'Forma accusativi pluralis plerumque *βασιλεῖς*, veluti 2. 9. 1271 a 26: 2. 11. 1272 b 37: 3. 14. 1285 a 26: 3. 15. 1286 b 11, sed *βασιλέας* legitur 3. 13. 1284 b 33' (Bon. Ind. 135 a 21 sqq.), and also in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 24. Βασιλέας is the form found in Attic Inscriptions, though *βασιλεῖς* appears after B.C. 307 (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 110). The acc. plur. of *ἱερεύς* in the Politics is *ἱερεῖς* and of *ἱππεύς* *ἱππεῖς*. For the meaning of *ἀίδιος* see above on 1271 a 40. Not mere temporary kings, like the *βασιλεῖς* mentioned in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29, but perpetual kings.

**35 sqq. μεταβῆναι,** because a transition is now made from a question affecting all constitutions to the study of a single constitution, Kingship. Aristotle had said in c. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq. that he would discuss the normal constitutions first, and Kingship is a normal constitution. The inquiries of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters have had reference to the question of Justice, but now Aristotle asks whether Kingship is expedient, not whether it is just; the two questions, however, do not lie far apart, and when he at length arrives at the end of the inquiry in c. 17. 1287 b 36 sqq., we find that an answer is given to both of them (1287 b 39, *δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον*: 1288 a 1, *οὔτε συμφέρον οὔτε δίκαιον*: 1288 a 18, *δίκαιον*: 1288 a 30, *πότερον οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει*). The question of the expediency of Kingship cannot be discussed until the various kinds of Kingship have been distinguished, for it may well be that one and the same answer will not hold good of all. Besides, Aristotle is not sorry to seize the opportunity which his classification of Kingships affords him of describing the various forms of Kingship and of correcting the error of those who regarded the Lacedaemonian Kingship as Kingship in a truer sense than any other Kingship according to law (1285 a 3 sqq.); for he holds that the Lacedaemonian Kingship is, in fact, the least of those according to law. It is the expediency of the Absolute Kingship, however, that he really wishes to discuss. In his account of this form Aristotle C. 14.

probably has the Persian Kingship before him (see notes on 1284 a 14 and 1287 a 1). Socrates had described Kingship as always according to law (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, *βασιλείαν δὲ καὶ τυραννίδα ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἡγεῖτο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἑκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο* κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle takes a different view. Just as in the classification of democracies and oligarchies in the Sixth (Fourth) Book forms in which law is supreme are marked off from those in which it is not, so here in the classification of Kingships the same is the case; but while the democracies and oligarchies in which law is not supreme are the worst, the form of Kingship in which law is not supreme is the best and highest. Aristotle's classification of Kingships would have been simplified, if he had first divided them into Kingships according to law and not according to law, and had then subdivided the class of Kingships according to law. His study of Kingship would probably have been fuller and more complete if he had not studied Kingship according to law on the way, as it were, to an examination of the question as to Absolute Kingship. We are grateful to him for studying barbarian Kingship as well as Greek, for in the case of other constitutions he is silent as to the non-Greek world, if we except his notice of the Carthaginian *ἀριστοκρατία*, and not entirely for want of material, for non-monarchical constitutions appear to have existed, for instance, in Lycia (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 185); but his treatment of barbarian Kingship is cursory in the extreme. It makes no pretence of being exhaustive, for the kind of barbarian Kingship which Aristotle selects for notice is said by him to exist only among 'some of the barbarians' (c. 14. 1285 a 17). It should also be noted that in the inquiry respecting the downfall and the preservation of Kingship and Tyranny contained in the Seventh (Fifth) Book no notice is taken of the distinction drawn in the Third between different kinds of Kingship, or of that drawn in the Sixth (Fourth) between different kinds of Tyranny. So again in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 Aristotle evidently implies the existence of Kingships not *κατὰ γένος*, but it is not easy to say to what Kingships he there refers (see note on 1313 a 10). One remark may be added. Aristotle classes under the head of *βασιλεία* dignities to which we should not allow the name of Kingship. The Aesymneteship, for instance, might be held for only a few months or years, yet it is treated by Aristotle as a form of *βασιλεία*. It is so because it is

exercised over willing subjects and is invested with large powers, for these are the two characteristics of *βασιλεία* (7 (5). 10. 1313 a 5). *Βασιλεία* may or may not be according to law, may or may not be *κυρία πάντων* (c. 14. 1285 a 4, b 29), may or may not be elective, may or may not be hereditary, may even be for a less term than life, but these two characteristics are always found in connexion with it.

37. *σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον* κ.τ.λ. Compare the question raised in 2. 1. 1261 a 2, *ἀλλὰ πότερον ὅσων ἐνδέχεται κοινωνῆσαι, πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνεῖν τὴν μέλλουσαν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον;* *Τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ* stands in opposition to *τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει*, therefore it must mean 'broadly to any city and country which is to be well-constituted politically.' We have been told in the preceding chapter that in some cases the best constitution must assume the form of a perpetual Kingship, but that does not preclude the raising of the question whether Kingship is advantageous to any political community which desires to be well-constituted or only to some. Aristotle's readiness to consider the question whether Kingship is expedient or not would be little in harmony with popular opinion in Greece, which was no doubt unfavourable to the institution: cp. Demosth. Philip. 2. 25, *βασιλεὺς γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἅπας ἐχθρὸς ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐναντίος.* Even Isocrates, though he praises Kingship in his Nicocles and Ad Nicoclem—he could hardly do otherwise in works written for a King—speaks of it in his Oration to Philip (§ 107) as little suited to Greeks, though indispensable to barbarians, and allows in his Nicocles (§ 24) that the Lacedaemonians and Carthaginians reserve it for use in war and are oligarchically governed at home. Xenophon's praises of Kingship in his Cyropaedeia refer, at any rate nominally, to a Persian King. Plato, however, had been bolder in his Republic and Politicus, for he certainly has Greeks in view when he advocates in those dialogues Kingship of the most thorough-going kind. See on this subject vol. i. p. 277.

38. *καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ.* *Χώρα* probably here means not 'a territory occupied by villages,' as in Strabo, p. 336, *σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τόπους τοὺς κατὰ Πελοπόννησον πλὴν ὀλίγων, οὓς κατέλεξεν ὁ ποιητής, οὐ πόλεις ἀλλὰ χώρας νομίζειν δεῖ, συστήματα δήμων ἔχουσαν ἑκάστην πλείω, ἐξ ὧν ὕστερον αἱ γνωριζόμεναι πόλεις συνῳκίσθησαν*, but 'a territory occupied by an *ἔθνος* or *ἔθνη*,' as in Xen. Anab. 4. 8. 22,

ἐν τῇ Κόλχων χώρᾳ, for in c. 14. 1285 b 30 we have ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη, and in 1285 b 33 πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων. Nothing, however, is said of the χώρα or ἔθνος in the recapitulatory summaries in c. 17. 1288 a 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 6 sqq.

41. ἢ πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς, 'or has several different forms': cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 33, οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ταὐτὸν ζῷον ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς.

1285 a. 2. τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος. In some forms of Kingship (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) the τρόπος τῆς ἀρχῆς is despotic (1285 a 22, b 2 sq.), in others not; in some the King is supreme over more things than in others (c. 15. 1285 b 35 sqq.).

3. πασῶν, sc. τῶν βασιλειῶν. For the juxtaposition of εἷς and πασῶν see note on 1281 a 13.

ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle places first and second in his enumeration of forms of Kingship two existing forms, the Laconian and the barbarian, and then passes on to two obsolete forms, the Aesymneteship, which existed in the ancient days of Greece, and the Kingship of the heroic times.

δοκεῖ, 'is thought,' by whom we are not told: possibly Plato's language in Laws 691 D–692 B respecting the Lacedaemonian Kingship is present to Aristotle's mind. He does not agree with this view; he sees that there are Kingships according to law (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) which are supreme over more things than the Laconian, and therefore are Kingships in a fuller sense, for the true King is κύριος πάντων (c. 17. 1288 a 18 sq.: cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37). In Diog. Laert. 3. 82 a classification of Kingships into Kingships κατὰ γένος and Kingships κατὰ νόμον is ascribed with very doubtful correctness to Plato, and the Lacedaemonian Kingship is brought under the former head, so that it is implied not to be κατὰ νόμον.

5. ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τὴν χώραν, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς. Ἐξέρχομαι rarely takes the accusative (see Liddell and Scott).

ἡγεμών ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, 'he is the leader in all matters relating to war': cp. 1285 b 18, τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, and Hdt. 9. 33, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ . . . μισθῷ ἐπειρῶντο πείσαντες Τισαμενὸν ποιέεσθαι ἅμα Ἡρακλειδέων τοῖσι βασιλεῦσι ἡγεμόνα τῶν πολέμων. For τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5, ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον: Anab. 4. 3. 10: Cyrop. 1. 2. 10. Ἡγεμὼν τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον stands in tacit contrast to ἡγεμονία πολιτική, of which

we read in c. 17. 1288 a 9. In Philip. § 33, *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῖς ἀπ' ἐκείνου γεγονόσι καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον δεδώκασι*, Isocrates appears to distinguish between the Kingship and the *ἡγεμονία*. According to Hdt. 6. 56 the Lacedaemonian Kings had the right to determine against whom war should be made (*πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν ἐπ' ἣν ἂν βούλωνται χώρην*), and Gilbert holds (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 46) that there are some indications that this right remained to them even in Xenophon's time (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 34: 2. 2. 7: 4. 7. 1), but Xenophon implies in Rep. Lac. 15. 2, *καὶ στρατιὰν ὅποι ἂν ἡ πόλις ἐκπέμπῃ, ἡγεῖσθαι*, that the State and not the Kings possessed it.

**6.** *ἔτι δὲ* κ.τ.λ. *Τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς* (cp. 1285 b 23) answers to *τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*. Something more is meant by this phrase than the offering of sacrifices to the gods, sacrifices such as the Kings of the heroic times offered (1285 b 10: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), and it probably includes the right of the Lacedaemonian Kings to name the officers called Pythii, through whom the Delphic oracle was consulted (Hdt. 6. 57. 2), and to have the custody of oracles (6. 57. 4). We learn from Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, *ἔθηκε γὰρ θύειν μὲν βασιλέα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια ἅπαντα, ὡς ἀπὸ θεοῦ ὄντα*, why it fell to the Lacedaemonian King to sacrifice. It was natural that the same authorities should be charged with matters relating to the gods and to war, for success in war was held to be given by the gods. In his account of the prerogatives of the Lacedaemonian Kings Aristotle omits to notice their share in deliberative authority as members of the senate, and also the judicial authority which, as we know from Hdt. 6. 57, they possessed in a particular class of cases (this had perhaps been narrowed: see above on 1270 a 21).

**7.** *αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία* κ.τ.λ. *Μὲν οὖν* is taken up by *ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας*, 14, and then at length finds a *δέ* to answer to it in *παρὰ ταύτην δέ*, 16. *Αὕτη ἡ βασιλεία* (cp. 14) means 'this kind of Kingship,' as *αὕτη ἡ δικαιοσύνη* in Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25 means 'this kind of justice,' for the Lacedaemonian Kingship is not the only Kingship included in the class, as we see from 15, *τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἱρεταί*. It appears, in fact, from 10 sqq. that the Kingship held by Agamemnon as leader of the Greek forces before Troy is included in it, a Kingship which we must not confuse with his Kingship of Mycenae, for his Kingship of Mycenae belongs to the fourth class of Kingships, *αἱ κατὰ τοὺς*

ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους βασιλεῖαι (1285 b 4 sqq.). Aristotle may well have also referred to this class the Kingship, or Leadership, of Greece, which was held for a time by Agesilaus and for life by Philip and Alexander of Macedon. Compare Plut. Ages. c. 40, where Agesilaus is said to have been regarded until the defeat at Leuctra as σχεδὸν ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμὼν καὶ βασιλεύς, with Ages. c. 6, where we read that in a dream which Agesilaus had at Aulis before embarking for Asia, he heard a voice addressing him thus, ὦ βασιλεῦ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅτι μὲν οὐδεὶς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὁμοῦ συμπάσης ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς ἢ πρότερον Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ σὺ νῦν μετ' ἐκεῖνον, ἐννοεῖς δήπουθεν, and with Isocr. Panath. § 76. At a later time Philip of Macedon was elected by the Congress at Corinth ἡγεμών (or στρατηγός) αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Diod. 16. 1, 89, 91: Arrian, Anab. 7. 9. 5: cp. Demosth. De Cor. c. 201 and Justin, 9. 4, and see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 51. 3), and on his death his son Alexander was elected by the Congress to the same dignity (Diod. 17. 4. 9: Arrian, Anab. 1. 1. 2: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 90. 1). Thus the office of ἡγεμών, or στρατηγός, αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος in the hands of Philip and Alexander was an elective office and tenable apparently for life. Long before the time of Agesilaus and Philip, Gelon had asked to be appointed στρατηγός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον (Hdt. 7. 158). Aristotle can hardly intend to include the Carthaginian Kingship under this form of Kingship, for in 2. 11. 1273 a 30 he distinguishes between the offices of King and General at Carthage. He would seem to omit the Carthaginian Kingship from his enumeration, for it cannot fall under the head of the barbarian Kingship, though the Carthaginians were non-Greeks, inasmuch as its authority was by no means of a 'despotic' type. Would such an office as that of the ταγός of the Thessalians be classed by Aristotle under this form of Kingship?

στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ ἀίδιος. Ἀίδιος is explained by διὰ βίου in 15. A στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἀίδιος evidently had not the power of life and death. Vict. would read αὐτοκράτωρ in place of αὐτοκρατόρων, partly because the rendering of Vet. Int. is 'imperialis,' and Schneider and Sus., adopting his suggestion, place αὐτοκράτωρ in their text (see critical note on 1285 a 8). But, though στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ is a recognized title, I do not remember to have met with στρατηγία αὐτοκράτωρ. With στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων may be compared 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. A στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ differed from

an ordinary *στρατηγός* in having authority to deal with many questions for himself as to which an ordinary *στρατηγός* would have to consult the popular assembly or other supreme authority: cp. Polyb. 3. 87. 7, *ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπάτων· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκατέρῳ δώδεκα πελέκεις ἀκολουθοῦσι, τούτῳ δ' εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρες, κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός.* So in Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 37 A. § 4, *συναγωγῆς δὲ τῶν λογιστῶν ἡ βουλὴ αὐτοκράτωρ ἔστω*, the word *αὐτοκράτωρ* is explained by Mr. Hicks to mean 'not bound to consult the popular assembly.' Cp. also Thuc. 6. 26 and 5. 27. It was the practice of Greek States to create *στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες* to deal with crises, just as the Romans created a dictator, but the *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* had not, like the dictator, the power of life and death, and more *στρατηγοί* than one could be declared *αὐτοκράτορες*, whereas the dictatorship was always confided to a single individual, though on one or two occasions we find two dictators in existence at the same time (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 131, ed. 1). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in fact, identifies the Roman dictator, not with the *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*, but with the *αἰσυμνήτης* (Ant. Rom. 5. 73). Still the position of sole *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* was often the first step to a tyranny in the hands of men like Phalaris (Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 28), Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8), and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 13. 94. 6).

8. *εἰ μὴ ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ κ.τ.λ.*, 'except in a particular Kingship, as for instance [in the Kingship existing] in the time of the ancients, on warlike expeditions by right of force.' *Ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ* is probably to be rendered 'manuum iure' (Lamb. 'lege ea quae est in manibus et armis posita'). It is opposed to *ἐν δίκης νόμῳ* (Liddell and Scott s. v. *νόμος*). Where a person is slain by an exercise of the right which superior force confers, he is said to be slain *ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ*, whether he is slain by his adversary on the battlefield or, as in the passage before us, by his King for cowardice in presence of the enemy. Eaton compares Thuc. 3. 66, *οὓς μὲν ἐν χερσὶν ἀπεκτείνατε, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλγοῦμεν (κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δή τινα ἔπασχον)*: compare also the word *χειροδίκαι* in Hes. Op. et Dies, 189 ('men who use the right of might'). Bernays translates *ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ* 'als standrechtliches Verfahren' ('by process of martial law'), and Mr. Welldon follows him, but the use of the word *χειροδίκαι* does not support this translation. In the kind of Kingship of

ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους βασιλεῖαι (1285 b 4 sqq.). Aristotle may well also referred to this class the Kingship, or Leadership, of G which was held for a time by Agesilaus and for life by Phili Alexander of Macedon. Compare Plut. Ages. c. 40, Agesilaus is said to have been regarded until the defeat at I as σχεδὸν ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμὼν καὶ βασιλεύς, with Ages. c. 6 we read that in a dream which Agesilaus had at Aulis embarking for Asia, he heard a voice addressing hir ὦ βασιλεῦ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅτι μὲν οὐδεὶς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὁμοῦ ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς ἢ πρότερον Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ σὺ νῦν μετ' ἐκεῖν δήπουθεν, and with Isocr. Panath. § 76. At a later time Macedon was elected by the Congress at Corinth ἡγεμών τηγός) αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Diod. 16. 1, 89, 91: Arrian, . 5: cp. Demosth. De Cor. c. 201 and Justin, 9. 4, and se Demosthenes, 3. 1. 51. 3), and on his death his son Ale elected by the Congress to the same dignity (Diod. 17. 4. Anab. 1. 1. 2: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 90. 1). Thu of ἡγεμών, or στρατηγός, αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος in th Philip and Alexander was an elective office and tenabl for life. Long before the time of Agesilaus and Philip asked to be appointed στρατηγός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν τῶν Ἑλλ βάρβαρον (Hdt. 7. 158). Aristotle can hardly intend tc Carthaginian Kingship under this form of Kingship, 1273 a 30 he distinguishes between the offices of King at Carthage. He would seem to omit the Carthagin from his enumeration, for it cannot fall under the barbarian Kingship, though the Carthaginians were inasmuch as its authority was by no means of a 'd Would such an office as that of the ταγός of the T classed by Aristotle under this form of Kingship?

στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ ἀίδιος. Ἀίδιος is διὰ βίου in 15. A στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἀίδιος evi the power of life and death. Vict. would read αὐτο of αὐτοκρατόρων, partly because the rendering c 'imperialis,' and Schneider and Sus., adopting place αὐτοκράτωρ in their text (see critical note But, though στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ is a recognized remember to have met with στρατηγία αὐτοκράτωρ. τις αὐτοκρατόρων may be compared 7 (5). 7. 1307 τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. A στρατηγὸς αὐτοκρά



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which Aristotle is speaking the King had, I conceive, the right to put to death with his own hand any of his warriors who showed cowardice on a warlike expedition; he had not the right to put any of them to death by judicial process. Sus. renders *ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ* 'im Handgemenge' ('in the *mêlée*'), but I much prefer the interpretation given above. How would the King be able to slay one of his own men while himself engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the foe? For *ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ*, cp. c. 5. 1278 a 17, *ἔν τινι πολιτείᾳ*, and 1278 a 28, *ἔν τισι δημοκρατίαις*. Sus.[3]: '*ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ* seclusit Gifanius, *βασιλείᾳ* eodem tempore secluserunt Bernaysius et Susemihlius.' The suggestion of Bern. and Sus. is not without plausibility, but I do not think that any change is called for. Aristotle's meaning is that the class of Kingship of which the Lacedaemonian Kingship is the type does not possess, as a class, the power of life and death, but that particular Kingships falling under the class do possess it, and he gives an instance of this. It is doubtful whether, as the emendation of Bern. and Sus. would imply, the Lacedaemonian King possessed the right to put a Spartan citizen to death 'in a certain case'; we expect also to be told what case is referred to, but the only case mentioned is that of *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι*. The Lacedaemonian King does not appear to have possessed the power which Kings of this type possessed *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων*; the punishment provided by the Lacedaemonian law for *οἱ τρέσαντες* seems, on the contrary, to have been a severe form of *ἀτιμία* (Plut. Ages. c. 30).

**11.** **κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων κ.τ.λ.** 'For instance, in Il. 1. 225 sqq.' (Sus.[2], Note 618: Sus.[4], 1. p. 422). See also Il. 2. 224 sqq.

**12.** **ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν.** For *ἐξελθόντων* see above on 1281 b 4, 13. *Καὶ κτεῖναι*, not merely not to tolerate, but even to put to death.

**λέγει γοῦν κ.τ.λ.** The quotation is from Il. 2. 391, where Agamemnon says,

> "*ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης ἐθέλοντα νοήσω*
> *μιμνάζειν παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, οὔ οἱ ἔπειτα*
> *ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἠδ' οἰωνούς.*"
> *ὡς ἔφατ'· Ἀργεῖοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.*

In Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 32 these threats are ascribed to Hector, for there we read, *ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἕκτωρ*

> *ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω,*
> *οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.*

Aristotle probably remembered the similar threats placed by Homer in the mouth of Hector in Il. 15. 348 (cp. Il. 12. 248 sqq.),

ὃν δ' ἂν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε νεῶν ἐτέρωθι νοήσω,
αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι, οὐδέ νυ τόνγε
γνωτοί τε γνωταί τε πυρὸς λελάχωσι θανόντα,
ἀλλὰ κύνες ἐρύουσι πρὸ ἄστεος ἡμετέροιο,

and was thus led into the error of ascribing the lines quoted by him to Hector, and not to Agamemnon. It will be seen that Aristotle abbreviates this passage of Homer in quoting it both here and in Eth. Nic. 3. 11, that in the latter passage he substitutes πτώσσοντα for ἐθέλοντα μιμνάζειν παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, and that in the passage before us he adds πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος after οἰωνούς, words which do not appear in our text. There is nothing surprising in the abbreviation or the substitution to which reference has been made, but the addition of πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος is remarkable. The passages in which the text of Homer as quoted by Aristotle differs from the text handed down in the extant MSS. and other authorities are very numerous. A list of them will be found in Bon. Ind. 507 a 29 sqq. In some of them Aristotle's memory may well be at fault (compare his inaccurate quotation from Isocrates in Rhet. 3. 9. 1410 a 1, and see Prof. Butcher in *Class. Rev.* 5. 310 sq.), and if the addition before us stood alone, we might be tempted to account for it by supposing a confusion with αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι in the similar passage, Il. 15. 348 sqq. But it does not stand alone. In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 25 Aristotle attributes to Homer the line (which is not to be found in our Homer),

ἀλλ' οἷον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην,

and in Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 a 33 sqq. he adds after Il. 11. 542,

Αἴαντος δ' ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο,

the following line, which does not occur in the MSS., but which Plutarch also found there (see De Audiend. Poet. c. 6. 24 C and c. 14. 36 A),

Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμέσασχ', ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο.

So again, as we learn from Soph. El. 4. 166 b 6 sqq. (cp. Poet. 25. 1461 a 22) Aristotle found the words δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι in the address of the Dream to Agamemnon (Il. 2. 23 sqq.), but they are not to be found there now, though the words δίδομεν δέ τοι

εὖχος ἀρέσθαι occur in Il. 21. 297. For other instances of the same thing see Bon. Ind. 507 b 52 sqq. Variations of this nature must probably be ascribed to a difference between the text of Homer which Aristotle had before him and that which has come down to us. Even as early as the time of Alcibiades it seems to have been usual for grammarians to 'correct' the text of Homer (Plut. Alcib. c. 7, ἑτέρου δὲ (γραμματοδιδασκάλου) φήσαντος ἔχειν Ὅμηρον ὑφ' αὑτοῦ διωρθωμένον, "εἶτ'," ἔφη, "γράμματα διδάσκεις Ὅμηρον ἐπανορθοῦν ἱκανὸς ὤν; οὐχὶ τοὺς νέους παιδεύεις;"), and, as Camerarius long ago pointed out (Interp. p. 134), Alexander possessed a copy of the Iliad corrected by Aristotle himself (Plut. Alex. c. 8: Strabo, p. 594). It is likely enough, therefore, that in the time of Alexander, and even earlier, more texts than one of Homer were current, with not a few varieties of reading. Recent discoveries of Homeric papyri add to the likelihood of this. See as to them Mr. F. G. Kenyon 'On the Geneva Fragments of Homer' in *Class. Rev.* 8. 134 sqq., and also in *Class. Rev.* 11. 406. The text of the quotations from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo given in Thuc. 3. 104 differs widely from that of our MSS. (see Mr. T. W. Allen in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 15. p. 309).

**13.** οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν, 'it shall not be a sure thing for him to escape'—perhaps a Litotes for 'he shall have no hope of escaping.'

**15.** τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Κατὰ γένος does not perhaps necessarily imply that the Kingship passed from father to son, but only that it was confined to members of a given family. In place of αἱρεταί we have in c. 15. 1285 b 39 κατὰ μέρος, a wider term, for an office held κατὰ μέρος may be filled by election or otherwise. See below on 1285 b 39. To what elective Kingships of the Lacedaemonian type does Aristotle refer? Hardly to the Carthaginian (see above on 1285 a 7); perhaps, among others, to the office of ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος held for life, as we have seen (above on 1285 a 7), by Philip of Macedon and Alexander: whether he refers to the office of ταγός of the Thessalians, is doubtful, though this office was elective.

**16.** παρὰ ταύτην δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μοναρχίας εἶδος, as in 29 sq., not βασιλείας, as in 15, while in 1285 b 4 we have εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς. Yet in the recapitulation, 1285 b 20 sqq. (cp. c. 15. 1285 b 34, 1286 a 5), all the forms which Aristotle enumerates are classed as βασιλείας εἴδη. Perhaps he is in doubt whether the

barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship are really forms of Kingship or of Tyranny; in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 7 sqq. they are treated as forms of Tyranny shading off into Kingship, and we are there told that the barbarian Kingship was elective, which we do not learn here, unless it is implied in 1285 b 2 sq. (see note). He speaks of the 'barbarian' form of Kingship as existing only among 'some' of the barbarians of Europe and Asia. Other barbarian races perhaps had hereditary Kings whose power was more limited. Others again were not ruled by Kings at all; we hear, for instance, of *Θρᾷκες ἀβασίλευτοι* in Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 17. The Kingship of the Thracians, Illyrians, Phoenicians, and Ethiopians may have been of the type here described by Aristotle. Hardly the Molossian Kingship (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 23 sq.), or the Macedonian, for the Macedonians were very outspoken to their King (Polyb. 5. 27. 6, *εἶχον γὰρ ἀεὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἰσηγορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς*), and the Macedonian people seem to have been the judges in capital cases in time of peace (Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, p. 136, note).

**18.** *ἔχουσι δ' αὗται* κ.τ.λ. It is natural to expect that when the power of a Kingship is great, it will not be governed by law and hereditary. Tyranny is regarded by Aristotle as not hereditary, for though tyrannies often passed from father to son, the inheritor of a tyranny was apt to lose it (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 21 sqq.). *Πατρικός* is apparently not used by Aristotle elsewhere in the sense of 'hereditary,' and in 24, 33, and 1285 b 5, 9 we have *πάτριος* used in this sense, but *πατρικός* often bears this meaning (e. g. in Thuc. 1. 13). As to the extent of the authority of barbarian Kings, cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, *κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν γὰρ ἅπασα πόλις Ἑλλὰς ἐβασιλεύετο, πλὴν οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ βάρβαρα ἔθνη δεσποτικῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμους τινὰς καὶ ἐθισμοὺς πατρίους* (this is perhaps based on Theophrastus, but Aristotle would say that the barbarian King also governed according to law): Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Antig. 8. 182 C: Eurip. Hel. 246 Bothe, 276 Dind.,

*τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἑνός.*

**19.** *διὰ γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. This is added to explain how it happens that the law in these countries authorizes a despotic rule and that these Kingships are hereditary. As to the slavishness of barbarians, cp. Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 291 Nauck,

*ἰὼ τυραννὶ βαρβάρων ἀνδρῶν φίλη,*

and Isocr. Philip. § 107. Aristotle advised Alexander in ruling his empire τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρῆσθαι (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.: see note on 1324 b 36). That Asiatics were especially slavish, we see from 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 27 sqq. and Plut. De Vitios. Pud. c. 10, πάντες οἱ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντες ἑνὶ δουλεύουσιν ἀνθρώπῳ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μίαν εἰπεῖν τὴν Οὐ συλλαβήν.

**22.** τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, not, as in c. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq., in the sense of 'rule exercised for the advantage of the master' (for then this form of Kingship would not be a normal constitution, as it is), but 'despotic rule,' as in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3).

**23.** τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'thus while they are of a tyrannical type for the above-mentioned reason, they are safe' (and therefore unlike tyrannies), 'because they are hereditary and in accordance with law.' Does 'for the above-mentioned reason' mean because the subjects are slavish, or because the power of the King is as great as that of a tyrant? Bernays and Welldon take the former view, but, looking to 1285 b 2 sq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq., I lean rather to the latter. It is easy to understand why conformity to law confers safety, but why are Kingships the safer for being hereditary? Probably because men more willingly submit to rule when it has come down to the ruler from his ancestors and has become traditional. Thus ἑκόντων takes the place of πάτριαι in 27.

**24.** καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The bodyguard of a barbarian King is composed of natives of the State for the same reason for which his tenure of power is safe, i. e. because it is hereditary and in accordance with law, and therefore willingly submitted to. We see that Kings no less than Tyrants and Aesymnetes (c. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.) had a bodyguard—usually at any rate, though perhaps not invariably (c. 15. 1286 b 6 sqq.)—but the King's bodyguard was not intended, like the Tyrant's, to secure his throne, but merely to enforce obedience on any of his subjects who might be for the moment recalcitrant (c. 15. 1286 b 27 sqq.).

**25.** οἱ γὰρ πολῖται κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 and Isocr. Hel. § 37. The Lacedaemonian Kings were guarded by citizens (Isocr. Epist. 2. 6).

**26.** τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξενικόν. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 7. 8), Aristodemus of Cumae had

three bodyguards, one of the lowest of the citizens, another of manumitted slaves, and a third of hired barbarians.

30. ἕτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and another which existed among the ancient Greeks, [the monarchy of those] who are called Aesymnetes.' The εἶδος μοναρχίας is loosely explained by the name given to those who held it: compare 2. 11. 1273 a 30, τὰς μεγίστας (ἀρχάς), τούς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς, and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 10. Pittacus and, it would seem, Peisistratus (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.) are counted by Aristotle among the ancient Greeks, but not of course Dionysius the Elder (3. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.). 'We find the word αἰσυμνητήρ correctly explained in Etym. Magn. αἰσυμνᾶν ὅ ἐστι τὸ αἰσίων μνήμην ποιεῖσθαι' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 280. 1). The title αἰσυμνήτης was not confined to the extraordinary magistrates to whom Aristotle here refers. At Cyme (we are not told which Cyme) the magistrates generally were called by this name (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1556 b 44 sqq.); in Hom. Odyss. 8. 258 the αἰσυμνῆται are umpires in contests for prizes; and in Megara and her colony Chalcedon and also in Chersonesus, a colony of the Pontic Heracleia, which was itself a Megarian colony, the functions of the αἰσιμνᾶται or αἰσιμνῶντες seem to have been those of the πρυτάνεις at Athens (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 72. 3, 188. 1, 194. 5, 280. 1). We are here concerned, however, only with the extraordinary Aesymnete. The nature of his office may be gathered from Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 54 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 389), which refers to Miletus, Ἐπιμενης μετὰ ταῦτα αἰσυμνήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονεῖται λαβὼν ἐξουσίαν κτείνειν οὓς βούλεται· καὶ ὃς τῶν μὲν παίδων Ἀμφιτρῆτος οὐδενὸς οἷός τ' ἦν ἐγκρατὴς γενέσθαι· ὑπεξῆλθον γὰρ παραχρῆμα δείσαντες· τὰ δὲ ὄντα αὐτοῖς ἐδήμευσε, καὶ ἀργύριον ἐκήρυξεν, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς κτείνειεν· τῶν δὲ κοινωνῶν τοῦ φόνου τρεῖς ἀπέκτεινε, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις φυγὴν προσεῖπεν· οἱ δὲ ᾤχοντο. Οἱ μὲν δὴ Νηλεῖδαι κατελύθησαν ὧδε. This is the earliest extraordinary Aesymnete we hear of, unless the Aesymneteship of Tynnondas in Euboea (Plut. Solon, c. 14) was still earlier. The μόναρχος ἐξουσία which the Athenian Aristarchus held at Ephesus at the time of the overthrow of the Medes by Cyrus (B.C. 559) may possibly, as Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141, points out, have been that of an Aesymnete, but this is not certain. The Aesymnete had larger powers than any Greek King—larger than even the Greek King of heroic times, for the administration of the State lay wholly in his hands. He is, in fact, commonly described as a tyrant (31: cp. c. 15. 1286 b 38: Plut. Solon, c. 14: Theophrast. ap. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73),

ἐν τῇ Κόλχων χώρᾳ, for in c. 14. 1285 b 30 we have ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη, and in 1285 b 33 πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων. Nothing, however, is said of the χώρα or ἔθνος in the recapitulatory summaries in c. 17. 1288 a 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 6 sqq.

41. ἢ πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς, 'or has several different forms': cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 33, οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ταὐτὸν ζῷον ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς.

1285 a. 2. τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος. In some forms of Kingship (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) the τρόπος τῆς ἀρχῆς is despotic (1285 a 22, b 2 sq.), in others not; in some the King is supreme over more things than in others (c. 15. 1285 b 35 sqq.).

3. πασῶν, sc. τῶν βασιλειῶν. For the juxtaposition of εἷς and πασῶν see note on 1281 a 13.

ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle places first and second in his enumeration of forms of Kingship two existing forms, the Laconian and the barbarian, and then passes on to two obsolete forms, the Aesymneteship, which existed in the ancient days of Greece, and the Kingship of the heroic times.

δοκεῖ, 'is thought,' by whom we are not told: possibly Plato's language in Laws 691 D–692 B respecting the Lacedaemonian Kingship is present to Aristotle's mind. He does not agree with this view; he sees that there are Kingships according to law (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) which are supreme over more things than the Laconian, and therefore are Kingships in a fuller sense, for the true King is κύριος πάντων (c. 17. 1288 a 18 sq.: cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37). In Diog. Laert. 3. 82 a classification of Kingships into Kingships κατὰ γένος and Kingships κατὰ νόμον is ascribed with very doubtful correctness to Plato, and the Lacedaemonian Kingship is brought under the former head, so that it is implied not to be κατὰ νόμον.

5. ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τὴν χώραν, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς. Ἐξέρχομαι rarely takes the accusative (see Liddell and Scott).

ἡγεμών ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, 'he is the leader in all matters relating to war': cp. 1285 b 18, τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, and Hdt. 9. 33, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ . . . μισθῷ ἐπειρῶντο πείσαντες Τισαμενὸν ποιέεσθαι ἅμα Ἡρακλειδέων τοῖσι βασιλεῦσι ἡγεμόνα τῶν πολέμων. For τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5, ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἀσκεῖ δημοσίᾳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον: Anab. 4. 3. 10: Cyrop. 1. 2. 10. Ἡγεμὼν τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον stands in tacit contrast to ἡγεμονία πολιτική, of which

we read in c. 17. 1288 a 9. In Philip. § 33, *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῖς ἀπ' ἐκείνου γεγονόσι καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον δεδώκασι*, Isocrates appears to distinguish between the Kingship and the *ἡγεμονία*. According to Hdt. 6. 56 the Lacedaemonian Kings had the right to determine against whom war should be made (*πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν ἐπ' ἣν ἂν βούλωνται χώρην*), and Gilbert holds (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 46) that there are some indications that this right remained to them even in Xenophon's time (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 34: 2. 2. 7: 4. 7. 1), but Xenophon implies in Rep. Lac. 15. 2, *καὶ στρατιὰν ὅποι ἂν ἡ πόλις ἐκπέμπῃ, ἡγεῖσθαι*, that the State and not the Kings possessed it.

**6.** *ἔτι δὲ* κ.τ.λ. *Τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς* (cp. 1285 b 23) answers to *τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*. Something more is meant by this phrase than the offering of sacrifices to the gods, sacrifices such as the Kings of the heroic times offered (1285 b 10: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), and it probably includes the right of the Lacedaemonian Kings to name the officers called Pythii, through whom the Delphic oracle was consulted (Hdt. 6. 57. 2), and to have the custody of oracles (6. 57. 4). We learn from Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, *ἔθηκε γὰρ θύειν μὲν βασιλέα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια ἅπαντα, ὡς ἀπὸ θεοῦ ὄντα*, why it fell to the Lacedaemonian King to sacrifice. It was natural that the same authorities should be charged with matters relating to the gods and to war, for success in war was held to be given by the gods. In his account of the prerogatives of the Lacedaemonian Kings Aristotle omits to notice their share in deliberative authority as members of the senate, and also the judicial authority which, as we know from Hdt. 6. 57, they possessed in a particular class of cases (this had perhaps been narrowed: see above on 1270 a 21).

**7.** *αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία* κ.τ.λ. *Μὲν οὖν* is taken up by *ἓν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας*, 14, and then at length finds a *δέ* to answer to it in *παρὰ ταύτην δέ*, 16. *Αὕτη ἡ βασιλεία* (cp. 14) means 'this kind of Kingship,' as *αὕτη ἡ δικαιοσύνη* in Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25 means 'this kind of justice,' for the Lacedaemonian Kingship is not the only Kingship included in the class, as we see from 15, *τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἱρεταί*. It appears, in fact, from 10 sqq. that the Kingship held by Agamemnon as leader of the Greek forces before Troy is included in it, a Kingship which we must not confuse with his Kingship of Mycenae, for his Kingship of Mycenae belongs to the fourth class of Kingships, *αἱ κατὰ τοὺς*

ἡρωϊκοὺς χρόνους βασιλεῖαι (1285 b 4 sqq.). Aristotle may well have also referred to this class the Kingship, or Leadership, of Greece, which was held for a time by Agesilaus and for life by Philip and Alexander of Macedon. Compare Plut. Ages. c. 40, where Agesilaus is said to have been regarded until the defeat at Leuctra as σχεδὸν ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμὼν καὶ βασιλεύς, with Ages. c. 6, where we read that in a dream which Agesilaus had at Aulis before embarking for Asia, he heard a voice addressing him thus, ὦ βασιλεῦ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅτι μὲν οὐδεὶς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὁμοῦ συμπάσης ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς ἢ πρότερον Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ σὺ νῦν μετ' ἐκεῖνον, ἐννοεῖς δήπουθεν, and with Isocr. Panath. § 76. At a later time Philip of Macedon was elected by the Congress at Corinth ἡγεμών (or στρατηγός) αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Diod. 16. 1, 89, 91: Arrian, Anab. 7. 9. 5: cp. Demosth. De Cor. c. 201 and Justin, 9. 4, and see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 51. 3), and on his death his son Alexander was elected by the Congress to the same dignity (Diod. 17. 4. 9: Arrian, Anab. 1. 1. 2: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 90. 1). Thus the office of ἡγεμών, or στρατηγός, αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος in the hands of Philip and Alexander was an elective office and tenable apparently for life. Long before the time of Agesilaus and Philip, Gelon had asked to be appointed στρατηγός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον (Hdt. 7. 158). Aristotle can hardly intend to include the Carthaginian Kingship under this form of Kingship, for in 2. 11. 1273 a 30 he distinguishes between the offices of King and General at Carthage. He would seem to omit the Carthaginian Kingship from his enumeration, for it cannot fall under the head of the barbarian Kingship, though the Carthaginians were non-Greeks, inasmuch as its authority was by no means of a 'despotic' type. Would such an office as that of the ταγός of the Thessalians be classed by Aristotle under this form of Kingship?

στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ ἀίδιος. Ἀίδιος is explained by διὰ βίου in 15. A στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ἀίδιος evidently had not the power of life and death. Vict. would read αὐτοκράτωρ in place of αὐτοκρατόρων, partly because the rendering of Vet. Int. is 'imperialis,' and Schneider and Sus., adopting his suggestion, place αὐτοκράτωρ in their text (see critical note on 1285 a 8). But, though στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ is a recognized title, I do not remember to have met with στρατηγία αὐτοκράτωρ. With στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρατόρων may be compared 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. A στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ differed from

an ordinary *στρατηγός* in having authority to deal with many questions for himself as to which an ordinary *στρατηγός* would have to consult the popular assembly or other supreme authority: cp. Polyb. 3. 87. 7, *ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπάτων· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκατέρῳ δώδεκα πελέκεις ἀκολουθοῦσι, τούτῳ δ' εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρες, κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός.* So in Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 37 A. § 4, *συναγωγῆς δὲ τῶλ λογιστῶν ἡ βουλὴ αὐτοκράτωρ ἔστω*, the word *αὐτοκράτωρ* is explained by Mr. Hicks to mean 'not bound to consult the popular assembly.' Cp. also Thuc. 6. 26 and 5. 27. It was the practice of Greek States to create *στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες* to deal with crises, just as the Romans created a dictator, but the *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* had not, like the dictator, the power of life and death, and more *στρατηγοί* than one could be declared *αὐτοκράτορες*, whereas the dictatorship was always confided to a single individual, though on one or two occasions we find two dictators in existence at the same time (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 131, ed. 1). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in fact, identifies the Roman dictator, not with the *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*, but with the *αἰσυμνήτης* (Ant. Rom. 5. 73). Still the position of sole *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* was often the first step to a tyranny in the hands of men like Phalaris (Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 28), Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8), and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 13. 94. 6).

8. **εἰ μὴ ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ κ.τ.λ.**, 'except in a particular Kingship, as for instance [in the Kingship existing] in the time of the ancients, on warlike expeditions by right of force.' *Ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ* is probably to be rendered 'manuum iure' (Lamb. 'lege ea quae est in manibus et armis posita'). It is opposed to *ἐν δίκης νόμῳ* (Liddell and Scott s. v. *νόμος*). Where a person is slain by an exercise of the right which superior force confers, he is said to be slain *ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ*, whether he is slain by his adversary on the battlefield or, as in the passage before us, by his King for cowardice in presence of the enemy. Eaton compares Thuc. 3. 66, *οὓς μὲν ἐν χερσὶν ἀπεκτείνατε, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλγοῦμεν* (*κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δή τινα ἔπασχον*): compare also the word *χειροδίκαι* in Hes. Op. et Dies, 189 ('men who use the right of might'). Bernays translates *ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ* 'als standrechtliches Verfahren' ('by process of martial law'), and Mr. Welldon follows him, but the use of the word *χειροδίκαι* does not support this translation. In the kind of Kingship of

which Aristotle is speaking the King had, I conceive, the right to put to death with his own hand any of his warriors who showed cowardice on a warlike expedition; he had not the right to put any of them to death by judicial process. Sus. renders *ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ* 'im Handgemenge' ('in the *mêlée*'), but I much prefer the interpretation given above. How would the King be able to slay one of his own men while himself engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the foe? For *ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ*, cp. c. 5. 1278 a 17, *ἔν τινι πολιτείᾳ*, and 1278 a 28, *ἔν τισι δημοκρατίαις*. Sus.[3]: '*ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ* seclusit Gifanius, *βασιλείᾳ* eodem tempore secluserunt Bernaysius et Susemihlius.' The suggestion of Bern. and Sus. is not without plausibility, but I do not think that any change is called for. Aristotle's meaning is that the class of Kingship of which the Lacedaemonian Kingship is the type does not possess, as a class, the power of life and death, but that particular Kingships falling under the class do possess it, and he gives an instance of this. It is doubtful whether, as the emendation of Bern. and Sus. would imply, the Lacedaemonian King possessed the right to put a Spartan citizen to death 'in a certain case'; we expect also to be told what case is referred to, but the only case mentioned is that of *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι*. The Lacedaemonian King does not appear to have possessed the power which Kings of this type possessed *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων*; the punishment provided by the Lacedaemonian law for *οἱ τρέσαντες* seems, on the contrary, to have been a severe form of *ἀτιμία* (Plut. Ages. c. 30).

**11.** *κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων* κ.τ.λ. 'For instance, in Il. 1. 225 sqq.' (Sus.[2], Note 618: Sus.[4], 1. p. 422). See also Il. 2. 224 sqq.

**12.** *ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν*. For *ἐξελθόντων* see above on 1281 b 4, 13. *Καὶ κτεῖναι*, not merely not to tolerate, but even to put to death.

*λέγει γοῦν* κ.τ.λ. The quotation is from Il. 2. 391, where Agamemnon says,

> "*ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης ἐθέλοντα νοήσω*
> *μιμνάζειν παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, οὔ οἱ ἔπειτα*
> *ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἠδ' οἰωνούς.*"
> *Ὣς ἔφατ'· Ἀργεῖοι δὲ* κ.τ.λ.

In Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 32 these threats are ascribed to Hector, for there we read, *ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἕκτωρ*

> *ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω,*
> *οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.*

Aristotle probably remembered the similar threats placed by Homer in the mouth of Hector in Il. 15. 348 (cp. Il. 12. 248 sqq.),

*ὃν δ' ἂν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε νεῶν ἐτέρωθι νοήσω,*
*αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι, οὐδέ νυ τόνγε*
*γνωτοί τε γνωταί τε πυρὸς λελάχωσι θανόντα,*
*ἀλλὰ κύνες ἐρύουσι πρὸ ἄστεος ἠμετέροιο,*

and was thus led into the error of ascribing the lines quoted by him to Hector, and not to Agamemnon. It will be seen that Aristotle abbreviates this passage of Homer in quoting it both here and in Eth. Nic. 3. 11, that in the latter passage he substitutes *πτώσσοντα* for *ἐθέλοντα μιμνάζειν παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν*, and that in the passage before us he adds *πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος* after *οἰωνούς*, words which do not appear in our text. There is nothing surprising in the abbreviation or the substitution to which reference has been made, but the addition of *πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος* is remarkable. The passages in which the text of Homer as quoted by Aristotle differs from the text handed down in the extant MSS. and other authorities are very numerous. A list of them will be found in Bon. Ind. 507 a 29 sqq. In some of them Aristotle's memory may well be at fault (compare his inaccurate quotation from Isocrates in Rhet. 3. 9. 1410 a 1, and see Prof. Butcher in *Class. Rev.* 5. 310 sq.), and if the addition before us stood alone, we might be tempted to account for it by supposing a confusion with *αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσομαι* in the similar passage, Il. 15. 348 sqq. But it does not stand alone. In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 25 Aristotle attributes to Homer the line (which is not to be found in our Homer),

*ἀλλ' οἷον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην,*

and in Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 a 33 sqq. he adds after Il. 11. 542,

*Αἴαντος δ' ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο,*

the following line, which does not occur in the MSS., but which Plutarch also found there (see De Audiend. Poet. c. 6. 24 C and c. 14. 36 A),

*Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμέσασχ', ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο.*

So again, as we learn from Soph. El. 4. 166 b 6 sqq. (cp. Poet. 25. 1461 a 22) Aristotle found the words *δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι* in the address of the Dream to Agamemnon (Il. 2. 23 sqq.), but they are not to be found there now, though the words *δίδομεν δέ τοι*

εὖχος ἀρέσθαι occur in Il. 21. 297. For other instances of the same thing see Bon. Ind. 507 b 52 sqq. Variations of this nature must probably be ascribed to a difference between the text of Homer which Aristotle had before him and that which has come down to us. Even as early as the time of Alcibiades it seems to have been usual for grammarians to 'correct' the text of Homer (Plut. Alcib. c. 7, ἑτέρου δὲ (γραμματοδιδασκάλου) φήσαντος ἔχειν Ὅμηρον ὑφ' αὑτοῦ διωρθωμένον, "εἶτ'," ἔφη, "γράμματα διδάσκεις Ὅμηρον ἐπανορθοῦν ἱκανὸς ὤν; οὐχὶ τοὺς νέους παιδεύεις;"), and, as Camerarius long ago pointed out (Interp. p. 134), Alexander possessed a copy of the Iliad corrected by Aristotle himself (Plut. Alex. c. 8: Strabo, p. 594). It is likely enough, therefore, that in the time of Alexander, and even earlier, more texts than one of Homer were current, with not a few varieties of reading. Recent discoveries of Homeric papyri add to the likelihood of this. See as to them Mr. F. G. Kenyon 'On the Geneva Fragments of Homer' in *Class. Rev.* 8. 134 sqq., and also in *Class. Rev.* 11. 406. The text of the quotations from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo given in Thuc. 3. 104 differs widely from that of our MSS. (see Mr. T. W. Allen in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 15. p. 309).

13. οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν, 'it shall not be a sure thing for him to escape'—perhaps a Litotes for 'he shall have no hope of escaping.'

15. τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Κατὰ γένος does not perhaps necessarily imply that the Kingship passed from father to son, but only that it was confined to members of a given family. In place of αἱρεταί we have in c. 15. 1285 b 39 κατὰ μέρος, a wider term, for an office held κατὰ μέρος may be filled by election or otherwise. See below on 1285 b 39. To what elective Kingships of the Lacedaemonian type does Aristotle refer? Hardly to the Carthaginian (see above on 1285 a 7); perhaps, among others, to the office of ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος held for life, as we have seen (above on 1285 a 7), by Philip of Macedon and Alexander: whether he refers to the office of ταγός of the Thessalians, is doubtful, though this office was elective.

16. παρὰ ταύτην δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μοναρχίας εἶδος, as in 29 sq., not βασιλείας, as in 15, while in 1285 b 4 we have εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς. Yet in the recapitulation, 1285 b 20 sqq. (cp. c. 15. 1285 b 34, 1286 a 5), all the forms which Aristotle enumerates are classed as βασιλείας εἴδη. Perhaps he is in doubt whether the

barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship are really forms of Kingship or of Tyranny; in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 7 sqq. they are treated as forms of Tyranny shading off into Kingship, and we are there told that the barbarian Kingship was elective, which we do not learn here, unless it is implied in 1285 b 2 sq. (see note). He speaks of the 'barbarian' form of Kingship as existing only among 'some' of the barbarians of Europe and Asia. Other barbarian races perhaps had hereditary Kings whose power was more limited. Others again were not ruled by Kings at all; we hear, for instance, of *Θρᾷκες ἀβασίλευτοι* in Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 17. The Kingship of the Thracians, Illyrians, Phoenicians, and Ethiopians may have been of the type here described by Aristotle. Hardly the Molossian Kingship (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 23 sq.), or the Macedonian, for the Macedonians were very outspoken to their King (Polyb. 5. 27. 6, *εἶχον γὰρ ἀεὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἰσηγορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς*), and the Macedonian people seem to have been the judges in capital cases in time of peace (Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, p. 136, note).

**18.** *ἔχουσι δ' αὗται* κ.τ.λ. It is natural to expect that when the power of a Kingship is great, it will not be governed by law and hereditary. Tyranny is regarded by Aristotle as not hereditary, for though tyrannies often passed from father to son, the inheritor of a tyranny was apt to lose it (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 21 sqq.). *Πατρικός* is apparently not used by Aristotle elsewhere in the sense of 'hereditary,' and in 24, 33, and 1285 b 5, 9 we have *πάτριος* used in this sense, but *πατρικός* often bears this meaning (e. g. in Thuc. 1. 13). As to the extent of the authority of barbarian Kings, cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, *κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν γὰρ ἅπασα πόλις Ἑλλὰς ἐβασιλεύετο, πλὴν οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ βάρβαρα ἔθνη δεσποτικῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμους τινὰς καὶ ἐθισμοὺς πατρίους* (this is perhaps based on Theophrastus, but Aristotle would say that the barbarian King also governed according to law): Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Antig. 8. 182 C: Eurip. Hel. 246 Bothe, 276 Dind.,

*τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἑνός.*

**19.** *διὰ γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. This is added to explain how it happens that the law in these countries authorizes a despotic rule and that these Kingships are hereditary. As to the slavishness of barbarians, cp. Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 291 Nauck,

*ἰὼ τυραννὶ βαρβάρων ἀνδρῶν φίλη,*

and Isocr. Philip. § 107. Aristotle advised Alexander in ruling his empire τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρῆσθαι (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.: see note on 1324 b 36). That Asiatics were especially slavish, we see from 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 27 sqq. and Plut. De Vitios. Pud. c. 10, πάντες οἱ τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντες ἑνὶ δουλεύουσιν ἀνθρώπῳ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μίαν εἰπεῖν τὴν Οὐ συλλαβήν.

22. τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, not, as in c. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq., in the sense of 'rule exercised for the advantage of the master' (for then this form of Kingship would not be a normal constitution, as it is), but 'despotic rule,' as in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3).

23. τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'thus while they are of a tyrannical type for the above-mentioned reason, they are safe' (and therefore unlike tyrannies), 'because they are hereditary and in accordance with law.' Does 'for the above-mentioned reason' mean because the subjects are slavish, or because the power of the King is as great as that of a tyrant? Bernays and Welldon take the former view, but, looking to 1285 b 2 sq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq., I lean rather to the latter. It is easy to understand why conformity to law confers safety, but why are Kingships the safer for being hereditary? Probably because men more willingly submit to rule when it has come down to the ruler from his ancestors and has become traditional. Thus ἑκόντων takes the place of πάτραι in 27.

24. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The bodyguard of a barbarian King is composed of natives of the State for the same reason for which his tenure of power is safe, i. e. because it is hereditary and in accordance with law, and therefore willingly submitted to. We see that Kings no less than Tyrants and Aesymnetes (c. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.) had a bodyguard—usually at any rate, though perhaps not invariably (c. 15. 1286 b 6 sqq.)—but the King's bodyguard was not intended, like the Tyrant's, to secure his throne, but merely to enforce obedience on any of his subjects who might be for the moment recalcitrant (c. 15. 1286 b 27 sqq.).

25. οἱ γὰρ πολῖται κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 and Isocr. Hel. § 37. The Lacedaemonian Kings were guarded by citizens (Isocr. Epist. 2. 6).

26. τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξενικόν. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 7. 8), Aristodemus of Cumae had

three bodyguards, one of the lowest of the citizens, another of manumitted slaves, and a third of hired barbarians.

30. ἕτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and another which existed among the ancient Greeks, [the monarchy of those] who are called Aesymnetes.' The εἶδος μοναρχίας is loosely explained by the name given to those who held it: compare 2. 11. 1273 a 30, τὰς μεγίστας (ἀρχάς), τούς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς, and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 10. Pittacus and, it would seem, Peisistratus (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.) are counted by Aristotle among the ancient Greeks, but not of course Dionysius the Elder (3. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.). 'We find the word αἰσυμνητήρ correctly explained in Etym. Magn. αἰσυμνᾶν ὅ ἐστι τὸ αἰσίων μνήμην ποιεῖσθαι' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 280. 1). The title αἰσυμνήτης was not confined to the extraordinary magistrates to whom Aristotle here refers. At Cyme (we are not told which Cyme) the magistrates generally were called by this name (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1556 b 44 sqq.); in Hom. Odyss. 8. 258 the αἰσυμνῆται are umpires in contests for prizes; and in Megara and her colony Chalcedon and also in Chersonesus, a colony of the Pontic Heracleia, which was itself a Megarian colony, the functions of the αἰσιμνᾶται or αἰσιμνῶντες seem to have been those of the πρυτάνεις at Athens (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 72. 3, 188. 1, 194. 5, 280. 1). We are here concerned, however, only with the extraordinary Aesymnete. The nature of his office may be gathered from Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 54 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 389), which refers to Miletus, Ἐπιμενης μετὰ ταῦτα αἰσυμνήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονεῖται λαβὼν ἐξουσίαν κτείνειν οὓς βούλεται· καὶ ὃς τῶν μὲν παίδων Ἀμφιτρῆτος οὐδενὸς οἷός τ' ἦν ἐγκρατὴς γενέσθαι· ὑπεξῆλθον γὰρ παραχρῆμα δείσαντες· τὰ δὲ ὄντα αὐτοῖς ἐδήμευσε, καὶ ἀργύριον ἐκήρυξεν, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς κτείνειεν· τῶν δὲ κοινωνῶν τοῦ φόνου τρεῖς ἀπέκτεινε, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις φυγὴν προσεῖπεν· οἱ δὲ ᾤχοντο. Οἱ μὲν δὴ Νηλεῖδαι κατελύθησαν ὧδε. This is the earliest extraordinary Aesymnete we hear of, unless the Aesymneteship of Tynnondas in Euboea (Plut. Solon, c. 14) was still earlier. The μόναρχος ἐξουσία which the Athenian Aristarchus held at Ephesus at the time of the overthrow of the Medes by Cyrus (B.C. 559) may possibly, as Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141, points out, have been that of an Aesymnete, but this is not certain. The Aesymnete had larger powers than any Greek King—larger than even the Greek King of heroic times, for the administration of the State lay wholly in his hands. He is, in fact, commonly described as a tyrant (31: cp. c. 15. 1286 b 38: Plut. Solon, c. 14: Theophrast. ap. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73),

though Pittacus is not unnaturally spoken of as a king in the popular ditty (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr., Carm. Popul. 43),

ἄλει μύλα ἄλει·
καὶ γὰρ Πιττακὸς ἀλεῖ,
μεγάλας Μιτυλάνας βασιλεύων.

Thus tyrants in early days were called Aesymnetes (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1557 a 5 sqq.). The Aesymnete ruled κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 16), though his office is implied in 1285 a 32 to be κατὰ νόμον: the law, in fact, empowered him to rule κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην. Like the tyrant, he had a bodyguard, though his bodyguard would be smaller than the tyrant's (c. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq.) and composed of citizens, like the bodyguard of the king, not of mercenaries, like that of the tyrant. Aristotle evidently conceives a resemblance to exist between the Aesymneteship and the barbarian Kingship (32), and it is possible that the Greeks borrowed this great office from the barbarians, for we are told in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 11 that elective αὐτοκράτορες μόναρχοι existed among some of the barbarians. Dionysius of Halicarnassus finds its equivalent in the Roman Dictatorship (Ant. Rom. 5. 73, ἔστι γὰρ αἱρετὴ τυραννὶς ἡ δικτατορία· δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ τοῦτο παρ' Ἑλλήνων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὸ πολίτευμα λαβεῖν· οἱ γὰρ Αἰσυμνῆται καλούμενοι παρ' Ἕλλησι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ βασιλείας ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, αἱρετοί τινες ἦσαν τύραννοι· ἤροῦντο δὲ αὐτοὺς αἱ πόλεις οὔτ' εἰς ἀόριστον χρόνον οὔτε συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς, ὁπότε δόξειε συμφέρειν καὶ εἰς ὁπόσον χρόνον· ὥσπερ καὶ Μιτυληναῖοί ποθ' εἵλοντο Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας τοὺς περὶ Ἀλκαῖον τὸν ποιητήν, where Theophrastus evidently has this passage of the Politics before him, though he says nothing of the Aesymnetes mentioned by Aristotle who held office for life). The Aesymneteship resembled the Roman Dictatorship in being called into play 'in asperioribus bellis aut in civili motu difficiliore' (Speech of the Emperor Claudius in the Lyons Tables, 1. 28: Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 1. 140), but there were some important differences between the two offices. The Aesymnete, for instance, was elected by the people, whereas the dictator was named by one of the consuls. The dictator held office for not more than six months; Pittacus, on the contrary, remained Aesymnete for ten years (Diog. Laert. 1. 75), and Aristotle knew of Aesymnetes who held office for life. The dictator was always created to deal with some specified business; this was frequently, but not always, it would seem, the case with the Aesymnete. The Aesymnete was master of

the State in civil no less than in military affairs; the civil authority of the dictator was less extensive (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 1. 141 sqq.). It is not surprising that the Aesymneteship soon fell into disuse. It might not have done so if its power had been less, or if its tenure had been limited, like that of the Roman dictatorship, to six months. Pittacus surrendered it after holding it for ten years and retired into private life, but there were not many Greeks of his stamp, and there must always have been a risk of Aesymnetes declining to retire. Hence the Greek States allowed the office to disappear, and made shift with *στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες* in its place. Indeed, the creation even of a sole *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* was sometimes attended with peril to the State, for the risk of the establishment of a tyranny was always greater in Greece than at Rome. Still Greece probably lost something by allowing the Aesymneteship to fall into disuse. It was an office which in the hands of good men was a means of suppressing tyranny.

**32.** **τῆς βαρβαρικῆς**, sc. *μοναρχίας*.

**34.** **μέχρι τινῶν ὡρισμένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων**, 'till the expiration of some definite time or the performance of some definite actions.'

**36.** **τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν κ.τ.λ.** Compare the very similar expression in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 19, *οἱ φυγάδες, ὧν οἱ Ἀλκμεωνίδαι προειστήκεσαν.*

**Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής.** In a passage of Diogenes Laertius based on Aristotle (2. 46: Aristot. Fragm. 65. 1486 b 34) we find the form *Ἀντιμενίδας*, which is the correct Lesbian form. He was a brother of Alcaeus, and another brother was named *Κίκις* (Alcaeus, Fragm. 137), *κίκυς* meaning 'strength,' so that the names of all the three brothers were indicative of strength and prowess. See note on 1311 b 29.

**37.** **δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle evidently anticipates that his statement that Pittacus was elected tyrant by the Mytileneans will hardly be credited by his own contemporaries—an elective tyranny would seem to them to be a contradiction in terms—and he supports it with the strongest testimony he can find, that of the foe whom Pittacus was elected to put down. The fact would hardly have been forgotten if the songs of Alcaeus had not, like those of Simonides (Aristoph. Nub. 1353 sqq.), passed somewhat out of fashion. Alcaeus, however, can only have known of Pittacus' election by hearsay, for he was an exile when it took place. His scolion, or convivial song, was probably composed in the camp of

the exiles leagued against Mytilene, but it would not be long in finding its way into the city. It would be sung with most zest by others than the Mytileneans, for it satirized them as *ἐθελόδουλοι*, a grave reproach to Greeks (cp. Hdt. 3. 143 and 1. 62 sq., and Theogn. 847–850).

**39.** *τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν* κ.τ.λ. Alcaeus, Fragm. 37 A Bergk. There is a reference to this fragment in Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 a 30 sqq. 'Respicit Plutarchus, Erot. c. 18, *κοινῇ τὸν Ἔρωτα συνεγγράφουσιν εἰς θεοὺς ποιητῶν οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ νομοθετῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων ἀθρόαι φωναὶ μέγα ἐπαινέοντες, ὥσπερ ἔφη τὸν Πιττακὸν ὁ Ἀλκαῖος αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς Μιτυληναίους τύραννον*, ubi cum Reiske *ἀθρόᾳ φωνῇ* coniecisset, illud ipsum Schneidewin Alcaeo tribuit' (Bergk). The epithet *κακόπατρις*, 'born of a mean father,' is no doubt applied to Pittacus because his father was a Thracian and perhaps a slave. As to his Thracian extraction cp. Duris, ap. Diog. Laert. 1. 74: we see from Thuc. 4. 107 that Pittacus was a Thracian name. *Τὸν κακοπάτριδα* closes a line, and then follow two complete lines. In the second of these, *Ἐστάσαντο* κ.τ.λ., the second syllable is long, but this syllable may be either long or short in this metre, and thus we are not obliged to regard the *α* of *Πιττακός* as long. Ahrens (De Graec. Ling. Dial. i. 246) accentuates *Πίττακον*: he remarks (1. 10), 'Grammatici uno ore testantur, Aeoles accentum in ultima acutum fugientes retraxisse in priores syllabas, exceptis tantummodo, ut accuratiores monent, praepositionibus et coniunctionibus.'

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ἀφικομένην δυνάμεως πόλιν ἐπὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἡρώων ὁμοῦ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῇ ἐς Δωριέας ἐπέλιπε τὸ ἐκ τῆς τύχης εὐμενές). As to 'the heroes,' cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 17, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ ἡρώων μιμηταί· οἱ δὲ ἡγεμόνες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἦσαν ἥρωες, οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἄνθρωποι.

6. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ justifies ἑκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι γιγνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον by introducing an explanation in detail of the way in which this came about.

τοὺς πρώτους, 'the first kings of each dynasty,' 'the founders of dynasties.'

τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας. The founders of the heroic Kingships won their thrones, according to Aristotle, by services to the people, just as it was the revolt of the people that overthrew Kingships (15). Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 84) has already pointed out that this account is hardly consistent with 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq., where Kingship is said to have come into being for the protection of the ἐπιεικεῖς from the demos. However, the origin of Kingship generally (including the Persian Kingship, for Cyrus is referred to) is traced in a very similar way in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq. Aristotle refers the origin of Kingship to the will of the people, but the Kings themselves would probably claim that they owed their thrones to Zeus, from whom they sprang (see Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1. 23).

7. κατὰ τέχνας, 'in connexion with arts.' Bernays translates 'by the invention of arts,' and no doubt services of this nature are especially present to Aristotle's mind, but the phrase is wide enough to include cases like that of Melampus, who was made joint-king of Argos with his brother and the previous King Anaxagoras for healing the Argive women of their madness (Paus. 2. 18. 4). As to Kings who won their thrones by discoveries in connexion with the arts, we may compare the words of Atreus in Eurip. Fragm. 853,

δείξας γὰρ ἄστρων τὴν ἐναντίαν ὁδὸν
δήμους τ' ἔσωσα καὶ τύραννος ἰζόμην,

where Nauck refers to Strabo, p. 23 (Polyb. 34. 1. 4 sqq.), καὶ Πολύβιος δ' ὀρθῶς ὑπονοεῖ τὰ περὶ τῆς πλάνης· τὸν γὰρ Αἴολον τόν προσημαίνοντα τοὺς ἔκπλους ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν πορθμὸν τόποις ἀμφιδρόμοις οὖσι καὶ δυσέκπλοις διὰ τὰς παλιρροίας ταμίαν τε εἰρῆσθαι τῶν ἀνέμων καὶ βασιλέα νενομίσθαι φησί, καθάπερ Δαναὸν μὲν τὰ ὑδρεῖα τὰ ἐν Ἄργει παραδείξαντα, Ἀτρέα δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου τὸν ὑπεναντίον τῷ οὐρανῷ δρόμον, μάντεις τε καὶ ἱεροσκοπουμένους ἀποδείκνυσθαι βασιλέας, τούς θ' ἱερέας τῶν Αἰγυπτίων

*καὶ Χαλδαίους καὶ Μάγους σοφίᾳ τινὶ διαφέροντας τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεμονίας καὶ τιμῆς τυγχάνειν παρὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν.* Camerarius (Interp. p. 137) compares Diod. 1. 43. 6.

**ἢ πόλεμον.** Aristotle no doubt remembers the way in which Bellerophon came to be King of the Lycians (Hom. Il. 6. 189 sqq.).

**ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν,** sc. *τὸ πλῆθος.* **Συνάγειν** is used here in the sense of 'forming into a *πόλις*' (cp. c. 6. 1278 b 21 sq., Diod. 3. 56. 3, *μυθολογοῦσι δὲ πρῶτον παρ' αὐτοῖς Οὐρανὸν βασιλεῦσαι καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους σποράδην οἰκοῦντας συναγαγεῖν εἰς πόλεως περίβολον,* Paus. 2. 30. 9, and Isocr. Hel. § 35), so that it answers to *κτίσαντες* in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38. In Plato, Laws 681 C we have *τοῖς ἡγεμόσι καὶ ἀγαγοῦσι τοὺς δήμους, οἷον βασιλεῦσι.* Cp. also Conon ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186. p. 131 a 23 Bekk., *παραλαβὼν τὴν βασιλείαν (Λίγιαλός), ἐπεὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἤθροισέ τε τὸν λαὸν σποράδην οἰκοῦντα καὶ πόλιν ἔκτισεν ἐπὶ τῷ ποταμῷ μεγάλην καὶ εὐδαίμονα, Καῦνον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπονομάσας.*

**ἢ πορίσαι χώραν.** So the Heracleidae, being heirs to Argos, Lacedaemon, and Messene, made over their territories to their comrades in the invasion of Peloponnesus and received Kingships in return for them (Isocr. Archid. § 17 sqq. and especially § 20). Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38, *ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν,* and Polyb. 6. 7. 4, *χώραν κατακτώμενοι* (sc. *οἱ βασιλεῖς*).

**8. καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι,** 'and hereditary for those who succeeded to them.' So Bern., 'und für die folgenden Geschlechter ward diess dann ein angestammtes Verhältniss.'

**9. κύριοι δ' ἦσαν κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle says nothing of the share of the Kings in deliberative authority as conveners of the *γερουσία* (Hom. Il. 9. 68 sqq.). For *τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας* cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 9.

**10. τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαί.** The sacrificial functions of the Kings passed to the *βασιλεῖς* or *ἄρχοντες* or *πρυτάνεις,* as to whom see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq., and note on that passage. The Egyptian King was a priest according to Plato, Polit. 290 D sq.; not so the Greek King of heroic times. The sacrificial and judicial prerogatives of early Greek Kings were no doubt sources of profit to them, and their military position would bring them plunder.

**καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον.** Did the King try all the actions that were brought? If so, there cannot have been many of them, especially as the King would be from time to time absent

on campaigns. Gilbert (Beiträge zur Entwickelungsgeschichte des griech. Gerichtsverfahrens und des griech. Rechtes, p. 445) thinks that in the earliest days of Greece the whole people sat in judgement on offences affecting the collective interests. He infers this from the practice in historical times of the Macedonians (see note on 1285 a 16), the Epirots (Polyb. 32. 21 Hultsch), and the Acarnanians (Liv. 33. 16). But he holds that the right of trying these offences passed to the King in those States of Eastern Greece in which, as at Mycenae, a powerful Kingship came into existence, though the King may probably have exercised it with the advice of his *γέροντες* (p. 446).

**11.** *τοῦτο δ' ἐποίουν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὀμνύοντες, οἱ δ' ὀμνύοντες.* In times later than the heroic Greek judges and dicasts probably always adjudicated on oath (cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 47, *ἅπασι δὲ προσετάττετο παριοῦσι καθάπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ μεθ' ὅρκου τὴν ψῆφον ἐπιφέρειν*): the oath of the Athenian dicast is well known (see vol. i. p. 273, note 1, and below on 1287 a 25). Hence Aristotle's mention of the fact that some Greek Kings in the heroic times adjudicated unsworn. Those Kings who adjudicated on oath would no doubt swear to judge justly, and possibly to judge according to the laws. We must not assume that the Kings who adjudicated unsworn did not take an oath from time to time to rule according to the laws. The Lacedaemonian Kings swore to the Ephors every month that they would so rule (Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 7), but we do not hear of their adjudicating on oath, though they may have done so. Plutarch in Quaest. Rom. 44 speculates why the priest of Jupiter at Rome was not allowed to swear—*πότερον ὅτι βάσανός τις ἐλευθέρων ὁ ὅρκος ἐστί, δεῖ δὲ ἀβασάνιστον εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἱερέως; ἢ ὅτι περὶ μικρῶν ἀπιστεῖσθαι τὸν τὰ θεῖα καὶ μέγιστα πεπιστευμένον οὐκ εἰκός ἐστιν; ἢ ὅτι πᾶς ὅρκος εἰς κατάραν τελευτᾷ τῆς ἐπιορκίας, κατάρα δὲ δύσφημον καὶ σκυθρωπόν; . . . ἢ κοινὸς ὁ τῆς ἐπιορκίας κίνδυνος, ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἐπίορκος εὐχῶν κατάρχηται καὶ ἱερῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως;* That the oath was a check on the King we see from Soph. Fragm. 428,

> *ὅρκου δὲ προστεθέντος ἐπιμελεστέρα*
> *ψυχὴ κατέστη· δισσὰ γὰρ φυλάσσεται,*
> *φίλων τε μέμψιν κεἰς θεοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν.*

The Athenians out of respect for Xenocrates would not allow him to give his testimony on oath (Cic. ad Att. 1. 16. 4). We have *ὀμνύοντες* here, as we have *ὀμνύουσι* in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 9 and in

Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 11. See Liddell and Scott as to the use of ὀμνύω, and Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 153. See also note on 1324 b 20.

**12.** ὁ δ' ὅρκος ἦν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις. The article is absent before ἐπανάτασις, as is often the case when the genitive comes first: cp. Thuc. 4. 12. 2, τῶν τε χωρίων χαλεπότητι, and 3. 58. 4, ἐς πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας (Richards). Cp. also 3. 4. 1277 a 11 sq., b 19, 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 29, τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας, and see critical note on 1331 b 5. Ἐπανάτασις, not simply ἀνάτασις, because the sceptre is lifted up in a particular direction. For the fact see Hom. Il. 7. 412: 10. 321. Compare the oath of Abraham (Gen. xiv. 22, And Abram said to the king of Sodom, I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth, that I will not take from (thee?) a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take anything that is thine). The lifting-up of the sceptre perhaps signified that the King staked his sceptre on the honesty of the judgement. No words needed to be uttered, no gods to be named; in both these respects the oath referred to differed from ordinary oaths, in which it was common to name three gods (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 21. 9). Cp. Alexis, Fragm. Θητεύοντες (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 420),

ὅρκος βέβαιός ἐστιν ἂν νεύσω μόνον,

and Cratin. Χείρωνες, Fragm. 11 (Meineke, 2. 155),

οἷς ἦν μέγιστος ὅρκος
ἅπαντι λόγῳ κύων, ἔπειτα χήν· θεοὺς δ' ἐσίγων,

where see Meineke's note.

**13.** οἱ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οἱ ἀρχαῖοι χρόνοι include οἱ ἡρωϊκοὶ χρόνοι, in which these Kingships came into being, but also far later times (see above on 1285 a 30). For ἄρχειν with the accusative of the matters over which rule is exercised, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 9, where Π have ἄρχει πάντα. If we read with all the MSS. (except $M^s$, which omits the first τά, and $P^1$, which adds κατά before ἴνδημα) καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἴνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια (St. Hilaire and Sus. would omit the first καί), we shall probably be right in translating, with Bernays, 'both matters in the city and matters in the territory and matters beyond the frontier,' though τὰ ἴνδημα usually means 'home-affairs,' and it would be *possible* to take it in this sense here, translating 'both matters in the city and home-affairs generally and matters beyond the frontier.' Those who strike out καί before τὰ κατὰ πόλιν translate 'the affairs of the State, both home-affairs and affairs beyond

the frontier.' Τὰ κατὰ πόλιν *might* probably mean 'the affairs of the State' (cp. Plato, Polit. 287 B, D, 295 E, 305 E, and see Holden on Xen. Oecon. 11. 14), but τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν (Isocr. De Pace, § 49) or τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 11) is more commonly used in this sense, τὰ κατὰ πόλιν meaning rather 'matters in the city' in contradistinction to 'matters in the country': compare for the contrast of κατὰ πόλιν and κατ' ἀγρόν Xen. Oecon. 11. 14 and Cyneg. 13. 15, Plato, Theaet. 142 A and Rep. 475 D, and Menand. Ὑδρία Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 207). If we are right then in taking τὰ κατὰ πόλιν in the sense of 'matters in the city,' the three-fold division in the passage before us will answer to that in Plato, Phaedrus 230 C, οὔτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεος οὔτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὔτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξιέναι.

**14.** συνεχῶς ἦρχον, unlike the later βασιλεῖς (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), who were annual officers.

ὕστερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to the circumstances attending the fall of Kingship compare 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 38 sqq. and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, where Theophrastus is probably followed, as in the passage immediately preceding. Both Dionysius and Polybius (6. 7. 6–9) speak as if the Kingship of heroic Greece always passed into a tyranny before it fell (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 10 sqq.), but we gather from the passage before us and from 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 40 sq. that this was not always the case.

**15.** τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων. Aristotle probably refers in the first place to Theseus (Plut. Thes. cc. 24, 25), but also to Theopompus the Lacedaemonian King (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq.) and to the Kings of the Molossians (1313 a 23 sqq.).

τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄχλων παραιρουμένων. The diminution of the powers of the Kingship is commonly attributed by the authorities to οἱ πολλοί or ὁ δῆμος. Cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, ἀρξαμένων δέ τινων ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις πλημμελεῖν, καὶ νόμοις μὲν ὀλίγα χρωμένων, ταῖς δ' ἑαυτῶν γνώμαις τὰ πολλὰ διοικούντων, δυσχεράναντες ὅλον τὸ πρᾶγμα οἱ πολλοὶ κατέλυσαν μὲν τὰ βασιλικὰ πολιτεύματα, νόμους δὲ καταστησάμενοι καὶ ἀρχὰς ἀποδείξαντες, ταύταις ἐχρῶντο τῶν πόλεων φυλακαῖς. Pausanias speaks of ὁ δῆμος in 4. 5. 10 and 2. 19. 2. Polybius also assigns the chief part in the overthrow of monarchy to the πλῆθος (6. 8. 1), and so does Lucretius (5. 1136 sqq.). Their view is confirmed by the fact that in the Achaean cities Kingship was succeeded by democracy (Polyb. 2. 41. 4 sq.). Aristotle speaks of Kingship as designed to protect the ἐπιεικεῖς from the δῆμος (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9), and it is

natural that he should regard the Many as the agents in its overthrow. If we ask how it happened that, though Kingship was overthrown by the Many, it was nevertheless usually succeeded by the supremacy of the Few, Polybius has an answer ready; the Many effected the overthrow of Monarchy by means of *προστάται*, and they allowed these *προστάται* to rule over them (Polyb. 6. 8. 1 sq.).

**16.** **αἱ πάτριοι θυσίαι** are so termed in contradistinction to *αἱ ἐπίθετοι* (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 3: Isocr. Areopag. § 29). The Kingship was reduced to priestly functions at Cyrene (Hdt. 4. 161) and Ephesus, where we read of the descendants of Androclus in Strabo, p. 633, *καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὀνομάζονται βασιλεῖς ἔχοντές τινας τιμάς, προεδρίαν τε ἐν ἀγῶσι καὶ πορφύραν ἐπίσημον τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, σκίπωνα ἀντὶ σκήπτρου, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς Ἐλευσινίας Δήμητρος.*

**20.** **μὲν οὖν** is taken up by *μὲν οὖν*, 28, and then answered by *πέμπτον δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 29.

**22.** **ἐπί τισι δ' ὡρισμένοις**, 'but held on certain fixed conditions.' Though the submission rendered to the heroic Kingship by its subjects was a willing submission, it was not unconditional. Aristotle conceives the heroic Kingship to have been granted to the Kings by the people on the condition that they should be generals and judges and supreme over matters relating to the gods. This form of *νομικὴ βασιλεία* resembles *νομικὴ φιλία* (Eth. Nic. 8. 15. 1162 b 25, *ἔστι δὴ νομικὴ μὲν (φιλία) ἡ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς κ.τ.λ.*).

**24.** **ἐκ γένους**, literally 'resulting from family,' 'by right of family.' Ἐκ here signifies the 'origo et causa' of the *ἀρχή* (Bon. Ind. 225 b 15). Cp. [Plato,] Menex. 238 D, *οὗτοι δὲ* (i. e. *βασιλεῖς*) *τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ γένους τοτὲ δὲ αἱρετοί.* Elsewhere we have *κατὰ γένος.*

**26.** For **τετάρτη τούτων**, 'fourth of these which I am enumerating,' cp. 2. 11. 1272 b 28, and see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.

**27.** **αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle forgets that he has included under the Lacedaemonian type of Kingship not only hereditary but also elective Kingships (1285 a 15: cp. also c. 15. 1285 b 39). His recapitulations are not always exact: see vol. i. Appendix B, and above on 1258 a 17 and 1278 a 34.

**29.** **πέμπτον δ' εἶδος κ.τ.λ.** *Πάντων* is here neuter (though in c. 16. 1287 a 11 we have *τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν*): cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 13, *οὗτος γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διοικεῖ*, and Demosth. Ol. 1. 4, *τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντων ἐκεῖνον ἕνα ὄντα κύριον καὶ ῥητῶν καὶ ἀπορρήτων.* It is characteristic of Monarchy to be supreme over

everything (Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37 sq.), though all Kings were not so (1285 a 4). Compare with Aristotle's language here the address of the Chorus to the King of the Argives in Aesch. Suppl. 370 sqq. Sus. appears to take *πάντων* with *τῶν κοινῶν*, reading *ὅνπερ* in place of *ὥσπερ* with Buecheler, but Bernays seems right in following Bekker, who places a comma after *ὧν* and takes *ὥσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη τῶν κοινῶν* together.

**30.** *τῶν κοινῶν*, 'public matters,' as in c. 5. 1278 b 4 (not 'public property,' as Bern.).

**31.** *τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν*, sc. *ἀρχήν*, 'answering to household rule.' Supply *βασιλεία* from *εἶδος βασιλείας* (cp. 34). Bonitz (Ind. 748 b 18 sqq.) explains *τάττειν* here as used 'de notionum ordine logico,' and refers among other passages to 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 32, *ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν*, Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 18, *ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη*, and Top. 5. 7. 137 a 30 sqq., where *τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λεγόμενον* is used synonymously with *τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τεταγμένον*.

*ὥσπερ γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. Supply *ἀρχή* with *ἡ οἰκονομική*. In saying that the rule over a household is a kind of Kingship (see above on 1278 b 37), Aristotle is thinking of the relation of the father to his children, not of that of the husband to his wife or of the master to his slaves.

**32.** *οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία* κ.τ.λ. Sus. would read *παμβασιλεία* in place of *βασιλεία*, but Aristotle speaks of the fifth kind of Kingship simply as Kingship (cp. *τὴν βασιλείαν*, c. 16. 1287 b 35), because it is Kingship *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. *Πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων* is of course dependent on *οἰκονομία*, not on *βασιλεία*.

C. 15. **33 sqq.** Aristotle seems to take it for granted that if he discovers whether the two extreme forms are expedient or not, he will have solved the question of the expediency of the intermediate forms. In just the same way Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis sketches the extreme variations of the human race under the influence of climate and region, closing the treatise with the words, *αἱ μὲν ἐναντιώτατα φύσιές τε καὶ ἰδέαι ἔχουσιν οὕτως· ἀπὸ δὲ τουτέων τεκμαιρόμενος τὰ λοιπὰ ἐνθυμέεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἁμαρτήσῃ*. Aristotle may also have felt that a discussion of the expediency of the heroic Kingship and the Aesymneteship would have only an historical, and a discussion of the expediency of the barbarian Kingship only a scientific, interest for Greeks.

**35.** *τῶν ἄλλων αἱ πολλαί*. Aristotle probably refers to the heroic

Kingship and possibly also to the barbarian Kingship, for the power of the Aesymnete seems to have been quite unbounded.

**36.** ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the late appearance of εἰσί in this sentence cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 35 sqq. and see note on 1332 b 42.

τῆς παμβασιλείας, literally 'Kingship over everything' (cp. παμμήτωρ = πάντων μήτηρ), as we see from c. 16. 1287 a 8 sqq. It would seem from the expression τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, 1287 a 8, and from the absence of any remark in the passage before us, that the word was not coined by Aristotle, as Schneider thinks, but was a recognized Greek word. Παμβασιλεύς does not occur in Aristotle's writings, though it occurs in Σοφία Σειράχ 50. 15 and in C. I. G. 4725. 6 (Liddell and Scott).

**39.** ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος. See above on 1285 a 15, where we have τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἱρεταί. Tenure 'by family' is opposed to tenure 'by turns,' because tenure 'by turns' makes the office accessible to all, not indeed simultaneously but successively. Tenure 'by turns' is a wider term than tenure 'by election,' because, when tenure 'by turns' is the rule, the dignity may pass by election or it may not.

**2.** τὸ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'now to inquire as to the kind of Generalship 1286 a.
we have mentioned is to enter on an inquiry belonging in species rather to inquiries respecting laws than to inquiries respecting constitutions.' The inquiry started by Aristotle in c. 14. 1284 b 35 sqq. is an inquiry respecting Kingship as a constitution (cp. 1284 b 39, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον). So too in 3. 1. 1274 b 32 it is taken for granted that the subject for consideration is the constitution: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας. For ἔχει εἶδος Bonitz (Ind. 218 b 17) compares Rhet. 2. 22. 1395 b 20, περὶ δ' ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἴπωμεν, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκατέρου τούτων ἐστίν. Notwithstanding what he says here, Aristotle describes in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 17 sqq. an attempt to abolish the Lacedaemonian Kingship as an attempt to alter 'a part of a constitution.'

**4.** ἐν ἁπάσαις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. and see note on that passage.

For τοῦτο referring to τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας, see notes on 1263 a 1 and 1291 a 16, and cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 25, where ταῦτα refers to φθοραί and σωτηρίαι.

5. ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην. Aristotle evidently intended to treat of laws some time or other: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11 sqq.

7. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. This is the initial inquiry; it is followed by the further inquiries, *τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς* (c. 17. 1288 a 30 sq.). The question whether the rule of men or of law is best was as old as the time of Pittacus, if we may trust Diod. 9. 27. 4 and Diog. Laert. 1. 77 (see above on 1281 a 34), and of Solon, to judge by Plut. Solon, c. 14, *πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν διὰ μέσου πολιτῶν τὴν ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ νόμου μεταβολὴν ὁρῶντες ἐργώδη καὶ χαλεπὴν οὖσαν, οὐκ ἔφευγον ἕνα τὸν δικαιότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς πράγμασιν.* Athenian public opinion had long decided the question in favour of law; it identified Democracy with the rule of law and Monarchy and Oligarchy with the rule of persons (vol. i. p. 494, note), and it is in this spirit that Theseus speaks as the representative of Democracy in Eurip. Suppl. 415 sqq. Bothe (429 sqq. Dind.): cp. also Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 9. 23, *ο[ὐ] γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀπειλήν, ἀλλὰ νόμου φωνὴν κυριεύειν δεῖ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων.* The teaching of Socrates, however, gave new life to the discussion. No one rendered a more willing obedience to the laws than he, yet his view that he who knows is the true ruler, and that a parallel exists between the ruler of a State and the master of an art, furnished Monarchy, or at any rate Monarchy in the hands of a scientific ruler, with a fresh ground of claim. For what master of an art would be prepared to fetter his practice of his art by written rule? It does not appear that Socrates himself ever raised this question, but his views undoubtedly suggested those to which Plato gives expression in Polit. 294 A sqq. and Laws 874 E sqq. See as to Plato's views vol. i. p. 270 sqq. Aristotle in his first inquiry on the subject, contained in c. 15, is led, after a brief discussion (1286 a 9–21) of the question whether the best man or the best laws should rule, to suggest a compromise—let the best man promulgate laws and let laws rule except where they deviate from what is right, or in other words let the best man rule in subjection to law, except where right requires that he shall overrule law. But at the beginning of c. 16 Aristotle discovers that a ruler in this position would not be an Absolute King, whereas it is the claims of Absolute Kingship that he has promised to examine. Hence the compromise has to be abandoned and a fresh inquiry into the subject undertaken in c. 16 with the result that law should rule in some cases and the One Best Man in others.

9. δοκοῦσι δὴ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Polit. 294 A sqq. Aristotle

agrees that the law from its inevitable generality is unable to regulate some things and fails to regulate others well (1286 a 24), even when the utmost possible degree of *ἀκρίβεια* is imparted to it. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 14. 1137 b 13–32: Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 9 sqq.: 3. 11. 1282 b 1–6: 3. 15. 1286 a 36 sq.: Rhet. 1. 13. 1374 a 18 sqq. Law is said in c. 16. 1287 b 22 to be unable to regulate things about which men deliberate. For *πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν* cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 5. 16, *πρὸς τὸ συμπῖπτον ἀεὶ διατάττων ἐπορεύετο.*

**12.** For **ἄρχειν**, used of the master of an art, cp. c. 6. 1279 a 4 sq.

**καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and in Egypt it is permissible for the physicians to change' (i.e. to depart from) 'the rules of treatment prescribed by law after four days' treatment, while if a physician does this before, he does it at his peril.' Bonitz (Ind. 391 a 7) is probably right in supplying *τοὺς γεγραμμένους νόμους* with *κινεῖν*, unless indeed we should rather supply *τὰ γράμματα* from 12. With *μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον* Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 7) supplies *μελέτην*: perhaps, however, *θεραπείαν* is the word which is suppressed (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 40, *τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν*). For *ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ* (not *αὐτῶν*) *κινδύνῳ*, cp. c. 16. 1287 b 30, *τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται* (*οἱ μόναρχοι*) *συνάρχους*, and Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 a 9, *ἁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες.* As to the fact Camerarius (Interp. p. 136) refers to Diod. 1. 82. 3, *κατὰ δὲ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς τῆς χώρας ἐκδημίας θεραπεύονται πάντες οὐδένα μισθὸν ἰδίᾳ διδόντες· οἱ γὰρ ἰατροὶ τὰς μὲν τροφὰς ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαμβάνουσι, τὰς δὲ θεραπείας προσάγουσι κατὰ νόμον ἔγγραφον, ὑπὸ πυλλῶν καὶ δεδοξασμένων ἰατρῶν ἀρχαίων συγγεγραμμένον· κἂν τοῖς ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς βίβλου νόμοις ἀναγινωσκομένοις ἀκολουθήσαντες ἀδυνατήσωσι σῶσαι τὸν κάμνοντα, ἀθῷοι παντὸς ἐγκλήματος ἀπολύονται, ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ποιήσωσι, θανάτου κρίσιν ὑπομένουσιν, ἡγουμένου τοῦ νομοθέτου τῆς ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων παρατετηρημένης θεραπείας καὶ συντεταγμένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων τεχνιτῶν ὀλίγους ἂν γενέσθαι συνετωτέρους.* The authority followed by Diodorus does not seem to have been aware that the physicians in Egypt were free after four days to depart from the treatment prescribed by law, if desirable. The reason why they were allowed to do so may have been that a crisis in the disease was thought to occur on the fourth day: cp. Hist. An. 5. 20. 553 a 9, *αἱ δὲ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται τοῖς πλείστοις κατὰ τριήμερον ἢ τετραήμερον, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ τῶν νόσων συμβαίνουσι κρίσεις.* See also Hippocr. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 347 sqq. Kühn, where the

writer explains that the crisis in fevers occurs on days uneven in number, the third, fifth, seventh, or ninth, and adds, *μεθίει δὲ τὸ πῦρ ἐν τῇσι περισσῇσι διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ἐν τῇσιν ἀρτίοισι τῶν ἡμερέων ἔλκει τὸ σῶμα ἀπὸ τῆς κοιλίης, ἐν δὲ τῇσι περισσῇσιν ἀφίει*, but this teaching hardly agrees with that of the passage just quoted from the History of Animals. Or the view may have been that the full effect of the drugs administered would not be experienced by the patient till the third day: see Hippocr. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 341 Kühn.

**16. διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν**, for the same reason for which *ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους θεραπεία* is not the best—the reason being that the *γράμματα καὶ νόμοι* may be unsuitable in the given case.

**ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.** This is the rejoinder of an advocate of law. 'But yet [if it is made an objection to law that it embodies an universal principle,] that universal principle too [no less than other things] must be possessed by the rulers, [so that their sway is open to the same objection,] and that from which the affective element is wholly absent is better than that in which it is innate. Now the affective element finds no place in the law, whereas every human soul must have it. [Hence the law is a better ruling authority than a man.]' *Κἀκεῖνον τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου* takes up 10, *τὸ καθόλου μόνον λέγειν*. That without *ὁ καθόλου λόγος* a ruler cannot rule aright, we see from 1. 13. 1260 a 17, *διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν* (*τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων*), and Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 20–28: cp. Plut. Ad Princ. Inerud. c. 3, *τίς οὖν ἄρξει τοῦ ἄρχοντος; ὁ νόμος, ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνητῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων, ὡς φησι Πίνδαρος, οὐκ ἐν βιβλίοις ἔξω γεγραμμένος, οὐδέ τισι ξύλοις, ἀλλ' ἔμψυχος ὢν ἑαυτῷ λόγος, ἀεὶ συνοικῶν καὶ παραφυλάττων καὶ μηδέποτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἐῶν ἔρημον ἡγεμονίας.*

**17. κρεῖττον δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq. and Plato, Laws 713 E sqq. As to *τὸ παθητικόν* see above on 1254 b 8, and compare c. 16. 1287 a 28 sqq., where *τὸ παθητικόν* is represented by *ἐπιθυμία*. For *ᾧ συμφυές* cp. Plato, Timaeus 70 E, *καὶ κατέδησαν δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον* (i.e. *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*) *ἐνταῦθα ὡς θρέμμα ἄγριον, τρέφειν δὲ ξυνημμένον ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ τι μέλλοι τὸ θνητὸν ἔσεσθαι γένος.*

**19. ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην.** Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 34 sqq., and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 18, *καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ πρῶτος τὰ τεταγμένα μὲν ποιεῖ τῇ πόλει, τὰ τεταγμένα δὲ λαμβάνει, μέτρον δὲ αὐτῷ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλλὰ ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.* *Ἀνθρωπίνην* is probably added because the proposal was to put a *πάπ* in the place of the law.

**20. ἀντὶ τούτου**, perhaps rather 'in return for this' than 'in

compensation for this' ('pro eo quod affectibus non caret,' Bon. Ind. 63 a 57). The presence of an affective element in the individual human being is the price he pays for his deliberating better about particulars. Cp. Hdt. 3. 59, *παρὰ δὲ Ἑρμιονέων νῆσον ἀντὶ χρημάτων παρέλαβον.*

**21.** *ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν* κ.τ.λ. *Αὐτόν*, i.e. *τὸν ἄριστον ἄνδρα.* Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Polit. 295 D–E, 300 C. He draws the provisional conclusion that it will be best to have a Lawgiver-King content in general to leave supremacy to the law which he has made, but ready to overrule it when it is well that he should do so. (Compare c. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq., where a similar arrangement is suggested.) Plutarch describes in Ages. c. 30, how Agesilaus after Leuctra, seeing how numerous those were who had lost courage in the battle (*οἱ τρόσαντες*), advised that the laws which imposed a severe form of *ἀτιμία* in such cases should 'sleep for a while.' Aristotle, however, goes much further than this, and asks that his Lawgiver-King shall overrule the law not only in critical times, but whenever it deviates from the right. We may compare the powers of overruling law possessed by the Roman Senate, and afterwards by the Emperor, even before the Principate became an Absolute Monarchy (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 823 sqq., ed. 1), and also the dispensing power of the Popes and the English Kings (Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 6). Cowell in the earlier editions of his 'Interpreter, or Law Dictionary,' writing in the reign of James I, who found it necessary to suppress the work by proclamation, said under the title 'King,' 'And though at his coronation he take an oath not to alter the laws of the land, yet, this oath notwithstanding, he may alter or suspend any particular law that seemeth hurtful to the public estate' (Hallam, Const. Hist. of England, c. 6). It must be borne in mind that the King whom Aristotle would invest with powers of this nature is *ex hypothesi* an *ἀνὴρ ἄριστος.*

**24.** *ὅσα δὲ* κ.τ.λ. The antecedent to *ὅσα* is *τούτων* or *ταῦτα* (after *ἄρχειν*). *Κρίνειν*, 'to decide,' as in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 29.

**26.** *καὶ γὰρ νῦν* κ.τ.λ. *Συνιόντες* takes up *πάντας* (cp. c. 11. 1281 b 34, *πάντες . . . συνελθόντες*). *Κρίνουσιν*, 'come to decisions.' Both judicial and deliberative decisions are probably referred to, whereas in c. 11. 1281 b 31, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 5, and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 4 *κρίνειν* refers only to the former. The point of the addition, *αὗται δ' αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον*, will become clear if we supply

after τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον the words 'which are just the things that the law cannot deal with.'

**28.** μὲν οὖν, 'true.' This passage seems to be based on c. 11. 1281 a 42 sqq.

**29.** ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, 'but the State is made up of many individuals, [and therefore is better than any single individual].' Cp. c. 11. 1282 a 38 sq.

**30.** μιᾶς καὶ ἁπλῆς. An ἑστίασις συμφορητός is really a number of ἑστιάσεις, and it is compound, not ἁπλῆ.

διὰ τοῦτο. For the asyndeton cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 33, διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ηὔξατο Φωκυλίδης: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 11, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν κ.τ.λ.: 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 12, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτήρια τῆς ἀρχῆς: Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 36, διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται: Magn. Mor. 2. 11. 1209 a 24, ταῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως λέγονται.

καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον, 'also decides better' [besides being better].

**31.** ἔτι μᾶλλον . . . **33.** ἀδιαφθορώτερον. A numerous body not only arrives at better decisions than a single individual or a few, but is also less likely to be led astray from the just conclusions at which it arrives. For the structure of the sentence see above on 1253 b 35–37. Μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον, 'less easily seduced': cp. Plato, Laws 768 B, δικαστὰς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα ἀδιαφθόρους ταῖς δεήσεσι δικάζειν, where the word is explained in Bekk. Anecd. 1. p. 343 by τὸ μὴ παρακεκινημένον τῆς ὀρθῆς γνώμης (see Stallbaum on the passage). For the thought, cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 41, καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι ποιεῖν ὀρθῶς· εὐδιαφθορώτεροι γὰρ (οἱ) ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν εἰσὶν κ[αὶ] κέρδει κ[αὶ] χάρισιν, and Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 78, 'The legislator can be "got at," the people cannot . . . The legislator may be subjected by the advocates of women's suffrage or liquor-prohibition to a pressure irresistible by ordinary mortals, but the citizens are too numerous to be all wheedled or threatened.' Yet the Constitution of the United States looks, and not in vain, to the President to act as a check on the tendency of Congress 'to yield to pressure from a section of its constituents or to temptations of a private nature' (Bryce, 1. 75 sq.).

**33.** τοῦ δ' ἑνὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been pleading that the decisions of a multitude are less easily seduced by the wrongful influence of others than those of one man, and now he goes on to plead that they are less easily warped by internal passion. Sus. reads γάρ *e conj.* in place of δ', which is the reading of ΓΠ, but not,

I think, rightly. When a whole people *did* come to be mastered by anger, to appease it was impossible; the only thing possible was to let its anger have full course in the hope that it would exhaust itself after a time (Eurip. Orest. 678 sqq. Bothe, 696 sqq. Dindorf).

**36.** ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 701 A, *εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δημοκρατία ἐν αὐτῇ τις μόνον ἐγένετο ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάνυ γε δεινὸν ἦν τὸ γεγονός*, c. 11. 1281 b 15 sqq., 23 sq., and c. 15. 1286 b 31 sq. Aristotle evidently connects the overriding of law with the rule of a *πλῆθος* of the kind which bears sway in extreme democracies (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 15, 23 sqq.: 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), a *πλῆθος* including other elements than *οἱ ἐλεύθεροι* (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 38 sqq.).

**38.** εἰ δὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, 'this abstinence from overriding of the law.' A high degree of virtue is not attainable by the Many (c. 7. 1279 a 39 sqq.: 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 39). Ἀλλ' *εἰ πλείους* κ.τ.λ., 'still if there were a plurality of persons good both as men and as citizens.' This is the characteristic of true *ἀριστοκρατία* (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sq.). For ἀλλά cp. c. 5. 1278 a 9.

**1.** ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. As Giph. points out (p. 395), this view is 1286 b.
implied in the argument of Darius in favour of Monarchy (Hdt. 3. 82): compare also the answer of Alexander to the proposal of Darius to share the Persian Kingship with him (Diod. 17. 54. 5). In the quaint story preserved in Stob. Floril. 10. 50 Aristotle hints that even in an individual the right side may fall out with the left. And if the One Man does escape internal discord, his rule may nevertheless be productive of *στάσις*, for others will be apt to fall out with him (Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 29).

**2.** ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Good men do not fall out among themselves (Eth. Nic. 8. 4. 1156 b 11 sq.). *Σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν*, cp. Thuc. 2. 40. 5.

**3.** εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 445 D, *ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἂν κληθείη, πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία.* (Contrast the account given of *ἀριστοκρατία* in Plato, Polit. 301 A.) Aristotle is speaking aporetically in the passage before us. It is not his deliberate view that Kingship differs from Aristocracy in being the rule of one good man, while Aristocracy is the rule of several. The true King is one who surpasses in virtue and political capacity all the rest of the citizens put together. No such superiority is possessed by the individual rulers of an Aristocracy.

**6.** καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ., 'both when the Kingly office is accompanied with a bodyguard and when it is not.' It was a drawback to Kingship that it usually involved a bodyguard, and Aristotle says that Aristocracy would be better than Kingship, even if the King had no bodyguard. That Kingship is an ἀρχή, we see from 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 8.

**7.** καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., 'and it was perhaps only owing to this that,' etc. 'Only' is often left unexpressed by Aristotle: see above on 1282 a 36 and b 4. The account of the succession of constitutions given in the passage which commences here is aporetic only, and is not in agreement with Aristotle's deliberate opinion on the subject. A quite different account is given in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq., where constitutional changes are connected with changes in the art of war; indeed, in the criticism of Plato which is 'tacked on' (see vol. i. p. 519, note) at the close of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.) Aristotle seems to deny that there is any regular succession of constitutions (1316 a 20 sqq.). The object of the review here given of the succession of constitutions appears to be to show that the days of Kingship were long past, and that it was in place only when States were small and a few much surpassed the rest in virtue. When States became larger, its place was naturally taken, first by an equal constitution, and then by degenerate forms of this ending in democracy, and when they became larger still, democracy came to be the only constitution which could easily be introduced.

**8.** For σπάνιον with the infinitive see Liddell and Scott.

**9.** ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις. Πόλεις here seems to mean 'States,' not 'cities': see notes on 20 and 1310 b 17. It is implied in the latter passage that States were small when Kingship prevailed.

**10.** ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'besides, men instituted their Kings in consequence of benefit conferred, and benefits are the work of good men, [and good men were then rare].' Ἀπό in ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας marks the 'origo et causa' (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.). For the fact, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10 sqq. That benefits are the work of good men is implied in Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 4, ὁ δ' Ἀρμένιος συμπροὐπεμπε (τὸν Κῦρον) καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὐεργέτην, τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθόν. In an inscription found at Lycosura and published by Cavvadias in his 'Lycosura' we read ὅπως ἦι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γνωστὰ ἃ τε τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐεργεσία ἃ τε τᾶς πόλιος εἰς τοὺς ἀξίους εὐχαριστία.

Complimentary decrees declaring individuals *εὐεργέται* often speak of them as *ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί* (see e. g. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 92 and No. 138, line 40).

**12.** *οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον* κ.τ.λ., 'they no longer endured [to be ruled by Kings], but sought for something shared in common by all, and established a constitution.' Cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C (quoted on 1287 a 22), Isocr. Hel. § 35, *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα (Θησεὺς) κοινὴν τὴν πατρίδα κατεστήσας καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν συμπολιτευομένων ἐλευθερώσας ἐξ ἴσου τὴν ἄμιλλαν αὐτοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐποίησε* κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 9. 5. 16, *τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν διὰ πλειόνων πολιτεύεσθαι μηδὲ ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἠρτῆσθαι τὰ πάντα ἄμεινον ἐφαίνετο τοῖς Θηβαίοις.* We should infer from the passage before us that the constitution established after the fall of Kingship was one which gave supreme power to 'many' (cp. 12, *πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν*), but we are told in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. that it was an oligarchy of knights. For *κοινόν τι*, cp. c. 3. 1276 b 1, *εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας*: Plut. Aristid. c. 22, *γράφει ψήφισμα (Ἀριστείδης) κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἱρεῖσθαι*: and (with Bon. Ind. 399 a 60) Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sqq. In the passage before us, as often elsewhere when the object is easily supplied, 'accusativus eius rei, quam quis *ὑπομένει*, omittitur' (see Bon. Ind. 800 b 61, where Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 b 18 is referred to among other passages). It is indeed quite in Aristotle's way to suppress the accusative governed by a verb: see below on 18, and see note on 1273 b 18. Here, as in the Seventh (Fifth) Book, Monarchies, or at any rate Kingships, are marked off from Constitutions (see vol. i. p. 521 and vol. ii. p. xxvii).

**14.** *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D sqq., which is corrected in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. The meaning of *ἔντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον* will be clearer if we translate 'for they made wealth [and not virtue] the honoured thing.' In an aristocracy virtue should be honoured above wealth, if it is to be durable (2. 11. 1273 a 37–b 1). That *τὸ ἔντιμον ποιεῖν τὸν πλοῦτον* is a sign of oligarchy, we see from Eurip. Fragm. 628,

*δήμῳ δὲ μήτε πᾶν ἀναρτήσῃς κράτος*
*μήτ' αὖ κακώσῃς, πλοῦτον ἔντιμον τιθείς.*

Cp. also Plato, Rep. 564 D.

**16.** *ἐκ δὲ τούτων* κ.τ.λ. Plato in the Republic (555 B sqq.) had made oligarchy pass into democracy and democracy into tyranny, but Aristotle here makes oligarchy pass into tyranny and tyranny

6. καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ., 'both when the Kingly office is accompanied with a bodyguard and when it is not.' It was a drawback to Kingship that it usually involved a bodyguard, and Aristotle says that Aristocracy would be better than Kingship, even if the King had no bodyguard. That Kingship is an *ἀρχή*, we see from 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 8.

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10. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'besides, men instituted their Kings in consequence of benefit conferred, and benefits are the work of good men, [and good men were then rare].' Ἀπό in *ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας* marks the 'origo et causa' (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.). For the fact, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10 sqq. That benefits are the work of good men is implied in Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 4, *ὁ δ' Ἀρμένιος συμπροὔπεμπε (τὸν Κῦρον) καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὐεργέτην, τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθόν.* In an inscription found at Lycosura and published by Cavvadias in his 'Lycosura' we read *ὅπως ἦι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις γνωστὰ ἃ τε τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐεργεσία ἃ τε τᾶς πόλιος εἰς τοὺς ἀξίους εὐχαριστία.*

Complimentary decrees declaring individuals *εὐεργέται* often speak of them as *ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί* (see e. g. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 92 and No. 138, line 40).

**12.** *οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον* κ.τ.λ., 'they no longer endured [to be ruled by Kings], but sought for something shared in common by all, and established a constitution.' Cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C (quoted on 1287 a 22), Isocr. Hel. § 35, *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα* (*Θησεὺς*) *κοινὴν τὴν πατρίδα κατασ τήσας καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν συμπολιτευομένων ἐλευθερώσας ἐξ ἴσου τὴν ἄμιλλαν αὐτοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐποίησε* κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 9. 5. 16, *τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν διὰ πλειόνων πολιτεύεσθαι μηδὲ ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ἠρτῆσθαι τὰ πάντα ἄμεινον ἐφαίνετο τοῖς Θηβαίοις.* We should infer from the passage before us that the constitution established after the fall of Kingship was one which gave supreme power to 'many' (cp. 12, *πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν*), but we are told in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. that it was an oligarchy of knights. For *κοινόν τι*, cp. c. 3. 1276 b 1, *εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας*: Plut. Aristid. c. 22, *γράφει ψήφισμα* (Ἀριστείδης) *κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἱρεῖσθαι*: and (with Bon. Ind. 399 a 60) Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sqq. In the passage before us, as often elsewhere when the object is easily supplied, 'accusativus eius rei, quam quis *ὑπομένει*, omittitur' (see Bon. Ind. 800 b 61, where Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 b 18 is referred to among other passages). It is indeed quite in Aristotle's way to suppress the accusative governed by a verb: see below on 18, and see note on 1273 b 18. Here, as in the Seventh (Fifth) Book, Monarchies, or at any rate Kingships, are marked off from Constitutions (see vol. i. p. 521 and vol. ii. p. xxvii).

**14.** *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D sqq., which is corrected in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. The meaning of *ἔντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον* will be clearer if we translate 'for they made wealth [and not virtue] the honoured thing.' In an aristocracy virtue should be honoured above wealth, if it is to be durable (2. 11. 1273 a 37–b 1). That *τὸ ἔντιμον ποιεῖν τὸν πλοῦτον* is a sign of oligarchy, we see from Eurip. Fragm. 628,

> *δήμῳ δὲ μήτε πᾶν ἀναρτήσῃς κράτος*
> *μήτ' αὖ κακώσῃς, πλοῦτον ἔντιμον τιθείς.*

Cp. also Plato, Rep. 564 D.

**16.** *ἐκ δὲ τούτων* κ.τ.λ. Plato in the Republic (555 B sqq.) had made oligarchy pass into democracy and democracy into tyranny, but Aristotle here makes oligarchy pass into tyranny and tyranny

into democracy, ingeniously suggesting that tyranny is an intensification of oligarchy, both these constitutions resting on a sordid love of gain (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8 sqq.), but differing in this that tyranny claims for one man what oligarchy claims for a few (cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq.). Oligarchy did often pass into tyranny (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.), and tyranny into democracy (1316 a 32), but in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 20–39 Aristotle appears to reject anything like a fixed succession of constitutions. We are also there told that constitutions less often change into cognate forms than into opposite forms (1316 a 18 sqq.), so that we do not expect oligarchy often to pass into the cognate form, tyranny.

**17.** *τῶν τυραννίδων.* The article is added because *τυραννίδας* precedes in 16. For other instances of the same thing see 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12–15 (*ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων* followed by *τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους*), 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 38 sq., 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 36, 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 37, 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 33, 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 22 sq., etc.

**18.** *αἰεὶ γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the object of *ἄγοντες* see above on 12: *τὴν πολιτείαν* is probably to be supplied, cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 36, *ἔτι δ' ὅταν ἔνιοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἕλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν*, and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25, *οἱ τὸ μέσον ἐκβαίνοντες καθ' αὑτοὺς ἄγουσι τὴν πολιτείαν.* For the risks attaching to the exclusion of a large number of citizens from office see above on 1281 b 28. For *ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν*, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 7, *τὸν δῆμον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρόν.*

**20.** *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ., 'but now that States have come to be even larger [than they were when it first happened that many were alike in virtue], perhaps it is no longer even easily possible, [much less suitable to the circumstances,] for any other constitution than democracy to come into existence.' *Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις* answers to 11, *ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν.* I translate *τὰς πόλεις* 'States' (with Sus. and Welldon), not 'cities' (as Bernays), because the words must apparently bear the same meaning as in 10, where I render *πόλεις* 'States.' Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq., 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22, and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 17 sq. Compare also Isocr. Areopag. § 62, where the word *πόλεων* seems to mean 'States,' not 'cities.' In [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 75 it is not clear whether *ἡ πόλις* means 'the State' or 'the city.' In 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq. *τὰς πόλεις* evidently means 'the cities.' For *οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον*, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 10, *οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν*, 1287 b 8, *οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον*, and c. 2. 1275 b 32, *οὐδὲ δυνατόν.*

**23.** πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; Bonitz (Ind. 150 b 4) explains τὸ γένος here by τὰ τέκνα, but perhaps it means the descendants generally (cp. Thuc. 1. 126. 12, 13).

**25.** κύριος ὤν, 'although he has the power to do so.'

**26.** ἀλλ' οὐκέτι κ.τ.λ., 'but here we reach a statement which it is no longer easy to believe,' 'here we pass the point at which belief is easy.' For οὐκέτι cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq. Aristotle's friend Antipater, however, refrained on his deathbed from passing on his regency to his son Cassander and appointed Polysperchon, who was not related to him, regent instead (Diod. 18. 48. 4: Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 7. 238). Marcus Aurelius, on the other hand, shrank from excluding his son Commodus from the succession, 'and his weakness must reflect strongly on his memory. He may have judged, indeed, that the danger to the State from a bad prince was less than the danger from a disputed succession, especially in the face of the disasters accumulating around it' (Merivale, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, 8. 348). Giphanius (p. 397) thinks that Aristotle is led by the difficulties which he raises in the passage before us to reject hereditary Monarchy altogether, but this is not the case, for he believes in the existence of families in which surpassing virtue is hereditary, and in their case he approves of hereditary Monarchy (c. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq.).

**27.** ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ., 'there is matter for debate, again, in the question with respect to the bodyguard also [as well as in that with respect to the children], whether,' etc. Ἔχει is here used impersonally: see Bon. Ind. 305 b 31 sqq., where Phys. 1. 2. 185 b 11, ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου . . . πότερον ἐν ᾗ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, is referred to. The Lacedaemonian Kings had a bodyguard (Isocr. Epist. 2. § 6), and in Hom. Il. 1. 324 Agamemnon says of Achilles,

> εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώῃσιν, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἕλωμαι
> ἐλθὼν ξὺν πλεόνεσσι· τό οἱ καὶ ῥίγιον ἔσται.

**31.** μηδὲν πράττων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1286 a 36 sq. and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, νόμοις μὲν ὀλίγα χρωμένων, ταῖς δ' ἑαυτῶν γνώμαις τὰ πολλὰ διοικούντων.

**34.** μὲν οὖν is answered by δέ, c. 16. 1287 a 1.

τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον, i.e. τὸν κατὰ νόμον βασιλέα.

**35.** δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχὺν κ.τ.λ. Μέν really belongs to ἰσχύν, but 'interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis

cernitur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20, where 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12 sqq. is referred to: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.).

**36. ὥστε κ.τ.λ.** For the suppression of *εἶναι*, see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where reference is made to Poet. 15. 1454 a 34, *ζητεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός* (sc. *εἶναι*). See also notes on 1277 a 38 and 1327 a 34.

**ἑκάστου καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων.** Cp. Plato, Laws 932 C, *εἰς δικαστήριον εἰσαγόντων αὐτοὺς εἰς ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν, οἵτινες ἂν ὦσι πρεσβύτατοι ἁπάντων*, where *ἕνα καὶ ἕκαστον* seems to mean much the same thing as *ἕνα ἕκαστον*. No other instance of the occurrence of the word *συμπλείονες* in Aristotle's writings is given in the Index Aristotelicus, and it is an extremely rare word. Σύμπολλοι occurs in Plato, Polit. 261 E and elsewhere.

**37. τοῦ πλήθους,** 'the whole body of citizens': cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 18, *περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους.*

**καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.,** 'after the fashion in which the ancients granted bodyguards, whenever they set up one whom they called Aesymnete or tyrant of the State.' Bonitz (Ind. 779 b 52) is probably right in making *τύραννον* as well as *αἰσυμνήτην* in the accusative after *ἐκάλουν* and not taking *τύραννον* with *καθισταῖεν*. As to *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι* see above on 1285 a 30. For *ὅτε καθισταῖεν*, 'whenever they set up,' cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7, 21. The contrast with *ὅτ' ᾖτει* illustrates Eucken's remark (De Partic. Usu, p. 67), '*ὅτε* utrum cum indicativo an cum optativo ponatur, ab Aristotele accurate distinguitur.'

**39. ὅτ' ᾖτει τοὺς φύλακας.** Cp. Diod. 13. 95. 3 sqq.

C. 16. 1287 a. **1. τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος.** Aristotle is thinking of a King like the King of the Persians (Hdt. 3. 31, *ἄλλον μέντοι ἐξευρηκέναι νόμον, τῷ βασιλεύοντι Περσέων ἐξεῖναι ποιέειν τὸ ἂν βούληται*).

**4. καθάπερ εἴπομεν,** in c. 15. 1286 a 2 sqq.

**ἐν πάσαις γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** The example of the Lacedaemonian *ἀριστοκρατία* shows that a perpetual, and indeed an hereditary, generalship might exist in an *ἀριστοκρατία*. Perpetual magistracies were also not unknown in democracies, though the tendency there was to clip their wings (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 41 sqq.). As to Thessaly, cp. Diod. 15. 60. 2, *διόπερ οἱ Θετταλοὶ προστησάμενοι τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμόνα Ἰάσονα τούτῳ τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπέτρεψαν.* We are reminded of the Stadtholders of Holland, as to whom see Lord Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 2. 'The Stadtholder,' he says, 'commanded the forces of the common-

wealth, disposed of all military commands, had a large share of the civil patronage, and was surrounded by pomp almost regal.'

6. καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως, 'and many make one man supreme over the internal administration of the State'—the opposite province to that of a perpetual general—and thus virtually constitute a Kingship according to law of a different kind. Διοίκησις is here opposed to στρατηγία, as Sus.[2] (Index s.v.) has already pointed out: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 128, καὶ κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ περὶ διοίκησιν τῆς πόλεως, and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 43 *init.*, where αἱ περὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλιον διοίκησιν ἀρχαί are distinguished from αἱ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. Cp. also Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 97, τὸν μὲν ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς πράξεσιν ἄπιστον γεγενημένον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἰκονομίαις ἄχρηστον. As to Epidamnus, cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 25. Epidamnus and Opus were both of them oligarchical States (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 39 sqq., 236). Some oligarchies went further and placed the greatest offices—both military and civil, it would seem—in the hands of one man (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22). Pharsalus was probably an oligarchy when it placed the administration in the hands of Polydamas (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 2, οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ Θετταλίᾳ μάλα εὐδοκίμει, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει οὕτως ἐδόκει καλός τε κἀγαθὸς εἶναι ὥστε καὶ στασιάσαντες οἱ Φαρσάλιοι παρακατέθεντο αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπέτρεψαν λαμβάνοντι, ὅσα ἐγέγραπτο ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, εἴς τε τὰ ἱερὰ ἀναλίσκειν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην διοίκησιν). But the same tendency is traceable even in democracies. For instance, we find a great authority wielded at Athens by ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 248). This important office, however, to judge by the silence of the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, did not exist at the time when this treatise was written (Gilbert, ibid.), and very possibly did not come into existence till after Aristotle's death. A multiplicity of magistrates (ἡ πολυαρχία), with the attendant 'circumlocution' and rivalries, often did harm to Greek States, as we can judge from Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 18 and Plut. Camill. c. 18, and they often gained by placing power in the hands of one man, thus anticipating on a small scale the experience of the Romans in relation to the Empire.

7. καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, 'at Epidamnus for instance' (see above on 1266 b 22, καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα).

καὶ περὶ Ὀποῦντα δὲ κατά τι μέρος ἔλαττον, 'and indeed at Opus to a certain smaller extent': cp. Plato, Laws 757 D, εἰ μέλλει στάσεων ἑαυτῇ μὴ προσκοινωνήσειν κατά τι μέρος, and Tim. 86 D, τὸ δὲ

ἀληθές, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία κατὰ τὸ πολὺ μέρος διὰ τὴν ἐνὸς γένους ἕξιν ὑπὸ μανότητος ὀστῶν ἐν σώματι ῥυφώδη καὶ ὑγραίνουσαν νόσος ψυχῆς γέγονε: Diog. ap. Stob. Floril. 9. 49, οὐ γὰρ πειράσεται αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ καθ' ἓν μέρος. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 41. 1) thinks that the office at Opus referred to is that of the ἀρχός mentioned in an inscription (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 63, p. 118), but this is uncertain. The office of κοσμόπολις, to which Sus.[2], Note 671 (Sus.[4], 1. p. 439), takes Aristotle to refer, existed at the Epizephyrian Locri (Polyb. 12. 16. 6, 9), but we do not know that it existed among the Opuntian Locrians.

8. περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης κ.τ.λ. Susemihl places the mark of a lacuna after ὁ βασιλεύς, 10, but not, it would seem, rightly, for a sentence constructed in a very similar way occurs in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 40, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἔοικεν—οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε κ.τ.λ. We should probably supply ποιητέον τὴν σκέψιν after βασιλεύς, 10, from 2.

9. ἄρχει πάντα, cp. c. 14. 1285 b 13 sq.

10. ἑαυτοῦ. In 1287 a 1 all MSS. have αὐτοῦ (except those which have wrongly αὐτοῦ), and this form 'longe frequentius apud Aristotelem exhibetur' (Bon. Ind. 211 b 45). In 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 17 all MSS. have κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην.

οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν, 'not even natural,' much less expedient, and the question raised at the commencement of c. 14 was whether Kingship is expedient. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 172 (from the Ἀντιγόνη),

οὔτ' εἰκὸς ἄρχειν οὔτ' ἐχρῆν ἄνευ νόμου (εἶναι νόμον libri)
τύραννον εἶναι· μωρία δὲ καὶ θέλειν,
ὃς τῶν ὁμοίων βούλεται κρατεῖν μόνος.

11. For ἕνα πάντων see note on 1281 a 13.

12. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 12. 1282 b 26, τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, and 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 27.

14. ὥστ' εἴπερ . . . 16. τοὺς ἴσους. For the structure of this sentence see above on 1253 b 35–37. Goettling and Sus. add καί *e conj.* before οὕτως, but without necessity. The pleonastic addition of τοίνυν in the apodosis, 16 ($\Pi^1$ omit it, but in all probability wrongly), is quite Aristotelian (see περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως 2. 455 a 12–26 and Bonitz, Aristotel. Studien, 2. 72 sq.), no less than the similar use of οὖν in the apodosis, as to which see Bon. Ind. 540 b 15 sqq. and Bonitz, Aristot. Stud. 2. 59 sqq. Ἔχειν is to be supplied with τὸ ἄνισον τοὺς ἴσους in 16.

**τροφὴν ἢ ἐσθῆτα.** As to *τροφήν*, Mr. Broughton has already referred to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 36 sqq. (cp. also Plato, Laws 691 C). As to *ἐσθῆτα*, a big man in a small garment would suffer physically from cold, and a small man in a large garment from heat.

**16. διόπερ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 32 sqq. The subject of *ἄρχειν* is *τοὺς ἴσους* supplied from the preceding sentence.

**18. ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος.** *Τάξις* and *νόμος* are conjoined in Plato, Phileb. 26 B and Laws 673 E. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 29.

**τὸν ἄρα νόμον κ.τ.λ.** 'Inter articulum et nomen *ἄρα* collocatum legitur in De Caelo 4. 4. 311 b 27, *τὸ ἄρα πῦρ οὐδὲν ἔχει βάρος*' (Bon. Ind. s.v.). **Μᾶλλον** is occasionally used by Aristotle not only in the same clause with a comparative (as in Plato, Polit. 259 C *sub fin.*), but also, it would seem, in close connexion with it (e.g. in Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 b 5, *μᾶλλον φανερώτερα*: see other instances given in Bon. Ind. 402 b 53 sqq.), and it may be so used here (cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 23, *καὶ ὅλως τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεῖνον ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν*). But as Bonitz says of the passages in which *μᾶλλον* is used with a comparative, 'saepe dubites utrum *μᾶλλον* "magis" an "potius" significet,' and *μᾶλλον ἤ* may mean 'potius quam' in the passage before us.

**20. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and in accordance with this same contention, even if it should be better that certain individuals should rule [and not the law alone], it will be right to make these individuals guardians of the laws and ministers to the laws, [for otherwise the law will not rule].' Magistrates who are only guardians of the laws are contrasted with Kings by Plato in Polit. 305 C, *καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν ἄρα ῥώμην ἀνευρίσκομεν οὐ βασιλικὴν οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ νόμων φύλακα καὶ ὑπηρέτιν ἐκείνης*: compare what Plutarch says of Theseus in Thes. c. 24, *τοῖς δὲ δυνατοῖς ἀβασίλευτον πολιτείαν προτείνων καὶ δημοκρατίαν αὐτῷ μόνον ἄρχοντι πολέμου καὶ νόμων φύλακι χρησομένην*. Cp. also Plato, Laws 715 C–D. The archons at Athens swore *συμφυλάξειν τοὺς νόμους* (Pollux, 8. 86).

**22. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Magistrates are necessary, because there are things which the law cannot regulate (1287 b 19–25). With *ἕνα τοῦτον* (cp. c. 17. 1288 a 19) supply *ἄρχειν*, and cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C, *οὕτω δὴ τύραννός τε γέγονε, φαμέν, καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἀριστοκρατία καὶ δημοκρατία, δυσχεραινόντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν ἕνα ἐκεῖνον μόναρχον*.

**23.** ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. See on this passage vol. i. p. 273, note 2, where the view which Bernays takes of it has been explained. His rendering is, '[hier wendet vielleicht Jemand ein: gegen die Lückenhaftigkeit des Gesetzes helfen Beamte nicht, denn] wo das Gesetz ausser Stande scheint, etwas Bestimmtes zu verordnen, wird auch wohl kein Mensch im Stande sein, sich ein festes Urtheil zu bilden.' I still prefer the explanation which has been given in vol. i. p. 273. I take ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε to introduce not an objection proceeding from an advocate of the claims of the One Best Man—objections are commonly introduced by ἀλλά, as in c. 15. 1286 b 24, 26—but a still more cogent argument in favour of the claims of Law than those which have hitherto been urged. (Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε introduces a similar transition from a statement advanced with less emphasis to a statement advanced with more in 2. 9. 1271 a 18–22, 3. 13. 1284 b 30, and 3. 16. 1287 a 41.) Aristotle has been reminded by what he has just said, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναί τινας ἀρχάς (22), that there are things which the law cannot regulate, so that as to them the law cannot rule, as he has said in 18 sqq. that it ought to do, and now he adds that with respect to these things the law is no worse off than a human being would be. They are as much beyond the cognizance of a human being as they are beyond definition by the law. But the law does all that can be done in relation to them, for it educates the magistrates to supply its own defect of particularity, and it also allows of its own amendment.

**25.** ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1287 b 25, κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς. It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 273, note 1), that Aristotle here has before him the oath taken by the Athenian juror. See Demosth. in Lept. c. 118. A similar oath is prescribed to be taken by jurors in an inscription from Eresus in Lesbos (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 125, p. 211). The expression κατὰ γνώμαν τὰν δικαιοτάταν occurs also in an inscription from Calymna and in the oath of the Delphian Amphictyons (Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, 1. 170). Its meaning may be gathered from Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 63, ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ὅρκου ἐξήλειψαν τὸ ψηφιεῖσθαι γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ καὶ οὔτε χάριτος ἕνεκ' οὔτ' ἔχθρας. The term τοὺς ἄρχοντας, however, includes not only jurors (cp. 1287 b 15 sq.) but office-holders generally, as may be inferred from the words κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν. For ἐφίστησι κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας Schneider compares Isocr. Areopag.

§ 37, *ὥστε τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν ἐπέστησαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς εὐκοσμίας.* Τὰ λοιπά, 'whatever it cannot regulate in detail.'

**27.** *ἔτι δὲ* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Laws 772 B, *ζῶντος μὲν τοῦ τάξαντος νομοθέτου κοινῇ, τέλος δὲ σχόντος αὐτὰς ἑκάστας τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας εἰσφερούσας τὸ παραλειπόμενον τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, μέχρι περ ἂν τέλος ἔχειν ἕκαστον δόξῃ τοῦ καλῶς ἐξειργάσθαι.* Contrast Plato's language in Polit. 294 B sq.

**28.** *ὁ μὲν οὖν* κ.τ.λ. I take *οὖν* here to contain an inference, as in 1. 1. 1252 a 7 (see note), and translate 'therefore.' Attention has been drawn in what precedes to the reasonableness of law. The contrast of *θεός* and *θηρίον* and of both with *ἄνθρωπος* is familiar to us from 1. 2. 1253 a 27 sqq. The rule of law had been represented by Plato (Laws 713 C–714 A) as an approach to the rule of the *δαίμονες* of Cronus, *νόμος* being explained as *νοῦ διανομή* (cp. Laws 674 B). Reason is, in fact, often identified with God, e. g. in Eurip. Fragm. 1007,

*ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός:*

cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 281, *νῷ πείθου: ὁμοία τῇ, πείθου θεῷ.* Aristotle conceives a human being as an union of a god in the shape of reason (cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq.) with a brute, much as Plato in Rep. 588 C sqq. conceives the human soul as three shapes under the external aspect of a man, the shape of a many-headed animal, the shape of a lion, and the shape of a man, representing respectively desire, *θυμός*, and reason. That a brute is present in every human being was suggested by such phrases as those used by the Chorus of Women in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes (683 sq. Didot),

*εἰ νὴ τὼ θεώ με ζωπυρήσεις,*
*λύσω τὴν ἐμαυτῆς ὖν ἐγὼ δή,*

where a proverb is alluded to (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 318).

**31.** *καὶ ὁ θυμὸς* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers Hom. Il. 9. 553,

*ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ Μελέαγρον ἔδυ χόλος, ὅστε καὶ ἄλλων*
*οἰδάνει ἐν στήθεσσι νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων,*

and Pindar, Olymp. 7. 27–31. The remark would gain in interest if it was suggested by the complicity of Dion in the murder of Heracleides at Syracuse (Plut. Dion, cc. 47, 53) or by Alexander's murder of Cleitus in B.C. 328, but it would be rash to assume this.

For διαστρέφει cp. Polyb. 8. 24. 3, Καίσαρος ὁ Γαλάτης, ὃν τἄλλα ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, ὑπὸ Σωστράτου νεῦ κόλακος διεστρέφετο.

32. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν, 'hence' (i.e. because Law is God and Reason unmixed with anything else) 'Law is Reason without appetite,' and Reason without appetite is better than Reason with appetite (c. 15. 1286 a 17 sq.). Cp. De An. 3. 10. 433 a 26, νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός· ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. Anaxagoras had said that it is by virtue of being ἀμιγής and pure that νοῦς subdues everything (Fragm. 6 in Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 249: Aristot. Phys. 8. 5. 256 b 24 sqq.: De An. 3. 4. 429 a 18 sqq.).

33. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ. This corrects the argument used in c. 15. 1286 a 11 sqq. Ὅτι κ.τ.λ. gives, in explanation of τὸ τῶν τεχνῶν παράδειγμα, the point which the parallel of the arts is adduced to prove.

34. For καὶ αἱρετώτερον cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 9, 1179 a 6, οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, Pol. 2. 4. 1262 a 30, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 37. See critical note.

35. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for [it is better to be treated by physicians rather than by written rule only because] physicians do not do anything contrary to right reason for the sake of friendship.' I follow Bernays in thus completing the reasoning. For παρὰ τὸν λόγον cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1151 b 34, ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων κ.τ.λ., and 4. 11. 1125 b 33 sqq.

37. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plut. Aristid. c. 4, where Plutarch says of Aristides, οὐ μόνον δὲ πρὸς εὔνοιαν καὶ χάριν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ πρὸς ἔχθραν ἰσχυρότατος ἦν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιστῆναι. As to ἐπήρεια see note on 1311 a 37.

38. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. This passage may be rendered in two different ways. 1. With Liddell and Scott (who compare Strabo, p. 259, πρῶτοι δὲ νόμοις ἐγγράπτοις χρήσασθαι πεπιστευμένοι εἰσί) and others, we may take διαφθείρειν as in the infinitive after πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, and translate 'since when [the case is otherwise and] patients suspect physicians of being commissioned by their enemies to destroy them for the sake of gain.' 2. We may (with Bernays) take διαφθείρειν as in the infinitive after ὑποπτεύουσι τοὺς ἰατρούς. I incline to prefer the latter rendering, especially as διὰ κέρδος comes in a little awkwardly, if we adopt the former. Aristotle has

before him here Plato, Polit. 298 A, *καὶ δὴ καὶ τελευτῶντες ἢ παρὰ ξυγγενῶν ἢ παρά τινων ἐχθρῶν τοῦ κάμνοντος χρήματα μισθὸν λαμβάνοντες (οἱ ἰατροὶ) ἀποκτιννύασιν*: indeed, he only repeats what Plato himself in effect says in Polit. 300 A. If it was not clear that he has this passage of Plato before him, we might be tempted to imagine that he alludes to a well-known incident in Alexander's career, the relation of which in Plutarch's Life of Alexander (c. 19) begins thus, *ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Παρμενίων ἔπεμψεν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, διακελευόμενος αὐτῷ* (i. e. *Ἀλεξάνδρῳ*) *φυλάξασθαι τὸν Φίλιππον* (his physician Philip the Acarnanian) *ὡς ὑπὸ Δαρείου πεπεισμένον* (cp. *πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς*) *ἐπὶ δωρεαῖς μεγάλαις* (cp. *διὰ κέρδος*) *καὶ γάμῳ θυγατρὸς ἀνελεῖν Ἀλέξανδρον*: compare Arrian, Anab. 2. 4. 9, *ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοθῆναι ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ Παρμενίωνος φυλάξασθαι Φίλιππον· ἀκούειν γὰρ διεφθάρθαι ὑπὸ Δαρείου χρήμασιν ὥστε φαρμάκῳ ἀποκτεῖναι Ἀλέξανδρον.* This happened in B.C. 333.

**40.** *τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν*, 'the treatment prescribed by the writings,' like *τὸν ἐκ τῶν νόμων χρόνον* in Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 28.

**41.** *ἀλλὰ μὴν* κ.τ.λ. *Ἀλλὰ μήν . . . γε*, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. *'Ἰατρὸν εἰσάγειν τινί*, to call in a physician for another, Xen. Mem. 2. 4. 3, Demosth. c. Everg. et Mnesib. c. 67, but in Med. of the physician himself when ill' (Liddell and Scott, who refer to the passage before us). *Ἐφ' ἑαυτούς*, 'to take charge of themselves' (see note on 1273 b 19, *ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις*). Not only do patients prefer a written scheme of treatment to treatment by physicians whom they regard as corrupted by their foes, but physicians themselves show distrust even of medical advice which is simply wanting in dispassionateness, for, when they are sick, they do not treat themselves, but call in other physicians. They do so because they feel that they are themselves at such a time under the influence of emotion, and that they need the guidance of a neutral dispassionate authority.

**3.** *διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περί τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες.* Cp. Thuc. 1. 1287 b. 63, *παρῆλθε παρὰ τὴν χηλὴν διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης βαλλόμενός τε καὶ χαλεπῶς*, and see Mr. W. H. Forbes, Thucydides Book i. p. 151. For *ἐν πάθει ὄντες* cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 8. 1150 a 27 sqq. and 7. 5. 1147 b 9 sqq. Aristotle seems to think that not only sick physicians, but also gymnastic trainers, when engaged in gymnastic exercises, would be *ἐν πάθει*.

*ὥστε δῆλον* κ.τ.λ. Supply *οἱ τὸν νόμον ζητοῦντες* as the nom. to

ζητοῦσιν. In 1287 b 23 we have to supply in a similar way 'the advocates of the supremacy of law.' 'And so it is clear that [those who seek for written law] in seeking for that which is just seek for that which is neutral, for the law is that which is neutral.' This is made clear by the practice of physicians to which reference has just been made. So that the parallel of the arts, far from telling against the use of written law in the State, as some claimed that it does, in reality furnishes an argument in favour of its use. That the way to the just lies through the neutral, we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 19 (already compared by Eaton), *διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι.* Sus., following Thurot, reads *ὁ δὲ νόμος* in place of *ὁ γὰρ νόμος* without MS. authority and not, I think, rightly.

5. ἔτι κυριώτεροι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been asserting the value of written law (cp. 1287 a 34, *κατὰ γράμματα*, and 40, *τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν*), and now he says that the case is even stronger in favour of unwritten law. For the distinction between *οἱ κατὰ γράμματα νόμοι*, 'laws resting on writings,' and *οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη*, 'laws resting on (unwritten) customs,' cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 86 (a passage professing to record Plato's views), *νόμου διαιρέσεις δύο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένος, ὁ δὲ ἄγραφος· ᾧ μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πολιτευόμεθα, γεγραμμένος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ ἔθη γενόμενος, οὗτος ἄγραφος καλεῖται*, and Plato, Polit. 299 A, *κατηγορεῖν δὲ τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὰ γράμματα τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκυβέρνησε τὰς ναῦς, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔθη.* For *οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη νόμοι*, which are here implied to be unwritten (as *ἔθη* are in Plato, Polit. 295 A, 299 A, and Laws 841 B), cp. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 40 sq. On *ἄγραφοι νόμοι* see Cope, Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 239–244, where he concludes (p. 244) that customs are 'what we are to understand principally by the *νόμοι ἄγραφοι* in the Politics,' so that the term is used in the Politics in a wider sense than it is when it refers, as it sometimes does (see Cope), to 'the great fundamental conceptions and duties of morality,' such as 'the worship of God, duty to parents, gratitude, the requital of benefits,' and the like. For the fact that more important matters are dealt with by unwritten than by written laws, cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Zeuxidam. 1, 221 B, *Ζευξίδαμος, πυθομένου τινὸς διὰ τί τοὺς περὶ ἀνδρείας νόμους ἀγράφους τηροῦσι, καὶ τοῖς νέοις ἀπογραψάμενοι οὐ διδόασιν ἀναγινώσκειν, Ὅτι, ἔφη, συνεθίζεσθαι [δεῖ] ταῖς*

*ἀνδραγαθίαις κρεῖττον ἢ ταῖς γραφαῖς προσέχειν.* As to *ἀσφαλέστερος* see vol. i. p. 270, note. We have *οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἤθη* in 6 and *τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος* in 7. Compare the change from *ἔθος* in 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 14 to *ἔθεσιν* in 1292 b 16.

**8.** *ἀλλὰ μὴν* κ.τ.λ., 'then again, it is not even easy, [much less well,] for the one man to keep an eye on many things.' Eurip. Phoeniss. 692 Bothe (745 Dindorf), *εἷς ἀνὴρ οὐ πάνθ' ὁρᾷ*, had passed into a proverb (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 378). Cp. also Xen. Oecon. 4. 6, *καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀμφὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἴκησιν* (sc. *τῶν μισθοφόρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἷς ὡπλίσθαι προστέτακται*) *αὐτὸς* (i.e. *ὁ βασιλεύς*) *ἐφορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πρόσω ἀποικοῦντας πιστοὺς πέμπει ἐπισκοπεῖν*, and Cyrop. 8. 2. 11, *εἰ δέ τις οἴεται ἕνα αἱρετὸν εἶναι ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται· ὀλίγα γὰρ εἰς γ' ἂν ἴδοι καὶ εἰς ἀκούσειε.* Were the Lacedaemonian ephors at their origin designed to be the 'eyes' of the Kings? The word *ἔφοροι* is used in the sense of 'spies' by Megasthenes ap. Strab. p. 707 (see note on 1313 b 12).

**10.** *τοῦτο*, i.e. *τὸ πλείονας εἶναι ἄρχοντας.*

**11.** *πρότερον*, in c. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq.

**12.** *εἴπερ* κ.τ.λ. In *τοῦ δὲ ἑνὸς* κ.τ.λ. the apodosis is introduced by *δέ*. For the use of *δέ* in the apodosis after a conditional sentence introduced by *εἰ* or *ἐάν*, see above on 1278 a 32.

**13.** *τὸ "σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω,"* Hom. Il. 10. 224,

*σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν,*
*ὅππως κέρδος ἄῃ· μοῦνος δ' εἴπερ τε νοήσῃ,*
*ἀλλά τέ οἱ βράσσων τε νόος, λεπτὴ δέ τε μῆτις,*

and 13. 235 sqq. Cp. Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 450,

*ναῦν τοι μί' ἄγκυρ' οὐδαμῶς σώζειν φιλεῖ,*
*ὡς τρεῖς ἀφέντε· προστάτης θ' ἁπλοῦς πόλει*
*σφαλερός, ὑπὸν δὲ κἄλλος οὐ κακὸν πέλει,*

and Archil. Fragm. 144 (ap. Aristid. 2. 137), *καὶ ὁ μέν γε κατ' ἰσχὺν προφέρων, εἰ καὶ ἑνὸς εἴη κρείττων, ὑπὸ δυοῖν γ' ἂν αὐτὸν κατείργεσθαί φησι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος καὶ ἡ παροιμία*, where the Scholiast (quoted by Bergk) adds, *ἡ μὲν παροιμία φησίν· οὐδὲ Ἡρακλῆς πρὸς δύο· τὸ δὲ Ἀρχιλόχου ῥητὸν οἷον μέν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἴσως δὲ ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτον.*

**14.** *καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ* κ.τ.λ. Hom. Il. 2. 372, where Agamemnon is speaking of Nestor (Sus.[2], Note 651).

**15.** *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν* κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1287 b 8, *δεήσει ἄρα . . .* 11, *τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον*, in which words the suggestion is made that the powers which it is proposed to entrust to the One Man should rather be given to a plurality of magistrates. *Ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής*, for

it was well known from the terms of the dicast's oath (see above on 1287 a 25) that he had to regulate matters as to which the law was silent. Aristotle has already implied in 1287 a 25 sqq. that the magistrates have to do so too in relation to some matters. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.

**18.** ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν. Cp. 1287 a 26, κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν.

**20.** διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν. Διαπορεῖν here = ἀπορεῖν according to Bon. Ind. 187 b 1 sqq., where Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 11, διαπορούντα τοιαῦτ' ἄττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ., is placed next to the passage before us.

**23.** οὐ τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., 'nay, [the advocates of the supremacy of law] do not make this counter-assertion that' etc. Οὐ τοίνυν is used in self-correction: see above on 1267 a 5 and compare in addition to the passages there referred to Plato, Rep. 603 B, and Strato, Fragm. Φοινικίδης, 31 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 546),

> "οὕτω λαλεῖν εἴωθε." μὴ τοίνυν λάλει
> οὕτως παρ' ἐμοί γ' ὤν.

**24.** ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ ἕνα μόνον, sc. εἶναι δεῖ τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.

**26.** ἄτοπόν τ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. For the thought compare Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 10–12, a passage which seems to be present to Aristotle's memory here. Ἴδοι evidently suits ὄμμασι only, not ἀκοαῖς or what follows, but Aristotle 'often expects us to supply a word from a previous clause which is not altogether suitable': see above on 1257 a 21. For ἀκοαῖς in the sense of 'organs of hearing' see Bon. Ind. s. v.

**27.** δυοῖν is apparently the reading of all extant MSS. (one cannot tell from 'duobus' what reading Vet. Int. found in his text), but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle's writings as the dative of δύο—it is common enough in them as the genitive, but δυσί or δύο are the forms of the dative mostly used by Aristotle—and here it strikes us as all the more strange because it is followed by δυσὶν and δυσί. According to Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschriften, p. 124 (ed. 2), δυοῖν is used as the genitive and dative in Attic Inscriptions down to B.C. 329, δυεῖν from B.C. 329 to B.C. 229, and δύο as the genitive, δυσί as the dative, in Roman times. Thus, if the MSS. are to be trusted, Aristotle often departs in this matter from the usage of the Attic Inscriptions of his time.

**29.** *ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ.* Πολλούς is emphatic (see note on 1275 a 32): cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 11, *ἐκ τούτου δὴ καὶ πολλοὶ ἐνομίσθησαν βασιλέως ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ πολλὰ ὦτα· εἰ δέ τις οἴεται ἕνα αἱρετὸν εἶναι ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται· ὀλίγα γὰρ εἷς γ' ἂν ἴδοι καὶ εἷς ἀκούσειε κ.τ.λ.*, where Xenophon probably intends to correct Hdt. 1. 114, *ὁ δὲ αὐτέων διέταξε τοὺς μὲν οἰκίας οἰκοδομέειν, τοὺς δὲ δορυφόρους εἶναι, τὸν δέ κού τινα αὐτέων ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλέος εἶναι· τῷ δέ τινι τὰς ἀγγελίας ἐσφέρειν ἐδίδου γέρας, ὡς ἑκάστῳ ἔργον προστάσσων.* The messengers mentioned by Herodotus would be included among the 'King's feet' referred to by Aristotle here. The 'many ears and eyes' of a King became proverbial: cp. Lucian, Adv. Indoct. c. 23, *οὐκ οἶσθα ὡς ὦτα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ πολλοὶ βασιλέως;* The important fact that Cyrus had fallen in the battle of Cunaxa was discovered and reported to Artaxerxes by an 'eye of the King,' Artasuras (Plut. Artox. c. 12). Institutions as unlike as the *ὠτακουσταί* of Hiero I of Syracuse (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 13 sqq.: cp. Plut. De Curiositate, c. 16) and the 'younger members' of the Nocturnal Council of Plato's Laws (964 E: see vol. i. p. 448 sq.) were probably suggested by this Persian institution. According to Megasthenes (ap. Strab. p. 707) a similar institution existed in India: see his account of the *ἔφοροι*.

**30.** *τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους.* Aristotle probably remembers the words of Achilles to his friend Phoenix in Il. 9. 616,

*ἶσον ἐμοὶ βασίλευε καὶ ἥμισυ μείρεο τιμῆς.*

Cp. also Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 18 *sub fin.*, *καὶ τὸ Δαρείου γένος ἐβασίλευσεν, ἀνδρὸς οὐ μόνον ἀδελφοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλοις ἐπισταμένου κοινωνεῖν πραγμάτων καὶ δυνάμεως*, and Thuc. 2. 97. 3, where we read of *οἱ παραδυναστεύοντές τε καὶ γενναῖοι Ὀδρυσῶν* (i. e. associates of the King of the Odrysae in his rule). Monarchs expect of those whom they make partners in rule not only friendliness to their rule but also friendliness to themselves. The two things are not the same. Alexander, we remember, called Craterus *φιλοβασιλεύς* and Hephaestion *φιλαλέξανδρος* (Plut. Alex. c. 47: Diod. 17. 114): cp. Plut. Brut. c. 8, *λέγεται δὲ Βροῦτος μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν βαρύνεσθαι, Κάσσιος δὲ τὸν ἄρχοντα μισεῖν*, where Julius Caesar is of course referred to. *Τῆς ἀρχῆς φίλοι* should probably be read (with Casaubon and Richards: see critical note) in place of *τῇ ἀρχῇ φίλοι*, though this expression is used in an unfavourable sense in Lucian, Catapl. c. 11, *ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι πάντες οἱ καὶ προσκυνοῦντες καὶ τῶν λεγομένων*

καὶ πραττομένων ἕκαστα ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ φόβῳ ἢ ἐλπίσιν ἔδρων τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες φίλοι καὶ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἀποβλέποντες; In place of αὐτοῦ (MSS. wrongly αὐτοῦ) Sus. would read αὐτοῖς, which is found in the version of the passage given by the Aldine edition of the Scholia on Aristophanes (Acharn. 92: Duebner excludes this quotation from the Politics from his text of the Scholia—see Dindorf's Preface, pp. iv–v Duebner, as to the Aldine edition), but not, I think, rightly: see above on 1286 a 12. The title 'friend of the King' probably came originally from Egypt, where we trace it as early as the Twelfth Dynasty (see Maspero, Histoire Ancienne des Peuples de l'Orient, p. 104, ed. 1), and even the Sixth (Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, Eng. Trans., p. 72). The Macedonian Kings made those whom they raised to the dignity of 'friends' so far partners in rule that they consulted them on the most important matters and employed them on the most important commissions (see Spitta, De Amicorum, qui vocantur, in Macedonum Regno Condicione, p. 38, who refers among other passages to Diod. 17. 54, and Arrian, Anab. 1. 25. 4). Ποιοῦνται here takes the place of ποιοῦσιν, 29, just as in c. 5. 1278 a 34 ποιοῦσιν takes the place of ποιοῦνται, 1278 a 30.

**31.** μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες κ.τ.λ., '[friends indeed they must of necessity be, for] if they are not friends,' etc.

**33.** ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος. Cp. Plato, Laws 837 A, φίλον μέν που καλοῦμεν ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἴσον ἴσῳ.

**34.** οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς.

**35.** οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. Cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 24, where see note.

C. 17. **36.** ἐπὶ μέν τινων, 'in the case of some persons.' I follow Bernays, from whom Sus. differs (Sus.[4], 1. p. 443: Qu. Crit. p. 396 sqq.), in taking τινων to be masculine: cp. c. 14. 1284 b 40, ἡ τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει, and c. 17. 1288 a 31, καὶ τίσι.

**37.** ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστὸν κ.τ.λ., 'for there is that which is marked out by nature to be ruled by a master, and another to be ruled by a King, and another marked out for free government, and it is expedient and just that each should be thus ruled.' For καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον, cp. 41, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq., and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16 sq. I prefer the rendering which I have given of καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον to that of Sepulveda, 'et horum imperiorum cuiusque aliud est ius et alia commoditas,' though Bernays translates the passage in a somewhat

similar way. Richards would add τοῦτο after δίκαιον, 39. For ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστόν, cp. 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 36 sqq. Πολιτικόν in 38, καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικόν, appears to be used in reference to the kind of free government which obtains in a Polity, for Aristotle is evidently speaking of normal constitutions only, and he can hardly refer in πολιτικόν to Aristocracy. Of course, if we regard 1288 a 6–15 as authentic and as placed where it stands by Aristotle, we have an additional reason for taking πολιτικόν to refer to the Polity, for it clearly refers to the Polity in 1288 a 7, 12.

40. οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, 'nor any of the other constitutions.' For the genitive, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 30, and Diod. 5. 21. 2, οὔτε γὰρ Διόνυσον οὔθ' Ἡρακλέα παρειλήφαμεν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἡρώων ἢ δυναστῶν ἐστρατευμένον ἐπ' αὐτήν.

41. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε κ.τ.λ. See as to this passage vol. i. p. 274–5. In 1288 a 1 we have a μέν *solitarium* (see above on 1262 a 6).

2. πάντων is here masculine (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 11, τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν). This is clear from 3, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν κ.τ.λ. 1288 a.

3. ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον. Supply κύριον ὄντα after αὐτόν. As to the chiasmus in οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, see note on 1277 a 31.

4. οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ᾖ may be added to correct a dictum of Plato to Dionysius the Elder recorded in Diog. Laert. 3. 18, ὁ δὲ διαλεγόμενος περὶ τυραννίδος καὶ φάσκων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο κρεῖττον ὃ συμφέρει αὐτῷ μόνον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέροι, προσέκρουσεν αὐτῷ. Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37.

6. πρότερον, in c. 13. 1284 a 3 sqq.

πρῶτον δὲ . . . 15. ἀρχάς. Susemihl brackets this paragraph as an interpolation, and it looks at any rate like a subsequently added passage. It may well be from the pen of Aristotle—its contents do not seem to be seriously at variance with his teaching elsewhere (see vol. i. Appendix D)—but it is doubtful whether it was placed where it stands by his hand or by that of another. A similar doubt arises as to other passages in the Politics (see for instance vol. i. p. 569 and p. 519, note). The position of this paragraph in relation to its context is certainly remarkable. Aristotle is discussing Kingship, and in particular is about to describe what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess: why should he pause at this point to explain

who are fit subjects for Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity, when he is concerned for the moment only with Kingship? And why is it necessary to enter into this question as to Aristocracy and Polity first (*πρῶτον*, 1288 a 6), before stating what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess? Then again, though the recapitulation in 1288 a 30 sqq. makes it clear that in what has preceded it has been explained for whom Kingship is an expedient institution, this may refer only to what has been said in 1288 a 15–19. On the other hand, it may be urged in defence of the paragraph that it is after a long argument in favour of Aristocracy (in the sense of the rule of a plurality of good men) that Aristotle interposes his closing remark in 1287 b 36 sq., 'but perhaps these things are so in the case of certain persons and not in the case of others,' and that therefore he may naturally wish to explain before he goes further who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Aristocracy hold good, no less than who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Kingship hold good. Nor is it altogether surprising that he should add a similar explanation as to Polity, for he has implied in 1287 b 37 sqq. that there are those who are marked out by nature for each of the normal constitutions. Still it must be admitted that the paragraph has an intrusive look where it stands.

8. **τὸ τοιοῦτον** here refers not to anything preceding, but to what follows. See for other instances of the same thing note on 1337 b 6. As to **φέρειν**, see vol. i. p. 290, note 1. The case is omitted in which Kingship falls to a single individual, not a *γένος*.

9. **πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν.** **Πολιτικήν** is added to show that a mere fitness for *ἡγεμονία πολεμική* is not enough. Cp. *πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν* in 12 and *πλῆθος πολεμικόν* in 13. The King is to be capable of *πολιτικὴ ἡγεμονία*, the rulers in an aristocracy of *πολιτικὴ ἀρχή*. The word *ἡγεμονία* belongs especially to Kingship: cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 1. 1420 a 21, where *οἱ ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς βασιλείας ἡγεμονίαν τεταγμένοι* are contrasted with *οἱ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολιτευόμενοι*, and Plut. adv. Colot. c. 31, *οὐχ οἱ τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις λέγοντες; οὐχ οἱ τὸ βασιλεύειν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ διάπτωσιν ἀποφαίνοντες;* Cp. also Plato, Laws 711 C, *τῇ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἡγεμονίᾳ.*

**ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ . . . 15. τὰς ἀρχάς.** See vol. i. Appendix D.

**11.** κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν, and not *κατὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν*, as in oligarchies (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1161 a 2 sq.).

**12.** πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, the rule which is exercised over persons *ὅμοιοι τῷ γένει καὶ ἐλεύθεροι* (c. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.).

πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. The law in a polity gives office to the well-to-do, just as in an aristocracy office falls to the *γνώριμοι* (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2). Does *κατ' ἀξίαν* imply that office will be elective in a polity? If so, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq. and contrast 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8–11 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 34 sqq., passages which, however defective the text of the latter may be, seem to show that magistrates might be appointed by lot in a polity (see vol. i. pp. 509, 573).

**15.** As to τῶν ἄλλων see critical note.

**18.** καὶ κύριον πάντων is added because not all Kings are *κύριοι πάντων* (c. 14. 1285 a 4).

**19.** πρότερον, in c. 13. 1284 b 25 sqq.

**20.** τὸ δίκαιον, i.e. *τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν δίκαιον*, cp. c. 13. 1283 b 17, *κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον*.

**22.** πάντῃ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they entirely claim on the basis of superiority, though not the same superiority.' Aristotle's account in Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq. of the 'superiority' on which the partisans of democracy base their claims does not agree with the account given in Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sqq., for in the former passage (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28 sqq.) they are said to base their claims on *ἀξία*—the *ἀξία*, in fact, which *ἐλευθερία* confers—and in the latter not on *ἀξία* but on number. Still, whichever of the two passages we follow, they base their claims on a 'superiority.'

**24.** ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν, i.e. because no other course is becoming or in accordance with nature: cp. c. 13. 1284 b 28 sqq.

**28.** τοῦτο, i.e. to constitute the whole of which the rest are parts.

**31.** πῶς, 'under what conditions' (so Bern.). Cp. c. 3. 1276 a 17, *ἔοικε δ' οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν*.

**32.** ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. At this point a transition is made from the C. 18.
question what are the different forms of Kingship and for whom Kingship is advantageous to the question how a Kingship or an Aristocracy (for the two forms turn out in 34 sqq. to be nearly related, cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 31 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 2 sq., 31 sq.) is to be brought into being. For a similar transition cp. 6 (4).

8. 1294 a 25 sqq. The reasoning of the paragraph which commences at *ἐπεὶ δέ* is—the best State is an aristocratical or Kingly State, but the virtue of a citizen of the best State is the same as the virtue of a good man; hence the virtue of a citizen of an aristocratical State or of a man of Kingly mould is identical with the virtue of a good man; hence to institute an aristocratical or Kingly State it is necessary to have recourse to the education and customs which produce good men. This preface prepares us to find in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books what we do find there—inquiries directed to the discovery of the education and customs which produce good men. As to the transition from the Third to the Fourth Book see vol. i. p. 292 sqq.

34. The use of the word *οἰκονομουμένην* indicates the completeness of the control exercised: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 31 sqq.

37. *ἐν δὲ* κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. Appendix B.

39. *τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν.* Cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, *ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων*, and 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 5, *πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται* κ.τ.λ.

41. *ὥστ' ἔσται* κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle corrects the view expressed by Plato in his Politicus that the essence of the *βασιλικός* and the *πολιτικός* is to possess a certain science. Just as he had said in 1. 7. 1255 b 20 that *ὁ δεσπότης οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι*, so he now implies the same thing as to the *βασιλικός* and the *πολιτικός*. The education which is to produce them is not the communication of a science; it is the communication of an *ἕξις*. Contrast Plato, Polit. 292 B, *τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἶναί τινα ἔφαμεν, οἶμαι*, and 292 E; also 259 B. Aristotle, however, allows in 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 5 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.) that the ruler should possess not only virtue but also political aptitude. In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8 certain *πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀσκήσεις* are referred to which find a place apparently in Aristotle's scheme of education, though their exact nature is left obscure, and these *πολιτικαὶ ἀσκήσεις* may perhaps be one means by which he would seek to develope this political aptitude, but he probably thought that the art of ruling was mainly acquired in the course of being ruled (3. 4. 1277 b 8 sqq.).

1288 b. 1. *καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη.* Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, *εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι*, and Menex. 241 C, *μαθόντας καὶ ἐθισθέντας μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς βαρβάρους.* In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, on the other hand, it is implied that *παιδεία* comprises an element of habituation.

2. In place of πολιτικόν we expect ἀριστοκρατικόν, but the rulers in the best State have already been spoken of as πολιτικοί in c. 5. 1278 b 3.

4. τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς. The same two questions are raised as to the Polity in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30 sqq.

## BOOK IV (VII).

14. Compare the very similar sentence in De An. 2. 4. 415 a 14, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι λαβεῖν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν. For μέλλω with the aor. infin. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 b 11, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. Phrynichus condemns as un-Attic the use of μέλλειν with the aor. infin., but that it is so used by Attic writers is undoubted: see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 74. Schanz remarks in his Prolegomena to Plato's Symposium, § 5, 'aoristi infinitivi cum μέλλειν a Platone copulati exempla apud Platonem exstant, quae haud facile quispiam in dubitationem vocare possit.' He refers among other passages to Protag. 312 B, μέλλεις παρασχεῖν, and Gorg. 512 E, ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι, and 525 A. It is natural that Aristotle should find the clue to the best constitution in the inquiry what is the most desirable life, for we read in 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40 that 'the constitution is the mode of life chosen by the State.' See vol. i. p. 209 sqq. An instructive commentary on the first chapter will be found in the second of Vahlen's Aristotelische Aufsätze, Über ein Capitel aus Aristoteles' Politik, from which I shall frequently have occasion to make quotations. C. 1. 1323 a.

16. For πρῶτον in the sense of πρότερον Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 5, note) compares 3. 4. 1276 b 19.

17. ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν κ.τ.λ., 'for [the best constitution and the most desirable life go together, inasmuch as] it is fitting that those who live under the best constitution their circumstances enable them to attain should fare best, unless something contrary to expectation happens.' It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 294, note 2) that the reasoning latent in the Greek cannot be fully expressed in English. For the thought cp. Plato, Laws 828 D, ὡς ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις οἵαν οὐκ ἄν τις ἑτέραν εὕροι τῶν νῦν περὶ χρόνου σχολῆς καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξουσίας, δεῖ δὲ αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον, ζῆν εὖ. We hardly expect Aristotle to add the

qualification 'their circumstances enable them to attain' (*ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς*), for those who fare best must be those who live under the *absolutely* best constitution, which is contrasted in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 25 sq., 32 with the best attainable under given circumstances (*ἡ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη, ἡ ἐνδεχομένη ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*).

**20.** *πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν*, 'all individuals, so to say,' for *πᾶσιν* corresponds to *ἑκάστῳ*, cp. 1323 b 21. Aristotle first discusses the question what is the most desirable life for the individual (1323 a 21–b 29), and then the same question as to the State.

**21.** *χωρίς*, i.e. *ἑκάστῳ*, 'for the individual': cp. 1323 b 40, *καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν*, 3. 6. 1278 b 24, and Soph. Fragm. 521,

*νῦν δ' οὐδέν εἰμι χωρίς· ἀλλὰ πολλάκις*
*ἔβλεψα ταύτῃ τὴν γυναικείαν φύσιν,*
*ὡς οὐδέν ἐσμεν,*

where, as Gomperz remarks (Die Bruchstücke der griech. Tragiker, p. 33), *χωρίς* (= *ἰδίᾳ*, 'privatim,' 'seorsum') serves to distinguish the individual lot of the speaker from the general lot of women.

*νομίσαντας οὖν* . . . **23.** *αὐτοῖς*, 'holding then that many of the things said in the non-scientific inquiries also respecting the best life are adequately said, we must now too make use of them.' On the question what 'non-scientific inquiries' are here referred to, something has been said in vol. i. p. 299, note 1. The expression *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, when used by Aristotle, does not necessarily refer to non-scientific inquiries of his own, still less to writings of his own, but it probably refers to writings of his own in the passage before us, for, besides that, as Zeller remarks (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 119. 2: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4), the contents of the passage are quite Aristotelian in spirit, it seems to be implied in the words *καὶ νῦν*, 'now too,' that Aristotle has himself said these things before (cp. Meteor. 1. 3. 339 b 36, *εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸν ἄνω τόπον θεωρήμασι, λέγωμεν δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ νῦν*, and 341 a 12 sqq.). Whether, as Bernays held (Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 69 sqq.), a Dialogue of Aristotle is here 'used,' is uncertain, for the non-scientific writings of Aristotle were not all of them Dialogues (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 123: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 119 sq.). What is the exact meaning of *χρηστέον*? The word recurs in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 26, *λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς* (i.e. *τῆς ψυχῆς*) *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς*, where *χρηστέον* seems to introduce merely a statement of results, but it does not follow that it always means no more than

this. Bernays thought that we have in 1323 a 24 sqq. a *verbatim* extract from the non-scientific composition made use of. Against this Vahlen argues in the second of his Aristotelische Aufsätze. Zeller holds (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 119. 2: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4) that the contents of the non-scientific composition are reproduced, not indeed *verbatim*, but pretty closely ('ziemlich eng anzuschliessen scheint'), and we are certainly conscious (with Bernays) of a freer flow of periods in the first chapter than we often meet with in Aristotle's writings, though Vahlen has shown that many of the expressions used occur elsewhere in them. Bernays takes the use of the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι to extend to the end of the first chapter, and it would seem from the words περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς in 23 that all that is said on this subject is based on them, so that they will have been used at any rate down to σώφρων, 1323 b 36. If we ask why Aristotle has recourse on this subject to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, and not, as in c. 13. 1332 a 7 sqq. and 21 sqq., to the Nicomachean Ethics—Zeller finds teaching to the same effect in Eth. Nic. 1. 6 sqq., 10. 6 sqq.—the answer probably is that he prefers, when he can, to refer to the more popularly written and more generally accessible class of compositions. Zeller (*Hermes*, 15. 553 sqq.: see vol. ii. p. x, note 1) thinks that the passage 1323 a 21 sqq., in addition to Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 9 sqq., was before the writer of Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 32, πάντα δὴ τἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἱρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις· φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὧν ἕνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν, but perhaps the passage in the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι was itself before him. For the aorist νομίσαντας, cp. c. 7. 1328 a 3 and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 27, and see above on 1271 b 4. As to the case of νομίσαντας see note on 1275 a 16.

**24.** ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for in truth against one division [of goods] at any rate no one would contend,' etc. Γάρ introduces a justification of the use of the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι on the ground of the absence of dissent. For ἀμφισβητεῖν πρός, cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 35: Isaeus 11. 9, ἀμφισβητῆσαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνου διαθήκας: Demosth. in Phorm. c. 33, ἀμφισβητεῖς πρὸς ἓν ῥῆμα τῶν ἐν τῇ συγγραφῇ: Polyb. 2. 2. 10, ἀμφισβητούντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα. But how would an assertion that the happy need not possess all three kinds of goods run counter to the division of goods into these three kinds? Apparently in this way. The division implies that all the three kinds of goods are goods, and it is taken for granted that those who are to

be happy should possess all goods (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 28 sqq.). There were other divisions of goods—among them a division into *ἐπαινετά*, *τίμια*, and *δυνάμεις* (Eth. Nic. 1. 12). As to the division into external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, see vol. i. p. 299, note 1. That wealth should be accompanied by virtue had often been said by the poets (Sappho, Fragm. 81: Pindar, Olymp. 2. 53 sqq. and Pyth. 5. 1 sqq.: Eurip. Fragm. 163: compare Lysander's remark to the younger Cyrus in Cic. De Senect. 17. 59, recte vero te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuae fortuna coniuncta est), and Simonides (Fragm. 70) had said that health should accompany wisdom. Cp. also Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 17 sqq. When Aristotle sought to show in the inquiry which commences here that the chief ingredient in *εὐδαιμονία* is virtue, his work was half done for him by the ordinary use of the Greek language. To the Greeks *ὁ εὐδαίμων* was *ὁ εὖ πράττων* (1323 b 29 sqq.), and *ὁ εὖ πράττων* was *ὁ τὰ καλὰ πράττων*, and *τὰ καλὰ πράττειν* implied virtue. Our word 'happiness' has no such link with virtue.

**27.** *οὐδεὶς γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. The word *μακάριος* is used throughout the first chapter as interchangeable with *εὐδαίμων*, but it is a slightly stronger word, as we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 6–8. Aristotle offers no proof that the happy should possess external goods and the goods of the body, no doubt because he considers it unnecessary to do so; the only question likely to be raised is whether they need possess the goods of the soul. Compare Plato, Phileb. 21, which is evidently present to his memory. For *φαίη μακάριον* without *εἶναι* cp. 2. 3. 1261 b 22.

**29.** *δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας μυίας*. We read in a fragment of Plutarch (Libr. Perdit. Fragm. 7. 10), *φαρμακοπώλην δέ τινα εἰδέναι ὑπὸ μὲν δρακόντων καὶ ἀσπίδων μηδὲν πάσχειν, μύωπα δὲ φεύγειν μέχρι βοῆς καὶ ἐκστάσεως*, but Aristotle is thinking not of gadflies, but of harmless flies. As to cowardice of this kind see Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 4 sqq.

**30.** *ἀπεχόμενον δὲ* κ.τ.λ. *Τῶν ἐσχάτων* is in the gen. after *μηδενός*. To act thus is to be like a wild beast: cp. Plato, Laws 831 D, *μηδὲν δυσχεραίνοντα, ἐὰν μόνον ἔχῃ δύναμιν καθάπερ θηρίῳ τοῦ φαγεῖν παντοδαπὰ καὶ πιεῖν, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀφροδισίων πᾶσαν πάντως παρασχεῖν πλησμονήν*, which is imitated in Epist. 7. 335 A sq. For *ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν* Vahlen compares Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 16, *τοῦ εὐδοξεῖν ἐπιθυμῶν*, and 1. 7. 3, and Xen. Oecon. 14. 9.

**32.** ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1174 a 1, *οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.* For *τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον* Vahlen compares Phylarch. ap. Athen. Deipn. 536 e, *οὕτως ἐξαπατηθῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν . . . ὥστε τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὑπολαβεῖν βιώσεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὅτι μόνος εὗροι τὴν ἀθανασίαν.* For *τι παιδίον*, cp. 1323 b 8, *ὄργανόν τι*, and see Bon. Ind. 763 a 16 sqq., where Meteor. 3. 3. 372 b 13, *καὶ διότι περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἢ τὴν σελήνην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περί τι τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων*, is referred to.

**34.** ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'but these things almost all men would admit when said; they differ, however, in respect of the quantity they desire of each good and in respect of their relative superiority.' As to *λεγόμενα* Vahlen remarks that it is to be taken in close connexion with *συγχωρήσειαν*, and compares among other passages Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 32, *διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον*: Plato, Rep. 436 E, *οὐδὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει*: Hdt. 2. 146, *τούτων ὧν ἀμφοτέρων πάρεστι χρᾶσθαι τοῖσί τις πείσεται λεγομένοισι μᾶλλον*, and 4. 11, *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος λόγος ἔχων ὧδε, τῷ μάλιστα λεγομένῳ αὐτὸς πρόσκειμαι.* For *ὥσπερ πάντες*, where *ὥσπερ* = 'fere,' Vahlen compares Rhet. 1. 6. 1363 a 11, *ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες*, perhaps not a quite conclusive parallel. Closer ones may be found in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v., who refers in illustration of the use of *ὥσπερ* in the sense of 'fere' to Protag. 346 A, *ὥσπερ ἀσμένους*, among other passages. For *ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς* cp. 1323 b 14, *κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν.* A different interpretation of *ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς* from that given above is, however, possible; it might mean 'in respect of the excess they desire of this or that good' (cp. *τὴν ὑπερβολήν*, 38, and 1323 b 8), but 'superiority,' not 'excess,' is probably the meaning. Ὑπεροχαῖς appears to be in the plural because three different sorts of goods are measured against each other, so that whichever sort is preferred will conceivably possess one degree of superiority over the second and another over the third.

**36.** τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς κ.τ.λ. Ὁποσονοῦν is severed from *τῆς ἀρετῆς* by the whole length of the sentence for the sake of emphasis: see above on 1281 a 14. Aristotle here remembers Plato, Apol. Socr. 29 D, *ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ*

*ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;* and 29 E, *ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περι ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος.*

**37.** For **πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων** Vahlen compares 1. 9. 1257 b 7, *ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων.* **Πλοῦτος** is explained in 1. 13. 1259 b 20 as *ἡ τῆς κτήσεως ἀρετή.* Cp. also c. 5. 1326 b 33, *περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας.*

**38. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν.** See vol. i. p. 295, note 2. Vahlen compares the use of *ἡμεῖς δ' ἐρωτήσομεν* in De An. 1. 3. 406 b 22, also Metaph. Γ. 5. 1010 a 15, *ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐροῦμεν*, and Pol. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 16 sqq. As to *ἡμεῖς* see above on 1270 a 9.

**39. ὅτι ῥᾴδιον μὲν κ.τ.λ.** **Μέν** is taken up by *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά*, 1323 b 6 (see note on 1284 b 4). **Περὶ τούτων**, i. e. whether it *is* right to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an unlimited amount of external goods. In place of *διαλαμβάνειν* Lambinus followed by Bekk.[2] reads *λαμβάνειν* (Sus. and Bonitz, Ind. s.v., also bracket the *διά*), and it is true that in 2. 3. 1262 a 17 we have *ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις*, and that no parallel has hitherto been adduced for the expression *διαλαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν*, but it is not perhaps absolutely certain that *διαλαμβάνειν* is wrong. Many verbs compounded with *διά* are occasionally used in a sense but little removed from that of the simple verb, e.g. *διαναγκάζειν, διαπορεῖν, διαλανθάνειν, διαφυλάττειν*, etc.

**40. ὁρῶντας ὅτι κ.τ.λ.** So that those who possess the virtues have the means of acquiring external goods in addition, whereas those who possess external goods have not necessarily the means of acquiring the virtues, whence it follows that the virtues are to be sought in preference to external goods. A little later, however, Aristotle says that external goods are the gift of fortune (1323 b 27 sq.). He continues here to make use of the Apology of Plato, 30 A, *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.* Compare the definition of *εὐδαιμονία* in Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 16 as *εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων*: Isocr. De Pace, § 32, *τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οἷς ἔχομεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τούτοις κτώμεθα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὠφελείας ὧν δεόμενοι τυγχάνομεν· ὥσθ' οἱ τῆς αὑτῶν διανοίας ἀμελοῦντες λελήθασι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἅμα τοῦ τε φρονεῖν ἄμεινον καὶ τοῦ*

*πράττειν βέλτιον τῶν ἄλλων ὀλιγωροῦντες*: Xenocr. Fragm. 63 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 3. 127), *Ξενοκράτης δὲ ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτῆσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῇ δυνάμεως· εἶτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίνεται, φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχήν· ὡς δὲ ὑφ' ὧν, τὰς ἀρετάς· ὡς δὲ ἐξ ὧν, ὡς μερῶν, τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἕξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις· ὡς τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός* (cp. Plato, Rep. 403 D): Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 58 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 344), *δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος ἄνευ ξυνέσιος οὐκ ἀσφαλέα κτήματα.*

1. *τῷ χαίρειν = ἡδονῇ*, as in De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 1 (referred to in Bon. Ind. s. v. *χαίρειν*). Protarchus in Plato, Phileb. 21 A sqq. finds the Good to be *τὸ χαίρειν* or pleasure. The word *μακάριος* was supposed to be derived from *χαίρειν* (Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 6 sq., quoted by Vahlen). Tyrants were thought to be *εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι* if they were seen to be in the daily enjoyment of bodily pleasures (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 28 sqq.). 1323 b.

2. *εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν*. Cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 34, *φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὧν ἕνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν.* Εὐδαιμονία is said to be a combination of *τὸ καλόν* and pleasure in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19: see vol. i. p. 296, note 1.

*ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει* κ.τ.λ. Compare the remark of Solon quoted in Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 9, *καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλιστ', ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ*, and Plato, Euthyd. 281 B, *ἆρά γε ὀνίναιτ' ἂν ἄνθρωπος πολλὰ κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ πράττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; ἢ μᾶλλον ὀλίγα νοῦν ἔχων;* (cp. Laws 660 E). Compare also the remark of Bias to Croesus, made in support of Solon (Diod. 9. 27. 3), *τὰ γὰρ ἐν σοὶ βούλεται (ὁ Σόλων) θεωρήσας ἀγαθὰ διαγνῶναι, νυνὶ δὲ τὰ παρὰ σοὶ μόνον ἑόρακεν· εἶναι δὲ δι' ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εὐδαίμονας*, and two lines variously ascribed to Antiphanes (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 63: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 154), Alexis (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 41: Meineke, 3. 521), and Menander (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 175: Meineke, 4. 273),

*ψυχὴν ἔχειν δεῖ πλουσίαν· τὰ δὲ χρήματα*
*ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὄψις, παραπέτασμα τοῦ βίου.*

4. *τὴν ἔξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν*, 'the external acquisition of goods.' Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 16, note 1) compares Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1098 b 26, *τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν.* Compare also Plato, Rep. 443 C, *τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτο μέν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν*

ἕξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῶς, περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, and Aristot. De Gen. An. 3. 3. 754 a 33, τὸ τῶν βατράχων φῶν μόνον στερεόν ἐστι καὶ στυφρὸν πρὸς τὴν ἕξω σωτηρίαν.

5. πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, cp. Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 16, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (Vahlen), and Isocr. De Pace, § 90, πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν.

τούτοις, i. e. τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀγαθοῖς, or (as in 10) τοῖς περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθοῖς.

6. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle proves that it is not well to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an unlimited amount of external goods by showing (1) that the goods of the soul are not, like external goods and ὄργανα generally, harmful or useless when in excess, but on the contrary increase in utility with every increase in their amount; (2) that the best state of the soul is as much more precious (τιμιώτερον) than the best state of property and of the body as the soul is more precious than property and the body; (3) that external and bodily goods are desirable for the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of external and bodily goods. On all these three grounds it is clear that the goods of the soul are to be sought to a far greater extent than the goods of the body and external goods.

7. ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι, cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής. That instruments have a limit, we see from 1. 8. 1256 b 35 sqq. and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 35 sqq.

8. πᾶν δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον κ.τ.λ., 'and everything that is useful' (not merely external goods but bodily goods also, vol. i. p. 299, note 2, and εὐτυχία as a whole, Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq.) 'belongs to the class of things whose,' etc. Supply τούτων with ἐστιν (with Giph.). Τὰ χρήσιμα (or ὠφέλιμα) are goods that are desirable for the sake of other goods (Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 13 sqq.: 1. 3. 1096 a 7, χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν: 8. 2. 1155 b 19). Cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 3 sqq. and De Part. An. 2. 5. 651 a 36 sqq.

9. ἀναγκαῖον. 'In the first chapter of the Fourth Book of the Politics, which Bernays is probably right in believing to be taken over (herübergenommen) from an ethical dialogue, ἀνάγκη and ἀναγκαῖον are interchanged in such a way that the latter stands where the use of ἀνάγκη owing to its being followed by a vowel would have produced an hiatus' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der Πολιτεία

*Ἀθηναίων* des Aristoteles, p. 10). Kaibel has apparently overlooked the fact that the same rule is followed throughout the Politics: see for instance 3. 11. 1282 b 8–13 and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39–b 1. I have noticed only one passage in the Politics in which *ἀνάγκη* stands before a vowel, 2. 4. 1262 b 14, *ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἕνα*, and the reason why it is used there probably is that *ἀναγκαῖον* occurs in the next line, unless indeed *τούς* should be added before *ἀμφοτέρους*. On the other hand there are several passages in which *ἀναγκαῖον* stands before a consonant.

For *αὐτῶν* used pleonastically in addition to the relative, cp. Plato, Rep. 395 D, and Stallbaum's notes on this passage and on Gorg. 452 D. The same usage occurs in English, e. g. in 'Who is the poet but lately arrived in Elysium whom I saw Spenser lead in and present him to Virgil?' (Lyttelton's Dialogues of the Dead).

**10.** *τῶν δὲ* κ.τ.λ. With *εἶναι* supply *ἀναγκαῖον* from 9. *Δέ* answers to *μέν* in 7, *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτός*, and we expect in 11 not *χρήσιμον εἶναι*, but *χρήσιμόν ἐστιν*. See however Vahlen, Aristot. Aufs. 2. 24 sqq., who adduces other passages (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 2 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sqq.: De An. 2. 5. 417 a 22 sqq.) in which the second limb of an antithesis suffers a similar change, and is caught into the structure of an intervening sentence.

**11.** *εἰ δεῖ* κ.τ.λ. Menand. Monost. 579 is in the same spirit:

*νοῦς ἐστι πάντων ἡγεμὼν τῶν χρησίμων.*

**13.** *ὅλως τε* κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly it is manifest that we shall say that the best state of every individual thing, if we match one against another, corresponds in respect of superiority to the distance between the things of which we say that these very states are states,' i. e. if we match two things one against the other, the superiority of the best state of the one thing over the best state of the other corresponds to the distance between the one thing and the other. *Ὅλως* marks a transition from statements as to this or that class of goods to a broad universal proposition as to *ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα*: see above on 1262 b 3. For *ἑκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα* Vahlen compares among other passages Poet. 23. 1459 a 24, *ὧν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα*. *Ἥνπερ εἴληφε διάστασιν* = *τῇ διαστάσει ἥνπερ εἴληφε*, and *τῇ διαστάσει* is dependent on *ἀκολουθεῖν*. In Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15 sq. and Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23 we find *ἀκολουθεῖν* followed by *κατά*, and many have connected it here with *κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν*, but Vahlen (whose interpretation I have

followed) is probably right in connecting ἀκολουθεῖν with τῇ διαστάσει (understood), and not with κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. That εἴληφε διάστασιν is a perfectly possible phrase (no less than εἴληχε διάστασιν, the reading of $\Pi^1$) is shown by Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 30), who compares among many other passages Plato, Tim. 65 A, ὅσα δὲ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἑαυτῶν καὶ κενώσεις εἴληφε, τὰς δὲ πληρώσεις ἀθρόας καὶ κατὰ μεγέλα.

**16.** ὥστ' εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 697 B, 727 D sq., 731 C, Symp. 210 B, and Protag. 313 A. When Alcestis says in Eurip. Alcest. 292 Bothe, 301 Dindorf,

ψυχῆς γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστι τιμιώτερον,

she means by ψυχή 'life.'

**17.** καὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 2. 1129 b 5 and Rhet. 3. 19. 1419 b 16 sq.

καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου. Πλοῦτος is said to be the ἀρετή of κτῆσις in 1. 13. 1259 b 20.

**22.** ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, 'moral and intellectual virtue': cp. 1323 a 27–34 and 1323 b 2, τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.

καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας. An important addition. Hitherto we have been told only this, that those who are to be happy must *possess* as much virtue as possible, but now we are told that *action* in accordance with the virtues is also essential to happiness, and this is not lost sight of in the sequel (cp. 31–36, 41 sqq.).

**23.** μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, 'appealing to the happiness of the Deity in proof of this.' Vict. 'quod inquit posse nos hoc videre utentes Deo teste, non intellexit debere nos adhibere ipsum testem et quasi invocare ut hoc confirmet, sed uti illo tanquam signo quodam certo et exemplo huius rei claro atque illustri.' Μάρτυρι χρῆσθαί τινι is commonly used in the sense of 'producing some one as a witness,' as in Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 30, Ἀθηναῖοι Ὁμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος, but here, as Vahlen points out, μάρτυς has the same meaning as in Plato, Phileb. 67 B, τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ κ.τ.λ. or as 'testes' in Cic. De Fin. 2. 33. 109. Cp. also Metaph. Λ. 1. 1069 a 25.

**24.** ὃς εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος κ.τ.λ. As to the source and nature of the happiness of God, cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ (i. e. τῷ θεῷ) αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν, and Plut. De Is. et Osir. c. 1, οὐ γὰρ ἀργύρῳ καὶ χρυσῷ μακάριον τὸ θεῖον, οὐδὲ βρονταῖς καὶ κεραυνοῖς ἰσχυρόν, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ φρονήσει. As to the phrase εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος see note on 1314 b

28. 'In the earlier days of Greece *εὐδαίμων* would hardly be used of a deity, as we can easily understand if we look to the original meaning of the word; later also it appears to have gone out of use again to some extent as an epithet of the gods. On the other hand we often find it thus used by Plato and other writers of his time (see Ast, Lexicon Platonicum). I have found it elsewhere in Aristoph. Aves 1741, *τῆς τ' εὐδαίμονος Ἥρας*, in Aristot. Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 8, *τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι*, and' in the passage of the Politics before us (Heinze, Der Eudämonismus in der griech. Philosophie, 1. 663).

**26.** *ἐπεὶ καὶ* κ.τ.λ., 'since it is just on account of this' (i. e. because happiness does not spring from external goods) 'that prosperity also differs from happiness [no less than external goods differ from goods of the soul], for the spontaneous and fortune are the cause of goods external to the soul [the abundance of which constitutes prosperity], whereas no one is just or temperate [or consequently happy] from fortune or owing to fortune.' *Ἐπεί* introduces a justification of the statement that the happiness of the individual is proportionate to his virtue and moral prudence and to the degree in which he acts in accordance with them: if this were not so and his happiness sprang from external goods, it would not differ from prosperity. That prosperity consists in an abundance of external goods, we see from Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 b 39, *εὐτυχία δ' ἐστίν, ὧν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα.* That it was identified by many with happiness we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 7 sq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq.

**28.** As to *ταὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη* see vol. i. p. 21 sqq.

*δίκαιος δ' οὐδεὶς* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Protag. 323 D sq.

**29.** *ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην.* This expression is used for the sake of emphasis: cp. Plut. De Fortuna, c. 1, *πότερον οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα, οὐδὲ ἰσότης, οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, οὐδὲ κοσμιότης, ἀλλ' ἐκ τύχης μὲν καὶ διὰ τύχην Ἀριστείδης ἐνεκαρτέρησε τῇ πενίᾳ . . . ἐκ τύχης δὲ καὶ διὰ τύχην Φιλοκράτης λαβὼν χρυσίον παρὰ Φιλίππου πόρνας καὶ ἰχθῦς ἠγόραζε;*

*ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ* κ.τ.λ., 'and next in order, and calling for the same arguments to establish it, comes the truth that the best *State* also is happy and does well.' But it cannot do well—Aristotle in effect proceeds—unless it does noble things, and it cannot do noble things without moral and intellectual virtue, and the courage,

justice, and wisdom of a State are identical in nature with the same virtues in an individual, so that the happiness of a State, like that of an individual, cannot exist apart from the moral and intellectual virtues and action in accordance with them; its happiness is inseparable from the very same virtues with which happiness is associated in the individual. Bernays and Susemihl, who substitute *γάρ* in 31 for the *δέ* of the MSS., regard the passage *ἀδύνατον*, 31–*σώφρων*, 36, as containing the proof of the preceding sentence *ἐχόμενον*, 29–*καλῶς*, 31, but Vahlen has already pointed out (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 45 sq.) that the former passage is rather a deduction from latter. The arguments used in the passage 31–36 are not the same as those used in 1323 a 38–b 29, nor do they prove that the best State is happy; what is proved in 31–36 is that the happy State will possess the same courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom which are possessed by the virtuous individual. One can conceive that the State might be happy without possessing the virtues of the virtuous individual; the object of 31–36 is to show that this is not the case, and that any happy State must possess these virtues, and thus to supplement and complete 29–31. It follows that the best State will possess them. In saying that the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of a State are identical with the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of an individual Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 435 B sq. and 441 C sq. With *ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν κ.τ.λ.* compare the reasoning in Plato, Gorg. 507 C.

**34.** *ἔχει*, not *ἔχουσι*, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 34 sq. and Plato, Phileb. 64 E, *μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.*

**35.** *μορφήν*. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) remarks of this passage, '*μορφή* idem fere quod *δύναμις* significat.'

The suppressed antecedent of *ὧν* must be *τῇ ἀνδρίᾳ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ φρονήσει*: we expect therefore *ἀνδρεῖος καὶ δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος* in place of *δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων*, but Aristotle is not careful of exact correspondence in enumerations of this kind, as Vahlen shows by comparing Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 4–8, Pol. 1. 13. 1259 b 39–1260 a 2, Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 6–9, and Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 36–1283 a 3, where we expect *τοῦ κάλλους* in place of *τοῦ πλούτου* in 1283 a 2. The same thing is observable in Plato: see Stallbaum on Plato, Rep. 490 C.

**37.** *μέν* is probably answered not by *δέ* in *νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω*, 40,

but by δέ in πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 1324 a 5 (see Vahlen, Aristot. Aufs. 2. 25).

**πεφροιμιασμένα.** Not only what has been said on this subject, but the whole contents of the first three chapters are introductory, because they merely prepare the way for the inquiry with which Aristotle is mainly concerned, the inquiry as to the best constitution (cp. c. 2. 1324 a 19 sqq., c. 4. 1325 b 33 sqq.).

**38. θιγγάνειν** 'is rare in the best Prose (ἅπτομαι being the common verb), but is used by Xenophon, Cyrop. 1. 3. 5, 5. 1. 16, 6. 4. 9, and by Aristotle' (Liddell and Scott s. v.). See also Rutherford, New Phrynichus, pp. 169, 391. Ἐπεξελθεῖν (aor. infin.) is used though θιγγάνειν (pres. infin.) has preceded, probably because ἐπεξέρχεσθαι is not used in this sense.

**39. ἑτέρας σχολῆς,** i. e. ἑτέρας μεθόδου (Sus.[3] Ind. s. v. σχολή), cp. 1324 a 2, ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, and 21, ἡμεῖς δὲ. ταύτην προῃρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν. Compare also Plut. Pericl. c. 39, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἑτέρας δόξει πραγματείας εἶναι. Νῦν δέ, 40, is in opposition to ἑτέρας σχολῆς.

**40. μέν** should rather follow ὑποκείσθω, but 'μέν interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. s. v.).

**41. κεχορηγημένης κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 32 sq. and 10. 9. 1179 a 4 sqq. Xenocrates, on the other hand, had identified the good and the happy life, and his view is consequently corrected here (Top. 7. 1. 152 a 7, καθάπερ Ξενοκράτης τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσι τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τῶν βίων αἱρετώτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐδαίμων· ἓν γὰρ τὸ αἱρετώτατον καὶ μέγιστον), and also that of the Cynics, for they held that virtue needed only the addition of the strength which Socrates possessed to be sufficient for happiness (Diog. Laert. 6. 11, αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος).

1. The suppressed subject of μετέχειν probably is, not τὸν βίον, but 1324 a. ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς πόλεις.

2. **ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου,** 'for the time of the present inquiry': cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 a 34, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος, and Isocr. Paneg. § 167, ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν ἡλικίας, and see Bon. Ind. 268 a 5–13.

5. **Πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle has just said that the courage, C. 2. justice, etc., of a State are the same as the corresponding virtues in an individual, and now he asks whether this is also true of happiness. The question marked out for inquiry in 1323 a 20 sq., πότερον ὁ αἱρετώτατος βίος κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος, has been so

far answered that we have been told that the most desirable life both for the State and for the individual is *μετ' ἀρετῆς*, but we have not yet learnt whether the happiness of the State resembles the happiness of the individual (1323 b 21 sqq.) in springing from virtue and being proportionate to it, and, till we know this, we cannot affirm that the happiness of the State and that of the individual are the same. We are now told that this is the case (1324 a 13, *καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν*). Plutarch claims that Lycurgus was already aware of this (Lycurg. c. 31, *ὥσπερ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς βίῳ καὶ πόλεως ὅλης νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς αὑτήν*, and Ages. c. 33). He often seems tacitly to defend Lycurgus against Aristotle's criticisms (see notes on 1270 a 4, 19, and 1324 b 7).

**12.** **ἀποδέχεται**, 'accipit cum assensu, probat' (Bon. Ind. s.v.). Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 25.

**14.** **ἓν μὲν κ.τ.λ.** For *συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως* see note on 1293 a 4, *κοινωνοῦσι καὶ πολιτεύονται*. As to the question here raised and the parties to the discussion, see vol. i. p. 305 sqq. In using the words *ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος* Aristotle probably has before him not only the language of Aristippus in Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 13, *ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι . . . οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλήω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι*, but also the example of Anaxagoras, who lived many years at Athens, though a Clazomenian, and when he was forced to leave it, did not return to his native city, but preferred to live a stranger's life at Lampsacus and died there (Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 15).

**17.** For **διάθεσιν πόλεως** cp. Plato, Rep. 579 E, *εἴπερ τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἧς ἄρχει ἔοικεν*.

**18.** **κοινωνεῖν πόλεως** = *συμπολιτεύεσθαι*, to take an active share in a State (cp. 15).

**19.** **εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις.** For *καί*, cp. c. 9. 1329 a 7, *τρόπον μέν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ ἑτέροις*.

**ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The best MSS. have *ἐκεῖνο μὲν γάρ* in 22, though $P^{4.6}$ $L^{5}$ omit *γάρ* and Vet. Int. has no equivalent for it (Vet. Int. occasionally fails to render *γάρ*: see vol. ii. p. lxiii). *Γάρ* should probably be retained in the text, and if we retain it, we must place the apodosis at *ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.*, 23. After a string of protases introduced by *ἐπεί*, the apodosis is often introduced by *οὖν* in Aristotle's writings (see Bonitz, Aristot. Studien, 2. 59 sqq.). In c. 13. 1331 b 26 sqq. and in De An. 1. 4. 408 a 5 sqq. the

apodosis is introduced by *μὲν οὖν* after a protasis introduced by *ἐπεί* or *εἰ*.

**τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας.** Cp. c. 3. 1325 b 20, *θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις*. Bonitz (Ind. 186 a 28) explains *διάνοια* here as 'cogitandi actio' (i.e. 'thought'), referring to Metaph. E. 1. 1025 b 6, *πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ ἢ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας*, Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11 sq., and De Interp. 14. 23 a 32 sq.

**23. ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν**, i.e. *ταύτην τὴν τάξιν καθ' ἣν*. Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 33) compares 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19, *ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν*: 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28: 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 8. Cp. also De Gen. An. 4. 4. 772 a 2.

**24. κἂν ὁστισοῦν**, whether *πρακτικός* or *θεωρητικός*.

**25. ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμολογούντων κ.τ.λ.** Cp. c. 16. 1335 a 39, *τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα* (where see note), and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 2, *τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμβουλευόμενα*. For this use of *παρά* see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 440 a. 1.

**27. ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικός τις, ὃν μόνον τινὲς φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον.** Aristotle was on the point of saying *ὁ φιλόσοφος*, as in 32, but he substitutes this long phrase, because he declines to identify this kind of life exclusively with the philosophic life. He selects three strong assertions for review, each containing the word *μόνον*, and this is the first of them. The other two are *μόνον γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν*, 39, and *οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαίμονά φασιν*, 1324 b 2. As to the passage before us cp. c. 3. 1325 a 18, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμάζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τόν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίον ἕτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετώτατον, οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον. Πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος*, however, means something more than a mere rejection of political office; Aristotle probably has Anaxagoras in his mind, his refusal to be cumbered even with property, his passion for *θεωρία* and *ἐλευθερία*: compare the account of Anaxagoras in Plut. Pericl. c. 16, where *ἀνόργανον καὶ ἀπροσδεῆ τῆς ἐκτὸς ὕλης ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς κινεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν* may be compared with *πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος*, in Himer. ap. Phot. Biblioth. 1088 R (quoted by Menage on Diog. Laert. 2. 6), where *πάσης ἑαυτοὺς τῆς ἔξωθεν ἀσχολίας ἐλευθερώσαντες* may be compared with the same phrase, and in Diog. Laert. 2. 6, *οὗτος* (i.e. *Ἀναξαγόρας*) *εὐγενείᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ διαφέρων ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνῃ, ὅς γε τὰ πατρῷα παρεχώρησε τοῖς οἰκείοις, αἰτιαθεὶς γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἀμελῶν, "Τί οὖν," ἔφη,*

"οὐχ ὑμεῖς ἐπιμελεῖσθε;" καὶ τέλος ἀπέστη καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρίαν ἦν, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν πολιτικῶν. See also Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 912. 5), Ἀναξαγόραν . . . τὴν θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν: Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 13 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 1. 4. 1215 b 6 sqq. and 1. 5. 1216 a 10 sqq. Aristotle, however, may also be thinking of Empedocles (cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, quoted below on 1325 a 19). Ὃν μόνον τινές φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον perhaps contains a reminiscence of Plato, Theaet. 175 D, οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, and Rep. 476 A, καὶ χωρὶς αὖ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, οὓς μόνους ἄν τις ὀρθῶς προσείποι φιλοσόφους: cp. Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunae, c. 30, αἱ σώφρονες (ψυχαὶ) μετὰ σχολῆς ἀπράγμονα καὶ φιλόσοφον στέρξασαι βίον. Aristotle hints in these words that it is possible to lead a philosophic life without withdrawing altogether from politics; he probably remembers that Socrates, Archytas, and Epaminondas had done so. Cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 26, much of which chapter is thought by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 892. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 441, note 1), to be based, in substance at any rate, on Dicaearchus, Σωκράτης γοῦν οὔτε βάθρα θεὶς οὔτ' εἰς θρόνον καθίσας οὔτε ὥραν διατριβῆς ἢ περιπάτου τοῖς γνωρίμοις τεταγμένην φυλάττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παίζων, ὅτε τύχοι, καὶ συμπίνων καὶ συστρατευόμενος ἐνίοις, καὶ συναγοράζων, τέλος δὲ καὶ συνδεδεμένος καὶ πίνων τὸ φάρμακον ἐφιλοσόφει, πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἅπαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ἁπλῶς ἅπασι φιλοσοφίαν δεχόμενον, and Cic. de Orat. 3. 34. 137, septem fuisse dicuntur uno tempore, qui sapientes et haberentur et vocarentur. Hi omnes praeter Milesium Thalen civitatibus suis praefuerunt. Plato, again, though he speaks of the true philosopher as scorning political office (Rep. 521 A sq.), will not hear of his philosophic class refusing political office, at any rate in his ideal State. Cp. also Gorg. 500 D. Chrysippus was so far from thinking the σχολαστικὸς βίος the only one fit for a philosopher that he classed it as an ἡδονικὸς βίος (Plut. De Stoicor. Repugnantiis, c. 2).

**29.** σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 36, αὐτοὶ δὲ πολιτεύονται ἡ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. For οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἀρετήν, cp. (with Eaton) 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 29, μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. Φαίνονται προαιρούμενοι, 'evidently choose.'

**31.** καὶ τῶν προτέρων (e.g. Anaxagoras and, as we shall see, Gorgias) καὶ τῶν νῦν (e.g. Isocrates and Epaminondas). οἱ

*πρότεροι* does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Politics (*οἱ πρότερον* is the usual phrase), but it occurs in Plato, Phaedr. 274 B and Menex. 241 D.

**λέγω δὲ δύο κ.τ.λ.** See critical note.

**32. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle probably has before him the words of Socrates in Plato, Gorg. 500 C, *ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ* (the political life) . . . *ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ.*

**33. ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Rep. 540 A, *ἀναγκαστέον . . . ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἑκάστους κ.τ.λ.* (cp. Laws 702 A *sub fin.*).

**35. νομίζουσι δ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ.** It is possible that Anaxagoras had expressed himself to this effect: he seems at any rate to have implied in his account of the happy man that he was not a *δυνάστης* (Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 13 sqq.). Isocrates had said in his Letter to the Sons of Jason (§ 11), *ἐμοὶ γὰρ αἱρετώτερος ὁ βίος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βελτίων ὁ τῶν ἰδιωτευόντων ἢ ὁ τῶν τυραννούντων, καὶ τὰς τιμὰς ἡδίους ἡγοῦμαι τὰς ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ τὰς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις*: compare the spurious Fourth Philippic ascribed to Demosthenes, c. 70. As Eaton points out, Plato had already made Thrasymachus in Rep. 344 A sqq. speak of *τυραννὶς* as *ἡ τελεωτάτη ἀδικία*: cp. also Gorg. 478 E, Polyb. 2. 59. 6, *αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὔνομα* (of tyrant) *περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν, καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας*, and Paus. 8. 27. 11, *τούτῳ τῷ Ἀριστοδήμῳ καὶ τυραννοῦντι ἐξεγένετο ὅμως ἐπικληθῆναι Χρηστῷ*, and 8. 36. 5. In *μετ' ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης* ('accompanied with injustice of the very greatest kind') *τινός* lends emphasis: cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 3. 12, *ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὡς δεινήν τινα λέγεις δύναμιν τοῦ φιλήματος εἶναι* ('how very terrible'), and Soph. O. C. 560, and see Liddell and Scott, s.v. *τις* A. ii. 8.

**37. πολιτικῶς δέ**, i.e. if rule is exercised as it should be exercised over men free and equal (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.: 1. 7. 1255 b 20).

**38. ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ**, and so not to be productive of *τὸ ἄριστα πράττειν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως* (24). As to *ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν* see above on 1266 a 27. *Τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ*, in contrast to *ἡ ἐκτὸς εὐημερία* (health, food, etc.), Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1178 b 33 sqq.

τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. As Bonitz points out (Ind. 247 b 23), ἐξ ἐναντίας takes a dative in Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 31.

39. μόνον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This was the view of Gorgias as expressed by Meno in Plato, Meno 71 E, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν (and perhaps also of Prodicus and Protagoras, Rep. 600 C sq.): compare what Socrates says to Callicles, the friend of Gorgias, in Gorg. 500 C, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, and what Callicles himself says in Gorg. 485 D of one who continues to study philosophy after he has ceased to be young, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυὴς ᾖ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι κ.τ.λ., and Hipp. Maj. 281 B sq. Gorgias formed himself (Hipp. Maj. 282 B) and his disciples (Xen. Anab. 2. 6. 16) on this model; his ideal of human life stood in the strongest possible contrast to that of Anaxagoras. Nowhere can it have found more sympathy than at Athens (cp. Thuc. 2. 40). The added remark (c. 3. 1325 a 21 sqq.), ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηδὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταὐτόν, may also be due to Gorgias. In 2. 2. 1261 b 1 (cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.) Aristotle leaves the question open whether ruling is a good thing or not.

40. ἐφ' ἑκάστης γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This was not the general view: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 6, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. Aristotle, however, seems to have said, if the προτρεπτικός ascribed to him was really his, that Kings were favourably circumstanced for philosophizing (Fragm. 47. 1483 a 41 sqq.): compare the view of Marcus Aurelius (Comm. 11. 7), and contrast Plut. Ad Princ. Inerud. c. 5, where Plutarch suspects that Alexander was half inclined to regard his own splendour and power ὡς κώλυσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀσχολίαν. For ἐπί with the gen. in the sense of 'in respect of,' cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 17, and Plato, Rep. 460 A, ὥστε τὸν φαῦλον ἐκεῖνον αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐφ' ἑκάστης συνέρξεως τύχην.

1324 b. 2. οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ. By 'the despotic and tyrannical form of the constitution' Aristotle means a form of constitution devised πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν τῶν πέλας. No notice is taken of those who praised the life of the tyrant, probably because no one would claim

that the tyrant was alone happy. For *τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας*, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 11, *ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας*, and 2. 7. 1267 a 17, *ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας*. Thibron and other writers on the Lacedaemonian constitution are probably referred to (see c. 14. 1333 b 18 sqq.), for they seem to have called the Lacedaemonian State happy because it ruled over many, and to have ascribed its happiness to the framer of its constitution (1333 b 22 sq., 29 sqq.). Aristotle may have thought that Alexander needed warning on the subject (cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 13: Aristot. Fragm. 614. 1581 b 18 sqq.).

**3. παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and in some States this is the distinctive aim both of the constitution and of the laws, that the members of the State may exercise a despotic rule over others.' In the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, for instance, both constitution and laws were framed with this end in view (c. 14. 1333 b 5 sqq.). For *ὅρος τῆς πολιτείας* cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 10 sq. Compare also the use of *ὑπόθεσις* in 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 27 sqq.

**5. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις.** *Καί* = 'though': cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 2, *Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ οὐ μεταλαβόντες τούτου τοῦ χρυσίου ὅμως πρόθυμοι ἦσαν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον*, and see Liddell and Scott s.v. *καί* B. ii. 4.

*νομίμων* = *νόμων*: cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 42 and 1269 a 1, and see Bon. Ind. s. v. *νόμιμος*.

**6. εἴ πού τι πρὸς ἓν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι**, cp. Plato, Laws 963 A, *πρὸς γὰρ ἓν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ἀεὶ πάνθ' ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν νόμων βλέποντ' εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἀρετήν που ξυνεχωροῦμεν πάνυ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι.*

**7. ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ.** The same thing is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq. and of Lacedaemon in 2. 9. 1271 b 2 sqq.: cp. also 1325 a 3, and Plato, Laws 626 A, *καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρήσεις οὕτω σκοπῶν τὸν Κρητῶν νομοθέτην, ὡς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἅπαντα δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τὰ νόμιμα ἡμῖν ἀποβλέπων συνετάξατο.* We should hardly have guessed that this was so from the part of the Code of Gortyna which has come down to us, but the account of Cretan institutions given in Strab. p. 480 on the authority of Ephorus so far bears out the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, that it represents the development of courage in the young citizens to have been one main aim of the constitution. Plutarch probably has similar charges before him when in Lycurg. c. 31 and Ages. c. 33 he tries to make out that the aim of Lycurgus was very much that which Plato and Aristotle said that it ought to have been (see above on 1324 a 5). For *ἥ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος*, cp. c. 14. 1333 b 9, *τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν*. For *τὸ*

τῶν νόμων πλῆθος, 'most of the laws,' Bonitz (Ind. 603 b 17 sqq.) compares 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 31, 32 and 2. 5. 1264 a 13.

**9.** ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further in all the non-Greek nations that are capable of winning at the expense of others warlike prowess is honoured.' Aristotle has before him Hdt. 2. 167, ὀρέων καὶ Θρᾴκας καὶ Σκύθας καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Λυδοὺς (he substitutes the Celts for the Lydians) καὶ σχεδὸν πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀποτιμοτέρους τῶν ἄλλων ἡγημένους πολιητέων τοὺς τὰς τέχνας μανθάνοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους τούτων· τοὺς δὲ ἀπαλλαγμένους τῶν χειρωναξιέων γενναίους νομιζομένους εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνειμένους· μεμαθήκασι δ' ὦν τοῦτο πάντες οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι, where there is a transition from the barbarians to the Lacedaemonians, just as in the passage before us there is a transition from the Lacedaemonians to the barbarians. He probably also has before him Plato, Laws 637 D, πότερον, ὥσπερ Σκύθαι χρῶνται καὶ Πέρσαι, χρηστέον, καὶ ἔτι Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Κελτοὶ καὶ Ἴβηρες καὶ Θρᾷκες, πολεμικὰ ξύμπαντα ὄντα ταῦτα γένη, ἢ καθάπερ ὑμεῖς (i. e. the Lacedaemonians and Cretans), and perhaps Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 10. Cp. also Isocr. Paneg. § 67, ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχικώτατα μὲν τῶν γενῶν καὶ μεγίστας δυναστείας ἔχοντα Σκύθαι καὶ Θρᾷκες καὶ Πέρσαι. The phrase τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν recurs in 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 4, where οἱ κρατοῦντες takes its place in the next line: cp. Demosth. De Chers. c. 42, ἐστὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες. No doubt among the barbarians of Europe in Aristotle's day, as among those of Africa in our own, there were raiding and raided races. Ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, i. e. ἡ πολεμικὴ δύναμις, referring to πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους, 8 (cp. τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, 13). Thus πολέμου is emphatic in 16 and 18, and τῶν πολεμίων in 20. For the perfect τετίμηται see above on 1280 a 16, διῄρηται, and see Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, ἀναπέπταται.

**12.** καὶ νόμοι τινές εἰσι, 'laws also' providing for the giving of honours, as well as honours. The honours might be given apart from any provisions of law.

**13.** καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance at Carthage men receive, we are told, their decoration composed of armlets with as many armlets as they have served campaigns.' Coray would read ἐκ τοσούτων κρίκων, but Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 34) rightly disapproves of this attempt to secure a more exact correspondence between antecedent and relative. I translate κρίκων 'armlets,' not 'rings,' for the κρίκος which Demosthenes wore was not a ring but an armlet (Plut. Demosth. c. 30, Ἐρατοσθένης δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν κρίκῳ

φησὶ κοίλῳ τὸ φάρμακον φυλάσσειν· τὸν δὲ κρίκον εἶναι τοῦτον αὐτῷ φόρημα περιβραχιόνιον: cp. Dec. Orat. Vit. Demosth. 847 B), and those worn by Carthaginian soldiers may well have been so too. Compare the armillae given to Roman soldiers for brilliant feats of arms (Liv. 10. 44: Guhl and Koner, Life of the Greeks and Romans, Eng. Trans. p. 586). We hear very little of similar rewards for gallant service in Greece. It was with land that Pittacus was rewarded for slaying his antagonist Phrynon (Plut. De Herod. Malign. c. 15). It was not by rewards given to the brave but by the education of youth that the Lacedaemonians and Cretans developed military prowess in their citizens. The Carthaginian custom may have been derived from the Libyans around them (cp. Hdt. 4. 176), or possibly from Egypt (Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. 3. 201, p. 168. 25 sqq. Bekker). It seems likely from the passage before us that the decoration of κρίκοι was confined to citizens of Carthage and was intended to induce them to serve in war and not to leave military service to mercenaries.

15. ἦν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and there was at one time a law in Macedon also that he who had slain no foeman should be girded with his halter (instead of a belt).' A man girded with a halter would cut a sorry figure beside one girded with a handsome belt adorned with metal, and possibly golden, buckles (Guhl and Koner, Eng. Trans. p. 235). Among the Cappadocians to wear a belt meant to be an officer (Anth. Pal. 11. 238: Liddell and Scott s. v. ζώνη). Compare the Macedonian custom mentioned by Hegesander, quoted in Athen. Deipn. 18 a, Ἡγήσανδρος δέ φησιν οὐδὲ ἔθος εἶναι ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ κατακλίνεσθαί τινα ἐν δείπνῳ, εἰ μή τις ἔξω λίνων ὢν κεντήσειεν· ἕως δὲ τότε καθήμενοι ἐδείπνουν, where we read that Cassander, though a brave man and a skilful hunter, had not been able to fulfil this requirement at the age of thirty-five and still sat at dinner. A closer parallel may be found in the iron ring worn by many of the Chatti till they had slain an enemy in war (Tac. Germ. c. 31, et aliis Germanorum populis usurpatum raro et privata cuiusque audentia apud Chattos in consensum vertit, ut primum adoleverint, crinem barbamque submittere, nec, nisi hoste caeso, exuere votivum obligatumque virtuti oris habitum . . . Fortissimus quisque ferreum insuper anulum (ignominiosum id genti) velut vinculum gestat, donec se caede hostis absolvat. Plurimis Chattorum hic placet habitus). Similar customs are traceable among the Sauromatae (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 122: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 460). 'It is a rule

among all the tribes' [of the head-hunting Malays of Borneo] 'that no youth can regularly wear a mandau (sword) or be married or associate with the opposite sex, till he has been on one or more head-hunting expeditions. A mandau is presented to him probably at his birth or when he receives a name, but not till he has washed it in the blood of an enemy can he presume to carry it as part of his every-day equipment' (Bock, Head-hunters of Borneo, p. 216). Under Cetewayo, a Zulu who had not 'washed his spear,' that is, who had not killed an enemy, could not marry. We light on a more genial form of the same custom in the island of Skye. 'In Dunvegan Castle is kept an ox's horn, hollowed so as to hold perhaps two quarts' (of what liquid?) 'which the heir of Macleod was expected to swallow at one draught as a test of his manhood, before he was permitted to bear arms or could claim a seat among the men' (Dr. Johnson's Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Works, 8. 289).

17. ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις κ.τ.λ. Now we pass from laws to customs (cp. 22). The result is attained by law at Carthage and in Macedon, by custom among the Scythians and Iberians. Eaton compares Hdt. 4. 66, where however there is no mention of the *σκύφος περιφερόμενος*, so that it is doubtful whether Aristotle derives his statement from this source. See however above on 1262 a 19, 1276 a 28, and 1284 a 26. The *σκύφος* was used by herdsmen and country people (Athen. Deipn. 498 f) and is quite in place among the Scythians: some, in fact, imagined an etymological connexion between *σκύφος* and Σκύθης (Athen. Deipn. 499 f). For *πίνειν σκύφον* Eaton compares Hom. Il. 8. 232,

*πίνοντες κρητῆρας ἐπιστεφέας οἴνοιο.*

18. ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἴβηρσι κ.τ.λ. Why have we *ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις* in 17, and *ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἴβηρσιν* here? Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 21, where see note. A similar custom existed among the Sindi, a Scythian race dwelling at the foot of the Caucasus on the East coast of the Euxine (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 121: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 460, *Σίνδοι τοσούτους ἴχθῦς ἐπὶ τοὺς τάφους ἐπιβάλλουσιν, ὅσους (ἂν) πολεμίων ὁ θαπτόμενος ἀπεκτονὼς ᾖ*). For *καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον*, cp. Thuc. 5. 11. 1, *περιέρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον* (with Arnold's note). The word *ὀβελίσκος* is usually explained here as meaning 'an obelisk,' but this use of it is rare, and if we explain it thus, we must suppose that a long pointed stone is referred to, for soldiers after a battle would not find it easy to set up real obelisks at the grave

of a comrade. It is possible that the word should be translated here 'a small spit.' This is its usual meaning, and every soldier had a small spit ready to hand (Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Apophth., Scipio Minor 16, 201 B). Spits might be thought likely to be useful to the dead man, like the fish thrown on the grave by the Sindi. I am glad to see since the foregoing words were written, that Dr. Jackson also translates *ὀβελίσκους* 'spits' (see his note in Sus.[4]). Professor Ridgeway (*Academy*, Aug. 29, 1885), rendering the word 'obelisk,' makes the interesting suggestion that the passage before us throws light on the original purpose of stone circles. I read in the *Athenaeum* for Dec. 14, 1895, that 'at Monte Pitti in the province of Pisa, near some remains of ancient walls, an Etruscan necropolis has been discovered, the tombs of which are enclosed in circles of rude stones.' See also Dr. Thurnam, Ancient British Barrows in *Archaeologia* 42, p. 211, quoted by Prof. Boyd Dawkins, Early Man in Britain, p. 285, and the remarks of Mr. Arthur Evans quoted by Prof. Windle, Life in Early Britain, p. 54 sq. We expect *διεφθαρκὼς ᾖ*, not *διαφθείρῃ*, for the destruction of the foe must necessarily precede the fixing of the *ὀβελίσκοι*, but compare the use of the present participle in 2. 8. 1268 a 8, *καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτώντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν*. The present is probably used in these passages because a thing occurring frequently is referred to. That the Iberians were a warlike race, had been remarked by Plato, Laws 637 D, and by Thucydides (6. 90, *Ἴβηρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμωτάτους*): compare the story told in Diod. 14. 75. 8 of their gallant behaviour when deserted by the Carthaginians. Aristotle mentions the fact, partly in confirmation of the statement in 10 that it is among warlike races that these customs prevail, partly because the Iberians were little known to the Greeks, though they had been mentioned by Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides. They must have become better known in Greece after their employment as mercenaries by Dionysius the Elder, and still more after the arrival in Greece of a contingent of Celtic and Iberian mercenaries sent by him in B.C. 369 to aid the Lacedaemonians against the Thebans (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 20). It is possible indeed that an Iberian belonging to this contingent may have been buried in Greece in the manner here described by Aristotle.

**20.** *καταπηγνύουσι*. The forms *πηγνύω*, *καταπηγνύω* are 'rare in classical authors' (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective,

s.v. *πήγνυμι*). We find *ἀπολλύουσι* in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 12 (in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 23 some MSS. have *ἀπολλύασι* and others *ἀπολλύουσι*). As to *δεικνύουσι* see Bon. Ind. 167 b 50 sqq., and cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 36. As to *ὀμνύουσι* see note on 1285 b 11.

**21. καὶ ἕτερα δὴ κ.τ.λ.** For *καὶ . . . δή*, see above on 1253 a 18. *Νόμοις κατειλημμένα*, 'ratified by laws,' cp. Plato, Laws 823 A, *τὰ ταῖς ζημίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα*, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 29, *κατειλημμένων δὲ τοῖς ἐθισμοῖς ἤδη τῶν κυριωτάτων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ*, and see Prof. J. C. Wilson on Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 16 sqq. in *Academy*, Feb. 18, 1888.

**24.** The suppressed nominative to **ἄρχῃ** is probably not *ὁ πολιτικός*, but *τις*: see as to this use of the third person singular Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

**26. πῶς γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ.** *Ἢ νομοθετικόν* is added to strengthen the argument, for it is still more difficult to suppose that what is not *νόμιμον* is *νομοθετικόν* than that it is *πολιτικόν*. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 12, *τά τε γὰρ ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν*, and Eurip. Ion 404 Bothe (442 Dind.),

> *πῶς οὖν δίκαιον τοὺς νόμους ὑμᾶς βροτοῖς*
> *γράψαντας αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ὀφλισκάνειν;*

**27. οὐ νόμιμον δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and it is not lawful to rule not only justly but unjustly, and it is possible to conquer [and so to acquire rule] unjustly as well as justly,' so that it is possible to rule over unwilling subjects unjustly. This is added because some held that Might is Right (1. 6. 1255 a 18). Conquering (*τὸ κρατεῖν*) is the first step to ruling over others (c. 14. 1333 b 30). *Οὐ νόμιμον δέ*, as always, like *οὐ καλῶς δ' ἔχει* (c. 7. 1328 a 8), *οὐ ῥᾴδιον δέ* (c. 10. 1330 a 6), *οὐκ ἔστι δέ* (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 9), *οὐκ ἐμπίπτει δέ* (6 (4). 16. 1300 b 34), etc.

**29. τοῦτο**, i. e. that it is the function of the master of the art to rule over unwilling, no less than willing, subjects.

**30. τὸ ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι**, which are the characteristics of rule over the unwilling, for they are the characteristics of despotic rule: cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, *τὰς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πλεονεξίας ἁπάσας (αἱ μοναρχίαι) περιειλήφασιν· καὶ γὰρ παρασκευάσασθαι δυνάμεις καὶ χρήσασθαι ταύταις, ὥστε καὶ λαθεῖν καὶ ὀφθῆναι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πεῖσαι, τοὺς δὲ βιάσασθαι . . . μᾶλλον αἱ τυραννίδες τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν οἷαί τ' εἰσίν.* Plato contemplates the use of persuasion and force by the physician in Laws 720 D and Polit. 296 B (cp. Gorg. 456 B), but perhaps

he would not dispute what Aristotle here says, that the function of the physician, *qua* physician, is not to persuade or coerce, but to heal (cp. Rep. 488, esp. D–E). Cp. also Athen. Deipn. 427 f sq.

**32.** ἀλλ' ἐοίκασι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 91, *ὧν ἀμελήσαντες οἱ γενόμενοι μετ' ἐκείνους οὐκ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τυραννεῖν ἐπεθύμησαν, ἃ δοκεῖ μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν δύναμιν, πλεῖστον δ' ἀλλήλων κεχώρισται.*

**33.** καὶ ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, the antecedent to *ὅπερ*, = *τὸ ἄρχειν μὴ βουλομένων*, or *τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν*. Cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 41 sqq.

**36.** ἄτοπον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 37, *ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστόν*, and 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. Thus Aristotle urged Alexander to rule the Greeks *ἡγεμονικῶς* and the barbarians only *δεσποτικῶς* (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.), perhaps remembering the advice of Isocrates to Philip (Philip. § 154, *φημὶ γὰρ χρῆναί σε τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας εὐεργετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεύειν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλείστων ἄρχειν*).

**40.** ἔστι δὲ θηρευτόν, sc. *πρὸς τοῦτο*, i.e. *ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυσίαν*, for as a rule only animals fit to be eaten were offered in sacrifice, though it is true that dogs were sacrificed to Hecatê and that some other exceptions to the rule occur (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 26).

**41.** ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt has before him the State sketched in the Laws of Plato (704 C, ΑΘ. *γείτων δὲ αὐτῆς πόλις ἆρ' ἔσται τις πλησίον;* ΚΛ. *οὐ πάνυ· διὸ καὶ κατοικίζεται· παλαιὰ γάρ τις ἐξοίκησις ἐν τῷ τόπῳ γενομένη τὴν χώραν ταύτην ἔρημον ἀπείργασται χρόνου ἀμήχανον ὅσον*). The Islands of the Blest (to which Aristotle playfully compares his best State in c. 15. 1334 a 28 sqq.) lay far away from men: cp. Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 167,

> *τοῖς δὲ δίχ' ἀνθρώπων βίοτον καὶ ἤθε' ὀπάσσας*
> *Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατένασσε πατὴρ ἐς πείρατα γαίης.*

It was a situation of this kind that the Phaeacians were taught by experience to seek out: cp. Hom. Odyss. 6. 2,

> *αὐτὰρ Ἀθήνη*
> *βῆ ῥ' ἐς Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν δῆμόν τε πόλιν τε,*
> *οἳ πρὶν μέν ποτ' ἔναιον ἐν εὐρυχόρῳ Ὑπερείῃ,*
> *ἀγχοῦ Κυκλώπων, ἀνδρῶν ὑπερηνορεόντων,*
> *οἳ σφέας σινέσκοντο βίῃφι δὲ φέρτεροι ἦσαν.*
> *ἔνθεν ἀναστήσας ἄγε Ναυσίθοος θεοειδής,*
> *εἶσεν δ' ἐν Σχερίῃ, ἑκὰς ἀνδρῶν ἀλφηστάων.*

**4.** ἔσται. For the future cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 18, 2. 8. 1267 b 1325 a. 34 sqq., etc.

**5.** τοιοῦτον, i.e. *πολέμιον*.

δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'it is evident, then, that while all cares and studies with a view to war are to be considered noble, they are not to be so considered as being the highest end of all, but as existing for the sake of that end.' That they are not the highest end of all, or in other words that they do not constitute happiness, is evident because happiness is attainable by States in which they are not practised, and also because they are not the *ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ* (1324 b 22 sqq.), whose end is to produce happiness. There were probably those who regarded 'cares and studies with a view to war' as the highest end of all; thus an admirer of the Lacedaemonians claims in Isocr. Panath. § 202 that gratitude is due to them, *ὅτι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων εὑρόντες αὐτοί τε χρῶνται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατέδειξαν*, and explains in § 217 that he refers to *τὰ γυμνάσια τἀκεῖ καθεστῶτα καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν τῆς ἀνδρίας καὶ τὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συνόλως τὴν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμέλειαν*. As to δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι see critical note.

7. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου κ.τ.λ., 'and the good lawgiver's business is to see with respect to a State and a race of men and every other association how they are to share [not in conquest, but] in good life and the measure of happiness attainable by them.' Cp. Plato, Laws 631 B, where happiness is implied to be the end of laws, and Rep. 521 A, *οἱ τῷ ὄντι πλούσιοι, οὐ χρυσίου, ἀλλ' οὗ δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἔμφρονος*. *Γένος* = *ἔθνος*, as in 2. 9. 1269 b 25 sq. (cp. Plato, Gorg. 483 D, *τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν*). Aristotle keeps both *πόλεις* and *ἔθνη* in view here, because he has had both in view in his criticisms (1324 b 3 sqq.). It should be noticed that he regards the *ἔθνος* as a kind of *κοινωνία*. *Ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς* is emphasized by its position in the sentence: cp. Plato, Rep. 413 C, *τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέον*.

10. διοίσει μέντοι κ.τ.λ., i.e. though this will always be the end at which he aims, the laws by which he seeks to attain it will differ according as his State has neighbours or not. If it has no neighbours, his laws will be less directed to the encouragement of military prowess than in the contrary case. For *τῶν ταττομένων ἕνα νομίμων* cp. Plato, Laws 743 E, *τῶν προσταττομένων αὐτόθι νόμων*.

11. καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., 'and it is the province of the legislative art, if the State has neighbours, to consider this, [not how to subjugate them all indiscriminately, but] what sort of studies should be practised in relation to each sort of neighbour, or how the State is to adopt the measures which are appropriate in relation to each of

its neighbours.' Τῆς νομοθετικῆς takes up τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου. Πρὸς ποίους and πρὸς ἑκάστους are emphatic. The lawgiver should not lay down one indiscriminating rule, as the Lacedaemonian lawgiver had done, but rather a rule varying according to the character of the neighbours with whom the State has to deal. Ποῖα means πολεμικὰ ἢ εἰρηνικά. We may infer from c. 14. 1333 b 38 sqq. that the lawgiver will teach his State to practise military studies in relation to aggressive neighbours or neighbours who deserve to be enslaved, but not in relation to others. Πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἑκάστους χρηστέον is a wider inquiry than ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον, and includes the whole subject of the action of the State in relation to its neighbours both in peace and in war, which of them should be ruled ἡγεμονικῶς and which δεσποτικῶς, how war should be waged with them, if they are Greeks (cp. Plato, Rep. 471 A sqq.), and other questions of the same kind. Aristotle evidently does not agree with Isocrates when he says that laws affect only the internal organization of States, and not their mutual relations (De Antid. § 79: see vol. i. p. 552).

**14.** ὕστερον, in c. 13. 1331 b 26 sqq. and c. 14. 1333 a 11 sqq.

**19.** τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, so termed, as we see from 3. 6. 1279 a 8 (where see note), in contrast to the ἀρχαί of the head of a household, a ship-captain, or a training-master, and the like, and also to priesthoods (6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18). C. 3.

τε should follow not τόν, but ἕτερον: for other instances of its displacement see Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq. and above on 1259 a 13.

τοῦ ἐλευθέρου, cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν (i.e. Empedocles) καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλεύθερον γεγονέναι καὶ πίσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριον, εἴ γε τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῷ διδομένην παρῃτήσατο, καθάπερ Σάνθος ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγει, τὴν λιτότητα δηλονότι πλέον ἀγαπήσας: Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted above on 1324 a 27), Ἀναξαγόραν . . . τὴν θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν: Plut. De Exil. c. 12, οὕτω τῆς φιγῆς πρὸς ἓν μέρος τὸ ἄδοξον ἐντεινόμενοι παρορῶμεν τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην καὶ τὴν σχολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

**20.** With τοῦ πολιτικοῦ supply βίου, as with τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ in 24.

**21.** οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον, sc. εἶναι νομίζουσιν.

ἀδύνατον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Gorgias may probably have used this argument. Aristotle is of the same opinion: cp. 1325 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 32 sqq.

**22.** τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν κ.τ.λ., so that one who does nothing cannot be happy. Cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 5, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις·

εὐπραξία γάρ, and Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 14, where εὐδαιμονία is said to be often defined as εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς.

**24.** οἱ μὲν ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Τοῦ ἐλευθέρου = the man who avoids political offices. Cp. Isocr. Epist. 6. § 11, ἐμοὶ γὰρ αἱρετώτερος ὁ βίος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βελτίων ὁ τῶν ἰδιωτευόντων ἢ ὁ τῶν τυραννευόντων, a proposition in favour of which Xenophon often makes Hiero argue (e.g. in Hiero 1. 2, 7 sqq.).

**25.** οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἡ ἐπίταξις ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων is implied to be the function of ὁ δεσποτικός (cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 33 sqq.: 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq.).

**27.** τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν κ.τ.λ. It is apparently implied that those who rejected political office regarded all rule as despotic, yet in c. 2. 1324 a 35 sqq. they are said to have distinguished between despotic and constitutional rule.

**28.** οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1333 b 27 sq.

**30.** ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, in 1. 7. 1255 b 16 sqq. This reference to the πρῶτοι λόγοι might well be taken to show that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books do not fall within them, were it not that a similar reference occurs in 3. 6. 1278 b 17 sq., a chapter which certainly seems to form part of the πρῶτοι λόγοι (see vol. ii. p. xxi).

**32.** ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further the actions of the just and temperate have in them the perfect realization of many things that are noble': cp. Plato, Tim. 90 D, ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου, and Epinomis 985 A, θεὸν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν τέλος ἔχοντα τῆς θείας μοίρας ἔξω τούτων εἶναι, λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς. Πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν stands in contrast to οὐδενὸς μετέχει τῶν καλῶν (26).

**34.** καίτοι τάχ' ἄν κ.τ.λ. The tyrant Jason is here alluded to (see vol. i. p. 237, note 1). A saying of his is mentioned in Rhet. 1. 12. 1373 a 25 (cp. Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 24 and De Sanitate Tuenda, c. 22), δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν, which no doubt referred to the acquisition of a tyranny. Jason was a great admirer of Gorgias (Paus. 6. 17. 9), and it is possible that Gorgias' praises of the practical and political life may have influenced him. Be that as it may, Aristotle evidently fears that his own identification of εὐδαιμονία with τὸ εὖ πράττειν (for this is what he means by τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων, cp. 1325 b 14 sq.) may lead some one to the same conclusion as Jason, but he hastens to explain that absolute power does not bring with it τὸ εὖ πράττειν, except in the hands of one who is as superior to those he rules as

a master is to his slaves (1325 b 3 sqq.). Aristotle does not dispute that political power makes it easier to do noble things (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 32 sqq.), but then political power must not be out of proportion to the worth of its possessor.

**36.** πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων... πράξεων. This takes up πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, 32.

ὥστε οὐ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Susemihl reads *e conj.* δεῖν for δεῖ, but cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 5, where the *indirecta oratio* is similarly abandoned, though Aristotle is describing the views of others. In the Phoenissae of Euripides Eteocles, who has deprived his brother Polyneices of his share of the Kingship, or Tyranny, of Thebes, refuses to give up the Tyranny to him, and Aristotle no doubt has his famous speech in his memory. He says (470 sqq. Bothe, 504 sqq. Dindorf),

> ἄστρων ἂν ἦλθον' ἡλίου πρὸς ἀντολὰς
> καὶ γῆς ἔνερθε, δυνατὸς ὢν δρᾶσαι τάδε,
> τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὥστ' ἔχειν τυραννίδα.
> τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ χρηστόν, μῆτερ, οὐχὶ βούλομαι
> ἄλλῳ παρεῖναι μᾶλλον ἢ σώζειν ἐμοί.

**38.** καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων κ.τ.λ. This reads as if Aristotle were quoting from some solemn covenant for the establishment of a tyranny: compare the oath taken in support of Drusus in Diod. 37. 11, τὸν αὐτὸν φίλον καὶ πολέμιον ἡγήσεσθαι Δρούσῳ, καὶ μήτε βίου μήτε τέκνων καὶ γονέων μηδεμιᾶς φείσεσθαι ψυχῆς, ἐὰν (μὴ) συμφέρῃ Δρούσῳ τε καὶ τοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον ὀμόσασιν. Polybius (7. 8. 9) dwells with emphasis, and perhaps with a little surprise, on the loyalty of Gelon to his father Hiero II, tyrant of Syracuse.

**39.** ὅλως, 'broadly,' not only fathers and children (who are one kind of friends), but friends of all sorts.

As to ὑπολογίζειν see critical note.

πρὸς τοῦτο, 'in comparison with this': cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 8. 1108b 16, αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν.

**1.** τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἱρετώτατον, i.e. τὸ εὖ πράττειν. Isocrates had 1325 b.
called τυραννίς in Evag. § 40 τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὄντων and τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγιστον καὶ σεμνότατον καὶ περιμαχητότατον.

**2.** ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεῦδος, 'in assuming this as the foundation of their argument they assume what is false.'

**3.** οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ. The reply of the Chorus to the speech of

Eteocles referred to above on 1325 a 36 (Eurip. Phoeniss. 492 sq. Bothe: 526 sq. Dind.) is perhaps present to Aristotle's memory:

> *οὐκ εὖ λέγειν χρὴ μὴ 'πὶ τοῖς ἔργοις καλοῖς·*
> *οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τοῦτ', ἀλλὰ τῇ δίκῃ πικρόν.*

Compare also the remark of Plato to Dionysius the Elder quoted above on 1288 a 4, Hdt. 3. 142, and Eurip. Fragm. 172.

**7. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sqq. *Τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον* is an expression which frequently recurs: cp. Plato, Gorg. 484 A, *ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον*, and Laws 854 C, *ὡς δεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια πάντα ἄνδρα τιμᾶν.*

**10. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις κ.τ.λ.** This takes up and corrects 1325 a 36 sqq. Aristotle perhaps remembers the saying of Aristides when he surrendered his day of command at Marathon to Miltiades (Plut. Aristid. c. 5, *καὶ παρ' ἡμέραν ἑκάστου στρατηγοῦ τὸ κράτος ἔχοντος, ὡς περιῆλθεν εἰς αὐτὸν ἡ ἀρχή, παρέδωκε Μιλτιάδῃ διδάσκων τοὺς συνάρχοντας ὅτι τὸ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνόν ἐστι καὶ σωτήριον*). Aristides behaved in just the same way to Themistocles also, serving under him willingly and accepting the second place in the State (Plut. Aristid. c. 8: Aristid. et Cat. inter se comp. c. 5).

**κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων**, 'in virtue and in the power which is capable of effecting the best things': cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 31, *πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν*. Some take *τῶν ἀρίστων* after *κρείττων* and as masc., 'superior to the best men,' but not, I think, rightly. For *ἀρετὴ καὶ δύναμις* see above on 1284 a 6. The repetition of *κατά* may be for the sake of emphasis (*κατά* is not repeated in 3. 13. 1284 a 9, *ἄνισοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν*). That Aristotle attaches importance to the presence of both qualifications is evident from 12 sqq. Compare the effect of the repetition of prepositions in 3. 11. 1281 b 15, *περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος*, and in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 4, *οἷον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἴστρῳ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι συμβέβηκεν.*

**11.** For the repetition of **τούτῳ** see notes on 1317 b 5 and 1284 b 28.

**12. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'but [if a man is to be followed and obeyed as a sovereign,] he should possess,' etc. So in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. Aristotle requires of those who are to hold the more important magistracies that they shall possess not only virtue, but *δύναμις μεγίστη τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς* and attachment to the

existing constitution. Compare Callicles' description of *οἱ κρείττους* in Plato, Gorg. 491 A sq.

**15. εὐπραγίαν.** Aristotle uses both *εὐπραγία* and *εὐπραξία*: 'in Attic prose *εὐπραγία* was preferred' (Liddell and Scott).

**16. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.** Two separate assertions are here made—(1) that activity is not necessarily in relation to others, and (2) that it is not necessarily a means to something else, but that thoughts which are an end in themselves may be of an active type. The first of these two assertions does not seem to be quite in harmony with the spirit at any rate of Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 30 sqq., but still we gather from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 31 sqq. that there is an use of virtue not *πρὸς ἕτερον* but *καθ' αὑτόν* (*τελεία δ' ἐστίν* (sc. *ἡ ὅλη δικαιοσύνη*), *ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὑτόν*). The second of them clearly conflicts with De An. 1. 3. 407 a 23, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοήσεων ἔστι πέρατα* (*πᾶσαι γὰρ ἑτέρου χάριν*), *αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως ὁρίζονται*. But Zeller has already remarked (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 368. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 400, note 1) that Aristotle sometimes uses the word *πρᾶξις* in the Nicomachean Ethics in a wider sense than usual, and includes even pure thought under it—e. g. in Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 b 24, *ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται*, where he must refer in *ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις* to contemplative activity.

**17. καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες.** Aristotle probably refers to the persons whose opinion is stated in 1325 a 21 sqq., for they appear to have held that a man who lives a contemplative life does nothing and is not *πρακτικός*. Epaminondas was regarded at the outset of his career as *ἀπράγμων* because he was a philosopher, and was consequently despised (Plut. Pelop. c. 5).

**18.** For the severance of *ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν* from *τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν*, on which it depends, compare c. 4. 1326 b 8, *ὃ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν*, where *κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν* is similarly severed from *πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*. As here *πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, so in the passage before us *τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν* is emphasized by its position in the sentence. Cp. also Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 179, *τὰ ἐξενεγχθέντα ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἱερὰ ἀγάλματα ὑπὸ τῶν Περσῶν*.

**20. θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις,** cp. c. 2. 1324 a 19, *τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας*.

**21. ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία κ.τ.λ.,** 'for doing well is the end, and there-

fore there is a kind of action which is the end, [so that there is nothing strange in thoughts which are an end in themselves being active,] and we predicate action also [as well as thought] in the truest and fullest sense, even in the case of actions done in relation to others, of those who as master-agents direct action by their thoughts, [and whose thoughts are therefore more an end in themselves than those of the journeymen they direct].' Τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων is in the gen. after ἀρχιτέκτονας. For καὶ πράττειν (i. e. πράττειν as well as διανοεῖσθαι), see above on 1255 a 14, καὶ βιάζεσθαι. That the thoughts of a master-agent are more an end in themselves than those of a subordinate, we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 14, ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ (ταῖς τέχναις) τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται. In 21–23 Aristotle corrects Plato, who in Polit. 259 C, E had identified πρακτικοί with χειροτεχνικοί, and had said that the ἀρχιτέκτων is γνωστικός, not πρακτικός (ΞΕ. τῆς δὴ γνωστικῆς μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς χειροτεχνικῆς καὶ ὅλως πρακτικῆς βούλει τὸν βασιλέα φῶμεν οἰκειότερον εἶναι; and ΞΕ. καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικός, ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί. ΞΕ. παρεχόμενός γέ που γνῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ χειρουργίαν. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὕτω. ΞΕ. δικαίως δὴ μετέχειν ἂν λέγοιτο τῆς γνωστικῆς ἐπιστήμης). In Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 24 sqq., however, the word πρακτικός is used in the narrower sense in which Plato had used it in the Politicus, for here ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις is marked off from another kind which is said to be πρακτική (cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 6. 1217 a 6, τῶν μήτ' ἐχόντων μήτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν ἢ πρακτικήν). For ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξίς τις, cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 5, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις· εὐπραξία γάρ, and De An. 3. 2. 426 a 27, εἰ δ' ἡ συμφωνία φωνή τίς ἐστιν.

**23.** ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle, after proving the second of the two assertions contained in 16 sqq. (οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας κ.τ.λ.), takes up and proves the first of them (τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους). States situated by themselves have already been said not to be necessarily unhappy (c. 2. 1324 b 41 sqq.), and now they are shown not to be necessarily inactive.

**25.** οὕτω, i. e. καθ' αὑτάς and not πρὸς ἑτέρους.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for this also [as well as other things] can take place by sections [and not alone between whole States].' Τοῦτο = τὸ πράττειν. For καὶ τοῦτο cp. c. 4. 1326 a 13, καὶ πόλεως. For κατὰ μέρη cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 27 sqq. Among the 'other things' referred to rule would be included, for it was a familiar fact

that rule might be exercised by successive sections of the citizen-body (1325 b 7 sq.).

**26.** πολλαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is implied that, if there are κοινωνίαι ('relations') between the parts of the State, activity will exist. We may suppose that when the parts of the State have relations with each other, inter-action results or co-operative action or both. What is meant here by the expression 'the parts of the State'? Among the parts referred to are probably rulers and ruled: cp. c. 4. 1326 b 12, εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων, and c. 14. 1332 b 12, ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων.

**27.** ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο = τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀπρακτεῖν τὸν ζῆν καθ' αὑτὸν προῃρημένον. For ὑπάρχειν κατά τινος, cp. De Interp. 3. 16 b 13 and Anal. Pr. 2. 22. 67 b 28.

**28.** σχολῇ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for otherwise God and the whole universe [could hardly be active, and so] could hardly be well circumstanced [which all agree that they are], seeing that they have no actions external to them over and above their internal actions.' That God is well circumstanced we see from De Caelo, 2. 12. 292 a 22, ἔοικε γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἄριστα ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ἄνευ πράξεως. The universe consists according to Aristotle of concentric spheres with the earth in the centre (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 447 sqq.: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 487 sqq.), and God, who is an incorporeal being distinct from the universe, is outside its outermost sphere, so far as an incorporeal being can be said to be in any particular place. He is the First Mover of the universe, but he moves it passively, as the object of love (Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 b 3, κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον); he does not act upon it otherwise. Action is not to be predicated of him (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 8 sqq.: De Caelo, 2. 12. 292 a 22 sq., quoted above); at least not action in the ordinary sense of the word, for it would be beneath him; his only activity is thought, and as his thought must be exercised on what is best, it must be exercised on himself (Metaph. Λ. 9. 1074 b 33, αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις). Acts of thought exercised by God on himself, therefore, are the οἰκεῖαι πράξεις ascribed to God in the passage before us. But if God has no ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις, neither has the universe, for in Aristotle's view there is but one universe in existence (De Caelo, 1. 8. 276 a 18 sqq.: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 446 sq.—Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 485 sq.); there is nothing corporeal outside the universe,

and therefore nothing on which it can act. Plutarch maintains the opposite view, arguing for a plurality of worlds, in De Defect. Orac. c. 24, *εἰσὶν οὖν ἐκτὸς ἕτεροι θεοὶ καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὓς χρῆται (ὁ θεὸς) ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς ἀρεταῖς, οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρῆσίς ἐστι δικαιοσύνης ἢ χάριτος ἢ χρηστότητος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλους.* For *ὁ θεὸς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος* cp. Plato, Laws 821 A, *τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον.* For the contrast here of *οἰκεῖος* and *ἐξωτερικός* cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 33, where *ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις* stands in opposition to *ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον*: cp. also Plato, Rep. 521 A, *οἰκεῖος ὢν καὶ ἔνδον ὁ τοιοῦτος πόλεμος.*

**32. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,** = *τοῖς πολίταις*, cp. c. 4. 1326 a 6, where *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* corresponds to *πολιτῶν*, c. 4. 1325 b 40, and also Isocr. Archid. § 81, *οὐ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, and Thuc. 6. 18. 7.

C. 4. **33. περὶ αὐτῶν,** cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 2, *πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.*

**34. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας κ.τ.λ.** This would seem to refer to the contents of the Second Book: cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 29, *δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολιτείας.*

**37. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 39, *νῦν δ' οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ δεομένην πολλῆς χορηγίας ζητοῦσι μόνον.*

**38. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.** See above on 1265 a 17, where the same remark occurs. We read in Plato, Rep. 456 C, *οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὅμοια ἐνομοθετοῦμεν*, and in Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 68, *εἰ γὰρ αὖ καλῶς μὲν ἔχοι, μὴ δυνατὸν δέ τι φράζοι, εὐχῆς, οὐ νόμου, διαπράττοιτ' ἂν ἔργον*, and these passages agree with that before us in implying that men often pray for impossibilities: yet *εὔχου δυνατά* is one of the Precepts ascribed to the Seven Wise Men in the Collection of Sosiades (Stob. Floril. 3. 80: Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 217). *Προϋποτεθεῖσθαι* is middle; the perfects *τέθειμαι, ἐντέθειμαι* are used more commonly in a middle than in a passive sense (see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, pp. 635, 636). The reason of this is, as Richards points out, that *κεῖσθαι* is used in their place to express the passive.

**39. λέγω δὲ οἷον περί τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας,** sc. *δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον.* Plato, who begins the construction of his State in the Laws (737 C sqq.) with arrangements respecting these matters, had in Aristotle's opinion (2. 6. 1265 a 10 sqq.) fixed the number of the citizens at an impossibly high figure.

**40.** ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 709 C sq. (which Aristotle probably has before him), and Xen. Hipparch. 6. 1, *ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν τις δύναιτο πλάσαι οἷον βούλεται, εἰ μὴ ἐξ ὧν γε πλάττοιτο παρεσκευασμένα εἴη ὡς πείθεσθαι τῇ τοῦ χειροτέχνου γνώμῃ· οὐδέ γ' ἂν ἐξ ἀνδρῶν, εἰ μὴ σὺν θεῷ οὕτω παρεσκευασμένοι ἔσονται ὡς φιλικῶς τε ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἄρχοντα* κ.τ.λ.

**4.** τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ. See note on 1274 b 36. 1326 a.

**5.** ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and under the head of political equipment falls first [for consideration] the body of men composing the State, how many and what sort of men they should be by nature,' etc. Compare the similar sentences in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 4, *ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλὰς διαφοράς, πόσαι τε ἀρχαί, καὶ κύριαι τίνων* κ.τ.λ., and 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 30–32. Πολιτικὴ χορηγία, 'the equipment necessary to a State' (answering to *τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην*, 4), is different from the equipment necessary to an individual, but both are the gift of Nature and Fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sqq.: 1332 a 29 sqq., 39 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sq.). Nature supplies men possessing the needful qualities of body and soul (1332 a 40 sqq.), and Fortune supplies external and bodily goods (c. 1. 1323 b 27 sq.). Τῶν *ἀνθρώπων* = *πολιτῶν*, 1325 b 40, and *τῶν πολιτευομένων*, c. 7. 1328 a 17. Aristotle is not here concerned with the number or quality of the slaves of the State or of its metoeci. As he says that the question of the characteristics of the men and the territory is the *first* which needs consideration under the head of 'political equipment,' we infer that there are others which need consideration, and what are they? Probably the questions which arise as to the subsidiary classes of cultivators and artisans; these are dealt with in cc. 8–10. Τινάς in 6 seems to belong both to *πόσους* and to *ποίους*, and *τινά* in 8 both to *ὅσην* and to *ποίαν*, cp. c. 7. 1328 a 17, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν δεῖ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισται σχεδόν*, and c. 10. 1329 b 38, *καὶ πόσην τινὰ χρὴ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν* (so apparently Bonitz, Ind. 533 a 59 sqq.). For *κατὰ τὴν χώραν*, 7 ('in connexion with the territory'), cp. Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 7, *τῶν δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡ κατὰ γυναῖκα πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια.* Ὅσην, 7, is probably right: see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Crito 48 A, and cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 18, *τῷ δὲ ἐρώτημά τι προῦβαλε πεφροντισμένης δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως, οἷον ὅστις ἄριστος ἐν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἢ ποία τις ἡ τοῦδε πρᾶξις*, and Herondas 2. 28, *ὅστις ἐστὶ κἀκ ποίου Πηλοῦ πεφύρηται.* $M^{a}$ $P^{1}$ have *ὁπόσην*, not *πόσην*, in 1328 a 18.

**8. οἴονται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 742 D, *ἔστι δὴ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος πολιτικοῦ βούλησις, φαμέν, οὐχ ἥπερ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ φαῖεν, δεῖν βουλεσθαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην ὡς μεγίστην τε εἶναι τὴν πόλιν, ἢ νοῶν εὖ νομοθετοῖ, καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα πλουσίαν*: cp. also Rep. 460 A, where there may be an allusion to the name of Megalopolis founded in B. C. 369 shortly before the time when many think that the Republic saw the light. See also Rep. 423 A sq. (referred to by Eaton) and Laws 737 D.

**11. τῶν ἐνοικούντων**, 'of the inhabitants,' not merely of the citizens, so that according to these authorities a city would be *μεγάλη* which included a large number of slaves, metoeci, and aliens.

**12. δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.** Cp. De Caelo, 1. 5. 271 b 11, *τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει*, and Xen. Anab. 7. 7. 36, *οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ ὁρίζων τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ ὀλίγον, ἀλλ' ἡ δύναμις τοῦ τε ἀποδιδόντος καὶ τοῦ λαμβάνοντος*. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 32) remarks that *δέ* in *εἰς δὲ δύναμιν* is used in the same sense as *ἀλλά*, and compares Metaph. K. 3. 1061 a 23, *μὴ τοῦ ὅλου λόγου, τοῦ τελευταίου δὲ εἴδους*, and De An. 1. 5. 409 b 28.

**13. καὶ πόλεως**, 'of a State also [as well as of other things]': cp. c. 3. 1325 b 25, *καὶ τοῦτο*.

**18. οὐ κατὰ κ.τ.λ.**, 'it is not in respect of any and every multitude that we must do so.' For *κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος* cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 26 and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11 sqq. It is evident from what follows that Aristotle counts *βάναυσοι* here among *δοῦλοι*, just as he does in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq. Camerarius (Interp. p. 279) has already referred to the story told of Agesilaus by Plutarch in Ages. c. 26. The allies of the Lacedaemonians had contrasted the large number of troops which they contributed to the army of Agesilaus with the small number of the Spartans, and Agesilaus by way of reply ordered all the potters, smiths, carpenters, masons, and other *βάναυσοι τεχνῖται* in his army to stand up successively. Nearly every man in the contingent of the allies stood up, but not a single Spartan, and Agesilaus remarked, with a smile, *ὁρᾶτε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅσῳ πλείονας ὑμῶν στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπομεν ἡμεῖς*. Aristotle may remember this story.

**ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** This would be especially the case in a State like that which Aristotle is constructing—a State in which the citizens are not allowed to practise handicrafts or to till the soil. It would also be the case in a State like that of Plato's Laws (848 A). But even in actual Greek States *ξένοι* were numerous.

Many handicraftsmen were ξένοι (3. 5. 1278 a 7). Ξένοι were especially numerous in seaports (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 11 sqq.), but even at Sparta there were ξένοι (Plut. Agis, cc. 8, 10), not merely slaves. The rapid development of the arts and of commerce in ancient Greece was largely due to the ease with which its chief cities drew metoeci and other aliens from the Greek colonies in Asia and elsewhere and from Asia generally (see as to Sidonian residents in Athens Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 157). Many of these metoeci were skilled craftsmen. Asia and probably Egypt were to some of the arts of ancient Greece what Italy was to those of mediaeval Europe. Italy, indeed, did not supply metoeci to the ruder nations to the same extent. Even at the present day 'in Roumania commerce and industry are in the hands of foreigners, principally Jews, the upper classes being landed proprietors' (*Times*, March 18, 1897).

**19.** δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν. Here, as in 2. 7. 1266 b 10 sqq., ἀριθμός takes the place of πλῆθος. So in Phys. 6. 7. 237 b 33 τῷ πλήθει τῶν μορίων = τῷ ἀριθμῷ τῶν μορίων (Bon. Ind. 603 a 41).

**20.** ἀλλ' ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. Καὶ ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μορίων is added to explain in what sense ὅσοι πόλεώς εἰσι μέρος is used. It is implied in what follows that hoplites are οἰκεῖα μόρια τῆς πόλεως (cp. c. 9. 1329 a 37, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν, and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.), but not βάνανσοι, who are here contrasted with hoplites, though it is clear (see above on 18) that they often served as hoplites.

**23.** ἐξέρχονται. Aristotle probably remembers the description of the Egyptian Thebes in Hom. Il. 9. 383,

> αἳ θ' ἑκατόμπυλοί εἰσι, διηκόσιοι δ' ἀν' ἑκάστας
> ἀνέρες ἐξοιχνεῦσι σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν,

and perhaps also ἐκπέμπομεν in the story of Agesilaus related above on 18.

**24.** οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν μεγάλη τε πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. For the use of τε, compare c. 10. 1329 b 1, καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν.

**25.** ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. Καὶ τοῦτο, 'this also,' i. e. that not only is a populous State not necessarily a large one, but that a very populous State cannot easily be a well-ordered one. And a State which is not well-ordered is only a State in name (3. 9. 1280 b 5–8).

**27.** τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν κ.τ.λ. Ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος, 'set free in the direction of number': cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 10, διαφθείροντας ἅμα τοῖς ἤθεσι τὰ σώματα πρὸς πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνειμένα καὶ πλησμονήν. Carthage must have been an exception, unless we suppose its citizen-body to have been smaller in Aristotle's day than it afterwards became (see vol. ii. Appendix B). As to the Lacedaemonian State, cp. Isocr. Archid. § 81, where Archidamus is made to say, τῶν Ἑλλήνων διενηνόχαμεν οὐ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., and as to Athens, which was in the contrary plight, De Antid. § 172, διὰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων οὐκ εὐσύνοπτός ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀκριβὴς κ.τ.λ.

**29.** ὅ τε γὰρ νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστι. 'Id etiam conversum posuit libro tertio' (3. 16. 1287 a 18), 'ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος' (Camerarius, Interp. p. 280).

**32.** θείας γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'for surely this' (i. e. the ordering of a great number of things) 'is [beyond the power of man and] is the function of divine power, which is such as to hold together even the vast universe in which we live; the beautiful, in fact, [which is closely allied with order,] is commonly found in connexion with a given number and magnitude.' For θεία δύναμις Bonitz (Ind. 324 a 1) compares the spurious De Mundo, 6. 397 b 19. Aristotle clearly has before him Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 22, ἀλλὰ θεούς γε τοὺς ἀεὶ ὄντας καὶ πάντ' ἐφορῶντας καὶ πάντα δυναμένους, οἳ καὶ τήνδε τὴν τῶν ὅλων τάξιν συνέχουσιν ἀτριβῆ καὶ ἀγήρατον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ ὑπὸ κάλλους καὶ μεγέθους ἀδιήγητον, τούτους φοβούμενοι μήποτε ἀσεβὲς μηδὲν μηδὲ ἀνόσιον μήτε ποιήσητε μήτε βουλεύσητε: cp. also Plut. Dion, c. 10, πρὸς τὸ θειότατον ἀφομοιωθεὶς παράδειγμα τῶν ὄντων καὶ κάλλιστον, ᾧ τὸ πᾶν ἡγουμένῳ πειθόμενον ἐξ ἀκοσμίας κόσμος ἐστί, and for τόδε τὸ πᾶν, Plato, Polit. 269 C, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν τόδε τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ξυμποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ, τοτὲ δ' ἀνῆκεν, and Gorg. 508 A, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν. Συνέχειν is used as equivalent to ἑνοποιεῖν in De An. 1. 5. 410 b 10, ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἑνοποιοῦν αὐτά (i. e. τὰ στοιχεῖα)· ὕλῃ γὰρ ἔοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα· κυριώτατον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ συνέχον ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, and to μίαν ποιεῖν in De An. 1. 5. 411 b 6 sqq.: cp. Polyb. 11. 19. 3. Aristotle probably regards God as holding the universe together passively by being the common object towards which everything strives: see above on 1325 b 28. That the beautiful is closely allied with order we see from Metaph. M. 3. 1078 a 36, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον: cp. Plato, Phileb. 64 E, μετριότης γὰρ καὶ

*ξυμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ παντταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι* (both passages already quoted by Eaton). Vict. compares with the passage before us Poet. 7. 1450 b 34, *ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἔκ τινων οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί*, and Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1123 b 6, *ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ.*

**34. διὸ καὶ πόλις κ.τ.λ.**, 'hence a State also,' as well as other things. For the 'nominativus pendens' *πόλις*, see Bon. Ind. s. v. Anacoluthia, where 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 9 sqq. is referred to among other passages, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Cratylus 403 A, *ὁ δὲ Ἅιδης, οἱ πολλοὶ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸ ἀειδὲς προσειρῆσθαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ*, and Riddell, Apology of Plato (Digest of Idioms, § 271 b), who quotes among other instances Theaet. 173 D and Rep. 565 D–E. Cp. also De Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 31 sqq. and De Part. An. 3. 8. 671 a 12 sqq., and see Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 19. Bekker and Sus. have *πόλιν* in place of *πόλις*, but all MSS. except Γ $M^{a}$ have *πόλις*, and there can be little doubt that *πόλις* is right, for this 'nominativus pendens' is a not uncommon form of anacoluthon.

**ἧς κ.τ.λ.**, i. e. *ἧς ὅρος μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος ὑπάρχει.* Cp. 1326 b 23, *οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος.* So in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 15, *ἀλλ' ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ βουλομένων* the words *τύραννός ἐστι* are to be supplied. See also note on 1279 b 38. *Ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος* is the standard of not being too large to be well-ordered.

**35. ἀλλ' ἔστι τι κ.τ.λ.**, 'but in fact [apart from questions of beauty and good order] there is a due measure of size for a State also, as well as for everything else.' Not only will too large a State fail of being well-ordered and beautiful, but it will fail also to be able to discharge the function of a State and to realize self-completeness in respect of good life, and the same thing may be said of too small a State likewise. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29, *τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν*: De Gen. An. 2. 6. 745 a 5, *ἔστι γάρ τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις πέρας τοῦ μεγέθους, διὸ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὁστῶν αὐξήσεως*: De An. 2. 4. 416 a 16, *τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἐστὶ πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως*: De An. Motione, 3. 699 a 34, *ἔστι γάρ τι πλῆθος ἰσχύος καὶ δυνάμεως καθ' ἣν μένει τὸ μένον,*

*ὥσπερ καὶ καθ' ἣν κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν*: Plut. Sympos. 5. 5. 1, *καὶ γὰρ συμποσίου μέγεθος ἱκανόν ἐστιν, ἄχρι οὗ συμπόσιον ἐθέλει μένειν· ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερβάλῃ διὰ πλῆθος, ὡς μηκέτι προσήγορον ἑαυτῷ μηδὲ συμπαθὲς εἶναι ταῖς φιλοφροσύναις μηδὲ γνώριμον, οὐδὲ συμπόσιόν ἐστι.* Compare also Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21–35. As to *ὄργανα*, see 1. 8. 1256 b 35 sq. We note that a State is distinguished by Aristotle from an *ὄργανον*. It is not a mere *ὄργανον πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωήν* for the individual, but a moral being like the individual, only nobler and greater than he (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 7 sqq.).

**39.** *ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως*. Compare such expressions as *ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως* (Meteor. 4. 11. 389 b 10, *φθειρόμενα καὶ ἐξιστάμενα τῆς φύσεως*) or *χωρίζεσθαι τῆς φύσεως* (Meteor. 4. 1. 379 a 14), which stand in contrast to *ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν* (Poet. 4. 1449 a 15, *ἔσχεν ἡ τραγῳδία τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν*).

**41.** *δυοῖν σταδίοιν*, cp. Poet. 7. 1451 a 2, *οἷον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ζῷον.*

*εἰς δέ τι μέγεθος ἐλθόν*, 'but when it has assumed a measured size.' Cp. Meteor. 1. 14. 352 a 6, *ξηραινόμενοι γὰρ οἱ τόποι ἔρχονται εἰς τὸ καλῶς ἔχειν.*

1326 b. **2.** *ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης*. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11 sqq., where the view expressed by the Platonic Socrates in Rep. 369 D, *εἴη δ' ἂν ἥ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν*, is corrected.

**3.** *ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν κ.τ.λ.* A *πόλις* consisting of too large a number of citizens is not a *πόλις* because a *πόλις* is a *κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας* (3. 3. 1276 b 1), and a constitution cannot easily exist in a very large *πόλις*, for magistrates cannot easily exist in it, and a constitution implies the existence of magistracies (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, *πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται*). It seems to be implied that the constitution is the source of 'completeness in respect of good life.' Aristotle's argument here throws some light on his reference to Babylon in 3. 3. 1276 a 27 sqq., where it is implied that Babylon covered too large a space to be one city. He would probably also say that its inhabitants were too numerous to possess a constitution or to be marshalled by a general. When he says that an *ἔθνος* possesses only 'completeness in respect of necessaries,' is he speaking of *ἔθνη* composed of *πόλεις* (see note on 1261 a 27), as well as of *ἔθνη* composed of villages? As to Aristotle's account of the *ἔθνος* something has already been said in vol. i. p. 39. We should have been glad if he had told us more on the subject (see note on 1274 b 34 sqq.).

The *ἔθνος* appears to be a *κοινωνία* (cp. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 8, *πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν*): it has *νόμιμα* or *νόμοι* (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 9 sqq.); it is bound together not only by internal trade and by united action against external foes, but also by intermarriage and common sacrifices; it is often ruled by a King, and may even have an Absolute King at its head (3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.), but it is too large to have a constitution—we must suppose that the word 'constitution' is here used in a sense exclusive of Kingship—apparently because it is too large to be controlled by common magistrates (cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 40). We may conjecture that in Aristotle's view the members of an *ἔθνος* have not that desire to promote the virtue of their fellows which is to him one distinguishing mark of a citizen (3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.). An *ἔθνος* is, in fact, rather a *συμμαχία* and something more than a *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία*.

**7. διὸ κ.τ.λ.** Here again, as in 2, the Platonic Socrates is corrected (see above on 2). Cp. c. 8. 1328 b 16 sq. and 2. 2. 1261 b 12. Take *πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν* together (see note on 1325 b 18). *Κατά* seems to mean 'in connexion with': cp. c. 2. 1324 a 15, *ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίος) ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος*. For *τοσούτου* followed by *ὅ*, see above on 1267 a 24.

**9. ἐνδέχεται δὲ κ.τ.λ.** *Μείζω* is bracketed by Schneider, Bekker[2], and Susemihl, but it appears to be correct: cp. De Gen. An. 4. 4. 771 b 33, *ἀλλ', ὥσπερ καὶ τελεουμένων τῶν ζῴων ἔστιν ἑκάστου τι μέγεθος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ὧν οὔτ' ἂν μεῖζον γένοιτο οὔτ' ἔλαττον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ διαστήματι τοῦ μεγέθους λαμβάνουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, καὶ γίνεται μείζων ὁ δ' ἐλάττων ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁτιοῦν, οὕτω καὶ κ.τ.λ.* A man must be of a certain minimum size, if he is to be a man at all; if he exceeds that minimum and does not exceed the maximum, he is a larger man; if he exceeds the maximum, he ceases to be a man. The same thing, we are told in the passage before us, holds of the *πόλις*.

**11. ὥσπερ εἴπομεν,** in 1326 a 34 sqq.

**14. ἄρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον.** *Κρίσις* here refers especially to judicial decisions (cp. *τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων* in the next sentence). In the similar passage, 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq., on the other hand (*μάλιστα δ' ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας, ὅσαις ἀποδέδοται βουλεύσασθαί τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρῖναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν*), *κρῖναι* does not refer to judicial decisions, for here Aristotle is speaking of *ἀρχαί* in

a sense exclusive of τὸ δικαστικόν, of which he treats in another chapter of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (c. 16).

πρὸς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων seems to be given as an instance of αἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων πράξεις, and τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ' ἀξίαν as an instance of αἱ τῶν ἀρχομένων. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Laws 738 D, ὅπως ἂν ... φιλοφρονῶνταί τε ἀλλήλοις μετὰ θυσιῶν καὶ οἰκειῶνται καὶ γνωρίζωσιν, οὗ μεῖζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ γνωρίμους αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι· ὅπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις, ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὔτ' ἂν τιμῆς τῆς ἀξίας οὔτ' ἀρχῶν οὔτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἂν τῆς προσηκούσης ὀρθῶς τυγχάνοι: cp. also Laws 751 D and 766 E. Dr. Johnson says of the lairds' courts in the Highlands of Scotland (Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Works, 8. 320)—'When the chiefs were men of knowledge and virtue, the convenience of a domestic judicature was great. No long journeys were necessary, no artificial delays could be practised; the character, the alliances, and interests of the litigants were known to the court, and all false pretences were easily detected.' See also vol. i. p. 314, note 3. In ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Athens, for though in addressing an Athenian audience Hyperides says (Pro Lycophr. col. xii. 5, ed. Blass), λαθεῖν γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον οὐκ ἔνι οὔτε πονηρὸν ὄντα οὐδένα τῶν ἐν τῆ[ι] πόλει οὔτε ἐπ[ι]εικῆ, Isocrates describes Athens in De Antid. § 172 as too large to be εὐσύνοπτος (cp. Thuc. 8. 66. 3, already referred to by Eaton). Still even at Athens owing to the publicity of men's life in ancient Greece fellow-citizens knew each other far better than they do in a modern city of the same size: see Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 179 sq., who however goes too far when he says, 'tout se savait, tous se connaissaient à Athènes.' It is, indeed, difficult to understand how even in a citizen-body of (say) 5,000, with all the help derivable from frequent festivals, every citizen could be known, either personally or by repute, to his fellows. Yet Aristotle seems to imply that the citizens of a State ought to be acquainted with the character of every member of their body, if not with his person. The experience of the United States fully confirms the view of Plato and Aristotle that where fellow-citizens are not well acquainted with each other's characters, offices will not be well filled. 'In moderately-sized communities men's characters are known, and the presence of a bad man in office brings on his fellow-citizens evils which they are not too numerous to feel individually.... In large cities the results are different because the

circumstances are different' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, Part 3, c. 62). 'City governments begin to be bad when the population begins to exceed 100,000 and includes a large proportion of recent immigrants. They are generally pure in smaller places, that is to say, they are as pure as those of an average English, French, or German city' (ibid. Part 3, c. 67: vol. ii. p. 521, ed. 1. See also c. 61, vol. ii. p. 435). Aristotle would, of course, think a citizen-body even of 100,000 ten times more numerous than it ought to be. As to London, compare a remark made by a member of the County Council of London at its first meeting. 'Provincial corporations could easily proceed to elect aldermen, because in the provincial towns persons knew all about each other, but it was quite different in the metropolis' (*Times*, Feb. 1, 1889).

**20.** ἔτι δὲ ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις κ.τ.λ. This frequently happened at Athens. The register of citizens was kept by the deme: 'l'assemblée du dème est peu fréquentée; c'est un petit nombre de voix qu'il faut acheter, et quelques drachmes suffisent: ici cinq drachmes par tête, ailleurs peut-être moins encore.' See Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 32 sqq., who refers to Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 59, *οὗτοι γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βουλομένους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους ξένους πολίτας γενέσθαι, Ἀναξιμένην καὶ Νικόστρατον, κοινῇ διαπειμάμενοι πέντε δραχμὰς ἕκαστος προσεδέξαντο.* Those whose names got upon the register in this or in other unlawful ways were called *παρέγγραπτοι*. The larger the State was, the less check there would be on the registering authority. The Attic demes of Halimus, Sunium, and Potami, all of them on the coast, were especially credited with a readiness to admit aliens to the register (Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 32). It will be noticed that Aristotle speaks only of aliens and metoeci, not of slaves.

**22.** δῆλον τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 314.

**24.** εὐσύνοπτος must apparently mean 'easily within the view of the magistrates and the citizens' (cp. 14 sqq.).

**26.** Παραπλησίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Similarly,' because Aristotle has just said that the larger the State is, the better, if only it is *εὐσύνοπτος*, and now he goes on to say that the most self-complete territory is the best, and one which is large enough to support its citizens in a life, not temperate only, but temperate and liberal, though it must be *εὐσύνοπτος* (1327 a 1). Αὐταρκεστάτην, 27, takes up C. 5.

αὐτάρκειαν, 24. For τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας, cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 23, τὰ περὶ τῶν τείχων. We more often have the acc. after περί in phrases of this kind in the Politics.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For περί in the sense of 'quod attinet ad,' see Vahlen on Poet. 23. 1459 a 16, who quotes Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 25, καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω· περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσι δεττοί, and Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 29. With ποίαν τινά supply δεῖ εἶναι τὴν χώραν. In his preference for a territory as self-complete as possible Aristotle follows Plato, Laws 704 C, ΑΘ. τί δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ χώρα; πότερα πάμφορος ἢ καὶ τινῶν ἐπιδεής; ΚΛ. σχεδὸν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδεής, and Critias 110 E, and also Solon (Hdt. 1. 32, ὥσπερ χώρη οὐδεμιῇ καταρκέει πάντα ἑωυτῇ παρέχουσα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχει, ἑτέρου δὲ ἐπιδέεται· ἡ δὲ ἂν τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχῃ, ἀρίστη αὕτη). Hesiod, indeed, had already said of the just (Op. et Dies, 236),

θάλλουσιν δ' ἀγαθοῖσι διαμπερές· οὐδ' ἐπὶ νηῶν
νίσσονται, καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα,

with which Virgil's lines (Ecl. 4. 38 sq.) may be compared,

Cedet et ipse mari vector, nec nautica pinus
Mutabit merces: omnis feret omnia tellus.

Thessaly was famed for the variety of its produce; it was rich in corn and wine and timber, and in pasture for horses cattle and sheep (Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland, 1. 47); Cyprus was rich in corn, wine, oil, timber, and copper (Strabo, p. 684). We read of the χώρα πάμφορος of the Tyrrhenians in Diod. 5. 40. 3, and of the νῆσος εὐδαίμων καὶ πάμφορος of Sardinia in [Aristot.] De Mir. Auscult. 100. 838 b 22. Isocrates speaks of Egypt in Busir. § 12 as πλεῖστα καὶ παντοδαπὰ φέρειν δυναμένην. Messenia (Eurip. Fragm. 1068) and Laconia (E. Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 218) were remarkable for the variety of their produce. All these were fertile regions, but there were countries which were at once πάμφορα and rugged, and it is a territory of this kind that Plato prefers (Laws 704 D). Aristotle would hardly follow him in this. He would hardly be satisfied with a territory like the Attic, which comprised much poor land (Plut. Solon, c. 22), though it is called παμφορωτάτη by Xenophon (De Vect. 1. 3: cp. Plato, Critias 110 E. and Antiphanes, Fragm. Ὁμώνυμοι: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 98). The main reason which leads both Plato and Aristotle to prefer a πάμφορος territory is that in a State possessing such a territory importation and exportation are reduced to a minimum, and consequently also the commercial class. States with a barren territory

have often in the history of the world been forced to become commercial in order to exist—e.g. Aegina (above on 1258 a 34), Phocaea (Justin, 43. 3. 5), Elea (Strabo, p. 252). As to Chios see note on 1291 b 20. Much of the territory of Corinth was infertile, and this helped to make her a commercial State (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 516). 'It was on a bare rock surrounded by deep sea that the streets of Tyre were piled up to a dizzy height' (Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 24). As to Venice see H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 251. 'Nuremberga, cuius agro nihil magis sterile fieri potest, omnium tamen Germaniae urbium populosissima et opificum multitudine florentissima putatur' (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 518). The word *παντοφόρος* appears to be extremely rare: *πάμφορος* is common enough.

**30.** *πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει* κ.τ.λ. With *τοσαύτην* we should probably supply, not *πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειε*, but *δεῖ εἶναι* as with *περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινά*, 26 (cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41 sqq.). See 2. 6. 1265 a 28–38, where the same standard is adopted, in correction of Plato, Laws 737 D, *γῆς μὲν ὁπόση πόσους σώφρονας ὄντας ἱκανὴ τρέφειν*. Yet Plato's language in Critias 112 C, *τὸ μέσον ὑπερηφανίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας μεταδιώκοντες κοσμίας ᾠκοδομοῦντο οἰκήσεις*, is quite in the spirit of that of Aristotle here. Aristotle does not wish the citizens of his 'best State' to live either like the people of Myconus, who were charged with stinginess (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 6: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 175), or like the Boeotians, of whom the comic poet Eubulus said (Meineke, 3. 222),

*κτίζε Βοιωτῶν πόλιν*
*ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστων ἐσθίειν δι' ἡμέρας.*

See also vol. i. p. 316, note 1. For the use here of *πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει*, cp. c. 6. 1327 b 3, *περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης*. We have *μείζων καὶ πλείων* used in a somewhat similar way in Meteor. 2. 5. 363 a 15, *ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὸν τόπον εἶναι πολὺ πλείω ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀναπεπταμένον μείζων καὶ πλείων καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλεεινὸς ἄνεμος ὁ νότος ἐστὶ τοῦ βορέου*, and in Aen. Poliorc. c. 8, *προσδεχόμενον πλείω καὶ μείζω δύναμιν πολεμίων*. *Σχολάζοντας*, 31, 'though at leisure.'

**33.** *ὕστερον*. This is one of the promises of future investigations which are not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it (see vol. ii. p. xxvii sqq.).

*περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας*. *Καί* is explanatory, *καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας* being added to make it clear in what sense *κτῆσις* will be dealt with. *Κτῆσις* has been dealt with from

another point of view in 1. 8. 1256 a 1 sqq. Compare what Plato says on the subject in Rep. 591 D sq. For *τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας* cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3, *προσόδων εὐπορίας*, and Isocr. Panath. § 7, *τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον εὐπορίας*. See also below on 1327 a 8, *τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης*.

**35.** **πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτήν**, 'how and in what way it should stand to the use made of it': cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 99, *εὐπορία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τις πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρήσεις οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥστε καὶ φίλους εὖ ποιῆσαι καὶ φιλοτίμως καὶ εὐπόρως ἀπολειτουργῆσαι*, and Xen. Hiero, 4. 8, *οὐ γὰρ τῷ ἀριθμῷ οὔτε τὰ πολλὰ κρίνεται οὔτε τὰ ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις· ὥστε τὰ μὲν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὰ ἱκανὰ πολλά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἱκανῶν ἐλλείποντα ὀλίγα*. For *πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον*, cp. Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 31, *ὥστε τοῦτο σκεπτέον λαβοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀρχήν, εἴ τι κινεῖ αὐτὸ αὑτό, πῶς κινεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον*: Hippocr. De Capitis Vulneribus, vol. iii. p. 356 Kühn, *χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν τὸν τετρωμένον ὅπως ἔπαθε καὶ τίνα τρόπον*: Plato, Laws 964 D, *πῶς οὖν δὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ὦ ξένε, ἀπεικάζοντες αὐτὸ τοιούτῳ τινὶ λέγομεν*; and Polyb. 1. 32. 2, *πῶς καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ γέγονεν*, and 2. 31. 7, *οὕτω καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ*: see also Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 681 D, *οὕτω τε καὶ ταύτῃ*. **Αὐτήν** is added to *τὴν χρῆσιν* to contrast 'the use itself' with *τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν*: cp. c. 13. 1331 b 24, *περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς*, where 'the constitution itself' is tacitly contrasted with matters preliminary to the constitution and not falling within it. Vet. Int. wrongly refers *αὐτήν* to *τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας*, translating 'qualiter oportet habere et quo modo ipsam ad usum.'

**36.** **πολλαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'for there are many disputes on the subject of this inquiry, arising because of those who,' etc. For *ἔλκειν ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τὴν ὑπερβολήν*, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 22, *ἕλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν*, and Plato, Laws 890 A, *ἑλκόντων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον*. Should *τὴν χρῆσιν* be supplied with *ἕλκοντας*? On the side of *γλισχρότης* were the Pythagoreans (see a fragment of Aristophon in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 362, and fragments of Alexis, ibid. 3. 474, 483), the Cynics (Diog. Laert. 6. 8 *sub fin.*: 6. 25: Diog. Cynicus, Fragm. 273 Mullach), and writers like Ephorus (see above on 1265 a 30), to say nothing of the lawgivers of Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 5 sq.: Plut. Lycurg. c. 17) and Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 22); while on the side of *τρυφή* were Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 68, 69, 84) and others (vol. i. p. 301, and p. 302, note 1: also p. 199, note 1).

**39.** **τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας κ.τ.λ.** Wyse, followed by Sus.[4], is

probably right in placing δεῖ δ' ἔνια—ἐμπείροις in a parenthesis and making ὅτι κ.τ.λ. dependent on εἰπεῖν. Τὸ εἶδος τῆς χώρας, 'the character of the territory,' i.e. its geographical character, as distinguished from the character of the soil, which has been dealt with in 1326 b 26–30. Cp. Plato, Laws 625 C, *τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὁρᾶτε, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς*, and 834 C.

δεῖ δ' ἔνια κ.τ.λ., 'and we must be guided in respect of some matters by the opinion also of those who are experienced in questions of generalship [as well as that of those who look especially to the supply of commodities, the subject which has just been before us].' Aristotle may probably have before him the work of Aeneas Tacticus entitled *Στρατηγικὰ βιβλία* or *περὶ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα*, of which we possess a part in the Commentarius Poliorceticus of Aeneas (see below on 1331 a 16): cp. c. 8, *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν χώραν προσδεχόμενον πλείω καὶ μείζω δύναμιν πολεμίων πρῶτον μὲν τὴν χώραν δυσείσβολον τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ δυσστρατοπέδευτον καὶ δυσπόρευτον κατασκευάζειν καὶ τοὺς ποταμοὺς δυσδιαβάτους καὶ δύσπλους*, and c. 16. 16 sqq. Aristotle learns something from generals in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 16 sqq. as well as here.

40. ὅτι χρὴ μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δ' εὔεξοδον. Compare what is said of the city in c. 11. 1330 b 2 sqq. and 1331 a 3 sqq. Egypt (see vol. i. p. 316, note 2, and Strabo, p. 819) and Persis (Plut. Alex. c. 37) were difficult of access to foes, and Socrates claimed (vol. i. p. 316, note 2) that Attica was so, but Laconia is probably especially present to Aristotle's mind, for it was *δυσεμβολωτάτη* (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24: Eurip. Fragm. 1068: see Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 217, 311). Boeotia, on the contrary, lay comparatively open to the foe (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Epaminond. 18. 193 E, *καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑπτίαν οὖσαν καὶ ἀναπεπταμένην πολέμου ὀρχήστραν προσηγόρευεν, ὡς μὴ δυναμένους κρατεῖν αὐτῆς, ἂν μὴ τὴν χεῖρα διὰ πόρπακος ἔχωσι*), and of Elis we read in Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 6, 'No region of the Peloponnese is less protected against attacks from without. A broad river-valley leads, like an open entrance-road, from the interior into the midst of Elis; the mountains at the back of the territory afford little protection, because they are only the lower ranges of higher mountains. The level coast-line offers the easiest of approaches from the North and the South; the plains and the villages are exposed on all sides to landings from a hostile fleet.' That a country might be at once

hard of entrance to foes and easy of exit for friends we see from Plato, Laws 761 A, *δύσβατα δὲ δὴ πάντα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ὅ τι μάλιστα εὔβατα, ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ ὑποζυγίοις καὶ βοσκήμασιν, ὁδῶν τε ἐπιμελουμένους κ.τ.λ.* Another characteristic which the territory should possess, but which is not noticed here, is that it should be such as to favour the unity of the State (7 (5). 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). *Χρὴ τοῖς μέν*, not *χρὴ μὲν τοῖς*, is the logical order, but '*μέν* interdum non ei additur vocabulo, in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20): see above on 1268 b 12.

1327 a. **2.** *οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν*, sc. *εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι δεῖ*.

**3.** *τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν κ.τ.λ.* The recommendation that the territory should be well within reach for purposes of protection leads on naturally to the question as to the site of the city. This question is here dealt with only so far as the position of the city with reference to the territory and the sea is concerned; other matters come up for consideration in c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. The city should be placed where it will be readily able to protect the territory and to receive supplies of commodities. For both purposes it must be near the sea, yet it must also be well situated with respect to the territory. Whether Aristotle's opinion was known to Alexander when he founded Alexandria in B. C. 332, it is impossible to say, but at any rate the site of this city in many respects fulfilled Aristotle's requirements. Cp. Strabo, p. 798, *τῆς δ' εὐκαιρίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τὸ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ὅτι τῆς Αἰγύπτου πάσης μόνος ἐστὶν οὗτος ὁ τόπος πρὸς ἄμφω πεφυκὼς εὖ, τά τε ἐκ θαλάττης διὰ τὸ εὐλίμενον, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὅτι πάντα εὐμαρῶς ὁ ποταμὸς παρθμεύει συνάγει τε εἰς τοιοῦτον χωρίον ὅπερ μέγιστον ἐμπόριον τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐστί.* (No doubt Aristotle would not rejoice in the greatness of Alexandria as an emporium or in its close contiguity to the sea.) Some cities had the fault of being at a great distance from their territory (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32 sqq.). In not a few cases part of the territory was cut off from the city by mountains (this was the case with the Thyrean territory of Argos and the Lepreate territory of Elis), or by an arm of the sea (as when island cities held territory on the adjacent mainland). On the other hand, there were cities like Sparta, which were too far from the sea. Sparta is probably especially present to Aristotle's mind in 1327 a 3–27. It was evidently in his opinion not situated so well either for the protection of its territory or for the transmission of produce from its territory, as it would have been if it had been nearer to the sea.

Nor was it (18 sqq.) easily within reach of rescue by sea or capable of striking a blow by sea, nor could it well receive by sea commodities lacking to it or send away by sea its surplus produce. The cities of Elis and Messene were also too far from the sea. Cp. Polyb. 2. 5, *ταύτας γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰς χώρας* (i.e. *τὴν Ἠλείαν καὶ τὴν Μεσσηνίαν*) *Ἰλλυριοὶ πορθοῦντες διετέλουν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μῆκος τῆς παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ μεσογαίους εἶναι τὰς δυναστευούσας ἐν αὐταῖς πόλεις μακραὶ καὶ βραδεῖαι λίαν ἐγίνοντο τοῖς προειρημένοις αἱ παραβοήθειαι πρὸς τὰς ἀποβάσεις τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν, ὅθεν ἀδεῶς ἐπέτρεχον καὶ κατέσυρον ἀεὶ ταύτας τὰς χώρας.* In Aristotle's view the ideal site for a city was one which placed it in easy communication with both land and sea. Rome, according to Cicero (De Rep. 2. 5. 10), was marked out for empire by a position of this kind, and much the same thing may be said of London. We learn, indeed, from c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. that a city should be in easy communication, not only with its own territory and with the sea, but also with the mainland on the verge of which it lies. Such was the situation of Athens: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, *καὶ μὴν οὐ περίρρυτός γε οὖσα* (*ἡ Ἀττικὴ*) *ὅμως ὥσπερ νῆσος πᾶσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεταί τε ὧν δεῖται καὶ ἀποπέμπεται ἃ βούλεται· ἀμφιβάλλοντος γάρ ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπόρια· ἤπειρος γάρ ἐστιν.* Aristotle evidently prefers the site of Athens to that of Sparta, and indeed to those of most other Greek cities. It is easy to see from 1327 a 3–27 that Greek cities at a distance from the sea, and especially those whose communications with the coast were difficult —such cities, for instance, as Tegea and Mantineia—were neither very secure from foes nor very well supplied with commodities, and that cities immediately on the coast—and most Greek colonies were thus situated—tended to become denationalized and disorderly owing to the multitude of aliens which flocked to them, and also to suffer an increase in the number of their citizens not conducive to efficient government. In this matter as in others Aristotle favours a mean; the city should be neither on the sea nor too far from it.

**4. πρός τε τὴν θάλατταν κ.τ.λ.** For the order of the words cp. c. 11. 1331 a 12 sqq. and c. 16. 1335 b 5 sqq. 'Τε . . . τε, ut apud omnes prosarios, apud Aristotelem quoque raro in usum venit' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 16, who gives as another instance in the Politics c. 10. 1329 b 2 sq.).

**5. εἷς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος.** We expect *μὲν οὖν* in place of *μέν*, but cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 19, *εἷς μὲν τρόπος διδασκαλίας ἦν αὐτῷ οὗτος τοῦ*

παρεῖναι· ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and Thuc. 2. 97. 2, τὰ μὲν πρὸς θάλασσαν τοσαύτη ἦν.

7. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κ.τ.λ., i.e. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι εὐπαρακόμιστον κ.τ.λ. I follow the punctuation of Jackson, Welldon, and Sus. The fact that Athens lay near the coast must have greatly facilitated and cheapened the transport to it of the produce of its territory, and especially the transport of heavy commodities like timber, stone, marble, and metals.

8. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further, of material for timber and for any other industry of the kind that the territory may possess.' Aristotle passes from τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν, 7, to commodities like wood, stone, and metals which are ἄκαρπα μὲν χρήσιμα δέ (1. 11. 1258 b 27 sqq.: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 5, ἔστι δὲ καὶ γῆ ἡ σπειρομένη μὲν οὐ φέρει καρπόν, ὀρυττομένη δὲ πολλαπλασίους τρέφει ἢ εἰ σῖτον ἔφερε). Attica was rich in marble and silver (ibid. 1. 4 sq.). For ἐργασίαν, cp. Thuc. 4. 105, κτῆσίν τε ἔχειν τῶν χρυσείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῇ περὶ ταῦτα Θρᾴκῃ. For τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, cp. 1326 b 34, τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας, and Top. 2. 7. 113 a 31, διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθήσεως τὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ μορφὴν γνωρίζομεν, and see Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.

C. 6. 11. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας κ.τ.λ. The persons referred to here held that nearness to the sea was prejudicial to orderly government in two ways—(1) it involved the residence in the city of aliens bred up under other laws and likely to exercise an unfavourable moral influence on the citizens; (2) it involved the existence of a very numerous citizen-body, inasmuch as the numbers of the citizen-body would be swollen by a body of merchants, who, it is taken for granted, would be citizens. (That the word πολυανθρωπία refers to the number of the citizens appears from 1327 b 7–9, where it is explained that in Aristotle's 'best State' there will be no πολυανθρωπία in connexion with the oarsmen of the fleet, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως.) Aristotle contends, on the contrary, that nearness to the sea does not necessarily involve either of these results. The city might be placed at a little distance from the sea and might possess a port on the coast, whose inhabitants might be restrained from free communication with the inhabitants of the city; and this port should be a small port, intended for the supply of the needs of the members of the State, not of those of the world in general. Who were the critics whose views are here controverted? Possibly Plato is referred to, but this is not certain, for though he objects

to nearness to the sea in Laws 704 D sqq. (see Stallbaum on this passage, who refers to Cic. De Rep. 2.3.5 sqq., and cp. Laws 949 E sq., 952 D sqq.) on account of the risk of evil influences from aliens, he does not object to it on the ground of its involving *πολυανθρωπία*. In all probability the views here controverted were those of persons oligarchically inclined. That *πολυανθρωπία* is unfavourable to good government we have already seen (c. 4. 1326 a 25 sqq.). Many Greek cities were much exposed to the influence of aliens. Byzantium was overrun with them (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 14: cp. Athen. Deipn. 526 e), and at Agrigentum in its palmy days, if we may trust Diodorus (13. 84. 4), there were 180,000 aliens, while the citizens numbered somewhat more than 20,000. Haussoullier (Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 189) shows how foreign worships were instituted at the Peiraeus by aliens for their own behoof, and some of these probably spread to the citizens. We know that the seaports of Dundee and Leith were the channels through which the Reformation found its way into Scotland. '"The knowledge of God," says Knox, "did considerably increase within the realm, and this was chiefly effected by merchants and mariners belonging to Dundee and Leith," who imported the reformed doctrines from abroad' (*Academy*, Feb. 11, 1893). That contact with aliens might have ill results, we see from Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2. 35. 95, Carthaginienses fraudulenti et mendaces non genere, sed natura loci, quod propter portus suos multis et variis mercatorum et advenarum sermonibus ad studium fallendi studio quaestus vocabantur. Contact with aliens even of a satisfactory type might well affect the fidelity of the citizens of a Greek State to its traditions, and many of the aliens who crowded to Greek seaports were Asiatics of a type the reverse of satisfactory. The people of Epidamnus found that those of their citizens who had much communication with their Illyrian neighbours became demoralized (Plut. Quaest. Graec. 29, *γιγνομένους πονηρούς*). We read of the Spartan Callicratidas in Diod. 13. 76. 2, *οὗτος δὲ νέος μὲν ἦν παντελῶς, ἄκακος δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἁπλοῦς, οὔπω τῶν ξενικῶν ἠθῶν πεπειραμένος, δικαιότατος δὲ Σπαρτιατῶν.* Machiavelli in his Discourses on the First Decad of Livy (1. 55) ascribes the integrity and piety of the Germans of his day in part to the fact that 'they have never had much commerce with their neighbours, being seldom visited by them and seldom going abroad themselves, but live contented with the food and clothing that are the product of their own country, thereby preventing

all opportunities of evil conversation that might corrupt their manners.' It should be noticed that the argument here reproduced by Aristotle assumes that aliens did not take up their abode in inland cities; this does not, however, seem to have been invariably the case, for we hear of metoeci at Thebes (Diod. 17. 11 : Lys. Or. 23. 15) and under the name of παροικοι at Thespiae (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 294. 1). Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in c. 4. 1326 a 18 sqq. as if a body of aliens and metoeci was a necessary appendage to every Greek State.

**15.** γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., sc. τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν. With διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους ἐμπόρων πλῆθος Bonitz (Ind. s. v. διαπέμπειν) compares De Part. An. 4. 5. 681 a 28, ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον δύο πόρους καὶ μίαν διαίρεσιν, ᾗ τε δέχεται τὴν ὑγρότητα τὴν εἰς τροφήν, καὶ ᾗ πάλιν διαπέμπει τὴν ὑπολειπομένην ἰκμάδα.

**18.** μὲν οὖν appears to be answered by δέ, 32.

Ταῦτα, i. e. τὸ ἐπιξενοῦσθαί τινας and ἡ πολυανθρωπία.

**19.** πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων. States in command of the sea were for one thing less exposed to famine than States which were not ([Xen.] De Rep. Ath. 2. 6). See also Plato, Laws 705 A (quoted in the next note). We can imagine with what anxiety cities at a distance from the sea, for instance those of Arcadia, watched the prospects of the corn-harvest. The worship of Demeter and of Zeus, the giver of rain, would be especially congenial to such localities. They no doubt kept a vigilant eye on their rivers and the catabothra through which they in some cases flowed off to see that no flooding occurred and that they were not interfered with by rival neighbouring States. Greek colonies, on the other hand, were mostly at no great distance from the sea, and their command of necessaries must consequently have been much superior to that of many districts of Greece proper.

μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, cp. 25, ἀμφοτέρων (i. e. γῆς καὶ θαλάττης) μετέχουσιν. Susemihl, following Bojesen, reads μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, referring to c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. and to c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq., but compare on the other hand 32, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας κ.τ.λ., and Plato, Laws 705 A (a passage perhaps present to Aristotle's mind here), πρόσοικος γὰρ θάλαττα χώρᾳ τὸ μὲν παρ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἡδύ, μάλα γε μὴν ὄντως ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα. The territory no less than the city may be said μετέχειν τῆς θαλάττης, for it draws part of its supplies from the sea and sends part of its

surplus produce away by sea, besides being more easily protected against foes. Aristotle had advised in c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. that the city should be well placed in relation both to its territory and to the sea. No one had disputed that it should be well placed in relation to its territory, but a doubt had been raised whether it ought to stand in any relation whatever to the sea. Hence what is uppermost in Aristotle's mind is to show that it should not be far from the sea. That it will be well placed in relation to its territory, he takes for granted.

**21.** καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For evidence of this fact, see vol. i. p. 317. Compare also Thuc. 5. 82. 5 sq. The successful resistance of the seaport Stralsund to the besieging army of Wallenstein illustrates Aristotle's remark. 'The problem of overcoming the resistance of a fortress open to unlimited succours by sea is one of the most difficult in the whole art of war' (S. R. Gardiner, Thirty Years' War, p. 107). The Duke of Wellington preferred Calcutta to Agra as the seat of British Government in India (Lord Stanhope's Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 306). For *πρὸς τὸ ῥᾷον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους* (for so we should probably read with Sylburg in place of *τοὺς πολεμίους*, which is the reading of Γ Π), cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 27, *πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν*, and 2. 9. 1270 a 33, *μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις*.

**23.** καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι κ.τ.λ., 'and with a view to injuring assailants, if it should not be possible [to be easily succourable] both by land and by sea, the State will be more in a position to be so by one or the other, if it shares in both.' I do not think with Susemihl (Bericht über Aristoteles, etc., in the Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, lxxix. 1894, p. 273) that Argyriades is right in bracketing *πρός* before *τὸ βλάψαι*. The suppressed nom. to *δυνατόν* (*ἐστιν*) is not *τὸ βλάψαι*, but *τὸ εὐβοηθήτους εἶναι*. Greece defended itself in both ways against Xerxes, and Syracuse against Athens. Agrigentum, on the other hand, had no fleet when it was besieged by the Carthaginians (Diod. 13. 85 sqq.: Holm, Griech. Gesch. 2. 592). Athens would have had little prospect of success in the Peloponnesian War if she had only been able to strike at her assailants by land. The Lacedaemonian State suffered from not being able to attack its Theban invaders by sea. Compare a saying of Epaminondas (Aristid. Leuctr. 1. p. 421, 18, quoted by Schäfer, Demosth. 1. 104. 4), *λέγειν γὰρ ἔφη πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ πλεονεκτημάτων, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν θάλατταν δι' αὑτῶν ἕξουσιν.*

**25.** ὅσα τ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. It seems to be implied that the import and export of commodities was only possible by sea: Athens, however, imported many commodities by land (Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, καὶ ἔστι γῆν δὲ πολλὰ (ἡ Ἀττικὴ) δέχεται ἐμπόρια), and that there was traffic by land in Greece we see from Plato, Polit. 289 E, οἱ δὲ πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλάττοντες κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ πεζῇ. But the land-trade of Greece was not comparable in extent to its trade by sea (see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 444 sqq.).

**27.** αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικήν κ.τ.λ. takes up and justifies ὅσα τ' ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντα κ.τ.λ. A State may do things for itself which it would demean itself by doing for others (cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19 sqq. and 3. 4. 1277 b 5 sq.).

**29.** οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες κ.τ.λ. This remark is directed against Athens. Isocrates had claimed that in instituting a great mart at the Peiraeus, Athens had done Greece a service (Paneg. § 42); Aristotle, however, asserts that Athens had had the increase of her revenue in view. No doubt she derived a large revenue from the Peiraeus (see Xen. De Vect. 3. 12 sq., 4. 40, and [Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 a 5 sqq.), but the existence of a great emporium there also added largely to her influence; we see how bitterly the Megarians felt their exclusion from it (Thuc. 1. 67, 139). Among the chief sources of revenue at Athens were the fiftieth on exports and imports, the duty on sales, and the impost paid by metoeci (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 350 sqq.); the existence of a great emporium at the Peiraeus would largely increase the receipts from these and other sources. The revenue of States which did not possess an emporium must have been much smaller than the revenue of those which did. The revenue of inland States especially must have been limited, and few inland democracies can have been able to provide pay for attendance at meetings of the assembly and dicasteries.

**30.** τοιαύτης μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, 'to share in greed of this kind,' i. e. greed for revenue, for πλεονεξία probably does not mean 'gain' here, though it often bears this meaning. Cp. Plato, Tim. 27 C, πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν.

**32.** πολλαῖς . . . καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν, e. g. the territories and cities of Athens, Corinth, Megara, etc.

**33.** ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας. Ἐπίνεια are port-towns: cp. Suidas s.v., πόλισμα παραθαλάσσιον, ἔνθα τὰ νεώρια τῶν πόλεών εἰσιν, ὥσπερ Πειραιεὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Νίσαια τῆς Μεγαρίδος· δύνασαι δὲ ἐπὶ παντὸς

*ἐμπορίου καὶ παραθαλασσίου χρήσασθαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ, ὃ νῦν οἱ πολλοὶ κατάβολον καλοῦσιν.*

**εὐφυῶς κείμενα.** Cp. Diod. 13. 85. 4, *λόφον . . . κατὰ τῆς πόλεως εὐφυῶς κείμενον.*

**34. ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε πόρρω λίαν,** sc. *εἶναι*, 'so as neither to occupy the same city [as the buildings of the city] nor to be very far away.' The subject of *νέμειν* appears to be *ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας* understood, unless we supply *τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας.* Ἄστυ is used of the central city of the State lying round its central acropolis, in contradistinction to other cities comprised within the territory. For the omission of *εἶναι*, see above on 1277 a 38 and 1286 b 36. Cyllene, the port of Elis, and Gytheium, the port of Sparta, would be thought by Aristotle to be too far from Elis and Sparta.

**35. ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.,** 'but to be held in subjection by walls and other similar defences' (such as trenches, cp. Xen. Anab. 2. 4. 22).

**36. διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν,** 'through participation in them,' i. e. in ports and harbours.

**37. εἰ δέ τι βλαβερόν κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 952 D sqq. Compare the plan adopted by the people of Epidamnus of appointing a *πωλητής*, through whom alone all purchases from, and sales to, their Illyrian neighbours were to be made (Plut. Quaest. Gr. 29).

**41. βέλτιστον,** thus used, is less common in the Politics than *βέλτιον*, but we have it in Plato, Gorg. 500 C.

**οὐ γὰρ μόνον κ.τ.λ.** We read of Dionysius the Elder in Diod. 14. 107. 4 that he required Rhegium to surrender to him its fleet of seventy triremes, *διελάμβανε γὰρ τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν βοηθείας ἀποκλεισθείσης ῥᾳδίως ἐκπολιορκήσειν τὴν πόλιν.* For *αὐτοῖς φοβεροὺς εἶναι*, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 7–10 and 3. 15. 1286 b 27–31. Sections of the citizen-body were often the originators of *στάσις* (7 (5). 3–4) and might need to be controlled.

**3. περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους κ.τ.λ.,** 'but when we come 1327 b.
to the amount and magnitude of this force, with respect to that,' etc. For *πλήθους καὶ μεγέθους*, see above on 1326 b 30.

**4. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** That a Greek State could not live a life of hegemony without possessing a fleet, is virtually implied by the view, which dates back as far as the days of the Persian Wars, that a hegemony confined to the land is a 'lame hegemony' (Diod. 11.

50). Epaminondas held this view (see above on 1327 a 23, and also Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 416–419, and Schäfer, Demosthenes 1. 104 sq.).

5. πολιτικόν, 'spent in relations with other States,' not a solitary life, like that of the States referred to in c. 3. 1325 b 23 sqq. Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 22. Πολιτικόν is a broader term than ἡγεμονικόν, for a State may have political relations with others without standing to them in a relation of hegemony.

7. τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον, 'the excessive number of citizens which arises in connexion with the mass of trireme-oarsmen.' So Sus. 'jene Pöbelmenge die aus dem Schiffsvolk entspringt.' For γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 20, ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις. Γίγνεσθαι περί with the acc. means 'to happen to' in Plato, Protag. 309 B, and in Polyb. 1. 16. 7, 1. 22. 1, and 5. 110. 7, but I do not think that this is what it means here. As to πολυανθρωπία, see above on 1327 a 11. The Athenian demos was largely composed of trireme-oarsmen (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23).

11. πλήθους δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion of this sentence with that which precedes it would have been clearer if it had run, 'but the oarsmen need not be citizens, for, as a mass of perioeci and cultivators of the territory will be forthcoming, there will necessarily be no lack of sailors also.' Would Aristotle's serfs, who are not to be ὁμοειδεῖς, make good sailors? His plan of employing serfs as oarsmen had been anticipated not only at Heracleia on the Euxine, but also by Jason of Pherae (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 11, ἀνδρῶν γε μὴν ταύτας (sc. τὰς ναῦς) πληροῦν πότερον Ἀθηναίους ἢ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς μᾶλλον δύνασθαι, τοσούτους καὶ τοιούτους ἔχοντας πενέστας;). 'Quod idem nostra quoque aetate Veneti factitant, qui ad instruendas classes in agris delectum habere et valentiores agricolas triremibus adscribere consuerunt' (Giph. p. 945). Even at Athens, where a large section of the demos was composed of trireme-oarsmen (see above on 7), metoeci and aliens, and occasionally slaves, were also thus employed (Thuc. 1. 143, 3. 16, 8. 73 : Isocr. De Pace, §§ 48, 79). The oarsmen of the Lacedaemonian fleet were Helots or hired men (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 12).

13. ὁρῶμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. takes up 1327 a 32 sqq. Καὶ τοῦτο, 'this also,' i. e. τὸ ἀφθονίαν εἶναι ναυτῶν, as well as favourably situated ports and harbours. As to the fleet of the Pontic Heracleia, see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 12. 623. 3. Heracleia waged a vigorous

naval war with Leucon, prince of the Cimmerian Bosporus, who reigned from about B.C. 392 to 352. In later days (B.C. 280) her ships of war with five and six banks of oars and her one great *ὀκτήρης* helped Ptolemy Ceraunus to defeat the fleet of Antigonus Gonatas (Memnon, ap. Phot. Biblioth. p. 226 b 19 sqq. Bekker: Droysen, Gesch. des Hellenismus 2. 2. 332).

**14.** **Ἡρακλεωτῶν.** $P^{4.5}$ $S^{b}$ $V^{b}$ have *Ἡρακλειωτῶν*, but the forms *Ἡρακλεώτης*, *Ἡρακλεωτικός* appear elsewhere in Aristotle's writings without any recorded variant. *Ἡρακλειώτης* is the earlier form (see Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., p. 34, ed. 2) and appears in an Attic inscription prior to B.C. 403, but Aristotle probably used the form *Ἡρακλεώτης*, which is found in an Attic inscription of B.C. 298.

**15.** **τῷ μεγέθει**, i.e. in respect of the number of its citizens.

**16.** **λιμένων** is placed next to *χώρας*, because the harbours were to be outside the city, not, as was often the case, within it.

**πόλεων**, i.e. the *ἄστυ* and its *ἐπίνειον* or port.

**17.** **ἔστω διωρισμένα.** Cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 39, *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων.*

**19.** **πρότερον**, in c. 4. 1326 b 22 sqq.

**21.** **βλέψας κ.τ.λ.** A similar contrast is drawn between *αἱ ἐπιφανέσταται πόλεις* and *ἡ ὅλη οἰκουμένη* in Polyb. 1. 4. 6. The change in the preposition (*ἐπί—πρός*) finds many parallels in Aristotle's way of writing. Cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, *χωρὶς τά τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν*: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 38, *ὅσον εἰς γηδίου κτῆσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ γεωργίας*: 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 17, *οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν.* See also 2. 8. 1267 b 27, 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 33 sq., 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 38–41, and 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 16 sq.; and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 450. C. 7.

**22.** **ὡς διείληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν**, literally 'how it is divided into sections by nations': cp. c. 12. 1331 a 20, and Plato, Laws 886 A, *τὰ τῶν ὡρῶν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως, ἐναντοῖς τε καὶ μησὶ διειλημμένα*, and Phaedo 110 B, *ἡ γῆ αὕτη . . . ποικίλη, χρώμασι διειλημμένη.*

**23.** **τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'for the nations inhabiting cold countries, and in particular those in Europe,' etc. **Καί** introduces an explanation and limitation of *τὰ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη*, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, *τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν.* Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 435 E, and of Hippocrates, De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 547 sqq. Kühn, and esp. p. 553 (as Giph. points out, p. 948: see also Eaton): cp. Androt. Fragm. 36 (Müller, Fr. Hist.

Gr. 1. 375). Aristotle probably held that a connexion exists between coldness of climate and abundance of *θυμός*. He may have traced the connexion thus. Cold hardens the animal frame and makes it dry and earthy, not watery (De Gen. An. 5. 3. 783 a 15 sqq.), and animals in whose blood the earthy element predominates are spirited in character (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 33 sqq.), whereas those whose blood is of a more watery nature have a more subtle intelligence, and, if this wateriness is extreme, are cowardly (650 b 18 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 319, note 1, and De Part. An. 2. 2. 648 a 2–11. A different explanation may be deduced from passages in the Problems ascribed to Aristotle, which are not, however, one of his authentic works (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 100: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 96). Θυμός is connected with internal warmth (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 35, *θερμότητος γὰρ ποιητικὸν ὁ θυμός*: cp. Probl. 10. 60. 898 a 5, *ἢ ὅτι ὁ θυμὸς μετὰ θερμότητος; ὁ γὰρ φόβος κατάψυξις· ὅσων οὖν* (sc. ζῴων) *τὸ αἷμα ἔνθερμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ θυμοειδῆ*), and a cold climate, according to Probl. 14. 16. 910 a 38 sqq., makes the flesh close and solid, and so prevents the escape of the internal heat. As to the 'spirit' of the barbarians to whom Aristotle refers, cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 b 28, *διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν*: Polyb. 2. 35. 3, *διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην ἅπαν τὸ γινόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ βραβεύεσθαι*: Seneca, De Ira, 1. 11, quid Cimbrorum Teutonorumque tot millia superfusa Alpibus ita sustulit ut tantae cladis notitiam ad suos non nuntius sed fama pertulerit, nisi quod erat illis ira pro virtute, and 2. 15 (referred to by Giph. p. 948), 'ut scias,' inquit, 'iram habere in se generosi aliquid, liberas videbis gentes quae iracundissimae sunt, ut Germanos et Scythas' . . . Deinde omnes istae feritate liberae gentes, leonum luporumque ritu, ut servire non possunt, ita nec imperare. Non enim humani vim ingenii, sed feri et intractabilis habent: nemo autem regere potest, nisi qui et regi. Fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos qui mitiore caelo utuntur. As to the meaning of Εὐρώπη here, see vol. i. p. 318, note 3. In Hom. Hymn. in Apoll. 250 sq., 290 sq. Εὐρώπη is distinguished from the Peloponnese and the islands, but not from Hellas.

**25.** διόπερ κ.τ.λ., 'hence they continue comparatively free, but devoid of constitutional organization and unable to rule their neighbours.' They are free in comparison with Asiatics (3. 14.

1285 a 21). Aristotle can hardly include the Macedonians among the 'nations of Europe,' for they were not unable to rule over others, but does he regard them as Greeks? He is probably thinking of the Scythians, Thracians, and Illyrians among other European races: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 1. 4, *καὶ γάρ τοι τοσοῦτον διήνεγκε* (Κῦρος) *τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων . . . ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν Σκύθης, καίπερ παμπόλλων ὄντων Σκυθῶν, ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενὸς δύναιτ' ἂν ἔθνους ἐπάρξαι, ἀγαπᾷη δ' ἂν εἰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἔθνους ἄρχων διαγένοιτο, καὶ ὁ Θρᾷξ Θρᾳκῶν καὶ ὁ Ἰλλυριὸς Ἰλλυριῶν, καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως ἔθνη ἀκούομεν τὰ γοῦν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν αὐτόνομα εἶναι καὶ λελύσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων.* Contrast Isocr. Paneg. § 67, where the Scythians and Thracians, as well as the Persians, are described as *ἀρχικώτατα τῶν γενῶν καὶ μεγίστας δυναστείας ἔχοντα.*

**27. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν κ.τ.λ.** For *ἄθυμα*, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn, *περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀθυμίης τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀνανδρείης, ὅτι ἀπολεμώτεροί εἰσιν τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ Ἀσιηνοὶ καὶ ἡμερώτεροι τὰ ἤθεα κ.τ.λ.* Hippocrates, however, in the same treatise (p. 554 Kühn) says justly enough, *εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀσιηνοὺς διαφέροντας αὐτοὺς ἑωυτέων, τοὺς μὲν βελτίονας τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτέρους ἐόντας.* Would Aristotle say of the Persians (cp. c. 2. 1324 b 11) what he says of the Asiatics here? Modern observers take much the same view of Asiatic character. 'The Asiatic is as clever as the European with his hands and wits, though he lacks initiative and the power of government' (Speech of Sir H. H. Johnston, *Times*, Nov. 7, 1894). Aristotle's account of the Asiatics was hardly flattering to Alexander as the conqueror of Asia, nor did it lend support to his scheme of fusing Greeks and Asiatics. See on the subject vol. i. p. 319, note 3. Aristotle traces similar contrasts between animals to those which he here traces between the nations of Europe and Asia (Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 12, *διαφέρουσι δὲ* (*τὰ ζῷα*) *καὶ ταῖς τοιαῖσδε διαφοραῖς κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι πρᾶα καὶ δύσθυμα καὶ οὐκ ἐνστατικά, οἷον βοῦς, τὰ δὲ θυμώδη καὶ ἐνστατικὰ καὶ ἀμαθῆ, οἷον ὗς ἄγριος, τὰ δὲ φρόνιμα καὶ δειλά, οἷον ἔλαφος, δασύπους κ.τ.λ.*).

**28. διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ**, i.e. enslaved to their rulers. Kingship prevailed over most of Asia (Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn), and in many places of a despotic type (3. 14. 1285 a 16 sqq.).

**29. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος κ.τ.λ.** Contrast Isocrates' account of the difference between Greeks and barbarians in De Antid. § 293, *καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ προέχετε καὶ διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων οὐ ταῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείαις, οὐδ' ὅτι κάλλιστα πολιτεύεσθε καὶ μάλιστα φυλάττετε*

Cp. also Plato, Laws 717 D, *θυμουμένοις τε οὖν (τοῖς γονεῦσιν) ὑπείκειν δεῖ καὶ ἀποπιμπλᾶσι τὸν θυμόν . . . ξυγγιγνώσκοντα ὡς εἰκότως μάλιστα πατὴρ υἱεῖ δοξάζων ἀδικεῖσθαι θυμοῖτ' ἂν διαφερόντως*, and (with Eaton) Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 2, *καὶ τοῖς φίλοις (ὀργίζονται) μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις· οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἢ μή*. For *ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται*, cp. Probl. 27. 3. 947 b 32, *διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀναζεῖν καὶ τὸ ὀρίνεσθαι τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ταράττεσθαι, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς ἀλλ' οἰκείως*, and 2. 26. 869 a 5, *καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ζέσις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐστὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν*, and also Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adespota, 321 Nauck,

*πηδῶν ὁ θυμὸς τῶν φρενῶν ἀνωτέρω.*

**3. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος κ.τ.λ.**, 'hence Archilochus for instance' (see above on 1255 a 36), 'when he complains of his friends, fittingly enough discourses to his spirit [which is closely connected with friends, saying,] "For thy tortures surely were from friends."' See Archil. Fragm. 66, 67. For *ἀπάγχει*, cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 686 Didot, *ὃ μάλιστά μ' ἀπάγχει* ('excruciat').

**6. καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, i.e. the principle of rule and freedom as well as the capability of affection. Here Aristotle does not dissent from Plato, but agrees with him. He remembers Plato, Rep. 375 B, *ἦ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας ὡς ἄμαχόν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὗ παρόντος ψυχὴ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος;* where there is evidently a tacit reminiscence of the saying of Heraclitus quoted in 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 30 sq. Compare also Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 a 27, *ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ (ἀνδρεία)· ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται*, and Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 36, *ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν.*

**8. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ.** With **χαλεποὺς εἶναι** supply *δεῖν*, as in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3. See note on 1335 b 5. This takes up 1327 b 40, *πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας ἀγρίους*, and corrects Plato, Rep. 375 D sqq. Magnanimous men are fierce only to those who act unjustly, and so far from being fiercer to such persons when unknown to them, they will be fiercer to them when they are familiar friends. Plato, however, had himself said in Laws 731 B, *θυμοειδῆ μὲν δὴ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα εἶναι, πρᾷον δὲ ὡς ὅ τι μάλιστα.*

**10. πλήν.** Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares De An. 2. 1. 412 b 20, *ἧς ἀπολειπούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως.*

**13. παρ' οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'for in quarters in which they conceive there should be a feeling that the benefit conferred in the past is owed back [and ought to be requited], they think that in addition

to the injury done them they are defrauded also of the benefit.' Aristotle mentions in Rhet. 2. 8. 1386 a 11, among things that arouse compassion, *τὸ ὄθεν προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶξαι, κακόν τι συμβῆναι.*

**15.** **ὄθεν εἴρηται** "**χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν.**" We learn from Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 5, *χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν, ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκεν, ὄντες, χαλεπώτατοι τοῖς γονεῦσιν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν*, that this is a fragment of Euripides (Fragm. 965): cp. Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 228 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 355), *ἡ τῶν ξυγγενέων ἔχθρη τῆς τῶν ὀθνείων χαλεπωτέρη μάλα.*

**16.** **οἵ τοι πέρα κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Plato, Rep. 563 E, *καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην φλεῖ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι ἐν ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα.*

**17.** **τῶν πολιτευομένων**, 'those who exercise the rights of citizens in the State': cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 40 and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, and also 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 4 sq.

**18.** For **πόσην**, see above on 1326 a 5.

**19.** **οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'for we must not aim at the same exactness of detail by means of theoretical inquiries as is realized by means of what is presented to us through sense-perception.' For *ζητεῖν διὰ τῶν λόγων κ.τ.λ.*, cp. c. 17. 1336 a 5 sqq., and Plut. Pericl. c. 9, *θεωρείσθω διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἡ αἰτία τῆς μεταβολῆς.* For *τῶν γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως*, cp. De Caelo, 3. 4. 303 a 22, *καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐνδόξων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀναιρεῖν*, and for the contrast of *οἱ λόγοι* and *τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως*, see Bon. Ind. 20 b 30–39, and above on 1261 b 29. The double *διά* is awkward, but of this kind of awkwardness there are many instances in the Politics: see 2. 6. 1266 a 21 sq., 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 1 sqq., and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 9 sqq. The same thing happens with other prepositions—with *πρός* in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 18 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 38, with *περί* in 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 35 sq. and 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 34, and with *ἐν* in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 29 sq. and 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 2.

**21 sqq.** Aristotle here passes on to the question who are to be 'parts of the State.' It is from cc. 8–10 that we learn most of the little that he tells us as to the constitutional and social organization of his 'best State.' He begins by laying down a principle which holds of all things existing by nature, and therefore of the *πόλις*, and indeed of all *κοινωνίαι* which issue in 'something one in kind.' In all things that exist by nature the necessary conditions of the existence of the thing are to be distinguished from its parts. Not C. 8.

all the necessary conditions are parts of the thing, but only those which have something in common. In a πόλις the 'something in common' is 'the best attainable life' (1328 a 36), or in other words εὐδαιμονία, and as this is inseparable from virtue (c. 9. 1329 a 22), no class of persons is rightly a part of the State whose occupation precludes its attainment of virtue. Hence cultivators, artisans, day-labourers (c. 9. 1329 a 35 sq.), and traders (c. 9. 1328 b 39) are not to be parts of the State, or in other words are not to be citizens. The classes which will be parts of the State and which will constitute its citizen-body will be τὸ πολεμικόν (c. 9. 1329 a 2), or rather τὸ ὁπλιτικόν (c. 9. 1329 a 31, 37), τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων, and τὸ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων. Aristotle takes no notice here of a class which he recognizes in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 34 sqq., the official class (τὸ δημιουργικόν), but this also he would no doubt reckon as a part of the State. He is not, however, satisfied with excluding from citizenship the classes which are not δημιουργοὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς (c. 9. 1329 a 20); he requires that those who exercise deliberative and judicial functions in his 'best State' shall be over a certain age and yet not too old. In other words he gives supreme authority in his State to men of mature but not too advanced age, who will be presumably possessed of φρόνησις. Plato in his Republic had reserved the rule of the State for a special class of men highly gifted in intellect and character and prepared for rule by a long-continued philosophical training, but Aristotle does not think that the soldiers of the State would submit to be ruled by a class into which they would not ultimately rise; he also insists rather on the possession of φρόνησις by his rulers than on a philosophical training, and φρόνησις is according to him the fruit in fit minds of a ripe age. He follows in fact rather in the track of Plato's Laws than in that of his Republic, for Plato had required in the Laws that the holders of the chief offices should be men of mature years. But Plato had not, like Aristotle, arranged that deliberative and judicial functions should be withdrawn from men over a certain age, though he contemplates in Rep. 498 C the retirement of infirm old men from political and military duties. This was, it would seem, a more or less novel suggestion. Its importance was no doubt brought home to Aristotle's mind by his observation of the ill effects of advanced age on the holders of life-offices in the Lacedaemonian State (2. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), and probably also in many oligarchies. It will be

noticed that in Aristotle's 'best State' the right of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance would rest, not with the soldiers who would have to fight for the State in case of war, but with the older citizens (contrast the view of the young Archidamus in Isocr. Archid. § 3 sqq.), and that judicial authority, including no doubt the momentous right of inflicting the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, would also rest with the older citizens. Aristotle evidently thinks that the prospect of succeeding to these great powers after the attainment of a certain age would reconcile the younger citizens to their non-possession of them. He appears to allow the younger citizens to be owners of land (c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.), and perhaps to hold all but the chief military offices. But they are to have nothing to do with deliberative or judicial functions. In this Aristotle would seem to go too far. The attainment of a certain age has often been made a condition of the tenure of the highest political offices. This was the case at Rome (Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 242). Even restrictions of this kind would now and then exclude a William the Silent or a William Pitt. But it is one thing to impose a limit of age on the tenure of the highest offices and another to exclude the younger men from the exercise of all deliberative and judicial functions. How is the future statesman to learn his business, if his earlier career is to be exclusively devoted to the profession of arms, and he is not allowed to hold even minor civil offices? Aristotle is evidently too uncompromising, but we must bear in mind two things, if we wish to do him justice—(1) that he desires supreme authority in the State to be in the hands of those who are morally as well as politically ripe for its exercise; he desires Reason to rule in the State as it rules in the well-constituted individual; (2) that one of his aims is the limitation of war and of indiscriminate conquest, and that his exclusion of the more martially-disposed part of the citizen-body from supreme power in his 'best State' is closely connected with this aim. Nothing had done more to break up and weaken Greece in the fourth century B.C. than the incessant wars which had been waged between the various States—between the Lacedaemonians and the Thebans, the Thebans and the Phocians, the Thessalians of Pherae and the Thessalians of Larissa—and Aristotle may well have thought that the best way to check these wars was to place supreme power in the hands of the older citizens.

21. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but since, as in the other things which are constituted according to nature, not all those things are parts of the whole organization without which the whole would not exist, it is evident that neither must all those things be taken to be parts of the State which must necessarily be possessed by States, nor must we take as parts of any other union issuing in something one in kind all the things which are essential to such an union.' As this sentence stands, the words *τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων* would seem to be in the gen. after *τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως*, but it is probable that Aristotle began the sentence with the intention of making these words in the gen. after *μόρια* and inserted *τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως* only by an afterthought. For the thought, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, *τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις*, and for the distinction between *ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ* and *μέρη*, cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Eud. 1. 2. 1214 b 26, *ὧν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τ' εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσιν*. Plato had already drawn a similar distinction: cp. Polit. 287 D, *ὅσαι γὰρ σμικρὸν ἢ μέγα τι δημιουργοῦσι κατὰ πόλιν ὄργανον, θετέον ἁπάσας ταύτας ὡς οὔσης συναιτίους· ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο πόλις οὐδὲ πολιτική, τούτων δ' αὖ βασιλικῆς ἔργον τέχνης οὐδέν που θήσομεν*, and (with Eaton) Phaedo 99 B, and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 331. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 360, note 1). *Τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτα* are so termed in contradistinction to *τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης* and to *τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης* and *ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου* (De Part. An. 1. 1. 640 a 27–b 4). They are things which have in them a principle of motion and rest, whether that motion takes the form of locomotion, or increase and decay, or alteration: cp. Phys. 2. 1. 192 b 8, *τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν. πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥηθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν* (whereas the products of art have no such principle of motion and rest in them, except accidentally, so far as they are formed of earth or stone or other natural entities). Some of these natural entities are eternal, others are subject to generation and decay (De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 22 sqq.); some of them are bodies and magnitudes (for instance, the human body), others possess body and magnitude (for instance, a human being), others are principles within beings possessing

body and magnitude (for instance, the soul): cp. De Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 4 sqq., and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 384. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 417, note 2). The *πόλις*, we learn from the passage before us, belongs to the class of natural entities; it must belong to the subdivision of this class which consists of 'things possessing body and magnitude.' As to the words *οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς, ἐξ ἧς ἕν τι τὸ γένος*, see vol. i. p. 43, note 1.

**27.** *οἷον εἴτε τροφὴ* κ.τ.λ. Food is the 'common thing' in the case of a *συσσίτιον*, a certain amount of land in the case of the owners of an undivided estate (2. 5. 1263 b 23 sq.).

**28.** *ὅταν δ' ᾖ* κ.τ.λ. That there is nothing in common between the craftsman who uses an instrument and the instrument used, we learn in Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32, *ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οἷον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος*: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 17–24 and 7. 10. 1242 a 11 sqq. A slightly different lesson is taught in the passage before us. Here we learn that there is nothing in common between the instrument and the craftsman on the one hand and the product they bring into being on the other, except this, that the instrument and the craftsman act and the product is acted upon. That where one thing acts and another is acted upon there must be something common to the two things, we see from De An. 3. 4. 429 b 22, *ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηδενὶ μηδὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν· ᾗ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν*. But two things thus related to each other need not have much in common: see vol. i. p. 323, note 1. The usual antithesis to *ποιεῖν* is *πάσχειν*, not *λαμβάνειν*, but we find *λαμβάνειν τὴν μορφήν* contrasted with *ποιεῖν* in De Gen. An. 1. 21. 729 b 6 sqq.: cp. also Hist. An. 6. 23. 577 a 29 sqq., where *λαμβάνειν* = *δέχεσθαι*. In the passage before us the instrument and the craftsman who uses it are said *ποιῆσαι* and the work produced by them *λαβεῖν*.

**34.** *οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως*, because property stands to the *πόλις* as a means stands to the end to which it is a means, and thus there is nothing in common between property and the *πόλις* except that the former acts on the *πόλις* and the *πόλις*

is acted upon. It follows that slaves, who are animate articles of property—and *χερνῆτες*, including *βάνανσοι τεχνῖται*, are brought under the head of slaves in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq.—are not parts of the State. 'It was a maxim of ancient jurisprudence,' says Gibbon (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, c. 2), 'that a slave had not any country of his own; he acquired with his liberty an admission into the political society of which his patron was a member.' Contrast with *οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως*, Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 10, *πόλις μὲν οὖν οἰκιῶν πλῆθός ἐστι καὶ χώρας καὶ χρημάτων αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.*

**35.** *ἡ δὲ πόλις* κ.τ.λ. *Τῶν ὁμοίων* is emphatic. *Κοινωνία τις*, because there are other *κοινωνίαι τῶν ὁμοίων* besides the *πόλις*, e.g. trading or religious associations. For the thought, cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25, *βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα.* When Aristotle says in 2. 2. 1261 a 22, *οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων*, he is thinking of the distinction between rulers and ruled, so far as he is not using the word *πόλις* in a wider sense (see vol. i. p. 40).

**37.** *αὕτη δὲ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 13. 1332 a 7 sqq.

**38.** *τέλειος* is here the fem., as in Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 16, Metaph. Δ. 6. 1016 b 17, and Phys. 8. 8. 264 b 28. In c. 13. 1332 a 9 we have *χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν*, and the form *τελεία* seems to be the commoner form of the fem. in Aristotle's writings, to judge by the Index Aristotelicus.

*συμβέβηκε δὲ* κ.τ.λ. Slaves have no share in happiness (3. 9. 1280 a 33). *Βάνανσοι, ἀγοραῖοι*, and *γεωργοί* live lives unfavourable to virtue (c. 9. 1328 b 40 sqq.), and so do not share in happiness. There are persons excluded from happiness on account of some defect of nature or fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sq.). For *συμβαίνειν ὥστε*, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 34 sq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12.

**40.** *δῆλον ὡς* κ.τ.λ. For the various accounts given in the Politics of the causes of constitutional diversity, see vol. i. p. 220 sqq. For *εἴδη καὶ διαφοράς*, cp. Phys. 3. 5. 205 b 31, *τόπου δὲ εἴδη καὶ διαφοραὶ τἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὄπισθεν καὶ δεξιὸν καὶ ἀριστερόν.*

**41.** *ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον* κ.τ.λ. *Ἄλλον τρόπον* is a wider expression than *δι' ἄλλων*, which is added in explanation and to give increased precision to its meaning. Cp. c. 15. 1334 b 5, *πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται*, and 3. 18. 1288 a 39. For *τούς τε βίους καὶ τὰς πολιτείας*, cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40, *ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως.* For the

middle ποιοῦνται, 'make for themselves' (not ποιοῦσιν), cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31, συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος, and Meteor. 1. 5. 342 b 22, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων φασμάτων ὅσα ταχείας ποιεῖται τὰς φαντασίας.

2. καὶ πόσα κ.τ.λ., i.e. not only what the parts of the State are, 1328 b.
but also how many are the things without which the State cannot exist. For the omission of the article before πόλις, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις, and 2. 2. 1261 a 24, οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων: also 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 34 sq.

4. ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη (ἃ) ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. See critical note.

5. τῶν ἔργων, 'the services which a State needs' (cp. 1328 b 19, ἐργασίας).

ἔσται δῆλον, i.e. πόσα ταυτί ἐστιν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

6. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 369 C, ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρειῶν ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ ζῆν ἕνεκα. Παντάπασί γε. Δευτέρα δὴ οἰκήσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Ἔστι ταῦτα: also Critias 110 C, ᾤκει δὲ δὴ τότ' ἐν τῇδε τῇ χώρᾳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔθνη τῶν πολιτῶν περὶ τὰς δημιουργίας ὄντα καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφήν, τὸ δὲ μάχιμον ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν θείων κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφορισθὲν ᾤκει χωρὶς κ.τ.λ.

7. ὀργάνων. Cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 20, καὶ ἐσθὴς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα.

8. καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς, 'within their own body also,' as well as in the hands of any mercenaries they may employ or any allies they may possess. Cp. Plato, Laws 697 E, where the misery of a State dependent for its defence on mercenaries is depicted, and Philoch. Fragm. 132 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 406), μὴ ξενικὴν ἀλλ' αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq., and Thuc. 1. 121, δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἷοί τ' ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μεῖζον τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας· ὠνητὴ γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἡ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία.

πρός τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν. Cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 27–31.

10. χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, 'a certain abundance of money,' in contradistinction to εὐπορία τροφῆς, ὀργάνων, etc.

11. καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς. Schneider, Bekker², and Susemihl add τάς before πολεμικάς, but cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχειν. 'In the non-repetition of the article, and also of prepositions, Aristotle appears, if I do not mistake, to go further than other prose-writers' (Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 3. 330).

**12.** καὶ πρῶτον, 'and first in excellence,' cp. Isocr. Areop. § 29. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς, ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον. Τὰ δαιμόνια are placed first in the list of subjects of official competence given in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40. τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης (πολιτείας), and Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 23, τῶν δὲ κτημάτων πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ ἡγεμονικώτατον· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἄνθρωπος.

**13.** πάντων ἀναγκαιότατον. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 5 sqq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 22–b 2.

**15.** μὲν οὖν is answered by δέ, 24. Susemihl places in a parenthesis everything between ἡ γάρ, 16, and συμφερόντων, 23, but the parenthesis should stop at ταύτην, 19, for ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, 19, introduces an inference from 15, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν.

**17.** ὡς φαμέν. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 12 sq.: 3. 1. 1275 b 20 sq.: 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 26.

ἐὰν δέ τι τυγχάνῃ τούτων ἐκλεῖπον κ.τ.λ. Τούτων, sc. τῶν ἔργων. This would be the case in the ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις of Plato, Rep. 369 C–E, where there are no soldiers or priests or men of judicial or deliberative skill. For τὴν κοινωνίαν ταύτην, 'the society in which this occurs,' see above on 1276 a 14.

**19.** κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν, 'should be composed in accordance with these industries': cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα (i. e. ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία) κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην.

**20.** Aristotle forgets that herdsmen, fishermen, and hunters are also providers of food.

**22.** κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων. Lamb., followed by Bekk.[2] and Sus., reads δικαίων in place of ἀναγκαίων (cp. 14 sq.), but compare the passages collected in vol. i. p. 323, note 2, and also Polyaen. Strateg. 6. 1. 5, ὡς συμβούλῳ χρησόμενος τῶν ἀναγκαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 40, τούτοις οὖν προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ἐὰν ὑμῖν δόξῃ δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντα τῷ κοινῷ, προσθήσω δ' ὅτι καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, συγχωρήσατε ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τυχεῖν ἑκόντες. Judges are probably included under κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, the broad term τὰ ἀναγκαῖα comprising τὰ δίκαια τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

C. 9. **25.** πάντων τούτων, sc. τῶν ἔργων.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for it is possible that the same men should be all of them both cultivators and artisans and the deliberators and judges.' Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2 sqq.

**27.** ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους ὑποθετέον, 'or whether for each of the above-mentioned services we are to assume the existence of a separate class.' For *καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων*, not *καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων ἔργων*, see note on 1283 b 4, *καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων*.

**29.** οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτείᾳ, 'but the same arrangement does not prevail in every constitution.'

καθάπερ εἴπομεν, in 24–28.

**31.** ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these differing arrangements as to participation [besides being different themselves] also make constitutions different.' This proves their possibility. Cp. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sqq.

**34.** αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 2. 1324 a 23 sqq.

**36.** εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 1. 1323 b 29 sqq.

**38.** τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, 'that which possesses men absolutely just and not merely just relatively to the principle which may happen to be taken as the groundwork of the State': cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq.: 2. 9. 1269 a 32 sqq. See also Bon. Ind. 797 a 52 sqq.

**39.** οὔτε βάναυσον βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας. Plato had already forbidden the citizens of the State of the Laws, or even their slaves, to practise a handicraft (846 D), and had forbidden the practice of retail trade with a view to money-making to any one except strangers (847 D: 849 C sq.: 920 A). Thus he goes farther in this matter than Aristotle.

**40.** ἀγεννὴς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq., and (with Eaton) 1. 11. 1258 b 38, *ἀγεννέσταται δὲ (τῶν ἐργασιῶν) ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς*.

πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος. Plato (Laws 920 B) had reckoned retail trade among the *ἐπιτηδεύματα ἃ προτροπὴν ἔχει τινὰ ἰσχυρὰν πρὸς τὸ προτρέπειν κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι*. He has in his mind not only the adulteration practised by retailers (Laws 917 E, 920 C), but also their habit of exacting an excessive profit (Laws 918 D, 920 C).

**41.** οὐδὲ δή. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 10. 1142 b 6, *οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία*, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 173 a 33 sqq.

τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι, sc. *πολίτας*. Omissions of this kind are not rare in the Politics: see vol. ii. p. li, note 4, and note on 1266 b 1.

1329 a. **1. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** For the connexion of leisure with virtue and capacity for rule, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 28, *σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γενόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν*: 2. 11. 1273a 24, *ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν*: 2. 9. 1269a 34 sqq. Compare also Eurip. Suppl. 406 Bothe (420 Dind.),

*γαπόνος δ' ἀνὴρ πένης,*
*εἰ καὶ γένοιτο μὴ ἀμαθής, ἔργων ὕπο*
*οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο πρὸς τὰ κοίν' ἀποβλέπειν.*

**4. καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα,** 'and evidently are in an especial sense parts of the State, [so that there is no question to be raised as to their citizenship, such as has been raised as to the citizenship of the *βάναυσοι* and *γεωργοί*].'

**5. ἕτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετέον.** Susemihl, following Coray and Bekk.[2], inserts *ἑτέροις* after *ἕτερα*, but cp. c. 10. 1329 a 41, *ὅτι δεῖ διῃρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν.*

**6. ἄμφω,** sc. *τὰ ἔργα*, i. e. *τὸ πολεμεῖν* and *τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν*: cp. 8, *ἑκάτερον τῶν ἔργων.*

**φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο.** It has already (1328 b 37) been said to be *φανερόν* that the citizens must not be *βάναυσοι* or *ἀγοραῖοι* or *γεωργοί.*

**διότι τρόπον μέν τινα κ.τ.λ.** Cp. c. 14. 1332 b 41, *ἔστι μὲν ἅρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἑτέρους.* For *καί* before *ἑτέροις*, see above on 1324 a 19.

**8. ἑτέρας ἀκμῆς,** 'a different prime.' Warlike activity suits the prime of the body, which, according to Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sqq., falls between thirty and thirty-five years of age, whereas deliberative and judicial activity suits the prime of the soul and the intelligence, which Aristotle places at forty-nine (ibid.) or fifty (Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 32 sqq.). Plato places the prime both of body and of wisdom for men between thirty and fifty-five years of age; he does not seem to have discriminated the two primes, like Aristotle: cp. Rep. 460 E, *ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν, ἔφη, αὕτη ἀκμὴ σώματός τε καὶ φρονήσεως.*

**9. δυνάμεως = *ἰσχύος***: cp. c. 17. 1336 a 4 and 5 (8). 4. 1339a 4.

**ᾗ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων κ.τ.λ.** Eaton compares Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 79 and Thuc. 3. 27. Cp. also Plut. Aristid. c. 22.

**12.** For the construction of **μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν,** cp. Plato, Rep. 429 B, *οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, εἶπον, οἵ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ δειλοὶ ἢ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες κύριοι ἂν εἶεν ἢ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοίαν.*

**13. λείπεται τοίνυν κ.τ.λ.,** 'the only course left, then, is to assign these constitutional rights' (i. e. those of fighting, judging, and

deliberating) 'to the same men and to both classes' (i.e. both to those who have strength and to those who have wisdom), 'not however simultaneously; but in the natural order of things strength is found in younger men and wisdom in older men; therefore it is advantageous that distribution should be made to both classes in this way' (i. e. so that fighting should fall to the younger men, and deliberating and judging to the older men), 'and it is just that this should be so, for this division of functions has in it conformity to desert.' Ἀποδιδόναι takes up τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω, 6. For τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, see note on 1264 a 38. There is, however, just a possibility that πολιτείαν has been repeated from the preceding line by an error on the part of the copyist of the archetype and has taken the place of λειτουργίαν or τάξιν or some such word: cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 20, where πολιτείας, repeated from πολιτικόν in the preceding line, has taken the place of βοηθείας in Γ $M^{s}$ and Vat. Pal. Vict. interprets τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην 'hanc curam in republica' and Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 47 sq.) 'hanc partem reipublicae administrandae.' Sus. would substitute ἀμφότερα for ἀμφοτέροις and ταῦτα for ταύτην (Mr. Welldon follows him in the former change but not in the latter), and would make τὴν πολιτείαν (in the sense of 'the best constitution') the subject of ἀποδιδόναι. But perhaps no change in ἀμφοτέροις is necessary. The reading ἀμφοτέροις is supported by ἀμφοῖν, 16. For ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 11, ᾗ πέφυκεν, and Meteor. 2. 4. 360 b 2, ὡς πέφυκεν. For the addition of καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι (sc. οὕτως), compare the addition of καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον in 3. 17. 1287 b 37 sqq. and that of καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν in 1. 9. 1256 b 40. Welldon, however, may possibly be right in reading δίκαιόν ἐστιν in place of δίκαιον εἶναι (see critical note). In assigning strength to younger men and wisdom to older, Aristotle perhaps has before him Hom. Il. 13. 727–734, 19. 216–219, and 3. 108 sqq.: cp. also Eurip. Fragm. 293 and 511, and Aeschin. c. Timarch. cc. 24, 139. Wisdom was often ascribed not to πρεσβύτεροι, but to old men (e. g. by Pindar, Fragm. 182, cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 10, and Plato, Laws 653 A: by Sophocles, Fragm. 240, contrast Eurip. Fragm. 25: and by Euripides, Fragm. 622), but Aristotle ascribes it to πρεσβύτεροι. What exact age Aristotle designates by this word, it is difficult to say. In c. 16. 1335 b 29 (see note) those over fifty or even fifty-five years of age are referred to: on the other hand, in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 23 οἱ πρεσβύτεροι are contrasted not with οἱ νεώτεροι, but with

οἱ νέοι. As the prime of the intelligence is placed by him at forty-nine or fifty (see above on 8), perhaps this is the age intended. Alcibiades was probably about thirty-five when he became the advocate of the Syracusan expedition. The saying of Eupolis in his Demi, μὴ παιδὶ τὰ κοινά (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 467: cp. Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 128), was famous. Aristophanes makes the Athenian Demos say of the young men (Eq. 1382 Didot: cp. Isocr. Areop. § 45),

μὰ Δί', ἀλλ' ἀναγκάσω κοσσυγιστεῖν ἐγὼ
τούτους ἅπαντας, πανσαμένους ψηφισμάτων.

In the Polity or moderate Democracy which existed at Syracuse before the Athenian attack, the younger men were excluded from office by law (Thuc. 6. 38. 5). We read in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 31, νόμος δὲ ἦν Χαλκιδεῦσι μὴ ἄρξαι μηδὲ πρεσβεῦσαι νεώτερον ἐτῶν πεντήκοντα. A somewhat similar principle underlay the *ordo magistratuum* at Rome. Alcibiades, on the other hand, contends in Thuc. 6. 18. 6 that deliberation is most likely to be successful when it is carried on by old and young men together: compare the arguments put in the mouth of the young Archidamus by Isocrates (Archid. § 3 sqq.).

17. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes on from the γεωργοί, τεχνῖται, τὸ μάχιμον, and the κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων (c. 8. 1328 b 20 sqq.) to τὸ εὔπορον (1328 b 22), and in 1329 a 27 sqq. to οἱ ἱερεῖς. Περὶ τούτους corresponds to τούτων, 25 (Bon. Ind. 579 *b* 43 sqq.). By τούτους Aristotle means soldiers, judges, and deliberators (cp. c. 10. 1329 b 36 sqq.). I add εἶναι with Bekk., Sus., and others, though its omission may possibly be defensible, cp. c. 10. 1330 a 25, where however there is an εἶναι close at hand, and Rhet. 3. 12. 1414 a 18, τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἡδεῖαν δεῖ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, περίεργον, and see Vahlen on Poet. c. 24. 1459 *b* 7. Εὐπορία must be possessed by the citizens, for otherwise they will not be at leisure to attend to politics.

21. τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν. This phrase comes from Plato, Rep. 500 D, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ξυμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; It is, however, implied in the saying of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 326 E, τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. Contrast the description of the χρηματιστής in Plato, Gorg. 452 C as πλούτου δημιουργός.

τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but this' (i.e. the fact that βάναυσοι and generally

those who are not producers of virtue ought not to be citizens) 'is manifest from the principle which forms the basis of our State, for happiness must be forthcoming in it in close alliance with virtue, and we should pronounce a State happy, looking not to a part of it, but to all its citizens, [so that all the citizens must be virtuous, whence it follows that *βάναυσοι* and their likes must not be citizens].' In requiring that all the citizens shall be happy, Aristotle here goes beyond 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq., and in requiring that they shall all be virtuous beyond 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq. For *τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς*, cp. c. 9. 1328 b 35, *τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται πρότερον*, and Plato, Laws 742 E, *σχεδὸν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαίμονας ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι.*

**25.** *φανερὸν δὲ* κ.τ.λ., 'and this also is evident that the landed properties should belong to these' (i.e. to the soldiers, judges, and deliberators), 'if, as is the case,' etc. The landed properties might have been given to the cultivators (to whom Plato had given them in the Republic, 2. 5. 1264 a 32 sqq.), if it were not necessary that they should be slaves or barbarian serfs.

**28.** *οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν* κ.τ.λ. Compare the regulation as to the purchase of a priesthood in Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 369, *ὠνείσθω δὲ ὅς* [*κα ἢι ὁλ*]*όκληρος καὶ ὧι δαμοσιοργίας* [*μέτεστι*], and see Haussoullier's note quoted by Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 323, note 5, and also No. 358, *μὴ ἐξεῖναι κα*[*τάρ*]*χεσθαι εἰς τὸ Ἡραί*[*ον*] *ξένωι μηδενί*, and [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 73.

**30.** *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ. The reasoning is—the gods should be worshipped by citizens, but we have ranged all the active citizens either in the hoplite or in the deliberative class (Aristotle here appears to merge the judicial in the deliberative class: cp. 1328 b 26, *τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ διαζοντας*, and 1329 a 3 sq.), so that we must assign the priesthoods to those of the citizens who are past the age for work. Citizens who are past work are still *πως πολῖται* (3. 1. 1275 a 14 sqq.). Aristotle thinks it fitting that the easy and recreative work of paying honour to the gods should fall, not, as was often the case in Greece, to those whose strength was unimpaired, but to those who had become infirm through age (cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20 sqq., where easy harmonies are recommended to *οἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον*). Plato, on the contrary, had advised (Rep. 498 C sqq.) that in old age, when strength declines and military and political work is over, men who are to be happy should reserve themselves exclusively for philosophy. See also on this subject

vol. i. p. 329 sq. At Sparta men of advanced years were allowed to discharge important public functions (2. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), and this Aristotle does not approve. He does not intend to withdraw from the *βασιλεῖς, ἄρχοντες*, or *πρυτάνεις* the public sacrifices connected with the common hearth of the State which it was their function to offer (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.). These were not priestly sacrifices, and it is of priests alone that Aristotle is speaking in the passage before us. *Ἀνάπαυσις* is rather 'relaxation' than 'repose': cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. For the connexion of relaxation with the worship of the gods, cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24, *τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις παρέχοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς*, and Plato, Rep. 364 E (where Stallbaum compares Hdt. 8. 99, *ἐν θυσίῃσί τε καὶ εὐπαθίῃσι*, and 9. 11, *Ὑακίνθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε*), and Laws 803 D sq.

**34. ὧν μὲν τοίνυν . . . 1329 b 35, ζητεῖν.** I incline to regard this passage as an interpolation and as not being from the pen of Aristotle. As to 40, *ἔοικε δὲ . . .* 1329 b 35, *ζητεῖν*, I have already spoken in vol. i. Appendix E, and if we reject this passage, as we should probably do, it is difficult to retain the recapitulation, 34, *ὧν μὲν τοίνυν . . .* 39, *κατὰ μέρος*. For this recapitulation cannot have been immediately followed by the second recapitulation 1329 b 36, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . .* 39, *χώραν*, and to expunge (with Sus.) this second recapitulation is not advisable, for then the mention of *τῆς διανομῆς* in 39 becomes extremely abrupt, inasmuch as the reference to the territory which prepares the way for it in the text as it stands will have disappeared. The passage 40, *ἔοικε δὲ . . .* 1329 b 35, *ζητεῖν* appears still more clearly to have been interpolated. It may have been originally an annotation written by some member of the Peripatetic School on the margin of his copy of the Politics, and may have crept from the margin into the text. It is apparently intended to excuse and account for the absence of a special investigation of the question whether the fighting class should be distinct from the cultivating class. Thus we are told at its close (1329 b 33 sqq.) that it is useless to waste time in investigating what is well settled, and that one should investigate only what has been overlooked. It should be noticed that it says nothing of the existence in India both of castes and of a distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes, though Megasthenes, not very long after the time when the Politics was written, testified to this (ap. Strab. p. 703, *φησὶ δὴ* (*ὁ Μεγασθένης*) *τὸ τῶν Ἰνδῶν πλῆθος εἰς ἑπτὰ μέρη*

διῃρῆσθαι κ.τ.λ.), but it would be rash to conclude that, if the passage is an interpolation, its author wrote before the publication of Megasthenes' work. That it stood where it stands in the Politics in the days of the authority followed by Stobaeus in his account (Ecl. 2. 6. 17) of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics is likely, for he says of the distribution of functions between the young, the elders, and the old, *ταύτην δ' ἀρχαίαν εἶναι πάνυ τὴν διάταξιν, Αἰγυπτίων πρώτων καταστησαμένων, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐχ ἧττον*, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of c. 10. The late Prof. Chandler and Bojesen, indeed, contented themselves with rejecting only a part of the passage 1329 a 40 . . . b 35; the former rejected 1329 b 3, *τά τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην* . . . 25, **Σεσώστριος**, and the latter 1329 b 5, *ἀρχαία* . . . 25, **Σεσώστριος**. The part they reject is certainly the most evidently spurious part, but much suspicion also attaches to the part which they retain, 1329 b 25–35 (see vol. i. Appendix E), and on the whole I incline to reject the entire passage 1329 a 40–b 35, together with the recapitulation which precedes it, 1329 a 34–39.

**35. γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ** κ.τ.λ., 'for cultivators and artisans and the whole class of labourers are a necessary appurtenance of the State' (literally, 'a thing necessary to belong to States'): compare for the construction c. 10. 1330 a 3, *περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι* (sc. *τὰ συσσίτια*) *ταῖς εὖ κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν*, and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 7, *ὃ τούτων οὐδὲν ἧττόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν*, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 643 C, *ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι*.

**37. τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν.** For the absence of the article before *βουλευτικόν*, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 8, *τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν*.

**38. καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ** κ.τ.λ. For *καὶ* . . . *δή* see above on 1253 a 18. *Κατὰ μέρος*, Vict. 'per vices,' i.e. in such a way that the one succeeds the other.

**40. Ἔοικε δὲ** κ.τ.λ. As has been pointed out in vol. i. Appendix E, Greek writers are always glad to claim the authority of antiquity in support of their suggestions. Reference has already there been made to Demosth. in Lept. c. 89: compare also Lucian, De Saltat. c. 7, *καὶ πρῶτόν γε ἐκεῖνο πάνυ ἠγνοηκέναι μοι δοκεῖς, ὡς οὐ νεώτερον τὸ τῆς ὀρχήσεως ἐπιτήδευμα τοῦτό ἐστιν, οὐδὲ χθὲς καὶ πρώην ἀρξάμενον, οἷον κατὰ τοὺς προπάτορας ἡμῶν ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνων, ἀλλὰ* κ.τ.λ. Isocrates says (De Antid. § 82) that the most ancient laws were C. 10.

thought the best. For τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν cp. 3. 1. 1274 b 32, τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι. Διῃρῆσθαι χωρίς, 41. appears to take up κεχώρισται, 38. For διῃρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη cp. 1329 b 23, ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους. States were also divided κατὰ συσσίτια and κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ φυλάς (2. 5. 1264 a 6 sqq.).

1329 b. **2.** ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. In Egypt there was a general distribution of the population into γένη (Hdt. 2. 164, where however, the γεωργοί are not mentioned as one of the γένη: contrast Diod. 1. 73 sq., where the classes enumerated are priests, kings, warriors, herdsmen, *cultivators*, and artisans). Herodotus dwells rather on the prohibition of βάναυσοι τέχναι to the warrior class in Egypt than on the prohibition of agriculture (2. 165, καὶ τούτων βαναυσίης οὐδεὶς δεδάηκε οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἀνέονται ἐς τὸ μάχιμον), and so do Isocrates (Busir. § 18) and Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 4 *sub fin.*), but Plato in Tim. 24 B refers to the separation of the warrior class in Egypt from the herdsmen, hunters, and cultivators. The names of Sesostris and Minos are mentioned in the passage before us to show the antiquity of this institution in Egypt and Crete. The separation of the warriors from those who practise other arts is ascribed by Isocrates (Busir. § 15 sqq.) not to Sesostris, but to Busiris; 'legislation respecting the warrior class,' however, is ascribed by Diodorus (1. 94. 4) to Sesoosis (Sesostris), whom he calls the third lawgiver of Egypt, and Dicaearchus (Fragm. 7: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 235) credits him with a law making all arts hereditary. The passage before us evidently implies that the distinction between warriors and cultivators survived in Egypt even in the writer's day, i.e. that the cultivators did not serve as soldiers, nor the soldiers as cultivators.

**5.** ἀρχαία δὲ κ.τ.λ. With the object of proving that political institutions and laws are of early date (cp. 31 sqq.), the writer instances another institution, that of the syssitia. Compare the similar transition from the subject of the distinction of warriors and cultivators to that of syssitia in 2. 10. 1271 b 41 sqq.

**6.** τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην, sc. *συσσίτια*, in apposition to τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις.

**7.** τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. This results from the fact that in Italy syssitia were as old as the introduction of the names 'Italy' and 'Italians' and the conversion of the Italians from nomads into cultivators.

**8. φασὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Antiochus of Syracuse is probably referred to, for the facts here related are derived from him: cp. Antioch. Fragm. 3 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 181), "'Αντίοχος Ξενοφάνεος τάδε συνέγραψε περὶ 'Ιταλίας . . . τὴν γῆν ταύτην, ἥτις νῦν 'Ιταλία καλεῖται, τὸ παλαιὸν εἶχον Οἰνωτροί." "Επειτα διεξελθών ὃν τρόπον ἐπολιτεύοντο καὶ ὡς βασιλεὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς 'Ιταλὸς ἀνὰ χρόνον ἐγένετο, ἀφ' οὗ μετωνομάσθησαν 'Ιταλοί, κ.τ.λ.: Fragm. 4, 'Ιταλία δὲ ἀνὰ χρόνον ὠνομάσθη ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς δυνατοῦ, ὄνομα 'Ιταλοῦ. Τοῦτον δέ φησιν 'Αντίοχος ὁ Συρακούσιος . . . ἅπασαν ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ ποιήσασθαι τὴν γῆν, ὅση ἐντὸς ἦν τῶν κόλπων τοῦ τε Ναπητίνου καὶ τοῦ Σκυλλητίνου· ἣν δὴ πρώτην κληθῆναι 'Ιταλίαν ἐπὶ τοῦ 'Ιταλοῦ: and Fragm. 6, ἔτι δ' ἀνώτερον ('apud vetustiores') Οἰνωτρούς τε καὶ 'Ιταλοὺς μόνους ἔφη καλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ πρὸς τὸν Σικελικὸν κεκλιμένους πορθμόν. "Εστι δ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἰσθμὸς ἑκατὸν καὶ ἑξήκοντα στάδιοι, μεταξὺ δυοῖν κόλπων, τοῦ τε 'Ιππωνιάτου, ὃν 'Αντίοχος Ναπιτῖνον εἴρηκε, καὶ τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ. Compare also Virgil, Aen. 1. 532 sq. The origin of syssitia is here traced to the territory in which the Epizephyrian Locri was situated, and not to Crete, in much the same way in which the Locrian Onomacritus was made out by some authorities (2. 12. 1274 a 25 sqq.) to have been the spiritual progenitor of a number of great lawgivers.

**11. ἀκτήν**, 'peninsula': cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 6. 198 R, περιέχεσθαί τε ὀλίγου πᾶσαν αὐτὴν (i.e. τὴν 'Αττικήν) ὑπὸ τῆς θαλάττης· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τοὔνομα λαβεῖν, οἷον ἀκτήν τινα οὖσαν.

**'Ιταλίαν τοὔνομα λαβεῖν.** The name taken is put in the acc.: cp. Aristoph. Fragm. 304 Didot, "Αμφοδον ἐχρῆν αὐτῷ τεθεῖσθαι τοὔνομα.

**12. ἐντὸς κ.τ.λ.** The peninsula is apparently reckoned from its point, so that the territory lying between the point and the two gulfs is said to be within them, and the territory lying beyond the two gulfs, looking from the point, is implied to be outside them.

**τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ.** Antiochus called this gulf, the modern gulf of S. Eufemia, by the name Ναπητῖνος or Ναπιτῖνος, a name the origin of which is uncertain; how it comes to be called Λαμητικός in the passage before us, which is based on Antiochus, is not clear. The name Λαμητικός is derived from that of a city called Lametini, probably situated on the shore of the gulf of S. Eufemia and near the stream which still bears the name of Lamato (the ancient Lamêtus). See Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Lametini and art. Napetinus Sinus.

**13. ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'for these two gulfs are distant from each other [only] half a day's journey.' For the omission of 'only' see

note on 1282 a 36. The near approach of the two gulfs to each other is mentioned in justification of the description of Italy as lying 'within' them. They were 160 stadia, or about eighteen miles, apart (see above on 8), hence a day's journey is calculated here at thirty-six miles.

**14.** τοῦτον δὴ κ.τ.λ. Italus is probably regarded as the first lawgiver of the Oenotrians, and if this is so, the introduction of legislation among them is connected with the change from a pastoral to an agricultural life: see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., 1. 21, and cp. Plut. De Iside et Osiride, c. 13, *βασιλεύοντα δ' Ὄσιριν Αἰγυπτίους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπόρου βίου καὶ θηριώδους ἀπαλλάξαι, καρπούς τε δείξαντα καὶ νόμους θέμενον αὐτοῖς, καὶ θεοὺς δείξαντα τιμᾶν*, and Ovid, Metam. 5. 341,

> Prima Ceres unco glebas dimovit aratro,
> Prima dedit fruges alimentaque mitia terris,
> Prima dedit leges.

Janus takes the place of Italus in Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 22, *ἢ μᾶλλον ὅτι τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν αὐτὸς ἀγρίοις καὶ ἀνόμοις χρωμένους ἤθεσιν εἰς ἕτερον βίου σχῆμα, πείσας καὶ γεωργεῖν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, μετέβαλε καὶ μετεκόσμησε;* Compare the language of Strabo as to Masinissa (p. 833), *καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοὺς νομάδας πολιτικοὺς κατασκευάσας καὶ γεωργούς, ἔτι δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ λῃστεύειν διδάξας στρατεύειν.* Syssitia (*σῖτος*, 'corn') are probably conceived as connected with agriculture. For τοῦτον δὴ τὸν Ἰταλόν Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 39) compares 1. 6. 1255 a 7, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ δίκαιον. Δή introduces in both passages a statement about the person or thing which has been described in what precedes. We expect *θεῖναι* rather than *θέσθαι*, but cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 38.

**16.** διὸ κ.τ.λ. On the resemblance of this passage to 2. 10. 1271 b 30 sqq., see vol. i. p. 575, note 2. The continued existence of the institution and of certain of the laws of Italus among some of his descendants is apparently mentioned in confirmation of the statement that he introduced the syssitia and was the author of other laws also.

**18.** ᾤκουν δὲ κ.τ.λ. It would seem that the whole region from the Lametic Gulf to Tyrrhenia (i.e. Latium Campania and Lucania) is here conceived as inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones. That Aristotle included Latium in Opica we see from Fragm. 567. 1571 a 24 sq. Campania, according to Antiochus of Syracuse, was inhabited by 'Opici, who were also called Ausones' (Fragm. 8:

Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 183). But we do not find that Lucania is elsewhere said to be inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones, or indeed by Opici of any kind. Herodotus regards Elea, which was in the region ultimately known as Lucania, as in Oenotria, not in Opica (1. 167).

**20.** τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Antioch. ap. Strab. p. 255 (Fragm. 6: Müller, 1. 182), *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπεκτείνεται, φησί, τοὔνομα καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ τὸ τῶν Οἰνωτρῶν μέχρι τῆς Μεταποντίνης καὶ τῆς Σειρίτιδος· οἰκῆσαι γὰρ τοὺς τόπους τούτους Χῶνας, Οἰνωτρικὸν ἔθνος κατακοσμούμενον, καὶ τὴν γῆν ὀνομάσαι Χώνην.*

τὸν Ἰόνιον, sc. *κόλπον*, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 11, and see Liddell and Scott.

**23.** ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς κ.τ.λ. The Egyptians, according to Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, claimed that Lycurgus visited Egypt and borrowed there the separation of the warriors from the other classes which he introduced at Sparta, and Isocrates in his Busiris (§ 17 sq.) traces this and other Lacedaemonian institutions to Egypt: cp. Pherecr. *Ἄγριοι*, Fragm. 5 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 257), where Lycurgus is connected with Egypt. Aristotle, however, in 2. 10. 1271 b 22 sqq., like the Lacedaemonians themselves (see above on 1271 b 22), traces the laws of Lycurgus to Crete.

**24.** πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει κ.τ.λ. According to Dicaearchus, Fragm. 7 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 235), Sesostris was king of Egypt immediately after Orus, the son of Osiris and Isis, and lived 2936 years before the first Olympiad. Herodotus, however, would seem to place Sesostris much later. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 298), 'quod quidem nunc ait autor, regnum Sesostris longe superare annis regnum Minois, cum narratione Herodoti non videtur congruere. Hic enim' (2. 112 sqq.) 'Proteum regem Aegypti facit tertium a Sesostri, cuius regnum inciderit in tempus belli Troiani. Et in exercitu Graecorum illius belli fuit secundum Homerum' (Odyss. 19. 178 sqq.) 'Idomeneus et ipse tertius a Minoe, ut paene aequales ita reperiantur Sesostris et Minos; hoc modo, Sesostris, Pheron, Proteus, et Minos, Deucalion, Idomeneus.'

**25.** σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The sense is—'So then, just as we have seen that syssitia were invented first in Italy and afterwards in Crete, and the division of the population into different classes first in Egypt and afterwards in Crete, we may take it that all other discoveries have been made over and over again an indefinite number of times—for discovery comes easily to men, need reveal-

ing discoveries of a necessary kind, and others following in due course—and this holds of political institutions as fully as of anything else; but that all political institutions are ancient, [which is what concerns us now,] is proved by the example of Egypt.' The view that everything has been invented over and over again is quite Aristotelian: cp. Metaph. Λ. 8. 1074 b 10, *κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἑκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων*: De Caelo, 1. 3. 270 b 19, *οὐ γὰρ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις δεῖ νομίζειν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀφικνεῖσθαι δόξας εἰς ἡμᾶς*: Meteor. 1. 3. 339 b 27 sqq. This view may have been suggested by the fact that the inventions which were ascribed in Greece to Palamedes, Orpheus, and others were ascribed in Egypt to far earlier inventors, so that it was natural to suppose that in the interval between the Egyptian inventors and Palamedes and the rest the arts invented by the former had been lost. It is likely enough that arts have been lost and rediscovered. A writer in the *Times* of Sept. 27, 1886, remarks of some 'glazed bricks' of the time of Rameses II from Tel-el-Jahûdî, now in the British Museum, 'Historians of Italian art speak of the "discovery" of Luca della Robbia; here is the *faïence* decoration in the highest state of excellence more than 2,700 years before he was born.' For *ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ*, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq. Aristotle believed that the human race had existed from everlasting (see note on 1269 a 5). For the contrast of *τὰ ἀναγκαῖα* and *τὰ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν*, Camerarius (Interp. p. 298) compares Top. 3. 2. 118 a 6, *καὶ τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βελτίω, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ αἱρετώτερα· βέλτιον γὰρ τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶν ἐκ περιουσίας, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον . . . τὸ δ' ἐκ περιουσίας ἐστίν, ὅταν ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα τινὰ προσκατασκευάζηταί τις τῶν καλῶν*: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 2 sqq. For *τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν αὐτήν*, cp. Eurip. Fragm. 709 (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 729),

*οὔ τἄρ' Ὀδυσσεύς ἐστιν αἰμύλος μόνος·*
*χρεία διδάσκει, κἂν βραδύς τις ᾖ, σοφόν,*

and Leutsch and Schneidewin, 2. 203,

*πολλῶν ὁ λιμὸς γίνεται διδάσκαλος.*

That necessary things are discovered first had already been implied by Democritus (see vol. i. p. 356, note 1).

**31.** *ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα κ.τ.λ.* The argument is—'we might expect the Egyptians, who are thought to be the most ancient race in the world, to have come into existence before laws and

constitutions were invented, in which case we should find them lacking these still, but the fact is quite otherwise; hence laws and institutions must be of very ancient origin.' Thus the statement with which the passage commences as to the antiquity of the distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes is fully borne out. In the reference to the Egyptians it is evidently assumed with much *naïveté* that as a race is when it first comes into being, so it will remain. Bernays (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 169) and Susemihl would insert *ἀεί* after *τετυχήκασι*, but in my opinion without necessity. We are familiar with the belief that the Egyptian race was the most ancient in the world from the well-known story in Hdt. 2. 2. There was a general agreement as to the fact, though some claimed priority for the Phrygians (ibid.) or the Scythians (Justin, 2. 1. 5 sqq.) and Aristotle himself for the Magi (Diog. Laert. 1. 8), but there was much disagreement as to the cause. For one theory, see Hippys of Rhegium, Fragm. 1 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 13), Diod. 1. 10. 1, and Justin, 2. 1. 5 sqq. Aristotle's own theory may be gathered from Meteor. 1. 14. 352 b 20 sqq. The priests of Sais in the Timaeus of Plato (22 C sqq.) assign a different cause.

**33.** *διὸ δεῖ* κ.τ.λ., 'hence we should make use of what has been adequately said [without spending time on its further investigation], and attempt to investigate [only] what has been left untouched': cp. c. 1. 1323 a 21 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 12 sqq.: Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 8, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τό γε ἐπιχείρημα καλῶς ἔχει, τὸ ζητεῖν τὰ παραλελειμμένα καὶ νομοθετεῖν ταῖς μοναρχίαις*. I follow Sepulveda, Vict., and Lamb. in taking *ἱκανῶς* with *τοῖς εἰρημένοις*, and not (as do Sus. and Welldon) with *χρῆσθαι*: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 3, *ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν*, and Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10, *διόπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κομψῶς τοῦτο, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἴρηται*. Looking to these passages and to the very similar passage c. 1. 1323 a 21 sqq., I incline on the whole to retain the reading of Γ Π *εἰρημένοις*, and not (with Lamb., Bekk.², and Sus.) to substitute *εὑρημένοις* for it, though c. 11. 1331 a 16 might be quoted in favour of this reading. It is true also that the antithesis to *παραλελειμμένα* is often *εὑρημένα* (e.g. in Soph. El. 33. 184 b 6 sqq. and Demosth. De Symmor. c. 23: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 15 sqq.), but this is not always the case, as we see from Isocr. Hel. § 67, *πολὺ δὲ πλείω τὰ παραλελειμμένα τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστίν*. For the suppression of 'only,' see above on 1329 b 13 and 1282 a 36.

**36.** τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων. For the absence of τά before ὅπλα, cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29, περὶ τοῦ ὅπλα κεκτῆσθαι, and see critical note on 1267 b 33. As to the distinction here implied between the hoplites and those who share in the constitution, see vol. i. p. 324 and note 1 on that page.

**37.** εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.

**38.** αὐτῶν ἑτέρους, 'distinct from them': cp. c. 12. 1331 b 1 and Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 28, ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν (ἡδοναί) τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν.

**40.** τίνας καὶ ποίους. The answer to τίνας (given in 1330 a 25 sqq.) is 'slaves or non-Greek serfs,' and to ποίους (ibid.) is 'not of one race nor spirited in character.'

**41.** πρῶτον. Aristotle afterwards deals with the site of the city.

φαμεν, in 2. 5. 1263 a 37 sqq. That no citizen should want for food, is implied in 1263 a 21 sqq.: see above on 1263 a 24.

1330 a. **1.** For the reference here to Plato as τινές, see above on 1327 b 38. Lycurgus (In Leocr. cc. 92 and 132) carries this use of τινές so far as to say that τινές wrote this or that passage of verse which he quotes (Richards).

ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς γινομένην κοινήν, sc. εἶναι δεῖν. Φιλικῶς qualifies κοινήν, 'common in friendly fashion,' 'common as the goods of friends are common': cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 29, δι' ἀρετὴν δ' ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Γινομένην = ποιουμένην: cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 37, φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς. For εἶναι γινομένην, cp. Hdt. 1. 146, ταῦτα δὲ ἦν γινόμενα ἐν Μιλήτῳ, and Plato, Polit. 301 D, and see above on 1259 b 11. Sus. and Welldon adopt Congreve's conjecture of γινομένῃ for γινομένην (Sus. adding γίνεσθαι after γινομένῃ), but, as it seems to me, not rightly.

**2.** οὔτ' ἀπορεῖν κ.τ.λ. As to the importance of this, see Isocr. Areop. §§ 53, 83, and Plato, Laws 735 E.

**3.** περὶ συσσιτίων τε κ.τ.λ., 'and with regard to common meals, all agree that they are an useful thing to belong to well-constituted States.' For the construction, compare c. 9. 1329 a 35 sqq. Aristotle passes on to the subject of common meals, because, like the friendly community of property which he has just recommended, they are a means of securing the citizens against a want of food. It was also necessary to settle the question of their existence before proceeding to the division of the territory, inasmuch as a portion of the territory is to be set apart for their support. Aristotle

nowhere fulfils, in what we possess of the Politics, the promise which he makes in 4, so that we can only guess why he approved of the institution. He probably valued it as a means of regulating habits of life and of enforcing the 'temperate and liberal' standard which he commends (c. 5. 1326 b 30 sqq.), as a means of making an approach to community of property (2. 5. 1263 b 40 sqq.), and also as a means of developing a high spirit and mutual confidence in his citizens and securing their acquaintance with each other (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 41 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 333 sqq. For an account of the purpose for which, according to Plato, the institution was originally introduced, see Laws 780 B sq.

**5. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** All the citizens ought to share in the common meals, and not, as at Sparta, that portion only of them which could afford to pay a contribution. See 2. 9. 1271 a 26 sqq. and 2. 10. 1272 a 12 sqq. Aristotle appears here to contemplate the existence of *ἄποροι* in his 'best State.' *Τὸ συντεταγμένον*, 'the assessed sum' (Liddell and Scott).

**7. καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν**, 'and to manage the rest of the housekeeping.' For *τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν*, cp. c. 17. 1336 a 40 sq. and Plato, Rep. 458 D, *καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ*.

**8. τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα**, 'expenses in relation to the gods,' cp. 12, *τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας*, and 2. 8. 1267 b 34 sq.

**9. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν κ.τ.λ.** As Aristotle's principle seems to be that expenses which fall on all the citizens should be provided for by public land set apart for the purpose, we might have expected him to have gone farther in this direction, and (e. g.) to have set apart public land to defray the expenses of the public education which the citizens are to receive (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 21 sqq.). As to the public land in Greek States, see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 63 sq. Aristotle does not, like Hippodamus (2. 8. 1267 b 33 sqq.), divide the territory of his State into three parts—sacred, public, and private—but only into two, public and private. He devotes a part of the public land to expenses connected with the gods, i. e. to the provision of sacrifices, repairs of temples, and perhaps also liturgies connected with festivals.

**14. τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Laws 745 C, *κλήρους δὲ διελεῖν τετταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, τούτων τε αὖ δίχα τεμεῖν ἕκαστον καὶ ξυγκληρῶσαι δύο τμήματα, τοῦ τε ἐγγὺς καὶ τοῦ πόρρω μετέχοντα ἑκάτερον· τὸ πρὸς τῇ πόλει μέρος τῷ πρὸς τοῖς ἰσχάτοις εἷς κλῆρος καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἀπὸ πόλεως τῷ ἀπ' ἐσχάτων δευτέρῳ*

καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω πάντα. (Compare the process by which lots of land are assigned to the peasants of a Russian commune, as described by M. Leroy-Beaulieu in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Nov. 15, 1876. 'Chaque paysan reçoit une parcelle d'autant de sortes de terrain qu'il y a de qualités de terre dans la commune.' 'Quand les terres seraient tous de même qualité . . . l'inégale distance du village leur donne encore pour le paysan une inégale valeur.') Aristotle, however, does not approve (2. 6. 1265 b 24 sqq.) Plato's further suggestion (Laws 745 E) of two houses: see above on 1265 b 25. But would not the cultivation of two lots of land at a distance from each other be almost as troublesome as living in two houses? The reason for the arrangement which Aristotle follows Plato in adopting is obvious enough. Land near the city was probably as a rule far more valuable in ancient Greece than land at a distance from it. It was land in this situation that rich men were most likely to buy up (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8 sqq.). Cp. Xen. De Vect. 4. 50, καὶ οἵ γε χῶροι οὐδὲν ἂν εἶεν μείονος ἄξιοι τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἐνταῦθα (at Laurium in Attica) ἢ τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἄστυ, and Hdt. 6. 20, τῆς δὲ Μιλησίης χώρης αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ Πέρσαι εἶχον τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ πεδίον, τὰ δὲ ὑπεράκρια ἔδοσαν Καρσὶ Πηδασεῦσι ἐκτῆσθαι. So on the foundation of the colony of Thurii οἱ προϋπάρχοντες Συβαρῖται . . . τὴν μὲν σύνεγγυς τῇ πόλει χώραν κατεκληρούχουν ἑαυτοῖς, τὴν δὲ πόρρω κειμένην τοῖς ἐπήλυσι (Diod. 12. 11. 1). The owners of land near the city would not only be better able than others to take an active part in politics and be nearer to the conveniences and the handicraftsmen of the city, but would also command a better market for their produce, and would be less exposed to attack in case of invasion. Frontier-landowners, on the contrary, were the first to suffer in that event. Thus the Lacedaemonian owners of frontier-land suffered so much from the Messenians in Eira during the Second Messenian War that civil trouble resulted (Paus. 4. 18. 1: see note on 1306 b 37). Compare the case of the citizens of Corinth who owned the fertile and extensive frontier-plain between Corinth and Sicyon. This plain 'was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B.C.' by the Corinthian War, and though its owners withdrew their servants and cattle to Peiraeum, their loss 'was still so great that two successive seasons of it were quite enough to inspire them with a strong aversion to the war' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 455). As to the Acharnians, see Thuc. 2. 21, and the notes of Mr. Congreve and Prof. Jowett on the passage before us. The frontier-landowners

of ancient Greece, unlike those of the English and Scotch Border and of the Welsh Marches of England in the middle ages, seem to have feared more from the loss of their own goods than they hoped from raids on those of the foe.

**16.** For τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 1 sqq.

**21.** συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων. The story about the sufferings of the Lacedaemonian frontier-owners in the Second Messenian War comes from the Εὐνομία of Tyrtaeus (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 37 sqq.), and it is just possible that συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν ὁμόρων πολέμων was a line in that poem. The Lacedaemonian State may well have been one of those in which the law referred to existed. For the absence of περί before τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 37, τὸ βουλευόμενον τῶν κοινῶν.

**22.** διὰ τὸ ἴδιον, 'on account of their private interest': cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 4, αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκυῖαι πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν. For the thought, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 14 sqq. and 3. 16. 1287 b 2 sq.

**25.** τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας κ.τ.λ. Plato also makes agriculture over to slaves in the State described in the Laws (806 D sq.). Περίοικοι differ from slaves in being only half-enslaved (see above on 1269 a 34). Thus the Mariandynian περίοικοι of the Pontic Heracleia could not be sold for export beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, p. 542), nor could the Helots (Strabo, p. 365).

εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχήν. For the omission of εἶναι, see above on 1329 a 17 and 1277 a 38. Its omission is facilitated by the nearness of δούλους εἶναι.

**26.** μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοειδῶν, 'and should consist neither of men all of one kin nor of men spirited in character.' The gen. appears to be partitive, as in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 28. Polybius distinguishes ὁμόφυλοι from ὁμοεθνεῖς in 11. 19, ἀστασίαστα διετήρησε τοσαῦτα πλήθη καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καίπερ οὐχ οἷον ὁμοεθνέσιν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁμοφύλοις χρησάμενος στρατοπέδοις· εἶχε γὰρ Λίβυας Ἴβηρας Λιγυστίνους Κελτοὺς Φοίνικας Ἰταλοὺς Ἕλληνας, so that, if we take Aristotle to mean the same thing by ὁμόφυλος as Polybius does in this passage, he would be opposed to the employment of slaves belonging to one and the same great stock (Libyan, Celtic, Italian, or the like), even though they belonged to different ἔθνη, but this is not the sense in which the word is used in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 25 sqq., and Aristotle probably means ὁμοεθνής by ὁμόφυλος. In the corresponding passage in Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 18 in fact—καὶ μὴ κτᾶσθαι

ὁμοεθνεῖς (δούλους) πολλούς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν—the word ὁμοεθνεῖς is used, not ὁμόφυλος. Plato had already said in Laws 777 C, δεῖ δὴ λείπεσθον μόνῳ μηχανά, μήτε πατριώτας ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ῥᾷον δουλεύσειν, ἀσυμφώνους τε ('different in language') εἰς δύναμιν ὅ τι μάλιστα, and Aristotle follows in his track. His especial object is to avoid the errors committed by the Lacedaemonian State in its organization of slavery. The Helots were serfs (περίοικοι), not slaves, and Hellenic serfs into the bargain, both ὁμόφυλοι and θυμοειδεῖς (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 34 sqq.). But other Greek States also probably had slaves whom he would regard as too nearly akin to each other and too spirited to be submissive. The fugitive slaves who under the name of Bruttians (Βρέττιοι) did much to ruin some of the Greek colonies in South Italy (Diod. 16. 15) were apparently an instance in point. Attic slaves, on the contrary, came from a variety of sources, Lydia, Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Syria, and the Euxine (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans. p. 170). Dionysius the Elder wished his mercenaries to be collected ἐκ πολλῶν ἐθνῶν (Diod. 14. 44. 3). Aristotle would no doubt disapprove of a body of slaves wholly composed of negroes, and the experience of the island of St. Domingo in modern times bears out his view. 'It is always a wise arrangement to have different tribes in a caravan, for in the event of a strike, and there are always strikes, there is less chance of concerted action' (Prof. Drummond, Tropical Africa, p. 90). Some went so far as to advise the actual promotion of discord among slaves (Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 30, in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 242 and 5. cclxxii, and Plut. Cato Maior, c. 21, quoted by Meineke), but Aristotle says nothing about this. We notice that he imposes no limit on the number of the slaves in his 'best State,' though we might have expected him to do so.

**28.** δεύτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Non-Greek serfs, unlike the Helots. Aristotle probably has in his mind the Mariandynian serfs of the Pontic Heracleia (see above on 1269 a 34). Serfs of this type would have the drawback of being almost inevitably ὁμόφυλοι.

**30.** τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here again Aristotle departs from the Lacedaemonian practice. The Helots employed on private estates did not belong to the owners of those estates (Strabo, p. 365, τρόπον γάρ τινα δημοσίους δούλους εἶχον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τούτους, i.e. τοὺς Εἵλωτας): the owners could not free the Helots employed on their estates or sell them beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, ibid.).

**31.** τίνα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Plato had gone on to deal with this subject in the passage of the Laws (777 C sqq.) which Aristotle has before him here. The difficulty of the question is recognized in 2. 9. 1269 b 7 sqq. The promised solution is nowhere given in the Politics as we have it, but we have many suggestions on the subject in Oecon. 1. 5.

**32.** καὶ διότι κ.τ.λ. Διότι is here 'why.' This promise also remains unfulfilled in the Politics as we have it, but cp. Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 4, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅταν μὴ γίγνηται τοῖς βελτίοσι βέλτιον μηδὲ ἄθλα ἢ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, γίνονται χείρους, οὕτω καὶ περὶ οἰκέτας, and 14, χρὴ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὡρίσθαι πᾶσιν· δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἆθλον· βούλονται γὰρ πονεῖν, ὅταν ᾖ ἆθλον καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὡρισμένος. Xenophon had already said in Oecon. 5. 16, καὶ ἐλπίδων δὲ ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν ἐλευθέρων δέονται ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅπως μένειν ἐθέλωσι. Aristotle perhaps merely means by πᾶσι τοῖς δούλοις both public and private slaves. But it is possible that, as the slave often purchased his freedom from his master, emancipation was most within the reach of the slaves who stood highest in their master's service, or who had learnt some lucrative handicraft.

**34.** Τὴν δὲ πόλιν κ.τ.λ. Τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν, c. 10. 1330 a 23, has already been answered by τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας, 1330 a 25, but here it is further answered by τὴν δὲ πόλιν. Εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 5. 1327 a 3–c. 6. 1327 a 40. C. 11.

**36.** αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ. Various attempts have been made to interpret this passage as it stands. Göttling, Stahr, Busse (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 17 sqq.), and Broughton, in his edition of Pol. 1, 3, and 4 (7), take εἶναι to be used in αὐτῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν as it is used in such phrases as ἑκὼν εἶναι, κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι (Plato, Protag. 317 A), εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι (Polit. 300 C), and the like, and translate these words 'so far as concerns the position of the city in relation to itself,' but the objection to this view is that no instance is produced of the use of εἶναι in this sense in combination with a similar collection of words. Εἶναι, when thus used, commonly goes with one word, or two or three, of a simple and closely connected kind. Prof. Jowett, on the other hand (Politics 2. 273), thinks that 'the order of the words is as follows, δεῖ εὔχεσθαι κατατυγχάνειν (τοῦ) τὴν θέσιν εἶναι,' but Sus.[4] (1. p. 519) objects that, if we take the passage thus, we require τοῦ τὴν θέσιν, οἵαν δεῖ, εἶναι, or something similar, not simply τοῦ τὴν θέσιν

εἶναι. The difficulty of interpreting the passage as it stands being so great, it is not surprising that emendations of the text have been suggested. Coray and Bekk.[2] bracket εἶναι, while Bonitz (Ind. 375 b 8) places a query after κατατυγχάνειν. For Susemihl's view see his note in Sus.[4] Richards suggests that κατ' εὐχήν should be read in place of κατατυγχάνειν, translating 'but we should pray that the position of the city in relation to itself may be the best possible,' etc. If, however, κατ' εὐχήν was the original reading, we should expect it to be corrupted into κατατυχεῖν rather than κατατυγχάνειν, and perhaps also to stand nearer in the sentence to εἶναι than it does. In defence of κατατυγχάνειν it may be pointed out that κατατυχεῖν is used in the same sense ('votis potiri') in Demosth. De Cor. c. 178, ἐὰν δ' ἄρα μὴ συμβῇ κατατυχεῖν: cp. also Plut. Apophth. Lac. Ages. 59. 213 A and De Gen. Socr. c. 9. 580 B. I am myself inclined to suggest that some words may be wanting in the text. The rendering of Vet. Int. is 'ipsius autem ad se ipsam si ad votum oportet adipisci positionem, quattuor utique respicientes.' Sus. thinks that he here renders a gloss, Busse (De praesidiis, etc., p. 18) that he fills up a lacuna in his Greek text by borrowing words from c. 5. 1327 a 3 sq. It is, however, possible that the text of Γ differed here from that of the MSS. known to us, and that some words have really dropped out in our MSS. of which the rendering of Vet. Int. preserves a trace. The text, in fact, may have originally run, αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὑτὴν (εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχὴν) εἶναι τὴν θέσιν, εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας. The four things seem to be health, adaptation to the needs of political life, adaptation to those of war, and beauty (κόσμος, 1330 b 31), though Aristotle in his haste omits to mention the last. Less attention seems generally to have been paid by the founders of cities in ancient Greece to the first two points than to the rest: cp. Strabo, p. 235, τῶν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων περὶ τὰς κτίσεις εὐστοχῆσαι μάλιστα δοξάντων ὅτι κάλλους ἐστοχάζοντο καὶ ἐρυμνότητος καὶ λιμένων καὶ χώρας εὐφυοῦς κ.τ.λ. Myscellus, however, the founder of Crotona, had looked to health rather than to wealth (Strabo, p. 269), and in later days Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis had paid great attention to the question what site and aspect are most favourable to the health of a city. Plato also had taken health into consideration (Laws 778 E). For πρὸς τέτταρα δή, cp. Pindar, Pyth. 9. 90,

Αἰγίνᾳ τε γὰρ
φαμὶ Νίσου τ' ἐν λόφῳ τρὶς δὴ πόλιν τάνδ' εὐκλείξαι.

Δή thus used strengthens (Holden, Index to the Oeconomicus of Xenophon s. v.).

**38.** πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς ὑγίειαν. Sepulveda translates, 'primum ad valetudinem, ut rem necessariam' (and so Lamb.); Vict. 'primum quidem, ut necesse est, ad corporis sanitatem.' But perhaps it is better (with Richards) to supply ὄν with ἀναγκαῖον and to take ὡς ἀναγκαῖον as = ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ὂν βλέπειν πρὸς τοῦτο. A thing may deserve to be looked to first either on account of its excellence (cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11 sq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 5 sq.) or on account of its indispensability (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 29 sq.), and Aristotle is careful to explain that health is to be looked to first for the latter reason. Cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 29, καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὥσπερ ζῆν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, and Plato, Laws 743 E, εἰ δέ τις τῶν προσταττομένων αὐτόθι νόμων σωφροσύνης ἔμπροσθεν ὑγίειαν ἐν τῇ πόλει φανεῖται ποιῶν τιμίαν, ἢ πλοῦτον ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀναφανεῖται τιθέμενος. Some had regarded health as the most excellent thing in the world (Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq.: Anaxandrides, Θησαυρός, Fragm. 1, in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 169, a line of which,

τὸ μὲν ὑγιαίνειν πρῶτον ὡς ἄριστον ὄν,

may be in Aristotle's memory here: Rhet. 2. 21. 1394 b 13 sq.: Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, c. 5 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 1 sqq.).

αἵ τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Τε should follow ἕως, not αἱ: for other cases in which it is found out of its proper place, see above on 1325 a 19 and 1259 a 13. Πόλεις is omitted as a word which will be readily supplied: for other cases of its omission, see above on 1266 b 1. Hippocrates, as Stahr and others have pointed out, had already pronounced in favour of an Eastern aspect for cities in De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 530 Kühn, ὁκόσαι μὲν (τῶν πόλεων) πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολὰς τοῦ ἡλίου κέονται, ταύτας εἰκὸς εἶναι ὑγιεινοτέρας τῶν πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους ἐστραμμένων καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ θερμά, ἦν καὶ στάδιον τὸ μεταξὺ ᾖ. Compare Columella, De Re Rustica, 1. 5. 5, optime autem salubribus locis ad orientem vel meridiem . . . villa convertitur. The climate of Patras, the ancient Patrae, is thought unhealthy for strangers, because the mountains which rise above it close at hand screen it from the East winds (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 440). Cities whose site slopes towards the East are exposed to the wind ἀπηλιώτης (Probl. 26. 12. 941 b 17, καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τὰ ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς κινῶν ἀπηλιώτας ἀνέμους ἤγειρεν (ὁ ἥλιος), οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας κινῶν

νότους ἐγείρει), a wind which is in a mean between hot and cold winds (Probl. 26. 55. 946 b 24 sq.), and health results when things hot and cold are in due proportion to each other (Anal. Post. 1. 13. 78 b 18 sqq.). The East wind is described as 'warm' in Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 24, and as 'comparatively warm' in Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19 sqq. See also vol. i. p. 337, note 4.

**40.** δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν, 'and in the second place those which are sheltered from the North wind.' Here Aristotle differs from Hippocrates, who appears to regard cities facing North and sheltered from the South as more favourably situated for health than cities facing South and sheltered from the North (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. pp. 525–9 Kühn). For κατὰ βορέαν, cp. κατὰ βορρον, Oecon. 1. 6. 1345 a 33. We expect αἱ κατὰ βορέαν, but cp. 1330 b 10, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι, where ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι would have been more regular. See vol. i. p. 337, note 5. Some places suffered much from the North wind, e.g. Ismarus in Thrace: cp. Eustath. on Dionys. Perieg. 27, p. 90 Bernhardy (quoted by Ellis, Commentary on Catullus, p. 384), καθάπερ καὶ Ἰσμαρικὸς ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ὁ βορρᾶς, ἀπὸ Ἰσμάρου πόλεως Θρᾳκικῆς, ἔνθα μάλιστα βορρᾶς καταρρήγνυται. Plataea was exposed to the North wind, though, as it happened, the North wind was gentle there (Theophrast. Fragm. 5. c. 32 Wimmer). Plato had given the plain around the city in the island of Atlantis a Southern aspect sheltered from the North wind (Critias 118 A).

**41.** τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κ.τ.λ. Δεῖ should probably be supplied, as in c. 5. 1326 b 30 sqq. The sentence would have been more regularly constructed if καλῶς ἔχειν had not been added, for then πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικάς would have depended on βλέποντας, 38, but as a long parenthesis has intervened (αἵ τε, 38–μᾶλλον, 41), Aristotle adds καλῶς ἔχειν to make his meaning clear, and might have added δεῖ also. For πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικάς, cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ, and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 7, πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις. Aristotle does not explain what sort of site would be well adapted for political activity, but he would perhaps regard as such a site which, while fairly level and favourable to easy communication, had within it a spot suitable for the common life of the elder citizens who are to rule the State, and somewhat withdrawn from the turmoil of buying and selling, such a spot as he sketches in c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.

**2. πρὸς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Μὲν οὖν is answered by δέ, 8. Similar 1330 b.
advice is given as to the territory in c. 5. 1326 b 40, *χρὴ μὲν (τὴν χώραν) τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον.* A city would be (1) 'hard of approach' (*δυσπρόσοδος*), if it lay, like Sparta, behind mountains penetrable at only a few easily-guarded points (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24). Compare the description of Thalamae in Elis in Polyb. 4. 75. 2, *πλείστη δ' ἀποσκευὴ καὶ πλεῖστος ὄχλος ἠθροίσθη σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων εἰς τὸ χωρίον ὃ καλοῦσι Θαλάμας, διὰ τὸ τήν τε χώραν τὴν περιξ αὐτοῦ στενὴν εἶναι καὶ δυσέμβολον τό τε χωρίον ἀπραγμάτευτον καὶ δυσπρόσοδον.* So we read of Rome in Plut. Romul. c. 17, *ἦν δὲ δυσπρόσοδος ἡ πόλις ἔχουσα πρόβλημα τὸ νῦν Καπιτώλιον, ἐν ᾧ φρουρὰ καθειστήκει.* A lake or a river or cliffs would answer the same purpose as a mountain: see as to the site of Oeniadae Thuc. 2. 102. 3, as to the acropolis of Sicyon (the site to which the city was removed by Demetrius Poliorcetes) Diod. 20. 102. 4, and as to the site of Psophis Polyb. 4. 70. 7 sqq. A city would be (2) 'hard to beleaguer' (*δυσπερίληπτος*), if the ground about it was made difficult by chasms or unfordable rivers or marshes. Pella was surrounded by marshes (Liv. 44. 46, sita est in tumulo vergente in occidentem hibernum: cingunt paludes inexsuperabilis altitudinis aestate et hieme, quas restagnantes faciunt lacus). Looking to the advances that the art of siege-warfare had made (1331 a 1 sq.), a city's best chance of safety in Aristotle's days probably lay in the difficulty of approaching or beleaguering it.

**4. ὑδάτων τε καὶ ναμάτων κ.τ.λ.,** 'and of waters and streams there should, if possible, be forthcoming a native supply.' Οἰκεῖον, in opposition to *ὀμβρίοις*, 6: rain-water is not 'native,' but comes from the clouds. Compare the contrast of *ὄμβριον* and *γηγενὲς ὕδωρ* in Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunae, c. 25. 939 C, and also the contrast of *οἰκεῖαι* and *ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις* in c. 3. 1325 b 29 sq. Ναμάτων is added to explain and limit *ὑδάτων*, which, if it stood by itself, would include *ὄμβρια ὕδατα.* The term *νάματα* comprises both spring and river water: cp. Plut. Quaest. Nat. 2. 912 A, *τὰ πηγαῖα καὶ ποτάμια νάματα.* Aristotle may possibly have in his memory here some lines of Pindar of which Quintilian has preserved a trace: see Pindar, Fragm. 258 Bergk (Quintil. 10. 1. 109), non enim 'pluvias,' ut ait Pindarus, 'aquas colligit,' sed vivo gurgite exundat (Cicero), where Bergk remarks, 'Pindarus *συνάγειν ὕδατα ὄμβρια* dixisse videtur,' but is not 'vivo gurgite exundat' also probably a translation from Pindar? Many Greek cities were famous for

their springs. Corinth was so, and especially for its spring Peirene (cp. Paus. 2. 3. 5, κρῆναι δὲ πολλαὶ μὲν ἀνὰ τὴν πᾶσαν πεποίηνται πᾶσαν, ἅτε ἀφθόνου ῥέοντός σφισιν ὕδατος, and see as to Peirene, Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 529, 592); Pherae was famous for its spring Hypereia (Pindar, Pyth. 4. 125: Strabo, p. 439): Cyrene was built round the inexhaustible 'spring of Apollo,' and Hermione also had an inexhaustible spring (Paus. 2. 35. 3). Compare with Aristotle's recommendations as to water-supply those of Columella, De Re Rustica, 1. 5. 1 sqq. We see from the passage before us that a city was all the stronger from a military point of view if its water-supply was good and safe from interference in the event of a siege. Athens was ill-supplied with water (see next note), and her weakness in this respect must have been keenly felt when the country-population was cooped up in the city during the Peloponnesian War.

5. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but if a supply of this nature is not forthcoming, a way has been discovered to obtain water by constructing,' etc. For εὕρηται, cp. 1331 a 15 sqq., and for τοῦτό γε c. 7. 1327 b 21. Τοῦτό γε εὕρηται means that we need not begin an investigation as to that, inasmuch as the problem has been already solved. Ὀμβρίοις is placed before ὕδασιν because it is meant to be emphatic. Hippocrates has a good opinion of rain-water (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 537 Kühn, τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄμβρια (ὕδατα) κουφότατα καὶ γλυκύτατά ἐστιν καὶ λεπτότατα καὶ λαμπρότατα). So too Columella (De Re Rustica, 1. 5. 2). Aristotle perhaps intends this hint for Athens. 'There were three or four springs at Athens, but one only, that of Callirrhoe, was drinkable' (Merivale, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, c. 66, vol. viii. p. 217, note). See also below on 1330 b 25. Cisterns for storing rain-water existed in many Greek cities—at Alexandria (Stuart Poole, Cities of Egypt, p. 181), Cnidus (Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Cnidus), and Termessus (Davis, Anatolica, p. 231). They existed also in the insular part of Tyre (Maspero, Hist. Ancienne des Peuples de l'Orient, p. 192) and at Jerusalem (Tac. Hist. 5. 12). 'The sky is the only source from which fresh water is obtained in the smaller towns of Dalmatia, and especially on the islands, where there are neither springs nor streams' (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 1. 241). Aristotle does not refer to the possibility of bringing water into the city from a distance, but aqueducts existed in his day both at Samos (Hdt. 3. 60) and at Athens (*Athenaeum*,

No. 3355, p. 223). He would probably, however, feel that aqueducts lay at the mercy of an invading foe.

**7. μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας.** For the construction, cp. Rhet. 3. 17. 1418 a 34, *καὶ ὁ ἔλεγε Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, τοῦτό ἐστιν.*

**8. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κεῖσθαι τὸν τόπον κ.τ.λ.** For *εἶναι ἐν*, see Bon. Ind. 245 b 25 sqq., where among other passages c. 1. 1323 b 1, *καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν*, is referred to. Τοῦτο is *ὑγίεια*. For the use of the neuter in reference to a fem. substantive, cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 1, and see Bon. Ind. 484 a 59 sqq., where Metaph. Z. 10. 1035 b 14, *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψυχὴ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) κ.τ.λ.* is quoted.

**9. ἔν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον**, 'both in a healthy spot and facing a healthy quarter' (cp. Plato, Rep. 401 C).

**10. δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι.** We expect *ἐν τῷ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι*, but Schneider rightly compares c. 13. 1331 b 27, *τούτοιν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἓν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὑρίσκειν*: cp. also 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 7–10, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 33 sqq. As to the fact, cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 28, *διαφέρει δὲ καὶ χώρα χώρας εἰς ταῦτα* (i.e. *εἰς γένεσιν καὶ ἀγονίαν καὶ ἀρρενογονίαν καὶ θηλυγονίαν*) *καὶ ὕδωρ ὕδατος διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· ποιὰ γάρ τις ἡ τροφὴ γίνεται μάλιστα καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡ διάθεσις διά τε τὴν κρᾶσιν τοῦ περιεστῶτος ἀέρος καὶ τῶν εἰσιόντων, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος τροφήν· τοῦτο γὰρ πλεῖστον εἰσφέρονται, καὶ ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστι τροφὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ξηροῖς· διὸ καὶ τὰ ἀτέραμνα ὕδατα καὶ ψυχρὰ τὰ μὲν ἀτεκνίαν ποιεῖ τὰ δὲ θηλυτοκίαν* (see also Hist. An. 6. 19. 573 b 32 sqq.).

**καὶ τούτου κ.τ.λ.** With *ἔχειν* supply *δεῖ* from 8.

**11. οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** For *οἷς πλείστοις χρώμεθα*, see Vahlen on Poet. 16. 1454 b 20. For the thought cp. Hippocr. De Natura Hominis vol. i. p. 361 Kühn, *αἱ δὲ νοῦσοι γίνονται αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν διαιτημάτων, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος, ὃ ἐσαγόμενοι ζῶμεν. τὴν δὲ διάγνωσιν χρὴ ἑκατέρων ὧδε ποιέεσθαι· ὁκόταν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσήματος ἑνὸς πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἁλίσκονται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, τὴν αἰτίην χρὴ ἀνατιθέναι τουτέῳ ὅ τι κοινότατόν ἐστι καὶ μάλιστα αὐτέῳ πάντες χρεώμεθα· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ὃ ἀναπνέομεν.* As to water, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 532 Kühn (a passage which Aristotle seems to have before him), *πλεῖστον γὰρ μέρος ξυμβάλλεται (ὕδωρ) ἐς τὴν ὑγιείην.*

As to air, cp. Philyll. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 864),

> ἕλκειν τὸ βέδυ σωτήριον προσεύχομαι,
> ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ὑγιείας μέρος,
> τὸ τὸν ἀέρ' ἕλκειν καθαρὸν οὐ τεθολωμένον.

Aristotle does not say anything about the importance to health of other kinds of food than water. The Egyptians believed that all maladies arose from food (Hdt. 2. 77: Diod. 1. 82). See on this subject De Part. An. 3. 12. 673 b 25–28.

**13.** ἡ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and water and air possess this kind of nature,' i.e. are of such a nature as to be largely and frequently used by us (so Vict. 'talem naturam habere ut crebro cogamur ad illa confugere'). Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 15. Ἡ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις is little more than a periphrasis for τὰ ὕδατα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα: see Bon. Ind. 206 b 38, 'sed etiam ea res cui aliqua facultas inest δύναμις nominatur, ut interdum δύναμις prope ad paraphrasin videri possit delitescere, cf. φύσις' in such phrases as ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος φύσις, Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 14: Bonitz refers among many other passages to Meteor. 1. 2. 339 a 22, ὥστε πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ (i.e. τοῦ κόσμου) τὴν δύναμιν κυβερνᾶσθαι ἐκεῖθεν. The same usage is traceable in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v. δύναμις *sub fin.*

**14.** διόπερ κ.τ.λ. Ἐὰν μὴ πάνθ' ὅμοια μήτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων ᾖ ναμάτων, 'if all the springs are not equally good, and there is not an unlimited supply of wholesome springs.' Πάντα, sc. τὰ νάματα. Τοιούτων, i.e. ὑγιεινῶν. For μή followed by μήτε, see critical note on 1257 b 12. The arrangement recommended by Aristotle had probably already been adopted by some Greek cities when he wrote: thus we read of Pellene in Paus. 7. 27. 4, φκοδόμηται δὲ καὶ ἔλυτρον κρήνης ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, καὶ λουτρά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπεί τοι πίνειν πηγαί σφισιν ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν εἰσὶν οὐ πολλαί. It has been adopted in more than one city of modern Europe; for instance, at Nice (*Times*, Nov. 1, 1883).

**17.** περὶ δὲ τόπων τῶν ἐρυμνῶν. Aristotle has been speaking of the τόπος τῆς πόλεως from the point of view of salubrity (9), and now he turns to consider the question of ἐρυμνοὶ τόποι. Τῶν ἐρυμνῶν follows, instead of preceding, τόπων for the sake of emphasis. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 2, πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον, and Diod. 13. 111. 3, τινὲς δὲ γονεῖς καὶ τέκνα τὰ νήπια λαβόντες, where stress is laid on 'infant children' as being the most helpless.

**19.** οἷον ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικόν κ.τ.λ. Plato had

provided the city which he founds in the Laws with an acropolis (Laws 745 B, *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα μέρη δώδεκα διελέσθαι, θέμενον Ἑστίας πρῶτον καὶ Διὸς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερόν, ἀκρόπολιν ὀνομάζοντα*), but we seem to gather from 20, *ἀριστοκρατικὸν δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους*, that Aristotle's ideal city is to have more strong places than one, and that its chief strong place (c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.) is not an acropolis. For *μοναρχικόν*, cp. Pollux, 9. 40, *τάχα δὲ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ βασίλειον ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ τυραννεῖον*. The word, however, hints that an acropolis savours rather of Tyranny than of Kingship: cp. Diod. 16. 70, *Τιμολέων δὲ . . . τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον ἀκροπόλεις καὶ τὰ τυραννεῖα κατέσκαψε*, Plut. Timol. c. 24, and Juv. 10. 306 sq. That a level site was congenial to democracies may be inferred from the fact that the cities of Mantineia (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 239: Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 209) and Megalopolis (Curtius, 1. 281 sq.: Bursian, 2. 244), both of them designed to be democratically ruled, were built on comparatively level sites. Aristotle does not explain why there should be more strong places than one in the central city of an *ἀριστοκρατία* (see above on 1273 a 19)—perhaps he regards an *ἀριστοκρατία* as giving a share of power to a plurality of social elements (virtue, wealth, and the demos), each of which would have a strong place of its own—but it is a fact that at Sparta, Carthage, and the Epizephyrian Locri, the seats of three famous *ἀριστοκρατίαι*, there were more strong places than one within the city. As to Sparta, cp. Polyb. 5. 22. 1, *τῆς γὰρ Σπάρτης τῷ μὲν καθόλου σχήματι περιφεροῦς ὑπαρχούσης καὶ κειμένης ἐν τόποις ἐπιπέδοις, κατὰ μέρος δὲ περιεχούσης ἐν αὑτῇ διαφόρους ἀνωμάλους καὶ βουνώδεις τόπους κ.τ.λ.*, and Paus. 3. 17. 1, *Λακεδαιμονίοις δὲ ἀκρόπολις μὲν ἐς ὕψος περιφανὲς ἐξίσχουσα οὐκ ἔστι, καθὰ δὴ Θηβαίοις τε ἡ Καδμεία καὶ ἡ Λάρισα Ἀργείοις· ὄντων δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει λόφων καὶ ἄλλων, τὸ μάλιστα ἐς μετέωρον ἀνῆκον ὀνομάζουσιν ἀκρόπολιν* (see Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Sparta, vol. ii. p. 1026 b). The site of Carthage was 'a peninsula with water on three sides. On the three hills within this peninsula stood Carthage and its surroundings, its suburbs, and its necropolis' (E. A. Freeman, *Contemporary Review*, Sept. 1890, p. 368). See also Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 165 sqq. As to Locri, see Liv. 29. 6. 14 sqq. The seven hills of Rome, which was in its best days an *ἀριστοκρατία*, are famous.

**23.** **τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις**, i.e. other than those of war, e.g. *ἀναγκαίας* (c. 12. 1331 b 13) and *πολιτικὰς πράξεις*.

κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἱπποδάμειον τρόπον. Καί is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. Holm (Griech. Gesch. 2. 324) denies that Hippodamus was the first to lay out cities with straight streets. The Campanian Neapolis, he says, was laid out altogether in this way, and Selinus was laid out with two main streets crossing each other at right angles. 'New cities, therefore, were built in this fashion before the fifth century B.C.,' and all that Hippodamus did was to introduce the method in places of the highest importance. But is this view reconcilable with 2. 8. 1267 b 22 sq.?

25. ὡς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον. Like Athens, of which we read in Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 254), ἡ δὲ πόλις ξηρὰ πᾶσα, οὐκ εὔυδρος, κακῶς ἐρρυμοτομημένη διὰ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα, and like Rome till its rebuilding by Nero (Tac. Ann. 15. 43, ceterum urbis quae domui supererant non, ut post Gallica incendia, nulla distinctione nec passim erecta, sed dimensis vicorum ordinibus et latis viarum spatiis cohibitaque aedificiorum altitudine ac patefactis areis). Compare also the contrast between the laying out of Rome and Capua in Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2. 35. 96.

26. δυσέξοδος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for that arrangement of private dwellings is hard of exit for foreign troops and hard of exploration for assailants [whether foreign or not].' The fate of the Thebans who were admitted into Plataea in B.C. 431 is probably present to Aristotle's mind. They found much difficulty in escaping from the city when their attempt on it had failed (Thuc. 2. 4. 2, 5). Compare the difficult position in which Xenophon's troops found themselves in assaulting the city of the Drilae not far from Trapezus on the Euxine (Xen. Anab. 5. 2. 7, ὁ δ' ἐλθὼν λέγει ὅτι ἔστι χωρίον χρημάτων πολλῶν μεστόν· τοῦτο οὔτε λαβεῖν δυνάμεθα· ἰσχυρὸν γάρ ἐστιν· οὔτε ἀπελθεῖν ῥᾴδιον· μάχονται γὰρ ἐπεξεληλυθότες καὶ ἡ ἄφοδος χαλεπή). An attacking force did not relish assaulting a city which it was at once difficult to explore, and consequently to reduce, and difficult to get out of in case of failure.

27. διὸ δεῖ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν, i.e. διὸ δεῖ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσιν μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας χρησίμου (cp. 31, οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον ἕξει καλῶς). It is not quite clear whether Aristotle adds (in 29) καὶ τὴν μὲν ὅλην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὔτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους in explanation of his suggestion that the houses should be arranged in clumps or

quincunces, or as an alternative plan. Perhaps the former is the case. His plan will then be to drive straight wide streets between the clumps or quincunces of houses, but to leave the interior of each quincunx a tangle of narrow lanes. Compare J. R. Green's description of Roman London (Making of England, p. 106); it was 'little more than a mass of brick houses and red-tiled roofs, pierced with a network of the narrow alleys which passed for streets in the Roman world, and cleft throughout its area by two wider roads from the bridge.' Silchester and St. Alban's, however, were laid out with great regularity (Fox and St. John Hope, On the Desirability of the complete Excavation of the Site of Silchester, p. 4).

**28.** κατασκευάζῃ, sc. *τὴν τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσιν.*

καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., sc. *κατασκευάζονται*, 'as among farmers what some call clumps of vines are arranged.' For *τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας*, cp. Pollux, 7. 146, *καὶ ξυστὰς μὲν καὶ συστάσεις * ἡ ἀμπελόφυτος γῆ, ἡ μὴ κατὰ στίχον πεφυτευμένη, στοιχὰς δὲ ἡ κατὰ στίχον.* Vines were planted in clumps or quincunces, partly because they looked better when thus arranged, and partly because they were more productive (Varro, De Re Rustica, 1. 7. 2 sqq.: Columella, 3. 13. 4: Quintil. 8. 3. 9). The younger Cyrus seems to have planted trees in this way (Xen. Oecon. 4. 20 sqq.: cp. Cic. De Senect. 17. 59). Sus., following Scaliger, reads *ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις* ('in the fields,' or 'farms') in place of *ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς*, which is the reading of all the MSS., but the word *γεώργιον* is nowhere else used by Aristotle (is it used by any writer earlier than Philo, Mechan. Synt. p. 96, l. 49 Schoene?), and *ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς* ('among farmers'), which is retained by Bekk.[2], appears to be defensible: cp. Pherecr. Κοριαννώ, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 281),

*ἐν τοῖς Μαριανδυνοῖς ἐκείνοις βαρβάροις*
*χύτρας καλοῦσι τὰς μελαίνας ἰσχάδας,*

and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 2, *ἃ δὴ νόμιμα ἦν ἐν Μήδοις.* Ἐν ταῖς γεωργίαις, 'in the farms,' would probably be preferable to *ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις* (cp. Plato, Laws 762 A). But Aristotle often refers to practices prevailing among farmers (e. g. in De Gen. et Corr. 2. 8. 335 a 13: Hist. An. 5. 32. 557 b 29 sqq.).

**31.** καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον. See critical note.

**32.** περὶ δὲ τειχῶν κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1330 b 17, *περὶ δὲ τόπων τῶν ἐρυμνῶν.* Aristotle has just pronounced in favour of an old-fashioned arrangement of private houses, and now he passes

on naturally enough to the question whether it is not the best plan to be old-fashioned in the matter of walls, and to dispense with them altogether. He has before him Plato, Laws 778 D, *περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἔγωγ' ἂν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ξυμφεροίμην τὸ καθεύδειν ἐᾶν ὃ τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη καὶ μὴ ἐπανιστάναι κ.τ.λ.* The State of the Laws was pre-eminently one which laid claim to virtue (696 A: 731 A sqq.). Agesilaus ([Plut.] Apophth. Lac. Ages. 30) had been asked why Sparta had no walls, and had replied, *Οὐ λίθοις δεῖ καὶ ξύλοις τετειχίσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ταῖς δὲ τῶν ἐνοικούντων ἀρεταῖς*, and a similar dictum was ascribed to Lycurgus (Plut. Lycurg. c. 19). Isocrates had spoken of the Lacedaemonians as *ἀρετῆς ἀμφισβητοῦντες* in Archid. § 91, and had used the expression *τοὺς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένους* in Panath. § 228 (cp. § 120). For *λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν*, cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 57, *ἀρχαϊκὰ φρονεῖς: ἦτοι εὐήθη*, where Aristoph. Nub. 821 (Didot) and Plato, Euthydem. 295 C are referred to.

**34.** *καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρῶντες* κ.τ.λ. This refers to the humiliation (cp. 40, *μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι*) which Epaminondas' invasions of Laconia inflicted on Sparta. For the sing. *ἔργῳ*, cp. Meteor. 1. 13. 349 b 35, *δηλοῖ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον*, and Plato, Symp. 182 C, *ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦτο ἔμαθον*. In 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 15 we have *τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγκται* and in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 1 *ἐξελέγχεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἔργων*.

**35.** *ἔστι δὲ* κ.τ.λ. So far as this Aristotle agrees with Plato's censure of those who seek safety in walls (Laws 779 A, *τείχεσι δὲ καὶ πύλαις διανοεῖσθαι φραχθέντας τε καὶ καθεύδοντας σωτηρίας ὄντως ἕξειν μηχανὰς κ.τ.λ.*). Compare Thuc. 1. 32. 5, where the Corcyreans say, *τὴν μὲν οὖν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτοὶ κατὰ μόνας ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορινθίους· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μείζονι παρασκευῇ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὥρμηνται, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὄντες τῇ οἰκείᾳ μόνον δυνάμει περιγενέσθαι κ.τ.λ.*

**37.** *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ. Take the case of Plataea or Phlius besieged by the Lacedaemonians and their allies, or of Haarlem besieged by the forces of Spain (Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, Part 3, c. 8). For *καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται*, see above on 1264 b 18.

**38.** *καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς*. Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26, *μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας*, Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 18, *πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωϊκήν τινα καὶ θείαν*, Magn. Mor. 2. 5. 1200 b 11 sqq., and Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 32, *οἱ δ' αὖ Ἠλεῖοι . . . ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, τοιοῦτοι γενόμενοι οἵους τὴν ἀρετὴν θεὸς μὲν ἂν ἐμπνεύσας δύναιτο καὶ*

*ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἀποδείξαι, ἄνθρωποι δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τοὺς μὴ ὄντας ἀλκίμους ποιήσειαν.*

**40.** *τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα* κ.τ.λ. So far from strong walls being a sign of effeminacy, as many thought (Plato, Laws 778 E: [Plut.] Apophth. Lac. Agis 6, Ages. 55, and Panthoid. 1), they are really a sign of warlike forethought.

**1.** *ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὑρημένων* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle refers among other 1331 a.
things to the invention of the catapult made under Dionysius the Elder at Syracuse (Diod. 14. 42. 1, *καὶ γὰρ τὸ καταπελτικὸν εὑρέθη κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς ἂν τῶν κρατίστων τεχνιτῶν πανταχόθεν εἰς ἕνα τόπον συνηγμένων . . . διόπερ ἀνυπέρβλητον φιλοτιμίαν εἰσφέροντες οἱ τεχνῖται πολλὰ προσεπενοοῦντο βέλη καὶ μηχανήματα ξένα καὶ δυνάμενα παρέχεσθαι μεγάλας χρείας*, and 14. 50. 4). The term *μηχαναί*, however, probably includes not only catapults, but also battering-rams with shelter-sheds for those who worked them, movable wooden towers with drawbridges which could be lowered so as to give the besiegers access to the top of the city-wall, scaling-ladders, etc. (Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterth. p. 209. 1). Of these contrivances, catapults and (apparently) movable wooden towers were introduced into Greek warfare under Dionysius the Elder (Droysen, p. 211). He had to contend against the Carthaginians, who were the first to use battering-rams and towers for sieges in the West, and whose use of them against the Greeks gave them a great superiority in their Sicilian campaigns (Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 134). His catapults and wooden towers revolutionized the art of besieging cities. They cleared the walls of their defenders and thus facilitated the use of the battering-ram. Nor did the development of the art stop here. As time went on, the towers became higher and better armed, and the battering-rams longer and better sheltered. The new methods of siege-warfare were inherited by Philip of Macedon, whose engines of war were famous (Demosth. Phil. 3. c. 50). See on the whole subject Droysen, op. cit. p. 211 sqq. For *εἰς ἀκρίβειαν*, cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, *εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν*.

**3.** *ὅμοιον γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. *Ταῖς πόλεσιν* finds its correlative in *τὴν χώραν* and *ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις*. If we are to deprive cities of their defence for fear of making the citizens unmanly, why should we stop there? Why should we not deprive the territory and private dwellings of their defences also?

**4.** *τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν*, 'to seek that the territory shall be easy of invasion,' for *εἶναι* should be supplied with *εὐέμβολον*.

Compare for the construction 1. 9. 1257 b 17 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 443 B and 375 E.

περιαιρεῖν τοὺς ὀρεινοὺς τόπους, 'strip off (from the territory) its mountainous spots,' as one might strip off an outer coating. Περιαιρεῖν answers to *μὴ περιβάλλειν*, 3.

7. For ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ . . . γε see note on 1339 a 29.

10. ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημέναις. See critical note.

11. οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον. Coray brackets *μόνον*, but, as Sus.[2] has already pointed out, quite wrongly: see Stallbaum on Plato, Symp. 179 B, *καὶ μὴν ὑπεραποθνήσκειν γε μόνοι ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες*, where he refers to Xen. Mem. 2. 9. 8, *ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος τῷ Κρίτωνι ἡδέως ἐχαρίζετο, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι μόνος ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ.*

ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον κ.τ.λ., 'but attention must also be paid to them to secure that they shall be in a state befitting the city not only with a view to ornament, but also with a view to military procedures, both those already in use and those further ones which have recently been discovered.' The 'military procedures' here referred to are probably those of besiegers, not those of the besieged, but this is not quite certain. For *τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας*, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11, 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34, and Plato, Phaedr. 239 D. How were walls to be made proof against recent improvements in siege-methods? By being made higher, for one thing, to resist scaling, and thicker, to resist battering-rams and heavy artillery (see Droysen, op. cit. p. 253). Aristotle's remark is perhaps based on the experience of Athens. The dangerous position in which she found herself after the defeat of Chaeroneia prompted a hasty effort to repair the walls (Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 27, 31), which was continued in the years B.C. 334–326 (Corp. Inscr. Att. 2. 167, referred to by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 239, note 1, and Droysen, op. cit. p. 237. 1).

12. ὅπως κ.τ.λ. For the order of the words see note on 1327 a 4.

15. δι' ὧν τρόπων. See note on 1314 a 30 and cp. Diod. 13. 95. 3, *δι' οὗ τρόπου*.

16. τὰ μὲν εὕρηται. Many of these devices are mentioned in the Commentarius Poliorceticus of Aeneas Tacticus (*τακτικὸν ὑπόμνημα περὶ τοῦ πῶς χρὴ πολιορκουμένους ἀντέχειν*), which was written (according to Christ, Gesch. der gr. Litteratur, p. 308) soon after B.C. 360. It is the only part which has come down to us of a larger work

referred to by Polybius (10. 44) under the title of Τὰ *περὶ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα*. See above on 1326 b 39.

**ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν.** Cp. Isocr. Epist. 7. § 3, *χρὴ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν*, and De Pace, § 116, *φιλοσοφήσετε καὶ σκέψεσθε*.

**17. ἀρχὴν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Thuc. 1. 93. 8, *ἐβούλετο γὰρ (ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς) τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει (τῶν τειχῶν) ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς*. The Index Aristotelicus refers to no other passage in which *ἀρχήν* is similarly used. The use of *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* in Poet. 24. 1460 a 33 sq., however, approaches that of *ἀρχήν* here.

**19. Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** As the citizen-body must be divided into syssitia, and the walls must be dotted with guard-rooms and towers, it is a natural arrangement to locate some of the syssitia in the guard-rooms. Aristotle appears to intend the guard-rooms to be in the towers, but a common plan was to build city-walls solid only up to a certain height, and to place guard-rooms in them above that height (Droysen, op. cit. p. 251). As to *κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους* (with which Liddell and Scott compare Demosth. De Cor. c. 27, *προλαβὼν τοὺς ἐπικαίρους τῶν τόπων*), towers were often placed along the wall close to a gate which needed guarding, or at an angle where two curtains of wall met which could be commanded by weapons discharged from the tower, or at intervals along the curtain. In times of pressing danger, and especially during a siege, it must have been a common practice for the defenders of the walls to take their meals either on them or close to them (cp. Damon, ap. Athen. Deipn. 442 c, *διὸ καὶ πολεμουμένων ποτὲ αὐτῶν* (i.e. *τῶν Βυζαντίων*) *καὶ οὐ προσκαρτερούντων τοῖς τείχεσι, Λεωνίδης ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐκέλευσε τὰ καπηλεῖα ἐπὶ τῶν τειχῶν σκηνοπηγεῖν, καὶ μόλις ποτὲ ἐπαύσαντο λιποτακτοῦντες*, and Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 14), but Aristotle's recommendation refers to times of peace as well as times of war, and it probably went far beyond the practice of most cities. We find, indeed, that the polemarchs of Cynaetha spent the day at the gates of their city (Polyb. 4. 18. 2, *πολέμαρχοι τῶν κατεληλυθότων τινὲς ἐγεγόνεισαν· ταύτην δὲ συμβαίνει τὴν ἀρχὴν κλείειν τὰς πύλας καὶ τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον κυριεύειν τῶν κλειδῶν, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν τὴν δίαιταν ἐπὶ τῶν πυλώνων*), but Aristotle does not appear to be speaking here of high magistrates like polemarchs; he seems rather to have in view some part of the military force of the State. For *τὰ τείχη διειλῆφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις*, cp. Diod. 2. 7. 3, *τεῖχος διειλημμένον πύργοις πυκνοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις*.

C. 12.

**21. αὐτά**, Lamb. 'eae res': cp. c. 4. 1325 b 33, *ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφροι-*

μίασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν. Bonitz (Ind. 125 a 34) compares Top. 1. 5. 102 a 10, ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, δῆλον ἐξ αὐτῶν, and 102 b 20, but would read αὐτό in place of αὐτά.

**23.** καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Ταῦτα, 'these things,' probably refers not to συσσίτια, but to the matters which form the subject of the preceding sentence. Just as some of the syssitia and the guard-rooms are to be conjoined, so we must conjoin the temples of the gods and the syssitia of highest authority. As to μὲν δή, Eucken remarks (De Partic. Usu, p. 46), 'diverso modo usurpatur, saepissime quidem ita ut inquisitione quadam finita omnia quae antecedunt comprehendat': he compares Phys. 1. 8. 191 b 27, εἷς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and adds 'simili modo μὲν οὖν adhibetur.' See also Bon. Ind. 173 a 38 sqq.

**24.** τὰς δὲ κ.τ.λ. The suggestion just made as to some minor syssitia leads on to the question where 'the highest syssitia of the magistracies' are to be placed (τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια, not τὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων ἀρχείων συσσίτια, because Aristotle has the contrast of ἕνια τῶν συσσιτίων still in his mind), and to the general question how the various syssitia are to be distributed over the city, for it is not proposed that all citizens—priests, magistrates lower and higher, and soldiers—should meet for meals at one and the same spot. On the contrary, the soldiers will have their syssitia on the walls, the highest magistrates and the priests on the hill on which the temples stand, and the less dignified magistrates near the commercial agora. For τὰς τοῖς θείοις ἀποδεδομένας οἰκήσεις (contrast αἱ ἴδιαι οἰκήσεις, c. 11. 1330 b 21), cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 21, τὰ πέπτωτα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. Τοῖς θείοις = τοῖς τῶν θεῶν, 'the things of the gods,' and especially 'religious observances' (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 2, and Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 31, τὰ δαιμόνια): so Lamb. 'rebus divinis,' while Vict. translates 'divinis naturis.' Aristotle takes pains to sever the temples and the highest magistrates from all else, keeping them apart even from the free agora, much more from the commercial agora: contrast Plato, Laws 778 C, τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἱερὰ πᾶσαν πέριξ τὴν τε ἀγορὰν χρὴ κατασκευάζειν . . . πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἰκήσεις τε ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων, ἐν οἷς τὰς δίκας ὡς ἱερωτάτοις οὖσι λήψονταί τε καὶ δώσουσι, τὰ μὲν ὡς ὁσίων πέρι, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοιούτων θεῶν ἱδρύματα, καὶ ἐν τούτοις (i. e. 'deorum aedibus,' Stallbaum) δικαστήρια, ἐν οἷς αἵ τε τῶν φόνων πρέπουσαι δίκαι γίγνοιντ' ἂν καὶ ὅσα θανάτων ἄξια ἀδικήματα. The agora at Leontini seems to have been arranged on a plan

somewhat resembling that of Plato. Cp. Polyb. 7. 6, *ἡ γὰρ τῶν Λεοντίνων πόλις τῷ μὲν ὅλῳ κλίματι τέτραπται πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους, ἔστι δὲ διὰ μέσης αὐτῆς αὐλὼν ἐπίπεδος, ἐν ᾧ συμβαίνει τάς τε τῶν ἀρχείων καὶ δικαστηρίων κατασκευὰς καὶ καθόλου τὴν ἀγορὰν ὑπάρχειν.* Aristotle does not tell us where he would place the more important law-courts; he would probably place the less important ones at any rate near the commercial agora. His scheme differs from that of Plato in another point. Plato reserves his acropolis in the Laws (745 B) for Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, whereas Aristotle brings all the gods together on the central hill except those whose temples must necessarily be placed elsewhere. He follows Plato, however, in placing the more important magistracies of the State—its stratêgi, treasurers, and auditors (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sqq.)—in the immediate neighbourhood of the temples. Their moral influence would thus be strengthened and their sense of responsibility increased. Whether his plan of placing the 'Downing Street' of his State on the top of a hill was a wise one, may well be doubted. At Athens the magistrates lived not on the acropolis, but at its foot. It is true that at Athens the Boulê sometimes met in the acropolis (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 20), and that at Megara the offices of the chief magistracy seem to have been in the acropolis (Plut. Ages. c. 27). The wisdom of separating the offices of the major from those of the minor magistracies seems also questionable. But Aristotle's wish is to gather together in one easily defensible spot the animating forces of his State: cp. De Part. An. 3. 7. 670 a 23, *καρδία μὲν οὖν καὶ ἧπαρ πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖα τοῖς ζῴοις, ἡ μὲν διὰ τὴν τῆς θερμότητος ἀρχήν (δεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τινα οἷον ἑστίαν, ἐν ᾗ κείσεται τῆς φύσεως τὸ ζωπυροῦν, καὶ τοῦτο εὐφύλακτον, ὥσπερ ἀκρόπολις οὖσα τοῦ σώματος), τὸ δ' ἧπαρ τῆς πέψεως χάριν.*

**26.** *ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν κ.τ.λ.* Compare the way in which Plato severs the worship of the gods of the nether world from that of the heavenly gods (Laws 828 C, *ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν χθονίων καὶ ὅσους αὖ θεοὺς οὐρανίους ἐπονομαστέον καὶ τὸ τῶν τούτοις ἑπομένων οὐ ξυμμικτέον, ἀλλὰ χωριστέον ἐν τῷ τοῦ Πλούτωνος μηνὶ τῷ δωδεκάτῳ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδόντας*). Among the temples to which Aristotle refers are probably those of Aesculapius, which were often situated outside the city (Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 94, *"διὰ τί τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ τὸ ἱερὸν ἔξω πόλεώς ἐστι;" πότερον ὅτι τὰς ἔξω διατριβὰς ὑγιεινοτέρας ἐνόμιζον εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄστει; καὶ γὰρ Ἕλληνες ἐν τόποις καθαροῖς καὶ ὑψηλοῖς ἐπιεικῶς ἱδρυμένα τὰ Ἀσκληπίεια ἔχουσιν· ἢ ὅτι τὸν θεὸν ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου μετάπεμπτον*

ἥκειν νομίζουσιν, Ἐπιδαυρίοις δ' οὐ κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλὰ πόρρω τὸ Ἀσκληπιεῖόν ἐστιν). As to other temples, cp. Plutarch περὶ ἡσυχίας ap. Stob. Floril. 58. 14, διὰ τοῦτό τοι καὶ τῶν θεῶν τὰ ἱερά, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ παλαιοῦ ἀρχαίου νενόμισται, τοῖς ἐρημοτάτοις χωρίοις οἱ πρῶτοι (ἐνίδρυσαν), μάλιστα δὲ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Πανὸς καὶ Νυμφῶν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ὅσοι μουσικῆς ἡγεμόνες θεοί. The temples of Eileithyia in the Peloponnesus were often outside the gate of the city (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 536): there was, for instance, a temple of Eileithyia outside the gate in the walls of Corinth which led to Tenea (Paus. 2. 5. 4). The same was occasionally the case with the temples of the Chthonian Demeter; thus at Agrigentum 'the place chosen for' the Thesmophoria of Demeter 'was far beyond the walls of the elder city; it is barely within the walls of the enlarged city' (Freeman, Sicily, 2. 80), and at Syracuse the temple of Demeter and Persephonê 'was placed by Gelon outside the bounds of his enlarged city' (ibid. 2. 213: see Diod. 14. 63. 1). For ὁ νόμος, cp. c. 17. 1336 b 16, εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ τὸν τεθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. For an instance of the founding of a temple in a given spot in obedience to the commands of Delphi, cp. Paus. 1. 13. 8, καί σφισιν ἔστι τοῦ θεοῦ χρήσαντος, ἔνθα ὁ Πύρρος ἐτελεύτησεν, ἱερὸν Δήμητρος, ἐν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ Πύρρος τέθαπται. Obedience was proverbially due to a command from Delphi (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 5, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπεῖλε (i.e. Apollo at Delphi) τῷ παντὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι (πείθεσθαι τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις), τότε ἀπέδωκεν (ὁ Λυκοῦργος), οὐ μόνον ἄνομον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀόσιον θεὶς τὸ πυθοχρήστοις νόμοις μὴ πείθεσθαι: Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 8. 443, οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς Χρυσίππου φωναῖς ὡς πυθοχρήστοις παραγγέλμασιν ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle speaks only of the Delphic oracle, whereas Plato in Laws 738 B sqq. makes a similar reservation in favour of the commands of those of Dodona and Ammon also, and even of τινὲς παλαιοὶ λόγοι.

**28.** εἴη δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ., 'and the place would be suitable which is such as to (ὅστις) possess adequate conspicuousness for the enthronement of virtue and a superiority of strength in relation to the adjacent parts of the city.' For ὁ τόπος ὅστις (not ὅς), cp. Xen. Oecon. c. 21. 10, τοῦ δὲ δεσπότου ἐπιφανέντος . . . ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον, ὅστις δύναται καὶ μέγιστα βλάψαι τὸν κακὸν τῶν ἐργατῶν καὶ μέγιστα τιμῆσαι τὸν πρόθυμον. For the use of the word ἐπιφάνεια in a not very dissimilar sense, see the passages collected in Stallbaum's note on Plato, Alcib. 1. 124 C. Aristotle continues the sentence in καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρως as if he had written

not *ἐπιφάνειαν ἔχει ἱκανῶς*, but *ἐπιφανεστέρως ἔχει*. For the use of *ἔχειν* in this double sense (transitive and intransitive), cp. Plato, Rep. 370 E, and Stallbaum's note. The 'virtue' referred to is apparently that of the gods and the supreme magistrates. That virtue should not be hidden, we see from Paroem. Gr. 2. 760, *μὴ κρύπτε τὸ κάλλος ὥσπερ τὸ ποηφάγον: ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ δειλίαν κρυπτόντων καὶ ἣν ἔχουσιν ἀρετήν· ὁ δὲ ποηφάγος ζῷόν ἐστιν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς* (cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 621): Pindar, Nem. 9. 6,

*ἔστι δέ τις λόγος ἀνθρώπων, τετελεσμένον ἐσλὸν*
*μὴ χαμαὶ σιγᾷ καλύψαι:*

Hor. Carm. 4. 9. 29,

Paullum sepultae distat inertiae
Celata virtus:

and Plut. Pericl. c. 7, *τῆς ἀληθινῆς δ' ἀρετῆς κάλλιστα φαίνεται τὰ μάλιστα φαινόμενα, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲν οὕτω θαυμάσιον τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὡς ὁ καθ' ἡμέραν βίος τοῖς συνοῦσιν.* Cp. also Simonides, Fragm. 58,

*ἔστι τις λόγος*
*τὰν ἀρετὰν ναίειν δυσαμβάτοις ἐπὶ πέτραις.*

Temples especially were wont to be placed on conspicuous sites: see vol. i. p. 338, note 1, and compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10, *ναοῖς γε μὴν καὶ βωμοῖς χώραν ἔφη εἶναι πρεπωδεστάτην ἥτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὖσα ἀστιβεστάτη εἴη· ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ ἰδόντας προσεύξασθαι, ἡδὺ δὲ ἁγνῶς ἔχοντας προσιέναι*, Corp. Inscr. Gr. 2140. 35 (referred to by Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 83. 2), where the temple of Apollo in Aegina is described as situate in the *ἐπιφανέστατος τόπος τῆς πόλεως*, and Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 1. See also Hom. Hymn. in Aphrod. 100 sq. That the place assigned to the gods should be strong we see from Hdt. 5. 67; there are obvious reasons why the abode of the chief magistrates should be so.

**30.** *πρέπει δὲ* κ.τ.λ. *Μέν* is answered by *δέ* in *τὴν δὲ τῶν ὠνίων ἀγοράν*, 1331 b 1. *Κατασκευήν*, 'provision' or 'establishment,' cp. 1331 b 10, *κατεσκευάσθαι*. The agora here referred to is to be below the hill on which the gods and the magistrates dwell, but still on high ground (cp. 1331 b 12, *τὴν ἄνω*, sc. *ἀγοράν*). It would be in this agora that the citizens would come together to elect magistrates, for magistracies were to be elective in Aristotle's 'best State' (c. 4. 1326 b 15), and here too the ecclesia would meet, if indeed, which is uncertain, Aristotle intends an ecclesia to exist. But the main function of this agora seems to be to serve as

a place for the enjoyment of leisure (1331 b 12), the highest and best thing in human life (c. 14. 1333 a 30–b 3). The buildings round it would not be the buildings which usually surrounded an agora. They would include no temples, for the temples were to be on the top of the hill above it, and no public offices either, if the public offices were also to be on the top of the hill, with the exception of those which adjoined the commercial agora. The only buildings which we are distinctly told would adjoin the 'free agora' are those of the gymnasium of the elders. These buildings are placed close to it, partly in order that the shady walks and the streams of the gymnasium may add a fresh charm to the agora, partly in order that the elder citizens may obtain recreation without straying from the region which is especially theirs, partly also perhaps in order that they may be encouraged to carry on in their years of maturity the physical training of their earlier years, and may not be tempted to drop it as they probably often did in ancient Greece. There were already cities in which the agora and the gymnasium were close together—e. g. Elis (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 29) and Sparta (ibid. 2. 234)—but it should be noticed that Aristotle brings into the neighbourhood of his 'free agora' only the gymnasium of the elder men; if he had placed the gymnasium of the younger men near it, he would have seriously altered the character of the spot.

**31.** οἷαν κ.τ.λ., '(such an agora) as they call by the name of agora in Thessaly, for example—I mean the agora which they term "free."' With ὀνομάζουσιν we should supply ἀγοράν: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 183, τοῖς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένοις, μὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ὀνομαζομένης καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, where ὀνομαζομένης means 'called by that name.' The word ἀγορά was connected in the minds of Greeks with ἀγοράζω, and to use the word as the Thessalians did of a place in which nothing was bought or sold would seem strange to them. Lambinus, followed by Bekk.², Bonitz (Ind. 487 b 51), and Sus., would read νομίζουσιν in place of ὀνομάζουσιν, but it seems to me that this change involves the loss of the point of the passage. For καί in the sense of 'for example,' see above on 1255 a 36. Ἐλευθέραν is evidently interpreted by καθαρὰν τῶν ὠνίων πάντων in the next line. The word ἐλεύθερος is occasionally used by Aristotle in opposition to ἀναγκαῖος (e. g. in 1. 11. 1258 b 11), and we read of τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγοράν in 1331 b 11. Camerarius (Interp. p. 305) refers to Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 3 (a passage which Aristotle evidently

remembers), *οἱ δὲ Περσικοὶ νόμοι προλαβόντες ἐπιμέλονται ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται οἱ πολῖται οἷοι πονηροῦ τινος ἢ αἰσχροῦ ἔργου ἐφίεσθαι. ἐπιμέλονται δὲ ὧδε. ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐλευθέρα ἀγορὰ καλουμένη, ἔνθα τά τε βασίλεια καὶ τἆλλα ἀρχεῖα πεποίηται. ἐντεῦθεν τὰ μὲν ὤνια καὶ οἱ ἀγοραῖοι καὶ αἱ τούτων φωναὶ καὶ ἀπειροκαλίαι ἀπελήλανται εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, ὡς μὴ μιγνύηται ἡ τούτων τύρβη τῇ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων εὐκοσμίᾳ· διῄρηται δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἀγορὰ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀρχεῖα τέτταρα μέρη· τούτων δ' ἔστιν ἓν μὲν παισίν, ἓν δὲ ἐφήβοις, ἄλλο τελείοις ἀνδράσιν, ἄλλο τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὰ στρατεύσιμα ἔτη γεγονόσι.* At the opposite pole to an agora of this kind stands the *γυναικεία ἀγορά* of Menander (Pollux, 10. 18, *καὶ μὴν εἰ γυναικείαν ἀγορὰν τὸν τόπον οὗ τὰ σκεύη τὰ τοιαῦτα πιπράσκουσιν ἐθέλοις καλεῖν, εὕροις ἂν ἐν ταῖς Συναριστώσαις Μενάνδρου τὸ ὄνομα*: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 204). According to Holm, Gr. Gesch. 2. 309 (see also Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 361), the agora at Athens was divided into two parts, a Southern part used for political purposes, and a Northern part used for trade and social intercourse. That Aristotle would not be satisfied with a mere division of one and the same agora into two parts, we see from 1331 b 1, *τὴν δὲ τῶν ὠνίων ἀγορὰν ἑτέραν τε δεῖ ταύτης εἶναι καὶ χωρίς.* As to Sparta and Rome in relation to this matter, see vol. i. p. 339, note 1. The two kinds of agora are traceable in some Southern cities still. At Zara there is a Piazza dei Signori, and also a Piazza dell' Erbe (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 1. 239, 243). At San Marino the Borgo, which is 'the business centre of the State,' where the market is held, is some little way below the town of San Marino; 'it lies on a small plateau beneath the steep long ridge with its three crags crowned with castles' on which the town is built (E. Armstrong, 'A Political Survival,' in *Macmillan's Magazine*, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 197).

**33.** *καὶ μήτε βάναυσον* κ.τ.λ. Supply *εἰς ἣν δεῖ*. For *παραβάλλειν*, 'enter,' see Bon. Ind. s.v., where De Mir. Auscult. 81. 836 a 28, *ὅτε . . . εἰς τούτους τοὺς τόπους παρέβαλε*, is quoted among other passages.

**35.** *εἴη δ' ἄν* κ.τ.λ. At Athens in Aristotle's day the gymnasia were outside the walls, but Plato had already proposed a change in this respect (see vol. i. p. 338, note 2). One gymnasium at any rate at Thebes was outside the city (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25). At Sparta and Elis, on the other hand, the gymnasium was within the city (see above on 30), and this was the case also at Megalopolis (Paus. 8. 31. 8), and apparently at Pellene (Paus. 7. 27. 5: Curtius, Peloponn-

nesos, 1. 483). The gymnasium built by the grave of Timoleon at Syracuse and called Timoleonteum was in the agora (Plut. Timol. c. 39). The plan of separating the gymnasium of the elder from that of the younger men may be borrowed by Aristotle from Sparta; we read at any rate in Plut. Cimon, c. 16, of the ephebi and the young men (*τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν νεανίσκων*) exercising together in a stoa at Sparta as far back as the time of the great earthquake, when Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, was King. In the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropaedeia the boys, the ephebi, the full-grown men, and those past the military age have each of them a separate part of the agora for their use (Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 4, quoted above on 31).

**38.** *καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον* = *καὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν*, 'this arrangement' (or 'institution') 'also,' i.e. the gymnasia as well as the syssitia: cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὡρισμένα τοῖς ἡλικίαις*, and for *κόσμον*, 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 5, *ἕως ἂν πάντα κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον*, and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5, *τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις*.

**40.** *ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle here implies that there are two kinds of *αἰδώς*, one genuine and the other not (cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 273 M, *τῆς ἀληθωῆς αἰδοῦς*). Phaedra in the Hippolytus of Euripides (363 Bothe: 385 Dindorf) had already said,

*αἰδώς τε· δισσαὶ δ' εἰσίν, ἡ μὲν οὐ κακή,*
*ἡ δ' ἄχθος οἴκων,*

but she is distinguishing between the *αἰδώς* which holds back where there should be no holding back and the *αἰδώς* which is not inopportune. Aristotle's distinction, on the contrary, is drawn between the *αἰδώς* which befits freemen and the *αἰδώς* which does not. The *δέος οἰκετῶν πρὸς δεσπότας* of which we read in Aristot. Fragm. 178. 1507 b 22, 37 was probably miscalled *αἰδώς* by some. True *αἰδώς* was rather to be sought in the respectful awe with which the Spartans regarded the members of the *γερουσία* (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 180, *παρελθών τις τῶν γερόντων, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι καὶ αἰσχύνονται καὶ δεδίασι*: cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Polydor. 4. 231 F, *ἐρωτηθεὶς δὲ διὰ τί Σπαρτιᾶται κατὰ πόλεμον κινδυνεύουσιν ἀνδρείως, Ὅτι, ἔφη, αἰδεῖσθαι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἔμαθον, οὐ φοβεῖσθαι*). The nature of the *αἰδώς* which befits freemen may best be learnt from Plato, Laws 671 C sq. (where it is called *θεῖος φόβος*), 647 A, 698 B, and 699 C: we gather that it makes men obedient to law and order and content with their share of speech and silence, and also courageous and

good (699 C: cp. Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 235 Mullach). Compare Soph. Aj. 1073,

> *οὐ γάρ ποτ' οὔτ' ἂν ἐν πόλει νόμοι καλῶς*
> *φέροιντ' ἄν, ἔνθα μὴ καθεστήκῃ δέος,*
> *οὔτ' ἂν στρατός γε σωφρόνως ἄρχοιτ' ἔτι*
> *μηδὲν φόβου πρόβλημα μηδ' αἰδοῦς ἔχων,*

and the language of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 322 D. At Sparta the presence of *elders* was held to be enough, in the absence of magistrates, to produce *αἰδώς* (cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 10, *ὅπως δὲ μηδ' εἰ ὁ παιδονόμος ἀπέλθοι, ἔρημοί ποτε οἱ παῖδες εἶεν ἄρχοντος, ἐποίησε τὸν ἀεὶ παρόντα τῶν πολιτῶν κύριον εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτάττειν τοῖς παισίν, ὅ τι [ἂν] ἀγαθὸν δοκοίη εἶναι, καὶ κολάζειν, εἴ τι ἁμαρτάνοιεν. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας διέπραξε καὶ αἰδημονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς παῖδας· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως αἰδοῦνται οὔτε παῖδες οὔτε ἄνδρες ὡς τοὺς ἄρχοντας*, and 5. 5: also Plut. Lycurg. c. 17)—indeed, some held that the presence, or even the existence, of *ἐρῶντες* produced *αἰδώς* (Xen. Symp. 8. 33 sq.: Plato, Symp. 178 D sq.)—but Aristotle thinks that nothing produces it so well as the visible presence of magistrates: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 16 and Hell. 7. 3. 6, and on the whole subject Plut. Cleom. c. 9, a passage which shows that Aristotle's views were much influenced by those which prevailed at Sparta. A current proverb, however, is also probably present to his memory, *αἰδὼς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς* (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 381): cp. Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 34, *καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μᾶλλον (αἰσχύνονται)· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα.* See Cope's note on this passage.

1. **τὴν δὲ τῶν ὠνίων ἀγορὰν κ.τ.λ.** This answers to 1331 a 30, *πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τύπον κ.τ.λ. Ἔχουσαν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον κ.τ.λ.*, 'on a site easily made a meeting-point for all commodities, both those coming from the sea and those coming from the territory.' Compare the use of *εὐπαρακόμιστον* in c. 5. 1327 a 7 sqq. 1331 b.

4. **†πλῆθος†.** See critical note.

**εἰς ἱερεῖς, εἰς ἄρχοντας.** See critical note. Here, as in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 16 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 17 sqq.), priests are distinguished from magistrates.

5. **καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια**, i.e. as well as the syssitia of the chief magistracies. For the absence of *τά* before *τῶν ἱερέων*, see note on 1285 b 12, *τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις*. Vict. 'cum enim frequentes ipsos

oporteat esse in fanis illis, ut serviant officio suo, quod sine scelere deseri non potest, facilius id praestabunt, si explebunt desideria corporis propinquo in loco.' Aristotle's aim probably is to secure more attention to their duties on the part of the priests than was often forthcoming from them. 'By the *ἱερὸς νόμος* of Oropus (Ἐφ. Ἀρχ. 1885, 94) the priest of Amphiaraus was only required *μένειν ὁ τῷ ἱερῷ μὴ ἔλαττον ἢ δέκα ἡμέρας τοῦ μηνὸς ἑκάστου*. He probably spent the remainder of his time in the city, where he had a civil occupation in addition to his sacred office. Compare von Wilamowitz, *Hermes*. 21. 93' (Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 160. 2).

**περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων.** Schn. is probably right in supplying *τάξιν*. Compare the suppression of *διανομήν* in Plato, Laws 745 D.

**6. τῶν δ' ἀρχείων κ.τ.λ.**, 'but all the magistracies which have in their charge contracts and indictments in lawsuits and callings into courts and other administrative work of the kind just mentioned.' Aristotle does not rate these functions highly (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10 sqq.), nor does Plato (Rep. 425 C sqq.). The magistracies which have the supervision of contracts are here marked off from the agoranomi, though in 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12, *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἐφ' ᾗ δεῖ τινὰ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορῶσαν περί τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν*, the functions of the agoranomi are implied to include the supervision of contracts. Aristotle is perhaps here thinking of magistrates with whom contracts were registered: see as to these 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 34 sqq. and note.

**9. τὴν καλουμένην ἀστυνομίαν.** Probably the word *ἀστυνομία* was not familiar everywhere (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 23, *καλοῦσι δ' ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν*). The title, indeed, seems to be too grand for the functions of the office. See note on 1317 a 18. Yet Aristotle adds *οἱ καλούμενοι* to such simple and everyday words as *γεωργοί* and *βάναυσοι* in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 40 sq., so that the addition of *τὴν καλουμένην* here may need no special explanation.

**10. πρὸς ἀγορᾷ μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ.**, 'must be established near indeed to some agora and place of public concourse, but the place adapted for the business done by them is [not the place near the free agora, but] the place near the necessary agora, for,' etc. For *σύνοδος*, see note on 1319 a 31. For *τοιοῦτος*, cp. 1331 a 28. For the contrast of *ἀναγκαία ἀγορά* and *ἐλευθέρα ἀγορά*, cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 10.

**12. ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν.** For *ἐνσχολάζειν*, where the infinitive expresses the purpose, see Goodwin, Moods and

Tenses, § 770, who refers among other passages to Plato, Phaedr. 228 E, *παρόντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίου ἐμαυτόν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται*, and Thuc. 2. 44. 2. For *τὴν ἄνω*, cp. Thuc. 1. 93. 9, *τόν τε Πειραιᾶ ὠφελιμώτερον ἐνόμιζε τῆς ἄνω πόλεως*. For *τίθεμεν*, cp. c. 13. 1332 a 30 sq.

**ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις**, 'and this for necessary activities, [with the supervision of which these magistracies are concerned].'

**13. νενεμῆσθαι δὲ χρὴ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and matters in the territory should be distributed on the plan which has been described,' i.e. so that sites shall be allotted for guard-houses and syssitia of magistrates in them and for temples. Aristotle here has before him Plato, Laws 848 C sqq., and especially *δώδεκα κώμας εἶναι χρή, κατὰ μέσον τὸ δωδεκατημόριον ἕκαστον μίαν, ἐν τῇ κώμῃ δὲ ἑκάστῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἱερὰ καὶ ἀγορὰν ἐξῃρῆσθαι θεῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων θεοῖς δαιμόνων . . . πρῶτον δὲ οἰκοδομίας εἶναι περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ταῦτα, ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ τόπος ὑψηλότατος ᾖ, τοῖς φρουροῖς ὑποδοχὴν ὅ τι μάλιστα εὐερκῆ*. He also follows the example of Plato (Laws 760 B sqq.) in creating the magistracy of the agronomi to keep watch and ward over the rural districts. We nowhere find a mention of *ἀγρονόμοι* except in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, nor of *ὑλωροί* except in the Politics (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 333), though Suidas has an article under the head of *ὑληωροί*. See as to these magistrates below on 1321 b 27. Plato had already established syssitia for the agronomi (Laws 762 B, *διαιτάσθων δὲ οἵ τε ἄρχοντες οἵ τε ἀγρονόμοι τὰ δύο ἔτη τοιόνδε τινὰ τρόπον· πρῶτον μὲν δὴ καθ' ἑκάστους τοὺς τόπους εἶναι ξυσσίτια, ἐν οἷς κοινῇ τὴν δίαιταν ποιητέον ἅπασιν*). As to the *φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας*, see Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 10 sqq. (where one of its objects is implied to be the protection of property against robbers), and Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 6 sqq. *Φυλακτήρια* were scattered over Attica (see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 312, note 1, and Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 193); we read in Xen. De Vect. 4. 43 of a *τεῖχος* at Anaphlystus and of another at Thoricus. A description of the castle at Oenoe will be found in Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterthümer, p. 259. We may perhaps infer from Laws 848 C sqq. (quoted above) that Greek villages often had a fortress on high ground towering over them quite in the style which we associate with the middle ages. These *φυλακτήρια* furnished quarters for the young citizens of Athens during the year in which they served as *περίπολοι* (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 42, § 4, with Sandys'

note: cp. Eupolis, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56, *καὶ τοὺς περιπόλους ἀπιὼν ἐς τὰ φρούρια*). How important a part they sometimes played in the defence of the State appears from Diod. 14. 57. 6, where we read that after the city of Messana in Sicily had been captured by the Carthaginians, *τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρια*, in which most of the citizens had taken refuge, offered a successful resistance.

17. **ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and further temples must be marked out all over the territory, some for gods and others for heroes.' Cp. Plato, Laws 848 D, where it is arranged that in each village there shall be temples of the gods *καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων θεοῖς δαιμόνων*: elsewhere also in the Laws he recommends worship to be paid not only to gods and heroes but also to *δαίμονες* (Laws 717 B, *μετὰ θεοὺς δὲ τούσδε καὶ τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὅ γε ἔμφρων ὀργιάζοιτ' ἄν, ἥρωσι δὲ μετὰ τούτους*: cp. 738 B and D). As to the position given by Plato to *δαίμονες*, see the passages from his writings referred to by Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 501, note 38. Plutarch says (De Defect. Orac. c. 10: see also c. 17, and De Iside et Osiride, c. 25), *Ἡσίοδος δὲ καθαρῶς καὶ διωρισμένως πρῶτος ἐξέθηκε τῶν λογικῶν τέσσαρα γένη, θεούς, εἶτα δαίμονας πολλοὺς καγαθούς, εἶτα ἥρωας, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους, τῶν ἡμιθέων εἰς ἥρωας ἀποκριθέντων*. Aristotle is acquainted with the distinction between gods and *δαίμονες* (cp. *Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς*, c. 2. 463 b 13 sqq.), and his silence in this passage about *δαίμονες* is significant. That heroes were believed sometimes to fight for the State which worshipped them, appears from Diod. 15. 53. 4. Attica was full of village-shrines (Liv. 31. 26: see Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 8. 290). We see from the passage before us that the word *ἱερόν* was used of the building dedicated to a hero, though the sacred enclosure round it was properly called not a *τέμενος*, but a *σηκός* (Pollux, 1. 6).

18. **ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογουμένους κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 34, *τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν*, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 29 sqq. *Καὶ λέγοντας* is added in contradistinction to *ποιοῦντας*, cp. 20 sqq. *Τῶν τοιούτων* is repeated in 19 and 22, and in 20 we have *τὰ τοιαῦτα*. See note on 1284 b 28.

20. **οὐ γὰρ χαλεπόν κ.τ.λ.** There is a designed antithesis between the similarly sounding words *νοῆσαι* and *ποιῆσαι*, *εὐχή* and *τύχη*. For the contrast of *νοῆσαι* and *ποιῆσαι*, cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 15 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 745 B, *τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ τῆς χώρας ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐν μέσῳ*,

καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα πρόσφορα πάλει τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχοντα τόπον ἐκλεξάμενον, ἃ νοῆσαί τε καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν χαλεπόν: cp. also Phileb. 16 C, and Philem. Ἐφεδρῖται, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 10),

χαλεπὸν τὸ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ κελεῦσαι ῥᾴδιον.

**21.** τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. Bonitz (Ind. 303 a 54) compares c. 13. 1332 a 29, διὸ κατ' εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν, ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία. To pray is easy (Demosth. Ol. 3. 18, εὔξασθαι μὲν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ῥᾴδιον). For εὐχῆς ἔργον, cp. Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 68, εὐχῆς, οὐ νόμου, διαπράττοιτ' ἂν ἔργον, and [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, c. 20 *sub fin.*, τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσας τὰς προειρημένας συμπεριλαβεῖν παραινέσεις εὐχῆς ἴσως ἔργον ἐστί. For the use in the same sentence of the pres. infin. λέγειν and the aor. infin. συμβῆναι, cp. c. 13. 1332 a 28 sq. and 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 3 sq. Cp. also 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sq.

**24.** Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. The contents of the thirteenth and following chapters have been sketched in vol. i. p. 340 sqq. The answer given in them to the question here raised is—a State that is to be happy must consist of citizens who are endowed by nature, fortune, and education with the means of making an absolutely, and not merely conditionally, perfect use of virtue, or in other words of citizens who are not only good men (σπουδαῖοι), but are also supplied with an adequate amount of bodily and external goods, i.e. of citizens possessed of ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη (1332 a 28 sqq.: 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq.). Aristotle insists on this because he holds that Plato had starved the life of his guardians in the Republic and robbed it of happiness (2. 5. 1264 b 15 sqq.), and had sought to construct a happy State without making any class of his citizens happy (see vol. i. p. 427 sq.); he probably thought that Plato would not have made this mistake if he had studied the nature of happiness more closely. Aristotle's own ideal of a happy State, which is a sound and noble one, is conceived in direct and designed contrast to that of Plato's Republic and also to the model of the Lacedaemonian State. His ideal State consists of a body of citizens fully supplied with absolute goods and living a life in which work is crowned with leisure, yet unspoilt by their good fortune and enabled by a wisely ordered education to use their leisure aright. For τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, 'the constitution itself, as distinguished from matters outside it,' see above on 1326 b 35, and cp. Plut. De Cohib. Ira, c. 12, where αὐτὴ ἡ ὀργή is contrasted with τὰ ἐν ὀργῇ ἁμαρτήματα, and Demosth. in C. 13.

Lept. c. 144, *καὶ νυνὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου πᾶς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, τούτῳ δ'* (i.e. to the proposer of the law) *οὐδείς ἐστι κίνδυνος.* For *ἐκ τίνων καὶ ἐκ ποίων*, cp. c. 10. 1329 b 40, and see above on 1274 b 32. As to the repetition of *ἐκ*, see critical note.

**26.** *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ. The apodosis is introduced by *μὲν οὖν*, 39, as in c. 2. 1324 a 19 sqq., where see note. Plato (Laws 962 A) and Isocrates (De Pace, § 28 and Epist. 6. 8) had already dwelt on the importance in any inquiry of ascertaining both the end and the means of attaining it. For *τὸ εὖ*, see Bon. Ind. 291 b 25 sqq. Bonitz (Ind. 685 a 40) contrasts *τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων* with 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 14, *πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος.* See note on the latter passage.

**28.** *ἓν δὲ τὰς* κ.τ.λ., not *ἐν τῷ τάς*: see above on 1330 b 10.

**30.** *ταῦτα*, i.e. *τὸ τέλος* and *τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις.*

**31.** *ἔκκειται καλῶς*, 'is proposed well.' Compare (with Liddell and Scott) Megasthenes, ap. Strab. p. 707, *τοῖς δ' ὁπλοποιοῖς καὶ ναυπηγοῖς μισθοὶ καὶ τροφαὶ παρὰ βασιλέως ἔκκεινται.* In 28 we have *κεῖσθαι ὀρθῶς*, and in 36 *τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὅρον.*

*ἐν τῷ πράττειν*, as distinguished from *τὸ νοεῖν*, which is a prior stage: cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 6 sqq.

**33.** *ὅτε δὲ* κ.τ.λ. The Platonic Socrates in the Republic is charged with this twofold error in 2. 2. 1261 a 11–16.

**34.** *οἷον περὶ ἰατρικήν*, sc. *διαμαρτάνουσιν*: cp. Plato, Laws 962 A, *ἰατρὸς δὴ τὸ περὶ σῶμα ἀγνοῶν, ὃ προσείπομεν ὑγίειαν νῦν, ἢ νίκην στρατηγὸς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα δὴ διήλθομεν, ἕσθ' ὅπως ἂν νοῦν περί τι τούτων ἂν ἔχων φαίνοιτο;*

**36.** *ὅρον* here = *τέλος.*

**38.** *κρατεῖσθαι*, 'obtineri' (Bon. Ind. s. v.): see Vahlen on Poet. 18. 1456 a 10, *πολλοὶ δὲ πλέξαντες εὖ λύουσι κακῶς· δεῖ δὲ ἄμφω ἀεὶ κρατεῖσθαι*, and cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 21, *ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον.* See vol. i. p. 341, note 1.

*τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις.* We expect *πρός* in place of *εἰς*, but cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, *χωρὶς τά τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν*, and c. 15. 1334 a 14, *τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετάς.* Cp. also *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 23, *τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον.*

**39.** *ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται πάντες, φανερόν.* Here the apodosis begins. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Meno 78 A, *ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἄθλιος καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι;* and the argument which follows. Cp. also Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 4, *σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπός τις ἐστίν, οὗ στοχα-*

*ζόμενοι καὶ αἱροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν ἢ τ' εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς.*

**40.** **ἀλλὰ τούτων κ.τ.λ.** As to those who have not the power to attain happiness, cp. c. 8. 1328 a 38 sqq. In some of these there is a defect of *φύσις* (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 8 sqq.); this is the case with natural slaves (3. 9. 1280 a 33 sq.). In others there is a defect of *τύχη* (41 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27, *μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἢ φύσεως δεῖται καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς*). Compare Plato, Laws 747 C (quoted in vol. i. p. 341, note 2) and 934 D.

**41.** **δεῖται γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** This is added in explanation of *διά τινα τύχην*, for a defect of *χορηγία* is due to a defect of fortune. **Καὶ** *χορηγίας τινός*, as well as of *φύσις*.

**1.** **τούτου δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle probably remembers a saying of 1332 a.
Pelopidas recorded by Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3, *τῶν δὲ φίλων νουθετούντων καὶ λεγόντων ὡς ἀναγκαίου πράγματος ὀλιγωρεῖ, τοῦ χρήματα ἔχειν· "Ἀναγκαίου, νὴ Δία, Νικοδήμῳ τούτῳ," ἔφη, δείξας τινὰ χωλὸν καὶ τυφλόν*, and by Aelian, Var. Hist. 11. 9. Cp. also Plut. Aristid. et Cato inter se comp. c. 4, *ὡς γὰρ σῶμα τὸ καλῶς πρὸς εὐεξίαν κεκραμένον οὔτ' ἐσθῆτος οὔτε τροφῆς δεῖται περιττῆς, οὕτω καὶ βίος καὶ οἶκος ὑγιαίνων ἀπὸ τῶν τυχόντων διοικεῖται*, and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 32, *ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ μᾶλλον.*

**2.** **οἱ δ' εὐθὺς κ.τ.λ.** *Εὐθύς*, 'from the outset,' because, unlike the others, who start aright but fail later on, they are wrong at starting. So we read in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31 sqq. that there are persons who seek happiness in the pleasures of recreation, mistaking them for the pleasures of the true end of life. Cp. Eurip. Hippol. 360 Bothe (382 Dindorf), where some are said to miss what is good,

*ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ*
*ἄλλην τιν',*

and Arrian, Epictet. 3. 23. 34.

**7.** **φαμὲν δὲ κ.τ.λ.** As to the question whether we have here a reference to the Nicomachean Ethics, see vol. i. Appendix F. Aristotle has already given part of this definition in c. 8. 1328 a 37, *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος.* We find a similar definition of *εὐδαιμονία* ascribed to the Peripatetics in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, *εὐδαιμονίαν δ' εἶναι χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείας ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ προηγουμένην . . . προηγουμένην δὲ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν* (sc. *εἶναι δεῖν*) *διὰ τὸ πάντως ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθοῖς ὑπάρχειν*: compare another Peripatetic definition of *εὐδαιμονία* there given, *χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεμπόδιστον.* Speusippus

had defined εὐδαιμονία as ἕξις τελεία ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν or ἕξις ἀγαθῶν (Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 579. 62), but Aristotle substitutes χρῆσις for ἕξις. For καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, compare the frequent use of καί, when the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι are adduced (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 a 22, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις, Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 26 and 6. 4. 1140 a 2 sq., and Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 28), and also Eth. Nic. 6. 3. 1139 b 26, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν. $\Pi^1$ add διωρίσμεθα after καί, but probably wrongly; this may be a gloss on φαμέν which has crept into the text.

9. καὶ ταύτην κ.τ.λ., i.e. 'and this perfect use of virtue not an use of virtue conditionally, but absolutely,' or, in other words, not a merely necessary use of virtue, but a noble use of virtue. A conditional use of virtue is an use of virtue which is called for under certain circumstances: for instance, if an offence has been committed, it is under the circumstances an use of virtue to punish the offender, but this is not an absolute use of virtue, because it is an use of virtue dictated by circumstances not desirable in themselves; it is the adoption and acceptance of an evil for the sake of the good which under the circumstances it will ultimately produce, whereas an absolute use of virtue is concerned with absolute goods, not with evils which are under given circumstances goods; it is concerned with the calling into existence of honours and wealth. In depicting the life of the citizens of his 'best State,' Aristotle often has in his mind the model furnished by the life of the gods (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 b 23 sqq. and c. 3. 1325 b 28 sqq.), and here too he probably remembers the θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων of Homer (Odyss. 8. 325): cp. Isocr. Philip. § 117, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν θεῶν τοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἡμῖν ὄντας Ὀλυμπίους προσαγορευομένους, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς καὶ ταῖς τιμωρίαις τεταγμένους δυσχερεστέρας τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχοντας, καὶ τῶν μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ νεὼς καὶ βωμοὺς ἱδρυμένους, τοὺς δ' οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις τιμωμένους, ἀλλ' ἀποπομπὰς αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ποιουμένους: Menander, Κόλαξ Fragm. 3, with Meineke's note, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 153: and the remarks of Plutarch on the epithet 'Olympian' conferred on Pericles in Pericl. c. 39, καί μοι δοκεῖ τὴν μειρακιώδη καὶ σοβαρὰν ἐκείνην προσωνυμίαν ἐν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἀνεπίφθονον καὶ πρέπουσαν, οὕτως εὐμενὴς ἦθος καὶ βίον ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀμίαντον Ὀλύμπιον προσαγορεύεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος ἀξιοῦμεν αἴτιον μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀναίτιον δὲ κακῶν πεφυκὸς ἅρχειν καὶ βασιλεύειν τῶν ὄντων. For the association of τέλειος and ἁπλῶς, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 32, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν,

*καὶ κακίας ἡ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἑκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας).*

**10.** *λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τἀναγκαῖα*, 'and by the term "conditionally" I mean things which are necessary': i. e. things which are necessary if good is to come about, but which are not in themselves desirable. Bonitz (Ind. 797 a 43) explains *τἀναγκαῖα* here by *ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ*, comparing Metaph. Δ. 5. 1015 b 3, *καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συναιτίων τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως* (sc. *ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται*)· *ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχηται ἔνθα μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἄνευ τινῶν, ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἡ αἰτία ἀνάγκη τίς ἐστιν αὕτη.* Cp. also Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1238 b 5, *καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ* (sc. *ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τῷ φαύλῳ*) *ἁπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἁπλᾶ, τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἡ πενία συμφέρει ἡ νόσος.*

**11.** *οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις κ.τ.λ.*, 'as for instance, if we take just actions' (i. e. uses of the virtue justice), 'just vengeances and punishments proceed indeed from virtue' (i. e. are uses of virtue), 'but they are necessary,' i. e. not desirable in themselves, 'and are noble only in a necessary way.' Aristotle here has before him, and slightly corrects, Plato, Laws 728 C, *τοῦτο οὖν δὴ τὸ πάθος δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἔστι—καλὸν γὰρ τό γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη—τιμωρία δέ, ἀδικίας ἀκόλουθος πάθη, ἧς ὅ τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυγχάνων ἄθλιος, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἰατρευόμενος, ὁ δέ, ἵνα ἕτεροι πολλοὶ σώζωνται, ἀπολλύμενος.* In Laws 859 D–860 B the difficulty of classing just punishments either as *καλά* or as *αἰσχρά* is dwelt on, and Aristotle himself says in Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 30, *καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαίως* (sc. *πεπραγμένα*) *ἔργα* (sc. *ἀνάγκη καλὰ εἶναι*), *πάθη δὲ οὔ*: it would seem, however, from the passage before us, that just vengeances and punishments *τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν.* For the difference between *τιμωρία* and *κόλασις*, cp. Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 12, *διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῇ*, Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 26 sqq., and Gell. 6. 14, puniendis peccatis tres esse debere caussas existimatum est. Una est quae *νουθεσία* vel *κόλασις* vel *παραίνεσις* dicitur; cum poena adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi gratia, ut is qui fortuito deliquit attentior fiat correctiorque. Altera est quam ii qui vocabula ista curiosius diviserunt *τιμωρίαν* appellant. Ea caussa animadvertendi est, cum dignitas auctoritasque eius in quem est peccatum tuenda est, ne praetermissa animadversio contemptum eius pariat et honorem levet; idcircoque id ei vocabulum a conservatione honoris factum putant. For *ἀπ' ἀρετῆς*, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 11, *πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς*, and Plut. Pericl. c. 1, *ἐν τοῖς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἔργοις.*

**14. αἱρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Plato, Gorg. 507 D and 478 C: also Laws 628 C sqq. For *μέν solitarium*, see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. Here the suppressed clause is 'though it is desirable that, if punishments are needed, they should be inflicted.'

**15. αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς κ.τ.λ.**, 'but actions with a view to [the production of] honours and wealth are the noblest actions in an absolute sense': cp. 18, *κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις.* For the thought, cp. De Gen. An. 2. 1. 731 b 25, *τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον αἴτιον ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῦ βελτίονος ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις*, and Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36, *ἀρετὴ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις, ὡς δοκεῖ, ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων*, and 1. 6. 1362 b 2, *καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πρακτικαί.* Prodicus, indeed, according to Plato, Charm. 163 D, would give the name of *πράξεις* only to *τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις.*

**16. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κ.τ.λ.** *Τὸ ἕτερον* = *αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις.* As Schneider points out in his Addenda (2. 506), Sepulveda (p. 229: see his note, p. 230 b, which Schneider quotes) translates, 'illud enim est malum tollere,' but, as *αἵρεσις* can hardly bear this meaning, Schn. would read *ἀναίρεσις* in place of it, and this reading is adopted by Bekk.[2] and Sus. The change certainly makes the antithesis neater, for *κακοῦ τινὸς ἀναίρεσις* answers well to *κατασκευαὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ γεννήσεις*, and it receives support (which has not hitherto been observed, so far as I have seen) from Plato, Gorg. 478 C sq. and esp. 478 D, *ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας; ΠΩΛ. ἦν γάρ. ΣΩ. σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη.* Thus Plato at any rate regarded punishment as the 'removal of an evil,' the 'evil' being the wickedness of the offender, but the question is whether Aristotle took this view of punishment. This is very doubtful. He says indeed in Rhet. 1. 14. 1374 b 31, *καὶ [ἀδίκημα μεῖζόν ἐστιν] οὗ μή ἐστιν ἴασις· χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστι δίκην λαβεῖν τὸν παθόντα· ἀνίατον γάρ· ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις ἴασις* (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 16 sqq. and Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1220 a 35 sqq.). But it is one thing to say that punishment heals the injustice committed, and another to say that it heals and removes the wickedness of the wrong-doer. I incline on the whole to think that the reading of the MSS., *κακοῦ τινὸς αἵρεσις*, is right, and to regard the *ζημία* as the *κακόν τι* referred to: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 15, *τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐναντίως,*

*τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία*, and Rhet. 3. 10. 1411 b 19, *ὅτι καὶ αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόασιν· ἡ γὰρ εὔθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν* (where *εὔθυνα* means the penalty inflicted as a result of the *εὔθυνα* properly so called, see Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 16). The meaning of the sentence will then be that just punishments are 'a choice of what is in a degree an evil' (i. e. of *βλάβη* or *ζημία*). This interpretation harmonizes well with what follows in 19 sqq. (see the next note); it also has the merit of giving the proper force to *κακοῦ τινός*, where *τινός* softens *κακοῦ* and marks the contrast with *τὸ ἁπλῶς κακόν* (cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 22, *ἀντεχόμενοί τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός, ὁ γὰρ νόμος δίκαιόν τι*), and with the *φαῦλαι τύχαι* mentioned in 20. Evil is not a fit object of choice; men should choose the good (Plato, Protag. 358 C sq.: Gorg. 499 E: Isocr. De Pace § 106: cp. also Plut. Galba, c. 14, *κατ' οὐδένα λογισμὸν οὐδὲ αἵρεσιν ἀμεινόνων*).

**19.** *χρήσαιτο δ' ἄν* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle continues, 'Yes, and a good man would make an in some sense noble use of virtue in relation not only to evils which are in the particular case goods (such as just punishments), but also to absolute evils like poverty, disease, and other evil contingencies; still beatitude is not to be found in them but in their opposites. For the use which the good man makes of things which are not goods to him—and no things are goods to him which are not absolute goods—is not an absolutely noble use, and therefore happiness is not to be found in it, for we have defined happiness to be an absolutely noble use of virtue.' Aristotle perhaps has before him a saying which Plutarch places in the mouth of Epaminondas in De Gen. Socr. c. 14, *ἀλλ' ἀπάγγελλε τοῖς ἐκεῖ γνωρίμοις, ὅτι κάλλιστα μὲν αὐτοὶ πλούτῳ χρῶνται, καλῶς δὲ πενίᾳ χρωμένους αὐτόθι φίλους ἔχουσι*: cp. Isocr. Hel. § 8, *τοσοῦτον δ' ἐπιδεδωκέναι πεποιήκασι τὸ ψευδολογεῖν, ὥστ' ἤδη τινές, ὁρῶντες τούτους ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὠφελουμένους, τολμῶσι γράφειν, ὡς ἔστιν ὁ τῶν πτωχευόντων καὶ φευγόντων βίος ζηλωτότερος ἢ ὁ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων*, and Hor. Carm. 4. 9. 46,

rectius occupat
Nomen beati, qui deorum
Muneribus sapienter uti
Duramque callet pauperiem pati.

*Φαύλη τύχη* is a milder term than *δυστυχία*: cp. Phys. 2. 5. 197 a 25, *τύχη δὲ ἀγαθὴ μὲν λέγεται ὅταν ἀγαθόν τι ἀποβῇ, φαύλη δέ, ὅταν φαῦλόν τι, εὐτυχία δὲ καὶ δυστυχία, ὅταν μέγεθος ἔχοντα ταῦτα*, and Metaph. K. 8.

1065 a 35 sq. What Aristotle includes under φαῦλαι τύχαι may be gathered from Eth. Nic. 3. 9. 1115 a 10, φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον. A reminiscence of the passage before us may be traced in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν κακοῖς ἀρετῇ χρήσασθ' ἂν καλῶς ὁ σπουδαῖος, οὐ μήν γε μακάριος ἔσται. For the conjunction of πενία and νόσος, cp. Bacchylides 1. 32 sq. and Plato, Protag. 353 D.

21. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reference to ἠθικοὶ λόγοι may be a reference to Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 25, τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν (sc. βουλητὸν φατέον βουλητόν) εἶναι (see Sus.[4], 1. p. 530), and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 21, τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ: in some respects, however, we trace a nearer approach to the definition before us in Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 26, ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ᾧ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἐστιν ἀγαθά, and in Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 31, ἔστιν οὖν ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ᾧ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς καλὰ καλά ἐστιν (both passages referred to by Eaton), but there is nothing in either passage about διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. For τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 8 sqq. For the thought compare Plato, Laws 661 C sq.

23. δῆλον δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'and it is evident that [just as absolute goods are absolutely good and noble, so] these uses also' (i. e. the good man's uses of absolute goods) 'are necessarily absolutely good and noble.'

25. διὸ κ.τ.λ., 'hence,' i. e. because men see that the uses made by the σπουδαῖος of absolute goods are absolutely good and noble and confer happiness on him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, forgetting that the σπουδαῖος owes his happiness not to them but to his own virtue, and that even in his case they are only conditions, not causes, of happiness, while in the case of those who are not σπουδαῖοι they may be the causes not of happiness, but of unhappiness, inasmuch as they may not be goods at all to them. For ἄνθρωποι, cp. Plato, Symp. 189 C, ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι παντάπασι τὴν τοῦ ἔρωτος δύναμιν οὐκ ᾐσθῆσθαι, and 205 E, ὡς οὐδέν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὗ ἐρῶσιν ἄνθρωποι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, where see Stallbaum's critical note. We have οἱ ἄνθρωποι in 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sq. and in Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 15, just as we sometimes have ἄνθρωπος and sometimes ὁ ἄνθρωπος (see critical note on 1253 a 2). For the fact that men take external goods to be the causes of happiness, cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 6 sqq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq., and Plut. De Virt. et Vit. c. 1.

26. κιθαρίζειν λαμπρόν, cp. Hom. Il. 18. 570, ἱμερόεν κιθάριζε.

**27.** αἰτιῷτο. For the absence of τις, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 2, εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει, and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

**28.** ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., 'it is necessary, therefore, as a result of what has been said,' etc.: see above on 1267 b 14. Τὰ μέν, i. e. the external goods which are the gifts of Fortune. For ὑπάρχειν and παρασκευάσαι see note on 1331 b 21.

**29.** διὸ κ.τ.λ. These words are susceptible of two interpretations: either we may take κατ' εὐχήν as adverbial to εὐχόμεθα and translate with Sepulv. 'precibus optamus' (so Vict. and Lamb.), or we may supply εἶναι and translate 'hence in respect of those things over which fortune is supreme we pray that the composition of the State may be all that can be wished.' Perhaps the second interpretation is the better. Compare with the passage before us Soph. Fragm. 731,

τὰ μὲν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εὑρετὰ
ζητῶ, τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ (al. ἕτερα) παρὰ θεῶν ἠτησάμην.

**31.** τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 39, ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἔργον ἴδιόν ἐστιν. Ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως, because science is not enough by itself: cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 1, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην (sc. πολιτείαν πολίτης ἐστὶν) ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν. It should be noticed that if, as we are told in 39 sq., φύσις is one of the sources of virtue, it does not entirely depend on the lawgiver whether the citizens are virtuous or not. It is impossible, for instance, to turn barbarians into Greeks: still much may be done by attention to marriage and rearing to secure that the 'nature' of the citizens is what it should be.

**32.** ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. It is implied here that a man might be a citizen without sharing in the constitution: see vol. i. p. 229.

**34.** ἡμῖν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but in our State all the citizens share in the constitution, [so that all our citizens must be good].' See as to this vol. i. p. 324 and note 1, and Appendix B *sub fin.* Here Aristotle seems to use the word πολῖται in a sense exclusive of the νεώτεροι, or in other words οἱ ὅπλα κεκτημένοι, for in c. 10. 1329 b 36 it is implied that οἱ ὅπλα κεκτημένοι do not share in the constitution.

**35.** τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γίνεται σπουδαῖος. In some lines of Eupolis (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 457) Nicias asks Aristides,

πῶς γὰρ ἐγένου δίκαιος;

and Aristides answers,

> ἡ μὲν φύσις τὸ μέγιστον ἦν, ἔπειτα δὲ
> κἀγὼ προθύμως τῇ φύσει συνελάμβανον.

**36. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** It is more desirable that each individual citizen should be good than that all the citizens collectively should be good but not each individual citizen, because in the former case not only will each citizen be good but all will be good, and a good which includes another is more desirable than the good which it includes (Top. 3. 2. 117 a 16 sqq.). It appears from 2. 5. 1264 b 17, *ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην* (sc. *τὴν πόλιν*), *μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν*, that a State may be happy if only some of its members are happy.

**38. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.** For *ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι*, cp. Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 b 7. Cp. also Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 12, *ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους*. Eaton and Congreve compare Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 20, *γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ* (= *λόγῳ*): cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 9 sqq. The passage before us is perhaps present to the mind of the writer of [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis c. 4. 2 A, *ὡς εἰς τὴν παντελῆ δικαιοπραγίαν τρία δεῖ συνδραμεῖν, φύσιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔθος· καλῶ δὲ λόγον μὲν τὴν μάθησιν, ἔθος δὲ τὴν ἄσκησιν* (already quoted by Eaton). Theognis (429–438) and Pindar (Olymp. 9. 100 sqq.: Nem. 3. 40 sqq.: see L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 1. 158 sqq.) are already familiar with the contrast of nature and teaching as sources of virtue, and both insist on the importance of nature, but the maxim in the form in which it appears in the passage before us is perhaps found earliest in Protag. Fragm. 8 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 134), *φύσεος καὶ ἀσκήσεος διδασκαλία δέεται*, words which refer to the teaching not only of virtue, but of other things, and which are all the more remarkable as coming from Protagoras, because there were sophists who promised to teach virtue without dwelling on the necessity of natural aptitude and of practice (Plato, Meno 95 B). Compare (with Camerarius, Interp. p. 309) Hippocr. Lex, vol. i. p. 3 Kühn, if this work is by Hippocrates, *χρὴ γὰρ ὅστις μέλλει ἰητρικῆς ξύνεσιν ἀτρεκέως ἁρμόζεσθαι, τῶνδέ μιν ἐπήβολον γενέσθαι, φύσιος, διδασκαλίης, τρόπου εὐφυέος, παιδομαθίης, φιλοπονίης, χρόνου*. The saying reappears in Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 2, Plato, Phaedr. 269 D, and Isocr. De Antid. § 187. See also Wyttenbach's note on the passage of [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis quoted above. *Ἔθος* is mentioned before *λόγος*, because

education through habit precedes education through the reason (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.).

**40. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle perhaps remembers a saying variously ascribed to Thales, Socrates, and Plato: cp. Diog. Laert. 1. 33, *Ἕρμιππος δ' ἐν τοῖς βίοις εἰς τοῦτον* (i. e. Thales) *ἀναφέρει τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπό τινων περὶ Σωκράτους· ἔφασκε γάρ, φησί, τριῶν τούτων ἕνεκα χάριν ἔχειν τῇ τύχῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἐγενόμην καὶ οὐ θηρίον, εἶτα ὅτι ἀνὴρ καὶ οὐ γυνή, τρίτον ὅτι Ἕλλην καὶ οὐ βάρβαρος*, and Plut. Marius, c. 46, *Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἤδη πρὸς τῷ τελευτᾶν γενόμενος ὕμνει τὸν αὑτοῦ δαίμονα καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἶτα Ἕλλην, οὐ βάρβαρος οὐδὲ ἄλογον τῇ φύσει θηρίον γένοιτο, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι τοῖς Σωκράτους χρόνοις ἀπήντησεν ἡ γένεσις αὐτοῦ.* See Prof. J. E. B. Mayor in *Class. Rev.* 10. 191.

**41. οὕτω καὶ ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν,** 'so also of a certain quality in body and soul.' For *οὕτω* see critical note. Aristotle continues with *οὕτω* as if *ὥσπερ*, and not *πρῶτον*, had preceded, for I do not think that *οὕτω* here means 'then,' as it seems to do in Rhet. 3. 19. 1419 b 15. That a man may be born too faulty to be made good by education, we see from 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 8 sqq.

**42. ἔνιά τε κ.τ.λ.,** 'and in respect of some qualities it is no good to be born this or that, for habits cause them to change; some qualities, in fact, are made by nature to be susceptible of change under the influence of habits in two directions, towards that which is worse and that which is better.' I follow Stahr and Welldon in my rendering of *ἔνιά τε οὐδὲν ὄφελος φῦναι*: Sepulv. Vict. and Sus.[4] less well make *ἔνια* the subject of *φῦναι*. In *ἔνια* Aristotle refers to those elements in man which may be made better or worse by good or bad habituation, for instance the emotions: see note on 1253 a 34, and cp. Plut. Themist. c. 2, *ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρώταις τῆς νεότητος ὁρμαῖς ἀνώμαλος ἦν* (*ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς*) *καὶ ἀστάθμητος, ἅτε τῇ φύσει καθ' αὑτὴν χρώμενος ἄνευ λόγου καὶ παιδείας ἐπ' ἀμφότερα μεγάλας ποιουμένῃ μεταβολὰς τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλάκις ἐξισταμένῃ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ὕστερον αὐτὸς ὡμολόγει, καὶ τοὺς τραχυτάτους πώλους ἀρίστους ἵππους γίνεσθαι φάσκων, ὅταν ἧς προσήκει τύχωσι παιδείας καὶ καταρτύσεως*, Nic. c. 9, *οὕτως ἡ Ἀλκιβιάδου φύσις ἐπ' ἀμφότερα πολλὴ ῥυεῖσα καὶ λαμπρὰ μεγάλων ἐνέδωκεν ἀρχὰς νεωτερισμῶν*, and Coriolan. c. 1. For *ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον*, cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1197 a 30, *ἡ δὲ ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν, ᾗ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων ἐπαμφοτερίζομεν πρὸς τὸ καὶ εἶναι ταῦτα οὕτω καὶ μὴ εἶναι.* For *διὰ τῆς φύσεως*, cp. *διὰ*

τριῶν (i. e. φύσις, ἔθος, λόγος), 39. Elsewhere we find ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, as in Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19 sq. and De Part. An. 2. 13. 657 a 31 sq. (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 73).

1332 b. 3. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. For τῇ φύσει ζῇ ('live guided by nature'), cp. Metaph. A. 1. 980 b 25, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα (ζῷα) ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς, Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 27, τῇ ὀρέξει ζῇ, and Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 35, τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ (cp. 2. 13. 1390 a 16, καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος). For the implied contrast between φύσις and λόγος, cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 28 sqq., where a contrast between φύσις and προαίρεσις is implied.

4. μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, 'and some to a small extent guided by habits also.' For μικρά, cp. Plato, Rep. 404 A, ἐὰν σμικρὰ ἐκβῶσι τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης, and 527 A, ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι. As to the habituation of animals, cp. [Plut.] De Virtute Morali, c. 4, κύνας καὶ ἵππους καὶ ὄρνιθας οἰκουρούς ὁρῶντες, ἔθει καὶ τροφῇ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ φωνάς τε συνετὰς καὶ πρὸς λόγον ὑπηκόους κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀποδιδόντας, καὶ πράξεις τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν ἐχούσας.

5. μόνον, sc. τῶν ζῴων: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 9, λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων.

ὥστε δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'and so [in his case] these three things must harmonize with each other, [for it will not do to leave reason out,] since men are led by reason to do many things contrary to habituation and to nature, if they are persuaded that these things are better done otherwise [than as habit and nature dictate].' We learn from c. 15. 1334 b 9 sqq. that the three things must not only harmonize, but harmonize in the best way, i.e. by all being adapted to the best end. Plato speaks of education in Laws 653 B as being the bringing of the child's feelings of pain and pleasure into harmony with reason (cp. Rep. 401 C, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ ξυμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα). I cannot follow Sus. and Welldon in placing ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις after βέλτιον, 3, for, if we place these words there, what Aristotle says will be that nature and habit should harmonize, whereas the lesson which he wishes to enforce is surely this, that nature, habit, and reason should harmonize. As to πολλὰ γὰρ—βέλτιον, Laius in the Chrysippus of Euripides (Fragm. 837) had been made to plead,

λέληθεν οὐδὲν τῶνδέ μ' ὢν σὺ νουθετεῖς,
γνώμην δ' ἔχοντά μ' ἡ φύσις βιάζεται,

but the Chorus in Aristoph. Vesp. 1457 sqq. (Didot) says,

τὸ γὰρ ἀποστῆναι χαλεπὸν
φύσεος ἦν ἔχοι τις ἀεί.
καίτοι πολλοὶ ταῦτ' ἔπαθον·
ξυνόντες γνώμαις ἑτέρων
μετεβάλλοντο τοὺς τρόπους.

Cp. also Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 25, μετὰ λόγου δὲ (ἐπιθυμοῦσιν), ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες, and Plato, Rep. 452 D, ἀλλ' ἐπειδή, οἶμαι, χρωμένοις ἅμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρύη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου. A reference is given in the Index Aristotelicus for the plural of ἐθισμός to Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 a 26, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. The word ἐθισμός does not appear to occur in the writings of Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, or Isocrates; it occurs, however, in [Demosth.] Or. 17. c. 27, and it is frequently used by Polybius not only in the singular, but also in the plural (e. g. in 1. 17. 11 and 3. 76. 12).

**9.** For **διωρίσμεθα** in a middle sense, cp. Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 192 (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. ὁρίζω). Διώρισμαι does not appear to be often thus used by Aristotle: Bonitz, however (Ind. 200 a 27), takes **διωρίσθαι** to be middle in De Caelo, 4. 2. 308 b 1.

**πρότερον**, in c. 7. 1327 b 19 sqq. **Εὐχειρώτους τῷ νομοθέτῃ** in the passage before us takes the place of **εὐαγώγους τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν** in 1327 b 38.

**10. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες.** Ἀκούοντες answers to τὸν λόγον, 7. Here μανθάνειν includes both ἐθίζεσθαι and ἀκούειν. Contrast 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 16, μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι. Sus.[2] refers to Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 14, διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν . . . ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται. Cp. also Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν 1. 437 a 11, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἡ ἀκοὴ πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται μέρος· ὁ γὰρ λόγος αἴτιός ἐστι τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκουστὸς ὤν, οὐ καθ' αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 17 sqq., and Metaph. Θ. 5. 1047 b 31, ἁπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἕθει οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν ὅσαι ἕθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν

οὐκ ἀνάγκη. Add Philem. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 6 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 34: cp. 5. ccxxxii),

ἥκουσα τοῦτο καιρός, οὐδὲ φύεται
αὐτόματον ἀνθρώποισιν, ὦ βελτιστε, νοῦς,
ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγρῷ θύμος· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ
ἑτέρων ἀκούειν καὶ θεωρῆσαι * *
κατὰ μικρὸν ἀεί, φασί, φύονται φρένες.

C. 14. **18. τοῦτο δὴ σκεπτέον.** Cp. c. 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.

**ἑτέρους εἶναι,** sc. διὰ βίου.

**15. δῆλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 16, καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' ἐνίοτε ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος. For ἀκολουθεῖν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23, κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις.

**16. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν κ.τ.λ.** Here Aristotle has before him Plato, Polit. 301 D, νῦν δέ γε ὁπότε οὐκ ἔστι γιγνόμενος, ὡς δὴ φαμέν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς οἷος ἐν σμήνεσιν ἐμφύεται, τό τε σῶμα εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρων εἷς, δεῖ δὴ συνελθόντας ξυγγράμματα γράφειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. also 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and Isocr. Hel. § 56, τοῖς δὲ καλοῖς εὐθὺς ἰδόντες εὖνοι γιγνόμεθα, καὶ μόνους αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἀπαγορεύομεν θεραπεύοντες, ἀλλ' ἥδιον δουλεύομεν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχειν. The passage before us shows that not only gods (1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq.) but also heroes were credited with surpassing personal beauty, so that we are not surprised to find that Philip of Crotona, who excelled in this respect, was worshipped as a hero at Egesta after his death (Hdt. 5. 47). For ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων (not τῶν ἑτέρων), see Bon. Ind. 34 b 34 sqq., where Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a 28, ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσι χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 b 7, and Meteor. 2. 6. 365 a 3 sq. are referred to.

**20. ὥστε κ.τ.λ.** Lamb. 'ita ut incontroversa et in promptu posita esset eorum qui imperant prae iis qui sub imperio sunt excellentia'. Sus. 'dass diese Ueberlegenheit der Herrschenden für die Beherrschten (selber) unzweifelhaft und einleuchtend wäre.' Thus Lamb. takes τοῖς ἀρχομένοις as in the dat. after ὑπεροχήν (so too Mr. Welldon), Sus. as in the dat. after ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ φανερόν. I have not noticed any passage in which the construction assumed by Lamb. occurs, and I incline to follow Sus., at any rate till a parallel passage is produced.

**23. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.,** 'but since it is not easy to light on this highly superior element, and we have not among ourselves anything to

answer to the vast superiority of the kings to their subjects, which Scylax says exists in India.' For λαβεῖν in this sense, cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 7, Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 a 34, *πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἕνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ῥᾷον ἢ πολλοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν*, and Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 17. As to τοῦτο, Aristotle often uses the neuter in referring to persons, e.g. in 2. 5. 1263 a 1 and 3. 13. 1283 b 9. He would seem to have had before him the genuine narrative of Scylax of Caryanda in Caria, as to whom see Hdt. 4. 44. The Periplus which we possess bearing his name is not the genuine work by him, and does not contain the statement here repeated by Aristotle. The testimony of Scylax as to the superiority—both physical and mental, apparently—of the kings in India to their subjects may well have been perfectly true. 'Throughout Polynesia the chiefs and upper classes are taller than the lower orders, and with a finer physical they combine a greater mental development. They are in every respect superior to the people whom they rule. They are as genuine an aristocracy as ever existed in any country. They know every plant, animal, rock, river, and mountain, are familiar with their history, legends, and traditions, and strict in observing every point of their own complicated etiquette. They swim, row, sail, shoot, and fight better than the common people, and excel in house and canoe building' (Seemann, Viti, p. 79). For the form βασιλέας see note on 1284 b 33.

**25.** φανερὸν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'it is clear that it is for many reasons necessary that all should share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn [and that rulers and ruled should be the same persons], for when the sharers are alike, equality demands that each shall have the same share' (i.e. an identity of political privilege), 'and [the constitution must be just, for] it is difficult for a constitution to last which is framed in contravention of what is just.' For *τό τε γὰρ ἴσον ταὐτὸν τοῖς ὁμοίοις*, cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 12 sqq. and 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 7 sq., and also Thuc. 6. 38. 5, *καὶ πῶς δίκαιον τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι;*

**29.** μετὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for together with the ruled [citizens] are forthcoming desirous of revolution all those who are scattered over the territory,' i.e. the cultivators and other residents in the country (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 30, *οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν*, and 38, *τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους*). Aristotle has arranged in c. 10. 1330 a 25 sqq. that the cultivators shall not be *θυμοειδεῖς* or

ὁμόφυλοι, still he takes it for granted here that they will be desirous of revolution, though unable to make a revolution without the help of the ἀρχόμενοι πολῖται. Reiz followed by Sus. would read βουλομένων, but βουλόμενοι is probably right, for Aristotle is apt to suspect slave or serf cultivators of a tendency to νεωτερισμός (2. 4. 1262 a 40 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 28).

**32.** ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 18 sqq., and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ᾤετο προσήκειν οὐδενὶ ἀρχῆς ὅστις μὴ βελτίων εἴη τῶν ἀρχομένων, καὶ τοῖς προειρημένοις πᾶσι δῆλον καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

**34.** πῶς οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'how then this difference is to exist, and how they are to share [in ruling and being ruled by turns], the lawgiver must consider.' Μεθέξουσι takes up κοινωνεῖν, 26.

**35.** πρότερον, in c. 9. 1329 a 2 sqq.

**36.** ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν κ.τ.λ., 'for nature has furnished us with the distinction, having made that which is the same in kind itself of two parts, the one younger and the other older.' For διαίρεσιν, see critical note. For a similar acceptance of the guidance of nature, cp. c. 17. 1337 a 1 and 1. 8. 1256 b 7 sqq.: also De Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 13, διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότες ὥσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγιστείας χρώμεθα τῶν θεῶν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ (the number three), and Poet. 24. 1460 a 3, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἁρμόττον αὐτῇ διαιρεῖσθαι. By 'that which is the same in kind,' is meant man.

**37.** ὧν τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 690 A, καὶ τρίτον ἔτι τούτοις ξυνέπεται τὸ πρεσβυτέρους μὲν ἄρχειν δεῖν, νεωτέρους δὲ ἄρχεσθαι, and Rep. 412 C, ὅτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἄρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι, νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, δῆλον; Cp. also 1. 12. 1259 b 10–17.

**38.** ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 6, τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν. Aristotle perhaps remembers the words of the aged Nestor to Agamemnon and Achilles (Hom. Il. 1. 259),

ἀλλὰ πίθεσθ'· ἄμφω δὲ νεωτέρω ἐστὸν ἐμεῖο,

and what Agamemnon says of Achilles in Il. 9. 160,

καί μοι ὑποστήτω, ὅσσον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι
ἠδ' ὅσσον γενεῇ προγενέστερος εὔχομαι εἶναι.

Plutarch may have the passage before us in his memory in An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 7, καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἄλλαις ὑπεροχαῖς προσμάχονται καὶ διαμφισβητοῦσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ γένους καὶ φιλοτιμίας, ὡς ἀφαιροῦντες αὐτῶν ὅσον ἄλλοις ὑφίενται, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ χρόνου πρωτεῖον, ὃ καλεῖται κυρίως πρεσβεῖον, ἀζηλοτύπητόν ἐστι καὶ παραχωρούμενον . . . ἔτι

*τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλούτου δύναμιν ἢ λόγου δεινότητος ἢ σοφίας οὐ πάντες αὐτοῖς γενήσεσθαι προσδοκῶσιν, ἐφ' ἣν δὲ προάγει τὸ γῆρας αἰδῶ καὶ δόξαν, οὐδεὶς ἀπελπίζει τῶν πολιτευομένων.* I have questioned this in vol. ii. p. xix, but I had not then remarked the resemblance which exists between An Seni, etc., c. 18. 793 A, *ὥσπερ γὰρ . . . ἤθους*, and 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20 sqq. A similar calculation to that of Aristotle probably underlay the distinction drawn by Diocletian between the Augusti and the Caesares, the former being 'elder princes' and the latter 'rising in their turn to the first rank' (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 13: vol. ii. p. 168, ed. 1812).

**39.** *οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττων*, sc. *τῶν ἀρχόντων*—a step in the direction of discontent (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36, *ἄρξονται γὰρ οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλων χειρόνων*).

*ἄλλως τε κ.τ.λ.*, 'especially as he may expect to be repaid this contribution [of obedience], when he has reached the right age.' An *ἔρανος* is a contribution of service or money for which in fairness a return should be forthcoming: cp. Eurip. Suppl. 349 Bothe (363 Dindorf),

*κάλλιστον ἔρανον δοὺς γὰρ ἀντιλάζυται*
*παίδων παρ' αὐτοῦ τοιάδ' ἂν τοκεῦσι δῷ,*

Isocr. Hel. § 20, *νομίζων ὀφείλειν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον, μηδενὸς ἀποστῆναι τῶν ὑπὸ Πειρίθου προσταχθέντων, ἀνθ' ὧν ἐκεῖνος αὐτῷ συνεκινδύνευσεν*, and Isocr. Plat. § 57, where *τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον* is explained by *τὴν αὐτὴν εὐεργεσίαν*. It is not quite clear what is meant by *τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον* (40). Sus., followed by Welldon, takes the words to mean 'den Ehrenvorzug zu befehlen' ('the honourable privilege of ruling'). To me it seems that the *ἔρανος* referred to is rather the contribution of submission to the rule of others which the young citizen makes in his youth and receives from those younger than himself in years of maturity.

**42.** *ὥστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κ.τ.λ.* Rulers and ruled will be the same persons at different ages, so that they will be in a sense the same and in a sense different, and similarly the education given to rulers and ruled will be the same but will be different at different ages, the young learning to be ruled and later on learning through being ruled to rule, so that the education also of rulers and ruled will be in a sense the same and in a sense different. For the late appearance of *εἶναι* in this sentence, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 29, *ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ ἁρμόττει μεγάλας ἔνθα δ' εἶναι μικρὰς τὰς αὐτάς*, and see note on 1285 b 36.

1333 a. **2. τε γάρ** here is not taken up by **καί** or any equivalent to **καί**, a thing which rarely happens (see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 19 sq.), so rarely that Eucken pronounces the passage before us corrupt. Sus.[2], however, rightly remarks that we have here 'one of the few cases in which **τε γάρ** = "etenim."' 'English readers may consult Shilleto's critical note to Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 176' (Sus.[4]). Eucken points out that in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 33. **αἱ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦντος**, the use of **τε γάρ** is only apparently similar, inasmuch as the last eight words are virtually equivalent to **καὶ ὁ δῆμος βουλήσεται καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονήσει**. So again in De Part. An. 3. 10. 673 a 3, **γαργαλιζόμενοί τε γὰρ ταχὺ γελῶσι διὰ τὸ τὴν κίνησιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι ταχὺ πρὸς τὸν τόπον τοῦτον**, we find **τε γάρ** virtually taken up in **συμβαίνειν δέ φασι** κ.τ.λ., 673 a 10.

**3. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή** κ.τ.λ., 'but [we do not mean that he should have been ruled otherwise than a freeman should be ruled, for] rule is, as was shown in the first discussions' (i. e. in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.), 'in one of its forms for the sake of the ruler and in another for the sake of the ruled, and we say that the former of these is rule such as is exercised by a master over slaves and the latter rule such as is exercised over freemen, [so that the latter is the kind of rule to which it is fitting that the young freeman should submit before ruling].'

**5. φαμεν**, in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.

**6. διαφέρει δ' ἔνια** κ.τ.λ. This was probably written later than 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq., for we hear nothing there to the same effect. Aristotle had identified **δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή** in that passage with **ἡ περὶ τἀναγκαῖα**, and had added, **θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδώδεις, λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονικὰς πράξεις**. Now we are told that even service of this kind may become noble if it is rendered for a noble end. What Aristotle would consider a noble end may be gathered from 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq. and 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 5 sq.). He probably has in his mind among other things the **ἄνευ θεραπόντων αὐτοῖς ἑαυτῶν** (**αὐτῶν ἑαυτοῖς**?) **διακονήσεις** of the young Spartans employed in the Crypteia (Plato, Laws 633 B sq.). Plato had already recommended his agronomi and their youthful assistants to do the like (Laws 762 E sqq., cp. especially **καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δουλεύσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρξαι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις . . . ἔπειτα τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις τε καὶ ἐντίμοις βεβιωκόσι τοὺς νέους**, and 763 A, **τὰ δ' ἄλλα αὐτοὶ δι' αὑτῶν διανοηθήσεσθαι ὅτι**

*βιωσόμενοι διακονοῦντές τε καὶ διακονούμενοι ἑαυτοῖς*). Perhaps the young Athenians who served as *περίπολοι* had more done for them by slaves than Plato and Aristotle approved. Vict. refers to the story of Favonius and Pompey told in Plut. Pomp. c. 73, *ἐπεὶ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν δεῖπνου καὶ παρεσκεύασεν ὁ ναύκληρος ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, ἰδὼν ὁ Φαώνιος οἰκετῶν ἀπορίᾳ τὸν Πομπήιον ἀρχόμενον αὐτὸν ὑπολύειν προσέδραμε καὶ ὑπέλυσε καὶ συνήλειψε· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτου περιέπων καὶ θεραπεύων ὅσα δεσπότας δοῦλοι, μέχρι νίψεως ποδῶν καὶ δείπνου παρασκευῆς διετέλεσεν, ὥστε τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα τῆς ὑπουργίας ἐκείνης θεασάμενον ἄν τινα καὶ τὸ ἀφελὲς καὶ ἁπλαστον εἰπεῖν·*

*Φεῦ τοῖσι γενναίοισιν ὡς ἅπαν καλόν* (Eurip. Fragm. 953).

Vict. adds, referring to the siege of Florence in 1529, 'Recordor ego, cum premeretur obsidione nostra ciuitas, hostisque ad portas castra posuisset, universam nostram iuventutem in operibus faciendis muniendaque urbe occupatam fuisse, neque tamen eo tempore quicquam quod nobilitati suae non conveniret gessisse, non enim ob mercedem inde capiendam, sed ob libertatem defendendam id faciebat.'

**11.** *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ. If we take Aristotle to refer in *πολίτου* here, as also in 3. 18. 1288 a 37 sqq., to the full citizen of the 'best State,' who is *ex hypothesi* capable of ruling, we shall not need to read *πολιτικοῦ* with Rassow and Susemihl. See vol. i. Appendix B. The argument is—since the virtue of a ruling citizen and the virtue of the best man are the same, and in our State the ruled citizen becomes sooner or later a ruler, so that he will need sooner or later to possess the virtue of a good man, the lawgiver must make this the aim of his labours, that the citizens may become good men, and [must seek to ascertain] by means of what pursuits [they may best be made so] and what is the end of the best life. For *πραγματευτέον ὅπως . . . γίγνωνται* Bonitz (Ind. 630 a 14) compares Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 b 19, *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα ποιήσωσιν.* The end of the best life is leisure (c. 15. 1334 a 11 sqq.).

**16.** *διῄρηται δὲ* κ.τ.λ. In c. 15. 1334 b 17 sqq., as in 1. 13. 1260 a 5 sqq., the two parts of the soul are *τὸ λόγον ἔχον* and *τὸ ἄλογον*: here they are *τὸ λόγον ἔχον καθ' αὑτό*, and *τὸ λόγον οὐκ ἔχον καθ' αὑτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον.* Thus here Aristotle adopts the division of the soul which is mentioned as feasible in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 1, *εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ*

λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς, a passage which throws much light on that before us, though καθ' αὑτό, 17 ('per se,' in contradistinction to καθ' ἕτερον: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, quoted above on 1323 b 24, and Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 22 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 290 b 34), means more than ἐν αὐτῷ, 1103 a 2. The part of the soul referred to as λόγον οὐκ ἔχον καθ' αὑτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν (Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 30), or, as it is occasionally called in the Politics (see above on 1254 b 8), τὸ παθητικόν. Τὸ θρεπτικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς is omitted, as in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 12, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. Aristotle recalls this division of the soul because he wishes to throw light on the relative worth of the virtues connected with each part of the soul, and to show, in opposition to the eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution, that the virtues of the rational part have more of the character of ends than those of the other part. For the perfect διῄρηται, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 17 and 2. 9. 1269 b 16. For the participle δυνάμενον, see note on 1254 b 23.

**19.** πως, 'in any way,' as in Xen. Oecon. 9. 1, ἡ γυνὴ ἐδόκει σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Ἰσχόμαχε, πώς τι ὑπακούειν ὧν σὺ ἐσπούδαζες διδάσκων;

τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν = ὡς ἡμεῖς διαιροῦμεν, for it is hardly likely that διαιρετέον εἶναι should be supplied. Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 32 sq. For the μέν *solitarium* in τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διαιροῦσιν, see above on 1332 a 14, 1262 a 6, and 1270 a 34.

**21.** αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We learn in what sense the appetitive part of the soul exists for the sake of the rational part from Magn. Mor. 2. 10. 1208 a 12, ἐπειδή γάρ τι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔχομεν τὸ δὲ βέλτιον, ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκέν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν, καὶ τότ' ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καλῶς, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥστε μὴ κωλύειν ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβάλλεσθαι καὶ συμπαρορμᾶν πρὸς τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιτελεῖν τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον· τὸ γὰρ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν τῷ βελτίονι. Cp. also M. Antonin. Comm. 5. 16, ἢ οὐκ ἦν ἐναργές, ὅτι τὰ χείρω τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν, τὰ δὲ κρείττω ἀλλήλων; κρείττω δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀψύχων τὰ ἔμψυχα, τῶν δὲ ἐμψύχων τὰ λογικά. On the far-reaching principle, αἰεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν ἕνεκεν, see vol. i. p. 58 sq.

**22.** καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. When a principle holds good in reference both to art and to nature, Aristotle is often careful

to point out the fact: e.g. in Meteor. 4. 3. 381 a 10 sq., De Part. An. 1. 1. 639 b 15 sq., and De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 20 sqq.

**24.** διῄρηταί τε διχῇ. Sepulv., Lamb., Schn., Sus.[2], Welldon, and others supply ὁ λόγος, but Vict. and Sus.[4] supply τὸ λόγον ἔχον, and perhaps this is better.

καθ' ὅπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαιρεῖν. E.g. in De An. 3. 10. 433 a 14, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 3 sqq.

**26.** ὡσαύτως, in the same way as ὁ λόγος, i.e. into τὸ λόγον ἔχον πρακτικόν and τὸ λόγον ἔχον θεωρητικόν.

τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, i.e. τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος καθ' αὑτό.

δηλονότι is adverbial, as in c. 2. 1325 a 1: see on this use Bon. Ind. 173 b 30 sqq.

**27.** καὶ τὰς πράξεις δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed we shall say that the activities of the soul stand in a corresponding relation to each other.' Three classes of activities are apparently referred to—(1) πράξεις τοῦ λόγον οὐκ ἔχοντος καθ' αὑτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυναμένου (e.g. ἐλευθέριοι, σώφρονες πράξεις: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 6 and 3. 3. 1111 b 1 sq.): (2) πράξεις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος πρακτικόν (φρόνιμοι πράξεις): (3) πράξεις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος θεωρητικόν (σοφαὶ πράξεις).

**28.** τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν, 'for those who can attain either to all the three activities of the soul or to the two lower ones of the three.' I take the meaning to be, that even if a man can attain only to the activities of the irrational part of the soul and to those of the lower, or practical, section of its rational part, the latter class of activities, being activities of the better part of the two, are more desirable for him than the former. If a man can attain to all three, then of course the activities of the theoretic section of the rational part are the most desirable for him.

**29.** αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for that is always most desirable for each man which is the highest to which it is possible for him to attain,' whether it is absolutely the highest or not. See vol. i. p. 60.

**30.** πᾶς ὁ βίος, 'life as a whole': see above on 1253 b 33. In 40 we have τοὺς βίους. By πᾶς ὁ βίος Aristotle means πᾶς ὁ πολιτικὸς βίος: cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 30, χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διῃρημένος εἴς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικήν). In 1. 8. 1256 a 30 sqq. we have a classification of human life, so far as it is concerned with getting food. For the association of ἀσχολία and πόλεμος and of εἰρήνη and σχολή, cp. 41 sq., c. 15. 1334 a 38 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 4 sqq.

**32.** καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν κ.τ.λ. 'Bonitz brackets εἰς τά in 32 and 33 (Ind. 42 b 26 sqq. and 632 a 29 sq.), but see Vahlen in the *Zeitschrift für d. östr. Gymn.* 1872, p. 540' (Sus.², p. 453). I have not seen Vahlen's article. The construction, if we supply διῄρηται, as we must apparently do, is certainly remarkable. For τῶν πρακτῶν we have τῶν πραγμάτων in 40.

**34.** For αἱρεσιν, cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 106, *εὑρήσετε γὰρ τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων περὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις τῶν πραγμάτων ἁμαρτάνοντας.*

**35.** πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν. Aristotle continues his sentence as if ἃ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αἱρετὰ εἶναι had preceded in 33, and not περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν αἵρεσιν εἶναι. He here has before him Plato, Laws 628 D sq. (referred to by Eaton) and 803 D. Cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 4, δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν.

ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς. See last note. There was much to suggest the view that σχολή is a nobler thing than ἀσχολία in the Greek conception of the gods as ῥᾳδίως ζῶντες, and in Aristotle's own conception of the life of the Deity (see above on 1325 b 28), to say nothing of the close connexion which the Greeks held to exist between σχολή and ἐλευθερία (Plato, Theaet. 175 D) and between σχολή and culture (Isocr. Busir. § 21 sq.: Metaph. A. 1. 981 b 20 sqq.). As has often been pointed out by others, Aristotle does not mean idleness or recreation by σχολή. Σχολή is marked off by him both from ἀσχολία and from παιδιά or ἀνάπαυσις: it is not, like παιδιά and ἀνάπαυσις, recreation after toil (5 (8). 3. 1337 b 37 sqq.: 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 36 sqq.), nor is it, like ἀσχολία, the doing of work which is done not for its own sake, but as a means to something else; it is employment in work desirable for its own sake—the hearing of noble music and no doubt also of noble poetry, intercourse with friends chosen for their worth (Eth. Nic. 9. 11. 1171 b 12 sqq.), and above all the exercise, in company or otherwise, of the speculative faculty. Ἀσχολία and the παιδιά or ἀνάπαυσις which makes ἀσχολία possible must necessarily find a place in human life, for men cannot exist without them, but the noblest element in human life is σχολή, and it is the end for which work and recreation exist. We hardly know whether Aristotle would class the sight of noble pictures or statues with the hearing of noble music and poetry as a right use of σχολή: he would probably not regard in this light the exercise of an art even for its own sake. Many will differ from him here, and some may ask whether work

done as a means to something else is not often as desirable for its own sake as anything which could be brought under the head of σχολή. May we not say this of work done in a noble cause, like that of the victors of Marathon and Salamis, or that of Pitt and Stein, when they 'weathered the storm'? It should be noticed that while Aristotle is following in the track of Plato when he exalts peace above war, he is not a borrower from Plato in his exaltation of σχολή at the expense of ἀσχολία. His view of human life as comprising in its best form ἀσχολία, παιδιά, and σχολή is a remarkable one, and I am not aware that he owes it to any one.

**2. καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δέ**, 'and indeed things useful': cp. Plato, Theaet. 171 E, *ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν.* 1333 b.

**3. καὶ παῖδας ἔτι ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται παιδείας.** According to the common view (a different view is ascribed to Pythagoras in Diog. Laert. 8. 10), boyhood ceased at puberty (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 6, *ἐγὼ γὰρ παῖς τε ὢν τὰ ἐν παισὶ νομιζόμενα καλὰ δοκῶ κεκαρπῶσθαι, ἐπεί τε ἤβησα, τὰ ἐν νεανίσκοις, τέλειός τε ἀνὴρ γενόμενος τὰ ἐν ἀνδράσι*). Παῖς, however, is otherwise used in 3. 1. 1275 a 14. The words *τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας ὅσαι δέονται παιδείας* seem to imply that education in the 'best State' will extend over more *ἡλικίαι* than the two represented by boyhood and the years from puberty to twenty-one (see note on 1336 b 37).

**5. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα κ.τ.λ.** The Lacedaemonians and Cretans are especially referred to (cp. 12 sqq. and c. 2. 1324 b 7 sqq.: see also note on 1337 a 31). Plato had said much the same in Laws 628 C sqq. Are we to infer from the use of *καί* in 11, *καὶ τῶν ὕστερόν τινες γραψάντων*, that Aristotle regarded the Lacedaemonian and Cretan lawgivers as the authors of written constitutions and laws? Aristotle turns aside to censure the Lacedaemonian training in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. also. The Fourth and Fifth Books of the Politics are written in a strongly anti-Laconian spirit. The Lacedaemonian lawgiver is more severely criticized in them than he is in the Second. It is true that the Spartans are said in the Second Book (c. 9. 1271 b 9) to prefer external goods to virtue —a strong thing to say of men who prided themselves on their virtue (4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32)—but this fault is not explicitly traced back to the lawgiver. In the Fourth Book, on the other hand (c. 2. 1324 b 27 sq.), the lawgiver is charged with pursuing an

unlawful end; it is also implied in 1325 a 7 sqq. (cp. c. 14. 1333 b 23) that he was not a good lawgiver (contrast 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18–21). Aristotle's criticisms of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver throughout the Fourth and Fifth Books are, in fact, more in the spirit of those of Isocrates (see e.g. Panath. § 210 sqq.) than of those of Plato.

**6. ταύτας = τὰς τούτων.** Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 40, and see note on 1276 a 14.

**7. οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαντες κ.τ.λ.,** 'evidently have neither framed their constitutional arrangements with a view to the better end,' etc. **Πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος** answers to **πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη,** 1333 a 39, and **πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς,** 8, to **πρὸς πάντα,** 1333 a 36. The 'better end' is leisure and peace and things noble.

**9. τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν.** Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 9.

**ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν κ.τ.λ.** We have been told in 1333 a 36 that things noble are to be preferred to things necessary and useful. Compare the very similar sentence in De Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 28, *ἐπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἠξήθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρήσιμον ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες*: also Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 3, Probl. 27. 5. 948 a 31, *διὰ τί μάλιστα τὴν ἀνδρείαν τιμῶσιν αἱ πόλεις, οὐ βελτίστην οὖσαν τῶν ἀρετῶν; ἢ ὅτι διατελοῦσιν ἢ πολεμοῦντες ἢ πολεμούμενοι, αὕτη δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν χρησιμωτάτη ἐστίν· τιμῶσι δὲ οὐ τὰ βέλτιστα, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα,* and Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 3, *ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική.* **Φορτικῶς,** for *τὸ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ἥκιστα ἁρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις* (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 2). The Spartans valued themselves on their *ἐλευθεριότης*—compare the proverb *ἐλευθεριώτερος Σπάρτης* (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 246: 2. 393)—and when Aristotle hints here that their lawgiver was *φορτικός*, and in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 32 sqq. that his famous training made them *βάναυσοι*, he says as severe a thing as it was possible for him to say. In **πλεονεκτικωτέρας** Aristotle echoes Plato, Laches 182 E, **οἷς** (i.e. *Λακεδαιμονίοις*) *οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὅ τι ἂν μαθόντες καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον*: cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 188 and Plut. Lycurg. c. 28, *ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτοις οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀδικίας ἴχνος οὐδὲ πλεονεξίας, ἣν ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἔνιοι τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, ἐνδεῶς δὲ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.*

**11. παραπλησίως τούτοις.** I do not think that Aristotle means by these words *φορτικῶς*. Cp. Meteor. 1. 6. 342 b 35, *παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ οἱ περὶ Ἱπποκράτην τὸν Χῖον καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν αὐτοῦ Αἰσχύλον ἀπεφήναντο.*

**14. ἅ,** 'which praises.'

**16. ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.,** 'for just in the same spirit in which,' etc. Thibron's grounds of praise are those of *οἱ πολλοί*, and are therefore sordid and easily overthrown by reasoning. *Οἱ πολλοί* are athirst for *εὐτυχήματα*: cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 3, *ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἧς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν.* **Ζηλοῦσι,** as in Isocr. De Pace, § 83, *καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες αὐτοί τε τὴν πόλιν εὐδαιμόνιζον καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν νοῦν οὐκ ἐχόντων ἐμακάριζον αὐτήν, τῶν μὲν συμβήσεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα μελλόντων οὐδεμίαν ποιούμενοι πρόνοιαν, τὸν δὲ πλοῦτον θαυμάζοντες καὶ ζηλοῦντες.*

**18. τῶν εὐτυχημάτων.** The term *εὐτύχημα* is applied to *τὰ ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθά*, such as high birth, wealth, and political power: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sqq.

**ἀγάμενος φαίνεται,** 'evidently admires.' There is perhaps a reference to Thibron in Isocr. Panath. § 41, *τὴν Σπαρτιατῶν (πόλιν), ἣν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ μετρίως ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἔνιοι δέ τινες ὥσπερ τῶν ἡμιθέων ἐκεῖ πεπολιτευμένων μέμνηνται περὶ αὐτῶν.* As to the other writers on the Lacedaemonian Constitution, see above on 1269 a 29.

**20. ὅτι κ.τ.λ.,** 'because it was owing to their having been trained to meet dangers that they ruled over many,' and thus they owed their empire to their lawgiver. **Γυμνάζεσθαι** is not used exclusively of gymnastic training (cp. for instance 2. 12. 1274 a 26), but the gymnastic training enforced by the Lacedaemonian lawgiver (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 27 sqq.) is probably here referred to, for it was supposed at Sparta to produce courage (1338 b 12 sqq.). The notion that *γυμνάσια* lead to *ἄλλων ἀρχαί* occurs also in Plato, Protag. 354 A–B (cp. 342 B–C).

**23. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The sense is—besides it is not merely that they have lost noble living, but that they have lost it, notwithstanding that (as they claim) they have faithfully observed the laws given them by their lawgiver and there has been nothing to hinder them from doing so; this is indeed strange. Aristotle hints that either the fault must rest with the lawgiver or the Spartans had not really observed his laws. **Γελοῖον** has much the same meaning here as *ἄτοπον* (cp. Phys. 7. 3. 246 a 25, *ἔτι καὶ ἄλλως ἄτοπον. τὸ γὰρ λέγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἠλλοιῶσθαι ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν λαβοῦσαν*

τέλος γελοῖον κ.τ.λ.). An oracle given to Lycurgus, according to Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 57 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 390: cp. Diod. 7. 14. 7), ὡς εὐδαίμων ἡ πόλις ἔσοιτο εἰ τοῖς ἐκείνου νόμοις ἐμμένοι, is probably present to Aristotle's memory. In Isocr. Archid. § 61 the Lacedaemonian King Archidamus claims that the Spartans had abided by the laws which had been given them; there were, however, two views on this subject (see Isocr. De Pace, § 102 and above on 1270 a 19). There may be an allusion in μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις to the fact that the observance of Solon's laws at Athens had been interrupted by the Tyranny ('Aθ. Πολ. c. 22). Μηδενός is neuter, as in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 23, μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός. For ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 6, ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις. For μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 7, ὥστε ἄτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς τούτων δόγμασιν.

**26.** οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Even if these eulogists of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver were right in praising him for making rule over other States his end, the kind of rule—despotic rule—which they praise him for honouring is not the kind of rule which a lawgiver should be seen to honour. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sqq., and for τιμᾶσθαι φαίνεσθαι, Plato, Laws 962 A, εἴ τις τὸν σκοπόν, οὗ βλέπειν δεῖ τὸν πολιτικόν, φαίνοιτο ἀγνοῶν κ.τ.λ.

**27.** τοῦ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1325 a 24 sqq.

**29.** ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Further, they praise the lawgiver not only for what brings no permanent happiness, but also for what is positively harmful.

**30.** κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν, 'trained the citizens to conquer with a view to ruling over others.' I have not met with an instance of ἀσκεῖν used with an acc. of the person and an infinitive, unless we except the passage of Photius quoted below on 1337 a 1, but Plutarch has in De Defect. Orac. c. 21 γλώσσαις δὲ πολλαῖς ἤσκητο χρῆσθαι, and in Pyrrh. c. 24, ἄνδρας ἠσκημένους μάχεσθαι. Conquering is the first step to ruling over others: cp. c. 2. 1324 b 27 sq., and 1324 b 7 sqq., and also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 2, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εἰδότας οὐδὲ μελετῶντας ἢ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν πολεμίων.

**32.** δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. A shrewd remark and one which, so far as I know, Aristotle was the first to make. There is much in the history of ancient Rome and modern France to illustrate and confirm it. Τῷ δυναμένῳ, like τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν in c. 3. 1325 a 37.

**34.** ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσι κ.τ.λ., 'yet this is just what the Laconians

charge Pausanias their king with doing, notwithstanding that he was already the holder of so great an office.' The Lacedaemonians praise their lawgiver for teaching the State to do to other States the very thing which they censure Pausanias for trying to do to his fellow-citizens. Aristotle has usually been taken to refer here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20, *καὶ Παυσανίαν τὸν βασιλέα* (sc. *φασί τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλῦσαι*) *τὴν ἐφορείαν*, to the victor of Plataea, whom he, however, describes in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 2 sqq. as *ὁ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον*. This Pausanias was not really king, but only guardian of King Pleistarchus, who was a minor (cp. Hdt. 9. 10 and Thuc. 1. 132, referred to by Eaton), but he is 'often loosely called king in the later writers, e.g. in [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 97: Duris, Fragm. 31 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 477), ap. Athen. Deipn. 535 e: Justin 9. 1' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch. 2. 380. 4, ed. 1), and Aristotle may be guilty of a similar looseness here. In the second edition, however, of his Griechische Geschichte (1. 513 and note 3, and 3. 1. 98. 1) Busolt, following E. Meyer, takes the reference here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20 to be to the king Pausanias who was an opponent of Lysander. This Pausanias was really king, and might well be contrasted as such with *ὁ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον*, but see on the other side of the question Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 22. 2. Was the opponent of Lysander quite the man to entertain the hardy design of abolishing the ephorate and making himself master of the State?

**35.** *πολιτικός*. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sq.

**36.** *λόγων*, i.e. praises of the lawgiver for his training his citizens to conquer with a view to empire.

**37.** *ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ*. Cp. c. 15. 1334 a 11 sq. and c. 3. 1325 b 30 sqq. The 'best things' to which Aristotle refers appear to be temperance, justice, and wisdom in contradistinction to a capacity to conquer one's neighbours.

**38.** *τήν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν κ.τ.λ.* See as to this account of the true aim of war, vol. i. p. 327 sq. Aristotle evidently has before him Isocr. Panath. § 219, *οἶμαι γὰρ ἅπαντας ἂν ὁμολογῆσαι κακίστους ἄνδρας εἶναι καὶ μεγίστης ζημίας ἀξίους, ὅσοι τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς εὑρημένοις ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ, τούτοις ἐπὶ βλάβῃ χρώμενοι τυγχάνουσι, μὴ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν χώραν εἰσβάλλοντας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκειοτάτους καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συγγενείας μετέχοντας· ἅπερ ἐποίουν Σπαρτιᾶται.*

40. ἵνα is here followed by ὅπως. See Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 18 sqq., who gives a long list of passages in Aristotle's writings in which the same thing occurs, among them Pol. 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq., 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 6–17, and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq. Kaissling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 32) compares Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 16. l. 7 sqq.

1334 a. 1. πάντων δεσποτείας, 'despotic rule over all.' Πάντων is an objective genitive: cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 21, προωδοποίηται γὰρ ἕκαστος πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος πάθους, where ἑκάστου = πρὸς ἕκαστον (Bon. Ind. 149 b 10).

2. τρίτον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply ὅπως ζητῶσι.

5. τάξῃ. See above on 1260 a 36.

6. αἱ γὰρ πλεῖσται κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 3 sqq.

τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων, i.e. τῶν πολεμικῶν πόλεων, States that make war their end.

8. τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀφιᾶσιν κ.τ.λ. Compare for the metaphor Plato, Rep. 430 A. Βαφή here means the temper which is produced by dipping, rather than the dipping itself. In Plut. De Vitioso Pudore, c. 4. 530 E, we have ὥσπερ βαφὴν τὴν φυλάττουσαν ἀπιστῶν μαλαχθεῖσαν αἰσχύνῃ προέμενος. Aristotle evidently thought (cp. 25 sqq.), with Isocrates (De Pace, § 95 sqq.), that when the Peloponnesian War came to an end and the Lacedaemonians found themselves at the head of an empire, they lost much of the justice and temperance which war had enforced on them and became ὑβρισταί (28) and ἀνδραποδώδεις (39). Compare Isocr. De Pace, § 96, ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν καθεστώτων παρ' αὐτοῖς (i. e. τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις) ἐπιτηδευμάτων τοὺς μὲν ἰδιώτας ἐνέπλησεν (ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς θαλάττης) ἀδικίας, ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνομίας, φιλαργυρίας, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ὑπεροψίας μὲν τῶν συμμάχων, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὀλιγωρίας δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν. Isocrates dwells on their insolent treatment of the Chians (§ 98) and of the islands generally (§ 99). He ascribes this change in them to their possession of maritime empire, which had already demoralized Athens, whereas Aristotle ascribes it to defective education and to the effect of leisure. The Lacedaemonian training was a training only for war; it did not impart justice and temperance, still less did it impart intellectual virtue. If this had been otherwise, the Lacedaemonians would have spent their leisure in pursuits which would have prevented the loss of 'temper' to which Aristotle refers. So Plato (Rep. 549 B) says of them that they lacked the

'saviour of virtue'—*λόγου μουσικῇ κεκραμένου, ὃς μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σωτὴρ ἀρετῆς διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι.* Compare what Ephorus says of the Thebans in Fragm. 67 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 254). See above on 1271 b 4.

**11.** *Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 3. 1325 b 30 sqq. and c. 14. 1333 b 37. C. 15. The end is *σχολή*, as is explained in 14 sqq.

**12.** *ὅρον*, 'distinctive aim' (= *τέλος*, 11): cp. c. 2. 1324 b 3 sqq.

**14.** *τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετάς.* Cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, *τὰ εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα*, and c. 13. 1331 b 38, *τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις.*

*ὑπάρχειν*, sc. *τῇ πόλει*: cp. 34 sqq. and contrast c. 14. 1334 a 9 sq. That the best *man* will possess the capacity of using leisure aright, we have seen in c. 14. 1333 a 41 sqq.

**15.** *πολλάκις*, e. g. in c. 14. 1333 a 35.

**16.** *τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγήν.* Cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 10, *τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν*, and 21, *τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν.* *Διαγωγή* is the use of leisure in occupations desirable for their own sake—such occupations as have been described above on 1333 a 35. See as to its nature, Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 735. 5 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 266. 5), and Sus.[2], Note 921 (Sus.[1], 1. p. 542). It is closely related to the end of human life (5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29–31), and therefore to happiness (1339 b 17–19), and hence, like happiness, it combines in itself both the pleasurable and the noble.

**19.** *διὸ σώφρονα κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 1. 1323 a 40, *κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις.* *Σωφροσύνη* is a security for the possession of an abundance of necessaries, because it excludes the spendthrift habits of life which are a common concomitant of its opposite: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 7, *διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν* (i.e. *τῶν ἀσώτων*) *εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν.* It is implied that courage and other military virtues are productive of wealth in c. 14. 1333 b 10, 16 sqq.: cp. also Xen. Symp. 4. 13, *τὸν μὲν ἰσχυρὸν πονοῦντα δεῖ κτᾶσθαι τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον κινδυνεύοντα, τὸν δέ γε σοφὸν λέγοντα.* That they are preservative of wealth is obvious.

**20.** *κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις.* See Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 765, where a remark of Erasmus is quoted, 'dicitur in eos quibus propter obnoxiam ministeriis sordidioribus conditionem non vacat honestis disciplinis operam dare.'

The proverb seems to be remembered by Euripides in a fragment of the Antiope (Fr. 215),

οὐ χρή ποτ' ἄνδρα δοῦλον ὄντ' ἐλευθέρας
γνώμας διώκειν οὐδ' ἐς ἀργίαν βλέπειν,

and probably by Plutarch in Solon, c. 22, εἰλωτικοῦ πλήθους, ὃ βέλτιον ἦν μὴ σχολάζειν, ἀλλὰ τριβόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ πονοῦν ταπεινοῦσθαι (see note on 1313 b 18). So we read in Plut. Cato Censor, c. 21, of Cato's slaves, ἔδει δὲ ἢ πράττειν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων οἴκοι τὸν δοῦλον ἢ καθεύδειν. Compare also the saying ascribed to Socrates, ἡ Ἀργία ἀδελφὴ τῇ Ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐστί (Aelian, Var. Hist. 10. 14).

**21.** οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6-10, and Isocr. Archid. § 7.

**23.** φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, 'and of intellectual virtue for leisure.' Bonitz (Ind. 821 a 6) rightly explains φιλοσοφία here as = 'virtus intellectualis.' See above on 1263 b 40. In 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 26 we find φρόνησις used in the sense of 'intellectual virtue' (see Sus.[2], Note 1023: Sus.[4], 1. p. 585). We do not learn in the Fifth Book how Aristotle proposes to develope intellectual virtue by his education; yet he keeps its development in view even in his arrangements respecting musical training; thus one reason why he rejects the study of pipe-playing is because it is οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν (5 (8). 6. 1341 b 6).

**24.** σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 5, διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις. Aristotle hopes to develope temperance by means of the musical element in his education (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.) and possibly justice also (cp. τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν, 1340 a 21). Something, however, would have been done for the promotion of temperance even in childhood by careful attention to children's pastimes and to the tales told them, and by the prohibition of objectionable language in their presence, etc.

**25.** ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος κ.τ.λ., 'for war *obliges* men to be just and temperate,' so that in time of war men act justly and temperately, whether they have these virtues or not. Ἀναγκάζει is emphatic. Compare for the expression Eurip. Fragm. 528, τὸ φῶς δ' ἀνάγκη προστίθησι σωφρονεῖν, and for the thought Xen. Cyrop. 8. 4. 14, δοκεῖ δέ μοι, ὦ Κῦρε, χαλεπώτερον εἶναι εὑρεῖν ἄνδρα τἀγαθὰ καλῶς φέροντα ἢ τὰ κακά· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὕβριν τοῖς πολλοῖς, τὰ δὲ σωφροσύνην τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐμποιεῖ.

**26.** ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις κ.τ.λ. For the phrase, compare

Diod. 14. 80. 2, *εἰς τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν εἰρήνῃ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσιν*, and for the thought, Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 29, *ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ* (i.e. *τὰ εὐτυχήματα*) *γίγνονται*: Thuc. 8. 24. 4, *Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην εὐδαιμονήσαντες ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν*: and the proverb **Κολοφωνία ὕβρις**, *ἐπὶ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ὑβριστῶν, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ Κολοφώνιοι* (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 266). See also Justin 8. 1. 4. It would be easy to multiply instances of this familiar saying. For *τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης*, cp. Plato, Theaet. 172 D, *τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται*. For *μᾶλλον*, see note on 1270 b 33.

**28. πολλῆς οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Schn. 'insolentiam structurae annotavit cum Camerario [Interp. p. 319] Victorius; poetarum Atticorum exempla posuit Porson ad Euripidis Orestem versu 659, prosaicorum scriptorum locum praeter hunc adhuc alium similem nondum reperi.' See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 409. 4. Anm. 5, where Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 86, *αὐτὸν γὰρ σὲ δεῖ προμηθέως*, is referred to among other passages from the poets. It is possible that *μετέχειν* has dropped out (cp. 35).

**30. πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας.** Cp. c. 1. 1323 a 25 sqq. and Plato, Laws 631 B. The possession of all possible goods was held to make men insolent and overbearing (Rhet. 2. 16. 1390 b 32 sqq.). **Ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς** was a familiar Greek expression: cp. Bergk, Fragm. Adesp. Lyr. 18,

*ἀνθεῦσαν ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσιν οἷς θάλλει πόλις,*

and see Leutsch and Schneidewin's note on Gregor. Cypr. 1. 36 (Paroem. Gr. 2. 58). It is parodied in Aristoph. Acharn. 1025 Didot,

*καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι νὴ Δί' ὥπερ μ' ἐτρεφέτην*
*ἐν πᾶσι βολίτοις,*

and Vesp. 709 Didot,

*δύο μυριάδες τῶν δημοτικῶν ἔζων ἐν πᾶσι λαγῴοις.*

**οἷον εἴ τινές κ.τ.λ.** Homer (Odyss. 4. 561 sqq.), as Camerarius points out (Interp. p. 319), speaks of the Elysian *plain*; it is from Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 170 sqq., that we first hear of the *Islands* of the Blest. See Liddell and Scott s.v. *μάκαρ*. Hesiod describes how some favoured heroes of the fourth race did not die like their fellows, but were removed by Zeus far from the haunts of men to the Islands of the Blest in the deep-eddying Ocean. Even in the later Iron Age there were those whose lot was thought to be the same—e.g. Harmodius (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. Scol. 10) and those

who were initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries (Diog. Laert. 6. 39). Some found the *μακάρων νῆσοι* in Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Cos, and Rhodes, the realm of Macareus (Diod. 5. 82), but they were more commonly believed to lie in the Atlantic Ocean at some distance from the West Coast of Libya (Plut. Sertor. c. 8: cp. Hor. Epod. 16. 41 sqq.).

**32.** **φιλοσοφίας** is introduced at some cost of trimness, but this is Aristotle's way: see note on 1323 b 35.

**34.** **μὲν οὖν** has no **δέ** to answer to it, as the text stands. Perhaps it was taken up by another *μὲν οὖν* in the lacuna which, as we shall see, probably exists in 1334 b 4, both being then answered by *τίνα δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται*, 5.

**35.** **τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν**, i.e. *φιλοσοφία σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη*.

**36.** **αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος** κ.τ.λ., 'for [if they have them not, they will not be able to use good things in leisure-time, and] while it is disgraceful,' etc. Leisure is the crown of life, and *ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή* is the *διαγωγὴ τῶν ἐλευθέρων* (5 (8). 3. 1338 a 21 sqq.), hence it is especially desirable to be able to make a right use of good things in leisure-time. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1105 a 9, *περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ*.

**38.** Observe the chiasmus in *ἀσχολοῦνται καὶ πολεμοῦνται* and *εἰρήνην ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας*.

**40.** **διὸ δεῖ** κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 2, *πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ τῶνδε σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς*. Contrast the language of Xenophon in Rep. Lac. 10. 4, *τόδε γε μὴν τοῦ Λυκούργου πῶς οὐ μεγάλως ἄξιον ἀγασθῆναι; ὅς . . . ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἠνάγκασε δημοσίᾳ πάντας πάσας ἀσκεῖν τὰς ἀρετάς . . . ἐπέθηκε δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνυπόστατον ἀνάγκην ἀσκεῖν ἅπασαν πολιτικὴν ἀρετήν*.

**41.** **ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ** κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—for they do not differ from other men in their views with regard to the question what are the greatest goods: the common herd think that external goods are the greatest of goods (Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 17, *τούτων γάρ*—i.e. *χρημάτων καὶ τιμῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τῶν σωματικῶν*—*οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ πεπραγμάτευται ἐστιν*), and so do the Lacedaemonians (Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 6 sqq.); it is only in this that they differ from the mass of men, that they hold these goods to be won by means of one of the virtues (courage or military virtue). So far we see our way clearly, but there is little

doubt that the sentence which follows, commencing with *ἐπεὶ δέ*, has reached us in an imperfect state, and that several words have dropped out after *τῶν ἀρετῶν*, 1334 b 4—how many, it is impossible to say. The lost words may well have ended with the word *ἀρετήν*, and the omission of them may well have been due to the resemblance of *ἀρετήν* to *ἀρετῶν*, 1334 b 4. Many attempts have been made to fill the lacuna (see Sus.[3] on the passage), but with indifferent success. If I were to hazard a suggestion, it would be to insert after *ἀρετῶν* the words *νομίζουσι, τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα χρησίμην εἶναι δοκοῦσαν ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦσι μόνον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὅλην ἀσκητέον τὴν ἀρετήν.* It seems likely at any rate that this filling-up more or less represents the sense of the words which have fallen out. Compare with the passage before us 2. 9. 1271 a 41–b 10. Camerarius (Interp. p. 320) was the first to suggest 'locum mendis non carere.' For *οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων*, cp. Poet. 5. 1449 b 10 sqq. (already compared by Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 327), and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 20, *ἀλλ' εἰμὶ ἄπληστος κἀγὼ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι χρημάτων· τῇδέ γε μέντοι διαφέρειν μοι δοκῶ τῶν πλείστων ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* For *ταύτῃ* referring to what follows Bonitz (Ind. 546 b 11) compares Poet. 23. 1459 a 30 sqq. *Ἀλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι ταῦτα* (1334 b 2) = *ἀλλὰ τῷ νομίζειν γενέσθαι ταῦτα*, as Vict. points out. Possibly *γίνεσθαι* should be read (with Schn. Bekk.[2] and Sus.) in place of *γενέσθαι*: cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 7, where we have *γίνεσθαι*. *Ταῦτα*, 1334 b 2, 3 = *τἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα*. For the thought, cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 8.

4. *καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν*. Aristotle does not mean that virtue is not 1334 b.
to be practised for the sake of the happiness resulting from it; what he objects to is the practice of virtue for the sake of *τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά*.

5. *πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται κ.τ.λ.* For *πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων*, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, *ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων*, 3. 18. 1288 a 39, and Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 22, and for *πῶς ἔσται*, Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 34, *πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσι, δεῖ σκέψασθαι τὸν νομοθέτην*. The answer to *διὰ τίνων* is *διὰ φύσεως ἔθους λόγου*: cp. c. 13. 1332 a 38 sqq. *Τοῦτο δή*, as in c. 14. 1332 b 13.

6. *τυγχάνομεν δὴ διῃρημένοι πρότερον κ.τ.λ.* *Δή* here, as often elsewhere (see note on 1252 a 24), introduces an investigation. *Διῃρημένοι* is middle and used in the sense of *διορίζειν* (cp. 3. 14. 1284 b 41, *διελέσθαι*). *Πρότερον*, in c. 13. 1332 a 38 sqq.

7. *τούτων*, 'of these things,' a partitive genitive: cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41, *τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν*.

**8.** πρότερον, in c. 7.

**9.** ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. explains why this question must be considered: we must ask whether training through habit should precede training through reason, because these two kinds of training must be so harmonized with each other as to be adjusted to the best end, and we shall be better able to adjust them to the best end when this question has been answered. Aristotle has already said (c. 13. 1332 b 5) that nature, habit, and reason must harmonize with each other; he now adds that they must be so harmonized as to be adjusted to the best end. He follows in the track of Plato, Laws 653 B and 659 D. At Sparta this best kind of harmony had been missed, for in the Lacedaemonian training nature and habit had not been brought into harmony with reason, nor had reason been adjusted to the best end.

**11.** καί, 'both.'

**12.** καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίων ἦχθαι, sc. τοὺς παιδευομένους. In Eth. Nic. 1. 2. 1095 b 4 we have τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς. For ὁμοίων (i.e. ὁμοίων τῷ λόγῳ), cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 26, πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιούτῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς μουσικῆς, and Plato, Tim. 18 B, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν ἐπεμνήσθημεν, ὡς τὰς φύσεις τοῖς ἀνδράσιν παραπλησίας εἴη ξυναρμοστέον, and Rep. 472 C, ὃς ἂν ἐκείνοις ὅ τι ὁμοιότατος ᾖ, τὴν ἐκείνοις μοῖραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἔξειν.

**φανερὸν δὴ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle is about to decide that training through habit must precede training through reason, but that training through habit must be adjusted to and pursued for the sake of reason, which is the end, and he proves the second proposition first (in 12–17) and then the first (in 17–25). Translate—'this then at any rate is evident, first that as in all other things, [so in the case of the human being,] generation starts from a beginning, and that the end of some beginnings is related to another end, and that reason and thought are the end of man's natural development, so that [reason and thought are the end of generation, and] it is with a view to these ends that we should order generation and our training in custom.' I follow Sepulveda, Vict., Lamb., Stahr, and Welldon in my rendering of ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστί. Sus.[2] (cp. Sus.[4], 1. p. 545) translates 'dass die Erzeugung und Geburt den Anfang macht (für den man zu sorgen hat)'—i.e. 'that generation and birth are the beginning (for which we have to care)'—comparing c. 16. 1334 b 29, but the next sentence, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους,

suggests that *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστί* means 'start from a beginning.' It has not, I think, been noticed that Aristotle has before him Plato, Phaedr. 245 D, *ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' ἐξ ἑνός· εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο*, which supports the interpretation adopted by me. With Sepulveda (p. 237 b) I take the 'beginning' from which generation 'starts' to be the union of the parents: cp. Plato, Laws 720 E, *ΑΘ.... ἆρ' οὐ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν περὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν πρώτην πόλεων πέρι κατακοσμήσει ταῖς τάξεσι; ΚΛ. τί μήν; ΑΘ. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν γενέσεων πάσαις πόλεσιν ἆρ' οὐχ ἡ τῶν γάμων σύμμιξις καὶ κοινωνία;* and c. 16. 1334 b 29–31, where it is implied that *ἡ σύζευξις* is the *ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως*. Compare with the passage before us those quoted in vol. i. p. 348, note 2, and Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 a 7 sqq. Aristotle's aim is that in all arrangements connected with the generation of his future citizens and with the training of habit given them the ultimate development of reason and thought shall be kept in view, and we find that he bears this in mind later on (see above on 1334 a 23, and cp. c. 16. 1335 b 16 sqq., 29 sqq., and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 24 sq., b 6 sqq.). We expect *τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς* in place of *τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς*, but cp. c. 16. 1334 b 41, *ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων*, and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 35, *τὰς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων*. See also below on 1336 a 41 and cp. Plato, Laws 715 A, *τά τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφετέρισαν σφόδρα κ.τ.λ.* For *ἄλλου τέλους*, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 19, *ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός*.

**19. καὶ τὰς ἕξεις τὰς τούτων κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 6, where the soul is said to consist *ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως*, and De An. 3. 10. 433 a 9, *φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἡ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα*. That *ὄρεξις* belongs to the irrational part of the soul and *νοῦς* to the rational, is implied in 1. 5. 1254 b 5–9, but we are not told elsewhere, so far as I am aware, that *ὄρεξις* is the *ἕξις* of the one part of the soul and *νοῦς* of the other. For the meaning of *ἕξεις*, cp. Metaph. Δ. 20. 1022 b 10, *ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἕξεις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ' ἣν ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἢ καθ' αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια ἕξις τις· διάθεσις γάρ ἐστι τοιαύτη*, and see note on 1254 a 39, where an *ἕξις* has been said to be a more permanent state than a *διάθεσις*. Thus *ὄρεξις* is a *διάθεσις τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται*, and *νοῦς* stands in a similar relation to *τὸ λόγον ἔχον*. *Ὄρεξις* is explained in 22 by *θυμός, βούλησις*, and *ἐπιθυμία*, for *ὄρεξις* is made up of these three things (De

An. 2. 3. 414 b 2, *ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις*, and Eth. Eud. 2. 7. 1223 a 26, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν*). As Eaton points out, however, 'Aristotle's language is not uniform,' for he connects *βούλησις*, not with the irrational, but with the rational part of the soul in De An. 3. 9. 432 b 5, *ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός*. As to the nature of *βούλησις*, see Eth. Nic. 3. 4. 1111 b 19 sqq. Aristotle evidently regards infants as having wishes which are not *ἐπιθυμίαι*, and yet which belong wholly to the irrational part of the soul. One difference between *ἐπιθυμία* and *βούλησις* is that the former is always felt in relation to that which is possible, and that this is not always the case with the latter (1111 b 22).

**22.** *θυμὸς γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle, as Eaton has already pointed out, follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 441 A, *καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό γ' ἄν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστά ἐστι, λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι μὲν ἥμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε*. Cp. also Rep. 402 A: Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 8 sq.: Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 22: and the fragment of Philemon quoted above on 1332 b 10. Aristotle may perhaps regard *θυμός*, *βούλησις*, and *ἐπιθυμία* as closely connected with the body: cp. Virg. Aen. 6. 730 sqq.

**23.** *καὶ γενομένοις εὐθύς*, 'even immediately after they are born': cp. De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 a 27, *καὶ τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς ἀκολουθεῖ γενομένοις, τὰ δὲ προϊούσης τῆς ἡλικίας γίνεται δῆλα καὶ γηρασκόντων*: Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 9, *ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν*: and Meteor. 3. 1. 371 a 6, *εὐθὺς γεγονόσιν*.

**24.** *ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς* κ.τ.λ. The expression comes to Aristotle from Plato, Rep. 586 C, *πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ* (cp. 431 C and 524 B, and Laws 897 C). These are the faculties that control *ὄρεξις* (Eth. Nic. 7. 8. 1150 b 22 sqq.) and bring it within bounds. They are absent in other animals than man (De An. 3. 10. 433 a 11 sq.), and the child has them in an imperfect form (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 13). At what age they develope we are not told. According to Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 22 sqq. *νοῦς* increases in men as they grow older, and reaches its highest development in old age (*ἐπὶ γήρως*). Some further light is thrown on the subject by Plato, Symp. 181 D, *οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παίδων, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν ἤδη ἄρχωνται νοῦν ἴσχειν· τοῦτο δὲ πλησιάζει τῷ γενειάσκειν*. Compare with what Aristotle says here

Polyb. 3. 20. 4, *εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ τύχη καὶ τοῦτο προσένειμε Ῥωμαίοις, τὸ φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐθέως ἐκ γενετῆς.*

**προϊοῦσιν.** Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares De Part. An. 4. 10. 686 b 11, *προϊοῦσι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀνθρώποις αὔξεται τὰ κάτωθεν.*

**25. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ.** Πρῶτον *μέν* is answered by *ἔπειτα*. With *ἔπειτα τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως* we must apparently supply *εἶναι* or some such word. See note on 1279 b 7.

**27. ἕνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως.** The *ὄρεξις* should be so trained as to obey *νοῦς* (1. 5. 1254 b 5: see note on 1333 a 21, and cp. Plato, Laws 653 B, 659 D).

**τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.** Cp. Plato, Rep. 591 C, *ἔπειτα δ', εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξιν καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγιὴς ἢ καλὸς ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα ξυμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος* [*φανεῖται*]. As to the omission of *ἕνεκα* with *τῆς ψυχῆς* Eucken remarks (Praepositionen, p. 20), 'if *ἕνεκα* belongs to two notions, it is usually expressed only with the first, and must be supplied with the second.'

**29 sqq.** Cp. Plato, Laws 721 A. But Aristotle is less guided by Plato in this chapter than he is in the seventeenth. He raises questions here which Plato had not raised and solves those which Plato had already raised in a different way. Plato had not inquired *ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν*, nor had he discussed the proper season of the year for marriage or the other questions raised in 1335 a 39 sqq. *Ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* is evidently equivalent to *ἀπὸ τῆς συζεύξεως.* C. 16.

**30. τῶν τρεφομένων,** 'of the children in process of rearing,' for not all that are born are to be reared. So Sepulv., whom Vict. follows.

**πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ.,** 'attention must first be given to the coupling of man and wife in marriage, [and the question must be considered] when'—i. e. at what age—'and in what condition [of body and mind] they should enter upon matrimonial intercourse with each other.' Critias, following no doubt Lacedaemonian traditions, had already said the same thing (see vol. i. p. 350, note 1). On the other hand, 'Chrysippus is reproached by Posidonius (Galen, Hipp. et Plat. 5. 1) for neglecting the first germs of education in his treatise on the subject, particularly those previous to birth' (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Eng. Trans., p. 303, note 2). In

relation to animals other than man nature herself had fixed the age and season of the year at which intercourse was to take place (Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 19, *ὧραι δὲ καὶ ἡλικίαι τῆς ὀχείας ἑκάστοις εἰσὶν ὡρισμέναι τῶν ζῴων*), and Aristotle follows in her track. Indeed Greek custom seems to have prescribed a certain season of the year for marriage (c. 16. 1335 a 36 sqq.), and particular Greek States seem often to have had an age of their own for its celebration (c. 16. 1335 a 15 sqq.). Another point is recognized in 1335 b 26 sqq. as needing consideration, *πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἁρμόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν*. It is not likely that regulations on this subject existed in any Greek State. *Πρῶτον μέν* has nothing strictly answering to it, but it is in effect taken up by c. 17. 1336 a 3. *γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων κ.τ.λ. Ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν*, as in Plato, Laws 932 B, *τῶν περὶ γάμους γυναικῶν ἐπιμελουμένων*. The question *πότε κ.τ.λ.* is considered in 1334 b 32–1335 a 35, and the question *ποίους τινὰς ὄντας κ.τ.λ.* is considered, so far as relates to the body, in 1335 b 2–12.

**32.** *δεῖ δ' ἀποβλέποντα* κ.τ.λ., 'and the lawgiver in instituting this union should look both to the persons united [as distinguished from the children to be born] and to the [whole] time for which they will live [not merely to the time at which the union takes place], in order that they may arrive simultaneously in respect of age at the same epoch' (i. e. the epoch at which each of the two loses the power to have children: cp. 1335 a 7, *τέλος τῆς γεννήσεως*, and for *συγκαταβαίνωσι* 1335 a 10 sq., 31). If the lawgiver looked merely to the time at which the union takes place, and did not look forward to the time at which the power to have children is lost by husband and wife respectively, he might very well be led to arrange that husband and wife should both be of the same age and young, but to do this would be an error, and the right course for him is to keep in view the whole course of the lives of the wedded pair and to arrange that the husband shall be twenty years or so older than his wife. For *τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον*, cp. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 17. 1098 E,

*οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μέτρον ὁ τοῦ βίου χρόνος,*
*ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐπιδραττόμενον τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ἐξαμιλλᾶται* κ.τ.λ.: Euphron, *Δίδυμοι* Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 490),

*ὦ Ζεῦ, τί ποθ' ἡμῖν δοὺς χρόνον τοῦ ζῆν βραχὺν*
*πλέκειν ἀλύπως τοῦτον ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἐᾷς;*

Philemon, Ἔφηβος Fragm. 1 (Meineke 4. 10),

οὐκ εἰς ἡμέραν
χειμάζομαι μίαν γάρ, εἰς τὸ ζῆν δ' ὅλον:

and Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 444, Πιτύλος Ποσειδίππου τὸν ἴδιον θρεπτὸν Λυκολέοντα ἀφῆκεν ἐλεύθερον παραμείναντα αὐτῷ τὸν τᾶς ζωᾶς χρόνον. Camerarius (Interp. p. 323) rightly translates τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον 'vitae ipsius spacium.' Susemihl's rendering of the sentence, which Mr. Welldon follows, translating 'he should have in view not only the persons themselves who are to marry but their time of life,' needs the support of parallel instances of this use of τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον. Aristotle follows in the track of Euripides (Fragm. 24: cp. Fragm. 906, and contrast Fragm. 319, quoted below on 1335 a 1),

κακὸν γυναῖκα πρὸς νέαν ζεῦξαι νέον,
μακρὰ γὰρ ἰσχὺς μᾶλλον ἀρσένων μένει,
θήλεια δ' ἥβη θᾶσσον ἐκλείπει δέμας.

For νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν, cp. 2. 8. 1267 b 39, ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν τὸ κύριον. That ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν refers to τὴν σύζευξιν, we see from 1335 a 35 sqq. The union of man and wife is called a σύζευξις in 1. 3. 1253 b 9 sq. and a κοινωνία in 1. 2. 1252 b 9 sq.

**37.** καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 41, εἶτα λανθάνουσιν ἔνδον ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις στάσεις καὶ διαφορὰς αὑτοῖς ἐγκαταλείποντες, and Plut. Amat. c. 2, ἐκ τῆς γενομένης τοῖς γονεῦσιν αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ στάσεως. A 'difference' is less serious and less long-continued than a 'state of discord,' though it may often end in the production of discord: cp. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 37, καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν ὕστερον.

**39.** τῶν τέκνων includes female as well as male children.

**40.** τῶν πατέρων might well mean here, as often elsewhere, 'the parents,' but it would seem to mean 'the fathers,' if we compare 1335 a 32–35, for there the father alone must be referred to, inasmuch as he alone would be seventy years of age at the time when the children are approaching their acmê.

ἀνόνητος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for elderly fathers get no good from children's return of service, nor do the children from the assistance given by fathers.' If a man marries (say) at fifty-five, he will probably be in his grave before he gets much assistance from his

children or is able to start them in life. See also vol. i. p. 184, note 2. For *ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων*, not *ἡ χάρις ἡ παρὰ τῶν τέκνων*, see above on 1334 b 12.

1335 a. **1. οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι.** Euripides puts very different advice into the mouth of one of his characters (Fragm. 319),

> *καὶ νῦν παραινῶ πᾶσι τοῖς νεωτέροις*
> *μὴ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τοὺς γάμους ποιουμένοις*
> *σχολῇ τεκνοῦσθαι παῖδας· οὐ γὰρ ἡδονή,*
> *γυναικί τ' ἐχθρὸν χρῆμα πρεσβύτης ἀνήρ·*
> *ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστα. καὶ γὰρ ἐκτροφαὶ καλαὶ*
> *καὶ συννεάζων ἡδὺ παῖς νέῳ πατρί.*

On the un-Attic word **πάρεγγυς** see Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 120.

**2. ἥ τε γὰρ αἰδὼς κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 5. 5, *καὶ γὰρ δὴ ὁ μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἡλικες ἀλλήλοις σύνεισι, μεθ' ὅπερ καὶ ἐλαχίστη αἰδὼς παραγίγνεται.* **Τοῖς τοιούτοις**, sc. *τέκνοις*, 'children of the kind we have just described,' i.e. near in age to their parents. *Ὥσπερ ἡλικιώταις*, 'as it does also to those of the same age': cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, *ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής*, and 2. 10. 1272 a 41, *ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις.*

**3. καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 5, *φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἷς φθονοῦσιν· ἅμα γὰρ εἴρηται· τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν· ὅθεν εἴρηται "τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται"* (Aeschyl. Fragm. 298).

**4. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We are apparently intended to supply *δεῖ νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν* before *ὅπως κ.τ.λ.* *Ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῖρο μετέβημεν*, cp. 1334 b 29 sqq. **Τῶν γεννωμένων**, 'of the offspring in process of generation,' whether born or unborn, for *τὸ γεννώμενον* in De Gen. An. 1. 2. 716 a 22 refers to the latter and *τοῖς γεννωμένοις* in Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 13 to the former. After birth, however, *τὰ γιγνόμενα* is the usual designation, as in 1335 b 20, 22, and c. 17. 1336 a 16, and *τὰ τέκνα* is used of a still later stage (1334 b 39). *Ὑπάρχῃ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν*, 'be such as to answer to the wish of the lawgiver.' For *πρός* with the acc. in this sense, cp. Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 16, *ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος (νόμος) ᾖ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα*, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 642 a 40–54: also Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 139, *ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται δεῖν τοῖς πάλαι κειμένοις χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ τὰ πάτρια περιστέλλειν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὰς βουλήσεις μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς διαδύσεις τῶν ἀδικημάτων νομοθετεῖσθαι.*

6. σχεδὸν δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'now all these things come about in connexion with one arrangement,' or 'one mode of dealing with the subject'—the arrangement being to place the commencement of wedlock at such ages in the case of husband and wife respectively as will enable it to close, so far as the production of children is concerned, at the age of seventy in the case of the husband and fifty in that of the wife, so that at no period of the cohabitation will the power of procreation be wanting to either party. It deserves notice that Aristotle himself was about forty years of age when he married the niece and adopted daughter of Hermias (see vol. i. p. 466). That this union was a happy one may be inferred from the direction in Aristotle's will that his wife's bones should be, in accordance with her request, disinterred and buried with his own (Diog. Laert. 5. 16). Πάντα ταῦτα, i. e. τὸ μὴ διαφωνεῖν τὰς δυνάμεις, τὸ μήτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων μήτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι, and τὸ τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. For συμβαίνειν κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν, cp. Meteor. 1. 1. 338 b 20, ὅσα συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν, and Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 8, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὼ ἄνδρε καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ' ἐπιμέλειαν ἐγενέσθην φύλακε κατὰ τὰς πύλας ταύτας. The phrase perhaps contains an allusion to the proverb μία μάστιξ ἐλαύνει (or μία μάστιξ πάντας ἐλαύνει, Suidas)· ἐπὶ τοῦ ῥᾳδίου (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 280): cp. Herodes, Περὶ Πολιτείας, p. 175 (Bekker, Orat. Att., vol. v. p. 659), ἀπὸ μιᾶς οὖν τέχνης ὁρμώμενος ἡμῶν τε κρατήσειν οἴεται καὶ τούτων ὧν δι' ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄρξει. Sus. transposes σχεδόν, 6—τούτους, 11, to after 27, πληθύον ἔτι (ἢ μικρόν), reading σχεδὸν δέ in place of σχεδὸν δή, but the result of this transposition is to sever πάντα ταῦτα from the things to which these words refer.

8. ὁ τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος, 'the extreme sum of seventy years' (cp. 35). For the fact, cp. Hist. An. 7. 6. 585 b 5 sqq. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 323), 'haec ita se habere putatur esse certum. Etsi pauca quaedam dissentanea memorantur, ut olim de Masinissa, quem Plutarchus in libello quo quaeritur an senibus capessenda sit respublica' (c. 15) 'ex Polybio' (37. 10. 5, 11 sq.) 'narrat, mortuum annos habentem nonaginta, reliquisse superstitem puerum annorum quatuor. Et de Constantia, quae nupsit Friderico Secundo, traditur peperisse eam filium grandiorem annis quinquaginta.' See also Plin. Nat. Hist. 7. 61 sq. Bonitz (Ind. 289 b 16) couples with the passage before us Hist. An. 8. 15. 599 b 10, καὶ ἄρχονται θηρεύεσθαι (οἱ θύννοι) ἀπὸ Πλειάδος ἀνατολῆς μέχρι

'Αρκτούρου δύσεως τὸ ἔσχατον. For the order of the words, which is quite regular, cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 27, ἡ ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος: see Sandys' note on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 51. l. 10, ὁ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σῖτος ἀργός.

9. For πεντήκοντα, cp. 29, ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα.

10. δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ., 'the commencement of the union, so far as age is concerned, should reach down at its close to these epochs' (i.e. the close of the union should arrive for the wife at the age of fifty and for the husband at the age of seventy, so that the husband should be twenty years older than the wife at the time of marriage). For κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, 'in respect of age' as contrasted with time of year (τοῖς περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις, 36), cp. De Gen. An. 5. 3. 784 a 17, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν γίνεται χειμὼν καὶ θέρος καὶ ἔαρ καὶ μετόπωρον. For the use of καταβαίνειν, cp. Plut. Demetr. c. 53, κατέβη δὲ ταῖς διαδοχαῖς τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ βασιλεῦον εἰς Περσέα τελευταῖον, ἐφ' οὗ 'Ρωμαῖοι Μακεδονίαν ὑπηγάγοντο.

11. ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς κ.τ.λ. Partly in support of the conclusion at which he has just arrived, which implies that the bridegroom will be twenty years older than the bride at the time of marriage, and therefore will not be young, and partly in order to settle the age of the bride, which has not yet been settled, Aristotle recalls the fact that the union of young persons is a bad thing. The substantive συνδυασμός is not used elsewhere in the Politics in the sense of 'coitus,' though it is often thus used in the zoological writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), but we have συνδυασθέντων in this sense in 1335 b 24 (cp. also συνδυάζεσθαι in 1. 2. 1252 a 26, so far as it refers to the union of male and female). With the passage 1335 a 11–28 should be compared Plato, Rep. 459 B: Aristot. Hist. An. 5. 14. 544 b 14, τὸ γὰρ τῶν νέων (sc. σπέρμα) ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἄγονον, γονίμων δ' ὄντων ἀσθενέστερα καὶ ἐλάττω τὰ ἔκγονα· τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα δῆλον ἐπί τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ζῳοτόκων τετραπόδων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρνίθων, τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἔκγονα ἐλάττω, τῶν δὲ τὰ ᾠά, and 7. 1. 582 a 16, μέχρι μὲν οὖν τῶν τρὶς ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἄγονα τὰ σπέρματά ἐστιν· ἔπειτα γόνιμα μὲν μικρὰ δὲ καὶ ἀτελῆ γεννῶσι καὶ οἱ νέοι καὶ αἱ νέαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν πλείστων. συλλαμβάνουσι μὲν οὖν αἱ νέαι θᾶττον· ἐὰν δὲ συλλάβωσιν, ἐν τοῖς τόκοις πονοῦσι μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ σώματα δ' αὐτῶν ἀτελέστερα γίνεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ γηράσκει θᾶττον, τῶν τ' ἀφροδισιαστικῶν ἀρρένων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν τῶν τοῖς τόκοις χρωμένων πλείοσιν· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐδ' ἡ αὔξησις ἔτι γίνεσθαι μετὰ τοὺς τρεῖς τόκους, and De Gen. An. 4. 2. 766 b 29, τά τε γὰρ νέα θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον τῶν ἀκμαζόντων καὶ γηράσκοντα μᾶλλον (τὰ πρεσβύτερα

μᾶλλον P, i.e. Vat. 1339)· *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὔπω τέλειον τὸ θερμόν, τοῖς δ' ἀπολείπει.* Aubert and Wimmer, in their edition of the De Generatione Animalium, remark on this passage, 'this appears from statistical investigations to be correct'; among other authorities they refer to 'the very precise and interesting investigations of Quetelet, Sur l'Homme': see also below on 1335 a 15. According to Aristox. Fragm. 20 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), Pythagoras recommended (he probably referred to males only) complete abstinence till twenty, *ὅταν δὲ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀφίκηται, σπανίοις εἶναι χρηστέον τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις· τοῦτο γὰρ πρός τε τὴν τῶν γεννώντων καὶ γεννησομένων εὐεξίαν πολὺ συμβάλλεσθαι*: see also below on 1335 b 37, *ὑγιείας χάριν.* At Sparta, care was taken that both bridegroom and bride should be in their bodily prime (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 6: Plut. Lycurg. c. 15, cp. Num. et Lycurg. inter se comp. c. 4, where the custom at Rome is contrasted with the Lacedaemonian custom). It is evident from 28 sq. that Aristotle does not class a girl of eighteen among the *νέαι*, at all events so far as fitness for marriage is concerned.

**13. ἀτελῆ**, 'imperfect,' i.e. lacking some limb or organ, or with some limb or organ imperfectly developed, or lacking some sense, for instance the sense of sight or hearing (De An. 3. 1. 425 a 9 sqq.), or some power, for instance the power of movement (De An. 3. 9. 432 b 21–26) or speech, or the power to procreate (cp. Hist. An. 7. 1. 581 b 21 sqq., and De An. 2. 4. 415 a 26 sqq. and 3. 9. 432 b 21 sqq.), or possibly imperfect in mind (cp. 1335 b 29 sqq.), idiotic or the like. As infants born imperfect are not to be reared in Aristotle's 'best State' (1335 b 20), and the offspring of the over-young is often imperfect, much destruction of infant life would be saved by the prohibition of the marriage of those who are over-young.

**μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν**, 'small in figure': cp. Pindar, Isthm. 4. 53, *μορφὰν βραχύς.* In 17 we have *μικροὶ τὰ σώματα.* To be small in person was to lack beauty (Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1123 b 6 sqq.). 'Ο *μικρός* was 'a term of reproach at Athens' (Liddell and Scott s.v.: Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 280, note: cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 3).

**15. ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Vict. 'hoc autem vulgo de plebe Gallorum dicitur, apud quos mala haec consuetudo increbruit; unde notantur etiam voce ostendente erratum hoc ipsorum irridenteque brevitatem corporis eorundem et deformitatem.' Among the States

other than Troezen to which Aristotle here refers, Crete should probably be included. Cp. Ephor. Fragm. 64 (Strabo, p. 482: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 251), *γαμεῖν μὲν ἅμα πάντες ἀναγκάζονται παρ' αὐτοῖς οἱ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐκ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀγέλης ἐκκριθέντες.* The age referred to would be the expiration of the eighteenth year according to Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, p. 408. The bride in Crete might be no more than twelve years of age (ibid. p. 407). The early age at which daughters were given in marriage at Troezen is probably an indication of material prosperity, for the father no doubt had to provide his daughter with a dowry. In Crete the bridegroom did not take his bride home till she was old enough to manage a household (Strabo, p. 482), and the actual provision of a dowry by the father may have been delayed till then. 'In a meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, M. Joseph Körösi, Director of the Buda-Pest Statistical Bureau, read a paper on the "Influence of Parents' Ages on the Vitality of Children." . . . M. Körösi has collected about 30,000 data, and has come to the following conclusions:—Mothers under twenty years of age and fathers under twenty-four have children more weakly than parents of riper age. Their children are more subject to pulmonary diseases. The healthiest children are those whose fathers are from twenty-five to forty years of age, and whose mothers are from twenty to thirty years old' (*Times*, Jan. 14, 1889).

**16.** **ἐπιχωριάζεται.** Ἐπιχωριάζει would be more usual, but Liddell and Scott refer to Nymphis, ap. Athen. Deipn. 619 f, *κατά τινα ἐπιχωριαζομένην παρ' αὐτοῖς συνήθειαν.* See critical note.

**18.** **διαφθείρονται,** 'die.' Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares De Gen. An. 4. 4. 773 a 18 sqq.

**διὸ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν κ.τ.λ.,** 'the well-known oracle also' (in addition to other things). For *τὸν χρησμόν*, cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 30, *ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις.* $P^1$ and $P^2$ have preserved this oracle for us in their margins—*τὸ μὴ τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα* (see Sus.[1]). The literal meaning of these words was 'let fallow land remain fallow, do not plough up uncultivated land,' or in other words 'let the land rest.' The verb *νεᾶν* and the substantive *νεατός* (Xen. Oecon. 7. 20) were used of the ploughing-up of fallow land (see Liddell and Scott). Cp. also Anth. Pal. 6. 41,

*χαλκὸν ἀροτρητήν, κλασιβώλακα, νειοτομῆα.*

As, however, the land which had been left for a time fallow was the land which would naturally be used for ploughing, the advice

of the oracle came in effect to this, that ploughing should cease for a time and that crops should not be raised. No wonder that men rejected this interpretation of the oracle and cast about for another—that given in the text. A third interpretation was, indeed, possible. The oracle might be understood as a warning against rash innovation: cp. Athen. Deipn. 461 e, *καὶ κατακλιθέντων, ἀλλὰ μήν, ὁ Πλούταρχος ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν Φλιάσιον ποιητὴν Πρατίναν, οὐ γᾶν αὐλακισμέναν ἀρῶν, ἀλλὰ σκύφον ματεύων, κυλικηγορήσων ἔρχομαι κ.τ.λ.* For *διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν*, see above on 1284 a 23.

**20. διὰ τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας.** Sepulv. 'propterea quod adolescentulae nuptui traderentur' (*γαμίσκεσθαι* being taken as passive: so Lamb. and Sus.), or 'because the custom was to take the younger women to wife' (*γαμίσκεσθαι* being taken as middle: so Liddell and Scott). Perhaps the words which follow, *τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις*, where the act of the father, not the bridegroom, is referred to, make rather in favour of the former interpretation. *Γαμίσκειν* is a rare word.

**22. καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην**, as well as *πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν* (12).

**τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις**, 'to give away their daughters in marriage, when they are older' (literally 'to make their givings-away in marriage for girls when older').

**23. ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Aeschyl. Fragm. 239.

**24. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and the bodies of the males also are thought to suffer injury in respect of growth, if they have intercourse with females while the seed is still increasing, for the seed also [as well as the body, the increase of which has just been referred to] is subject to a fixed limit of time, which it does not overpass in its increase, or overpasses only slightly, [so that it is not an indifferent matter whether intercourse occurs at an earlier or later age].' The editors from Vict. downward, so far as I have observed, with the exceptions of Reiz and Göttling, read *σώματος* in place of *σπέρματος*, and there is much doubt as to the correct reading. The words *σῶμα* and *σπέρμα* are occasionally interchanged in the MSS.—e.g. in De Gen. An. 2. 3. 737 a 11 we should probably read *σῶμα* with Aubert and Wimmer in place of *σπέρμα*, and in Chaeremon, Fragm. 13, I would read *'Ωρῶν σπέρματ'* in place of *'Ωρῶν σώματ'*. It is therefore not without hesitation that I retain *σπέρματος* in the passage before us. I do so for the following reasons: (1) It is the reading of all the better MSS., for even in $P^2$, which now has *σώματος*, *σπέρματος* was the original reading;

$P^1$ has ἄλλως *σώματος* in its margin. Vet. Int. has 'corpore,' but whether he found *σώματος* in the Greek text used by him is doubtful, for he may well have translated a marginal reading. Susemihl ascribes the reading *σώματος* to Leonardus Aretinus, but Schneider says (Politica, vol. ii. p. 436), 'Aldinum et plurium Victorii codicum scripturam *σπέρματος* reddidit Aretinus,' and a manuscript of his Latin Translation belonging to Balliol College, Oxford (MS. Ball. 242)—I have not consulted any others—has 'ac masculorum corpora crescere impediuntur si adhuc augente semine consuetudinem ineant.' (2) If we read *σώματος*, it is not easy to see, as Schneider has already pointed out in his note on the passage, why Aristotle did not simply write *καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, ἐὰν ἔτι αὐξανομένων* (and not *αὐξανομένου τοῦ σώματος*) *ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν*: Sepulveda, in fact (p. 240), found *αὐξανομένου* (not *αὐξανομένου τοῦ σώματος* or *σπέρματος*) in some MSS. and prefers this reading. Besides, the added remark *καὶ γὰρ —ἔτι* seems rather otiose, if it refers to the body, for every one knows that the growth of the body ceases after a certain age. (3) The difficulty has been raised by Schneider that we nowhere read in Aristotle of a 'certus temporis terminus seminis augmento atque incremento definitus, ultra quem progrediatur nunquam, quoque intercepto corporis incrementum impediatur.' 'Corporis incrementum,' he adds, 'intra vigesimum fere annum aetatis consistere solet, seminis vero incrementum et copia pro natura alimentorum aliasque per causas variatur usque ad annum sexagesimum.' The question is one for thorough students of Aristotle's physiology to decide, and I cannot pretend to be one of them, but it should be noticed that the expression *φθίνοντος τοῦ σπέρματος* occurs in De Gen. An. 3. 1. 750 a 34, *ὡς ἐξαναλισκομένου τοῦ περιττώματος καὶ ἅμα τῆς ἡλικίας ληγούσης φθίνοντος τοῦ σπέρματος*, in reference to the old age not indeed of a man, but of an animal, and if he believed in a decrease of the secretion after a certain age, he may well have believed in an increase of it up to a certain age. Some indications of his having done so are traceable, if we can trust the Seventh Book of the History of Animals, c. 5. 585 a 36, *πλὴν οὔτ' ἀρχομένων* (sc. *τοῦ σπέρματος καὶ τῶν καταμηνίων*) *γόνιμα εὐθὺς οὔτ' ἔτι ὀλίγων γιγνομένων καὶ ἀσθενῶν*, and Probl. 20. 7. 923 a 35, *ἢ ἅπαντα μὲν μέχρι τούτου ἀκμάζει, ἕως ἂν κατὰ τὸ σπέρμα ἀκμάζῃ; ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἐπιδιδόασιν, ὁτὲ μὲν τῷ πλήθει ὁτὲ δὲ τῇ παχύτητι.* Compare what we read in Hist. An. 7. 1. 581 b 2 sqq. of the

effect on bodily growth of a discharge of *τὰ λευκά* in early childhood, for the catamenia in the female answer to the seed in the male (De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 2 sqq.)—*τὰ δὲ λευκὰ καὶ παιδίοις γίνεται νέοις οὖσι πάμπαν, μᾶλλον δ' ἂν ὑγρᾷ χρῶνται τροφῇ· καὶ κωλύει τὴν αὔξην καὶ τὰ σώματα ἰσχναίνει τῶν παιδίων.* For *ὡρισμένος χρόνος*, cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 22 and 3. 14. 1285 a 34. As to (*ἢ μικρόν*), see critical note.

**28.** **διὸ κ.τ.λ.** *Διό* is explained by *ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 30. We should have expected from Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 16–29 (quoted in part above on 11) that Aristotle would have delayed the age of marriage for women till twenty-one, but this would have involved a shortening of the duration of wedlock, as it is to close before the wife is fifty years of age. The male reaches the acmê of his physical development between thirty and thirty-five (see vol. i. p. 186, note 2, and cp. 1335 a 32 sq.), so that Aristotle might well have placed the age of marriage for the male a little earlier than he does, but he probably wishes to make the duration of wedlock the same for husband and wife (about thirty-two years). As to the ages recommended by Plato, see vol. i. p. 183.

**29.** As to [*ἢ μικρόν*], see critical note.

**30.** **ἐν τοσούτῳ**, sc. *χρόνῳ*, 'at an age no greater than this.'

**ἀκμάζουσί τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται**, 'coupling will take place while their bodies are in their prime.' For the importance of this, cp. Plato, Rep. 459 B and Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 23.

**31.** **συγκαταβήσεται**, sc. *σύζευξις*, cp. 10.

**32.** **τοῖς μέν**, the children, answering to *τοῖς δέ*, 34, the fathers.

**33.** **ἀρχομένοις τῆς ἀκμῆς**, cp. 1335 b 27, *ἄρχεσθαι τῆς συζεύξεως.*

**34.** **ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας**, 'their period of vigour having now been brought to a close' (cp. De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 8, *καὶ παύεται τῆς ἡλικίας ληγούσης τοῖς μὲν τὸ δύνασθαι γεννᾶν, ταῖς δὲ τὰ καταμήνια*, and Demosth. in Apatur. c. 4, *οὔπω δ' ἔτη ἐστὶν ἑπτὰ ἀφ' οὗ τὸ μὲν πλεῖν καταλέλυκα*), or possibly 'having now been wrecked.' For *πρός*, 'towards,' see Bon. Ind. 641 b 9, where we find a reference among other passages to De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 a 25, *τὰ μὲν γὰρ (τῶν ζῴων) οὐ πολιοῦται πρὸς τὸ γῆρας ἐπιδήλως.*

**36.** **τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Philo, Mechan. Synt. p. 99. 11, *δεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ὑπορύξεσι τῶν τειχῶν λαθραίως χρᾶσθαι καθάπερ καὶ νῦν χρῶνται μεταλλεύοντες.* *Τοῖς περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις*, 'time in connexion with season,' in contradistinction to *οἱ περὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν χρόνοι*: cp. c. 5. 1327 a 8, *τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης*, and for the distinction

Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 19, ὧραι δὲ καὶ ἡλικίαι τῆς ὀχείας ἑκάστοις εἰσὶν ὡρισμέναι τῶν ζῴων.

**37.** οἷς οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. There is a tacit antithesis between οἱ πολλοί and οἱ ἰατροί and οἱ φυσικοί, 40. In reference to the question of season, which is a very simple one, we need not have recourse to the opinion of learned men; the verdict of the many will suffice: cp. Top. 2. 2. 110 a 19, οἷον ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ῥητέον τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγιείας, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν· πότερον δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ποιητικὸν ὑγιείας ἢ οὔ, οὐκέτι ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ κλητέον ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ἰατρός. See vol. i. p. 187, note 1. The mention of οἱ πολλοί would seem to show that it was usual to marry in the winter throughout Greece and not merely in Attica. In ὁρίσαντες Aristotle probably refers to a custom or unwritten law. Pythagoras went further (Diog. Laert. 8. 9, καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δέ φησιν οὕτως· "ἀφροδίσια χειμῶνος ποιέεσθαι, μὴ θέρεος· φθινοπώρου δὲ καὶ ἦρος κουφότερα, βαρέα δὲ πᾶσαν ὥρην καὶ ἐς ὑγείην οὐκ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι": cp. Alcaeus, Fragm. 13, 39 with Bergk's notes, and Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 32). 'In 1876 Dr. Kulischer, in a paper in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, collected details of human pairing-seasons, as marked by festivals of plainly matrimonial intent, and brought forward still more distinct evidence from the statistics of births, which show maxima and minima pointing to two especial pairing-times, about New Year and in late spring. Dr. Westermarck' [in his history of Human Marriage, Macmillan, 1891] 'brings new evidence to bear on the subject' (Prof. E. B. Tylor, *Academy*, Oct. 3, 1891).

**38.** τὴν συναυλίαν ταύτην, 'this kind of dwelling together.' Συναυλία in this sense is connected with αὐλή, not αὐλός, and is a very rare word, but Bekk.[2] is no doubt wrong in following Lamb., who reads συνουσίαν. The word ὁμαυλία occurs in Aesch. Choeph. 599, ξυζύγους δ' ὁμαυλίας ('wedded unions,' Liddell and Scott), and Schn. points out that Plato (Laws 721 D) 'caelibatum eodem modo μοναυλίαν vocavit.' There were other kinds of συναυλία, e. g. those of ὁμέστιοι and ὁμοτράπεζοι, not ὁμόλεκτροι.

**39.** δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν κ.τ.λ., 'and the married couple also in turn' (as well as the lawgiver, cp. 1334 b 33 and 1335 b 14) 'should study the teaching of physicians and that of physical philosophers.' For ἤδη see note on 1258 b 18: ἤδη here lends emphasis to a pronoun, as in that passage and often elsewhere (e.g. in 2. 8. 1268 b 21: 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 14: 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10). For θεωρεῖν τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα, cp. Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 12,

*πρῶτον τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόμενα θεωρητέον*, and Meteor. 2. 9. 370 a 21, *τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ βροντῆς καὶ ἀστραπῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτ' ἐστί*, and see note on 1324 a 25.

**41. οἵ τε γὰρ ἰατροὶ κ.τ.λ.**, 'for physicians state in an adequate way the favourable moments of the body [for the procreation of children].' Hesiod had recommended the time after a sacrificial feast (Op. et Dies 735,

> *μηδ' ἀπὸ δυσφήμοιο τάφου ἀπονοστήσαντα*
> *σπερμαίνειν γενεήν, ἀλλ' ἀθανάτων ἀπὸ δαιτός*),

but some were wholly against the time after a feast of any kind, even the ordinary *δεῖπνον*, and among them was Epicurus (Plut. Sympos. 3. 6: Usener, Epicurea, Fragm. 61, p. 117 sq.). Cp. Plato, Laws 674 B, Plut. Lycurg. c. 15, and Diog. Laert. 7. 18. We learn the opinion of the Athenian physician Mnesitheus (B. C. 400–350?) from Athen. Deipn. 357 C, „*τὸ δὲ τῶν μαλακίων γένος, οἷα πουλυπόδων τε καὶ σηπιῶν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, τὴν μὲν σάρκα δύσπεπτον ἔχει· διὸ καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδισιασμοὺς ἁρμόττουσιν. αὐτοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσι πνευματώδεις, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισιασμῶν καιρὸς πνευματώδους προσδεῖται διαθέσεως* (cp. De Part. An. 4. 10. 689 a 29 sqq.). As to the dawn of day, see Aristoph. Lysistr. 966 Didot.

**1. καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί.** Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 766 b 1335 b. 34, *καὶ τὸ βορείοις ἀρρενοτοκεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ νοτίοις· ὥστε καὶ περιττωματικώτερα. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον περίττωμα δυσπεπτότερον· διὸ τοῖς μὲν ἄρρεσιν ὑγρότερον τὸ σπέρμα, ταῖς δὲ γυναιξὶν ἡ τῶν καταμηνίων ἔκκρισις* (cp. 767 a 8 sqq.): Hist. An. 6. 19. 574 a 1: Probl. 1. 24. 862 a 30, *ἔτι δὲ ἡ δύναμις ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄρθροις ἐστί, ταῦτα δὲ ἀνίεται ὑπὸ τῶν νοτίων*: Probl. 26. 43. 945 a 18 sq. Plato recognizes the influence of winds on generation in Laws 747 D.

**2. ποίων δέ τινων κ.τ.λ.** Here the question announced for consideration in 1334 b 31 is taken up, so far at least as relates to the body. Plato had already said something on the subject in Laws 775 B sqq.: cp. 779 D sqq. The view which prevailed at Sparta may be gathered from Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 4, *ταῖς δ' ἐλευθέραις μέγιστον νομίσας* (ὁ Λυκοῦργος) *εἶναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν πρῶτον μὲν σωμασκεῖν ἔταξεν οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος φύλου· ἔπειτα δὲ δρόμου καὶ ἰσχύος, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς θηλείαις ἀγῶνας πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐποίησε, νομίζων ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἰσχυρῶν καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα ἐρρωμενέστερα γίγνεσθαι*, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 14: compare the fragment of Critias quoted in vol. i. p. 350, note 1.

3. ἐπιστήσασι μὲν κ.τ.λ. For the case of ἐπιστήσασι, see note on 1275 a 16. Subjects often receive only a hasty consideration in the Fourth Book, a fuller treatment of them later on being promised: see vol. i. p. 296. What Aristotle means by ἐπιστήσασι μᾶλλον (sc. τὸν λόγον, cp. Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου 6. 470 b 5), we see from c. 17. 1336 b 25, ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ. Ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας, perhaps 'in the inquiries respecting the management of children,' rather than 'in the inquiries respecting the education of children,' which is the rendering of Sepulv., Vict., Lamb., and Liddell and Scott. Παιδονομία is used in a different sense in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 39 and 1323 a 4. It seems strange that Aristotle should intend to treat the question ποίων τινῶν κ.τ.λ. in an inquiry respecting the management of children. He apparently designed to include a discussion of the subject in the Politics; no such discussion, however, finds a place in the work as we have it (for other cases of the same thing, see vol. ii. p. xxvii).

5. τύπῳ δὲ ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν, 'but one should now also say what is adequate in outline.' Sus. inserts δεῖ after ἱκανόν, but, as he himself suggests in Sus.[1], Addenda, p. lxiv, it seems likely that δεῖ is to be supplied here from λεκτέον, 4: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3 sqq., where δεῖν must apparently be supplied with ὑπάρχειν and δεῖ with τάττειν. Bonitz does not refer to the passage before us in Ind. 168 a 54 sqq., where he considers one or two other cases in which δεῖ may be thought to be omitted. Aristotle inherits the expression τύπῳ from Plato, in whose writings it occurs frequently. A τύπος is the outline or περιγραφή (cp. Laws 876 D, περιγραφήν τε καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν τιμωριῶν εἰπόντας) which an artist draws before filling in his picture: see note on 1263 a 31.

οὔτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 26, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. As to ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἕξις, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10, ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν, Xenophanes, Fragm. 2 Bergk, Eurip. Fragm. 284, and Plato, Rep. 403 E–407 E, where Stallbaum compares Plut. Philopoemen c. 3. What Plato objects to in athletes, however, is their sleepiness and inability to stand the rapid changes of diet which are inseparable from a soldier's life, whereas Aristotle rather objects to the tendencies impressed on their constitution by severe toil of one monotonous kind. For the order of the words in 5–8, see note on 1327 a 4.

**6. πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν**, 'with a view to the kind of bodily fitness that is useful to a citizen': cp. Xen. Oecon. 11.13. *Εὐεξία* differs from strength, and it also differs from health; it is the business of a gymnastic trainer to produce *εὐεξία*, just as it is the business of a physician to produce health (Top. 5. 7. 137 a 3 sqq.). But the *εὐεξία* which Aristotle speaks of here is not gymnastic *εὐεξία*, but the *εὐεξία* which makes a man an efficient citizen, fit in body to bear the labours which fall to the lot of soldiers and citizens.

**πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τεκνοποιίαν.** As to the ill-effect of the training of athletes on health, cp. Plato, Rep. 403 E sq., and as to its ill-effect on *τεκνοποιία*, cp. De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 35, *ἀναλίσκει γὰρ ὁ πόνος τὰ περιττώματα*, and Hist. An. 6. 20. 574 b 28, *ἴδιον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν Λακωνικῶν (κυνῶν) συμβαίνει πάθος· πονήσαντες γὰρ μᾶλλον δύνανται ὀχεύειν ἢ ἀργοῦντες.*

**7. κακοπονητική**, 'unfit for labour,' 'labouring ill,' like *κακόπνους*, 'breathing ill,' or *κακοθάνατος*, 'dying ill.'

**8. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** *Οὖν* here contains an inference from what precedes, as in 1. 1. 1252 a 7 (see note on that passage). *Πόνος* is the source of *εὐεξία* (Phys. 2. 3. 195 a 8 sqq.: Metaph. Δ. 2. 1013 b 9 sq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 23 sqq.). Compare what Atalanta is made to say in Eurip. Fragm. 529,

> *εἰ δ' εἰς γάμους ἔλθοιμ', ὃ μὴ τύχοι, ποτέ,*
> *τῶν ἐν δόμοισιν ἡμερευουσῶν ἀεὶ*
> *βελτίον' ἂν τέκοιμι δώμασιν τέκνα·*
> *ἐκ γὰρ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ὅστις ἐκπονεῖ*
> *σκληρὰς διαίτας οἱ γόνοι βελτίονες.*

But Atalanta's training had been that of a huntress, not that of an athlete. The toils which Aristotle would recommend to married women would, however, rather be the light and varied toils of the mistress of a household, as to which we learn much from the advice given by Ischomachus to his wife in Xen. Oecon. c. 10. 10 sq. For *πόνοις μὴ βιαίοις*, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40, *τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους.*

**9. πρὸς ἕνα μόνον**, sc. *πόνον* (Ridgeway and Sus.[4]).

**11. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and these physical characteristics should be possessed alike by men and women,' so that women no less than men should *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σωμάτων.* (*Ταῦτα* is in the plural because the characteristics are many.) Aristotle's language is very similar to that of Plato in Laws 804 D, *τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλειῶν ὁ μὲν*

*ἐμὸς νόμος ἂν εἴποι πάντα, ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρρένων, ἴσα καὶ τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν*, but Plato goes much further both in Rep. 451 C–457 B and in Laws 804 C–806 C than Aristotle does here.

12. **χρὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** 'Pregnant women also,' as well as those marrying. Ἐγκύμων is the Attic word rather than ἔγκυος. Aristotle here follows in the track of Lycurgus and Plato: cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 3, *αὐτίκα γὰρ περὶ τεκνοποιίας, ἵνα ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρξωμαι, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὰς μελλούσας τίκτειν καὶ καλῶς δοκούσας κόρας παιδεύεσθαι καὶ σίτῳ ᾗ ἀνυστὸν μετριωτάτῳ τρέφουσι καὶ ὄψῳ ᾗ δυνατὸν μικροτάτῳ· οἶνον γε μὴν ἢ πάμπαν ἀπεχομένας ἢ ὑδαρεῖ χρωμένας διάγουσιν*, whereas Lycurgus ordered a different course, and Plato, Laws 788 D sqq. and 789 D, *βούλεσθε ἅμα γέλωτι φράζωμεν, τιθέντες νόμους, τὴν μὲν κύουσαν περιστεῖν, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάττειν τε οἷον κήρινον, ἕως ὑγρόν, καὶ μέχρι δυοῖν ἐτοῖν σπαργανᾶν*. Not only would the unborn child profit by the exercise taken by the mother, but the mother herself would secure an easier delivery (De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 30 sqq.).

14. **τοῦτο δὲ ῥᾴδιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι**, i. e. to secure that pregnant women shall not take little food and exercise.

**προστάξαντι κ.τ.λ.** Τινά is of course to be taken with πορείαν. Aristotle here perhaps takes a hint from Plato, who in Laws 833 B had made a temple the goal of a foot-race: cp. also Laws 789 E. For *θεῶν τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμήν*, where ἡ γένεσις = 'partus' (Bon. Ind. 149 a 3 sqq.), cp. Plato, Phileb. 61 B, *εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴτε Ἥφαιστος εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως*. Notwithstanding the gender of *τῶν εἰληχότων*, the gods referred to are no doubt Eileithyia (Hom. Il. 11. 270 sq.: Paus. 8. 32. 4: Theocr. 17. 60 sqq.) and Artemis (Plato, Theaet. 149 B, *αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχε*): perhaps also Demeter Calligeneia (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 56. 19) and at Athens the Τριτοπάτορες (Phanodem. Fragm. 4: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 367). The temples of Eileithyia in the Peloponnesus were often just outside the city-gate (see note on 1331 a 26). Ἀποθεραπείαν, from ἀποθεραπεύειν, 'to honour zealously' or 'completely': cp. ἀποβάπτειν (c. 17. 1336 a 16), ἀφιλάσκεσθαι (Plato, Laws 873 A), ἀποδύρεσθαι, and ἀποθρηνεῖν. A daily offering at a temple would be an indication of zealous worship: cp. Plut. Nic. c. 4, *σφόδρα γὰρ ἦν (ὁ Νικίας) τῶν ἐκπεπληγμένων τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ θειασμῷ προσκείμενος, ὡς φησι Θουκυδίδης, ἐν δέ τινι τῶν Πασιφῶντος διαλόγων γέγραπται, ὅτι καθ' ἡμέραν ἔθυε τοῖς θεοῖς*.

16. **τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν κ.τ.λ.** What is the construction of τὴν

διάνοιαν? Is it in the acc. after διάγειν, the subject of διάγειν being τὰς ἐγκύους understood and διάγειν itself being here used in the sense of 'to keep,' as in Isocr. Nicocl. § 41, καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βασιλεύοντας μὴ μόνον τὰς πόλεις ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ πειρᾶσθαι διάγειν, ὧν ἂν ἄρχωσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς οἴκους τοὺς ἰδίους? Or is τὰς ἐγκύους the subject of διάγειν used intransitively, and the proper rendering of τὴν διάνοιαν 'in respect of the mind'? Or is τὴν διάνοιαν the subject of διάγειν used intransitively? Sepulveda, who translates, 'mentem autem contra quam corpus tranquillam securamque gerere convenit,' appears to adopt the first of these interpretations, Victorius, who translates, 'mente autem contra atque corpore sedatius remissiusque degere convenit,' the second (so Stahr and Sus.), Mr. Welldon, who translates, 'their mind unlike their bodies should at such a time be comparatively indolent,' the third. I incline to the second interpretation: no instance of διάγειν being used in the sense of 'to keep' is given in the Index Aristotelicus, and in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 32 sq. the word is used intransitively. The reason why Aristotle advises the avoidance of mental labour appears to be because it would 'be a hindrance to the body' (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.) and he wishes the bodily state of the mother to be as good as possible. Compare the advice given by Plato in Laws 792 E, where however he counsels the avoidance of an excess of pleasures and pains rather than of mental labour. We expect τοῦ σώματος in 17 rather than τῶν σωμάτων.

18. **ἀπολαύοντα . . . φαίνεται**, 'evidently are influenced by.'

**τῆς ἐχούσης**, i.e. τῆς μητρός: see Bon. Ind. 305 b 38, where De Gen. An. 2. 4. 740 a 26, 37, and 3. 3. 754 b 1 are referred to.

19. **ὥσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς.** Cp. De Gen. An. 2. 4. 740 a 24, ἐπεὶ δὲ δυνάμει μὲν ἤδη ζῷον ἀτελὲς δέ, ἄλλοθεν ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν τὴν τροφήν· διὸ χρῆται τῇ ὑστέρᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐχούσῃ, ὥσπερ γῇ φυτόν, τοῦ λαμβάνειν τροφήν, ἕως ἂν τελεωθῇ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἤδη ζῷον δυνάμει πορευτικόν. In this passage and also in that before us Aristotle seems to have in his memory Hippocr. De Natura Pueri, 1. 414 Kühn, φημὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ φυόμενα πάντα ζῆν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἰκμάδος, καὶ ὅκως ἂν ἡ γῆ ἔχῃ ἰκμάδος ἐν ἑωυτῇ, οὕτω καὶ τὰ φυόμενα ἔχειν. οὕτω καὶ παιδίον ζῇ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἐν τῇσι μήτρῃσι· καὶ ὅκως ἂν ἡ μήτηρ ὑγιείης ἔχῃ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ παιδίον ἔχει.

**περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως κ.τ.λ.**, 'and with respect to the exposure or rearing of children, let there be a law that defective offspring shall not be reared, but that offspring shall not be exposed on the ground

of an excessive number of children [as distinguished from that of imperfection], in case the customs of the State, as regulated by the lawgiver' (literally, 'the ordering of the customs'), 'are opposed to an excessive number, for the amount of reproductive intercourse should be fixed, and if any parents have offspring in consequence of intercourse taking place beyond that limit, abortion should be produced before sensation and life develope in the embryo, for that which is holy in this matter will be marked off from that which is not by the absence or presence of sensation and life.' See on this passage vol. i. p. 187 and notes 2 and 3. In Greece the poor were often unwilling to rear children, especially daughters: cp. Plut. De Amore Prolis c. 5, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ πένητες οὐ τρέφουσι τέκνα, φοβούμενοι μὴ* κ.τ.λ., and Poseidipp. *Ἑρμαφρόδιτος* Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 516),

*υἱὸν τρέφει πᾶς κἂν πένης τις ὢν τύχῃ,*
*θυγατέρα δ' ἐκτίθησι κἂν ᾖ πλούσιος.*

The Greeks noticed with surprise that in Egypt all children born were reared (Aristot. Fragm. 258. 1525 a 37 sqq.: Strabo, p. 824). In Aristotle's 'best State' exposure would be resorted to only in the case of imperfectly developed offspring, or rather of offspring the imperfection of which was obvious at the moment of birth, for not all the kinds of imperfection noticed above on 1335 a 13 would be traceable at birth. The rule at Sparta was not to rear anything *ἀγεννὲς καὶ ἄμορφον* (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Seneca says of Rome (De Ira 1. 15), liberos quoque, si debiles monstrosique editi sunt, mergimus. I know not whether *ἀπόθεσις* in the sense of the 'exposing of children' occurs elsewhere. For *ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν*, cp. *τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων*, 2. 10. 1271 b 29, 32. *Κωλύῃ*, sc. *πλῆθος τέκνων* (so Vict. 'in illis locis ubi lege interdictum est ne quis pater alat plures liberos quam lex patiatur'): cp. c. 17. 1336 a 35, *οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Ὡρίσθαι γὰρ δεῖ* κ.τ.λ., cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 6 sq. and 2. 7. 1266 b 8 sqq. In *ἐὰν δέ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων*, supply *τέκνα* with *γίγνηται* from what precedes, and take *παρὰ ταῦτα* (sc. *τὰ ὡρισμένα*) with *συνδυασθέντων*, 'in consequence of intercourse in excess of the legal limit' (so Vict. and Stahr), or possibly 'in contravention of the legal limit' (cp. Plato, Polit. 300 D, where *παρὰ ταῦτα* = *παρὰ τοὺς νόμους*). For the use of *ταῦτα* here see note on 1252 a 33. For the case of *συνδυασθέντων* (one might expect *συνδυασθεῖσι*), Reiz (quoted by Schn.) compares Hom. Il. 16. 531, *ὅττι οἱ ὃκ' ἤκουσε μέγας θεὸς εὐξαμένοιο*, and Odyss. 9. 256, *ἡμῖν δ'*

*αὖτε κατεκλάσθη φίλον ἦτορ Δεισάντων* κ.τ.λ. Richards adds a reference to Thuc. 3. 13. 9 and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 4. 2. See also notes on 1281 b 4 and 13.

**24.** *πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν.* Cp. De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 b 32, *εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν αἴσθησιν τὸ ζῷον, καὶ τότε πρῶτόν ἐστι ζῷον, ὅταν αἴσθησις γένηται πρῶτον* κ.τ.λ., and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 16, *τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως.* Contrast the view of Democritus, De An. 1. 2. 404 a 9, *διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν*, which was also that of Diogenes of Apollonia (Fragm. 5: Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 1. 254). Aristotle is here speaking not of life in general, but of animal life, for plants also live, and in their case *ζωὴν λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν* (De An. 2. 1. 412 a 14): cp. De An. 3. 12. 434 a 27.

**25.** *ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν.* Bonitz (Ind. 243 b 17) takes *ἐμποιεῖσθαι* here as middle, but the verb seems to be rarely used in this sense in the middle voice, and perhaps Sus. is right in taking it as passive. In the 'oath of Hippocrates' which was sworn by aspirants to medical practice one of the promises made is that the taker of the oath will not produce abortion. The thing, however, was no doubt occasionally done not only by physicians but by midwives (Plato, Theaet. 149 D).

*τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον* κ.τ.λ. As to the use of *οὐχ ὅσιος* and *ἀνόσιος* of violations of duty to near relatives, see note on 1262 a 28. The abortion of an embryo in which sensation and life had already developed would involve a violation of this nature.

**26.** *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ., 'but since the commencement of the fit age for marriage for man and wife has been defined' (in 1335 a 28 sqq.), 'and it has been settled at what age they should begin their union.' As to the *μέν solitarium* in *ἡ μὲν ἀρχή*, see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. The suppressed clause here is 'but the end of it has not.'

**28.** *λειτουργεῖν πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν*, 'to serve the State' in relation to the begetting of children, according to Liddell and Scott (so also Mr. Welldon): Sus., on the other hand, translates 'sich diesem Geschäfte zu widmen' ('to devote themselves to this task'), and Stahr 'dem Kinderzeugen obzuliegen,' following in the track of Lamb., 'liberis procreandis operam dare.' Perhaps, as Plato speaks in Rep. 460 E of *τίκτειν τῇ πόλει* and *γεννᾶν τῇ πόλει*, the first of these two interpretations is to be preferred. For *πρός*, cp. 6 (4). 4.

1291 a 35, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν. Ἁρμόττει is used in association with χρή here as with δεῖ in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 14.

**29.** τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔκγονα κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 23 and Plato, Rep. 459 B. By οἱ πρεσβύτεροι Aristotle here means οἱ παρηκμακότες, i. e. those over fifty or perhaps fifty-five: cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 13, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες. In Probl. 38. 6. 967 b 13 sqq. οἱ πρεσβύτεροι are apparently identified with οἱ γεγηρακότες. See notes on 1329 a 13 and 1321 a 22. By οἱ γεγηρακότες Aristotle may probably mean men over sixty, or sixty-five. Membership of the Lacedaemonian γερουσία was confined to men who had passed their sixtieth year. When Aristotle says that the children of aged fathers are ἀσθενεῖς, he perhaps means more than that they are weak in body. Οἱ ἀσθενεῖς are specially subject to emotion (see note on 1342 a 11).

**32.** διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμήν, sc. ὡρίσθω ὁ χρόνος τῆς ποιήσεως: so Lamb. 'quare id tempus praefiniatur, in quo mens maxime viget ac floret,' Coray, and others. Aristotle is speaking of the mental prime of the husband, not the wife. The bodily prime of a man falls between thirty and thirty-five (see above on 1335 a 28).

**33.** τῶν ποιητῶν τινές. Solon (Fragm. 27) is referred to. He however places the mental prime between forty-two and fifty-six. There is a further reference to these poets in c. 17. 1336 b 40 sqq.

**35.** ὥστε τέτταρσιν κ.τ.λ. Plato also in the Republic (460 E) closes the period of τεκνοποιία for the man at fifty-five, adding that in his case the mental and bodily prime lies between twenty-five and fifty-five. Sir Nicholas Bacon (born in 1509) was fifty-two years of age when his famous son Francis was born to him in 1561. Lord Chatham was fifty-one when William Pitt was born to him. Sir John Herschel (born in 1792) was born when his father Sir William Herschel (born in 1738) was fifty-four years of age. How many other great men have had fathers over fifty at the time of their birth, I am unable to say. For τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως cp. Plato, Rep. 461 C, μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύημα μηδέ γ' ἕν.

**37.** τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν κ.τ.λ. Compare Plato, Rep. 461 B sq., where Plato does not impose this restriction on the intercourse of those over the legal age, if only they take care that no offspring shall see the light or, supposing it does, shall live.

ὑγιείας χάριν. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 8 sqq., 726 a 22, and 5. 3. 783 b 29 sq., and Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 22 sqq. See also

Plin. Nat. Hist. 28. 58, and the case of Timochares in Hippocr. De Morbis Vulgaribus 5, vol. iii. p. 574 Kühn. Pythagoras probably would not have admitted that health could ever be thus promoted (cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 9).

**ἢ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης αἰτίας**, such as *εὐεξία*, which is often mentioned in conjunction with *ὑγίεια*, e. g. in Phys. 7. 3. 246 b 4: Plato, Rep. 559 A, Protag. 354 B. Cp. Laws 708 B, *τισὶν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις παθήμασιν*.

**38. φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν**, 'ought manifestly to resort to the intercourse.'

**περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον**, sc. *ὁμιλίας*, 'but with respect to the intercourse of a husband with another woman than his wife, or of a wife with another man than her husband.' Aristotle has before him here Plato, Laws 784 E, *ὅταν δὲ δὴ παῖδας γεννήσωνται κατὰ νόμους, ἐὰν ἀλλοτρίᾳ τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κοινωνῇ γυναικὶ ἢ γυνὴ ἀνδρί, ἐὰν μὲν παιδοποιουμένοις ἔτι, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιζήμια αὐτοῖς ἔστω, καθάπερ τοῖς ἔτι γεννωμένοις εἴρηται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σωφρονῶν καὶ σωφρονοῦσα εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔστω πάντα εὐδόκιμος, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐναντίως τιμάσθω, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀτιμαζέσθω*, and 841 C sqq. Both Aristotle and Plato (in Laws 841 C sqq. at any rate, *μὴ λανθάνων ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας πάσας*) seem to confine themselves to the prohibition of unconcealed adultery. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 40. The writer of the First Book of the Oeconomics (c. 4. 1344 a 8–13) appears to go further. Contrast with all this the occasional permission to Spartan wives of intercourse with other men than their husbands (Plut. Lycurg. c. 15).

**39. ἁπλῶς**, 'broadly,' 'at any time,' in contradistinction to *περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας*: cp. Anal. Pr. 1. 15. 34 b 7, *δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν τὸ παντὶ ὑπάρχον μὴ κατὰ χρόνον ὁρίσαντας, οἷον νῦν ἢ ἐν τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς*.

**40. ἁπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι**, 'openly to touch': cp. Plato, Laws 816 E, *μηδέ τινα μανθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι φανερὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων*. Plato had already used the word *ἅπτεσθαι* in Laws 841 D, *μηδενὸς ἅπτεσθαι τῶν γενναίων ἅμα καὶ ἐλευθέρων*, and this is no doubt one of the passages which Aristotle has before him here. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 28 sq.

**μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς** occurs in Plato, Laws 777 E, and *μηδαμῶς μηδαμῇ* in Laws 820 B, but I know not whether *μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς* occurs elsewhere in Aristotle's writings. The Index Aristotelicus omits the phrase, and indeed by some error the word *μηδαμῶς*. **Πάντῃ**

πάντως is a phrase frequently employed by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s. v. πάντη).

ὅταν ᾖ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις. Καί here probably means 'or,' as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8 (see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1303 a 20). The word πόσις is used here and in 1. 3. 1253 b 6 by Aristotle, but it is a poetical word, seldom used in prose. On προσαγορευθῇ, see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. ἀγορεύω.

C. 17. 1336 a. 3 sqq. Aristotle says little in this chapter which had not already been said by Plato, and throughout the whole of it he seems to write with the Seventh Book of the Laws before him, but he brings together, and thus makes more effective, what Plato had said in a scattered and often an incidental way. He sometimes differs from Plato; thus he is for rearing children under seven to a greater extent at home than Plato had proposed to do, he will not have their crying restrained, etc. In recommending, again, that children should be habituated from their earliest infancy to bear heat and cold, he goes beyond anything contemplated by Plato or practised at Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 4) or in Crete (Ephor. Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250), for neither the Spartans nor the Cretans seem to have begun this habituation in babyhood, and Plato speaks of ἐκ παίδων (Rep. 403 C), not, like Aristotle, of ἐκ μικρῶν παίδων, when he refers to the subject (Rep. 404 A); it is rather from some barbarian races, such as the Celts, that Aristotle learns this lesson, as indeed he himself tells us. He keeps the same end in view in his rules as to the rearing of children as he does in his rules as to marriage; he seeks in both to secure that the children shall be well-grown in body and sound in mind and likely to make good soldiers and citizens in after-years. Rearing comes first, covering the whole period up to seven years of age, and then comes education (c. 17. 1336 b 37 sqq.). Aristotle confines himself during the first two or three years of life to studying the physical development of the child in accordance with the principle laid down in c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq., but after that age he pays attention to the development not only of the body, but of the ὄρεξις and character. Till seven the children must necessarily in his opinion be reared at home, and consequently must be more or less in the company of slaves, and he evidently fears that if they are much in the company of slaves at this impressible time —the age at which permanent tastes are acquired, πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον (1336 b 33)—they may acquire a taint of

illiberal feeling and indecency of which it will not be easy to rid them in later life. This leads him to pay special attention to the years from two or three to seven.

**Γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle reproduces the turn of the opening sentences of the Seventh Book of the Laws (788 A, *γενομένων δὲ παίδων ἀρρένων καὶ θηλειῶν τροφὴν μέν που καὶ παιδείαν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ὀρθότατ' ἂν γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν*). *Δεῖ* must be supplied with *οἴεσθαι*: Aristotle forgets that he has not used the word since c. 16. 1335 b 38, and that the imperatives *ἔστω* (39) and *ζημιούσθω* (1336 a 1), which however contain in them much of the force of *δεῖ*, have intervened. *Μεγάλην εἶναι διαφοράν*, 'is a highly important determining influence one way or the other': we expect rather *μέγα διαφέρειν* (cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 16 sqq.) or *μεγάλην ποιεῖν διαφοράν* (cp. De Part. An. 2. 4. 651 a 15) or *μεγάλην ἔχειν διαφοράν* (Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 22), but that which produces a difference is often termed a *διαφορά*, just as that which produces fear is sometimes termed *φόβος*. Compare the construction noticed in the note on 1264 a 39.

**5. φαίνεταί τε κ.τ.λ.**, 'and evidently, if we investigate the question by a reference to the lower animals and to the barbarian nations which make it their aim to introduce the habit of body suitable for war, food abounding in milk is most congenial to the bodies [of infants], and with little wine in it on account of the diseases which wine produces.' With *τὴν πολεμικὴν ἕξιν* contrast 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10, *ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν*. For *ἄγειν* see critical note. *Φαίνεσθαι* without an infinitive or a participle may mean either 'to appear' or 'evidently to be' (Bon. Ind. 808 b 52 sqq.); here it probably means the latter. The nom. to *φαίνεται* is *ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα* (or *πληθύουσα*) *τροφὴ οἰνοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα*. For *διά*, see note on 1328 a 19. The nations referred to are no doubt those mentioned in c. 2. 1324 b 9 sqq., and especially the Scythians: cp. Antiphanes, *Μισοπόνηρος* (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85),

*εἶτ' οὐ σοφοὶ δῆτ' εἰσὶν οἱ Σκύθαι σφόδρα,*
*οἳ γενομένοισιν εὐθέως τοῖς παιδίοις*
*διδόασιν ἵππων καὶ βοῶν πίνειν γάλα;*

We read of the milk-drinking Hippemolgi in Hom. Il. 13. 5. The Greeks, however, mostly used goats' milk (Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 313); they used ewes' milk but little (ibid.), and they regarded the milk of cows (Plut. Pelop. c. 30) and asses (Plut. Demosth. c. 27) as food for invalids. It was on goats' milk that Jupiter was reared as an infant (Manil. Astron. 1. 364 sqq.).

Compare the rearing of the infant Camilla (Virg. Aen. 11. 570 sqq.). But Aristotle is recommending the use of milk not merely in the case of sucklings, who indeed *must* use it, but in the case of children generally, or at any rate of children under three or thereabouts. The great physical strength of the Suebi was due in part to their use of milk (Caesar, Bell. Gall. 4. 1. 8 sq.). In the early days of ancient Greece infants were sometimes given honey, not milk (Schol. Aristoph. Thesm. 506). Phoenix gave the infant Achilles wine (Hom. Il. 9. 489), and it was probably commonly given to infants (Dio Chrys. Or. 4. 155 R, *ἢ σὺ οἴει λέγειν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοὺς βασιλέας τρέφεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τίτθης γάλακτι καὶ οἴνῳ καὶ σιτίοις;*), but Hippocrates (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 542 Kühn) advises, *καὶ φημὶ ἄμεινον εἶναι τοῖς παιδίοισιν τὸν οἶνον ὡς ὑδαρέστατον διδόναι· ἧσσον γὰρ τὰς φλέβας ξυγκαίει καὶ συναναίνει*: one source of stone in the bladder was thus removed. According to Hist. An. 7. 12. 588 a 3 sqq., wine sometimes produced convulsions in infants (*βλαβερὸν δὲ πρὸς τὸ πάθος καὶ ὁ οἶνος ὁ μέλας μᾶλλον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ ὁ μὴ ὑδαρής, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν φυσωδῶν*: cp. De Somno, 3. 457 a 14, *διὸ τοῖς παιδίοις οὐ συμφέρουσιν οἱ οἶνοι οὐδὲ ταῖς τίτθαις (διαφέρει γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτὰ πίνειν ἢ τὰς τίτθας), ἀλλὰ δεῖ πίνειν ὑδαρῆ καὶ ὀλίγον· πνευματῶδες γὰρ ὁ οἶνος, καὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ὁ μέλας*). Compare also Plato, Laws 666 A and 672 B (together with Aristot. Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19), and Athen. Deipn. 429 b.

8. **ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and further it is of advantage to have all the movements made [of the bodies of infants] that it is possible to have made in the case of creatures so young.' **Τηλικούτων** I take to be in the genitive after *ὅσας κινήσεις*. **Ποιεῖσθαι** is to be supplied with *συμφέρει*. Aristotle has before him Plato, Theaet. 153 A, and 153 B, *τί δέ, ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ σώζεται;* and also Laws 789 E, *καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς τροφοὺς ἀναγκάζωμεν νόμῳ ζημιοῦντες τὰ παιδία ἢ πρὸς ἀγροὺς ἢ πρὸς ἱερὰ ἢ πρὸς οἰκείους ἀεί πῃ φέρειν, μέχριπερ ἂν ἱκανῶς ἵστασθαι δυνατὰ γίγνηται, καὶ τότε διευλαβουμένας, ἔτι νέων ὄντων μή πῃ βίᾳ ἐπερειδομένων στρέφηται τὰ κῶλα, ἐπιπονεῖν φερούσας, ἕως ἂν τριέτες ἀποτελεσθῇ τὸ γενόμενον;* **Συμφέρει**, not merely *πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν*, as in 4, but probably also *πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν* (cp. 34 sqq.); perhaps indeed in other ways too (cp. Plato, Laws 790 C sqq.).

10. **πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι κ.τ.λ.** Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 8, *διὰ δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι θραύεται μᾶλλον· εὔθραυστον γὰρ τὸ νέον διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν*. Plato was so much alive to this danger that he

recommended the use of swathing-bands, it would seem, during the whole of the first two years of life (Laws 789 E), though at Sparta they were not used at all (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16) and the general Greek custom (according to Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 80 sq.) probably was to drop them at the end of the fourth month. Plato had also advised with the same object in view that the unfortunate nurse should carry the child in her arms till he was three years old (see above on 8). Aristotle is silent as to all this; he apparently hopes to secure the same result by adopting from barbarian nations the use of certain *ὄργανα μηχανικά*, which kept the body of the infant from being twisted. What these instruments were, it is difficult to say. Vict. compares the 'serperastra' of Varro, Ling. Lat. 9. 5, which were knee-splints or knee-bandages for straightening the crooked legs of children. As to the swaddling-clothes used, see Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 79 sq.

**12.** *τῶν τοιούτων*, i.e. *τηλικούτων*.

*συμφέρει δὲ* κ.τ.λ. The Spartans and Cretans sought to make their youth indifferent to heat and cold, but they do not seem to have begun their discipline in this respect as early in life as Aristotle recommends (see above on 1336 a 3 sqq.). As to its importance, see 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 22 sqq. and Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adesp. 461 (Nauck).

**15.** *διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς* κ.τ.λ. See Göttling's note, and that of Eaton, who adds references to Galen *Περὶ Ὑγιεινῶν*, 1. 10 (vol. vi. p. 51 Kühn), Strabo, p. 165, where we read of the Iberian women, *ἔν τε τοῖς ἔργοις πολλάκις αὐταὶ καὶ λούουσι καὶ σπαργανοῦσιν ἀποκλίνασαι πρός τι ῥεῖθρον*, and Virg. Aen. 9. 603,

> Durum ab stirpe genus, natos ad flumina primum
> Deferimus, saevoque gelu duramus et undis.

See also the note of Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. p. 569, on the Greek proverb, *Ὁ Ῥῆνος ἐλέγχει τὸν νόθον*, who quote Julian, Epist. 16. p. 383 D (cp. Or. 2. p. 81 D sq.), whence it appears that the dipping of the new-born babe in the Rhine was used as a test of its legitimacy, spurious offspring being held to sink and legitimate offspring to swim. They also refer to Valerius Flaccus, Argonaut. 6. 335, where we read of the Scythians on the Phasis,

> Nunquam has hiemes, haec saxa relinquam,
> Martis agros, ubi iam saevo duravimus amne
> Progeniem natosque rudes.

They remark that neither Aristotle, who was, so far as they know, the first to refer to the custom, nor Galen says a word as to the use of the practice as a test of legitimacy. A few other references to a similar custom may be noted. Zeus was believed to have been dipped at his birth in the river Lusius, which flows through the Arcadian Gortyna and is the coldest of rivers (Paus. 8. 28). Thetis sought to make Achilles immortal by dipping him as an infant in the Styx, and the Styx was very cold (Hes. Theog. 785 sq.). 'The modern Beloochees plunge the new-born infant into a tub of snow-water' (Prof. Ridgeway, *Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc.* 2. 147). Compare also the proverb (Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1189),

ἐν Παρίῳ ψυχρὸν μὲν ὕδωρ, καλαὶ δὲ γυναῖκες.

The Lacedaemonian practice was to bathe the infant after birth not in water, but in wine; this was held to be strengthening to healthy children (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Were all these customs connected with the wide-spread custom of infant baptism, which Mr. Whitley Stokes (*Academy*, Feb. 15, 1896) traces 'among the heathen Norsemen, the heathen Celts, two unconverted West African tribes, and lastly the Mexicans before the arrival of the Spaniards,' referring also to 'the cases mentioned by Prof. Tylor in his Primitive Culture, third edition, vol. ii. pp. 430–433'? Ἀποβάπτειν, 'to dip completely': see above on 1335 b 14, ἀποθεραπείαν.

17. τοῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. A σκέπασμα is a mere protection against cold, something much less elaborate than an ἱμάτιον. The Spartan youth were allowed an ἱμάτιον, though only one (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 4). Some modern physicians give very different advice. 'In infancy parents above all should not make the mistake of letting their infants be too thinly clad. . . . It was a monstrous mistake for parents to send out their children with bare necks and heads and bare legs. Children ought to be clothed from head to foot winter and summer' (Dr. Corfield, Address to Sanitary Institute, *Times*, Sept. 30, 1889).

18. πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Two interpretations of these words are possible. Lamb. translates, 'omnibus enim rebus quibus assuefieri possunt, statim ab ineunte aetate eos assuefacere melius est, dummodo sensim ac paulatim'; thus he takes πάντα to refer not to the beings which are to be habituated, but to the things to which they are to be habituated; and so Sus. 'zu Allem, wozu man Kinder überhaupt gewöhnen kann.' But it is also possible, and perhaps

simpler, to translate *πάντα ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐθίζειν* 'all things that are susceptible of habituation.' I am not sure whether I am right in inferring from the passages with which Bonitz (Ind. s. v. *ἐθίζειν*) groups that before us that he takes the words in this sense. He refers, however, in the preceding line to Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 19–23 and Eth. Eud. 2. 2. 1220 b 1, where we learn that not all things are susceptible of habituation. The bodily habit of children, Aristotle goes on in 20 to tell us, *is* susceptible of habituation to cold. Μέν here, as often elsewhere (Bon. Ind. s. v.), 'non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur'; it should have followed *εὐθὺς ἀρχομένων*, not *βέλτιον*. Ἐκ *προσαγωγῆς* is 'frequent in Hippocrates' (Liddell and Scott) and a favourite expression with Aristotle, but it is apparently not used by Thucydides, or Xenophon, or Plato, or (in the sense at least in which it is used here) by the Attic Orators. Compare for the thought Hist. An. 6. 12. 567 a 5 sqq. and Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 29, and for the turn of the sentence De Part. An. 3. 14. 675 a 6, *ὥστε διελεῖν μὲν δύνανται, φαύλως δὲ διελεῖν.*

20. **διὰ θερμότητα.** Cp. Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19, *ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὕτω διάθερμοί εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως*, and Probl. 3. 7. 872 a 6, *οἱ δὲ παῖδες ὑγροὶ καὶ θερμοί*: also Plato, Laws 664 E and 666 A. This view is inherited from Hippocrates: cp. Hippocr. Aphor., vol. iii. p. 710 Kühn, *τὰ αὐξανόμενα πλεῖστον ἔχει τὸ ἔμφυτον θερμόν.* Τὴν *τῶν ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν*, like *τὴν τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν*, c. 14. 1333 b 38.

21. **τὴν πρώτην**, sc. *ἡλικίαν*, which must be supplied from 23. See note on 1281 a 26. The phrase occurs in Pindar, Nem. 9. 42 (*ἐν ἁλικίᾳ πρώτᾳ*), and in De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 19, *ἔτι οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει σπέρμα οὔτ' ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡλικίᾳ οὔτ' ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς ἀρρωστίαις*, but in a wider sense than in the passage before us, where it appears to refer to the first two or three years of life.

23. **τὴν δ' ἐχομένην κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle intended to say that the next period of life till five should be dealt with in a different manner, the child being now encouraged to play games, but his sentence breaks down in course of utterance, for $\Pi^1$ $P^{4.5}$ Bekk. are probably wrong in omitting *δέ*, 26, which is needed to contrast *δεῖ τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως* with what immediately precedes. The accusative *τὴν ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν* is thus left without anything to govern it: compare the position of the nominative *ὑπομνηστευσάμενός τις* in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 14 sqq. For the thought, cp. Plato, Laws 793 E,

*τριέτει δὲ δὴ καὶ τετραέτει καὶ πενταέτει καὶ ἔτι ἑξέτει ἤθει ψυχῆς παιδιὰν δέον ἂν εἴη.* For the child of six, however, Aristotle finds other occupation in 1336 b 35 sqq. Children under five are regarded by him as too young to be put to any study; it is not till seven that under his scheme of education children begin to learn what the gymnastic trainer and the *παιδοτρίβης* can teach them (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.), nor till after puberty apparently that they learn their letters (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.); among ourselves, on the contrary, to say nothing of the Kindergarten, children are taught their letters before five. The effect of hard physical labour in injuring growth is referred to in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10 sq. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 377 A, *οὐ μανθάνεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παισὶν μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. πρότερον δὲ μύθοις πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἢ γυμνασίοις χρώμεθα.* Aristotle does not quite agree with the last sentence; he thinks that from two or three to five children should have nothing to do with *γυμνάσια* involving *ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι*, but he does not agree that they should have no *γυμνάσια* at that age, but only stories. He provides a kind of gymnastic training for them in their pastimes and also in their *διατάσεις καὶ κλανθμοί*. He excludes *γυμνάσια* involving *ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι* because they check physical growth (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40 sqq.), and any checking of physical growth is especially out of place in the first five years of life, inasmuch as physical growth is the main business of these years; in fact, according to Plato, Laws 788 D, the human being grows in height during them as much as he does in the twenty succeeding years (*ἡ πρώτη βλάστη παντὸς ζῴου μεγίστη καὶ πλείστη φύεται, ὥστε καὶ ἔρις πολλοῖς παρέσχηκε μὴ γίγνεσθαι τί ἡ ἀνθρώπινα μήκη διπλάσια ἀπὸ πέντε ἐτῶν ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς εἴκοσιν ἔτεσιν αὐξανόμενα*: cp. Aristot. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 23, *ἐν ἔτεσι γὰρ πέντε σχεδὸν ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἥμισυ λαμβάνειν δοκεῖ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ γιγνομένου ἅπαντος*). For *ὥστε διαφύγειν τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων*, cp. Plato, Theaet. 153 B (quoted above on 1336 a 8).

**27.** *ἦν*, sc. *κίνησιν*.

**28.** *δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς κ.τ.λ.*, 'and the pastimes also' (no less than the *ἄλλαι πράξεις*) 'should be neither unbefitting for freemen nor laborious nor relaxed and effeminate.' Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 558 B, *εἰ μή τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι, οὔποτ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὢν εὐθὺς παίζοι ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοι τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα.* The pastimes of little boys in ancient

Greece were no doubt often faulty in the ways referred to by Aristotle. He has hitherto been concerned almost, if not quite, exclusively with the training of the body, which precedes that of the ὄρεξις (c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq.), but now he begins to provide for the training of the ὄρεξις, and here, as in 1336 b 2 sqq., he seeks to exclude ἀνελευθερία. Cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 19 sqq. Μήτε ἐπιπόνους, because toilsome games will check the growth of the body (cp. 25). Μήτε ἀνειμένας, Vict. 'neque remissas nimis atque enervatas': for the contrast of ἐπιπόνους and ἀνειμένας, cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 33 sq.

30. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just said by implication that the nature of the games which children over three should play is a matter to be attended to by those in authority, and now he adds the remark, 'Yes, and with regard to tales true and fictitious also,' etc. He here has before him Plato, Rep. 376 E, λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεῦδος δ' ἕτερον; Ναί. Παιδευτέον δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μανθάνεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, ψεῦδος, ἔνι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ: cp. Phaedo 61 B, where Stallbaum remarks, 'tenendum est λόγον esse vocabulum generis atque significare quamcunque orationem et narrationem, sive veram sive fictam; sed interdum, ubi opponitur μῦθος, de narratione vera usurpari solet.' Λόγος is thus used in opposition to μῦθος in Laws 872 D, Gorg. 523 A, Protag. 320 C, Tim. 26 E. It is probable therefore that περὶ λόγων καὶ μύθων in the passage before us means 'with regard to tales true and fictitious' (Sus. 'Erzählungen und Märchen'), though it should be noted that Vahlen (Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 1. 34) does not take this view and regards λόγοι and μῦθοι here as synonymous, no less than in Poet. 5. 1449 b 8, where he interprets 'λόγους id est μύθους.' Aristotle is as careful as Plato (Rep. 377 B sq., 381 E) not to leave it to the uncontrolled discretion of mothers and nurses what tales are told to children, but his object seems to be to exclude tales which do not prepare the way for the pursuits of after-life—tales simply frivolous and amusing, for instance, or unsuitable to future soldiers and citizens—rather than tales giving a false impression of the gods, which were those specially objected to by Plato. Does Aristotle intend any kind of religious instruction to be conveyed through these λόγοι καὶ μῦθοι? If not, he does not seem to provide for any religious element in the education of youth.

**32.** πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'all the things we have mentioned,' παιδιά, λόγοι, μῦθοι.

**33.** διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς κ.τ.λ. This is based on Plato, Laws 643 B, a passage which is probably present to Aristotle's mind in Poet. 4. 1448 b 5, *τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας*: cp. also Rep. 395 C. The Cretan lawgiver had already studied this (Ephor. Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250, *ὕστερον δὲ καὶ συντάξαντα τὴν κληθεῖσαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πυρρίχην, ὥστε μηδὲ τὴν παιδιὰν ἄμοιρον εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον χρησίμων*), and a saying was ascribed to Anacharsis, *παίζειν δεῖ, ὅπως σπουδάσῃς* (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 1. 233: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 33). Achilles as a child of six years had according to Pindar (Nem. 3. 43 sqq.) 'made mighty deeds his play.' The Tencteri learnt in the sports of childhood to become the formidable cavalry they proved themselves (Tac. Germ. c. 32). See also vol. i. p. 350, note 3, and cp. Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2 *init.* Aristotle wishes the pastimes even of infancy to be a preparation for the life of the soldier and the citizen. Many of the games played by Greek children were 'games of imitation': on this class of games see Becq de Fouquières, Jeux des Anciens, p. 63 sqq., where the games of 'the King,' 'the Judge,' and 'the Architect' are described. Children's mimicries of riding, driving, building, and nursing are familiar enough to ourselves. The ways of Themistocles and of Cato of Utica as children in the matter of games may be studied in Plut. Themist. c. 2 and Cato c. 1. The late Rev. C. Kingsley is said to have preached to an audience of chairs at four years old. 'Even the games to which the little Chinese are addicted are always impregnated with the mercantile spirit; they amuse themselves with keeping shop and opening little pawnbroking establishments, and familiarize themselves with the jargon, the tricks, and the frauds of tradesmen' (Huc's Chinese Empire, Eng. Trans., 2. 149). These are exactly the sort of games which Aristotle would wish his infant citizen *not* to play.

**34.** τὰς δὲ διατάσεις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes naturally enough from *παιδιαί*, one means of producing movement, to *διατάσεις καὶ κλαυθμοί*, another and a more involuntary means of doing so. He had said in 25 that *ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι* must be avoided in the years from two or three to five because they interfere with the growth of the body, and now he tells us that the *διατάσεις καὶ*

κλαυθμοί which he declines to follow others in checking are not open to this objection, for they contribute to the growth of the body. Thus they are in place at this age, while the ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι are not. Plato is referred to in the words οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις: cp. Laws 791 E sqq., where he follows a Spartan tradition, for the nurses at Sparta sought to check fretfulness and crying in infants (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Plato is apparently speaking of new-born babes (791 D), and this might tempt us to transpose (with Sus. and Welldon) τὰς δὲ διατάσεις, 34–διατεινομένοις, 39, to after 20, τὴν τῶν ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν, so as to group 34–39 with the part of the chapter which deals with infants (though even there the paragraph would not be in place, for it ought to follow the discussion of κινήσεις and to come after either συμφέρει, 10, or ἀστραβές, 12), but the transition from παιδιαί to διατάσεις is natural and easy, and, as I have pointed out, there is an evident reference in 34–39 to 25, οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὔξησιν ἐμποδίζωσιν. I am therefore against any transposition. For the thought, cp. Plut. Sympos. 6. 1. 1, αὐτόν τε ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ γυμνάσια καὶ κραυγαὶ καὶ ὅσα τῷ κινεῖν αὔξει τὸ θερμόν, ἥδιον φαγεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ προθυμότερον. The word used by Plato in Laws 792 A is κλαυθμοναί, not κλαυθμοί: κλαυθμός is a poetic word, 'rare in Attic Prose' (Liddell and Scott).

37. γίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they come to be in a way exercise for the body [and exercise makes the body grow]': cp. Probl. 21. 14. 928 b 28, αἱ μὲν οὖν ἕξεις γυμναζόμεναι αὔξονται καὶ ἐπιδιδόασιν. Γίνεται is in the sing. by attraction to γυμνασία: cp. Thuc. 8. 9. 3, αἴτιον δ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ξυνειδότες τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.

ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις κ.τ.λ., 'for it is the holding of the breath [which accompanies exertion] that produces strength in those who labour [and therefore serves the same end as exercise], and this' (i.e. the holding of the breath) 'happens to children also when they exert themselves in crying [no less than to men taking exercise].' With Bonitz (Ind. 190 a 31) I take ὅ to refer to ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις only, and not to the whole of the preceding sentence. For the use of διατείνεσθαι here of straining which involves the holding of the breath, Bonitz compares Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 14, ἢ ὅτι οἱ μὲν νόμοι ἀγωνιστῶν ἦσαν, ὧν ἤδη μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένων καὶ διατείνεσθαι ἡ ᾠδὴ ἐγίνετο μακρὰ καὶ πολυειδής; Cp. also Plut. Timol. c. 27, where διατεινάμενος is used of one who shouts ὑπερφυεῖ φωνῇ

καὶ μείζονι τῆς συνήθους. As to the effect of holding the breath in increasing strength, cp. De Somno 2. 456 a 16, ἰσχὺν δὲ ποιεῖ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 606 a 45), De Gen. An. 2. 4. 737 b 35 sqq., and 4. 6. 775 a 37 sqq. Τὴν ἰσχύν, not simply ἰσχύν, cp. Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 25, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἑκάστοις τὰ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον, and De Part. An. 2. 7. 653 a 10, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν ὕπνον τοῖς ζῴοις τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἐγκέφαλον.

40. τὴν τούτων διαγωγήν, 'the way in which these children pass their time.' Διαγωγή is here used in a wider sense than the special one in which (in 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29) it is denied to children.

τήν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. The sentence looks as if it was intended to run τήν τ' ἄλλην καὶ τὴν μετὰ δούλων and was only finished as it stands by an afterthought. For the thought, compare the saying of Isocrates ([Plut.,] Decem Oratorum Vitae, 838 A), πρὸς δὲ τὸν εἰπόντα πατέρα, ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀνδράποδον συνέπεμψε τῷ παιδίῳ· Τοιγαροῦν (ἔφη) ἄπιθι· δύο γὰρ ὠθ' ἑνὸς ἔξεις ἀνδράποδα, and Antiphanes, Μισοπόνηρος (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85). At Sparta παιδαγωγοί were dispensed with (see Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 16, and vol. i. p. 351, note 2). But Aristotle is speaking here of an earlier age than that at which boys were commonly provided with παιδαγωγοί—they would hardly have παιδαγωγοί till they went to school at seven—and he must be thinking rather of slave-nurses and of the slaves, male and female, about the house with whom the child was likely to come in contact. At Rome in its early days, according to Tac. Dial. de Orat. c. 28, 'suus cuique filius, ex casta parente natus, non in cella emptae nutricis sed gremio ac sinu matris educabatur.' The mother of Leopardi kept her children as much as possible out of the company of servants (see *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. 56, p. 90). Aristotle is evidently afraid that children under seven may pick up ἀνελευθερία and αἰσχρολογία from the slaves about them, male and female. It must have taken imported slaves generally some little time to learn to speak Greek: even those employed as nurses and παιδαγωγοί, though they would commonly speak better Greek than most slaves, probably often spoke the language imperfectly (cp. Plato, Lysis 223 A): still they would speak it well enough to be occasionally guilty of αἰσχρολογία.

41. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλικίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. Sus. understands τήν before μέχρι referring to Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq., where among other passages Eth. Nic.

10. 2. 1174 a 10, *ὅτι εἰσί τινες αἱρεταὶ καθ' αὑτὰς (ἡδοναὶ) διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν*, is quoted. See notes on 1330 b 10 and 1334 b 12 for other cases of the omission of the article. It was not till the age of seven that the Spartan boy was placed in an *ἀγέλη* (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16), and this was the age at which the Athenian boy began to resort to a *γραμματιστής* and a *παιδοτρίβης* ([Plato,] Axioch. 366 D sq.), and the Persian boy to a riding-master (Alcib. 1. 121 E), though Herodotus (1. 136) makes Persian education begin at five. Plato, on the other hand, in the Laws (794) had brought children from three to six years old together for games at the village-temples.

**2. εὔλογον οὖν κ.τ.λ.** The meaning is that, as children under 1336 b.
seven must be reared at home, where there are slaves and where illiberality of mind may easily be learnt, it is reasonable to expect that even at that early age they may acquire a taint of illiberality from what they see and hear. *Ἀνελευθερία* is used here in a wide and popular sense, not in the narrow and technical sense of *ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα* in which it is discussed in Eth. Nic. 4. 1–3.

**3. ὅλως μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** *Μὲν οὖν* is taken up by *ἐὰν δέ*, 8, the sense being, 'we banish indecent language altogether from the State, but if we do not entirely succeed in accomplishing that, and any person should be found saying or doing anything that we prohibit, then' etc. For the intervening *μάλιστα μὲν οὖν*, 6, occurring by way of correction in the middle of a sentence, cp. Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 a 32, *καὶ τὸν ἥττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*. Bonitz remarks (Ind. 540 b 55) '*ὅλως μὲν οὖν—μάλιστα μὲν οὖν—ἐὰν δέ* non debebat tentare Susemihl.' *Ὅλως* goes with *ἐξορίζειν*, as it probably also does in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 9, *τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν*. For the distance at which it stands from *ἐξορίζειν* see note on 1255 a 21. For *ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι* ('more than anything else'), cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 31. Aristotle passes on from *ἀνελευθερία* to *αἰσχρολογία*, because he regards *αἰσχρολογία* as a form of *ἀνελευθερία* (cp. 12, *ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν*). In *ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν κ.τ.λ.* he probably has before him a saying of Democritus recorded in [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, c. 14, *καὶ μέντοι καὶ τῆς αἰσχρολογίας ἀπακτέον τοὺς νεῖς, λόγος γὰρ ἔργου σκιὴ κατὰ Δημόκριτον*. Compare what we read of the Persians in Hdt. 1. 138, *ἅσσα δέ σφι ποιέειν οὐκ ἔξεστι, ταῦτα οὐδὲ λέγειν ἔξεστι*, and of Archytas in Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 19. The sons of the *ὁμότιμοι* of Cyrus in the Cyropaedeia of Xenophon are described as brought up at his court *αἰσχρὸν μὲν μηδὲν μήτε ὁρῶντες μήτε ἀκούοντες* (Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 86). Some may ask why Aristotle

does not banish comedy, in which *αἰσχρολογία* was common, from the State. That he does not do so, we see from 1336 b 20. The reason is that those below a certain age will be forbidden to witness comedy, and that those above it will be protected from injury by the education they have received (1336 b 20 sqq.).

**6.** *μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 729 B.

**9.** As to *ἀπηγορευμένων*, see Liddell and Scott, and Veitch Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. *ἀγορεύω*.

*τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἠξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις.* As to the age at which the young freeman was allowed to recline, instead of sitting, at meals, cp. 21 sqq. The age intended may be twenty-one (cp. 1336 b 37 sqq.). It was probably at this age that the young Spartan became a member of one of the *φιδίτια* (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 66. 2). Sus.[1] (Note 966: Sus.[4], 1. p. 558), however, regards the change as occurring in the seventeenth year, when the youths, as he believes (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.), begin to have syssitia of their own, though he allows that, as they remain outside the general syssitia till twenty-one, *κατάκλισις* will not commence for them *there* till that age. *Κατάκλισις* is associated in 21 sq. with *μέθη*, and Plato in Laws 666 B will not allow any of his citizens to share in *μέθη* till forty, but it is not likely that Aristotle intended to be equally strict.

**10.** *ἀτιμίαις κολάζειν καὶ πληγαῖς.* Not with blows only, like a slave, but with indignities and blows combined—the former because the offender is a freeman (cp. Demosth. De Chersoneso, c. 51, *ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐλευθέρῳ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ μεγίστη ἀνάγκη ἡ ὑπὲρ τῶν γεγενημένων αἰσχύνη, καὶ μείζω ταύτης οὐκ οἶδ' ἥντιν' ἂν εἴποι τις· δούλῳ δὲ πληγαὶ καὶ ὁ τοῦ σώματος αἰκισμός*, and c. Androt. c. 55), and the latter because he is under age (cp. Plato, Laws 700 C, *παισὶ δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ, ῥάβδου κοσμούσης, ἡ νουθέτησις ἐγίγνετο*). We read in Laws 721 B of offenders who are to be mulcted *χρήμασί τε καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ*. Freemen of full age, on the other hand, were to be punished *ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις*, i. e. with indignities usually inflicted not on freemen but on slaves. There were *ἀτιμίαι* not *ἀνελεύθεροι*, such as the withdrawal of political rights. In Laws 946 C we read of *βάσανοι ἐλεύθεραι*. Charondas had made use of humiliating punishments (Diod. 12. 16. 1). See on the subject Prof. Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, ed. 1, p. 116.

**14.** *ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας*, 'or indecent speeches from the stage.'

Iambi and comedy are evidently referred to (cp. 20 sqq.). Prof. W. Christ (Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, p. 167. 4) takes λόγοι here to mean 'dialogue,' comparing the expression λόγοι Σωκρατικοί for Socratic Dialogues (see also Bon. Ind. 433 b 3 sqq.), but Aristotle must have objected to indecent monologue as much as to indecent dialogue. In speaking of the class of mimes called παίγνια, Plutarch (Sympos. 7. 8. 4) remarks, οἱ δὲ πολλοί (i.e. most of those who introduce παίγνια at banquets), καὶ γυναικῶν συγκατακειμένων καὶ παίδων ἀνήβων, ἐπιδείκνυνται μιμήματα πραγμάτων καὶ λόγων ἃ πάσης μέθης ταραχωδέστερον τὰς ψυχὰς διατίθησιν.

ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οὖν here contains an inference, as in c. 16. 1335 b 8 and in 1. 1. 1252 a 7.

τοῖς ἄρχουσι, not the paedonomi probably, but rather the astynomi and agronomi (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 18 sqq.).

15. μηδὲν μήτε ἄγαλμα κ.τ.λ., 'that there is no image or picture representing indecent scenes' (Welldon).

τοιούτων, i.e. ἀσχημόνων. Pictures and statues representing indecent acts or scenes must evidently have been visible in Greek cities, especially, it would seem, in connexion with the gods in whose worship τωθασμός was used. It is not probably to the familiar Hermae that Aristotle objects, but rather to pictures and statues representing such subjects as the drunkenness of Dionysus: as to these cp. Athen. Deipn. 428 e, οὐ καλῶς δὲ οἱ πλάττοντες καὶ γράφοντες τὸν Διόνυσον, ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀγοντες ἐπὶ τῆς ἁμάξης διὰ μέσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς οἰνωμένον· ἐπιδείκνυνται γὰρ τοῖς θεαταῖς ὅτι καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττων ἐστὶν ὁ οἶνος· καίτοι γ' οὐδ' ἄν, οἶμαι, ἄνθρωπος σπουδαῖος τοῦθ' ὑπομείνειεν. Others perhaps represented the amours of Zeus.

16. εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς κ.τ.λ. As to this 'consecrated scurrility,' see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 4. 108, note (Part 2, c. 29): C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 29. 3 (who refers to Paus. 7. 27. 10), 2. § 56. 14, and 2. § 57. 20: Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 93 foot. Compare also Athen. Deipn. 622 a–d, and the unfavourable view expressed by Xenocrates, the contemporary head of the Academy, of the gods in whose worship τωθασμός was resorted to (Plut. De Iside et Osiride, c. 26, ὁ δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὰς ἀποφράδας καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν ὅσαι πληγάς τινας ἢ κοπετοὺς ἢ νηστείας ἢ δυσφημίας ἢ αἰσχρολογίαν ἔχουσιν, οὔτε θεῶν τιμαῖς οὔτε δαιμόνων οἴεται προσήκειν χρηστῶν, ἀλλὰ εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγάλας μὲν καὶ ἰσχυράς, δυστρόπους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπάς, αἱ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τυγχάνουσαι πρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο χεῖρον τρέπονται: cp. Plut. De Defect.

Orac. c. 14. 417 C). Among the gods to whom Aristotle here refers are Dionysus, Demeter, and Corê (C. F. Hermann ibid.). But other gods also were thus worshipped, for instance Apollo Aeglêtês in Anaphê (Conon, ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186. p. 141 b 27 sqq. Bekk., *ἐν Ἀνάφῃ τῇ νήσῳ . . . ἱερὸν Ἀπόλλωνος αἰγλήτου ἵδρυται, ἐν ᾧ σὺν τωθασμῷ οἱ ἐπιχώριοι θύουσι δι' αἰτίαν τοιαύτην κ.τ.λ.*). Here the *τωθασμός* was addressed by the worshippers to each other in commemoration of the jests exchanged between Medea and her attendant women on the one side and the Argonauts on the other, when the Argo was driven by a tempest to Anaphê. *Καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν*, 'scurrilous jeering also,' as well as indecent statues and pictures. *Ὁ νόμος*, probably an unwritten law, like that referred to in c. 11. 1331 a 26 sqq.

17. *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ.*, 'and in addition to this the law allows them to do honour to the gods on behalf both of themselves and of their wives and children.' Cp. Cato, De Re Rustica, c. 143, rem divinam (villica) ne faciat, neve mandet qui pro ea faciat, inuisso domini aut dominae. Scito dominum pro tota familia rem divinam facere. A saying of Pythagoras recorded in Diod. 10. 9. 7 is in a somewhat similar spirit, *ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς* (i.e. *Πυθαγόρας*) *ἀπεφαίνετο τοὺς θεοῖς εὔχεσθαι δεῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς φρονίμους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφρόνων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀσυνέτους ἀγνοεῖν τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν*. In Laws 909 D Plato goes farther and confines sacrificing, as distinguished from prayer, to priests and priestesses, *οἷς ἁγνεία τούτων ἐπιμελής*. *Τιμαλφεῖν* (a poetical word, 'rare in Prose,' see Liddell and Scott) refers probably especially to sacrifices. For *καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν*, see critical note on 1330 b 31.

20. *τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους κ.τ.λ.* Here Aristotle goes on to protect the young against *λόγους ἀσχήμονας* (cp. 14). As to iambi, see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 935 E, *ποιητῇ δὴ κωμῳδίας ἢ τινων ἰάμβων κ.τ.λ.* Iambi are iambic verses, often abusive and indecent (cp. 35, *ἢ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν*), declaimed by actors at festivals of Dionysus in which the phallus was introduced (Poet. 4. 1449 a 9–13). It was from iambi of this kind that comedy took its rise (Poet. 4. 1448 b 24–1449 a 15, and esp. 24 sqq. and 1449 a 2 sqq.). Iambi, however, did not pass away on the rise of comedy; we hear, in fact, that they were particularly popular at Syracuse (Athen. Deipn. 181 c). Iambi and comedy had this in common that they dealt in *ψόγος* (cp. Hor. Carm. 1. 16. 2, criminosis iambis), hence they are often named together, e.g. in Plato, Laws 935 E.

Whether Aristotle includes under iambi mimes written in iambic verse, like those of Herondas, it is difficult to say. As to comedy, compare Plato's views in Laws 816 D sqq. The satyr-play which was added at the close of a tragic trilogy often contained indecent passages, but it does not seem to have been open to as much objection as comedy (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 447), and it probably savoured less of *ψόγος* and *δυσμένεια*. It appears to be certain that boys were present at representations both of tragedy and of comedy at Athens (A. Müller, Die griech. Bühnenalt. p. 292. 1). The bigger boys were very fond of comedy and older lads of tragedy (Plato, Laws 658 D). As to *νομοθετητέον* see critical note. If it is the correct reading, *οὔτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας θεατὰς νομοθετητέον* must apparently mean 'we must not legislate that the young shall be [admissible as] spectators of either iambi or comedy.'

**21.** *πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν* κ.τ.λ. See above on 9. For *πρὶν ἤ* with the aor. subj. without *ἄν*, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 633 a 2 sqq. Kaissling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Athenaiensium Politia, p. 54) points out that *πρὶν ἤ* with the aorist subjunctive is not here preceded by *οὐ πρότερον*, as it is in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 17 sqq.

**22.** *τῶν τοιούτων*, i. e. iambi and comedy.

**24.** The Index Aristotelicus (608 b 30) gives no other instance of *ποιεῖσθαι τὸν λόγον* followed by a genitive (we expect *περὶ τούτων*, but compare for the absence of *περί* c. 10. 1330 a 22, 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 33 sq., and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 36, *αἱ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενόν εἰσι τῶν κοινῶν*), nor does it give any other instance of *παραδρομή* or *ἐν παραδρομῇ* (245 b 36). *Ἐν παραδρομῇ* seems to be a rare expression.

**25.** *εἴτε μὴ δεῖ* κ.τ.λ., sc. *νομοθετεῖν τοὺς νεωτέρους εἶναι θεατὰς ἰάμβων καὶ κωμῳδίας*. *Διαπορήσαντας* here=*διελθόντας τὰς ἀπορίας*, like *διαποροῦντας* in 3. 4. 1276 b 36 (Bon. Ind. 187 b 11). *Πῶς δεῖ*, sc. *τοῦτο νομοθετεῖν*, i. e. by what provisions of law the exclusion of the *νεώτεροι* will best be effected.

**26.** *κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν* κ.τ.λ., 'but in relation to the present occasion we have touched on it only in the way in which it was necessary to touch on it.' For the suppression of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36. Compare also Meteor. 3. 4. 374 b 17, *νῦν δ' ὅσον ἀνάγκη, τοσοῦτον περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν*, and for *κατὰ τὸν παρόντα*

καιρόν, Rhet. ad Alex. 1. 1421 a 24, ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια παραλιπεῖν νομίζω καλῶς ἡμῖν ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν ὑπάρχοντα καιρόν.

27. ἴσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for perhaps Theodorus, the actor of tragedy said not ill that which has just been said.' Γάρ introduces an explanation why it is not necessary for Aristotle to say more: Theodorus, in fact, had by his remark done much to solve the problem and to indicate the true course. Camerarius, however, asks, not without reason (Interp. p. 332), 'Quod vero hoc dictum est? Factum enim magis exponitur histrionis. Nisi aliquis coniecturam de eo capere dicto posse videatur. Aut libeat suspicari ista esse mutila.' Coray's note is, 'ἔλεγε τὸ παραπλήσιον τούτῳ τῷ περὶ τῶν παίδων. Τί δὲ ἔλεγε; τὸ οἰκειοῦσθαι τοὺς θεατὰς ταῖς πρώταις ἀκοαῖς, ὡς φαίνεται ἐκ τῶν ἑξῆς.' If ἔλεγε is to be retained, the passage should probably be explained as Coray explains it, but, as Sus.[1] says, 'ἔλεγε haud sine causa offendit Camerarium.' The only substitute for it which has occurred to me is ἔλυε ('gave not ill a practical solution of the question which has just been mentioned'). For ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκριτής, which is added to distinguish this Theodorus from others of the same name, cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 417, ὑποκριτὴς τραγ[ωιδίας], Athen. Deipn. 407 d. Τιμοκλῆς ὁ τῆς κωμῳδίας ποιητής (ἦν δὲ καὶ τραγῳδίας), and Aelian. Var. Hist. 14. 40, Θεοδώρου τοῦ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητοῦ ὑποκρινομένου τὴν Ἀερόπην. As to Theodorus, see Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 523, and Sus.[2], Note 968 (Sus.[4], 1. p. 558), and cp. Rhet. 3. 2. 1404 b 22 sqq., where the naturalness and charm of his voice are dwelt upon. He was one of the best tragic actors of the time immediately before that of Aristotle. How could Theodorus avoid being preceded by other actors on the stage, if he did not always take the part, perhaps an insignificant one, to which the first speech of the tragedy was assigned? Richards asks, 'Did he insist, when plays were competing, on being protagonist in the first, so that no other *protagonist* might win over the audience before him? Or does the statement about him refer to occasions when actors only (not plays or choruses) were competing, and when perhaps only scenes or single speeches were recited? See Haigh's Attic Theatre, p. 58.' Demosthenes acted in much the same way as Theodorus did, when he insisted on being heard by Philip of Macedon first of the Athenian envoys (Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 108, φάσκων γὰρ νεώτατος εἶναι πάντων τὴν τάξιν τοῦ πρῶτος λέγειν οὐκ ἂν ἔφη παραλιπεῖν, οὐδ' ἐπιτρέψειν τινί (αἰνιττόμενος εἰς ἐμέ) προκαταλαβόντα

*τὰ Φιλίππου ὥτα τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγον μὴ καταλιπεῖν*). Cp. also (with Richards) Demosth. Prooem. 34. p. 1443, *εἴητε δ' ὥσπερ τὰ θέατρα τῶν προκαταλαμβανόντων.*

**29. οὐδενὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** *Εἰσάγειν* is commonly used of the poet or chorêgus bringing the chorus on the stage (as in Aristoph. Acharn. 11, *εἴσαγ', ὦ Θέογνι, τὸν χορόν*), but here *προεισάγειν* is used with some freedom of the actors bringing on the stage the parts represented by them (W. Christ, Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, p. 171. 2).

**30. ὡς οἰκειουμένων κ.τ.λ.,** 'holding that the audience is made friendly to' (or 'won to the side of') 'what it hears first.' Liddell and Scott compare Thuc. 1. 36, *ὁ μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν οἰκειοῦταί τε καὶ πολεμοῦται.* *Οἰκειουμένων* is interpreted by *στέργομεν*, 33.

**31. συμβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ.,** 'and this same thing happens both in relation to dealings with men, [which is what Theodorus had in view,] and in relation to dealings with things.' For *πρός*, cp. 38, and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 3. For *τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμιλίας*, cp. Eurip. Phoen. 1329 Bothe (1408 Dindorf), *ὁμιλίᾳ χθονός.*

**33. πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον,** 'for whatever we first have to do with, we like better than anything else,' so that if iambi and comedy are witnessed in youth, they will be among the things liked best. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 378 D, *ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, ἀλλ' ἃ ἂν τηλικοῦτος ὢν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνιπτά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι· ὧν δὴ ἴσως ἕνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέον ἃ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὅ τι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀκούειν.* Compare Hor. Epist. 1. 2. 69 and familiar sayings like 'on revient toujours à ses premiers amours' and 'the child is father of the man.' 'The Jesuits used to say, "Give me a child till he is seven years old, and I will make him what no one will unmake"' (Miss E. Welldon in the *Cheltenham Ladies' College Magazine*, No. 18, p. 179). We may also explain in this way the tendency of men, as they grow old, to become 'laudatores temporis acti.' On the other hand, there is truth in Hom. Odyss. 1. 351,

> *τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπικλείουσ' ἄνθρωποι,*
> *ἥτις ἀκουόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται.*

**διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.** *Ποιεῖν ξένα,* 'to make strange and unknown,' in opposition to *οἰκειουμένων*, 30. Pythagoras (ap. Aristox. Fragm. 20: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 279) shows a similar desire to keep the young from all knowledge of evil. It was in a somewhat different sense that Antisthenes said (Diog. Laert. 6. 12), *τὰ πονηρὰ πάντα νόμιζε ξενικά.*

**34.** μάλιστα δ' αὐτῶν ὅσα ἔχει ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν. As αὐτῶν=τῶν φαύλων, it is clear that in Aristotle's view a thing might be φαῦλον without possessing μοχθηρία. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1148b 2, μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὑτό· φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. We see from Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 34, διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς, what a strong term μοχθηρία is. Aristotle probably regards iambi and comedy as not free from elements of depravity and malignity. Δυσμένειαν, the reading of Π Bekk. (as to the rendering of Vet. Int. see critical note on 1336 b 35), seems to be perfectly right, though Sus. would read δυσγένειαν in place of it. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Laws 934 D–936 A, where iambi and comedy are connected with ἔχθρα, βλασφημία, and κακηγορία, and Phileb. 48 A–50 A, where envy is implied to be an ingredient in comedy, for envy is nearly related to δυσμένεια, the words φθόνος and δυσμένεια being conjoined in Plato, Rep. 500 C, Phaedr. 253 B, and Protag. 316 D. Compare also Rep. 395 E, κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας, and Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 22, ὀργὴ δὲ χάριτος καὶ χόλος εὐμενείας καὶ τοῦ φιλανθρώπου καὶ φιλόφρονος τὸ δυσμενὲς καὶ ταρακτικὸν ἀπωτάτω τῇ φύσει τέτακται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ δυνάμεως, τὰ δ' ἀσθενείας ἐστὶ καὶ φαυλότητος. Plato does his best in the Laws (792 B, D, E) to secure that the child shall be εὔθυμος, ἵλεως, and εὐμενής, and it is in the same mood (Rep. 496 E) that he wishes men to close their life. This is the mood of the Olympian Gods (see above on 1332 a 9), and according to Plutarch (Pericl. c. 39) it was the εὐμενὲς ἦθος of Pericles that justified the application to him of the epithet 'Olympian.'

**35.** διελθόντων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Θεωρούς means 'spectators,' not 'auditores,' as Sus.[3] explains the word in this passage (Ind. s.v.). Aristotle gets the hint of what he here suggests from Plato, Rep. 466 E, ὅτι κοινῇ στρατεύσονται, καὶ πρός γε ἄξουσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ὅσοι ἄδροί, ἵν' ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεῶνται ταῦτα, ἃ τελεωθέντας δεήσει δημιουργεῖν . . . ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οἷον τοὺς τῶν κεραμέων παῖδας, ὡς πολὺν χρόνον διακονοῦντες θεωροῦσι, πρὶν ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ κεραμεύειν; Plato, however, is speaking here of older boys than those whom Aristotle has in view, and war would of course not be one of the μαθήσεις to which Aristotle refers. These μαθήσεις include probably gymnastic and music, especially the former. Plato in the Laws (794 C) had sent boys of six to

teachers of riding and of the use of the bow, the javelin, and the sling; Aristotle sends boys at seven to the gymnastic trainer and the *παιδοτρίβης* (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.); of riding he says nothing.

**37.** *δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι κ.τ.λ.* At this point we pass from *τροφή*, or rearing, to *παιδεία*, or education strictly so called, which is evidently conceived as beginning at seven years of age. We shall find in the sequel that, in accordance with the announcement made here, puberty forms a turning-point in the educational course, for till puberty no studies find a place in it but gymnastic, and that of the less laborious type (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40), whereas after puberty other studies are to be taken in hand for three years, and then the severe kind of gymnastic is to be commenced (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.). That the age of twenty-one, like puberty, marks a crisis in the physiological development of the human being, we see from Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 16–33. The meaning of *μετά* in 38, 39, is by no means clear, yet the commentators say nothing about it. Is Aristotle's meaning this, that a break is to occur in the education at two epochs—at the close of the period from seven years of age to puberty and at the close of the period from puberty to twenty-one, or in other words at puberty and at twenty-one? If this is so, it is manifest that Aristotle did not intend his education to cease at twenty-one, a conclusion to which other considerations also point (see vol. i. p. 370 and p. 358, note 2, and note on 1333 b 3). He apparently devotes the years intervening between three years after puberty and twenty-one to the severer kind of gymnastic training (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.). At Athens things were arranged quite differently. Young Athenians were enrolled in the *ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον* and became citizens on the completion of the eighteenth year (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 42: the seventeenth according to Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 197, 310, but see Mr. R. W. Macan in *Class. Rev.* 10. 199 sq.), though they spent the two following years in military training, garrison-duty, and field-service as *περίπολοι*, and therefore did not discharge any strictly political functions till two years later. Aristotle does not arrange for the performance of any military service before the age of twenty-one. For *πρὸς ἃς*, 'in relation to which,' cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, *διῄρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον*. In 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 37, on the other hand, we have *πρέπει γὰρ διῃρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον*, and in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὡρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις*.

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40. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσι κ.τ.λ. See above on 1335 b 33.

1337 a. 1. δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἑπακολουθεῖν. Cp. De Caelo 1. 1. 268 a 19, ταῦτα δ', ὥσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν οὕτως ἐπάγειν ἀκολουθοῦμεν, and Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 36. The phrase ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ φύσει occurs in Plato, Laws 836 C. Plato in the Laws (809 E sq.) had arranged his curriculum of study without reference to puberty by periods of three years from ten to sixteen. Aristotle follows the Lacedaemonian practice: cp. Phot. συνέφηβος (quoted by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 63), Σπαρτιᾶται δὲ σιδεύνας (sc. τοὺς ἐφήβους καλοῦσι) διέκρινον δὲ αὐτοὺς ἅρα (ἅμα?) τῇ ἥβῃ, τουτέστιν περὶ πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ ἑκκαίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότας, τῶν νεωτέρων παίδων, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἤδη ἀνδροῦσθαι.

πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία κ.τ.λ. As art and education seek to complete nature, they should follow nature as far as she goes. Art seeks to complete nature because she takes the raw material furnished by nature—wool, or bricks, or human beings—and by completing what is deficient produces a garment, or a house, or a State: see Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 118 sq., and compare (with Eaton) Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15, ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. and (with Congreve) Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 5 sq. The same thing is true of education, for education starts with that which is furnished by nature (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sq.), and completes it. Τέχνη and παιδεία go together here, as τέχνη and μάθησις in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 9, where see note. For πᾶσα παιδεία, 'every kind of education,' compare the use of παιδεία in the plural in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 7 sq., Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 26 sq., and Thuc. 2. 39. 2. The word προσλείπειν appears to be a rare one: Liddell and Scott compare C. I. G. 3935, τὰ προσλείψαντα τοῦ ἔργου.

3. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has now reached the subject—that of education—to reach which he has been hastening forward so fast, postponing the full consideration of not a few questions, and he here resumes the use of the aporetic method, which he had laid aside since the commencement of the Fourth Book (vol. i. p. 352). The first two of the questions here raised are easily answered, the first in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11–21, and the second in 1337 a 21–33, but the third question requires far fuller treatment; the consideration of it is not completed in what we possess of the Fifth Book.

**4.** κοινῇ . . . ἢ κατ' ἴδιον τρόπον, 'on a public footing or individually' (cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 24 sqq.). Aristotle has already said in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 29, *κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν* (sc. *τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων*) *καὶ ὀρθήν*. For *ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν*, cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 21 sq.

**6.** καὶ νῦν, 'even now' (cp. c. 16. 1335 b 5). Even in Aristotle's day not many Greek States made the superintendence of education the concern of the State.

**7.** ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην, sc. *τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι*. This is explained by 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 34, *τίς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία, καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν*.

## BOOK V (VIII).

**11.** Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Two reasons are given for this conclusion—(1) attention to the education of youth is demanded in the interest of the constitution (12–18), and (2) it is demanded because some training is required before men can act virtuously (18–21). C. 1. 1337 a.

**12.** καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12–36 and 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.

**14.** δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάστην παιδεύεσθαι. See critical note.

τὸ γὰρ ἦθος κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 544 D, *οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἴδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἴει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τἆλλα ἐφελκύσηται;* Aristotle insists in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq. that the safety of constitutions is not secured by the mere making of laws, however excellent they may be; it is necessary to produce in the citizens the type of character which is favourable to the maintenance of the particular constitution. We read in Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 12 of *τὰ ἤθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης*: cp. also Pol. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 39. As to the *δημοκρατικὸν ἦθος* see Demosth. Ol. 3. 25 sq., where it is implied that one feature of it is a willingness on the part of the leading men of the State to be content with a mode of life not more splendid than that of their neighbours and a desire that not private buildings, but public should be magnificent. Aristotle, however, would probably find the *δημοκρατικόν* and *ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἦθος* in the kind of character which makes

in favour of the existence and continuance of a democracy and an oligarchy: cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 2 sqq. and see note on 1310 a 12.

**17.** ἀεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., so that not only does the presence in the citizens of the type of character appropriate to a constitution generate that constitution, but a superior quality in the type generates a superior quality of constitution. For the form of the sentence cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25 sq. and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 28 sq. For βέλτιστον see critical note on 1337 a 18.

**18.** ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Euripides had placed a different sentiment in the mouth of one of the characters of his Augê: cp. Diog. Laert. 2. 33, *Εὐριπίδου δ' ἐν τῇ Αὐγῇ εἰπόντος περὶ ἀρετῆς,*

*κράτιστον εἶκῇ ταῦτ' ἐᾶν ἀφειμένα,*

*ἀναστὰς ἐξῆλθε (Σωκράτης), φήσας γελοῖον εἶναι ἀνδράποδον μὲν μὴ εὑρισκόμενον ἀξιοῦν ζητεῖν, ἀρετὴν δ' οὕτω ἐᾶν ἀπολωλέναι.* See also Plut. Virtutem doceri posse, c. 3. Not only is it necessary in the interest of the constitution that training likely to produce the required ἦθος should be given in youth, but training in youth is also necessary with a view to the practice of virtue. For previous training is desirable with a view to the practice of all *δυνάμεις καὶ τέχναι*, and virtue is a *δύναμις* (Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36 sqq.: contrast Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 6 sqq.). Or the argument may be an *a fortiori* one. If previous training is necessary for the practice of an art, *a fortiori* it is necessary for action in accordance with virtue, for the successful practice of an art implies the fulfilment of fewer conditions than action in accordance with virtue (Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 26 sqq.). For *δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας* see note on 1268 b 36 and Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq., where Metaph. θ. 2. 1046 b 2, *διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ [καὶ] ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσίν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαί εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἄλλο*, is quoted, and reference is made to Rhet. 1. 2. 1358 a 6 and other passages. For *προπαιδεύεσθαι καὶ προεθίζεσθαι*, cp. Pol. 3. 18. 1288 b 1, *παιδεία καὶ ἔθη*, and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, *εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι*. In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10 sq., on the other hand, *παιδεία* seems to include *τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι*. For *πρὸς τὰς ἑκάστων ἐργασίας*, 'with a view to the operations of each of them,' cp. Plato, Symp. 205 B, *ὥστε καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ πάσαις ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσί*, and Gorg. 450 C.

**21.** τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις. Cp. c. 2. 1337 b 9, *τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς.*

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle passes to the second question, whether education should be in the hands of the State or in those

of the private individual (i.e. the father, cp. 25, *τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων*). Two reasons are given why it should be in the hands of the State: (1) as the whole State (i. e. all the citizens) has one and the same end before it, the education given will be the same for all, hence its management should be in the hands of the State, and not in the hands of parents, as at present, training their children privately and in whatever subjects they please; (2) the individual should regard himself as part of the State, and the management of the part should be adjusted to the management of the whole [so that it should be in the hands which manage the whole, i.e. the hands of the State]. The first of these two arguments is hardly conclusive. The education given to all might be identical without being placed in the hands of the State. Against the second it may be urged that the welfare of the whole might be kept in view in the training of the part, even if education were not placed in the hands of the State. Compare with Aristotle's view that of Plutarch in Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4. We learn from 2. 5. 1263 b 36 sq. that Aristotle looks to education to make the State one, and this is another reason why the State should take the charge of it into its own hands.

**23.** **καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Laws 804 C–D and 810 A. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq., and Plut. Camill. c. 10, *κοινῷ γὰρ ἐχρῶντο τῷ διδασκάλῳ, ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες, οἱ Φαλέριοι, βουλόμενοι συντρέφεσθαι καὶ συναγελάζεσθαι μετ' ἀλλήλων εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοὺς παῖδας.* Κατ' *ἰδίαν* recurs in Hist. An. 1. 11. 492 b 15 (Eucken, Beobachtungen über die Praepositionen, p. 45).

**26.** **δεῖ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν.** Cp. Plato, Laws 942 B sq. Τῶν *κοινῶν*, education for instance. Τὴν *ἄσκησιν* as well as the things themselves. Aristotle's language recalls the contention of the Lacedaemonians in Diod. 11. 55. 4, *καὶ δεῖν ἔφασαν τῶν κοινῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀδικημάτων εἶναι τὴν κρίσιν οὐκ ἰδίᾳ παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων.*

**27.** **ἅμα δὲ κ.τ.λ.,** 'and at the same time [so far from its being right to think that the individual citizen can justly claim to educate his children as he pleases], it is not even right to think that he belongs to himself; the true creed is that all the citizens belong to the State.' Aristotle inherits this view from others. Thus we read of the Spartans in Plut. Lycurg. c. 24, *ὅλως νομίζοντες οὐχ αὑτῶν ἀλλὰ τῆς πατρίδος εἶναι διετέλουν,* and in c. 25, *τὸ δὲ ὅλον εἴθιζεν* (*ὁ Λυκοῦργος*)

τοὺς πολίτας μὴ βούλεσθαι μηδὲ ἐπίστασθαι κατ' ἰδίαν ζῆν, ἀλλ' . . . ὅλως εἶναι τῆς πατρίδος, and of the Athenians of the time of the Persian War in Demosth. De Cor. c. 205, ἡγεῖτο γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕκαστος οὐχὶ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ μόνον γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι. Much the same thing, indeed, is said by the Corinthian envoys in Thuc. 1. 70. 6 of the Athenians at the outset of the Peloponnesian War. But what Aristotle has especially before him is the language of Plato in Laws 923 A, ἔγωγ' οὖν νομοθέτης ὢν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ὑμῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι τίθημι οὔτε τὴν οὐσίαν ταύτην, ξύμπαντος δὲ τοῦ γένους ὑμῶν τοῦ τε ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τοῦ ἑπειτα ἐσομένου, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῆς πόλεως εἶναι τό τε γένος πᾶν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. Cp. Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 45, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur, and De Offic. 1. 25. 85. To none of these authorities does it occur for a moment that the Greek citizen belonged to Hellas as well as to his own State. Isocrates may perhaps have remembered this (Jebb, Attic Orators 2. 44). Aristotle does not consider how far the citizen should carry his sense of belonging to his πόλις. Clearly he thinks that the citizen should subordinate his private preferences to those of his πόλις, but should he suppress conscientious convictions and sink his conscience in the will of the πόλις? Suppose the πόλις is under a tyranny or extreme oligarchy or extreme democracy? If the virtue of a citizen is relative to the preservation of the constitution (3. 4. 1276 b 27 sqq.), a good citizen must apparently do what tends to preserve the constitution, however bad the constitution may be, but what would Aristotle say that a good man ought to do in such a case? Subordinate his conscience to the maintenance of the constitution? If so, contrast the view of the Platonic Socrates in Plato, Gorg. 512 E sq.

**29. μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως**, and that which is a part of the State belongs to the State: cp. 1. 4. 1254 a 9, τό τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἄλλου.

**ἡ δ' ἐπιμέλεια κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 14, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετήν. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 903 B, πείθωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις, ὡς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ' ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα . . . ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σόν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον ἀεί, καίπερ πάνσμικρον ὄν, and Charmides 156 E, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἴη τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἰατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, ὅτι τὸ ὅλον ἀγνοοῖεν, οὗ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὗ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδύνατον

εἴη τὸ μέρος εὖ ἔχειν: compare the teaching of Hippocrates referred to in Phaedrus 270 C, and see Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 7.

**31.** καὶ τοῦτο, 'in this matter also,' i.e. for attending to the education of youth and making it a matter of State-concern: cp. c. 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. The Lacedaemonians were praised for many other things (6 (4). 1. 1288 b 40 sqq.). It will be noticed that nothing is here said of the Cretans, and that the compliment paid to the Lacedaemonians is not extended to them: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq. and contrast Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 10 sqq., where the Cretan lawgiver, no less than the Lacedaemonian, is said to seek to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.

**34.** πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, 'how one should have them taught,' c. 2. cp. c. 3. 1338 a 38, and for πῶς c. 3. 1338 a 33, c. 4. 1338 b 38, ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστιν, and c. 6. 1340 b 20, πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἢ μή . . . νῦν λεκτέον.

**36.** περὶ τῶν ἔργων, 'sc. τῆς παιδείας, i.e. de iis rebus quas doceri iuvenes oporteat, opp. πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι' (Bon. Ind. 286 a 33). For τῶν ἔργων in this sense cp. 1337 b 5 sqq. Π[1] Sus. read διὰ τῶν ἔργων, which Sus.[2] translates 'thatsächlich' (does this mean 'practically'?), but it is difficult to believe that διά is the true reading.

**37.** οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον. For the distinction, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 a 24, πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον, and Top. 3. 1. 116 b 23, καὶ ὅλως τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεῖνον ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν. The study of music, we learn in the sequel, is of value both with a view to virtue and with a view to τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν, or in other words τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον, but the two ends are not to be confounded. Education in the 'best State' will naturally be adjusted to both, and hence the mention of them here. Aristotle points out that there was no agreement as to the training conducive to either. The Spartans, for instance, would say that gymnastic training was the road both to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 26 sq.) and to the life of empire, which they regarded as the best life (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 20 sqq.), but others would think differently.

**38.** οὐδὲ φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. As to this see vol. i. p. 354, note 2. For the distinction of διάνοια and τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, Bonitz (Ind. 185 b 61) compares 3. 11. 1281 b 7, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν: cp. also 1337 b 11, ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, and Plato, Laws

798 A, *καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διανοίας τε ἅμα καὶ τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν φύσεις.* For *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος*, cp. c. 5. 1340 a 11, b 11, De Part. An. 4. 11. 692 a 22, *τὸ ἦθος τοῦ ζῴου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς*, and Plato, Lysis 222 A, *ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατά τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος*, and Laws 793 E, *ἐξέτει ἤθει ψυχῆς.* Τὸ *τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος* is the disposition or character of the soul; the phrase is used not only by Plato, but also by Xenophon (Mem. 3. 10. 3), and there is nothing technical about it. Sus.[2] (Ind. s. v. *ψυχή*) explains it as synonymous with *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν*, but does it not rather mean the diathesis of *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν*?

**39.** *ἔκ τε τῆς ἐμποδὼν παιδείας* κ.τ.λ., 'and if we take as the starting-point of our inquiry the education with which we are daily in contact, the inquiry proves perplexing.' For *ἐκ*, cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 25, *καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν . . . παντελῶς ἐστὶν ὀλίγα*, and for *ἐμποδών*, cp. De Gen. et Corr. 1. 6. 323 a 26, *καὶ γὰρ κινεῖ κινούμενα πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ ἐμποδών* (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 243 a 61, who explains *τὰ ἐμποδών* as=*τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν*). Light is thrown on Aristotle's meaning by 1337 b 21 sqq. Actual education had four branches—reading and writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing—and of these reading, writing, and drawing were studied for their utility, and gymnastic as contributing to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 25 sqq.), while the study of music included the practice of *τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων* (c. 6. 1341 a 11 sqq.), and was commonly pursued with a view to pleasure (1337 b 28). Some authorities favoured studies useful for life, others those contributing to virtue, and others those of an out-of-the-way kind. Aristotle's own aim in planning the education of his 'best State' is to make his citizens men of complete virtue, fit in body, mind, and character to live in the practice of all the virtues and to rule and be ruled with a view to the most desirable life, the life in which work is crowned with leisure. Others had solved the question otherwise. Isocrates is on the whole in favour of useful studies, though he has something to say in defence of Eristic and Geometry and Astronomy, studies belonging to the out-of-the-way class (De Antid. § 261 sqq.: Hel. § 5). Of the Cynic Diogenes we read (Diog. Laert. 6. 73), *μουσικῆς τε καὶ γεωμετρικῆς καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελεῖν, ὡς ἀχρήστων καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων.* For the views of Polybius see Polyb. 9. 20. 6 sqq. On the other hand, Lacedaemonian education was designed to develope virtue, though no doubt a one-sided kind of virtue (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 16, *γράμματα μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τῆς χρείας*

*ἐμάνθανον, ἡ δ' ἄλλη πᾶσα παιδεία πρὸς τὸ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς ἐγίνετο καὶ καρτερεῖν πονοῦντα καὶ νικᾶν μαχόμενον*). As to the studies falling under the head of *τὰ περιττά*, see vol. i. p. 354, note 3. To the studies there enumerated should be added the wonderful feats of horsemanship which Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, learnt by his father's wish to perform (Plato, Meno 93 D). Aristotle, however, probably refers especially to the study of Geometry, Astronomy, and Eristic Argument, subjects which had found their way in Isocrates' day into the curriculum at Athens (Isocr. Panath. § 26: cp. Plato, Protag. 318 E, where Protagoras is made to sneer at *λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικήν* as studies which Hippias of Elis taught and he himself did not, the wisdom which he taught being *εὐβουλία περί τε τῶν οἰκείων καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως*). Both *τὰ περιττά* and *τὰ χρήσιμα* are here distinguished from *τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν*, but many advocates of the study of *τὰ περιττά* at any rate would claim that it aided the development of virtue. Cp. Isocr. Busir. § 23, *τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους ἀμελήσαντας τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπ' ἀστρολογίᾳ καὶ λογισμοῖς καὶ γεωμετρίᾳ διατρίβειν ἔπεισαν, ὧν τὰς δυνάμεις οἱ μὲν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα χρησίμους ἐπαινοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ὡς πλεῖστα πρὸς ἀρετὴν συμβαλλομένας ἀποφαίνειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν*. Pericles had studied *τὰ περιττά* under Anaxagoras and is thought by Plato and Plutarch to have owed much of his greatness of soul to these studies (Plato, Phaedr. 269 E sq.: Plut. Pericl. cc. 4–8). The virtuous Epaminondas had had a *περιττὴ παιδεία* (Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 3). It is with a view to virtue that Plato recommends the study of Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy (Rep. 525–530: Laws 818–822), and at a later age of Dialectic (Rep. 531 sqq.: Laws 965). For the contrast between *τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον* and *τὰ περιττά*, cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 25, *οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν*, and for the phrase *τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον*, Diog. Laert. 2. 25, *καὶ συνεχὲς ἐκεῖνα ἀνεφθέγγετο* (*ὁ Σωκράτης*) *τὰ ἰαμβεῖα*,

> *τὰ δ' ἀργυρώματ' ἐστὶν ἥ τε πορφύρα*
> *εἰς τοὺς τραγῳδοὺς χρήσιμ', οὐκ εἰς τὸν βίον*,

3. 98, *χρημάτων καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον χρησίμων*, and Hyperid. Or. Fun. 3. 10. For *δῆλον οὐδέν* ('nothing is clear'), cp. Plato, Theaet. 201 A, *μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν* ('manentibus vero—nec amplius quaerentibus—nihil erit perspicuum,' Stallbaum).

**42.** *πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτάς τινας*. Cp. Metaph. A. 8. 989 a 6, *τῶν δὲ τριῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον εἴληφε κριτήν τινα*, and De An.

1. 2. 405 b 8, *πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἴληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς.* 'Quid significet his locis formula *εἰληφέναι κριτήν* apertum est, quomodo eam vim possit habere dubium videtur . . . Equidem nomine *κριτής*, quoniam coniunctum est cum *λαμβάνειν*, significari putaverim suffragium iudicis: unumquodque ex tribus illis elementis unius tulit iudicis suffragium' (Bonitz on Metaph. A. 8. 988 b 22–989 a 19). See also Bon. Ind. s.v. *κριτής*.

1337 b. **2.** *καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ.* Thus the Spartans identified virtue with military virtue, which is only a part of it (2. 9. 1271 b 2 sqq.), and naturally erred in their *ἄσκησις* of virtue (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40). Aristotle's remark is perhaps suggested by that of Socrates in Plato, Laches 190 B, *ἆρ' οὖν τοῦτό γ' ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι ὅ τί ἐστιν ἀρετή; εἰ γάρ που μηδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίνα τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα ὁτῳοῦν, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο;*

**3.** *πρός*, cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 31 and 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 33.

**4.** *ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Plato, Laws 818 A, *τῷ πλήθει δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν* (i. e. Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy) *ἀναγκαῖα . . . μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρὸν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle probably refers to reading and writing and a certain amount of arithmetic and geometry as necessary. At Sparta these necessary subjects were evidently insufficiently studied (c. 4. 1338 b 33).

**5.** *ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα κ.τ.λ. Πάντα*, sc. *τὰ χρήσιμα*, not *τὰ ἀναγκαῖα*. For instance, cookery should not be studied (c. 5. 1339 a 39 sqq.). The parenthetic clause, *διῃρημένων—ἀνελευθέρων*, causes Aristotle to forget that he has begun his sentence with *ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα*, and he proceeds in 6, *φανερὸν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, as if these words had not preceded. Bonitz (Ind. 538 b 38) compares De Interp. 14. 24 a 6 sqq., referring to Waitz' note on this passage. In De Interp. 14, however, we have merely a pleonasm of *ὅτι*, whereas in the passage before us there is a surplusage of an entire clause introduced by *ὅτι*. Still irregularities in connexion with *ὅτι* are common in Aristotle's writings (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), and I think, on the whole, that Bekker, Bonitz, Sus., and the rest are right in leaving this awkward sentence as it stands. But a suggestion of Mr. Richards deserves mention, that *καί* should be added after *φανερόν*.

**6.** *τῶν τοιούτων*, sc. *ἔργων*. Here *ὁ τοιοῦτος* does not, as it usually does (Bernays, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Aristotel. Theorie des Drama, p. 27), refer back to something preceding; on the contrary it refers forward to *ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων κ.τ.λ.* Compare its use in 12,

in c. 6. 1341 a 22 sq., in 3. 17. 1288 a 8, in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 18, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.

**8. βάναυσον δ' ἔργον κ.τ.λ.** Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 5 sqq. and see vol. i. p. 111 sqq. Here and in c. 7. 1342 a 22, *εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν* (i. e. *βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν*) *αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως*, Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 495 D, *οὗ δὴ ἐφιέμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν*: cp. Laws 831 C, and Xen. Oecon. 4. 2 and 6. 5. As the term *μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι* (13) must include the work of the *θής* or day-labourer (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 25 sqq., where he is classed among *οἱ μισθαρνοῦντες*), his work is here described as *βάναυσος* in addition to that of *ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης*, to which the epithet is more commonly applied. In general, however, the *θής* and the *βάναυσος* are distinguished (cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 12, *βάναυσοι καὶ θῆτες*: 17, *τὸν βάναυσον καὶ τὸν θῆτα*: 21, *βίον βάναυσον ἢ θητικόν*: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 25: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 27 sq.: and 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 29, where we have *τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθαρνούντων πλῆθος*). Indeed, notwithstanding what is said in the passage before us, the distinction reappears in this very Book, for in 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 20 we have *βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν* (cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 13, *διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν· καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι*, where a difference is implied between *θητικός* and *βάναυσος*). Aristotle's feeling probably was that though the work of *οἱ μισθαρνοῦντες* deserved to be called *βάναυσος* on account of its effect on the mind, the work of the *βάναυσος τεχνίτης* merited the epithet still better, because it injured the body (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 37, *βαναυσόταται δ' (εἰσὶ τῶν ἐργασιῶν) ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα*). *Καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν* i. e. *καὶ βάναυσον τέχνην καὶ μάθησιν εἶναι ταύτην*. For *τέχνην καὶ μάθησιν*, cp. 18, *πράττει τις ἢ μανθάνει*, and 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1, *πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ παιδεία*. *Μάθησις* is the wider term, for though in one kind of *μάθησις* the aim is the acquisition of an art (Metaph. Θ. 3. 1046 b 36), in another it is the acquisition of an extent of knowledge falling short of that possessed by the master of an art (c. 5. 1339 a 36–38: Plato, Protag. 312 B). For *τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς* (where *τὰς χρήσεις* = *τὰς ἐνεργείας*, as in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 38), cp. De An. 2. 4. 415 a 18, *πρότερον γάρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ τὸν λόγον*, and Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1197 a 8, *ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐδὲν τέλος παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν πρᾶξιν*,

οἷον παρὰ τὸ κιθαρίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος οὐδέν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τέλος. ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις. The χρήσεις καὶ πράξεις τῆς ἀρετῆς to which Aristotle refers are probably those of the soldier and citizen (cp. c. 6. 1341 a 7). For τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς cp. c. 1. 1337 a 21.

12. τὰς τοιαύτας τέχνας. See note on 6.

13. τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας. Ἐργασία is a wider term than τέχνη: it is used, for instance, of such occupations as brothel-keeping in Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 33. It is not certain what occupations in addition to that of the day-labourer Aristotle intends to include under αἱ μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι. Does he include the work of a teacher of rhetoric like Isocrates, when done for hire? In Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 25 sqq. μισθαρνία is made to comprise both the μισθαρνία of the βάναυσοι τέχναι and the μισθαρνία of the unskilled θής: here, however, the phrase αἱ μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι is used in a sense exclusive of the βάναυσοι τέχναι. The form μισθαρνικὰς occurs also in Eth. Eud. 1. 4. 1215 a 31 and Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 29, but Plato uses the form μισθαρνητικός in Rep. 346 B, D, and (if the MSS. are right) μισθαρνευτικός in Soph. 222 D. See critical note on 1255 b 26.

14. ἄσχολον καὶ ταπεινήν. Leisure was held to give self-confidence (c. 6. 1341 a 28 sqq.), and its absence to make men poor-spirited, because it made them like slaves, who have no leisure (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20). The epithets θητικός and ταπεινός are interchanged in Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.

15. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and as to some liberal sciences also, while it is not illiberal to study them up to a certain point, to devote oneself to the study of them in an over-accurate way is bound up with the injurious results already mentioned,' i.e. unfits the body for the pursuits of a soldier and citizen and makes the mind abject. For ἔνοχος in this sense see Liddell and Scott. For the view that there is something illiberal in too close a study of a subject compare the passage from the Erastae ascribed to Plato quoted on 1338 b 32. The study of music has an ill effect when carried too far (c. 6. 1340 b 40 sqq. and 1341 b 10 sqq.: compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιτερπῶς ἔν τινι πότῳ ψήλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς εἶπεν, Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλων;), and also that of gymnastic (c. 4. 1338 b 32 sqq.). Socrates had said that the study of geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, and medicine should not be carried beyond a certain

point by the ordinary citizen (Xen. Mem. 4. 7), and Isocrates says the same thing of astronomy and geometry (De Antid. § 264: cp. [Demosth.] Erot. c. 44), and Plato of *γράμματα* (Laws 810 B). There were those who said this of philosophy (Plato, Gorg. 487 C), but Aristotle would hardly agree. The Cynics probably inherited the feeling of Socrates on this subject: see as to the Cynic Onesicritus vol. i. p. 112, note 1. Plato, on the other hand, had recommended in the case of a few the advanced study of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy (Laws 818 A: cp. 967 D); it is not clear whether Aristotle would object to this. The term *ἐλευθέριοι ἐπιστῆμαι* in its Latin rendering 'liberales artes' had a long subsequent history (see Mr. H. Parker in *Eng. Hist. Rev.* vol. v. p. 417 sqq.). The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle's writings.

**17.** *ἔχει δὲ* κ.τ.λ. This repeats with added details 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 6 sqq. Aristotle is preparing the way for his recommendation that boys shall be taught to sing and play: many regarded playing as *χειρουργία* (c. 6. 1340 b 20) and as fraught with *βαναυσία* (1340 b 40 sqq.: cp. Plato, Symp. 203 A). But the singing and playing which Aristotle enjoins will be *αὑτῶν χάριν* and *δι' ἀρετήν* (c. 6. 1341 b 8 sqq. and 1340 b 42).

**19.** *τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὑτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον.* As to *αὑτοῦ χάριν* see note on 1277 b 5, and cp. Rhet. 3. 18. 1419 b 7 sqq., and Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25, *ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν.* When Odysseus builds a ship (Hom. Odyss. 5. 243 sqq.), it is for himself. As to *φίλων*, cp. Plato, Laws 919 D, *Μαγνήτων . . . μήτε κάπηλος ἐκὼν μηδ' ἄκων μηδεὶς γιγνέσθω μήτ' ἔμπορος μήτε διακονίαν μηδ' ἥντινα κεκτημένος ἰδιώταις τοῖς μὴ ἐξ ἴσου ἑαυτῷ, πλὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἔτι τούτων εἰς τὸ ἄνω γένεσι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς αὑτοῦ πρεσβυτέροις, ὅσοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐλευθέρως*, and Symp. 184 B–C: cp. also Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 31, *καὶ (μεγαλοψύχου) πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ.* See also the story told by Plutarch of Favonius and Pompey (quoted above on 1333 a 6). For *δι' ἀρετήν*, cp. c. 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (which also illustrates *δι' ἄλλους*, 20), and Plato, Symp. 185 A sq.

**20.** As to *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* and as to the displacement of *πολλάκις*, which belongs to *δόξειεν ἄν*, see critical note, and cp. Plato, Rep. 358 D, *περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἂν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ*

ἀκούων; where πολλάκις belongs to λέγων καὶ ἀκούων. For the conjunction of θητικόν and δουλικόν, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.

21. αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις κ.τ.λ., 'the studies now commonly known and in use' (literally 'made public property'), 'as has been said before' (in c. 2. 1337 a 39), 'point in two directions,' i.e. they may be used in support of the view that useful subjects should be studied, or in support of the view that subjects tending to promote virtue should be studied (see note on 1337 a 39). For *αἱ καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις*, cp. c. 3. 1338 a 36 and Plato, Soph. 232 D, *τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντεπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν* ('publice deposita sunt,' Stallbaum, who adds 'verbum καταβάλλειν proprie dicitur de iis quae deponuntur in tabulario publico, veluti leges, testimonia, alia monumenta litteris consignata'). For *ἐναμφοτερίζουσιν*, see note on 1332 a 42.

C. 3. 23. ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν κ.τ.λ. 'Usually three, *γραφική* being omitted,' as Eaton remarks, who refers to Plato, Protag. 325 D-326 C (where children are described as going successively to teachers of *γράμματα*, teachers of harp-playing, and *παιδοτρίβαι*), and Theag. 122 E. We see from Protag. 325 E sqq. that in learning *γράμματα* children learnt passages of epic poetry by heart, and that in learning harp-playing they learnt to sing to the harp passages of lyrical poetry, so that the study of poetry entered into the study both of *γράμματα* and of harp-playing. That the study of *γράμματα* included learning to write, we see from Laws 810 B. It is remarkable that arithmetic is not mentioned: Sus.[4] takes the elements of arithmetic to be included under *γράμματα*, but does not give any passage in support of this view. According to Blümner (Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 111), arithmetical instruction at Athens was given at home, not at school; this may possibly be the reason why nothing is said about it.

24. καὶ τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικήν. Plato had learnt drawing (Diog. Laert. 3. 5) long before Pamphilus of Amphipolis (the teacher of Apelles, who was a contemporary of Philip and Alexander) had made the study fashionable first at Sicyon and then throughout Greece (Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 76 sq.: see Overbeck, Ant. Schriftquellen, p. 330, and Brunn, Gesch. der griech. Künstler 2. 134 sqq.). *Γραφική* probably includes painting as well as drawing. Aristotle says nothing of sculpture.

**25.** *τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν* κ.τ.λ. Charondas had insisted on the many uses served by *γραμματική*: cp. Diod. 12. 13. 1, *τὴν γὰρ γραμματικὴν παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας μαθήσεις προέκρινεν ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ μάλα πρασηκόντως· διὰ γὰρ ταύτης τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ χρησιμώτατα τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, ψήφους, ἐπιστολάς, διαθήκας, νόμους, τἄλλα τὰ τὸν βίον μάλιστα ἐπανορθοῦντα*, and Eurip. Fragm. 582, which is so similar in effect to the passage of Diodorus that one is inclined to ask whether Euripides had the words of Charondas before him. Cp. also 1338 a 15 sqq.

**26.** *τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν* κ.τ.λ. So thought the Lacedaemonians (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.), and also Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 91).

**27.** *τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις*, i. e. as to the object with which it is taught. Here *διαπορεῖν* takes an acc. of the thing which causes perplexity, as *ἀπορεῖν* does in Meteor. 1. 1. 339 a 2, *ἐν οἷς τὰ μὲν ἀποροῦμεν, τῶν δ' ἐφαπτόμεθά τινα τρόπον*. That Plato gives a wider meaning to *μουσική* than Aristotle does, we have seen in vol. i. p. 405. Both agree that *μουσική* is concerned with *μελοποιία* (c. 7. 1341 b 23 sqq.: Gorg. 449 D), but while to Plato (Rep. 398 D) a *μέλος* consists of *λόγος ἁρμονία* and *ῥυθμός*, Aristotle distinguishes *μελοποιία* and *λέξις* (Poet. 6. 1449 b 33 sqq., 1450 a 13 sqq.).

**28.** *ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν*, sc. *οὔσης*: cp. 1338 a 13, *ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων* (sc. *οὔσας*). For the fact cp. Plato, Laws 655 C, *καίτοι λέγουσί γε οἱ πλεῖστοι μουσικῆς ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν δύναμιν*, and Tim. 47 D, *ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία . . . τῷ μετὰ νοῦ προσχρωμένῳ Μούσαις οὐκ ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ἄλογον, καθάπερ νῦν, εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμος* κ.τ.λ.

**29.** *μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς*, 'learn it,' cp. c. 2. 1337 b 6 sqq., and see note on 1339 a 14.

*οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, cp. 1338 a 14, *οἱ πρότερον*, and Probl. 30. 11. 956 b 16, *διὰ τί οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγωνίας ἆθλόν τι προὔταξαν, σοφίας δὲ οὐδὲν ἔθηκαν;*

*ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ*, cp. 1338 a 14, *εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν*.

**30.** *τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν* κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cp. Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 a 25, *ἡ γὰρ φύσις αὐτὴ ζητεῖ τὸ πρόσφορον*, and Eth. Nic. 8. 6. 1157 b 16. Aristotle has not said before that Nature aims at this, but he has implied it in 2. 9. 1271 a 41 sqq. and 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq., passages in which he points out the disastrous consequences to the Lacedaemonian State of a forgetfulness of this.

**31.** For the place of **δύνασθαι** cp. c. 5. 1339 b 1, and see note on 1281 a 26.

**32. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων**, Lamb. 'hoc enim omnium rerum agendarum principium est.' With Sus. I take Aristotle to refer in **αὕτη** to *σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς*, not to Nature (as Vict., Schn. and others). For the attraction of the pronoun into the gender of the predicate, cp. (with Sus.[4]) 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 41. For the phrase, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 237 B, *περὶ παντός, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι· εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἡ βουλή, ἢ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη.*

**πάλιν**, for the lesson has already been taught in 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq.

**33. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ.** **Γάρ** introduces a justification of *ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς*. With **δεῖ** supply **ἔχειν**. For the thought cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sqq. The answer which is gradually given to the question in what activities leisure should be spent is, as we shall see, 'in activities desirable for their own sake.'

**34. καὶ τέλος**, 'and is its end': cp. 4. (7). 15. 1334 a 14 sqq. Mr. Welldon has anticipated me in retaining **τέλος** and placing a comma after it.

**35. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας**, 'for surely not in playing.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 27 sqq. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Laws 803 D, *τίς οὖν ὀρθότης; παίζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιωτέον; τίνας δὴ παιδιάς; θύοντα καὶ ᾄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον.*

**τέλος γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'for then, [as leisure is the end of life,] play would necessarily be to us the end of life.' Sus. would read in place of **ἀναγκαῖον** either **ἂν ἀναγκαῖον** (Schn. had proposed **ἂν ᾖ ἀναγκαῖον**, vol. ii. p. 452) or **ἀναγκαῖον ἦν** (with Spengel), but perhaps **ἂν εἴη** may be supplied with **ἀναγκαῖον**: cp. Xen. Oecon. 3. 13 and 4. 15. It seems to me more natural to supply **ἂν εἴη** than **ἐστι**. Many made play the end of life: cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31 sqq., and Ephor. Fragm. 82 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 259), *Ἔφορος ἐν πέμπτῳ φησὶν ὅτι Τιβαρηνοὶ καὶ τὸ παίζειν καὶ τὸ γελᾶν εἰσιν ἐζηλωκότες καὶ μεγίστην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦτο νομίζουσιν.* A *graffito* on a pavement-slab of the forum of Thannyas or Timegad in Algeria runs 'venari lavari ludere ridere—oc est vivere' (Prof. Sayce, Algerian Notes, *Academy*, No. 780, April 16, 1887, p. 279).

**38. ἡ δὲ παιδιὰ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Plato, Phileb. 30 E, *ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἡ παιδιά.*

**39.** τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας. Cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 11, *τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς.*

**41.** καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρῆσιν. Pastime should be used *ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις*, as a relief after toil (cp. 37).

**ὡς προσάγοντας φαρμακείας χάριν.** A drug differs from an article of daily food, in that it is only for occasional use: cp. Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 10, *προσθεωροῦντας ὅτι ἡ τροφὴ οὐ φάρμακον διὰ τὸ συνεχές*, and Top. 2. 11. 115 b 26, *πάλιν ποτὲ μὲν συμφέρει φαρμακεύεσθαι, οἷον ὅταν νοσῇ, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ.* For the medical use of the word *προσάγειν* cp. Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 28, *ὁ δὲ παρρησίαν καὶ δηγμὸν ἀνθρώπῳ δυστυχοῦντι προσάγων, ὥσπερ ὀξυδορκικὸν ὄμματι ταρασσομένῳ καὶ φλεγμαίνοντι, θεραπεύει μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖ τοῦ λυποῦντος, ὀργὴν δὲ τῇ λύπῃ προστίθησι καὶ παροξύνει τὸν ἀνιώμενον.*

**42.** ἄνεσις γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the movement of the soul to which we have referred' (that involved in play) 'is [remedial in character, for it is] a relaxation of strain and a remission because of the pleasure which accompanies it, [and only in place at times when there is strain].' For *κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς*, cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1369 b 33, *ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ.* and Plato, Laws 896 E sq.

**1.** τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν κ.τ.λ., 'but taking leisure [unlike working] is thought to have in itself pleasure and happiness and blissful life, [so that it does not need to be helped out with play, and we should not spend leisure in play].' 1338 a.

**3.** τοῦτο δ' οὐ κ.τ.λ., 'and this' (i.e. happiness) 'does not belong to those who work, but [only] to those who are at leisure, for he who works works for the sake of some end as having it not, but happiness is an end, inasmuch as all think that it is conjoined not with pain but with pleasure, [and therefore, as he has not the end, he has not happiness].' That things conjoined with pleasure were commonly regarded as ends, we see from Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 23–25. Aristotle's object in adding this remark is to point out that not only does leisure bring happiness with it, but that work does not; he thus prepares the way for the distinction which he proceeds to draw in 11 sqq. between studies which are preparatory for work and studies which are preparatory for leisure, the former being, like work, a means to an end, and the latter, like leisure, desirable for their own sake and an end in themselves. Sus. reads *τοῦτο γάρ* in place of *τοῦτο δέ*, but in this Mr. Welldon does not follow him, and rightly, for *τοῦτο δ' οὐ κ.τ.λ.* does not contain the proof that leisure is thought to have in it pleasure and happiness, but an added

statement carrying matters further. For ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολῶν ἕνεκά τινος ἀσχολεῖ τέλους ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 17 αὗται δ' (i. e. αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ πράξεις) ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν.

7. ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν κ.τ.λ., 'but [here their agreement ceases, for] all do not find the pleasure which accompanies happiness in the same pleasure.' Cp. Plato, Laws 658 E (quoted below on 1339 b 33), and Gorg. 448 C, ἑκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσι ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἄριστοι.

8. For καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἕκαστος καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, where we expect ἑαυτόν and αὑτοῦ, cp. Plato, Gorg. 503 E, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενα προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτοῦ κ.τ.λ.

9. ὥστε φανερὸν κ.τ.λ., 'and so, [as leisure is the end], it is evident,' etc. Καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν, 'with a view to leisure spent in noble enjoyment also,' as well as with a view to work. For τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν, cp. c. 7. 1342 a 31, τὴν ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς. It is obviously strange that we should have τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν here and τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν in 21, and it is possible that τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν is a simple blunder, and that we should read τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν (with Cor.) in place of it. But Sus., following Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 15), leaves the text as it stands, and I incline on the whole to do so too, though Bonitz adds a query to the words (Ind. 741 a 40) and Jackson would omit σχολήν as an interpolation and understand ἡδονήν (Sus.[4] *ad loc.*). For looking to 1337 b 31, σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς, and 1338 a 1, τὸ σχολάζειν (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 9), we expect that the conclusion drawn in 1338 a 9 sqq. will be that it is well to study with a view to taking leisure, or taking leisure nobly, and τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν, 'leisure spent nobly in diagogê,' comes nearer to this than τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν. Not leisure spent anyhow, but leisure spent in diagogê is the end with a view to which Aristotle claims that study should be especially pursued. The words τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν (12) also, as Postgate points out, require πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, and not πρὸς τὴν διαγωγήν, as their antithesis. For μανθάνειν ἄττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, cp. Theophil. Κιθαρῳδός Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 628),

μέγας
θησαυρός ἐστι καὶ βέβαιος μουσικὴ
ἅπασι τοῖς μαθοῦσι παιδευθεῖσί τε.

Μανθάνειν is to learn, παιδεύεσθαι to be trained by another.

**11.** For the repetition of the pronoun in **ταῦτα . . . ταύτας** see note on 1317 b 5.

**12. τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν κ.τ.λ.**, 'and that studies preparatory for work are pursued as necessary and as being for the sake of other things.'

**13. διό**, 'hence,' i.e. because it is right that studies which contribute to the enjoyment of leisure should find a place in education.

**15. ὥσπερ τὰ γράμματα κ.τ.λ.** See note on 1337 b 25.

**16. καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν**, 'and for the acquisition of knowledge': cp. 39 sq. and Isocr. Panath. § 209, *ὥστ' οὐδὲ γράμματα μανθάνουσιν, ἃ τηλικαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν ὥστε τοὺς ἐπισταμένους καὶ χρωμένους αὐτοῖς μὴ μόνον ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡλικίας τῆς αὑτῶν πραχθέντων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πώποτε γενομένων.*

**17. δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Learning to draw was evidently held by many to make men skilful in the purchase of works of art, furniture, and equipments of all kinds (1338 a 40 sqq.).

**19. πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκήν**, 'for health and prowess in battle.' Not every one would agree with Aristotle that learning music does not produce military prowess in the learner: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, *μουσικωτάτους γὰρ ἅμα καὶ πολεμικωτάτους ἀποφαίνουσιν αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ.*: Athen. Deipn. 626 f, *τὸ δ' ἀρχαῖον ἡ μουσικὴ ἐπ' ἀνδρείαν προτροπὴ ἦν κ.τ.λ.*: Plut. De Musica c. 26. And if the study of music does not produce health, listening to music was thought by Theophrastus to cure some diseases (Athen. Deipn. 624 a); indeed, a plague was thought to have been stayed at one time at Sparta by the Cretan musician Thaletas (Plut. De Mus. c. 42).

**21. λείπεται τοίνυν κ.τ.λ.**, 'it remains therefore that music is useful for rational enjoyment in leisure.' Aristotle has shown that the study of music is not useful for purposes connected with work, like learning to read and write and to draw, nor productive of bodily advantages useful for work, like gymnastic; hence he concludes that it is useful for leisure. He omits to inquire at present whether it is not productive of moral and intellectual virtues useful for work; we shall find later on that it is (c. 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.). This somewhat invalidates the conclusion which he arrives at here.

**22. εἰς ὅπερ κ.τ.λ.**, 'into which they do in fact evidently introduce it.' **Καὶ φαίνονται**, i.e. not only may be inferred to introduce it, but manifestly do so: cp. *καὶ συμβαίνειν* in 2. 3. 1262 a 18 sq.

For ὅπερ, not ἤπερ, see Bon. Ind. 484 b 5, where Hist. An. 2. 17. 508 b 13, ἀναδίπλωσιν ἔχει, ὃ ἀναλύεται εἰς ἕν, is referred to, and Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 24 ('Aristotelem nemo nescit usum neutrius valde adamasse') and 4. 1449 a 7. Aristotle takes no notice of the use of music in the worship of the gods.

ἦν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they give it a place in that which they think is the form of rational enjoyment appropriate to the free' (i.e. feasting), and therefore appropriate to those who are at leisure, for leisure belongs to freemen: cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις. Aristotle would hardly agree with their view that banqueting is ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή (see note on 1333 a 35). In c. 5. 1339 a 16 sqq. he treats conviviality (μέθη) as a means of relaxation, not as διαγωγή.

24. διόπερ Ὅμηρος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Hom. Odyss. 17. 382,

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἳ δημιοεργοὶ ἔασι,
μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,
ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὅ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἀείδων;

but the line first quoted by him, ἀλλ' οἷον κ.τ.λ., finds no place in our text, any more than it does, as Sus.[4] points out, in Plato, Rep. 389 D. Ἀείδων also takes the place of ἅπαντας in our texts (Sus.[1], Note 997). Probably we should read μόνον in place of μέν in ἀλλ' οἷον κ.τ.λ. I take Aristotle's text to have been—

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθών,
ἀλλ' οἷον μόνον ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην,
μάντιν ἢ ἰητῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,
οἳ καλέουσιν ἀοιδόν, ὅ κεν τέρπῃσιν ἅπαντας;

It is just possible that οἳ in 26 is a false reading for καί, but there is no absolute necessity for any change. Spengel, followed by Sus., reads οὓς καλοῦσιν or οἳ καλοῦνται in place of οἳ καλέουσιν, and regards these words as not forming part of the quotation, but the form of the word καλέουσιν seems to show that it is quoted from Homer. As to the differences between our text of Homer and Aristotle's quotations, see note on 1285 a 12. For the use of music at banquets, cp. Hom. Odyss. 1. 152. Aristoxenus gave a fanciful reason for it, quite different to that given here (Plut. De Musica, c. 43: Aristox. Fragm. 91 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 291: cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D).

**27.** καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ κ.τ.λ. Hom. Odyss. 9. 5 sqq. For (ὁ) Ὀδυσσεύς see critical note.

**32.** πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This promise is not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it: see vol. ii. p. xxviii sq.

**33.** καὶ πῶς, 'and how they are to be studied': cp. c. 2. 1337 a 34 sq.

**34.** For the needless addition of περὶ αὐτῶν, cp. περὶ αὐτῆς, c. 5. 1339 a 15.

νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν. Two different views have been taken of the construction of this sentence. Some have regarded τοσοῦτον εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ as an accusative and infinitive dependent on γέγονεν, as in Luke 16. 22, ἐγένετο δὲ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν πτωχόν, and Acts 21. 1 and 22. 17 (referred to by Hermann ad Viger. p. 231 note, cp. p. 749); the translation will then be, 'but now it has happened that thus much profit has accrued to us.' Others have taken τοσοῦτον εἶναι together in the sense of 'to this extent at least,' εἶναι being used as in such phrases as κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι (Plato, Protag. 317 A, where Stallbaum renders 'quantum quidem ad hoc attinet': see his note and Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 625). Göttling, who refers to Lobeck, Phryn. p. 275, Stahr in his edition of the Politics, and Sus.[4] appear to understand the passage thus. The translation will then be, 'but now to this extent at least we have profited.' I should prefer the second of these two interpretations if εἶναι followed τοσοῦτον immediately without the interposition of ἡμῖν. In support of the first interpretation it may be noted that in Plato, Rep. 397 B we have γίγνεται λέγειν (Richards), and in Xen. Oecon. 17. 3, γίγνεται ὁμονοεῖν (sc. πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους): see also Xen. Cyrop. 5. 2. 12. There is a further difference as to the meaning of πρὸ ὁδοῦ, Sus.[2] translating the sentence 'für jetzt steht uns vorläufig nur so viel fest,' and Welldon, 'at present however we have advanced so far as to see that,' etc., where 'vorläufig' and 'advanced' seem to represent πρὸ ὁδοῦ. My own rendering has been suggested by the meaning assigned to the word by Liddell and Scott.

**35.** ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων κ.τ.λ., 'that from the ancients also' (cp. 1337 b 29, οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς) 'we have a testimony derived from the established studies [that there are subjects which should be taught the young not as necessary but as liberal and noble].' The ancients are regarded by Aristotle as the authors of the established curriculum.

37. **τοῦτο**, 'this fact,' i.e. that we have the testimony of the ancients to this effect.

**ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι κ.τ.λ.** Supply again *τοσοῦτον ἐφ' εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν.* **Οἷον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν** is added in illustration of *τῶν χρησίμων τινά.* **Παιδεύεσθαι** is middle, as in c. 2. 1337 a 35. **Τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸν βίον** is contrasted with *τὸ πρὸς μάθησιν συντεῖνον*: compare the contrast in Plato, Rep. 527 A between studies pursued *πράξεως ἕνεκα* and *γνώσεως ἕνεκα.* As to *ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησις* cp. Menand. Monost. 657,

*διπλοῦν ὁρῶσιν οἱ μαθόντες γράμματα.*

40. **ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Plato, Rep. 525 B, *ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἀνθάπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν εἰς θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ, οὐκ ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα πολέμου τε κ.τ.λ.* For the contemptuous reference to *σκευή*, cp. Plato, Rep. 428 C, *οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην βουλευομένην ὡς ἂν ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις.* Buying *σκεύη* was work for women (Pollux 10. 18, *γυναικείαν ἀγοράν, τὸν τόπον οὗ τὰ σκεύη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πιπράσκουσιν*).

1338 b. 1. We expect **ἀλλά** or **ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον** in place of **ἢ μᾶλλον**, but **ἢ μᾶλλον** is substituted as less dogmatic, and partly also perhaps because *ἀλλά* has been used in the preceding line. Ἢ 'modeste affirmantis est' (Bon. Ind. 312 b 57 sqq.: cp. Trendelenburg on De An. 1. 1. 403 b 8). In 3. 1. 1275 a 25 and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 *ἤ* takes the place of *δέ*.

**ποιεῖ θεωρητικόν**, cp. c. 7. 1342 b 26, *βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἥ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον.* We expect *θεωρητικούς* rather than *θεωρητικόν*, but compare the change from the singular to the plural in c. 6. 1341 b 10–15 (*ὁ πράττων, βαναύσους*). **Θεωρητικόν**, 'a scientific observer' (Welldon).

**τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους.** Cp. Plato, Symp. 210 B, *τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖν τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος*, and Critias 112 E, *οὗτοι μὲν οὖν δὴ . . . ἐπὶ τῶν Εὐρώπην καὶ Ἀσίαν κατά τε σωμάτων κάλλη καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν ἐλλόγιμοί τε ἦσαν καὶ ὀνομαστότατοι πάντων τῶν τότε.* Aristotle probably would not go so far as Diotima in Plato, Symp. 210 sq., as to the results of studying *τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος*, but he apparently holds that the study of drawing helps to make men capable of diagogê. We note that he says nothing of landscape beauty, or of the use of drawing in cultivating a perception of it. In *τὰ σώματα* he no doubt refers mainly to the bodies of animals,

and especially of human beings (cp. *τῶν σωμάτων* in c. 4. 1338 b 11). As to Aristotle's value for beauty, cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 70, *κάλλους δὲ προνοῶν καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀρχήμασιν εὐμορφίας, τί ἄλλο ἢ τὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐπαληθεύει, τὸ κάλλος ἐπαινοῦντος καὶ μέρος τρίτον ἡγουμένου τἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι;* (I do not notice that this dictum is included in Rose's collection of the Fragments of Aristotle, ed. 2, 1886.) For the phrase *τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους*, cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 34, *τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας*, and 1327 a 8, *τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης*, and see note in Sus.[4]

3. **τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις.** Cp. Plut. De Amicorum Multitudine, c. 6 *sub fin.*, *τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ γενναίοις*, and Isocr. Areop. § 43, *τοὺς ἐλευθέρως τεθραμμένους καὶ μεγαλοφρονεῖν εἰθισμένους*. These passages show that there is no occasion to change *ἐλευθέροις* into *ἐλευθερίοις*, as Sus. is half inclined to do. As to the *μεγαλόψυχος*, cp. (with Eaton and Congreve) Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 11 sq.

4. **ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 8–28.

6. **δῆλον ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ.** In beginning the study of *γυμναστική* and *παιδοτριβική* at seven, Aristotle follows with some variation in the track of Plato, Laws 794 C, *πρὸς δὲ τὰ μαθήματα τρέπεσθαι χρεὼν ἑκατέρους* (after the completion of the sixth year), *τοὺς μὲν ἄρρενας ἐφ' ἵππων διδασκάλους καὶ τόξων καὶ ἀκοντίων καὶ σφενδονήσεως κ.τ.λ.* In the Republic, on the other hand, *μουσική* seems to precede *γυμναστική* (403 C, *μετὰ δὴ μουσικὴν γυμναστικῇ θρεπτέοι οἱ νεανίαι*: see Stallbaum on Protag. 326 B). At Athens boys began their studies by learning to read and write (aet. 7–11); at about eleven they were sent to a harp-player to learn the harp; how early their gymnastic studies began is uncertain (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans. pp. 111–115). Aristotle postpones learning to read and write and learning to sing and play till puberty (c. 4. 1339 a 4 sq.) and puts the boys in charge of gymnastic trainers and *παιδοτρίβαι* from seven till puberty. Till puberty they are to receive no literary training. His scheme of training resembles the Lacedaemonian more than the Athenian, but it avoids imposing on boys the severe physical toil imposed on them at Sparta, and it gives up three years after puberty to the exclusive study of subjects other than gymnastic. We may be quite sure that no young Spartan was permitted to drop gymnastic for three years.

7. **τούτων γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 16 sqq., where it is implied that *γυμναστική* imparts a certain bodily *ἕξις* and that *παιδοτριβική* imparts *ἐπιστήμην τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνίαν*. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 5.

15. 1138 a 31, *εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ*, and Isocr. De Antid. § 183. *οἱ μὲν παιδοτρίβαι τὰ σχήματα τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀγωνίαν εὑρημένα τοὺς φοιτῶντας διδάσκουσιν*: also *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 42, *χειρο[τονεῖ] δὲ (ὁ δῆμος) καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκάλους [οἵ]τινες ὁπλομαχεῖν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν κ[αὶ] καταπέλτην ἀφιέναι διδάσκουσιν*, and Plato, Gorg. 456 E, *τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι*. But of course the *παιδοτρίβης* would teach boys of seven only easy accomplishments, such as shooting with the bow and throwing the dart. In Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq. and 452 B, however (cp. 504 A), the business of the *παιδοτρίβης* is said to be to produce physical beauty and strength.

C. 4. 9. **Νῦν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** *Μὲν οὖν* has apparently nothing to answer to it in the sequel; the answering clause would have run, if it had not been suppressed, 'but we must take quite a different course.' Little is said by Aristotle in confutation of the first of the two errors here referred to, probably because it was generally felt to be an error, but the second is dealt with at some length, because the Lacedaemonian training still stood high in common opinion. Phocion, for instance, sent his son to Sparta to undergo the training (Plut. Phoc. c. 20). The late Mr. Mark Pattison notes in his copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics on 1338 b 9–19, 'Respicit hic locus ad Plat. Rep. libr. iii. et speciatim ad pag. 410 D.'

10. **αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι.** The Thebans are referred to (vol. i. p. 357, note 2: cp. also Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2, *ὠθισμοῖς τε χρῆσθαι καὶ περιτροπαῖς ἀλλήλων, ᾧ δὴ μάλιστά φασιν ἐν Λεύκτροις τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παλαιστρικῶν ὄντων καταβιβασθῆναι*), and also probably the Argives: cp. Aristophon, *Ἰατρός* (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 357),

*δεῖ τιν' ἄρασθαι μέσον*
*τῶν παροινούντων, παλαιστὴν νόμισον Ἀργεῖόν μ' ὁρᾶν*,

and see Meineke's note. The Cynic Diogenes agreed with Aristotle in objecting to this kind of training (Diog. Laert. 6. 30, *ἔπειτα ἐν τῇ παλαίστρᾳ οὐκ ἐπέτρεπε τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ ἀθλητικῶς ἄγειν (τοὺς παῖδας τοῦ Ξενιάδου), ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἐρυθήματος χάριν καὶ εὐεξίας*). Cp. also Julian, Or. 1. 10 D sq. It is to the habit of body characteristic of athletes that Aristotle objects, not to the practice of athletic exercises; the Spartan training included the latter, for instance boxing (cp. Plato, Protag. 342 B sq.), but it did not produce *ἡ ἀθλητικὴ ἕξις*. In 4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6 we have *τὴν πολεμικὴν ἕξιν*. *Ἀθλητικήν*, being placed before *ἕξιν*, is emphatic.

**λωβώμεναι τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων.** Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 29, *οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν πολυφαγίαν. διὰ πλῆθος γὰρ τροφῆς οὐ δυναμένης τῆς φύσεως κρατεῖν, ὥστ' ἀνάλογον αὔξειν καὶ διαμένειν ὁμοίαν τὴν μορφήν, ἀλλοῖα γίνεται τὰ μέρη, καὶ σχεδὸν ἐνίοθ' οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἐοικέναι τῷ πρότερον*, and Plutarch's language about Aratus, *ἐπιφαίνεται δ' ἀμέλει καὶ ταῖς εἰκόσιν ἀθλητική τις ἰδέα, καὶ τὸ συνεστὸν τοῦ προσώπου καὶ βασιλικὸν οὐ παντάπασιν ἀρνεῖται τὴν ἀδηφαγίαν καὶ τὸ σκαφεῖον* (Arat. c. 3). The excessive labour exacted from athletes would also tell on their physical growth, no less than the excessive amount of food they took: cp. Isocr. Ad Demon. § 12, *τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῖς σπουδαίοις λόγοις αὔξεσθαι πέφυκε.*

**12. θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον.** *Τοῦτο* = *τὸ θηριώδεις ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῖς πόνοις.* So Pericles says of the Spartans (Thuc. 2. 39. 2), *καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἐπιπόνῳ ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται*, and Ephorus of the Cretans (Fragm. 64 Müller, ap. Strab. p. 480), *πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ δειλίαν ἀλλ' ἀνδρείαν κρατεῖν, ἐκ παίδων ὅπλοις καὶ πόνοις συντρέφειν*: cp. Eurip. Suppl. 858 Bothe (884 Dindorf),

*ἀγροὺς δὲ ναίων σκληρὰ τῇ φύσει διδούς*
*ἔχαιρε πρὸς τἀνδρεῖον.*

Hippocrates shared the view that hard physical labour produces courage (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 565 Kühn), *καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ἡσυχίης καὶ ῥᾳθυμίης ἡ δειλίη αὔξεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ταλαιπωρίης καὶ τῶν πόνων αἱ ἀνδρεῖαι*, and p. 566, *ἐνταῦθα εἰκὸς εἶδεα μεγάλα εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ταλαίπωρον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εὖ πεφυκότα· καὶ τό τε ἄγριον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες αἱ τοιαῦται φύσιες οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔχουσιν.* Ephorus regarded the Spartans as the reverse of *θηριώδεις*, for he says of Dercyllidas (Fragm. 130 Müller), *ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ Λακωνικὸν οὐδὲ ἁπλοῦν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ πανοῦργον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες. Διὸ καὶ Σκύθον αὐτὸν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσηγόρευον.*

**14. καίτοι κ.τ.λ.** Here we have *οὔτε* taken up by *οὔτε* and in 16 by *τε* ('nay more'): see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 536. 3 a, and note on 1272 b 19.

**πολλάκις**, in 2. 9. 1271 a 41–b 6: 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq., and 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40 sqq.

**15. πρὸς μίαν**, sc. *ταύτην* (Ridgeway). 'The extraordinary position of **μάλιστα** is probably due to the position of *μίαν*' (Richards). The sentence, if completed, would run, *οὔτε πρὸς μίαν ταύτην οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην.* See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 452. 1 a.

16. τοῦτο, i. e. τὸ πρὸς ταύτην.

17. οὔτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It has not been noticed, so far as I am aware, that Aristotle here tacitly corrects a saying ascribed to Anacharsis in Diod. 9. 26. 3, ὁ δὲ Κροῖσος . . . ἠρώτησεν Ἀνάχαρσιν . . . τίνα νομίζει τῶν ὄντων ἀνδρειότατον· ὁ δὲ τὰ ἀγριώτατα τῶν ζῴων εἶφησε, μόνα γὰρ προθύμως ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Does Aeschylus refer to this view of Anacharsis in Suppl. 760,

ἀλλ' ἔστι φήμη τοὺς λύκους κρείσσους κυνῶν
εἶναι· βύβλου δὲ καρπὸς οὐ κρατεῖ στάχυν?

Plato had already said in Rep. 430 B, δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονυῖαν, τήν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδώδη, οὔτε πάνυ νόμιμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Brave and formidable men, however, were commonly likened to wild animals (Deinon ap. Athen. Deipn. 633 d sq.: Plut. Aristid. c. 18).

19. τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἤθεσιν. Heracles is called by Homer θυμολέων in Il. 5. 639 and Odyss. 11. 267 (cp. Hymn. Homer. 15, εἰς Ἡρακλέα λεοντόθυμον, and see Liddell and Scott, s. v. θυμολέων). Among the lower animals the dog is probably referred to: cp. Plato, Soph. 231 A, καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ. For the gentleness ascribed to the lion cp. Hist. An. 9. 44. 629 b 8, καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέων ἐν τῇ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπώτατός ἐστι, μὴ πεινῶν δὲ καὶ βεβρωκὼς πραότατος: Anal. Pr. 2. 27. 70 b 26, ὁ λέων ἀνδρεῖον καὶ μεταδοτικόν: and Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 16, τὰ δὲ ἐλευθέρια καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ εὐγενῆ, οἷον λέων. Plato also has a favourable opinion of the lion (Rep. 589 B). Yet Homer says of Achilles (Il. 24. 41),

λέων δ' ὡς ἄγρια οἶδεν.

The authorities followed by Pliny ascribed clemency to the lion (Nat. Hist. 8. 48, leoni tantum ex feris clementia in supplices: prostratis parcit et, ubi saevit, in viros potius quam in feminas fremit, in infantes non nisi magna fame).

πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. The sense is—and, so far from courage being the offspring of savageness, there are many very savage races which are wholly devoid of courage. The Achaei and Heniochi dwelt on the East coast of the Euxine. The Heniochi were believed to be an offshoot of the Lacedaemonians (Strabo, p. 496, Λάκωνας δὲ (οἰκίσαι) τὴν Ἡνιοχίαν, ὧν ἦρχον Κρέκας καὶ Ἀμφίστρατος οἱ τῶν Διοσκούρων ἡνίοχοι, καὶ τοὺς Ἡνιόχους ἀπὸ τούτων εἰκὸς ὠνομάσθαι); there is therefore some appropriateness in the reference to them here in an argument directed against Lacedaemonian customs. The wild races on the Euxine are described as θηριώδεις in Eth.

Nic. 7. 6. 1148 b 21 sqq. also. Cannibalism is a sign of *ἀγριότης* (Ephor. Fragm. 76, *τοὺς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι χαλεπούς, ὥστε καὶ ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν*: Aristot. Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 b 1, *ἄγριον καὶ ἀνθρωποφάγον*).

**22.** *τῶν ἠπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν*, 'continental nations,' as distinguished from nations inhabiting islands (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 12, *μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας, ἀλλ' ἠπειρωτικὰ ἔθνη καρπουμένους*). Asiatic nations are probably especially referred to: cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 187, *εἰ τὸν μὲν πόλεμον τὸν νῦν ὄντα περὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τοὺς ἠπειρώτας ποιησαίμεθα, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην διακομίσαιμεν*, and Philip. § 119, where we read of Jason of Pherae, *ἐποιεῖτο γὰρ τοὺς λόγους ὡς εἰς τὴν ἤπειρον διαβησόμενος καὶ βασιλεῖ πολεμήσων*. Continental races were perhaps regarded as wilder than island races; they were less in the way of intercourse with others.

**23.** *λῃστρικά*. Aristotle will not allow that these nations are *πολεμικά*: he slips in the word *λῃστρικά* instead: cp. Demosth. Phil. 1. 23, *ἀλλὰ λῃστεύειν ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ πολέμου χρῆσθαι τὴν πρώτην*, and Strabo, p. 833, where we read of Masinissa, *ἀντὶ τοῦ λῃστεύειν διδάξας (τοὺς νομάδας) στρατεύειν*. In Strabo, p. 508, certain *ἔθνη* are described as *λῃστρικὰ καὶ μάχιμα*.

*ἐστιν—μετειλήφασιν*. For the use in the same passage of a singular and a plural verb after a neut. plur. nominative see Bon. Ind. 490 a 56 sqq.

**24.** *ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας κ.τ.λ.* The sense is—besides, we need not go so far afield as to the races of the Euxine to prove that the Lacedaemonian system of gymnastic training is not the true means of producing courage, for the experience of the Lacedaemonian State has proved this.

**25.** *ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ κ.τ.λ.* *Αὐτοί*, 'alone': see notes on 1252 a 14 and 1278 b 24, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 8. 748 b 5. That the Spartans were thought to be *φιλόπονοι*, we see from Isocr. Archid. § 56, where Archidamus says, *ὁ δὲ πάντων σχετλιώτατον, εἰ φιλοπονώτατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ῥᾳθυμότερον τῶν ἄλλων βουλευσόμεθα περὶ τούτων*.

**26.** *νῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle no doubt has before him in his reference to athletic contests the story told of Epaminondas by Plutarch, Pelop. c. 7, *Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ τοὺς νέους πᾶλαι φρονήματος ἦν ἐμπεπληκώς· ἐκέλευε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ παλαίειν, εἶτα ὁρῶν ἐπὶ τῷ κρατεῖν καὶ περιεῖναι γαυρουμένους ἐπέπληττεν, ὡς αἰσχύνεσθαι μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς προσῆκον, εἰ δουλεύουσι δι' ἀνανδρίαν ὧν τοσοῦτον ταῖς ῥώμαις διαφέρουσιν*. As to the superiority of the Thebans in battle, cp. Diod. 15. 87. 1. For the absence of *ἐν*

before τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 33. ἡττηθέντες τῇ περὶ Ἐρετρίαν ναυμαχίᾳ, and c. 34. l. 4.

**27.** οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Lord Macaulay says the same thing in his note, History of England, c. 23 (Cabinet Edition, vol. viii. p. 13), though he does not refer to the Politics. That at Athens there was no public training for war, we see from Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5 Τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν = τῷ μόνον πρὸς μὴ ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖ according to Bonitz (Ind. 539 a 42), who remarks, 'interdum negatio universo enunciato vel enunciati membro praeponitur cum pertineat ad unum quoddam eius vocabulum,' and gives many other instances.

**28.** For τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον see note on 1281 a 21.

**30.** οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 357, note 3, and cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 a 25, διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι θῆρες ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ ἡ θρασεῖς. It would seem from Plato, Laches 196 E sq. that everybody regarded wild animals as courageous (cp. Laws 963 E). Gryllus is made to argue to this effect in Plut. Gryllus, c. 4. 988 C sq.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων. For the gen. see note on 1259 b 24.

**31.** ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός. Cp. Plato, Laws 641 B, γενόμενοι δὲ τοιοῦτοι (i.e. ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί) τά τε ἄλλα πράττοιεν καλῶς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ νικῷεν τοὺς πολεμίους μαχόμενοι.

**32.** οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but those who throw boys too much into these hard physical exercises and leave them untrained in necessary things make them in truth [not good men, but] sordid, for they make them useful to political science only for one task, and for this, as our inquiry tells us' (cp. 27, λειπομένους ἑτέρων), 'less well than others do.' Cp. [Plato,] Erastae 136 A, καλῶς γέ μοι, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, φαίνει ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ· ἔστι γὰρ ἀτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι μηδ' εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι, ὥστε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀπολελεῖφθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι. Cp. also Plato, Laws 644 A, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν (παιδείαν) ἢ τινα πρὸς ἰσχὺν ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης βάναυσόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι. In τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγώγους ποιήσαντες Aristotle appears to imply that the Lacedaemonian State did not oblige the young Spartan to learn to read and write (see Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 100 sq.). Has

he in his mind the language used by Archidamus (Thuc. 1. 84) not without reference to his own countrymen, *πολύ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὅστις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται?* For *εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες* cp. Hdt. 2. 165, *ἀνέονται ἐς τὸ μάχιμον*, and 167, *τοὺς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνειμένους*.

**35.** **ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος**, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 274 A, *ὡς ὁ λόγος φησίν*, and Soph. 259 C, *ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί*. 'Formula *ὁ λόγος σημαίνει* apud Platonem creberrimi usus est' (see Stallbaum on Plato, Polit. 275 E). In Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 21 we have *σημαίνει ὁ λόγος οὗτος*: cp. also Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 34, *ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον κ.τ.λ.*

**36.** **δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, 'and we ought to judge [whether they train them worse than others do]' etc. This remark may probably have reference to a reply of the Lacedaemonians to the Thebans, when the latter bade them fight or acknowledge their inferiority to the Thebans; the Lacedaemonians answered, *περὶ μὲν τοῦ πότεροι βελτίους τὰς πράξεις κρίνειν τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἑκατέροις πεπραγμένας κ.τ.λ.* (Aristid. Or. in Platon. 4. ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 248. 425 a 21 sqq. Bekker).

**37.** **ἀνταγωνιστὰς τῆς παιδείας**, 'rivals in gymnastic education' (Sepulv. 'concertatores et aemulos disciplinae').

**40.** **μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle would no doubt exclude at this age the pancration and the pentathlon, which were among the *βαρύτερα ἆθλα* (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 179: Paus. 6. 24. 1), and would probably desire that contests even in running and leaping should be made as little exacting as possible. In the Panathenaea at one time boys contended in the pentathlon, but later on this was dropped (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 373). See vol. i. p. 358, note 1, and cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 24 sq. In Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 26 *sub fin.* it is implied that *ἀναγκαῖα ἆθλα* are not suitable for a boy of fifteen.

**τὴν βίαιον τροφήν**, 'the constrained diet of athletes': see Liddell and Scott s.v. *ἀναγκοτροφέω*, and cp. Hippocr. De Diaet. 1. vol. i. p. 664 Kühn, *γυμνασίων τῶν ἀπὸ βίης γινομένων*.

**41.** **τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους**. Cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 16, *οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων*.

1. **δύνανται**, sc. *ἡ βίαιος τροφὴ καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνοι*. If with 1339 a. P[1.3.4] Bekk. we read *δύναται*, we must supply *τὰ ἀναγκαῖα γυμνάσια* (cp. 4).

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὀλυμπιονίκαις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle would seem to have had a list of Olympic victors before him, and possibly not merely the list inscribed on stone at Olympia, but a list in the form of a book. 'With the year B.C. 776 began the list of Olympic victors used by the Alexandrian writers on chronology. A list of this kind was first published by the sophist Hippias of Elis, a contemporary of Socrates (Plut. Numa, c. 1: cp. Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 61 and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 958. 1). The list was later dealt with by Aristotle and others' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 585). See on this subject Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 109. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 1. 104. 1): V. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 545 sqq.: Heitz, Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 254. Milo of Crotona was one of the exceptions: he won in the wrestling-match for boys at Olympia, and also won in the wrestling-match for men at six Olympic festivals between B.C. 532 and 512 (Holm, Gr. Gesch. 1. 439). In Herondas 1. 50 sqq. Gryllus, the hero of the piece, is said to have achieved almost as much.

3. ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 a 15, *τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν.*

4. ὅταν δ' ἀφ' ἥβης κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 358, note 2. The 'other studies' are reading and writing, music and drawing. Plato, on the other hand (Laws 809 E sqq.), allots three years (aet. 10–13) to reading and writing, and three more (aet. 13–16) to lessons on the harp. Aristotle evidently thinks it better to postpone these studies till after the attainment of puberty. His view is that mental work is not favourable to the body (1339 a 7 sqq.), and he desires that the important physical change involved in the attainment of puberty should have been safely and well achieved before any mental training begins. By ἥβη Aristotle evidently means (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1, *τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως*) not the attainment of the age at which youths arrived at ἥβη in the eye of the law, but the advent of physical puberty, which seems to be placed in the fourteenth year in Hippocr. Coacae Praenotiones, vol. i. p. 321 Kühn. Aristotle appears to devote to the more exacting kind of gymnastic training all the years intervening between three years after puberty and twenty-one. He makes no provision for the military duties which occupied the young Athenian during his nineteenth and twentieth years (see note on

1336 b 37). We do not learn when the youth of Aristotle's 'best State' were to begin their military training, but they would not do so apparently till after twenty-one. Plato in the Laws (833 D, 834 A) abolishes the heavier kind of gymnastic contests at festivals, such as wrestling and the pancration, but this is perhaps in part because he is legislating for Cretans.

7. ἅμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 359, note 1. This rule does not seem to be observed among ourselves. Much hard work is done on the river and in the football-field by youths who are preparing for difficult examinations. In a lecture before the Sanitary Congress at Brighton in 1890 the late Sir B. Richardson pointed out that in those occupations in which 'mental and bodily work was combined, the strain was most intense, and that those sorts of work should never be carried into weariness' (*Times*, Sept. 1. 1890).

12. καὶ πρότερον, in c. 3. 1337 b 27 sqq. C. 5.

13. For ἐνδόσιμον see Bon. Ind. s. v., where the passage before us is grouped with Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 a 5 sqq., in which passage ἐνδόσιμον = προοίμιον.

14. οὔτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Μετέχειν αὐτῆς, 16, is a vague expression, but probably means 'study it' (cp. παιδεύειν, 27, and see note on 1337 b 29). This question must be settled in order that we may ascertain how music is to be studied, for if it is to be studied for the sake of recreation, the tunes and rhythms to be practised by the pupil will be quite other than those which will be practised by him if it is to be studied for the sake of virtue or intellectual enjoyment. A classification of studies into *al ἠθοποιοί, al πρὸς ἡδονήν τινα καὶ χάριν ἐλευθέριον σπουδαζόμεναι*, and *al εἰς σύνεσιν ἢ πρᾶξιν λεγόμεναι* is implied in Plut. Themist. c. 2—a classification which recalls to some extent that in the passage before us. Compare also the witticism of Dorion, a musician and *bon vivant* of Aristotle's day, about a kind of lobster, *τοὺς δὲ καράβους ἔφη τρία ἔχειν, διατριβὴν καὶ εὐωχίαν καὶ θεωρίαν* (Athen. Deipn. 337 e).

17. καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης. As to sleep, cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 11, *τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς . . . τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἡδέα· διὸ al ῥᾳθυμίαι καὶ al ἀπονίαι καὶ al ἀμέλειαι καὶ al παιδιαὶ καὶ al ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὁ ὕπνος τῶν ἡδέων*, and De Somno et Vigilia 2. 455 b 20 sqq.

ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these things are not in themselves connected with virtue, but are pleasurable and at the same time "bid care to

cease," as Euripides says, [and therefore they are used with a view to relaxation].' For *τῶν σπουδαίων*, cp. Theogn. 115,

*πολλοί τοι πόσιος καὶ βρώσιός εἰσιν ἑταῖροι,*
*ἐν δὲ σπουδαίῳ πρήγματι παυρότεροι,*

and Plato, Symp. 181 A, *οἷον ὁ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν, ἢ πίνειν ἢ ᾄδειν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει ὡς ἂν πραχθῇ, τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη*, and see vol. i. p. 359, note 2. For *οὔτε* followed by *ἀλλά*, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 11 sqq., Magn. Mor. 2. 6. 1203 b 10, *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 16. l. 8, and with Kaibel (Stil und Text der *Πολιτεία Ἀθηναίων*, p. 158), Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 7 sqq. and 2. 21. 1394 a 22, where Roemer reads *οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ κ.τ.λ.* In Metaph. Θ. 3. 1046 b 33–36 *οὔτε* is taken up by *ὁμοίως δέ* (see Bonitz' note on the passage in his edition of the Metaphysics). Aristotle has Eurip. Bacch. 332 Bothe (377 Dindorf) before him, where we read of Bromius,

*ὃς τάδ' ἔχει*
*θιασεύειν τε χοροῖς, μετά τ' αὐλοῦ γελάσαι*
*ἀποπαῦσαί τε μερίμνας, ὁπόταν βότρυος ἔλθῃ*
*γάνος ἐν δαιτὶ θεῶν, κισσοφόροις δ' ἐν θαλίαις*
*ἀνδράσι κρατὴρ ὕπνον ἀμφιβάλλῃ.*

Here, as he says in 19–21, *ὕπνος μέθη μουσική* and *ὄρχησις* are all grouped together. The same is the case in Hom. Il. 13. 636 (cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 23),

*πάντων μὲν κόρος ἐστί, καὶ ὕπνου καὶ φιλότητος*
*μολπῆς τε γλυκερῆς καὶ ἀμύμονος ὀρχηθμοῖο,*

and Odyss. 8. 248,

*αἰεὶ δ' ἡμῖν δαίς τε φίλη κίθαρίς τε χοροί τε*
*εἵματά τ' ἐξημοιβὰ λοετρά τε θερμὰ καὶ εὐναί.*

Cp. also Athen. Deipn. 40 a.

**19.** *διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν* κ.τ.λ. Supply *μετὰ πάντων τούτων* from what follows. Cp. 1339 b 14, *εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν* (sc. *πάντων*), c. 7. 1342 a 14, where *πάντας* must be supplied with *κουφίζεσθαι*, 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 37, *καὶ περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινῶσιν ἀλλ' ἀκολουθῶσι* (sc. *τῷ νόμῳ*), and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 31, where *εἰς τὴν σύνοδον ταύτην* is suppressed after *ἀπαντῶσιν*.

**21.** *τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις.* This view implied that dancing is a cure for care. The sight of dancing must apparently be meant. Lucian says (De Saltat. c. 79), *οὕτω δὲ θέλγει ὄρχησις, ὥστε . . . λύπῃ ἐχόμενός (τις) ἐξέρχεται τοῦ θεάτρου φαιδρότερος ὥσπερ τι φάρμακον ληθεδανὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν νηπενθές τε καὶ ἄχολον*

πιῶν. He goes further in c. 81, and claims that it has a good ethical effect on the spectator.

ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν κ.τ.λ. This is answered in 1340 b 10 sqq. Ἀρετήν, 'moral virtue,' is represented by παιδείαν in c. 5. 1339 b 13 (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 38), for education is commonly connected by Aristotle with the production of moral virtue: cp. c. 7. 1342 a 2, πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις (ἁρμονίαις χρηστέον).

26. φρόνησιν, 'intellectual culture': see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 772. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 309. 3), and Sus.[2], Note 1023 (Sus.[4], 1. p. 585), who rightly defend the words καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν against those who would expunge them or change φρόνησιν into εὐφροσύνην. That the study of music may contribute to intellectual virtue is implied in c. 6. 1341 b 6 sq., and that intellectual virtue is the ultimate end of education we see from 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 14 sqq. For the use of φρόνησις in this sense, see Bon. Ind. 831 b 4 sqq.

τρίτον τῶν εἰρημένων, 'third among the aims which have been enumerated': see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἀλλὰ μήν, 29. Stallbaum on Plato, Protag. 326 A, compares Xen. Cyrop. 2. 2. 14, κλαύμασι μέν γε καὶ πατέρες υἱοῖς σωφροσύνην μηχανῶνται καὶ διδάσκαλοι παισὶν ἀγαθὰ μαθήματα. Is Aristotle here tacitly correcting Plato, Laws 819 B, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοὺς ἀτεχνῶς παισὶν ἐξευρημένα μαθήματα, μετὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μανθάνειν, and 820 D, ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Κλεινία, φημὶ τοὺς νέους δεῖν μανθάνειν· καὶ γὰρ οὔτε βλαβερὰ οὔτε χαλεπά ἐστι, μετὰ δὲ παιδιᾶς ἅμα μανθανόμενα ὠφελήσει μέν, βλάψει δὲ ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐδέν;

29. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγήν γε παισὶν κ.τ.λ. For ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ . . . γε, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 30, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου, and 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 7. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 15) has anticipated me in comparing these passages.

30. οὐδενὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 b 7, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὔδαιμον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον: Stob. Ecl. 2. 6. 12, καὶ τὸ ἐν βίῳ δὲ τελείῳ προσέθεσαν, ἐνδείξασθαι βουληθέντες ὅτι περὶ τοὺς ἤδη προήκοντας ἄνδρας ἡ εὐδαιμονία γίγνεται· τὸ γὰρ μειράκιον ἀτελὲς καὶ ὁ τούτου βίος, δι' ὃ οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ τοῦτ' εὐδαιμονίαν. Cp. also Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 186, αἶξ οὔπω τέτοκεν, ἔριφος δ' ἐπὶ δώματι παίζει: ἐπὶ τῶν οὔπω τεχθέντων ἢ γεγονότων, ἀλλ' ἀτελῶν ὄντων καὶ τὰ τῶν τελείων θελόντων ποιεῖν.

**31. ἀλλ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ.** The sense is—but perhaps the toils of boyhood in learning to play may, notwithstanding what has been said, be for the sake of pastime, not indeed for the sake of pastime in youth, but for the sake of pastime in manhood. The Lacedaemonian Leotychidas, the first in the royal line to bear this name at Sparta, in answer to the question, *Τί δεῖ μάλιστα μανθάνειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους παῖδας;* said, *Ταῦτα, ὅσ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ὠφελήσειεν ἄνδρας γενομένους* (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Leotych. 3), and Aristippus replied to a similar question, *Οἷς ἄνδρες γενόμενοι χρήσονται* (Diog. Laert. 2. 80).

**33. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ.**, i.e. *εἰ ἡ τῶν παίδων σπουδὴ ἐστι παιδιᾶς χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν.* The supposition is somewhat of a paradox: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 32, *σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ.* The Persian kings had *μουσουργοί* attached to their court (Xen. Cyrop. 4. 6. 11). Compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, *ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιτερπῶς ἔν τινι κίθαρᾳ ψήλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς εἶπεν, "Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλων;" ἀρκεῖ γάρ, ἂν βασιλεὺς ἀκροᾶσθαι ψαλλόντων σχολάζῃ, καὶ πολὺ νέμει ταῖς Μούσαις ἑτέρων ἀγωνιζομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεατὴς γεγνόμενος. Αὐτὸ ποιούντων*, i.e. *χειρουργούντων*, which is implied in *μανθάνειν αὐτούς* (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 3). So we have in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 30, *ὁρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι*, and in Plato, Rep. 498 A, *ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων.*

**38. ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον.** Cp. Plato, Laws 794 C, *ἐὰν δέ τῳ ξυγχωρῶσι, μέχρι γε μαθήσεως καὶ τὰ θήλεα*, and Protag. 312 B, *τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἑκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει*, and Isocr. De Antid. § 264, *ταῦτα δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀπηκριβωμένους οὐδὲν ἂν εὐεργετήσειε, πλὴν τοὺς ἐντεῦθεν ζῆν προῃρημένους, τοὺς δὲ μανθάνοντας ὀνίνησι.*

**39. τὰ τοιαῦτα**, 'things such as have been mentioned,' but what things are meant? 'Things which will be a source of pleasure in after-years' (so Vict.), or 'things which afford pleasure' (Sus.[4]), or 'musical performances' (Welldon)? The question is not free from doubt, but I incline to the third interpretation, as *ταῦτα* in 41 seems to mean 'musical performances,' and not *τὰ δυνάμενα τὰ ἤθη βελτίω ποιεῖν.*

**καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄψων πραγματείαν κ.τ.λ.** Richards is probably right in adding *τά* before *περί* (see critical note), though we expect *τὰ ὄψα* with *παρασκευάζειν* rather than the cumbrous periphrasis *τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄψων πραγματείαν.* If the reading of the MSS. is retained, *ὄψα* or some such word must be supplied with *παρασκευάζειν.* Bonitz

(Ind. s.v.) explains *πραγματεία* as 'rei alicuius tractatio via ac ratione instituta.' *Παρασκευάζειν* is especially used of cooks: cp. Plato, Gorg. 518 B, *οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασι σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον.* Cookery no less than music is a source of refreshment and pleasure to grown-up men. But it was regarded by the Greeks as work for slaves (1. 7. 1255 b 23–27: Plut. Lycurg. et Num. comp. c. 2, *ἀλλ' ἦν ἡ περὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευὴ δεδομένη δούλοις καὶ Εἵλωσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ περὶ τὸ δεῖπνον καὶ ὄψον διακονία*: Pomp. c. 73, *καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτου περιέπων καὶ θεραπεύων ὅσα δεσπότας δοῦλοι μέχρι νίψεως ποδῶν καὶ δείπνου παρασκευῆς*). Has Sextus Empiricus this passage of the Politics before him in Adv. Math. 6. 33, *καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μή ποτε, ὃν τρόπον χωρὶς ὀψαρτυτικῆς καὶ οἰνογευστικῆς ἡδόμεθα ὄψου ἢ οἴνου γευσάμενοι, ὧδε καὶ χωρὶς μουσικῆς ἡσθείημεν ἂν τερπνοῦ μέλους ἀκούσαντες?*

**41.** ἔχει, sc. *ἡ μουσική*.

**42.** ταῦτα, i.e. musical performances.

**1.** ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, i.e. *μανθάνειν δύνασθαι* 1339 b.
*ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ ὀρθῶς κρίνειν*, or in other words to learn to become better in character: cp. 1340 a 15, *τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν*. For the place of *δύνασθαι* cp. c. 3. 1337 b 31, and see note on 1281 a 26.

**2.** ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Athenaeus may have this passage before him in Deipn. 628 b, *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ', εἰ μὲν ἐμάνθανον τὴν μουσικήν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν· ὅτι δὲ κρίνειν δύνανται καλῶς τὴν τέχνην ὁμολογεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν, καί φασι τρὶς ἤδη σεσωκέναι διαφθειρομένην αὐτήν.* The Spartans learnt to sing (Plut. Lycurg. c. 21), and we read in c. 6. 1341 a 33 of one Spartan at any rate who had learned to play on the *αὐλός*—indeed, the Peripatetic Chamaeleon, a pupil of Aristotle, asserted that at one time they commonly learnt to play on the *αὐλός* (Athen. Deipn. 184 d)—but it would seem that in Aristotle's day they did not commonly learn to play on any instrument.

**7.** οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς κ.τ.λ. It is Apollo, not Zeus, whom the poets represent as singing and playing on the harp (Eurip. Ion 827 Bothe, 905 Dindorf, *σὺ δὲ κιθάρᾳ κλάζεις παιᾶνας μέλπων*). In the older poetic descriptions, however, according to Preller, Griech. Mythologie 1. 215, Apollo does not sing but only plays, while the Muses sing to his playing (e.g. in Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 201 sqq.). For *τοῖς ποιηταῖς*, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 423. 3, where Plato, Rep. 389 E, *Ὁμήρῳ*, and Laws 706 D, *αὐτῷ*, are compared. Vahlen (Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 417) compares Poet. 18.

1456 a 25, τὸν χορὸν δεῖ . . . συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδῃ ἀλ' ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ. Aristotle elsewhere uses the form ᾄδειν: he may possibly use ἀείδειν here because he is quoting from a poet.

9. τοὺς τοιούτους, i. e. τοὺς ἀείδοντας καὶ κιθαρίζοντας. In Hom. Odyss. 17. 382 sqq. the ἀοιδός is counted among δημιοῦργοί. Compare Croesus' advice to Cyrus as to the Lydians (Hdt. 1. 155) πρόειπε δ' αὐτοῖσι κιθαρίζειν τε καὶ ψάλλειν καὶ καπηλεύειν παιδεύειν τε παῖδας· καὶ ταχέως σφέας, ὦ βασιλεῦ, γυναῖκας ἀντ' ἀνδρῶν ὄψεαι γεγενημένους, ὥστε οὐδὲν δεινοί τοι ἔσονται μὴ ἀποστέωσι.

καὶ τὸ πράττειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hom. Odyss. 14. 463,

οἶνος γὰρ ἀνώγει
ἠλεός, ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολύφρονά περ μάλ' ἀείσαι
καί θ' ἁπαλὸν γελάσαι καί τ' ὀρχήσασθαι ἀνῆκεν,
καί τι ἔπος προέηκεν, ὅπερ τ' ἄρρητον ἄμεινον.

13. παιδείαν. See above on 1339 a 21. Παιδείαν corresponds to τὰ ἤθη βελτίω ποιεῖν, 1339 a 41.

14. εἰς πάντα τάττεται. Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 7, ὅσα εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἅπαντες τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.

15. μετέχειν, sc. πάντων. See above on 1339 a 19.

ἥ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ κ.τ.λ., 'for pastime [must be pleasurable, since it] is for the sake of relaxation and relaxation must be pleasurable, for it is a cure for the pain which is produced by toil, [and things are cured by their contraries].' For the famous principle that things are cured by their contraries, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 17, ἰατρεῖα γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι (see Stewart) and 4. 11. 1126 a 21 sq. Aristotle inherits this principle from Hippocrates: cp. Hippocr. Aphorism. vol. iii. p. 714 Kühn, ἀπὸ πλησμονῆς ὁκόσα ἂν νοσήματα γένηται, κένωσις ἰῆται, καὶ ὁκόσα ἀπὸ κενώσιος πλησμονή, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡ ὑπεναντίωσις, and De Natura Hominis, vol. i. p. 361 Kühn. Compare with τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν κ.τ.λ. Pindar, Nem. 4. 1,

ἄριστος εὐφροσύνα πόνων κεκριμένων
ἰατρός.

In the passage before us and in c. 3. 1337 b 36 sqq. we get a glimpse of Aristotle's Theory of Relaxation, if he can be said to have one. The essential thing about relaxation is that *it must be* pleasurable. Toil causes pain and pain is cured by its opposite; hence if the pain of toil is cured by relaxation, relaxation *must be* pleasurable. Play is a means of relaxation, but there are other means also—sleep and conviviality (1339 a 16 sqq.). *Sleep and* conviviality heal care as well as the pain of toil (ibid.); whether

play does so we are not told. Play, unlike sleep, involves movement (4 (7). 17. 1336 a 26 sqq.); it may even be toilsome, though it is a cure for toil (1336 a 28 sqq.). Unlike sleep, again, it may be of a right or a wrong kind ethically; it may, for instance, be illiberal (1336 a 29: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 17 sqq.); hence it may affect the character for good or ill. In infancy no toil is undergone, so that the play of infancy does not come as a relaxation after toil. Aristotle distinguishes diagogê from relaxation, for though diagogê is pleasurable, it has in it an element of *τὸ καλόν* which relaxation has not (1339 b 17 sqq.). We may probably infer that diagogê will not serve as relaxation. Does it need to be followed by relaxation as *ἀσχολία* does? Aristotle does not consider this question, but the answer to it is probably in the negative. It is true that the activities called into play in diagogê are activities of so high a kind (see note on 1333 a 35) that they may well cause fatigue needing to be removed by relaxation, but we must remember on the other hand that Aristotle regards them as pleasurable (c. 5. 1339 b 17 sqq.) and desirable for their own sake. *Ἀσχολία* is accompanied by pain (c. 3. 1337 b 39), and hence the need that it should be followed by relaxation.

**19.** *τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν κ.τ.λ.*, 'for happiness, [which is an accompaniment of diagogê,] consists of both these things.' See vol. i. p. 296, note 1, and cp. Stob. Ecl. 2. 6. 12, *ἥδιστον γάρ τι καὶ κάλλιστον εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν*. That happiness is an accompaniment of diagogê, we see from c. 3. 1338 a 1 sqq.

**20.** *καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν*. Plato (Laws 669 D sqq.) objects to *ψιλὴ μουσική*. 'Fuit autem *ψιλοκιθαριστικῆς* auctor Aristonicus, aequalis fere Archilochi' (cp. Athen. Deipn. 637 f), 'atque *ψιλὴν αὐλησιν* sub initium Pythiadum exercuit Sacadas' (Stallbaum on Laws 669 D).

**21.** Μουσαῖος. See note in Sus.[4].

**22.** *καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγάς*. See critical note on 1330 b 31.

**24.** *ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν κ.τ.λ.* *Ἐντεῦθεν*, i. e. from the fact of its pleasantness. *Παιδεύεσθαι* is probably middle: cp. 1340 b 13.

**25.** *ὅσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 'for things harmlessly pleasant, [of which music is one,] are suitable not only for the end' (i. e. happiness), 'but also for relaxation.' That the pleasure derived from music is harmless had already been said by Plato (Laws 670 D, *ἵνα . . . ᾄδοντες αὐτοί τε ἡδονὰς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀσινεῖς ἥδωνται κ.τ.λ.*). Plato had also connected harmless pleasure with pastime in Laws 667 E,

ΚΛ. ἀβλαβῆ λέγεις ἡδονὴν μόνον. ΑΘ. ναί, καὶ παιδιάν γε εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην λέγω τότε, ὅταν μήτε τι βλάπτῃ μήτε ὠφελῇ σπουδῆς ἕνεκα λόγου ἄξιον For ἁρμόττειν πρός, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10, ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαν ἁρμόττει πόλιν, and Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 34.

**27.** For ἐν τῷ τέλει γίνεσθαι cp. Plato, Laws 635 C, γεγονόμενοι ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ('dum versantur in voluptatibus,' Stallbaum), and 841 C γεγονὸς ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, and Phileb. 35 E.

**29.** οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον, apparently 'not merely with a view to a further end' (Vict. 'non ut plus inde capiant'). I have not happened to meet with a parallel to this use of ἐπὶ πλέον. For οὐχ ὅσον in the sense of 'not only,' cp. Thuc. 4. 62. 2 (Liddell and Scott).

**30.** διαναπαύειν, 'to let them rest awhile' (Liddell and Scott).

**31.** συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—but men are not content with using pastime as a means of obtaining the relaxation and pleasure of which they often stand in need; they fall into the error of confounding it with the end of life, and seek happiness in the pleasures arising from it. Pastime is χρήσιμον (1339 b 30), or in other words a means to the end (Eth. Nic. 8. 2. 1155 b 19 sq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 7, χρήσιμον καὶ ἄλλου χάριν), but instead of regarding it thus, they take it to be the end of life.

**33.** ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, 'but not any chance kind of pleasure.' Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 211), compares Poet. 14. 1453 b 10, οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν, and 26. 1462 b 13, δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς (i.e. tragedy and epic poetry) ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην. Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Laws 658 E, συγχωρῶ δή τό γε τοσοῦτον καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδονῇ κρίνεσθαι, μὴ μέντοι τῶν γε ἐπιτυχόντων, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκείνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην, ἥτις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει.

ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην κ.τ.λ., 'and seeking this' (i.e. the pleasure of the end) 'they take the other' (i.e. the pleasure of pastime) 'as being this.' Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 2, οἱ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης, and see note on that passage.

**36.** αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν, 'the pleasures we have mentioned,' i.e. the pleasures of pastime. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 9, καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι (sc. καθ' αὑτάς εἰσιν αἱρεταί)· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται, and 34, ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. See note in Sus.[4].

**38.** For the needless addition of αἰτίαν in the relative sentence,

cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3, *ὁπόσαι μὲν σωτηρίαν φέρουσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, χρησταὶ οὖσαι καὶ μὴ χρησταί, ἢ κίνδυνον τῷ δήμῳ ἅπαντι, τούτων μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶν οὐδὲν δεῖται ὁ δῆμος μετεῖναι*: Aristot. Hist. An. 2. 11. 503 a 23 sqq.: Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23 sqq. and 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7 sqq.: 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 32–34: 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 10: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19 sqq.

**40.** *περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν* κ.τ.λ. Compare the similarly anacoluthic sentence, 3. 16. 1287 a 8, *περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει πάντα κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς— δοκεῖ δέ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν.* Sus.[4] would supply (after *ἔοικεν*) *εἰκότως ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ζητεῖσθαι* (or *γίνεσθαι*). Perhaps, however, it is simpler to supply *ζητητέον*, which comes to the surface, as it were, in the next sentence. *Κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς*, 'have recourse to music': cp. c. 6. 1341 a 1, *ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυθμῶν κοινωνητέον. Οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην*, sc. *τὴν αἰτίαν.*

**42.** *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Probl. 10. 42. 895 a 33, *ἢ τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκεν, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὅτι ἡ θερμότης κάτω ὁρμᾷ.* A contrast is here drawn between the accidents of a thing and its nature or essence (*φύσις* = *οὐσία*, see Bon. Ind. 545 b 23 sqq., where Metaph. Δ. 4. 1014 b 35, *ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν φύσει ὄντων οὐσία*, is referred to among other passages). For the contrast of *οὐσία* and *συμβεβηκός*, see Metaph. Γ. 4. 1007 a 31 sqq.

**2.** *καὶ δεῖ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 15 sqq. and Probl. 28. 7. 950 a 5, *ἢ διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένας ἡδονὰς κοινὰς εἶναι ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις; ἅτε οὖν οὖσαι κοιναὶ ἀτιμόταται εἰσὶ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ μόναι ἐπονείδιστοι.* The many know not what true pleasure is (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 15). For *τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν*, cp. Metaph. Β. 2. 996 b 28, *τὰς κοινὰς δόξας ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες δεικνύουσιν.* Aristotle implies that this *κοινὴ ἡδονή* does not affect the character or the soul; he probably regards it as pleasure of a merely physical kind. For the view that pleasure which comes by nature is common to all, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 8, *τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικὴ πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δ' ἀμφοῖν*, Phys. 8. 7. 261 b 25 sq., and Plato, Laws 963 E. Cp. also Diphilus, *Πολυπράγμων* Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 407),

> *τόδε δ', ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ γένος ὥσπερ θηρίον*
> *ἐπίβουλόν ἐστι τῇ φύσει καὶ πανταχοῦ.*

**5.** *ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν* κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. 'sed etiam videre numquid ad mores quoque animamque pertineat.' For *συντείνειν πρός*, cp. *Περὶ νεότητος*

καὶ γήρως, 3. 469 a 20, διὰ τί δ' αἱ μὲν τῶν αἰσθήσεων φανερῶς συντείνουσι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν, αἱ δ' εἰσὶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ . . . τὸ αἴτιον τούτων ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται χωρίς. For πρὸς τὸ ἦθος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, cp. 11, τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἤθους, and see note on 1337 a 38: cp. also Plato, Symp. 195 E, ἐν γὰρ ἤθεσι καὶ ψυχαῖς θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν οἴκησιν ἔδρατο (Ἔρως). For συντείνει cp. De Part. An. 3. 4. 667 a 11, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῆς καρδίας κατὰ μέγεθός τε καὶ μικρότητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ μαλακότητα τείνουσί πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἤθη. For the repetition of the preposition see critical note on 1331 b 24. Plato had already said in Rep. 401 D, ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφὴ ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἅπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, τοὐναντίον; (cp. Laws 673 A), and in Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία, ξυγγενεῖς ἔχουσα φορὰς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδοις, τῷ μετὰ νοῦ προσχρωμένῳ Μούσαις οὐκ ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ἄλογον, καθάπερ νῦν, εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνάρμοστον ψυχῆς περίοδον εἰς κατακόσμησιν καὶ συμφωνίαν ἑαυτῇ ξύμμαχος ὑπὸ Μουσῶν δέδοται. Both these passages are probably present to Aristotle's mind here.

9. διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν. Eaton refers to Plato, Symp. 215 C, τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου (i.e. Ὀλύμπου), ἐάν τε ἀγαθὸς αὐλητὴς αὐλῇ ἐάν τε φαῦλη αὐλητρίς, μόνα κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι. Bernays (Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, Note 5) uses the passage before us to show that, when in c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. Aristotle describes the effect of τὰ ἱερὰ μέλη, it is to these melodies of Olympus that he mainly refers. See as to them Sus.[4], 1. 621 sq.

11. ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has to prove that music affects τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, therefore he has to prove that the ἐνθουσιασμός which it admittedly produces is an affection of τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος. Some may have regarded it as a σωματικὸν πάθος, like the πάθη referred to in Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 8 sqq., and others as a special condition of the νοῦς (cp. Plato, Ion 534 B, κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής ἐστι καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 66, περὶ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τὸν ἐνθουσιασμὸν ἑώρων), but Aristotle regards it as connected with an impulse to action (Magn. Mor. 2. 8. 1207 b 4, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ἄνευ λόγου ὁρμὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τι: cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 20. 1190 b 35 sqq.),

and this is perhaps the reason why he here traces it to *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος*. For other *πάθη τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθους*, Bonitz (Ind. 557 b 9) compares Rhet. 2. 9. 1386 b 12, where *τὸ ἐλεεῖν* and *τὸ νεμεσᾶν* are said to be *καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἤθους χρηστοῦ*. Some of the external symptoms of *ἐνθουσιασμός* may be gathered from Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 62 R, *ταῦτα δὲ ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἐνθέων ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, ἀσθμαίνουσα καὶ περιδινοῦσα τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ πειρωμένη δεινὸν ἐμβλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἐγκρατῶς καὶ σωφρόνως*.

**12. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι κ.τ.λ.** Even mere imitative sounds without the aid of melody or rhythm call forth in every one the feelings which they imitate (see vol. i. p. 362, note 3). Thus a single note from the pitch-pipe of a slave was enough to restore calmness and gentleness to the tones of C. Gracchus' oratory when they became harsh and angry (Plut. De Cohib. Ira, c. 6). Aristotle has just been dwelling on the effect of the *melodies* of Olympus, and he now adds this remark in order to guard against the supposition that the effect produced by music on *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος* is due not to its power of imitating ethical states, but to its accompaniments of melody and rhythm. Plato had spoken in Rep. 401 D (see note on 5) as if this was so. Aristotle appears to imply here that the musical imitation of ethical states is possible without the use of rhythm and melody; hence, when in c. 7. 1341 b 23 he speaks as if music was confined to *μελοποιία* and *ῥυθμός*, we must suppose that he refers to music in a somewhat narrower sense.

**14. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν κ.τ.λ.**, 'but since it happens that music belongs to the class of pleasant things, [so that it calls forth feelings of pleasure, and pleasure may be called forth by the right or the wrong objects,] and virtue is concerned with taking pleasure aright and loving and hating aright, it is evident that we ought to learn and to be habituated to nothing so much as to judging aright and taking pleasure in good characters and noble actions, [because it is thus that men learn virtue].' Aristotle proceeds in what follows to show that music is capable of teaching men to take pleasure in noble characters and actions, or in other words to be virtuous (cp. 1340 b 10 sqq.). *Μανθάνειν* is distinguished from *συνεθίζεσθαι* in 16, whereas in 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες*, the word *μανθάνειν* includes both *ἐθίζεσθαι* and *ἀκούειν*.

**18. ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα κ.τ.λ.**, 'and in rhythms and melodies there are images, most nearly approaching the reality, of anger and

gentleness,' etc. It is thus that Sepulveda ('proxime ad veras naturas accedunt'), Vict. ('maxime secundum veras naturas'), Stahr, and Sus. interpret *μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις*: cp. Top. 8. 14. 164 b 19, *ἐκ τῶν παρὰ πόδας*, 'things close to the feet.' Compare Alcidamas, De Sophistis, p. 88, *μιμήματα τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων*, and for *φύσεις* (with Bon. Ind. 838 b 55), Phys. 4. 6. 213 b 24, *ὃ διορίζει τὰς φύσεις* (i. e. *τὰ ὄντα, τὰ σώματα*). Aristotle, who here has before him Plato, Rep. 399 A sqq. (where however only *ἀνδρία* and *σωφροσύνη* are referred to, not *πραότης*), and Laws 654 E, 655 B, and 798 D, appears to imply that the images of emotions and ethical states conveyed in melody and rhythm approach nearer to the original than those conveyed for instance in poetry, except so far as poetry is associated with melody and rhythm. The question might be asked why the young should not be taught to take pleasure in good characters and good acts by a training concerning itself directly with that subject-matter and not merely with images of it, but Aristotle would probably reply that there would not be the same pleasurableness in a training of that kind as there is in a musical training, and that it would not fulfil the end of accustoming the young to take pleasure in the right things.

**20.** *καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις.* Aristotle implies that musical imitations not only of cowardice but also of *ἀκολασία*, the opposite of *σωφροσύνη*, are possible. Music can certainly at any rate imitate *ὕβρις*.

**21.** *τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν*, sc. *παθῶν καὶ ἕξεων τοῦ ἤθους* (Sus.[3] Ind. s. v. *ἠθικός*).

**22.** *μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχήν*, i. e. we experience emotional change: cp. (with Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 336) Rhet. 2. 1. 1378 a 20, *ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία.*

**23.** *τοιούτων*, sc. *ῥυθμῶν καὶ μελῶν.*

**25.** *οἷον εἴ τις κ.τ.λ.* For the thought cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 10 sqq.

*μὴ δι' ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν* is added, because if a man took pleasure in an image (for example) on account of the beauty or costliness of its material, he might not take equal pleasure in the thing of which it is an image. Cp. Poet. 4. 1448 b 15, *διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν*

*καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος, ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς, οὐ διὰ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν.*

**27.** **αὐτὴν ἐκείνην.** Bekk.[2] adopts the emendation of Lambinus and Scaliger, *αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου*, perhaps rightly. If we retain *αὐτὴν ἐκείνην*, we must supply *τούτου* as the antecedent to *οὗ*.

**28.** **συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Eaton and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 132 sq.) compare Probl. 19. 27. 919 b 26, *διὰ τί τὸ ἀκουστὸν μόνον ἦθος ἔχει τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ᾖ ἄνευ λόγου μέλος, ὅμως ἔχει ἦθος· ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ χρῶμα οὐδὲ ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐδὲ ὁ χυμὸς ἔχει· ἢ ὅτι κίνησιν ἔχει μόνον... αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὗται πρακτικαί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἤθους σημασία ἐστίν*, and Probl. 19. 29. 920 a 3 sqq. Prof. Butcher points out that these passages exaggerate the true Aristotelian view, as they deny all ethical suggestiveness to sight as well as to taste and smell. *Ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν* ('other sensible things than things audible') is taken up not by *ἀλλά*, 30, but by *ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς*, 38.

**31.** **σχήματα γάρ ἐστι τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ.**, 'for there are forms that have this power' (i. e. the power of imitating emotions and ethical states), 'but only to a small extent, and all, [even children and worthless men,] share in the perception just referred to.' The painter Parrhasius denied in a conversation with Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 3) that painting can imitate the character of the soul (*τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος*), but was led on by Socrates to a different conclusion (Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 5, *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ τὸ σωφρονικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ ὑβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειρόκαλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἑστώτων καὶ κινουμένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα μιμητά; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη*). Plato went further (Rep. 400 E sq.) and found not only painting, but also weaving, embroidery, building, and the forms of vessels and of animals and plants, full of ethical suggestiveness, but Aristotle rates the ethical suggestiveness of forms and colours lower and finds such suggestiveness, it would seem, only in the human body under the influence of emotion (compare the passage of Xenophon quoted above), or in representations of it. See vol. i. p. 363, note 5. As to *καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν*, see note on 1340 a 2, and vol. i. p. 363, note 3. Spengel and Sus. transpose *ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν* to after *κοινωνοῦσιν*, 32, while E. Müller inserts *οὐ* before *πάντες*, 31. If any change in the text is necessary, of which I do not feel certain, I prefer the former change

to the latter, but it would also be possible to add a second καὶ μικρόν after πάντες, 31. Forms and colours are mentioned as examples of τὰ ὁρατά: cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 a 3, τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ.

32. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the distinction between copies and symbolic representations of an original, see Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 124, who refers to Teichmüller, Aristotelische Forschungen, 2. 145–154, where the subject is fully discussed. 'A sign or symbol has no essential resemblance, no natural connexion, with the thing signified.' Aristotle does not say that painting and sculpture can give only symbolic representations of all that they imitate, but that it is only in this way that they can reproduce character. In τὰ γιγνόμενα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα Aristotle seems to refer to forms and colours in pictures and statues (for we read of painters in Poet. 1. 1447 a 18 as μιμούμενοι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι, cp. Plato, Rep. 373 B), not to attitudes and colours in living men. The words τὰ γιγνόμενα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα are added by an afterthought in explanation of ταῦτα very much as ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφήν is added in 1. 9. 1258 a 16 sqq.: cp. also [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 19, ἀλλὰ ταυτά γε νὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ὄνειδός ἐστιν, ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὰ γιγνόμενα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος. As to the repetition of τῶν ἠθῶν in 33 and 34 see critical notes on 1276 a 21 and 1319 a 33, and explanatory note on 1284 b 28.

34. καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. I now take this to mean, 'and these indications of character occur [only] in the case of the body under the influence of emotions, [so that it is not forms in general, but only a particular kind of forms, that are even indications of character].' I explained this obscure clause otherwise, though with much hesitation, in vol. i. p. 363. For the suppression of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36. For ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος cp. Plut. Sympos. 9. 15. 2. 747 C, ὅταν Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ Πανὸς ἢ τινος Βάκχης σχῆμα διαθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικῶς τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐπιμένωσι. For the fact, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 14, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενταί γε οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν. To many modern minds, however, there seems to be ethical suggestiveness in architecture.

35. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ., 'not but that, so far as it makes a difference in relation to the contemplation of these things also [whether we contemplate one thing or another],' etc. By 'these things' Aristotle means forms and colours.

**36.** δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος κ.τ.λ. Cp. Poet. 2. 1448 a 1, *ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι . . . ἤτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς, Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἴκαζεν.* In this, we learn from what follows, Polygnotus found a parallel in Homer and Pauson in poets far inferior to Homer. In the passage before us it is implied that Pauson was not *ἠθικός*, and according to Sus.[4], 1. p. 624, Aristotle means by 'an artist "full of character" (*ἠθικός*)' one who 'represents noble characters.' The word *ἠθικός* appears to bear this meaning here and in c. 7. 1342 a 3, 28, but in c. 6. 1341 a 21, *ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν*, it evidently means simply 'expressive of ethical character' as distinguished from 'emotional.' In Poet. 6. 1450 a 26 we read of Polygnotus, *οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφὴ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος.* Lysippus may be among the sculptors referred to as *ἠθικοί*: cp. Plut. De Alex. seu Virtute seu Fortuna 2. 2, *διὸ καὶ μόνον Ἀλέξανδρος ἐκέλευε Λύσιππον εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ δημιουργεῖν· μόνος γὰρ οὗτος, ὡς ἔοικε, κατεμήνυε τῷ χαλκῷ τὸ ἦθος αὐτοῦ καὶ συνεξέφερε τῇ μορφῇ τὴν ἀρετήν.* As to the skill of Polygnotus in portraying character, see Brunn, Gesch. der gr. Künstler 2. 40. There were paintings by Polygnotus at Athens in the Stoa Poecilê, in the Anaceium, in a chamber of the Propylaea, and elsewhere, so that his work must have been familiar to Aristotle's hearers. As to Pauson, see Brunn 2. 49 sqq. and Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 212, both of whom take Aristophanes to refer to him in Acharn. 854, Thesmoph. 948 sq., and Plut. 602. If they are right in this, Pauson would seem to have been a contemporary of Aristophanes.

**38.** ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς, 'in melodies taken by themselves' apart from anything else, apart from the person of the singer and from the words sung. Forms and colours, on the other hand, are suggestive of character only in the case of the body under the influence of emotion.

**40.** εὐθὺς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for, to begin with, the nature of harmonies, [which are elements in melody,] is different.' Aristotle goes on to show in 1340 b 7 sqq. that the same thing holds of rhythms, and probably he regarded a melody as made up of harmony and rhythm, just as Plato, who, unlike Aristotle (c. 5. 1339 b 20), did not approve of ψιλὴ μουσική (Laws 669 D sq.), regarded it as made up of words, harmony, and rhythm (Rep. 398 D). If harmonies

affect the *ἦθος* of the hearer differently, it follows that they differ in *ἦθος* and are *μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν*. The word *ἁρμονία* had more meanings than one (Monro, The Modes of Ancient Greek Music, p. 56), but it is evidently used here of the Dorian, Phrygian, and other 'modes,' whatever we take their nature to have been. On this disputed question see (in addition to Sus.[4], 1. p. 624 sqq.) the work of Mr. Monro just referred to, Mr. H. Stuart Jones' review of it in *Class. Rev.* 8. 448 sqq., and Mr. Monro's reply (ibid. 9.79 sqq.).

**41. ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον.** For the pleonasm cp. Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, *τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον*, and see Vahlen on this passage. For the fact cp. Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 6. 48 (p. 757. 29 sqq. Bekker), *οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον ἅπαν διάστημα κατὰ μουσικὴν ἐν φθόγγοις ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὕτω καὶ πᾶν ἦθος. τὸ δ' ἔστι τι γένος μελῳδίας. καθὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἠθῶν τινὰ μέν ἐστι σκυθρωπὰ καὶ στιβαρώτερα, ὁποῖα τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἱστοροῦσιν, τὰ δὲ εὐένδοτα πρὸς ἔρωτας καὶ οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ ὀδυρμοὺς καὶ οἰμωγάς, οὕτω τὶς μὲν μελῳδία σεμνά τινα καὶ ἀστεῖα ἐμποιεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ κινήματα, τὶς δὲ ταπεινότερα καὶ ἀγεννῆ.*

**42. ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 398 D, *ἀλλὰ μέντοι θρήνων τε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔφαμεν ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι; λέγε μοι· σὺ γὰρ μουσικός. Μιξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστὶ καὶ τοιαῦται τινές. Οὐκοῦν αὗται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι· ἄχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιξίν, ἂς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν* (possibly a hit at Sappho, who is credited with the invention of the mixo-Lydian mode by Aristoxenus ap. Plut. De Mus. c. 16), and Laws 800 D, *πᾶσαν βλασφημίαν τῶν ἱερῶν καταχέουσι, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ῥυθμοῖς καὶ γοωδεστάτας ἁρμονίαις συντείνοντες τὰς τῶν ἀκροωμένων ψυχάς, καὶ ὃς ἂν δακρῦσαι μάλιστα τὴν θύσασαν παραχρῆμα ποιήσῃ πόλιν, οὗτος τὰ νικητήρια φέρει.* He also has before him Pratinas ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 f (Pratinas, Fragm. 5),

> *μήτε σύντονον δίωκε μήτε τὰν ἀνειμέναν ἁστὶ μοῦσαν,*
> *ἀλλὰ τὰν μέσαν . . νεῶν ἅρουραν αἰόλιζε τῷ μέλει,*

where, as Sus.[4] points out, the Aeolian mode is described as intermediate between 'high-pitched Ionian' and 'low Ionian.' Pratinas, however, declares in favour, not of the Dorian mode, as Aristotle, but of the Aeolian, later called the hypo-Dorian according to Athen. Deipn. 625 a.

**ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον.** Grief was believed to compress and joy to expand the mind: cp. Eurip. Alcest. 771

Bothe (797 Dindorf), *τοῦ νῦν σκυθρωποῦ καὶ ξυνεστῶτος φρενῶν*, and Hippol. 937 Bothe (983 Dindorf), *μένος μὲν ξύστασίς τε σῶν φρενῶν*, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. 4. 31. 66, eodem enim vitio est effusio animi in laetitia quo in dolore contractio. So the Stoics defined λύπη as *συστολὴ ἄλογος* and explained ἡδονή as *ἔπαρσις* (Diog. Laert. 7. 111, 114: see Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 180). In Laws 800 D (quoted above) Plato had spoken of the ψυχή generally, but Aristotle here speaks more particularly of the *διάνοια* as affected by the various musical modes (cp. 1340 b 2); he regards it as susceptible of compression and relaxation, two extreme states, and also of a mean state of calm. He was led by a false etymology of the Greek word *ἐπιστήμη* to connect wisdom and knowledge with a calm state of mind (Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 10, *τῷ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λέγομεν*, and 18 sqq.), and this is perhaps one reason why he selects the composed and collected Dorian mode for use in education. He feels that anything which calms is useful both morally and intellectually. In Aesch. Suppl. 69,

*τὼς καὶ ἐγὼ φιλόδυρτος Ἰαονίοισι νόμοισι*
*δάπτω τὰν ἀπαλὰν νειλοθερῆ παρειάν*,

the high-pitched variety of the Ionian mode is probably referred to. This variety, which some identify with the mixo-Lydian (see Sus.[4], 1. 625 sqq.), appears to have been expressive of lamentation.

**2. πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας.** 1340 b. Aristotle probably refers to the softer varieties of the Ionian and Lydian modes: cp. Plato, Rep. 398 E, where these varieties (if we follow Mr. H. Stuart Jones' interpretation of the passage in *Class. Rev.* 8. 449, note) are said to be *μαλακαὶ καὶ συμποτικαί*.

**3. μέσως καὶ καθεστηκότως**, 'in a midway state of collectedness and composure': cp. c. 7. 1342 a 10, *καθισταμένους*, and Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 32, *καθεστηκότα*, and for the conjunction of *μέσως* and *καθεστηκότως*, Eth. Eud. 7. 5. 1239 b 35, *εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται*, and 1240 a 2 sq. *Καθίστασθαι* is conjoined with *σωφρονίζεσθαι* in Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 25. As to the Dorian mode, cp. c. 7. 1342 b 12 sqq. Plutarch describes the songs sung by the Spartans as *πολὺ τὸ κόσμιον ἔχοντα καὶ καταστατικόν* (Lycurg. c. 4), and Heracleides Ponticus (ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 d) says of the Dorian mode, *ἡ μὲν οὖν δώριος ἁρμονία τὸ ἀνδρῶδες ἐμφαίνει καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ οὐ διακεχυμένον οὐδ' ἱλαρόν, ἀλλὰ σκυθρωπὸν καὶ σφοδρόν, οὔτε δὲ ποικίλον οὔτε πολύτροπον*: cp. Plut. De Mus. c. 16, *ἡ μὲν (δωριστὶ) τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ἀξιωματικὸν ἀποδίδωσιν*.

4. ἐνθουσιαστικοὺς δ' ἡ φρυγιστί, sc. δοκεῖ ποιεῖν. Cp. 1340 a 10 and c. 7. 1342 b 1 sqq.

5. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently takes his account of the mental effect of each of the harmonies from *οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες*, 'those who had studied musical education.' Some musicians (Damon, for instance, as Sus.[4], 1. p. 596, points out, referring to Plato, Rep. 400 B and 424 C) had probably done this, and also some philosophers (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 27 sqq. and 1342 a 30 sqq.). Among the philosophers would be Plato (Rep. 398 E–399 A and elsewhere) and some of his disciples (Plut. De Mus. c. 3 *init.*), e.g. Heracleides Ponticus, and perhaps, as Eaton says, some Pythagoreans (cp. Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3. 441 E). It has been suggested by Mr. H. Stuart Jones (*Class. Rev.* 8. 450) that Aristotle's view of the mental effect of the various modes rests on a verbal basis, the word *ἀνειμένος* meaning both 'loosely strung' (or 'low-pitched') and 'soft, relaxed,' and the word *σύντονος* both 'highly strung' (or 'high-pitched') and the reverse of 'soft' and 'relaxed'; it appears, however, from the passage before us that his view comes to him from other authorities, so that the verbal confusion supposed to exist would be theirs rather than his. But indeed the emphatic statement in 6, *λαμβάνουσι τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων*, suggests that these authorities arrived at their conclusion inductively by watching the effect of the different modes on individual hearers.

6. λαμβάνουσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Thus they adopt the best method of inquiry: cp. De Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 30, *οὐ μὴν εἴληπταί γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ' ἐάν ποτε ληφθῇ, τότε τῇ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον τῶν λόγων πιστευτέον, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν ὁμολογούμενα δεικνύωσι τοῖς φαινομένοις.*

8. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 3. 8. 1408 b 32, *τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ἴαμβος αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ λέξις τῶν πολλῶν . . . ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος· δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα, ἔστι γὰρ τροχερὸς ῥυθμὸς τὰ τετράμετρα· λείπεται δὲ παιάν*: Poet. 24. 1459 b 34, *τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν . . . τὸ δὲ ἰαμβικὸν καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικά, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν.* As the trochee is *κορδακικώτερος*, it is probably regarded by Aristotle as *φορτικωτέρας ἔχων τὰς κινήσεις*: cp. Athen. Deipn. 631 d, *ὁ μὲν κόρδαξ παρ' Ἕλλησι φορτικὸς ἡ δ' ἐμμέλεια σπουδαία*, and 629 b sq. Compare the striking picture in Plut. Sympos. 7. 5. 1 of the effect produced by a skilful *αὐλῳδός* on the guests at a banquet—*οὐδὲ γὰρ κατακειμένοις ἔτι βοᾶν ἐξήρκει καὶ κροτεῖν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶντες ἀνεπήδων οἱ πολλοί, καὶ*

συνεκινοῦντο κινήσεις ἀνελευθέρους, πρεπούσας δὲ τοῖς κρούμασιν ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν. We read in Plato, Rep. 400 B, of ἀνελευθερίας καὶ ὕβρεως ἡ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, and in Laws 669 C of ῥυθμοὺς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων: cp. also 815 E.

**10.** ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle says nothing about the question raised in c. 5. 1339 a 25, whether music contributes to διαγωγή and φρόνησις.

**12.** εἰ δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. The reason for which Pythagoras employed music in education, according to Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3. 441 E, was akin to this, but not quite the same. Plutarch there says that he ἐπηγάγετο τὴν μουσικὴν τῇ ψυχῇ κηλήσεως ἕνεκα καὶ παραμυθίας, ὡς οὐ πᾶν ἐχούσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ μαθήμασιν ὑπήκοον, οὐδὲ λόγῳ μεταβλητὸν ἐκ κακίας, ἀλλά τινος ἑτέρας πειθοῦς συνεργοῦ καὶ πλάσεως καὶ τιθασσεύσεως δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ παντάπασι μέλλοι φιλοσοφίᾳ δυσμεταχείριστον εἶναι καὶ ἀπειθές.

**15.** οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 b 5 sqq., Plato, Laws 659 E, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδὴν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς παιδιαί τε καὶ φδαὶ καλεῖσθαι (sc. δοκοῦσι) καὶ πράττεσθαι, and Isocr. Areop. § 43, ἑώρων γὰρ ... τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν νεωτέρων) μάλιστα παιδευθῆναι δεομένας ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πόνοις ἡδονὰς ἔχουσιν· ἐν μόνοις γὰρ ἂν τούτοις ἐμμεῖναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρως τεθραμμένους καὶ μεγαλοφρονεῖν εἰθισμένους. Isocrates here (like Plato in Rep. 536 E, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα) adopts the Pythagorean view (Aristox. Fragm. 22: Muller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 279) that study, if it is to come to anything, must be willingly pursued. Aristotle seems to think so too.

**16.** ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. Ἡ μουσική (sc. τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη) is ἡδυσμένη because rhythm and harmony and melody go with it (Poet. 6. 1449 b 28 sqq.). In Poet. 6. 1450 b 15 we read τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πέντε ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, and Prof. Bywater (*Journal of Philology*, xiv. 1885, p. 42) would read ἡδυσμάτων here. Ἀνήδυντον, however, finds a better antithesis in ἡδυσμένων than in ἡδυσμάτων.

**17.** καί τις ἔοικε συγγένεια κ.τ.λ. Supply πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν (see Vol. ii., p. li., note 4). The sense is—and not only is music τῶν ἡδυσμένων, but it is also akin to the soul (which is not the case with all ἡδυσμένα), and therefore still more congenial to it than those ἡδυσμένα which are not akin to it. I cannot follow Sus. in transposing 17–19 to after ἐλευθεριωτέρας, 10. Cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία, ξυγγενεῖς ἔχουσα φορὰς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδοις, κ.τ.λ.,

and Probl. 19. 38. 920 b 33, *ῥυθμῷ δὲ χαίρομεν διὰ τὸ γνώριμον τι τεταγμένον ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν καὶ κινεῖν ἡμᾶς τεταγμένως· οἰκειοτέρα γὰρ ἡ τεταγμένη κίνησις φύσει τῆς ἀτάκτου, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον.* That which is akin to the soul is likely to be suitable to it (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 15: Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1178 a 5, *τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ*: Plato, Lysis 214 B, 221 E sq.).

18. **διὸ πολλοί** κ.τ.λ. The Pythagoreans held that the soul is a harmony, and two of Aristotle's disciples, Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus, followed them in this opinion (see Sus.[4], 1. 597, who refers to Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 444 and 2. 2. 888, 890 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, vol. ii. p. 436 sqq.): cp. De An. 1. 4. 407 b 27 sqq.). The view that the soul has harmony is that of Plato (Phaedo 93: see Sus.[4], ibid.). For the two views cp. De Caelo 1. 1. 268 a 4, *τῶν γὰρ φύσει συνεστώτων τὰ μέν ἐστι σώματα καὶ μεγέθη, τὰ δ' ἔχει σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, τὰ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἐχόντων εἰσίν*, and Plut. Camill. c. 20, *κίνησίς τίς τις ἡ σύν τινι κινήσει πάντως ἡ γένεσις.*

C. 6. 20. **χειρουργοῦντας** takes the place of *κιθαρίζοντας* (c. 5. 1339 b 8) partly because Aristotle does not wish to prejudge the question of the *αὐλός*, partly because the use of the word *χειρουργεῖν* serves to place in a strong light the doubtfulness of the point, the Greeks being prejudiced against *χειρουργία*. We shall find in the sequel that Aristotle seeks to confine *χειρουργία* within as narrow limits as possible (cp. 1340 b 35 sqq. and 1341 b 1). He nowhere considers the possible alternative of teaching the young to sing but not to play. The two things usually went together in ancient Greece, so far at any rate as solo-singers were concerned; the singer was expected to be able to accompany himself on the lyre.

21. **πρότερον**, in c. 5. 1339 a 33 sqq.

22. **οὐκ ἄδηλον** κ.τ.λ. This takes up 10 sqq., *ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων* κ.τ.λ. For *ποιούς τινας* cp. c. 5. 1339 a 22, *ὡς δυναμένην . . . καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς.* To become *ποιοί τινες* is to acquire a certain *ἕξις* (Categ. 8. 8 b 25, *ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες εἶναι λέγονται· ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν*), and it is by acquiring the appropriate *δύναμις* or *ἕξις* that we become able to judge of things (De An. 3. 3. 428 a 3). But the *ἕξις* is acquired by practice (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 31, *τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν* κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle's language here seems hardly consistent with his language in Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 7 sqq. He does not speak there as if it was

necessary to have learnt to sing and play in order to judge of music aright. We are told, again, in 3. 11. 1282 a 17 sqq. that there are arts in which the user is a better judge than the master of the art. Are we to infer that music is not one of these? Besides, Aristotle's teaching in the passage before us appears to imply that we ought to practise in youth all kinds of music—not merely the ethical kind, which he alone recommends for use in the education of the young (c. 7. 1342 a 2), but also practical and enthusiastic airs, for otherwise how can we judge of these aright?—and indeed all arts of the products of which we desire to become good judges (e.g. poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture, to say nothing of the useful arts). This he does not seem to have observed. His experience as to music evidently was that those who did not practise the art up to a certain point were apt to rest content with music possessing merely a physical charm—the music which pleased slaves and children—and did not acquire a liking for noble music. By 'good judges' Aristotle clearly means not good judges of music from a technical point of view, but men capable of taking pleasure in ethically good music (cp. c. 5. 1340 a 17 and 1339 a 24). The difference between *γίγνεσθαι*, 22, and *γενέσθαι*, 25, may be illustrated by Plato, Theaet. 155 C, *ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον* (sc. *ἐμὲ ἐλάττω*): see also Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 97.

25. **ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας ἄχειν τινὰ διατριβήν.** The value of education in keeping boys out of mischief is recognized by Isocrates in Panath. § 27 and Areop. § 45: cp. Plato, Protag. 326 A. 'Children are sent to school as much to keep them out of harm's way as to prepare them for after-life,' observes a writer in the *Academy* for Nov. 9, 1895, who probably remembers and extends to all children a remark as to little children which has been pointed out to me in *Spectator*, No. 330 (March 19, 1712), 'as little children are sent to school before they are capable of improvement, only to be out of harm's way.'

26. **τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγήν.** As to the rattle of Archytas, cp. Plut. Sympos. 7. 10. 1, *εἰ δὲ μή, δοτέον ὥσπερ παισὶν ἀτρεμεῖν μὴ δυναμένοις, οὐ δόρυ καὶ ξίφος, ἀλλὰ πλαταγὴν καὶ σφαῖραν* (cp. Anthol. Pal. 6. 309), *ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς τὸν νάρθηκα τοῖς μεθύουσιν ἐνεχείρισε κουφότατον βέλος καὶ μαλακώτατον ἀμυντήριον, ὅπως, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα παίουσιν, ἥκιστα βλάπτωσι*: Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 213 (where however the invention is ascribed to an Archytas who was a *τέκτων*):

Lucr. 5. 229. Archytas was fond of playing with children (Aelian, Var. Hist. 12. 15: Athen. Deipn. 519 b). Πλαταγαί, however, appear to have existed before the time of Archytas, for they were known to Hellanicus and to Pherecydes of Athens (see Göttling's note on the passage before us, and Hellan. Fragm. 61, Pherecyd. Fragm. 3: in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 53, 78). As to the form Ἀρχύτου see critical note.

**29.** οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. Sus.[4] compares Plato Laws 653 D, φησὶ δὲ τὸ νέον ἅπαν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Laws 664 E. Aristot. Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 18, διὸ καὶ τὰ παιδία οὔτε μανθάνειν δύναται οὔτε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁμοίως κρίνειν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις· πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ ταραχὴ καὶ ἡ κίνησις, and Plut. Sympos. 7. 10. 1, quoted above on 26.

**30.** ἡ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγὴ τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. Are these words present to the mind of the writer of Virg. Catal. 7,

> Et vos, Stiloque Tarquitique Varroque,
> Scholasticorum natio madens pingui,
> Ite hinc, inane cymbalon iuventutis?

**33.** τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις κ.τ.λ. Here the difficulty raised in c. 5. 1339 b 8, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος, is taken up and answered.

**34.** λῦσαι, sc. τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν: cp. 40 sqq.

**35.** πρῶτον μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for first, since it is [only] for the sake of judging of music that they are to practise playing [and not for the sake of perfect mastery of execution], on account of this they should indeed practise playing in youth, but as they become older, they should be released from playing, and yet be able to distinguish noble airs and to take pleasure in music aright, thanks to the training which they have received in youth.' Though it is provided here that, as men cease to be youthful, they shall be excused playing on an instrument, singing is apparently contemplated even in the case of aged men in c. 7. 1342 b 20 sqq., if this passage is genuine. Aristotle would seem to be less favourable to playing in the case of adult citizens than many were: not a few Pythagoreans played on the harp (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 39. 113: Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 23), and on the αὐλός (Athen. Deipn. 184 e), and so did Epaminondas (Athen. ibid.: Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 2. 4). Socrates learnt the harp in old age (Diog. Laert. 2. 32: Val. Max. 8. 7. Ext. 8).

**42.** μέχρι τε πόσου κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 2. 1337 b 15 sqq., and see note. This question receives an answer in 1341 a 5–17. Τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν, 'those who are being educated with a view to excellence as citizens,' and not with a view to excellence as musical executants. Πολιτικήν is emphasized by its position in the sentence. So in De Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 29 sqq. a contrast is implied between ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετή (including perhaps ἠθικὴ ἀρετή and φρόνησις) and ἡ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀρετή. Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 183, τοῖς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένοις, μὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ὀνομαζομένης καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς μετ' εὐσεβείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐγγιγνομένης, and see note on 1280 b 5.

**1.** καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυθμῶν κοινωνητέον. The question 1341 a.
as to the melodies is answered in 1341 a 9 sqq. and in c. 7. 1341 b 19 sqq., but the question as to the rhythms is not answered in what we possess of the Politics (see vol. i, p. 367, and vol. ii, p. xxviii sq.). We may probably infer, however, from c. 5. 1340 b 7 sqq. that the rhythms used in education will be οἱ ἔχοντες ἦθος στασιμώτερον.

**2.** ἔτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὀργάνοις κ.τ.λ. Answered in 1341 a 17–b 8. Ἐν is used here of the 'medium' of instruction, as it is often used in the Poetics (e.g. in Poet. 1. 1447 b 29) of the medium of imitation (see Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 24: Bon. Ind. 245 b 42 sqq.): cp. Plato, Laches, 182 A, οἱ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὀργάνοις γυμναζόμενοι.

**4.** τρόπους τινὰς τῆς μουσικῆς, 'some kinds of music' (for the use of τρόποι in the sense of εἴδη see Bon. Ind. 772 b 30 sqq.). Οἱ τεχνικοὶ τρόποι τῆς μουσικῆς, οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας (1341 b 10), are referred to: cp. 1341 b 14 sqq.

**6.** μήτε ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον πράξεις. It is implied that the study of music might stand in the way of a citizen's work in after-life without harming the body. It might do so if it lowered the character or enfeebled the intelligence (c. 2. 1337 b 8–11), and this result might well follow if music were studied as festival-performers study it.

**7.** μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάναυσον καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὕστερον. By τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις Aristotle probably means 'military and civic training,' 'training designed to develope military and civic virtue': cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 5, μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς, 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 42, τοῖς

πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν, and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8–11. The words πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὕστερον appear to be added in explanation and limitation of ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, but their meaning is by no means clear. Coray's note on them is "οὐκ ἔρρωται τὸ χωρίον." Some explain τὰς χρήσεις (in the sense of doing the thing studied) as one form of the military and civic training referred to and τὰς μαθήσεις as another and regard χρήσεις as preceding μαθήσεις, because in any training designed to produce good soldiers and citizens practice comes first and instruction in the theory afterwards (cp. c. 3. 1338 b 4, Metaph. Θ. 5. 1047 b 31 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 31 sqq. and 10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.). But what χρήσεις πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαί can the boys to whom Aristotle refers be said to perform? Bojesen, on the other hand, followed by Sus., interchanges χρήσεις and μαθήσεις, reading πρὸς μὲν τὰς μαθήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὕστερον. Sus.[1] appears from the translation which he gives of the passage to supply τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων with μαθήσεις and χρήσεις, but the expressions τὰς χρήσεις τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων and τὰς μαθήσεις τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων seem rather strange. And, whether we supply these words or not, the question remains, to what μαθήσεις πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαί pursued in boyhood and youth does Aristotle refer? He must apparently refer to the ordinary education in gymnastic, music, etc., for we know of no other which he provides for the young. I am inclined, however, to suggest a different interpretation of the passage before us. Should we not supply τοῦ σώματος with τὰς χρήσεις (as Schneider appears to do, for he says, 'χρήσεις sunt cum quis corpore vario modo utitur'), and explain the passage thus, 'the study of music in youth must not render the body unfit for military and civic training either by rendering it unfit for such training in a purely physical way' (literally, 'unfit for the uses of the body') 'or by rendering it an unfit assistant for the mind in studies later on'? That the body may be a help or a hindrance to the use of the mind in study we see from Plato, Rep. 498 B and 536 B, and Protag. 326 B sq.: cp. also Magn. Mor. 2. 10. 1208 a 12 sqq., quoted on 1333 a 11. For τὰς τοῦ σώματος χρήσεις cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 38.

10. τὴν μάθησιν, 'the study of music': cp. 6, τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς.

τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συντείνοντα. Supply τῶν ἔργων from 12: cp. 1341 b 9, τῆς ἐργασίας. Does Aristotle refer to the same kind of performances which Plato rejects in Laws 812 D sq.?

**11.** τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων κ.τ.λ. Compare a fragment of Anaxilas (Athen. Deipn. 623 e, f: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 352),

> ἡ μουσικὴ δ' ὥσπερ Λιβύη πρὸς τῶν θεῶν
> ἀεί τι καινὸν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν θηρίον
> τίκτει,

where Anaxilas has perhaps before him Plato, Laws 660 B, καινὰ δὲ ἄττα ἀεὶ γιγνόμενα περί τε τὰς ὀρχήσεις καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν κ.τ.λ. These feats of execution in singing and playing are distinguished here from ordinary 'agonistic' performances; the nature of 'agonistic' music may be divined from Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 20 sqq. and Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 22 sqq. Does Aristotle refer to the musical innovations of Timotheus among others, as to which see Pherecr. Χείρων Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 326 sqq.)? Cp. also Plato, Laws 812 D–E.

**13.** ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ., 'but practise even such music as we have mentioned' (i.e. music that is neither agonistic nor of extraordinary difficulty) 'only to the point at which' etc. For this limitation cp. Plato, Laws 812 B–E.

**15.** καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνια ζῴων. See vol. i. p. 365, note 1, and cp. Plato, Polit. 268 B, where Plato refers to the effect of music on herds and flocks, and Rep. 620 A, where he speaks of 'swans and other musical animals.' Cp. also Pindar, Fragm. 220, and Athen. Deipn. 328 f. For the conjunction of ζῷα and παιδία, cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1371 a 14, ὧν τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἢ θηρίων, Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 29 and 7. 2. 1236 a 2, and Plato, Theaet. 171 E, πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δέ, and Clitophon 409 D, τὰς δὲ τῶν παίδων φιλίας καὶ τὰς τῶν θηρίων κ.τ.λ.

**17.** δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις χρηστέον. They must not be instruments which serve for festival-competitions or in wonderful feats of execution (10 sqq.).

**18.** οὔτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς κ.τ.λ. Τεχνικὰ ὄργανα are instruments designed for use at festival-competitions (1341 b 10). It is implied here that learning to play on them would tend to make boys ill recipients of musical and other training. Why is this? Probably because learning to play on them trained the hand rather than the mind (1341 b 1, 6 sqq.). The cithara must have come by Aristotle's time to differ a good deal from the lyre; still Plato retains (Rep. 399 D) both lyre and cithara. Αὐτῶν, 20, i.e. τῶν ὀργάνων.

**21.** ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. This is a second argument against the use of the αὐλός in education. It is not an instrument expressive of

ethical character (see above on 1340 a 36), but rather one for employment in orgiastic rites (compare the use of the word βακχεία in c. 7. 1342 b 4 in connexion with *ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικαί*), one which produces that modification of emotion which orgiastic rites produce. For *παθητικόν* is a wider term than *ὀργιαστικόν*: not all things that are *παθητικά* are *ὀργιαστικά*. The use of the *αὐλός* in the worship of Dionysus (Virg. Aen. 11. 737, ubi curva choros indixit tibia Bacchi) and of Cybele (Hor. Carm. 4. 1. 22, Berecyntiae tibiae) is well known. Cp. also Strabo, pp. 466, 468, and Plato Crito 54 D. 'One who listens to the remarkable music of the flute and cymbals at the dances of dervishes in Konia or Kara Hissar of Phrygia can understand the intoxicating influence which it had over the devotees and populace of antiquity' (Prof. W. M. Ramsay in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 8. 510). Some light is thrown on the effect of the *αὐλός* in orgiastic worship by Plut. Sympos. 3. 8. 2, *ὥσπερ ἡ θρηνῳδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ τάδε κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει, προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον, οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαίρει καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικόν.* As to *κάθαρσιν* cp. c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. and see note on this passage. Compare also Plut. Pelopid. c. 19 (quoted above on 1274 a 32), where however the *αὐλός* is regarded, not as a means of stirring, and so carrying off, emotion, but as a means of softening the untempered strength of the spirited element in the Theban character.

**22. ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους κ.τ.λ.** For *τοὺς τοιούτους καιρὸς ὁ οἷς κ.τ.λ.* see note on 1337 b 6. Bonitz (Ind. 329 a 43) appears to give *ἡ θεωρία* here the sense of 'spectaculum,' to judge by the passages with which he groups the passage before us, as do also Sepulveda and some others, but it probably means much the same thing as *ἡ ἀκρόασις* (Sus.[3] Ind. s. v.); we must, however, remember that *αὔλησις* was accompanied with certain bodily movements on the part of the performer (1341 b 18), so that there was something to be seen as well as heard. For the contrast between *κάθαρσις* and *μάθησις* here compare the contrast between *παθεῖν* and *μαθεῖν* in Aristot. Fragm. 15 in Rose's second edition of the Fragments (Fragm. 45. 1483 a 19 in the first), *καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀξιοῖ τοὺς τελουμένους οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν ἀλλὰ παθεῖν καὶ διατεθῆναι, δηλονότι γενομένους ἐπιτηδείους* (Synes. Dion, c. 10). That *μάθησις* may be derived by persons of mature age from listening to music (and it is persons of mature age, not boys, that Aristotle has in view here) appears from c. 5. 1339 a 34 sqq.

**24. προσθῶμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ.** In interfering with the use of language the use of the *αὐλός* interferes with a means of education, for the air and the words sung exercise an educating influence on the singer. Cp. also De Part. An. 2. 16. 659 b 30, *οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι μαλακὰ καὶ σαρκώδη καὶ δυνάμενα χωρίζεσθαι* (sc. *τὰ χείλη ἔχουσι*), *φυλακῆς τε ἕνεκα τῶν ὀδόντων ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι διὰ τὸ εὖ· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ταῦτα.*

**26. διὸ καλῶς κ.τ.λ.** *Ἀποδοκιμάζειν τὴν χρῆσιν τοῦ αὐλοῦ ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων* is a rugged expression, and I have not happened to meet with any parallel to it. There is less ruggedness in the language of Plutarch in Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 30, *ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἀφεῖλε τῶν παιδευομένων νέων τὴν ἁρμονίαν τὴν Λύδιον καὶ τὴν Φρύγιον κ.τ.λ.*

**27. καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ.** We read of poets at a very early date who were also performers on the *αὐλός*—Mimnermus of Colophon and Smyrna at the end of the seventh century B.C. (Strabo, p. 643) and Sacadas of Argos at the beginning of the sixth (Plut. De Musica, c. 9). Compare Athen. Deipn. 184 c, *ἔμελε δὲ τοῖς πάλαι πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι μουσικῆς· διόπερ καὶ ἡ αὐλητικὴ περισπούδαστος ἦν. Χαμαιλέων γοῦν ὁ Ἡρακλεώτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Προτρεπτικῷ Λακεδαιμονίους φησὶ καὶ Θηβαίους πάντας αὐλεῖν μανθάνειν, Ἡρακλεώτας τε τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔτι, Ἀθηναίων τε τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους, Καλλίαν τε τὸν Ἱππονίκου καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Καλλαίσχρου.* Athenaeus shows by quotations from the *Δαιταλεῖς* of Aristophanes (Fragm. 17 : Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1037) and from the Ephialtes of Phrynichus (Fragm. 3 : Meineke 2. 581), that the *αὐλός* was commonly taught to boys in the days when these plays were performed. A reaction set in at Athens against the study of the *αὐλός*, aided perhaps by the increased hostility to Thebes which must have resulted from the Athenian defeat at Delium (B.C. 424), and certainly by the influence of Alcibiades (vol. i. p. 365, note 3), but Archytas at Tarentum, among other Pythagoreans, and Epaminondas at Thebes are said to have played on the *αὐλός* (Athen. Deipn. 184 e: see above on 1340 b 35), and we have already seen that at the Pontic Heracleia, a city in the population of which a Boeotian element was included (Paus. 5. 26. 7), the custom of learning to play on it still prevailed in the time of Chamaeleon (a little later than Aristotle), so that when Aristotle speaks of the study of the *αὐλός* as 'rejected,' we may take him to refer to the general rule.

**28.** σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle appears to be speaking of the Hellenes of Greece Proper, for they alone took part in the repulse of the Persian invasion in B.C. 480 and 479, and it is of this that the expression τὰ Μηδικά is commonly used (Busolt, Gr. Gesch. ed. 2, 2. 614. 1). When Aristotle looks back to an increase of wealth and leisure and a consequent widening of study at a date even prior to the invasion of Xerxes, he may be referring to the time of Anacharsis and to the story about him which Herodotus (4. 77) rejects, *ὡς . . . ὀπίσω ἀπονοστήσας φαίη πρὸς τὸν ἀποπέμψαντα Ἕλληνας πάντας ἀσχόλους εἶναι ἐς πᾶσαν σοφίην πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, τούτοισι δὲ εἶναι μούνοισι σωφρόνως δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον.* After the repulse of Xerxes the Greeks of Greece Proper threw themselves with vigour into the study of painting sculpture and architecture; the dramatic art made a great advance, and many States began for the first time to strike coins. Cp. Diod. 12. 1. 4. A similar spirit shows itself, though less happily, in the determination of Themistocles and Thucydides, son of Melesias, that their sons should be made marvellous horsemen and wrestlers (Plato, Meno 93–94). Compare with Aristotle's picture of Greece after the Persian Wars what we read of the intellectual and artistic progress of the United Provinces after the War of Independence. M. Lefèvre-Pontalis remarks in his Life of John de Witt (Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 12) that 'prosperity and freedom combined had been for the United Provinces the signal for a sudden blossoming of arts, sciences, and letters,' and illustrates his remark by enumerating the painters, jurists, philosophers, scholars, soldiers, and men of science who flourished in the United Provinces at this epoch. That leisure was thought to be favourable to high aims we see from c. 2. 1337 b 14 sq. and 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 1 sqq.

**31.** οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιζητοῦντες, 'making no distinction between things, but seeking out fresh studies.' Cp. Hdt. 3. 39, *ἔφερε δὲ καὶ ἦγε πάντας διακρίνων οὐδένα*, Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 535 Kühn, *ὅστις μὲν ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ ἔρρωται μηδὲν διακρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πίνειν αἰεὶ τὸ παρεόν*, and Antiphanes, Ἄρχων (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 22), *μηδ' ἕτερ' ἐπιζήτει καλά.*

**32.** ἤγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις. Vict. 'adduxerunt in ordinem eorum quae discerentur.' Cp. 18, *εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον.*

**33.** καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαίμονί κ.τ.λ. The ordinary practice was that an aulêtês was allotted to the chorêgus to accompany the chorus, the aulêtês being commonly a man of inferior social

position (cp. Athen. Deipn. 624 b, διὸ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν αὐλητὰς φρυγίους καὶ δουλοπρεπεῖς τὰς προσηγορίας ἔχειν· οἷός ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ Ἀλκμᾶνι Σάμβας καὶ Ἄδων καὶ Τῆλος, παρὰ δὲ Ἱππώνακτι Κίων καὶ Κώδαλος καὶ Βάβυς), while the chorêgus was a man of wealth and rank, but in this instance the chorêgus himself acted as aulêtês. We learn from this passage that chorêgi existed in the Lacedaemonian State; their existence at Athens is a familiar fact, and they can be shown to have existed in other States also (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 372. 1). As Sus.[4] (1. 603) points out, the chorus at Lacedaemon here mentioned was probably not a dramatic but a lyrical chorus.

**34.** ἐπεχωρίασεν, sc. ἡ αὐλητική.

οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, 'most of the gentlefolks.' Οἱ ἐλεύθεροι are contrasted with θῆτες in 1341 b 13 sq., and with βάναυσοι and θῆτες in c. 7. 1342 a 18 sqq., where ἐλεύθερος is conjoined with πεπαιδευμένος.

**35.** δῆλον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Chorêgi sometimes dedicated to Dionysus a tablet recording the victory of the poet whose play they had brought out: so we read of Themistocles in Plut. Themist. c. 5, ἐνίκησε δὲ καὶ χορηγῶν τραγῳδοῖς . . . καὶ πίνακα τῆς νίκης ἀνέθηκε, τοιαύτην ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχοντα, "Θεμιστοκλῆς Φρεάρριος ἐχορήγει, Φρύνιχος ἐδίδασκεν, Ἀδείμαντος ἦρχεν" (cp. Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 108). See A. Müller, Die griech. Bühnenalterth., p. 418, who follows Bergk in comparing Theophrast. Char. 22, ὁ δὲ ἀνελεύθερος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος νικήσας τραγῳδοῖς ταινίαν ξυλίνην ἀναθεῖναι τῷ Διονύσῳ, ἐπιγράψας μὲν (μόνον?) αὑτοῦ τὸ ὄνομα κ.τ.λ. The tablet mentioned by Aristotle here cannot of course have shown that most Athenians of respectability were able to play on the αὐλός: it can only have recorded the name of one such Athenian as having acted as aulêtês on this particular occasion. As to Ecphantides, one of the earliest comic poets at Athens, see Sus.[4], and Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 35 sqq.

**37.** ὕστερον δ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη κ.τ.λ. Supply ὁ αὐλός. 'But afterwards it was rejected [as an instrument for the young and for gentlefolks] simply by force of experience.'

**39.** ὁμοίως δέ, sc. ἀπεδοκιμάσθη. It is evident that at one time not only the αὐλός, but also the five instruments mentioned here, together with others which, like them, required manual dexterity and skill, were used by the young and by gentlefolks, but that they were afterwards discarded, so far as these classes were concerned, because they were thought not to contribute to virtue. They were probably regarded as training the hand rather than the mind or

character, and of three of them—sambucae and triangular and septangular harps—we read that their strength lay in pleasing the ear of the listener, not in anything ennobling. Music, however, that is merely for pleasure is said to be no better than a 'plaything' by Plato (Polit. 288 C: cp. Gorg. 501 E and Laws 700 D sqq.); the best type of music leads on to the love of τὸ καλόν (Rep. 403 C). As to the instruments here named see Sus.[4], 1 p. 632 sqq., and Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., pp. 312–314. The sambuca was high-pitched and piercing in tone (Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 101, *τὴν δὲ σαμβύκην πρὸς θηλύτητα (ἀναλογοῦσαν), ἀγενῆ τε οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ πολλῆς ὀξύτητος διὰ τὴν μικρότητα τῶν χορδῶν εἰς ἔκλυσιν περιάγουσαν*: cp. Athen. Deipn. 633 f), whereas the lyre was deeper in tone (Aristid. Quint. ibid). Trigona and pectides (which were a kind of harp) had already been rejected by Plato in Rep. 399 C as being 'many-stringed and many-toned,' but the number of strings in the pectis seems to have varied (Sus.[4], 1. p. 632 sq.), and Aristotle does not name this ground for rejecting them. Opinion at Mytilene was probably favourable to the sambuca, for we read in Euphorion ap. Athen. Deipn. 182 f of a statue of one of the Muses there, who was represented holding a sambuca.

1341 b. **2. εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ.** For this myth see Ovid, Fasti 6. 695 sqq.: Hygin. Fab. 165 (quoted in *Bull. de Corr. Hellénique* 12. 107): Paus. 1. 24. 1: Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109. As Schneider points out, Aristotle evidently has before him the lines of Melanippides (Fragm. 2 Bergk) and the reply of Telestes (Fragm. 1 Bergk): see for both Athen. Deipn. 616 sq. Some, however, ascribed the invention of the *αὐλός* to Apollo (Plut. De Mus. c. 14). *Τῶν αὐλῶν* and *τοὺς αὐλούς*, because two pipes and not one were commonly used for playing in Greece.

**4. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** According to Melanippides (Fragm. 2) Athena had said, when casting away the *αὐλοί*,

*ἔρρετ' αἴσχεα, σώματι λύμα,*
*οὔ με τᾷδ' ἐγὼ κακότατι δίδωμι.*

**6. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle probably remembers an old saying (Athen. Deipn. 337 e),

*ἀνδρὶ μὲν αὐλητῆρι θεοὶ νόον οὐκ ἐνέφυσαν,*
*ἀλλ' ἅμα τῷ φυσῆν χὠ νόος ἐκπέταται.*

Cp. Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109, *ἀπορρίψαι τὴν θεὸν φασι τοὺς αὐλοὺς ὡς οὐ πρόσφορον ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέροντας τοῖς σοφίας ἐφιεμένοις*: also

Plato, Laws 644 A, *τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἢ τινα πρὸς ἰσχὺν ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης βάναυσόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι*, and Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 16, *ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.* For *πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως*, 'training in flute-playing contributes in no way to the intelligence,' cp. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, c. 14, *πρῶτον γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ ψιλῶς οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἡμᾶς, οὕτω δ' οὐδ' ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι*, and Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 6, *τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς τὸ θαρρεῖν.*

**7. τῇ δὲ Ἀθηνᾷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην.** 'Science' and 'skill in art' are mentioned together, just as we have in Plato, Ion 536 C, *οὐ γὰρ τέχνῃ οὐδ' ἐπιστήμῃ περὶ Ὁμήρου λέγεις ἃ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ καὶ κατοκωχῇ*, and in Theaet. 207 C, *ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἁμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι.* In the passage before us *καὶ τὴν τέχνην* is probably added in explanation and limitation of *τὴν ἐπιστήμην*, for it is the less wide term of the two: cp. De Soph. Elench. 6. 168 b 6, *οἱ τεχνῖται καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἐπιστήμονες.* As to Athena cp. Hom. Odyss. 13. 297,

> *ἐπεὶ σὺ μέν ἐσσι βροτῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος ἁπάντων*
> *βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισιν, ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσιν*
> *μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν,*

where she is the speaker: Il. 5. 60 sq., 9. 390, and 15. 411 sq.: Plato, Polit. 274 C (cp. Plut. De Fortuna, c. 4): and Paus. 8. 36. 5, *ἔστι δὲ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερὸν ἐπίκλησιν Μαχανίτιδος, ὅτι βουλευμάτων ἐστὶν ἡ θεὸς παντοίων καὶ ἐπιτεχνημάτων εὑρέτις.* So we read of the Anaxagoreans in Syncell. Chron. p. 149 C (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 913. 4), *ἑρμηνεύουσι δὲ οἱ Ἀναξαγόριοι τοὺς μυθώδεις θεούς, νοῦν μὲν τὸν Δία, τὴν δὲ Ἀθηνᾶν τέχνην.*

**8. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The apodosis to this protasis virtually comes in c. 7. 1341 b 19, *σκεπτέον δ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ.*, though by the time Aristotle reaches these words he has forgotten the existence of his protasis, owing to the interposition of the long parenthesis (10–18) in which he states his reasons for excluding a professional study of music. Compare 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq., where the same thing occurs.

**10. τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας.** This is added because the word *τεχνικός* was commonly used in a different sense. Plato had already said of *ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι* that its only aim is pleasure (Gorg. 501 E), and Aristotle here has before him the whole passage, Gorg. 501 B–502 A.

ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἐν ταύτῃ = ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας παιδείᾳ. Γὰρ introduces the reason why Aristotle rejects study with a view to festival-competitions, not the reason why he calls this study τεχνικήν: hence the parenthesis which Sus. begins before τεχνικήν should rather begin before ἐν ταύτῃ. The object with which an ἐλεύθερος should study is his own improvement in virtue (c. 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.). The ἐλεύθερος is defined in Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25 sqq. as ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν: it is characteristic of him not to live for the convenience of another (Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31 sq.). To do things with a view to the virtue of others would be more befitting to him than to contribute merely to their pleasure (cp. Plato, Gorg. 500 A sq.). Thus αὑτοῦ and ἀρετῆς are both of them emphatic, and also τῶν ἀκουόντων and τῆς ἡδονῆς.

14. For καὶ . . . δή see note on 1253 a 18. We expect βάναυσον rather than βαναύσους, but see note on 1338 b 1.

πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, 'for the object is evil with a view to which they select their end' (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31, συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος, and Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 16, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς· ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν). Competitors at a festival play, or sing and play, in the way which is most likely to please the less refined among their audience.

17. αὐτούς τε ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις. Ποιούς τινας, i.e. βαναύσους. As to the κινήσεις of performers on the αὐλός, cp. Poet. 26. 1461 b 29, ὡς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων, ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῇ, πολλὴν κίνησιν κινοῦνται, οἷον οἱ φαῦλοι αὐληταὶ κυλιόμενοι, ἂν δίσκον δέῃ μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ ἕλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον, ἂν Σκύλλαν αὐλῶσιν: Athen. Deipn. 21 f, Φίλλις ὁ Δήλιος μουσικὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους φησὶ καθαρῳδοὺς κινήσεις ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ προσώπου μικρὰς φέρειν, ἀπὸ ποδῶν δὲ πλείους, ἐμβατηρίους καὶ χορευτικάς, and 22 c, Θεόφραστος δὲ πρῶτόν φησιν Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Καταναῖον αὐλητὴν κινήσεις καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ποιῆσαι τῷ σώματι αὐλοῦντα· ὅθεν σικελίζειν τὸ ὀρχεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς· μεθ' ὃν Κλεῖνιν τὸν Θηβαῖον (cp. Scholiast. Aeschin. quoted by Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 336): and Paus. 9. 12. 6, λέγεται δὲ ὡς καὶ τοῦ προσώπου τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς κινήσει σώματος περισσῶς δή τι ἕτερον (Πρόνομος) τὰ θέατρα. Pronomus was a famous player on the αὐλός. In a bas-relief found at Mantineia (see *Bull. de Corr. Hell.* 12. 105 sqq., esp. p. 110 sq.) the contorted attitude of Marsyas, as he plays on the αὐλός in competition with the cithara of Apollo, is in strong contrast with the calm bearing of the god.

**19. Σκεπτέον δ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle has finished what he had to say about *ὄργανα* and *ἐργασία*, and now only one of the subjects mentioned in c. 6. 1340 b 41 sqq. remains to be dealt with, and this is *ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυθμῶν κοινωνητέον* (i.e. *τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν*). But in taking up this subject for consideration Aristotle gives a wider extension to it than he had led us to expect that he would, and announces that he will inquire generally *περί τε τὰς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς*, as well as with regard to their use in education. And in fact we find in the sequel that he inquires in this chapter not only what harmonies are to be used in education, but also what are to be used for the other purposes served by music. This is quite in accordance with c. 5. 1339 a 11 sqq., where the question proposed for discussion is the broad question, for how many purposes music is useful. We see, therefore, that the Fifth Book of the Politics is not exclusively concerned with questions relating to the education of youth, but occupies itself also with the question for what purposes music is to be used in adult life. As to the state of the text in 19–26 see critical note. C. 7.

**21. τοῖς πρὸς παιδείαν διαπονοῦσι**, 'those who are practising music with a view to education': cp. *τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν*, c. 5. 1339 a 39. Cp. also Plut. Pericl. c. 4, *Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ παρὰ Πυθοκλείδῃ μουσικὴν διαπονηθῆναι τὸν ἄνδρα φησίν*, and Plato, Laws 818 A.

**23. τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν.** Sepulv. 'musicam in cantus modulatione et rythmis consistere,' and so most interpreters, but Vict. explains, 'musicam exerceri colique et per cantus et per numeros,' and perhaps he is right. Cp. 4(7). 2. 1324 a 15, *ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως* (*βίος*).

**24. τούτων δ' ἑκάτερον κ.τ.λ.** What the difference is between the educational effect of rhythm and melody, Aristotle does not tell us, for the promise here given of a discussion of the subject is not fulfilled in what we possess of the Politics. We see from Plato, Laws 655 A, that *ῥυθμός* makes men *εὔρυθμοι* and *ἁρμονία* makes them *εὐάρμοστοι*, but Aristotle probably has in view some more tangible difference than this. The *εὔρυθμος μουσική* would be the better preparation for war (cp. Polyb. 4. 20. 6). But the key to the question which of the two kinds is the better for education will be found in the question which benefits the character most.

**27. νομίσαντες οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Cp. 1342 a 31 sq. Specialists in music (*μουσικοί*, cp. 1342 b 23, *τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικήν τινες*) are distinguished here from philosophers who have received a musical training

(cp. 1341 b 33, *τινὲς τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ*, and c. 5. 1340 b 5 sq., and see below on 1342 a 31, and cp. for *ἐκ* Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 23). Works seem to have been in existence written by men belonging to each of these classes, which went into full detail both on the subject of harmonies and rhythms and on that of musical education. As to the persons referred to see note on 1340 b 5.

**31.** As to the meaning of *νομικῶς* see Sus.[4], who renders the word 'formally,' and compares Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 27, *ἁπλῶς οὐ ὅσον νόμου χάριν*. But does not the word mean 'after the fashion of a law,' i.e. in a broad and general way, as a law does? Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 9 sqq., and Plato, Laws 876 D, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅπερ πολλάκις εἰπομέν τε καὶ ἐδράσαμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν νομοθετήσει νόμων, τὸ περιγραφήν τε καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν τιμωριῶν εἰπόντας δοῦναι τὰ παραδείγματα τοῖς δικασταῖς τοῦ μή ποτε βαίνειν ἔξω τῆς δίκης κ.τ.λ.*

**32.** *ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* The classification of melodies here given rests on the familiar distinction of *ἤθη πράξεις* and *πάθη* (cp. Poet. 1. 1447 a 28), for *ἐνθουσιασμός* is a *πάθος* (Pol. 5(8). 5. 1340 a 11). Of the four kinds of tragedy mentioned in Poet. 18. 1455 b 32 sqq. one is *ἡ ἠθική* and another *ἡ παθητική*. Compare also Strabo, p. 15, *τοὐναντίον δ' οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινὰ λέγουσι πρώτην τὴν ποιητικήν, εἰσάγουσαν εἰς τὸν βίον ἡμᾶς ἐκ νέων καὶ διδάσκουσαν ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις μεθ' ἡδονῆς.* Ἠθικὰ *μέλη* are those which imitate and mould to virtue (see above on 1340 a 36); as to *πρακτικὰ μέλη*, 'melodies which imitate and stir to action,' cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 12, *ἦθος δὲ ἔχει ἡ μὲν ὑποφρυγιστὶ πρακτικόν, διὸ καὶ ἔν τε τῷ Γηρυόνῃ ἡ ἔξοδος καὶ ἡ ἐξόπλισις ἐν ταύτῃ πεποίηται*, and Poet. 24. 1459 b 37, *τὸ δὲ ἰαμβικὸν καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικά, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν*. So in Aelian, Var. Hist. 2. 44 a trumpeter is described as playing *τὸ παρορμητικὸν μέλος, διάτορόν τε καὶ γεγωνὸς ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ οἷον εἰς τὴν μάχην ἐγερτήριον*. Πρακτικὰ *μέλη* seem to have been the favourites at Sparta: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, and Inst. Lac. § 14, *ἐσπούδαζον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τὰς ᾠδὰς οὐδὲν ἧττον· κέντρον δ' εἶχε ταῦτα ἐγερτικὸν θυμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος καὶ παραστατικὸν ὁρμῆς ἐνθουσιώδους καὶ πρακτικῆς*. Plutarch, however, gives a somewhat different account of Spartan songs in Lycurg. c. 4, *λόγοι γὰρ ἦσαν αἱ ᾠδαὶ πρὸς εὐπείθειαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀνακλητικοὶ διὰ μελῶν ἅμα καὶ ῥυθμῶν πολὺ τὸ κόσμιον ἐχόντων καὶ καταστατικόν, ὃν ἀκροώμενοι κατεπραΰνοντο λεληθότως τὰ ἤθη καὶ συνῳκειοῦντο τῷ ζήλῳ τῶν καλῶν*. As to *πρακτικὰ μέλη*, which were of course not exclusively warlike, see vol. i. p. 367, note 1. Dr. Johnson describes in his Journey to the Western Islands (Works, 8. 279) how the strokes of

the reapers' sickles 'were timed by the modulation of the harvest-song, in which all their voices were united,' and adds that 'they accompany in the Highlands every action which can be done in equal time with an appropriated strain, which has, they say, not much meaning, but its effects are regularity and cheerfulness. The ancient proceleusmatic song, by which the rowers of galleys were animated, may be supposed to have been of this kind.'

**33.** ὡς is followed in 35 by καί. For instances of a similar structure see note on 1313 b 13.

**35.** καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and they lay down that musical modes are appropriate in nature to each of these, one mode answering to one kind of melody and another to another.' The Dorian mode was the appropriate harmony for ἠθικὰ μέλη, the Phrygian for ἐνθουσιαστικά, and perhaps the hypo-Phrygian (see above on 32) for πρακτικά. Μέρος seems here to be used in the sense of εἶδος (cp. διαίρεσιν, 32): for this use of the word see Bon. Ind. 455 b 46 sqq.

**36.** φαμὲν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1339 b 14. Plato, on the other hand, had spoken in Laws 659 D–660 A as if the ethical use of music was its only use. For καὶ πλειόνων see note on 1287 a 34.

**38.** καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν κ.τ.λ. See below on 1342 a 8. The promise here given of a full explanation of the word κάθαρσις is not fulfilled in the Poetics as it has come down to us: see note in Sus.[4]. For other matters known to have found a place in Aristotle's treatise which are wanting in our Poetics, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 107. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 102. 2). 'We possess Aristotle's treatise,' he remarks, 'only in a text mutilated and in many ways corrupted.' For ἁπλῶς, 'in a general way,' cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 4. 1185 a 38, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ἱκανὸν οὕτως ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον διορίσαι δεῖ.

**40.** τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν κ.τ.λ. Bernays translates in his Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, p. 7 (ed. 1880), 'drittens zur Ergötzung, um sich zu erholen und abzuspannen,' but if, as he seems to think, the words πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν are added in explanation of πρὸς διαγωγήν, the word διαγωγή must here be used in a different sense from that in which it is used elsewhere in the Fifth Book, e.g. in c. 5. 1339 b 14, where it is distinguished from παιδιά. This is not perhaps impossible, but it is more likely that

διαγωγή is used here in the same sense as in 1339 b 14, and that it is linked with ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσις because it has already been so linked in c. 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. Zeller, indeed, thinks (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 771. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 308. 1) that Aristotle intends ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσις to come in as a fourth end and not as a part of the third, though the word τέταρτον is not used. Sus. would read ταύτης δ' ἡ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ἡ πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν partly for other reasons and partly because he regards it as inconceivable 'that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction' (see Sus.[4], 1. p. 638 sqq.), but if any change in the text is necessary, I should be content with the insertion of ἢ before πρὸς ἄνεσιν.

1342 a. 1. φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον. Aristotle probably refers only to the modes which are not παρεκβάσεις, yet he finds a use in 22 sqq. even for those which are. For the repetition of πάσαις see note on 1283 a 30.

2. πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις. As to the meaning of ἠθικωτάταις here and ἠθικοῖς in 28 see note on 1340 a 36. Aristotle may use the plural because he is prepared to approve, in addition to the Dorian mode, of the ὑποδωριστί, of which we read in Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 14 that it is μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ στάσιμον, but perhaps it is more likely that he does not wish to exclude any modes which may be recommended as ἠθικώταται by οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας (cp. 30 sqq.). He rejects without consideration the possible claims of πρακτικὰ and ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη to a place, however subordinate, in the education of the young, but he might well have considered whether they do not deserve to be occasionally used. Are not boys, or some of them at any rate, παθητικοί, and might not κάθαρσις by music be sometimes useful to such boys even educationally? Might not airs which stir to action also be a useful element in the education of some boys? It is not clear that Aristotle objects to the presence of boys at the performance of πρακτικὰ καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη, any more than he objects to their presence at the performance of tragedies (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 20 sqq.), but he certainly allows no place in education to music of these two kinds.

**4. καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς.** Sus.[4] is probably right in translating these words 'also the practical and the enthusiastic': cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 14, *ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ* ('also') *τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.*

**δ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** See note in Sus.[4]. Aristotle seems to anticipate that his recommendation of the use of the 'enthusiastic' modes, when we listen to music played by others, will excite surprise, and hence in 4—16 he justifies it at some length, though he adds no similar justification of his recommendation of the use of the 'practical' modes under similar circumstances, probably because he does not anticipate that any objection will be made to this.

**7. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν.** *Ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως = τούτου τοῦ πάθους*: cp. 5, *πάθος*, and Plut. De Sanitate Tuenda c. 13, *ἥδη δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα τὸ σῶμα μηνύει πρὸς νόσον ἐπισφαλῶς ἔχειν, ἄλογοι γὰρ ἴσχουσιν ἀθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι.* For *κατακώχιμοι* see critical note on 1269 b 30. *Κατέχεσθαι* is the appropriate technical term, cp. Plato, Symp. 215 C, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 65, *τοὺς δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ὁρμῆς καὶ ἐπιπνοίας κατεχομένους ὑπὸ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ.* As to the nature of *ἐνθουσιασμός* see note on 1340 a 11. Of this susceptibility to *ἐνθουσιασμός* we have a striking example in Olympias, the mother of Alexander (Plut. Alex. c. 2, *ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιὰς μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ζηλώσασα τὰς κατοχὰς καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς κ.τ.λ.*). Had Aristotle observed in her case the calming effect of sacred melodies?

**8. ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν κ.τ.λ.,** 'and as an effect of the sacred melodies we see these men, when they have used the melodies which fill the soul with mystic excitement, brought back to a normal state as if having received medical treatment and purgation.' Sus.[4] points out that *χρῆσθαι*, like *κίνησις*, *καθίστασθαι*, and *κουφίζεσθαι*, is a medical term. It seems likely that the patient both listened to and sang the maddening melodies (see note in Sus.[4]). *Τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι* has been interpreted in many ways. Vict. explains these words 'cantibus expiando animo frangendisque vehementioribus illis motibus aptis,' Lamb. 'cantibus animum furore levantibus ac purgantibus,' and Liddell and Scott 'melodies which purge by mystic rites,' but Sepulveda is probably right in translating 'cantibus animum concitantibus' (cp. 1342 b 3, *ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά*). Bernays (followed by Sus.) renders the words in a not very dissimilar way, 'Lieder die eben das Gemüth berauschen' ('songs which intoxicate the soul'). *Ὅταν—μέλεσι* is bracketed by

Sus. as a gloss on ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν (see Sus.[4], 1. p. 640), i
perhaps not all the ἱερὰ μέλη were 'intoxicating to the soul': c
Plato, Ion 536 C, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τ
μέλους ὀξέως, ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλ
καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσ
There may have been ἱερὰ μέλη introductory to the melody whic
produced the decisive effect. Τὴν ψυχήν is emphatic: if the musi
does not go to *the soul*, it does nothing. For καθιστημένους se
above on 1340 b 3. In ἰατρείας καὶ καθάρσεως the καί is explanator
as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν (see note o
1257 b 7). The action of the sacred melodies on the souls o
persons naturally disposed to ἐνθουσιασμός is compared to the actio
of some cathartic medicine like hellebore, which removes the wor
elements and leaves the best (Plato, Rep. 567 C, καλόν γε, ἦν
καθαρμόν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώματα· οἱ μὲν γ
τὸ χείριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον). Th
following passages may be selected from many others as throwing
light on Aristotle's meaning—Plut. Sympos. 6. 7. 2, καὶ γὰρ ὕδρο
πος, ὦ φίλε, φρενετίζων καὶ μαινόμενος (πλέον ἰσχύει)· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐλλεβόρ
χρησάμενος ἡ διαίτῃ καταστῇ, τὸ μὲν σφοδρὸν ἐκεῖνο καὶ σύντονον οἴχετ
καὶ γέγονεν ἐξίτηλον, ἡ δ' ἀληθινὴ δύναμις καὶ σωφροσύνη παραγίνετα
σώματι· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ κάθαρσις τοῦ οἴνου, τὸ πληκτικὸν ἀφαιροῦσα κ
μανικόν, εἰς πραεῖαν ἕξιν καὶ ὑγιαίνουσαν καθίστησι: Strabo, p. 418, ca
δή φασιν ἐκεῖ (at the Malian Anticyra) τὸν ἐλλέβορον φύεσθαι τὸν
ἀστεῖον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ (at the Phocian Anticyra) σκευάζεσθαι βέλτιον, κα
διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδημεῖν δεῦρο (to the latter) πολλοὺς καθάρσεως καὶ θεραπείας
χάριν: and Plut. Coriol. c. 12, ἔδοξεν οὖν τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν εἰς δέο
γεγονέναι καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν ἡ χρεία τῶν Οὐελιτραινῶν διά τε τὴν ἀπορί
κουφισμοῦ δεομένοις, καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἅμα σκεδάσειν ἠλπιζον, εἰ τὸ θορυβοῦ
μάλιστα καὶ συνεπηρμένον τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς ὥσπερ περίττωμα τῆς πόλε
νοσερὸν καὶ ταραχῶδες ἀποκαθαρθείη. That certain sacred rites pro-
duced a similar effect on the soul to that produced by cathartic
medicines on the body, we see from Plato, Rep. 560 D, τούτων δέ γ
που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελου-
μένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 158,
διὸ καὶ τὰς βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λόγου τυγ
ἔχεσθαί φασιν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίησις διὰ βίου ἢ τύχῃ ὑπὸ
τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται, where
the purging influence of the rites is traced in part to the music by
which they were accompanied. On the whole subject of the

*κάθαρσις* effected by music and also by tragedy, see Sus.[4], 1. p. 641 sqq., and Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, c. 6. We are not distinctly told in the passage before us that a *κάθαρσις παθημάτων* occurs under the influence of the sacred melodies, as we are in the famous passage of the Poetics about tragedy (Poet. 6. 1449 b 27 sq.), but we can hardly be wrong in taking the musical *κάθαρσις* to be a *κάθαρσις* of *παθήματα* like the other. It should be noticed that music appears to purge all emotions, not merely, like tragedy, those of pity and fear, and also that the kind of music which produces a cathartic effect is by no means the wailful kind characteristic of such modes as the mixo-Lydian; music of this sort is charged with human feeling and essentially human, whereas cathartic music is full of a divine *afflatus* (Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 19, *διὸ καὶ ἁρμόζει τῷ χορῷ τὸ γοερὸν καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος καὶ μέλος· ἀνθρωπικὰ γάρ. ταῦτα δ' ἔχουσιν αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι, ἥκιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφρυγιστί· ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχική*). In Milton's Paradise Lost, 1. 549 sqq., the 'Dorian mood' is said to inspire 'deliberate valour' 'firm and unmoved With dread of death to flight or foul retreat' (cp. 1342 b 12 sqq.), and is also credited with a cathartic influence which Aristotle does not ascribe to it—

> 'Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage
> With solemn touches troubled thoughts, and chase
> Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain
> From mortal or immortal minds.'

Here the passage before us may be present to Milton's mind. Julian perhaps refers to it in Epist. 56. 442 B, *ὅτι γὰρ πρὸ ἡμῶν αὐτοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὸ τῆς θείας μουσικῆς καθαρθέντες ἀνήσονται, πιστευτέον τοῖς πρυαποφαινομένοις ὀρθῶς ὑπὲρ τούτων.*

11. **ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle seems still to be speaking of the effect of the sacred melodies. They cannot fail, he thinks, to purge others besides those who are specially given to *ἐνθουσιασμός*—those who are specially subject to the emotions of fear and pity (two allied emotions, as we learn from Rhet. 2. 8), and indeed those who are subject to emotion of any kind, and also those who are not specially emotional, so far as they are accessible to emotion. Philoxenus had represented the Cyclops as 'curing his love with music' (Philox. Fragm. 7: Plut. Amat. c. 18), and anger also was thought to be soothed by music (Athen. Deipn. 623 f sq.). As to the specially emotional persons referred to, cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1228 b 35, *οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ*

καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσί τι, πλὴν θᾶττόν τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πολλοί, and Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 21, ἥκιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφρυγιστὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχική. κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομέν τι παθητικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς μᾶλλον τῶν δυνατῶν εἰσί.

13. καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἑκάστῳ, 'so far as a share in the things mentioned' (i.e. emotions) 'falls to each': cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 22, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς, and Plato, Rep. 421 C, ἐατέον ὅπως ἑκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.

14. τινα κάθαρσιν. Bern. 'irgend eine Katharsis,' and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 246, note 1) observes, 'τινὰ κάθαρσιν implies that the *katharsis* in all cases is not precisely of the same kind,' and (p. 247) 'it is pretty plainly implied that the *katharsis* of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, the *katharsis* of "enthusiasm."' This may be so, but I am not sure that Aristotle means anything more than that all experience some purgation, though the amount of it varies with the amount of emotion by which they are severally possessed: cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 9, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ ('things which are shared by men in general') μὴ παρορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἔν τινι λόγῳ τίθεσθαι. Τις, indeed, is sometimes added to a substantive merely to soften it, as in Xen. Oecon. 8. 3, καὶ γὰρ χορὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων συγκείμενός ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ποιῶσιν ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος, ταραχή τις φαίνεται καὶ θεᾶσθαι ἀτερπές, but I do not think that this is the case here.

κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς. For κουφίζεσθαι cp. Plut. Coriol. c. 11 (quoted above on 8): De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 8, ὀλίγοις δέ τισιν ἐν μικρῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας κουφίζει τοῦτ' ἀπιόν, ὅταν πλεονάσῃ, καθάπερ ἡ πρώτη τροφή, ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ τῷ πλήθει· καὶ γὰρ ταύτης ἀπιούσης τὰ σώματ' εὐημερεῖ μᾶλλον: and Hist. An. 10. 5. 636 b 29 sqq.

15. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and similarly the cathartic melodies also' (as well as the sacred melodies) 'are a source to men of harmless pleasure.' So Vict. 'ut cantilenas illas sacras, quas docuit adhiberi solitas sua aetate ad expiandos lymphaticos, praeter furorem quem levant affirmavit gignere voluptatem, ita nunc testatur cantus purgandis animis factos, qui tamen non opitulantur ope divina valde commotis animo, sed concentu vocum sonorumque, apto illis motibus, prosunt, continere in se suavitatis plurimum.' The fact that they are a source of harmless pleasure shows that they are well suited both for diagogê and for relaxation (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 25 sqq.). The cathartic melodies here referred to seem to be the

same as those which are called enthusiastic in 1341 b 34. I understood this passage otherwise when I wrote (in vol. i. p. 366), 'the melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.' I should have written, 'just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.' [Since the foregoing note was written, Sus.[4] (1. p. 611) has rightly disagreed with the view which I took of the sentence in vol. i. p. 366. I then thought that it referred to cathartic melodies as distinguished from cathartic harmonies, whereas I think now that it refers to cathartic melodies as distinguished from the sacred melodies, whose effects I take to be described in *ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν*, 8—*ἡδονῆς*, 15. I am still of opinion that *καθαρτικά* should be retained in 15, and not, as Sus. suggests, discarded in favour of *πρακτικά*.]

16. **διὸ κ.τ.λ.** *Μέν* is taken up, not by *δ'* in 19, but by *δέ* in 28. With Spengel and Sus. I insert (*χρῆσθαι*) before *θετέον*: cp. *χρηστέον*, 1342 a 1, 2, *χρῆσθαι*, 27, and *χρηστέον*, 29. For *θετέον χρῆσθαι*, cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, *ἔθηκε γὰρ θύειν μὲν βασιλέα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια ἅπαντα*. *Διὸ—ἀγωνιστάς* is virtually repeated in 26–28.

18. **ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατὴς διττός κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Poet. 26. 1461 b 28 sqq. For *ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος*, see above on 1338 b 3.

19. **ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος.** Sus.[4] aptly compares Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est.

21. **ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας**, 'contests and spectacles.' Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 1, *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνικοὺς καὶ Διονυσιακούς, κἂν εἴ τινας ἑτέρας συμβαίνει τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας*, whence it appears that a 'contest' was a kind of 'spectacle.' A dramatic or musical performance would also be a 'spectacle.' *Θεωρία* is explained by Stallbaum to be used in the wider sense of 'festival' (*ἑορτή*) in Plato, Laws 650 A, *τῆς τοῦ Διονύσου θεωρίας*. Cp. also Isocr. Aeginet. § 10, *οὔτε θυσίαν οὔτε θεωρίαν οὔτ' ἄλλην ἑορτὴν οὐδεμίαν*. We infer from the use of *καί* in *καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις* that Aristotle is prepared to provide *ἀγῶνες* and *θεωρίαι* at which music of a higher type is performed for the citizens of his 'best State.' It is remarkable that he should expect day-labourers to care for music of any kind.

22. **εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ.** As to the souls of *βάναυσοι* and *θῆτες* cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D, quoted above on 1337 b 8. The position of *εἰσί* is strange; it seems hardly to belong to

ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ., and yet it can hardly belong to οὕτω καὶ κ.τ.λ., for that clause is already provided with an εἰσί. Did Aristotle originally intend the sentence to run εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις and insert ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. by an afterthought? Perhaps the repetition of εἰσί in 24 is to be compared with the repetition of δῆλον in 3. 13. 1283 b 17 and of ἔργον in 8(6). 5. 1319 b 35.

**23. οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσί.** Here the relation between the soul and an ἁρμονία dwelt on in c. 5. 1340 b 17 sqq. is again present to Aristotle's mind. The μιξολυδιστί and συντονολυδιστί (Plato, Rep. 398 E) are probably among the modes referred to, and perhaps also the low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian (see note in Sus.[4]); at any rate both high-pitched and low-pitched modes are treated as παρεκβάσεις τῶν ἁρμονιῶν in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24 sqq. The abandonment of the mixo-Lydian mode to βάναυσοι and θῆτες is uncomplimentary to Sappho, its reputed inventress (see above on 1340 a 42).

**24. καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα,** 'and of melodies those which are highly-strung and unnaturally coloured.' Σύντονα is perhaps used here in opposition both to ἀνειμένα or μαλακά, as in 1342 b 21 and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27, and to βαρέα, as in De Gen. An. 5. 7. 786 b 35, καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι τὸ βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον. The Cretans are said by Ephorus to have used in their songs the rhythms which are most σύντονοι (Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250). For the meaning of χρῶμα in music see Liddell and Scott, s.v., and Sus.[4], 1. p. 636 sqq. Aristotle probably objected to the musical innovations of Timotheus, of whom we read in Pherecr. Χείρων, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 333),

οὗτος ἅπαντας οὓς λέγω
παρελήλυθ' ᾄδων ἐκτραπέλους μυρμηκιάς,
ἐξαρμονίους ὑπερβολαίους τ' ἀνοσίους,

and also to the music of Agathon: cp. Plut. Sympos. 3. 1. 1, θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ Ἐράτωνα τοῦτον, εἰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι παραχρώσεις βδελυττόμενος καὶ κατηγορῶν τοῦ καλοῦ Ἀγάθωνος, ὃν πρῶτον εἰς τραγῳδίαν φασὶν ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ ὑπομίξαι τὸ χρωματικόν, ὅτε τοὺς Μυσοὺς ἐδίδασκεν, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν, ὡς ὁρᾶτε, ποικίλων χρωμάτων καὶ ἀνθηρῶν τὸ συμπόσιον ἐμπέπλεκε καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν ὤτων ἀποκλείει τρυφὴν καὶ ἡδυπάθειαν κ.τ.λ. Compare also Philoch. Fragm. 66 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 395), where we read of Lysander of Sicyon, καὶ περιελὼν τὴν συντονίαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς κιθαρισταῖς, χρώματά τε εὔχροα πρῶτος ἐκιθάρισε κ.τ.λ., and Pratinas, Fragm. 5, quoted above on 1340 a 42.

**26.** διόπερ κ.τ.λ. So Plato makes over *θρῆνοι* for famous men to women and worthless persons (Rep. 387 E).

**28.** ὥσπερ εἴρηται, in 1342 a 2.

**30.** καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον, in c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.

**31.** οἱ κοινωνοὶ κ.τ.λ., 'those who have shared in philosophical study and in musical education,' as distinguished from mere musicians on the one hand and philosophers who have not studied music on the other (see above on 1341 b 27). For the phrase cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, *κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας*: Laws 968 A, *παιδείας ὁπόσης διειληλύθαμεν κοινωνὸν γενόμενον*: Hipp. Minor 363 A, *οἱ μάλιστ' ἂν ἀντιποιησαίμεθα μετεῖναι ἡμῖν τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς*: Theaet. 172 C, *οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες*.

**32.** ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. Here begins a similar review of the opinions put in Socrates' mouth by Plato in the Republic to that which we find at the end of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.). As to these passages see vol. i. p. 519, note 1. The passage in the Republic referred to is Rep. 399 A sqq., where Plato seems to imply that the Dorian and Phrygian modes inspire courage in war and temperance in peace. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that the Phrygian mode does neither the one thing nor the other. *Φρύγιον* should probably be 'Ionian' in Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 30, *ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἀφεῖλε τῶν παιδευομένων νέων τὴν ἁρμονίαν τὴν Λύδιον καὶ τὴν Φρύγιον, τὴν μὲν τὸ θρηνῶδες καὶ φιλοπενθὲς ἡμῶν ἐγείρουσαν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν δὲ τὸ πρὸς ἡδονὰς ὀλισθηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον αὔξουσαν*: cp. Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 22. For *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ* cp. 2. 6. 1264 b 28, 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11, and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1, in all which passages the phrase is used in close proximity to a mention of *ὁ Σωκράτης*, and 2. 5. 1264 b 24, *ἡ πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν*. In 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1, on the other hand, we have *ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις* (perhaps referring to the Eighth and Ninth Books of the Republic), and in 2. 1. 1261 a 6, *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος*.

**34.** ἀποδοκιμάσας, in Rep. 399 D.

**2.** αὐλός. For the absence of the article see note on 1255 b 36. 1342 b.

**3.** For the difference between ὀργιαστικά and παθητικά see above on 1341 a 21.

δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποίησις· πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία κ.τ.λ., 'and poetry makes this clear' (i.e. that the *αὐλός* and the Phrygian mode are similar in effect), 'for every sort of Bacchic frenzy and all Bacchic agitation of mind [when represented in poetry] find their fit expression in

the pipes more than in any other instrument.' In translating *κίνησις* 'agitation of mind' and not 'bodily movement' I have followed Sus., who may probably be right (cp. 3, *παθητικά*, and c. 3. 1337 b 42), but I have done so with some hesitation, for *βακχεία* is used of physical movement in Plato, Laws 672 B, *τὰς περὶ βακχείας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μανικὴν χορείαν*, 790 E, *καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν ἰάσεις ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορείᾳ καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι*, and 815 B–C. For *ἐστὶν ἐν* (='sitae sunt in'), see above on 1330 b 8, and cp. c. 6. 1341 a 3, and Plato, Protag. 354 E, 356 D (where see Stallbaum). It should be noted that in a letter (genuine or not) from Olympias to Alexander quoted in Athen. Deipn. 659 f she distinguishes between *τὰ ὀργιαστικὰ ἱερά* and *τὰ βακχικά*, though in the passage before us *βακχεία* is evidently connected with *τὸ ὀργιαστικόν*.

7. **οἷον ὁ διθύραμβος** κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance the dithyramb, [which is an expression of Bacchic frenzy,] is generally agreed to be a Phrygian melody' (and to require the Phrygian mode).

8. *σύνεσιν*, not far in meaning from *τέχνην*: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11, *τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης*.

9. **διότι Φιλόξενος** κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'est autem molestum hac in parte quod legitur in media sententia accusandi casu *μύθους*.' Schn. 'Reizius latere nomen dithyrambi Philoxenei suspicatus est; et recte quidem. Equidem non dubito Μυσούς id fuisse, quo nomine fabulas tragicas ab Aeschylo et Agathone publico in certamine Athenis commissas fuisse novimus.' Sophocles also wrote a tragedy thus entitled (see Nauck, Trag. Gr. Fragm., p. 175). Schneider's conjecture has been adopted by Coray, Stahr, Bekk.², and Sus., and is probably right, if indeed *τοὺς Μυσούς* is not an explanatory gloss which has crept from the margin into the text. Bergk accepts the change (Poet. Lyr. Gr., Philoxenus Fragm. 20), and adds, 'huc refero Plut. De Mus. c. 33, *ὥστε οὐδὲ ζητεῖν παρὰ ταύτης τὸ διαγνῶναι δύνασθαι, πότερον οἰκείως εἴληφεν ὁ ποιητὴς ὡς οἷον* [*ὅμοιον* MSS. in place of *ὡς οἷον*] *εἰπεῖν ἐν μούσοις* (corrige Μυσοῖς) *τὸν ὑποδώριον τόνον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἢ τὸν μιξολύδιόν τε καὶ δώριον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν, ἢ τὸν ὑποφρύγιόν τε καὶ φρύγιον ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην* (*τὸ μέσον*?).' If *τοὺς Μυσούς* is correct, the dithyramb probably turned, like the tragedies of the same name by Aeschylus and Sophocles, on the story of Telephus. The mention of the title of the dithyramb is made somewhat abruptly, and also without necessity; still the title of a poem by Tyrtaeus is given, though less abruptly, in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 39. As to the subjects in connexion with which the Dorian mode was employed, it should

be noticed that, as Plutarch points out (De Musica c. 17), it was sometimes used for *τραγικοὶ οἶκτοι* and even for *ἐρωτικά*, subjects as alien to it, one would have thought, as a dithyramb. We see from Plato, Laws 669 C, that composers were not always successful in mating melody and words.

**11.** **ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς.** Cp. Poet. 24. 1460 a 3 sqq.

**12.** **περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ κ.τ.λ.** See above on 1340 b 3.

**14.** **ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.** Is this a reference to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 26 sqq., b 26 sq.? Cp. also Magn. Mor. 1. 24. 1192 a 6, *ὁ ἄρα ἐλευθέριος, ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἐπαινετός, μέσος τις ἂν εἴη τούτων.*

**15.** **ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.

**16.** **φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ Δώρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις.** Coray and Sus. read *τοὺς νεωτέρους*. Vet. Int. translates, 'manifestum quod Dorias melodias oportet erudiri magis iuniores,' but whether he found *τοὺς νεωτέρους* in his Greek text is doubtful. I incline on the whole to retain *τοῖς νεωτέροις*: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 19, *ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν*, and Plato, Laws 811 D, *προσήκοντες τὰ μάλιστα ἀκούειν νέοις*, and 821 E, *τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὃ θαυμαστὸν μὲν λέγεις, προσῆκον δ' αὖ μαθεῖν τοῖς νέοις.*

**17.** **εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποί—34. τὸ πρέπον.** Susemihl brackets this passage as an interpolation, and I incline now to think that he is right: I thought otherwise when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, note 1. It would seem that the writer of it seeks to qualify the decision just arrived at in favour of the use of the midway mode in education by pointing out that for certain ages the relaxed modes are the only possible and becoming ones, and also that there is something to be said for the use in education of such modes as the Lydian. It is hardly likely that Aristotle would do this, unless we suppose a change of mind on his part, for he would scarcely be willing to unsay what he has said against the relaxed modes in c. 5. 1340 b 2, or to allow the boys for whose training he recommends the Dorian mode to be also trained in modes which he regards as soft and effeminate. Besides, as Sus.[4] remarks (1. p. 616, note), after what has been said in c. 6. 1340 b 35 sqq. we do not expect to hear of old men singing, except perhaps on the occasion of some special festivity (c. 5. 1339 b 9 sq.). The language of the passage recalls that of Plato in Laws 785 B, *τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ πρέπον ἑκάσταις προστάττειν μέχρι τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν*, and 670 D, *ἵνα καθορῶντες τάς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ἐκλέγεσθαί τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἷοί τ' ὦσιν, ἃ τοῖς τηλικούτοις τε καὶ*

(cp. 1341 b 33, *τινὲς τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ*, and c. 5. 1340 b 5 sq., and see below on 1342 a 31, and cp. for *ἐκ* Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 232). Works seem to have been in existence written by men belonging to each of these classes, which went into full detail both on the subject of harmonies and rhythms and on that of musical education. As to the persons referred to see note on 1340 b 5.

**31.** As to the meaning of **νομικῶς** see Sus.[4], who renders the word 'formally,' and compares Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 27, *ἁπλῶς καὶ ὅσον νόμου χάριν*. But does not the word mean 'after the fashion of a law,' i.e. in a broad and general way, as a law does? Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 9 sqq., and Plato, Laws 876 D, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴπομέν τε καὶ ἐδράσαμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν νομοθετήσει νόμων, τὸ περιγραφήν τε καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν τιμωριῶν εἰπόντας δοῦναι τὰ παραδείγματα τοῖσι δικασταῖς τοῦ μή ποτε βαίνειν ἔξω τῆς δίκης κ.τ.λ.*

**32.** **ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The classification of melodies here given rests on the familiar distinction of *ἤθη πράξεις* and *πάθη* (cp. Poet. 1. 1447 a 28), for *ἐνθουσιασμός* is a *πάθος* (Pol. 5(8). 5. 1340 a 11). Of the four kinds of tragedy mentioned in Poet. 18. 1455 b 32 sqq. one is *ἡ ἠθική* and another *ἡ παθητική*. Compare also Strabo, p. 15, *τοὐναντίον δ' οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινὰ λέγουσι πρώτην τὴν ποιητικήν, εἰσάγουσαν εἰς τὸν βίον ἡμᾶς ἐκ νέων καὶ διδάσκουσαν ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις μεθ' ἡδονῆς.* Ἠθικὰ *μέλη* are those which imitate and mould to virtue (see above on 1340 a 36); as to *πρακτικὰ μέλη*, 'melodies which imitate and stir to action,' cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 12, *ἦθος δὲ ἔχει ἡ μὲν ὑποφρυγιστὶ πρακτικόν, διὸ καὶ ἔν τε τῷ Γηρυόνῃ ἡ ἔξοδος καὶ ἡ ἐξόπλισις ἐν ταύτῃ πεποίηται*, and Poet. 24. 1459 b 37, *τὸ δὲ ἰαμβικὸν καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικά, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν*. So in Aelian, Var. Hist. 2. 44 a trumpeter is described as playing *τὸ παρορμητικὸν μέλος, διάτορόν τε καὶ γεγωνὸς ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ οἷον εἰς τὴν μάχην ἐγερτήριον*. Πρακτικὰ *μέλη* seem to have been the favourites at Sparta: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, and Inst. Lac. § 14, *ἐσπούδαζον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τὰς ᾠδὰς οὐδὲν ἧττον· κέντρον δ' εἶχε ταῦτα ἐγερτικὸν θυμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος καὶ παραστατικὸν ὁρμῆς ἐνθουσιώδους καὶ πρακτικῆς*. Plutarch, however, gives a somewhat different account of Spartan songs in Lycurg. c. 4, *λόγοι γὰρ ἦσαν αἱ ᾠδαὶ πρὸς εὐπείθειαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀνακλητικοὶ διὰ μελῶν ἅμα καὶ ῥυθμῶν πολὺ τὸ κόσμιον ἐχόντων καὶ καταστατικόν, ὧν ἀκροώμενοι κατεπραΰνοντο λεληθότως τὰ ἤθη καὶ συνῳκειοῦντο τῷ ζήλῳ τῶν καλῶν*. As to *πρακτικὰ μέλη*, which were of course not exclusively warlike, see vol. i. p. 367, note 1. Dr. Johnson describes in his Journey to the Western Islands (Works, 8. 279) how the strokes of

the reapers' sickles 'were timed by the modulation of the harvest-song, in which all their voices were united,' and adds that 'they accompany in the Highlands every action which can be done in equal time with an appropriated strain, which has, they say, not much meaning, but its effects are regularity and cheerfulness. The ancient proceleusmatic song, by which the rowers of galleys were animated, may be supposed to have been of this kind.'

**33.** ὡς is followed in 35 by καί. For instances of a similar structure see note on 1313 b 13.

**35.** καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and they lay down that musical modes are appropriate in nature to each of these, one mode answering to one kind of melody and another to another.' The Dorian mode was the appropriate harmony for ἠθικὰ μέλη, the Phrygian for ἐνθουσιαστικά, and perhaps the hypo-Phrygian (see above on 32) for πρακτικά. Μέρος seems here to be used in the sense of εἶδος (cp. διαίρεσιν, 32): for this use of the word see Bon. Ind. 455 b 46 sqq.

**36.** φαμὲν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1339 b 14. Plato, on the other hand, had spoken in Laws 659 D–660 A as if the ethical use of music was its only use. For καὶ πλειόνων see note on 1287 a 34.

**38.** καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν κ.τ.λ. See below on 1342 a 8. The promise here given of a full explanation of the word κάθαρσις is not fulfilled in the Poetics as it has come down to us: see note in Sus.[4]. For other matters known to have found a place in Aristotle's treatise which are wanting in our Poetics, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 107. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 102. 2). 'We possess Aristotle's treatise,' he remarks, 'only in a text mutilated and in many ways corrupted.' For ἁπλῶς, 'in a general way,' cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 4. 1185 a 38, ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ ἱκανὸν οὕτως ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον διορίσαι δεῖ.

**40.** τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν κ.τ.λ. Bernays translates in his Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, p. 7 (ed. 1880), 'drittens zur Ergötzung, um sich zu erholen und abzuspannen,' but if, as he seems to think, the words πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν are added in explanation of πρὸς διαγωγήν, the word διαγωγή must here be used in a different sense from that in which it is used elsewhere in the Fifth Book, e.g. in c. 5. 1339 b 14, where it is distinguished from παιδιά. This is not perhaps impossible, but it is more likely that

διαγωγή is used here in the same sense as in 1339 b 14, and that it is linked with ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσις because it has already been so linked in c. 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. Zeller, indeed, thinks (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 771. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 308. 1) that Aristotle intends ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσις to come in as a fourth end and not as a part of the third, though the word τέταρτον is not used. Sus. would read ταύτης δ' ἡ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ἡ πρὸς ἄνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν partly for other reasons and partly because he regards it as inconceivable 'that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction' (see Sus.[4], 1. p. 638 sqq.), but if any change in the text is necessary, I should be content with the insertion of ἢ before πρὸς ἄνεσιν.

1342 a. 1. φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον. Aristotle probably refers only to the modes which are not παρεκβάσεις, yet he finds a use in 22 sqq. even for those which are. For the repetition of πάσαις see note on 1283 a 30.

2. πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις. As to the meaning of ἠθικωτάταις here and ἠθικοῖς in 28 see note on 1340 a 36. Aristotle may use the plural because he is prepared to approve, in addition to the Dorian mode, of the ὑποδωριστί, of which we read in Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 14 that it is μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ στάσιμον, but perhaps it is more likely that he does not wish to exclude any modes which may be recommended as ἠθικώταται by οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας (cp. 30 sqq.). He rejects without consideration the possible claims of πρακτικά and ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη to a place, however subordinate, in the education of the young, but he might well have considered whether they do not deserve to be occasionally used. Are not boys, or some of them at any rate, παθητικοί, and might not κάθαρσις by music be sometimes useful to such boys even educationally? Might not airs which stir to action also be a useful element in the education of some boys? It is not clear that Aristotle objects to the presence of boys at the performance of πρακτικὰ καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη, any more than he objects to their presence at the performance of tragedies (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 20 sqq.), but he certainly allows no place in education to music of these two kinds.

**4. καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς.** Sus.[4] is probably right in translating these words 'also the practical and the enthusiastic': cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 14, *ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ* ('also') *τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.*

**ὃ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** See note in Sus.[4]. Aristotle seems to anticipate that his recommendation of the use of the 'enthusiastic' modes, when we listen to music played by others, will excite surprise, and hence in 4—16 he justifies it at some length, though he adds no similar justification of his recommendation of the use of the 'practical' modes under similar circumstances, probably because he does not anticipate that any objection will be made to this.

**7. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχιμοί τινές εἰσιν.** *Ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως = τούτου τοῦ πάθους*: cp. 5, *πάθος*, and Plut. De Sanitate Tuenda c. 13, *ἤδη δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα τὸ σῶμα μηνύει πρὸς νόσον ἐπισφαλῶς ἔχειν, ἄλογοι γὰρ ἴσχουσιν ἀθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι.* For *κατακώχιμοι* see critical note on 1269 b 30. *Κατέχεσθαι* is the appropriate technical term, cp. Plato, Symp. 215 C, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 65, *τοὺς δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ὁρμῆς καὶ ἐπιπνοίας κατεχομένους ὑπὸ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ.* As to the nature of *ἐνθουσιασμός* see note on 1340 a 11. Of this susceptibility to *ἐνθουσιασμός* we have a striking example in Olympias, the mother of Alexander (Plut. Alex. c. 2, *ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιὰς μᾶλλον ἑτέρων ζηλώσασα τὰς κατοχὰς καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς κ.τ.λ.*). Had Aristotle observed in her case the calming effect of sacred melodies?

**8. ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν κ.τ.λ.**, 'and as an effect of the sacred melodies we see these men, when they have used the melodies which fill the soul with mystic excitement, brought back to a normal state as if having received medical treatment and purgation.' Sus.[4] points out that *χρῆσθαι*, like *κίνησις*, *καθίστασθαι*, and *κουφίζεσθαι*, is a medical term. It seems likely that the patient both listened to and sang the maddening melodies (see note in Sus.[4]). *Τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι* has been interpreted in many ways. Vict. explains these words 'cantibus expiando animo frangendisque vehementioribus illis motibus aptis,' Lamb. 'cantibus animum furore levantibus ac purgantibus,' and Liddell and Scott 'melodies which purge by mystic rites,' but Sepulveda is probably right in translating 'cantibus animum concitantibus' (cp. 1342 b 3, *ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά*). Bernays (followed by Sus.) renders the words in a not very dissimilar way, 'Lieder die eben das Gemüth berauschen' ('songs which intoxicate the soul'). *Ὅταν—μέλεσι* is bracketed by

Sus. as a gloss on ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν (see Sus.[4], 1. p. 640), but perhaps not all the ἱερὰ μέλη were 'intoxicating to the soul': cp. Plato, Ion 536 C, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὀξέως, ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσιν. There may have been ἱερὰ μέλη introductory to the melody which produced the decisive effect. Τὴν ψυχήν is emphatic: if the music does not go to *the soul*, it does nothing. For καθισταμένους see above on 1340 b 3. In ἰατρείας καὶ καθάρσεως the καί is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν (see note on 1257 b 7). The action of the sacred melodies on the souls of persons naturally disposed to ἐνθουσιασμός is compared to the action of some cathartic medicine like hellebore, which removes the worst elements and leaves the best (Plato, Rep. 567 C, καλόν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καθαρμόν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώματα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χείριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον). The following passages may be selected from many others as throwing light on Aristotle's meaning—Plut. Sympos. 6. 7. 2, καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, ὦ φίλε, φρενητίζων καὶ μαινόμενος (πλέον ἰσχύει)· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐλλεβόρῳ χρησάμενος ἢ διαίτῃ κατασταθῇ, τὸ μὲν σφοδρὸν ἐκεῖνο καὶ σύντονον οἴχεται καὶ γέγονεν ἐξίτηλον, ἡ δ' ἀληθινὴ δύναμις καὶ σωφροσύνη παραγίνεται τῷ σώματι· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ κάθαρσις τοῦ οἴνου, τὸ πληκτικὸν ἀφαιροῦσα καὶ μανικόν, εἰς πραεῖαν ἕξιν καὶ ὑγιαίνουσαν καθίστησι: Strabo, p. 418, καὶ δή φασιν ἐκεῖ (at the Malian Anticyra) τὸν ἐλλέβορον φύεσθαι τὸν ἀστεῖον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ (at the Phocian Anticyra) σπευάζεσθαι βέλτιον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδημεῖν δεῦρο (to the latter) πολλοὺς καθάρσεως καὶ θεραπείας χάριν: and Plut. Coriol. c. 12, ἔδοξεν οὖν τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν εἰς δέον γεγονέναι καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν ἡ χρεία τῶν Οὐελιτρανῶν διά τε τὴν ἀπορίαν κουφισμοῦ δεομένοις, καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἅμα σκεδάσειν ἤλπιζον, εἰ τὸ θορυβῶδες μάλιστα καὶ συνεπηρμένον τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς ὥσπερ περίττωμα τῆς πόλεως νοσερὸν καὶ ταραχῶδες ἀποκαθαρθείη. That certain sacred rites produced a similar effect on the soul to that produced by cathartic medicines on the body, we see from Plato, Rep. 560 D, τούτων δέ γέ που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 158, διὸ καὶ τὰς βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παρεπλήσιοι λόγου τυγχάνειν ἔχεσθαί φασιν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίησις διὰ βίου ἢ τύχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται, where the purging influence of the rites is traced in part to the music by which they were accompanied. On the whole subject of the

*κάθαρσις* effected by music and also by tragedy, see Sus.[4], 1. p. 641 sqq., and Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, c. 6. We are not distinctly told in the passage before us that a *κάθαρσις παθημάτων* occurs under the influence of the sacred melodies, as we are in the famous passage of the Poetics about tragedy (Poet. 6. 1449 b 27 sq.), but we can hardly be wrong in taking the musical *κάθαρσις* to be a *κάθαρσις* of *παθήματα* like the other. It should be noticed that music appears to purge all emotions, not merely, like tragedy, those of pity and fear, and also that the kind of music which produces a cathartic effect is by no means the wailful kind characteristic of such modes as the mixo-Lydian; music of this sort is charged with human feeling and essentially human, whereas cathartic music is full of a divine *afflatus* (Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 19, *διὸ καὶ ἁρμόζει τῷ χορῷ τὸ γοερὸν καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος καὶ μέλος· ἀνθρωπικὰ γάρ. ταῦτα δ' ἔχουσιν αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι, ἥκιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφρυγιστί· ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχική*). In Milton's Paradise Lost, 1. 549 sqq., the 'Dorian mood' is said to inspire 'deliberate valour' 'firm and unmoved With dread of death to flight or foul retreat' (cp. 1342 b 12 sqq.), and is also credited with a cathartic influence which Aristotle does not ascribe to it—

> 'Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage
> With solemn touches troubled thoughts, and chase
> Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain
> From mortal or immortal minds.'

Here the passage before us may be present to Milton's mind. Julian perhaps refers to it in Epist. 56. 442 B, *ὅτι γὰρ πρὸ ἡμῶν αὐτοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὸ τῆς θείας μουσικῆς καθαρθέντες ὑνήσονται, πιστευτέον τοῖς προαποφαινομένοις ὀρθῶς ὑπὲρ τούτων.*

11. **ταὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle seems still to be speaking of the effect of the sacred melodies. They cannot fail, he thinks, to purge others besides those who are specially given to *ἐνθουσιασμός*—those who are specially subject to the emotions of fear and pity (two allied emotions, as we learn from Rhet. 2. 8), and indeed those who are subject to emotion of any kind, and also those who are not specially emotional, so far as they are accessible to emotion. Philoxenus had represented the Cyclops as 'curing his love with music' (Philox. Fragm. 7: Plut. Amat. c. 18), and anger also was thought to be soothed by music (Athen. Deipn. 623 f sq.). As to the specially emotional persons referred to, cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1228 b 35, *οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ*

καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσί τι, πλὴν θᾶττόν τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, and Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 21, ἥκιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφρυγιστὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βακχική. κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομέν τι· παθητικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς μᾶλλον τῶν δυνατῶν εἰσί.

13. καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἑκάστῳ, 'so far as a share in the things mentioned' (i.e. emotions) 'falls to each': cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 22, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς, and Plato, Rep. 421 C, ἐατέον ὅπως ἑκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.

14. τινα κάθαρσιν. Bern. 'irgend eine Katharsis,' and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 246, note 1) observes, 'τινὰ κάθαρσιν implies that the *katharsis* in all cases is not precisely of the same kind,' and (p. 247) 'it is pretty plainly implied that the *katharsis* of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, the *katharsis* of "enthusiasm."' This may be so, but I am not sure that Aristotle means anything more than that all experience some purgation, though the amount of it varies with the amount of emotion by which they are severally possessed: cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 9, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ ('things which are shared by men in general') μὴ παρορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἔν τινι λόγῳ τίθεσθαι. Τις, indeed, is sometimes added to a substantive merely to soften it, as in Xen. Oecon. 8. 3, καὶ γὰρ χορὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων συγκείμενός ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ποιῶσιν ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος, ταραχή τις φαίνεται καὶ θεᾶσθαι ἀτερπές, but I do not think that this is the case here.

κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς. For κουφίζεσθαι cp. Plut. Coriol. c. 12 (quoted above on 8): De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 8, ὀλέγοις δέ τισιν ἐν μικρῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας κουφίζει τοῦτ' ἀπιόν, ὅταν πλεονάσῃ, καθάπερ ἡ πρώτη τροφή, ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ τῷ πλήθει· καὶ γὰρ ταύτης ἀπιούσης τὸ σῶμα εὐημερεῖ μᾶλλον: and Hist. An. 10. 5. 636 b 29 sqq.

15. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and similarly the cathartic melodies also' (as well as the sacred melodies) 'are a source to men of harmless pleasure.' So Vict. 'ut cantilenas illas sacras, quas docuit adhiberi solitas sua aetate ad expiandos lymphaticos, praeter furorem quem levant affirmavit gignere voluptatem, ita nunc testatur cantus purgandis animis factos, qui tamen non opitulantur ope divina valde commotis animo, sed concentu vocum sonorumque, apto illis motibus, prosunt, continere in se suavitatis plurimum.' The fact that they are a source of harmless pleasure shows that they are well suited both for diagogê and for relaxation (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 25 sqq.). The cathartic melodies here referred to seem to be the

same as those which are called enthusiastic in 1341 b 34. I understood this passage otherwise when I wrote (in vol. i. p. 366), 'the melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.' I should have written, 'just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.' [Since the foregoing note was written, Sus.[4] (1. p. 611) has rightly disagreed with the view which I took of the sentence in vol. i. p. 366. I then thought that it referred to cathartic melodies as distinguished from cathartic harmonies, whereas I think now that it refers to cathartic melodies as distinguished from the sacred melodies, whose effects I take to be described in *ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν*, 8—*ἡδονῆς*, 15. I am still of opinion that *καθαρτικά* should be retained in 15, and not, as Sus. suggests, discarded in favour of *πρακτικά*.]

**16. διὸ κ.τ.λ.** *Μέν* is taken up, not by *δ'* in 19, but by *δέ* in 28. With Spengel and Sus. I insert (*χρῆσθαι*) before *θετέον*: cp. *χρηστέον*, 1342 a 1, 2, *χρῆσθαι*, 27, and *χρηστέον*, 29. For *θετέον χρῆσθαι*, cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, *ἔθηκε γὰρ θύειν μὲν βασιλέα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια ἅπαντα. Διὸ—ἀγωνιστάς* is virtually repeated in 26–28.

**18. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατὴς διττός κ.τ.λ.** Cp. Poet. 26. 1461 b 28 sqq. For *ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος*, see above on 1338 b 3.

**19. ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος.** Sus.[4] aptly compares Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est.

**21. ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας**, 'contests and spectacles.' Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 1, *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμνικοὺς καὶ Διονυσιακούς, κἂν εἴ τινας ἑτέρας συμβαίνει τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας*, whence it appears that a 'contest' was a kind of 'spectacle.' A dramatic or musical performance would also be a 'spectacle.' *Θεωρία* is explained by Stallbaum to be used in the wider sense of 'festival' (*ἑορτή*) in Plato, Laws 650 A, *τῆς τοῦ Διονύσου θεωρίας*. Cp. also Isocr. Aeginet. § 10, *οὔτε θυσίαν οὔτε θεωρίαν οὔτ' ἄλλην ἑορτὴν οὐδεμίαν*. We infer from the use of *καί* in *καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις* that Aristotle is prepared to provide *ἀγῶνες* and *θεωρίαι* at which music of a higher type is performed for the citizens of his 'best State.' It is remarkable that he should expect day-labourers to care for music of any kind.

**22. εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ.** As to the souls of *βάναυσοι* and *θῆτες* cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D, quoted above on 1337 b 8. The position of *εἰσί* is strange; it seems hardly to belong to

ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ., and yet it can hardly belong to οὕτω καὶ κ.τ.λ., for that clause is already provided with an εἰσί. Did Aristotle originally intend the sentence to run εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις and insert ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. by an afterthought? Perhaps the repetition of εἰσί in 24 is to be compared with the repetition of δῆλον in 3. 13. 1283 b 17 and of ἔργον in 8(6). 5. 1319 b 35.

**23.** οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσί. Here the relation between the soul and an ἁρμονία dwelt on in c. 5. 1340 b 17 sqq. is again present to Aristotle's mind. The μιξολυδιστί and συντονολυδιστί (Plato, Rep. 398 E) are probably among the modes referred to, and perhaps also the low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian (see note in Sus.[4]); at any rate both high-pitched and low-pitched modes are treated as παρεκβάσεις τῶν ἁρμονιῶν in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24 sqq. The abandonment of the mixo-Lydian mode to βάναυσοι and θῆτες is uncomplimentary to Sappho, its reputed inventress (see above on 1340 a 42).

**24.** καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, 'and of melodies those which are highly-strung and unnaturally coloured.' Σύντονα is perhaps used here in opposition both to ἀνειμένα or μαλακά, as in 1342 b 21 and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27, and to βαρέα, as in De Gen. An. 5. 7. 786 b 35, καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι τὸ βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον. The Cretans are said by Ephorus to have used in their songs the rhythms which are most σύντονοι (Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250). For the meaning of χρῶμα in music see Liddell and Scott, s.v., and Sus.[4], 1. p. 636 sqq. Aristotle probably objected to the musical innovations of Timotheus, of whom we read in Pherecr. Χείρων, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 333).

οὗτος ἅπαντας οὓς λέγω
παρελήλυθ' ᾄδων ἐκτραπέλους μυρμηκιάς,
ἐξαρμονίους ὑπερβολαίους τ' ἀνοσίους,

and also to the music of Agathon: cp. Plut. Sympos. 3. 1. 1, θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ Ἐράτωνα τοῦτον, εἰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι παραχρώσεις βδελυττόμενος καὶ κατηγορῶν τοῦ καλοῦ Ἀγάθωνος, ὃν πρῶτον εἰς τραγῳδίαν φασὶν ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ ὑπομίξαι τὸ χρωματικόν, ὅτε τοὺς Μυσοὺς ἐδίδασκεν, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν, ὡς ὁρᾶτε, ποικίλων χρωμάτων καὶ ἀνθηρῶν τὸ συμπόσιον ἐμπέπληκε καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν ὤτων ἀποκλείει τρυφὴν καὶ ἡδυπάθειαν κ.τ.λ. Compare also Philoch. Fragm. 66 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 395), where we read of Lysander of Sicyon, καὶ περιελὼν τὴν συντονίαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς κιθαρισταῖς, χρώματά τε εὔχροα πρῶτος ἐκιθάρισε κ.τ.λ., and Pratinas, Fragm. 5, quoted above on 1340 a 42.

**26.** διόπερ κ.τ.λ. So Plato makes over *θρῆνοι* for famous men to women and worthless persons (Rep. 387 E).

**28.** ὥσπερ εἴρηται, in 1342 a 2.

**30.** καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον, in c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.

**31.** οἱ κοινωνοὶ κ.τ.λ., 'those who have shared in philosophical study and in musical education,' as distinguished from mere musicians on the one hand and philosophers who have not studied music on the other (see above on 1341 b 27). For the phrase cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, *κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας*: Laws 968 A, *παιδείας ὁπόσης διεληλύθαμεν κοινωνὸν γενόμενον*: Hipp. Minor 363 A, *οἱ μάλιστ' ἂν ἀντιποιησαίμεθα μετεῖναι ἡμῖν τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς*: Theaet. 172 C, *οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες*.

**32.** ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. Here begins a similar review of the opinions put in Socrates' mouth by Plato in the Republic to that which we find at the end of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.). As to these passages see vol. i. p. 519, note 1. The passage in the Republic referred to is Rep. 399 A sqq., where Plato seems to imply that the Dorian and Phrygian modes inspire courage in war and temperance in peace. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that the Phrygian mode does neither the one thing nor the other. *Φρύγιον* should probably be 'Ionian' in Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 30, *ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἀφεῖλε τῶν παιδευομένων νέων τὴν ἁρμονίαν τὴν Λύδιον καὶ τὴν Φρύγιον, τὴν μὲν τὸ θρηνῶδες καὶ φιλοπενθὲς ἡμῶν ἐγείρουσαν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν δὲ τὸ πρὸς ἡδονὰς ὀλισθηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον αὔξουσαν*: cp. Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 22. For *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ* cp. 2. 6. 1264 b 28, 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11, and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1, in all which passages the phrase is used in close proximity to a mention of *ὁ Σωκράτης*, and 2. 5. 1264 b 24, *ἡ πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν*. In 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1, on the other hand, we have *ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις* (perhaps referring to the Eighth and Ninth Books of the Republic), and in 2. 1. 1261 a 6, *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος*.

**34.** ἀποδοκιμάσας, in Rep. 399 D.

**2.** αὐλός. For the absence of the article see note on 1255 b 36. 1342 b.

**3.** For the difference between ὀργιαστικά and παθητικά see above on 1341 a 21.

δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποίησις· πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία κ.τ.λ., 'and poetry makes this clear' (i.e. that the *αὐλός* and the Phrygian mode are similar in effect), 'for every sort of Bacchic frenzy and all Bacchic agitation of mind [when represented in poetry] find their fit expression in

the pipes more than in any other instrument.' In translating *κίνησις* 'agitation of mind' and not 'bodily movement' I have followed Sus., who may probably be right (cp. 3, *παθητικά*, and c. 3. 1337 b 42), but I have done so with some hesitation, for *βακχεία* is used of physical movement in Plato, Laws 672 B, *τὰς περὶ βακχείας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μανικὴν χορείαν*, 790 E, *καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν ἰάσεις ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορείᾳ καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι*, and 815 B–C. For *ἐστὶν ἐν* (='sitae sunt in'), see above on 1330 b 8, and cp. c. 6. 1341 a 3, and Plato, Protag. 354 E, 356 D (where see Stallbaum). It should be noted that in a letter (genuine or not) from Olympias to Alexander quoted in Athen. Deipn. 659 f she distinguishes between *τὰ ὀργιαστικὰ ἱερά* and *τὰ βακχικά*, though in the passage before us *βακχεία* is evidently connected with *τὸ ὀργιαστικόν*.

**7. οἷον ὁ διθύραμβος κ.τ.λ.**, 'as for instance the dithyramb, [which is an expression of Bacchic frenzy,] is generally agreed to be a Phrygian melody' (and to require the Phrygian mode).

**8. σύνεσιν**, not far in meaning from *τέχνην*: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11, *τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης*.

**9. διότι Φιλόξενος κ.τ.λ.** Vict. 'est autem molestum hac in parte quod legitur in media sententia accusandi casu *μύθους*.' Schn. 'Reizius latere nomen dithyrambi Philoxenei suspicatus est; et recte quidem. Equidem non dubito Μυσούς id fuisse, quo nomine fabulas tragicas ab Aeschylo et Agathone publico in certamine Athenis commissas fuisse novimus.' Sophocles also wrote a tragedy thus entitled (see Nauck, Trag. Gr. Fragm., p. 175). Schneider's conjecture has been adopted by Coray, Stahr, Bekk.², and Sus., and is probably right, if indeed *τοὺς Μυσούς* is not an explanatory gloss which has crept from the margin into the text. Bergk accepts the change (Poet. Lyr. Gr., Philoxenus Fragm. 20), and adds, 'huc refero Plut. De Mus. c. 33, *ὥστε οὐδὲ ζητεῖν παρὰ ταύτης τὸ διαγράψαι δύνασθαι, πότερον οἰκείως εἴληφεν ὁ ποιητὴς ὡς οἷον* [*ὅμοιον* MSS. in place of *ὡς οἷον*] *εἰπεῖν ἐν μούσοις* (corrige Μυσοῖς) *τὸν ὑποδώριον τόνον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἢ τὸν μιξολύδιόν τε καὶ δώριον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν, ἢ τὸν ὑποφρύγιόν τε καὶ φρύγιον ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην* (*τὸ μέσον*?).' If *τοὺς Μυσούς* is correct, the dithyramb probably turned, like the tragedies of the same name by Aeschylus and Sophocles, on the story of Telephus. The mention of the title of the dithyramb is made somewhat abruptly, and also without necessity; still the title of a poem by Tyrtaeus is given, though less abruptly, in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 39. As to the subjects in connexion with which the Dorian mode was employed, it should

be noticed that, as Plutarch points out (De Musica c. 17), it was sometimes used for *τραγικοὶ οἶκτοι* and even for *ἐρωτικά*, subjects as alien to it, one would have thought, as a dithyramb. We see from Plato, Laws 669 C, that composers were not always successful in mating melody and words.

**11.** **ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς.** Cp. Poet. 24. 1460 a 3 sqq.

**12.** **περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ κ.τ.λ.** See above on 1340 b 3.

**14.** **ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.** Is this a reference to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 26 sqq., b 26 sq.? Cp. also Magn. Mor. 1. 24. 1192 a 6, *ὁ ἄρα ἐλευθέριος, ἐπειδή ἐστιν ἐπαινετός, μέσος τις ἂν εἴη τούτων.*

**15.** **ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ κ.τ.λ.** Cp. c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.

**16.** **φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ Δώρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις.** Coray and Sus. read *τοὺς νεωτέρους*. Vet. Int. translates, 'manifestum quod Dorias melodias oportet erudiri magis iuniores,' but whether he found *τοὺς νεωτέρους* in his Greek text is doubtful. I incline on the whole to retain *τοῖς νεωτέροις*: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 19, *ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν*, and Plato, Laws 811 D, *προσήκοντες τὰ μάλιστα ἀκούειν νέοις*, and 821 E, *τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὃ θαυμαστὸν μὲν λέγεις, προσῆκον δ' αὖ μαθεῖν τοῖς νέοις.*

**17.** **εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποί—34. τὸ πρέπον.** Susemihl brackets this passage as an interpolation, and I incline now to think that he is right: I thought otherwise when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, note 1. It would seem that the writer of it seeks to qualify the decision just arrived at in favour of the use of the midway mode in education by pointing out that for certain ages the relaxed modes are the only possible and becoming ones, and also that there is something to be said for the use in education of such modes as the Lydian. It is hardly likely that Aristotle would do this, unless we suppose a change of mind on his part, for he would scarcely be willing to unsay what he has said against the relaxed modes in c. 5. 1340 b 2, or to allow the boys for whose training he recommends the Dorian mode to be also trained in modes which he regards as soft and effeminate. Besides, as Sus.[4] remarks (1. p. 616, note), after what has been said in c. 6. 1340 b 35 sqq. we do not expect to hear of old men singing, except perhaps on the occasion of some special festivity (c. 5. 1339 b 9 sq.). The language of the passage recalls that of Plato in Laws 785 B, *τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ πρέπον ἑκάσταις προστάττειν μέχρι τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν*, and 670 D, *ἵνα καθορῶντες τάς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ἐκλέγεσθαί τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἷοί τ' ὦσιν, ἃ τοῖς τηλικούτοις τε καὶ*

τοιούτοις ᾄδειν πρέπον. We also hear a good deal about τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ πρέπον, or rather τὸ ἁρμόττον, in the opening chapter of the Book which stands next to the Fifth, if we adopt the order of the Books which has been adopted in the present edition and place the old Fourth Book immediately after the old Eighth. It should further be noticed that Plutarch seems to have had 17–29 before him in An seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 18, ὥσπερ γάρ, εἰ καθῆκον ἦν ᾄδοντας διατελεῖν, ἔδει, πολλῶν τόνων καὶ τρόπων ὑποκειμένων φωνῆς, οὓς ἁρμονίας οἱ μουσικοὶ καλοῦσι, μὴ τὸν ὀξὺν ἅμα καὶ σύντονον διώκειν γέροντας γεγονότας, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τὸ ῥᾴδιον ἔπεστι μετὰ τοῦ πρέποντος ἤθους. It is, however, possible that Plutarch had before him the criticism of the Republic by τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικήν τινες which is reproduced here, and not its reproduction in the passage before us. In addition to the objections to the passage 17–34 to which reference has already been made, it may be noted that, as Sus. has pointed out, looking to the reference to τὸ δυνατόν in 18 sqq., we expect to be told that the young should learn those melodies which are suitable to them and not beyond their powers, and not to be told, as we in fact are, that they should learn those melodies which will be the only ones suitable and practicable for them when they are past a certain age. Perhaps, however, the writer *does* mean that the relaxed modes are suitable both to the young and to the old; this seems to be indicated by his use of καί in ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, 'for the coming age also as well as for that of youth.' If this is his meaning, however, and there is nothing defective in the text, he must be allowed to have expressed it in a very imperfect way.

**20.** καὶ ταῦτα, i.e. τὰ δυνατὰ καὶ τὰ πρέποντα, as well as τὰ μέσα: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 37, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῇ ἑκάστοις ἐνδεχομένῃ τυχεῖν μεσότητος. Τὸ μέσον would not be exactly the same for boys and for men of full age and for old men.

οἷον τοῖς ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Gen. An. 5. 7. 787 b 10, ἔστι μὲν οὖν πᾶσιν ἡ ἰσχὺς ἐν τοῖς νεύροις, διὸ καὶ τὰ ἀκμάζοντα ἰσχύει μᾶλλον· ἄναρθρα γὰρ τὰ νέα μᾶλλον καὶ ἄνευρα. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν νέοις οὔπω ἐπιτέταται, τοῖς δὲ γηράσκουσιν ἤδη ἀνίεται ἡ συντονία· διὸ ἄμφω ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀδύνατα πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν, and Plut. An seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 18, quoted above on 17–34. Οἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 33) are distinguished from those who are in the same state from other causes: see Bonitz (Ind. 71 b 45), who groups with the passage before us Hist. An. 6. 18. 572 a 18, ἀπείπωσι διὰ τὸν πόνον.

**24.** ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 398 E, *ἀλλὰ μὴν μέθη γε φύλαξιν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ μαλακία καὶ ἀργία. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ; Τίνες οὖν μαλακαί τε καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ; Ἰαστί, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ λυδιστί, αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται.* See note on 1340 b 2.

**25.** ὡς μεθυστικὰς κ.τ.λ., 'taking them as connected with intoxication, not conformably to the influence of intoxication (for intoxication makes men rather frenzied revellers), but as enfeebled and exhausted.'

**27.** ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν κ.τ.λ. This sentence seems to be modelled on 1342 a 28 sq. and to be intended to contradict it. Καί, 27, implies that the study of relaxed modes by the young (for with δεῖ we must supply *τοὺς νέους* or *τοὺς νεωτέρους*) will be useful to them at their actual time of life as well as with a view to the coming time of life (see above on 17–34). We expect not *τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων*, but *τὴν τῶν ἀπειρηκότων διὰ χρόνον*, and we must not identify *οἱ πρεσβύτεροι* with *οἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον* (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 29 sqq.), but for some reason the wider term is preferred.

**29.** ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here we pass from *τὸ δυνατόν* to *τὸ πρέπον* (cp. 17 sq.). The apodosis of this sentence is missing in a lacuna after ἁρμονιῶν, 33. It seems better to adopt this view (with Sus.) than (with Schn. Cor. and Göttling) to place a colon instead of a full stop after τοιούτων, 29, and to connect ἔτι δ' εἴ τις, 29–ἁρμονιῶν, 33, with what precedes. As to the lacuna after ἁρμονιῶν see critical note.

**30.** For τοιαύτη followed by ἥ, see above on 1266 b 36.

**31.** κόσμον, probably 'orderliness': cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 7, *πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον*, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, quoted above on 1341 b 32.

**33.** τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς. For the absence of the article see above on 1253 b 11.

# APPENDIX A.

*Collation of Brit. Mus. MS. Harl.* 6874 *with the text of the Berlin Academy edition of Aristotle* (*ed. Bekker*, 1831).

I AM indebted to the kindness of Mr. F. G. Kenyon for the following collation of Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 6874.

The MS. contains the First Book of the Politics with the exception of the latter part of its last chapter, from 1260 a 26, τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, to the end. It also contains 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 24–1301 a 12, beginning with the words κλήρῳ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἁπάντων and ending with the word δημοτικά, and 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 3–1302 b 31, beginning with the words φαῦλον. φανερὸν δ' and ending with the word Μεγαρέων. 'It is of octavo size, measuring $8\frac{1}{8}$ in. × $5^{7}$ in. It is on vellum, written in a very neat hand, apparently of the first half of the fifteenth century. There is nothing to show how it came into its present fragmentary condition, as it was rebound when acquired by Lord Oxford' (Letter from Mr. Kenyon).

The MS. does not, as far as I see, contain anything new except in one passage, 1253 b 8, where a 'lacuna quasi trium litterarum inter ποῖον et δεῖ' is noted. None of the seventeen MSS. examined by or for Susemihl in 1252–1254 a 17 (see his edition of the Politics of 1872, p. xxviii) have any lacuna there. It is possible that τι has dropped out. But the MS. belongs to the better type of the second family and is nearly allied to $P^{2.3}$ (especially to $P^{3}$), two MSS. which, with $M^{8}$ $P^{1}$, the Vatican Palimpsest Fragments, and the Latin Translation of the Vetus Interpres, stand at the head of the authorities for the text of the Politics. Of course it has many errors of its own, and when it agrees with $P^{2.3}$, some of the inferior MSS. often do so too, but sometimes it agrees with $P^{2.3}$ where none of the inferior MSS. do so (this is the case in 1252 a 15, 1253 a 16, 1254 b 2, 1257 a 13, 16, 1300 b 24, 26). I have

noticed only two or three passages in which it sides with inferior MSS. against $P^{2.3}$—in 1252 a 26 it has *συνδιάζεσθαι* with $M^s$ $S^b$ $L^s$ pr. $P^3$, and in 1257 b 21 it has *ἡ* with $P^{4.6}$ Q $L^s$ Ald., not *ἡ* as $M^s$ $P^{1.2.3}$ $T^b$.

It often stands alone or almost alone in agreement with $P^3$: thus in

1255 a 31 $P^3$ has *εἴπαμεν*, and Harl. *εἴπαμεν* corrected into *εἰπομεν* prima manu,
b 2 *ἐκ* is omitted by pr. $P^3$ pr. Harl.,
1256 a 17 *πότερος* Harl. pr. $P^3$,
b 35 *οὐδὲ μιᾶς* $M^s$ $P^3$ Harl.,
1258 b 33 *ἔστι* $M^s$ $P^3$ Harl.: *ἐστὶ* $P^2$,
1259 b 8 *αἵμασις* Harl.: *αἷμασις* ('ut videtur,' Sus.[1]) pr. $P^3$,
10 *ἔχοι* $P^3$ Harl.

But $P^3$ has many false readings which Harl. has not, and in two passages Harl. shows a striking resemblance to $P^2$: thus in 1255 a 37 we find *ἐκ γόνων* in $P^2$ Q $M^b$ Harl., and in 1302 b 19 Ald. pr. $P^3$ have *ἐν ἔσονται* (*αἰνέσονται γρ.* marg. $P^3$), while Harl. has *ἐν ἔσονται* (marg. *μὴ αἰνέσονται* prima manu). It is obvious, therefore, that Harl. is not copied from $P^2$.

The glosses found in Harl. in 1302 a 28 and b 4 are found also in red ink in the margin of $P^2$ and in a later hand than the MS. in the margin of $P^3$ (see Susemihl's edition of 1872 in these passages). Harl. does not seem to have the glosses which are found in $P^2$ but not in $P^3$.

**1252 a 9.** *λέγουσιν*] *λέγουσι*. **14.** *ἐφεστήκῃ*] *ἐφεστήκει*. Ita semper, iota subscripto nunquam adhibito. **15.** *κατὰ λόγον*] *κατὰ τοὺς λόγους*. **16.** *ἀληθῆ* om. MS., ins. in marg. alia manu. **19.** *μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων* om. MS. **20.** *μόρια*] *μέρια*. **26.** *συνδυάζεσθαι*] *συνδιάζεσθαι*. **28.** *ἐκ* om. MS. **32.** *ἄρχον* om. MS.
**b 8.** *φασιν*] *φασὶν*. **10.** *κοινωνιῶν*] *κοινωνῖμων*. **12.** *πένητός ἐστιν*] *πένησιν ἐστὶν*, et similiter l. 14 *οἶκος ἐστίν*. **18.** *παῖδάς τε*] *παῖδας δὲ*. **23.** *ἀλόχων*] *ἀλλόχων*. **28.** *δὴ*] *δὲ*. **32.** *τῆς* om. MS.
**1253 a 1.** *τέλος*] *καὶ τέλος*. **4.** *φαῦλός ἐστιν*] *φαῦλος ἐστὶν*, et ita fere semper. **7.** *ἄζυξ ὢν*] lacuna in MS. **9.** *ἡ* om. MS. **12.** *ἐλήλυθεν*] *ἐλήλυθε*. **12, 13.** *ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ*] *τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν*. **19.** *ἐστίν*] *ἐστι*. **34.**

φρονήσει] φρονύσει. 35. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. 36. ἀφροδίσια] ἀφροδισία.

b 2–4. περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν πρότερον κ.τ.λ.] πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιῶν· οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία συνέστηκεν. 8. ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι] lacuna quasi trium litterarum inter ποῖον et δεῖ. 11. ἔστωσαν] ἔστωσαν. 25. ἐν om. MS. 28. τὰ δ'] τὰ δὲ. 35. αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ. 36. οὗς φησιν] οὓς φησὶν. 37. αὗται] αὖται, corr., ut videtur, αὗται.

1254 a 6. δέονται δ'] καὶ δέονται. 15, 16. ἄλλου δ' ἐστὶν om. MS. 16. ἄνθρωπος ὤν] δοῦλος ὢν, corr. ἄνθρωπος ὢν in marg. prima manu. 19. παρὰ] περὶ. 22. ἐστί] ἔστι. 25. ἐστίν] ἐστῖ. βελτίων] βελτίον. 28. ἐστί] ἔστι. 32. ἐστί τις] ἔστι τίς. 33. ἐξωτερικωτέρας] ἐξωτέρικοτέρας.

b 2. παρὰ] περὶ. 9. πᾶσιν] πᾶσῖ. 12. βέλτιον] βέλτιστον. 17. διάκεινται] διακείνωνται. δὲ om. MS. 20. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. 22. ἐστίν] ἐστὶ. 23. λόγου] λόγον. 28. ποιεῖν] ποιεῖ. 31. εἷς] εἷ. 37. τοῦτ' ἀληθές] τἀληθές.

1255 a 2–4. καὶ δίκαιόν . . . τὸ δουλεύειν om. MS. 5. καὶ post τις om. MS. 7. φασιν] φασὶ. 10. κρείττονος] κρείττον. 15. ἀεὶ] αἰεὶ. 20. οὔτ'] οὔτε. 24. φασιν] φασί. 26. τις] τίς. 29. δοῦλους] δοῦλος. 31. εἴπομεν] εἴπαμεν (corr. εἴπομεν, prima manu). 32. δούλους] λούλους. 33. αὐτοὺς] αὐτοῖς. 34. νομίζουσιν] νομίζουσῖ. 35. καὶ ἐλεύθερον] ἐλεύτερον. 36. ὥσπερ] ὥσπερ καὶ. φησὶ] φασὶ (ut videtur: corr. sec. manu). 37. ἔκγονον] ἐκ γόνου.

b 2. ἐκ additur supra lineam prima manu. 7. τὸ ante δεσπόζειν om. MS. 13. ἐστί τι] ἔστι τί. 18. ἐστίν] ἔστι. 24. τις] τίς. 27. ἕτερα] ἔργα. 29. δεσπότης] δεσπότις. 32. τῷ κτᾶσθαι] τῶν τᾶσθαι. 38. τις] τίς, et ita saepe.

1256 a 4. αὐτὴ τῇ] αὐτῆ. 10. ἡ οἰκονομικὴ] οἰκονομικῆ. 13. παρὰ] περὶ. 16. κτῆσις] κτήσις. 17. πότερον] πότερος. 28. ἀλλ'] ἀλλὰ. 36. ἁλιείας] ἁλείας. 41. ἀλλαγῆς] ἁλαγῆς.

b 5. λῃστρικόν] δηστρικὸν. 6. τοὺς] τὰς. 9. τελειωθεῖσιν] τελειωθεῖσι. 11. μέχρις] μέκρῖς. 14. αὐτοῖς] αὐτοῖς. 16. τἄλλα] τὰ ἄλλα. 28. ἐστὶ] ἐστῖ. 32. ἀγαθὴν] ἀγαθῶν. 35. οὐδεμιᾶς] οὐδὲ μιᾶς. 37. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. 41. χρηματιστικήν] χρηματικὴν.

1257 a 13. γέγονεν] γέγονε. 26. ἐπὶ πλέον] ἐπὶ λέον. 27. εὖτυ]
σίτον. 29. ἐστὶν] ἔστιν. 35. ἀναγκαίων] ἀναγκα
pr. manu, ν additum est postea.
b 10. λῆρος] in marg., alia manu, λοεδος. 12. οὐδὲ] οὔτε
17. γεγνομένων] γινομένων. 21. ἢ] ἡ. 23. ἀλλ᾽ἐ]
ἀναγκῆς. ἐστίν] ἐστῖ. 33. ἁρῶμεν συμβαίνων] ἁρῶ συμ-
βαῖον. 36. χρηματιστικῆς] χρηματικῆς. 37. ἐστὶ] ἔστι.
1258 a 8. ζητοῦσιν] ζητοῦσι. 15. τίνα om. MS. 18. ἀλ᾽]
ἀλλὰ. 20. ἐστὶν] ἔστιν. 21. ὥσπερ] ἅπερ. 30.
κατὰ τὴν] κατὰ τὰ τὴν. 32. ὑγιείας] ὑγείας. 37. ἐστὶ]
ἐστί. χρηματιστικὴ] χρηματικὴ. 39. οἰκονομικῆς] οἰκονο-
μικῆς.
b 13. ποῦ] τοῦ. 14. κτῆσις] κτήσις. 15. λοεσῶν om. MS.
16. τόποις] τούτοις. 20. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. χρηματιστικὴς]
χρηματηστικῆς. 30. γινομένων] γιννομένων. 33. ἐστὶν]
ἔστῑ. 36. τῆς om. MS. 38. σώματος] σόματος.
1259 a 3. ἐπιμελές] ἐπιμενὲς. 18. σπουδάζουσιν] σπουδάζουσι.
25. ἐμπορίων] ἐμποριῶν. 28. τοῦτο] τοῦτον. 29. γ᾽]
γε. 35. πόρων om. MS. 37. μέρη om. MS.
b 8. Ἄμασις] αἶμασις. 10. ἔχει] ἴχοι. 12. ὅπερ ἐστὶ om.
MS. 14. τε post ἀνδρῶν om. MS. 25. ἕξεων] ἕξεω.
26. εἴτε] εἴ τι. 27. ἔστι] ἐστῑ. ἐστιν] ἔστιν. 28. δὲ]
δὴ. 36. καθάπαξ] κατάπαξ. 40. εἶθ᾽ ὁ ἀρχόμενος ...
καλῶς om. MS.
1260 a 5. δὲ] δ᾽. 9. ἐλεύθερον] ἐλεύτερον. 11. διαφερόντως]
διαφερόντος. 16. αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ. 19. ἀρχιτέκτων] ἀρχι-
τέκτον. 20. ἐστὶν] ἔστῑν. 25. ἐπισκοποῦσιν] ἐπισκο-
ποῦσι. 26. Post verbum ἀρετή deficit MS.

## BOOK IV. c. 15.

1300 a 24. Incipit κλήρω καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἁπάντων. 25. φυλὰς] φῦλὰς.
φρατρίας] φατρῖας. 26. πολιτῶν] πολιτικῶν. 28. ἐκ
τινῶν] ἔκ τῖνων. 29. ἐκ τινῶν] ἐκ τῖνων. δ᾽] δὲ. 35.
ἐκ τινῶν] ἔκ τῖνων. 36. ἐκ τινῶν] ἐκ τῖνων. 41. ἐκ τινῶν]
ἔκ τῖνων, et ita 1300 b 2–4, 17, 1301 a 2, 3, 8, 9.
b 4. τὸ δὲ ἐκ τινῶν] τότε δὲ ἔκ τῖνων. 7. οὕτως] οὕτω. 10.
τῶν προσόδων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν om. MS. 22. ἀμφισβη-
τοῦσιν] ἀμφισβητοῦσι. 30. πόλεσιν] πόλεσι.
1301 a 4. δικαστήρια] δηκαστηρῖα. 7. συνδυαζόμενα] συνδιαζόμενα.
9. δικαστηρίου] δῖκαστῖρῖου. 12. Post verbum δημοτικά
deficit MS.

BOOK V. c. 1.

1302 a 3. Incipit φαῦλον. φανερὸν δ'. 10. ἐγγίνονται] ἐγγίγνονται. 14. ἡ ἐκ τῶν . . . ἡ om. MS. 16. γίγνονται] γίνονται. 28. Scholium in marg., τῆς ἰσότητος δηλονότι καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς. 33. αὐτῶν] αὐτῶν.

b 2. Post ὕβριν iterantur verba δ' ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων, sed ab ipso scriba error notatur. 4. Post τρόπον inseruntur verba ἐρίθεια ἡ φιλονεικία. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ μισθαρνία. 6. πῶς] πός. 10. Post ὁτὲ δὲ inseritur μὲν. 12. στασιάζουσιν] στασιάζουσι. 19. Ἀθήνησιν] Ἀθήνησι. ἐνίσονται] ἐν ἔσονται (marg. μὴ αἰνίσονται, prima manu). 31. Post verbum Μεγαρέων deficit MS.

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*On the use of Hyperbaton in the Politics.*

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In the following passages the emphasis appears to fall on the first only of the severed words:—

4 (7). 1. 1323 b 39, ἑτέρας γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα,

4 (7). 2. 1324 a 21, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προῃρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν,

5 (8). 6. 1341 a 22, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς κ.τ.λ.

5 (8). 7. 1342 a 4, ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει.

1257 a 13. γέγονεν] γέγονε. 26. ἐπὶ πλέον] ἐπὶ λέον. 27. σῖτον] σίτον. 29. ἐστὶν] ἔστιν. 35. ἀναγκαίων] ἀναγκα pr. manu, ν additum est postea.

b 10. λῆρος] in marg., alia manu, λοιδος. 12. οὐδὲ] οὔτε 17. γεγνομένων] γινομένων. 21. ἢ] ἤ. 23. ἀλλοῖς ἀναγκῆς. ἐστίν] ἐστῖ. 33. ἀρῶμεν συμβαῖνον] ἀρῶ συμβαῖον. 36. χρηματιστικῆς] χρηματικῆς. 37. ἐστὶ] ἐστ

1258 a 8. ζητοῦσιν] ζητοῦσι. 15. τίνα om. MS. 18. ἀλλ' ἀλλά. 20. ἐστὶν] ἔστιν. 21. ὥσπερ] ἅπερ. 30. κατὰ τὴν] κατὰ τὰ τὴν. 32. ὑγιείας] ὑγείας. 37. ἐστὶ ἐστί. χρηματιστικὴ] χρηματικὴ. 39. οἰκονομικῆς] οἰκονομικῆς.

b 13. ποῦ] τοῦ. 14. κτῆσις] κτήσις. 15. λοιπῶν om. MS. 16. τόποις] τούτοις. 20. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. χρηματιστικὴ χρηματηστικῆς. 30. γινομένων] γιννομένων. 33. ἐστὶν ἔστῖ. 36. τῆς om. MS. 38. σώματος] σώματε.

1259 a 3. ἐπιμελές] ἐπιμενὲς. 18. σπουδάζουσιν] σπουδάζου 25. ἐμπορίων] ἐμποριῶν. 28. τοῦτο] τοῦτον. 29. γ γε. 35. πόρων om. MS. 37. μέρη om. MS.

b 8. Ἄμασις] αἶμασις. 10. ἔχει] ἔχοι. 12. ὅπερ ἐστὶ om. MS. 14. τε post ἀνδρῶν om. MS. 25. ἕξεων] ἕξε 26. εἴτε] εἴ τι. 27. ἔστι] ἐστῖ. ἐστιν] ἔστιν. 28. δὲ] δὴ. 36. καθάπαξ] κατάπαξ. 40. εἶθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος... καλῶς om. MS.

1260 a 5. δὲ] δ'. 9. ἐλεύθερον] ἐλεύτερον. 11. διαφερόντως] διαφερόντος. 16. αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ. 19. ἀρχιτέκτων] ἀρχ τέκτον. 20. ἐστὶν] ἔστῖν. 25. ἐπισκοποῦσιν] ἐπισκ ποῦσι. 26. Post verbum ἀρετή deficit MS.

## BOOK IV. c. 15.

1300 a 24. Incipit κλήρω καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἁπάντων. 25. φυλὰς] φῦλα φρατρίας] φατρίας. 26. πολιτῶν] πολιτικῶν. 28. ἐκ τινῶν] ἔκ τῖνων. 29. ἐκ τινῶν] ἐκ τῖνων. δ'] δὲ. 35. ἐκ τινῶν] ἔκ τῖνων. 36. ἐκ τινῶν] ἐκ τῖνων. 41. ἐκ τινῶν] ἔκ τῖνων, et ita 1300 b 2–4, 17, 1301 a 2, 3, 8, 9.

b 4. τὸ δὲ ἐκ τινῶν] τότε δὲ ἔκ τῖνων. 7. οὕτως] οὕτω. 10. τῶν προσόδων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν om. MS. 22. ἀμφισβητοῦσιν] ἀμφισβητοῦσι. 30. πόλεσιν] πόλεσι.

1301 a 4. δικαστήρια] δηκαστηρῖα. 7. συνδυαζόμενα] συνδιαζόμενα. 9. δικαστηρίου] δῖκαστῖρῖου. 12. Post verbum δημοτικὰ deficit MS.

BOOK V. c. 1.

1302 a 3. Incipit φαῦλον. φανερὸν δ'. 10. ἐγγίνονται] ἐγγίγνονται. 14. ἡ ἐκ τῶν . . . ἡ om. MS. 16. γίγνονται] γίνονται. 28. Scholium in marg., τῆς ἰσότητος δηλονότι καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς. 33. αὐτῶν] αὐτῶν.

b 2. Post ὕβριν iterantur verba δ' ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων, sed ab ipso scriba error notatur. 4. Post τρόπον inseruntur verba ἐρίθεια ἡ φιλονεικία. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ μισθαρνία. 6. πῶς] πός. 10. Post ὁτὲ δὲ inseritur μὲν. 12. στασιάζουσιν] στασιάζουσι. 19. Ἀθήνησιν] Ἀθήνησι. ἐνίσονται] ἐν ἴσονται (marg. μὴ αἰνίσονται, prima manu). 31. Post verbum Μεγαρέων deficit MS.

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1257 a 13. γέγονεν] γέγονε. 26. ἐπὶ πλέον] ἐπὶ λέσον. 27. σῖτον] σίτον. 29. ἐστὶν] ἔστιν. 35. ἀναγκαίων] ἀναγκαία pr. manu, ν additum est postea.

b 10. λῆρος] in marg., alia manu, λοιδος. 12. οὐδὲ] οὔτε. 17. γεγονόμενον] γινομένων. 21. ἡ] ἡ. 23. ἀλλαγῆς] ἀναγκῆς. ἐστὶν] ἐστῖ. 33. ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον] ὁρᾶ συμβαίον. 36. χρηματιστικῆς] χρηματικῆς. 37. ἐστὶ] ἔστι.

1258 a 8. ζητοῦσιν] ζητοῦσι. 15. τίνα om. MS. 18. ἀλλ'] ἀλλὰ. 20. ἐστὶν] ἔστιν. 21. ὅσπερ] ὅπερ. 30. κατὰ τὴν] κατὰ τὰ τὴν. 32. ὑγιείας] ὑγείας. 37. ἐστιν] ἐστί. χρηματιστικὴ] χρηματικὴ. 39. οἰκονομικῆς] οἰκονομικῆς.

b 13. ποῦ] τοῦ. 14. κτῆσις] κτήσις. 15. λοιπῶν om. MS. 16. τόποις] τούτοις. 20. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. χρηματιστικῆς] χρηματηστικῆς. 30. γινομένων] γιννομένων. 33. ἐστὶν] ἔστῖ. 36. τῆς om. MS. 38. σώματος] σόματος.

1259 a 3. ἐπιμελές] ἐπιμενὲς. 18. σπουδάζουσιν] σπουδάζουσι. 25. ἐμπορίων] ἐμποριῶν. 28. τοῦτο] τοῦτον. 29. γ'] γε. 35. πόρων om. MS. 37. μέρη om. MS.

b 8. Ἄμασις] αἴμασις. 10. ἔχει] ἔχοι. 12. ὅπερ ἐστὶ om. MS. 14. τε post ἀνδρῶν om. MS. 25. ἕξεων] ἔξεων. 26. εἴτε] εἴ τί. 27. ἔστι] ἐστῖ. ἐστὶν] ἔστιν. 28. δὲ] δὴ. 36. καθάπαξ] κατάπαξ. 40. εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος . . . καλῶς om. MS.

1260 a 5. δὲ] δ'. 9. ἐλεύθερον] ἐλεύτερον. 11. διαφερόντως] διαφερόντος. 16. αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ. 19. ἀρχιτέκτων] ἀρχιτέκτον. 20. ἐστὶν] ἔστῖν. 25. ἐπισκοποῦσιν] ἐπισκοποῦσι. 26. Post verbum ἀρετή deficit MS.

## BOOK IV. c. 15.

1300 a 24. Incipit κλήρῳ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἁπάντων. 25. φυλὰς] φῦλὰς. φρατρίας] φατρίας. 26. πολιτῶν] πολιτικῶν. 28. ἐκ τινῶν] ἔκ τῖνων. 29. ἐκ τινῶν] ἐκ τῖνων. δ'] δὲ. 35. ἐκ τινῶν] ἔκ τῖνων. 36. ἐκ τινῶν] ἐκ τῦνων. 41. ἐκ τινῶν] ἔκ τῖνων, et ita 1300 b 2–4, 17, 1301 a 2, 3, 8, 9.

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1301 a 4. δικαστήρια] δηκαστηρῖα. 7. συνδυαζόμενα] συνδιαζόμενα. 9. δικαστηρίου] δῖκαστῖρῖου. 12. Post verbum δημοτικά deficit MS.

BOOK V. c. 1.

**1302** a 3. Incipit *φαῦλον. φανερὸν δ'.* 10. *ἐγγίνονται*] *ἐγγίγνονται.* 14. *ἡ ἐκ τῶν . . . ἢ* om. MS. 16. *γίγνονται*] *γίνονται.* 28. Scholium in marg., *τῆς ἰσότητος δηλονότι καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς.* 33. *αὐτῶν*] *αὐτῶν.*

b 2. Post *ὕβριν* iterantur verba *δ' ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τούτων*, sed ab ipso scriba error notatur. 4. Post *τρόπον* inseruntur verba *ἐρίθεια ἡ φιλονεικία. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ μισθαρνία.* 6. *πῶς*] *πός.* 10. Post *ὁτὲ δὲ* inseritur *μὲν.* 12. *στασιάζουσιν*] *στασιάζουσι.* 19. *Ἀθήνησιν*] *Ἀθήνησι. ἐνίσονται*] *ἐν ἴσονται* (marg. *μὴ αἰνίσονται*, prima manu). 31. Post verbum *Μεγαρέων* deficit MS.

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Kühner's account of Hyperbaton (Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 607. 1) is as follows—'In Hyperbaton two words forming together a unity are severed by the interposition of one or more less important words. By means of this severance prominence is given, as a rule, to one only of the severed words, that which stands first, but often also to both of them, especially when both are placed in emphatic positions in the sentence, for instance at the beginning or end of it.' In one particular this account is open to amendment. The severed words are not always only two in number; they are more than two, for instance, in Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 38, *οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους.*

In the following passages the emphasis appears to fall on the first only of the severed words:—

4 (7). 1. 1323 b 39, *ἑτέρας γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα,*

4 (7). 2. 1324 a 21, *ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προῃρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν,*

5 (8). 6. 1341 a 22, *ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς κ.τ.λ.*

5 (8). 7. 1342 a 4, *ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἑνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει.*

In the following passages, on the other hand, the emphasis appears to fall on both, or all, the severed words :—

4 (7). 1. 1323 a 16, ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτείαν,

5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10, ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχαρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς,

8 (6). 4. 1318 b 7, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις,

37, καὶ ἄρχουσι δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν εἶναι κυρίους ἑτέρους,

8 (6). 4. 1319 b 23, φυλαί τε γὰρ ἕτεραι ποιητέαι πλείους καὶ φρατρίαι,

8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εἶναι εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας,

35, τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνου.

The following words are among those most often emphasized in this way—*οὐδείς* and *μηδείς*, *πᾶς*, *πολύς*, *οὗτος*, *ἕκαστος*, *εἷς*, *αὐτός* and *ὁ αὐτός*, *ἄλλος* and *ὁ ἄλλος*, *τοιοῦτος* and *ὁ τοιοῦτος*, *τίς* and *τις*, *πόσος*, and *ποῖος*.

Occasionally two sets of words are thus emphasized in the same sentence—e. g. in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 3, *ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἐν ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας*, where both *διέστηκεν πολύ* and *ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας* are emphasized by severance, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 10, *ἅπαν γὰρ οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον*, where both *ἅπαν τοῦτο* and *οἰκεῖον μᾶλλον* are similarly emphasized.

Groups of words linked by *καί* or *ἤ* are often emphasized in this way: e. g. in

3. 5. 1278 a 6, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ ξενικόν,

17, ὥστ' ἐν μέν τινι πολιτείᾳ τὸν βάναυσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας,

19, ἐν ᾗ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν,

3. 10. 1281 a 24, ἀλλ' ἆρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἄρχειν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ;

8 (6). 3. 1318 a 15, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων.

It should be added that, though in nearly all the cases of the severance of connected words which have been examined by me in the Politics the aim evidently is to throw emphasis on particular words, I have noticed two or three passages in which this cannot

be said to be clearly the case. They are passages in which the relative is severed from its substantive. We have in

4 (7). 1. 1323 b 15, ἥπερ εἴληφε διάστασιν ἣν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας,
6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἷς κινεῖται μορίοις ἕκαστον αὐτῶν,
6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31, ὅνπερ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διοικεῖται τρόπον (contrast 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 24, ὃν τρόπον νῦν ἕκαστος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὑτοῦ τέκνων κ.τ.λ.).

Is any emphasis intended to be thrown on the severed words in these three passages?

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# APPENDIX C.

*On the variations in the order of words in* $\Pi^1$ *and* $\Pi^2$.

A CONSIDERABLE proportion of the variations in the order of words which we observe in $\Pi^1$ and $\Pi^2$ may be arranged in classes.

1. There are those in which $\Pi^2$ sever the adjective or pronoun from the substantive with which it agrees, while $\Pi^1$ place them together:—

1253 a 7, διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον $\Pi^2$ (ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος $\Pi^1$),
b 7, περὶ τριῶν ἂν τούτων σκεπτέον εἴη $\Pi^2$ (περὶ τριῶν τούτων σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη $\Pi^1$),
1256 b 26, τοῦτον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον $\Pi^2$ (ὄντα τοῦτον $\Pi^1$),
1270 b 28, κρίσεών εἰσι μεγάλων $\Pi^2$ (κρίσεων μεγάλων εἰσὶ $\Pi^1$),
1273 b 36, νομοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαῖον $\Pi^2$ (γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπουδαῖον $\Pi^1$),
1274 a 17, κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος $\Pi^2$ (ὢν ὁ δῆμος κύριος $M^s$ $P^1$ and perhaps Γ),
1276 b 14, εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλῃ πολιτείαν $\Pi^2$ (πολιτείαν μεταβάλῃ $\Pi^1$),
1323 b 15, ἣν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας $\Pi^2$ (εἶναι αὐτὰς ταύτας διαθέσεις $\Pi^1$),
1330 b 29, τὴν μὲν ὅλην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὔτομον $\Pi^2$ (πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν Γ $M^s$, πόλιν om. $P^1$),
1335 a 38, τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην $\Pi^2$ (ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συναυλίαν $\Pi^1$),

1339 a 14, τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν $\Pi^2$ (τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει $\Pi^1$),
1341 b 25, τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν $P^s$ $\Pi^3$ (τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει the rest)[1],
1340 b 8, ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον $\Pi^2$ (ἔχουσιν ἦθος $\Pi^1$),
1289 b 29, πάσας ὁρῶμεν τὰς πόλεις $\Pi^2$ (ὁρῶμεν πάσας $\Pi^1$),
1290 b 24, πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν $\Pi^2$ (ἔχειν πᾶσαν πόλιν $\Pi^1$),
1312 a 40, τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη πολιτειῶν $\Pi^2$ (πολιτειῶν ἑκάστη $\Pi^1$),
1315 b 12, πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον $\Pi^2$ (χρόνων ἐγένετο $\Pi^1$),
1320 a 31, ὁ τετρημένος γάρ ἐστι πίθος $\Pi^2$ (πίθος ἐστὶν $\Pi^1$)[2].

2. There are those in which $\Pi^2$ sever words from the words they govern, while $\Pi^1$ group the words together. A substantive, for instance, is often severed from the genitive it governs by $\Pi^2$, where it is not so severed by $\Pi^1$. Thus $\Pi^2$ have in

1328 b 17, ἐὰν δέ τι τυγχάνῃ τούτων ἐκλεῖπον (τι τούτων τυγχάνῃ $\Pi^1$),
1331 b 4, τὸ πλῆθος διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως (τῆς πόλεως διαιρεῖται $\Pi^1$),
1337 a 2, τὸ προσλεῖπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν (τῆς φύσεως βούλεται $\Pi^1$),
1340 b 29, τοῖς νηπίοις ἁρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων (ἁρμόττουσα τοῖς νηπίοις $\Pi^1$),
1309 b 38, οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν (οὐδετέραν γὰρ αὐτὼν ἐνδέχεται $\Pi^1$),
1321 b 30, αὗται μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς (τούτων εἰσὶ τρεῖς $\Pi^1$).

A similar tendency appears in the following passages, though in a less marked degree :—

1341 a 23, κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἡ μάθησιν $\Pi^2$ (δύναται μᾶλλον $M^s$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ),
24, συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ πρὸς παιδείαν $\Pi^2$ (αὐτῷ ἐναντίως $\Pi^1$),
1295 b 31, καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν $\Pi^1$ (καθάπερ οἱ πένητες τῆς τῶν πλουσίων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν $\Pi^1$),
1302 b 17, γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων $\Pi^2$ (γίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων εἴωθε $M^s P^1$ and possibly Γ),
1322 a 7, κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις $\Pi^2$ (κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἀδύνατον $\Pi^1$).

3. In all the above passages the order of words adopted in $\Pi^2$ is more broken and more emphatic than that adopted in $\Pi^1$, and

[1] In 1302 b 5 all MSS. have τίνα ἔχουσι δύναμιν.
[2] In 1338 a 25, on the other hand, $\Pi^1$ have ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν θαλείην and $\Pi^2$ καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην, where $\Pi^1$ are evidently wrong.

the following passages also show a leaning on the part of $\Pi^2$ to a more emphatic order (in the first five the adjective is placed before the substantive by $\Pi^2$):—

1276 b 40, *οὐκ ἂν εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ* $\Pi^2$ (*ἀρετὴ μία* $\Pi^1$),

1280 a 15, *φαῦλοι κριταὶ* $\Pi^2$ (*κριταὶ φαῦλοι* $\Pi^1$),

1290 b 8, *πλείονα μόρια* $\Pi^2$ (*μόρια πλείονα* $\Pi^1$),

1294 a 22, *ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή* $\Pi^2$ (*ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος ἀρχαῖος* $\Pi^1$),

1320 a 22, *δεῖ ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας* $\Pi^2$ (*ἐκκλησίας ὀλίγας* $\Pi^1$),

1277 a 14, *φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον* $\Pi^2$ (*εἶναι ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον* $\Pi^1$),

{ 1329 b 2, *τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον* $\Pi^2$ (*τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον* $\Pi^1$),
{ 1301 b 26, *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ* $\Pi^2$ (*ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ* $\Pi^1$),

1330 b 27, *τούτων ἀμφοτέρων* $\Pi^2$ (*ἀμφοτέρων τούτων* $\Pi^1$),

1334 b 29, *ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γένηται* $\Pi^2$ (*ὅπως τὰ σώματα βέλτιστα γίνηται* $\Pi^1$),

1337 b 12, *τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι* $\Pi^2$ (*παρασκευάζουσι τὸ σῶμα χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι* $\Pi^1$).

Yet sometimes $\Pi^1$ place words in the more emphatic order. Thus they have in

1259 b 30, *δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα σώφρονα εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν* (*εἶναι σώφρονα* $\Pi^2$),

1265 b 15, *ἀνίσους τοὺς κλήρους εἶχον* $M^s$ $P^1$, *ἀνίσους εἶχον τοὺς κλήρους* Γ (*τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον* $\Pi^2$),

1280 b 30, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου* (*ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι* $\Pi^2$): cp. 1341 a 21 (*οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς* ΓΠ) and 1286 a 15,

1281 a 27, *φαῦλα πάντα* (*πάντα φαῦλα* $\Pi^2$),

1282 a 40, *τούτων πάντων* (*πάντων τούτων* $\Pi^2$),

1331 a 16, *τὰ δὲ ζητεῖν δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν* (*τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν* $\Pi^2$),

1339 a 39, *εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δεῖ διαπονεῖν αὐτούς* (*δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα* $\Pi^2$),

1300 b 27, *ὅσα τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐπὶ καθόδῳ ἐπιφέρεται φόνου* (*τοῖς φεύγουσι φόνου* $\Pi^2$),

1307 b 11, *ὥστ' ἐξεῖναι συνεχῶς τοὺς αὐτοὺς στρατηγεῖν* (*τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχῶς* $\Pi^2$),

1322 a 31, *ἐν μείζονι δὲ σχήματι* (*ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι* $\Pi^2$).

4. In some passages the genitive is differently placed in $\Pi^1$ and $\Pi^2$:—

1326 a 20, *πόλεώς εἰσι μέρος* $\Pi^2$, *μέρος εἰσὶ πόλεως* $M^s$ $P^1$ and perhaps Γ,

1340 a 1, *τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν* $\Pi^2$ (*ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς ἐστιν* P, *ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς* Γ $M^s$),
1311 b 18, *χρώμενος αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ* $\Pi^2$ (*τῇ ἡλικίᾳ αὐτοῦ* $\Pi^1$),
1319 b 17, *ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἴτιον γενέσθαι* $\Pi^2$ (*αἴτιον τῆς στάσεως* $\Pi^1$).

In 1311 a 22, on the other hand, $\Pi^2$ have *τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν* and $M^s P^1$ and perhaps Γ *τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας* and in 1291 a 33 $\Pi^2$ have *ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μόριον τῆς πόλεως* and $M^s P^1$ and perhaps Γ *ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τῆς πόλεως μόριον*.

The variations classified in the foregoing pages amount to nearly half the entire number of variations in the order of words in $\Pi^1$ and $\Pi^2$.

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# APPENDIX D.

*Reminiscences in the Politics of passages in the writings of Plato and other Greek authors and of dicta of notable men.*

We are concerned in this Appendix not with explicit references, but with reminiscences, or apparent reminiscences, of a tacit kind. I have endeavoured to gather together in it those noticed *in the* commentary, or most of them, and a few which I have observed since I wrote it, beginning with reminiscences of Plato's writings or dicta. Many reminiscences have no doubt escaped me, but those which are here pointed out may serve in some degree to throw light on the direction and extent of Aristotle's reading in connexion with the Politics.

i. PLATO.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2. 108 | 1252 b 5 sqq. | Laws 805 D–E |
| 114, 117 | 16 sqq. | — 776 A, 680 A sqq. |
| 122 | 1253 a 8 | Polit. 267 B sq., 276 A? |
| 162 | 1255 b 20 sq. | — 259 B |
| 177 sq. | 1256 b 23 sqq. | Sophist 222 B–C, Laws 823 B |
| | 1258 a 10 sqq. | Laws 962 A, Rep. 397 E |
| 224 | 1260 b 5 sq. | — 777 E (cp. 720 B sqq.) |
| 260 | 1264 a 25 | Rep. 422 E |
| 268 | 1265 a 23 | Laws 625 C sq. |
| 270 | b 1 sqq. | — 928 E sq. |
| 271 | 7–10 | Rep. 460 A |

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| 2. | 315 | 1269 a | 34 sqq. | Laws 776 C sqq. |
| | 317 | b | 14 sqq. | — 781 A sq., 806 C |
| | 322 | 1270 a | 4 sqq. | — 780–1, esp. 780 B and 781 A |
| | 337 | b | 34 sq. | Rep. 548 B |
| | 358 | 1272 b | 9 sqq. | Laws 712 E |
| 3. | 163 | 1277 a | 26 sq. | Laws 643 E |
| | 169 | b | 11 sqq. | — 762 E? |
| | 172 | | 24 sq. | Meno 71 E |
| | | | 25 sqq. | Rep. 433 C |
| | 189 | 1279 a | 3 sq. | — 341 C–D |
| | 196 | b | 17 sq. | — 550 C |
| | 207 | 1280 b | 20 sqq. | — 369 A sqq. |
| | 212 | 1281 a | 34 sqq. | Laws 713 E sqq. |
| | 222 | 1282 a | 15 sq. | — 701 A |
| | 223 | | 20 sqq. | Rep. 601 D, Cratyl. 390 |
| | | | 25 sqq. | Laws 945 B sqq. |
| | 225 sq. | b | 14 sqq. | — 756 E–758 A, esp. 757 C, Rep. 540 D sq. |
| | 227 | | 23 sqq. | Gorg. 490 B sqq. |
| | 236 | 1283 a | 40 sqq. | — 488 D |
| | 238 | b | 23 sqq. | — 489 E sqq. |
| | 240 | 1284 a | 3 sqq. | Rep. 540 D |
| | 285 | 1286 b | 3 sqq. | — 445 D |
| | 296 sq. | 1287 a | 38 sqq. | Polit. 298 A sq., 300 A |
| | 303 | 1288 a | 4 sq. | Plato ap. Diog. Laert. 3. 18? |
| | 306 | | 41 sqq. | Polit. 292 B, E, 259 B |
| | 311 | 1323 a | 36 sqq. | Apol. Socr. 29 D, E |
| | 312 | | 40 sqq. | — 30 A sq. |
| | 318 | b | 29 sqq. | Rep. 435 B sq., 441 C sq. |
| | 322 | 1324 a | 27 sq. | Theaet. 175 D sq., Rep. 476 A sq. |
| | 323 | | 32 sqq. | Gorg. 500 C |
| | 326 | b | 9 sqq. | Laws 637 D |
| | 331 | | 41 sqq. | — 704 C |
| | 338 | 1325 b | 21–23 | Polit. 259 C, E |
| | 341 | | 40 sqq. | Laws 709 C sqq. |
| | 346 | 1326 b | 2 sq. | Rep. 369 D |
| | 347 | | 7 sqq. | Same passage |
| | 348 | | 14 sqq. | Laws 738 D sq., 751 D, 766 E |
| | 350 | | 26 sqq. | — 704 C, Critias 110 E |
| | 351 | | 30 sqq. | — 737 D, Critias 112 C |
| | 358 | 1327 a | 19 sqq. | — 705 A |

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| 3. 361 | 1327 a | 37 sqq. | Laws 952 D sqq. |
| 368 | 1328 a | 6 sq. | Rep. 375 B |
| | | 8 sqq. | — 375 D sqq. |
| 375 | | b 6 sqq. | — 369 C sq., Critias 110 C |
| 391 | 1330 a | 14 sqq. | Laws 745 C |
| 394 | | 26 | — 777 C sq. |
| 395 | | 31 sqq. | — 777 C sqq. |
| 406 | | b 32 sqq. | — 778 D |
| 419 | 1331 b | 13 sqq. | — 848 C sqq., 760 B sqq., 762 B sq. |
| 420 | | 20 sqq. | — 745 B |
| 422 | | 26 sqq. | — 962 A sq. |
| | | 39 sq. | Meno 78 A |
| 425 | 1332 a | 11 sqq. | Laws 728 C, 859 D–860 B |
| 431 | | 40 sqq. | Plato ap. Plut. Marius, c. 46 |
| 434 | | b 16 sqq. | Polit. 301 D sq. |
| 436 | | 37 sq. | Laws 690 A, Rep. 412 C |
| 442 | 1333 a | 35 | — 628 D sq., 803 D |
| 454 | 1334 b | 9 sq. | — 653 B, 659 D |
| 455 | | 12 sqq. | Phaedr. 245 D |
| 456 | | 22 sqq. | Rep. 441 A sq. |
| 457 | | 27 sq. | — 591 C sq. |
| | | 29 sqq. | Laws 721 A |
| 477 | 1335 b | 38 sqq. | — 784 E, 841 C sqq. |
| 480 | 1336 a | 8 sqq. | Theaet. 153 A, B, Laws 789 E |
| 485 | | 30 sqq. | Rep. 376 E sq. |
| 486 | | 33 sq. | Laws 643 B sq. |
| 487 | | 34 sqq. | — 791 E sqq. |
| 489 | | 41 sqq. | — 794 |
| 490 | | b 6 sqq. | — 729 B |
| 495 | | 33 | Rep. 378 D sq. |
| 496 | | 35 sqq. | — 466 E sq. |
| 499 | 1337 a | 14 sqq. | — 544 D sq. |
| 501 | | 23 sqq. | Laws 804 C–D, 810 A |
| 502 | | 27 sqq. | — 923 A sq. |
| | | 29 sqq. | — 903 B, Charm. 156 E |
| 506 | | b 2 sq. | Laches 190 B sq. |
| 507 | | 8 sqq. | Rep. 495 D sq. |
| | 1342 a | 22 sq. | |
| 512 | 1337 b | 35 sq. | Laws 803 D sq. |
| 519 | 1338 b | 6 sqq. | — 794 C |

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| 3. | 520 | 1338 b | 9 sqq. | Rep. 410 D |
| | 529 | 1339 a | 26 sqq. | Laws 819 B, 820 D? |
| | 534 | b | 33 | — 658 E sq. |
| | 536 | 1340 a | 5 sqq. | Rep. 401 D, Tim. 47 D |
| | 538 | | 18 sqq. | — 399 A sqq. |
| | 542 | | 42 sqq. | — 398 D sqq. |
| | 550 | 1341 a | 10 sq. | Laws 812 D sq.? |
| | 557 | b | 10 sqq. | Gorg. 501 B–502 A |
| | 571 | 1342 b | 17 sqq. | Laws 785 B, 670 D |
| 4. | 139 | 1288 b | 41 | Rep. 501 A, 540 E sq. |
| | 158 | 1290 a | 30 sqq. | Polit. 291 D |
| | 181 | 1292 a | 31 | Rep. 557 C sqq., Laws 712 E |
| | 204 | 1294 b | 18 sq. | Laws 712 D sqq. |
| | 211 | 1295 b | 4 sqq. | — 679 B sq., 728 D–729 A |
| | 212 | | 13 sqq. | — 728 D–729 A, 791 D |
| | 213 | | 21 sqq. | Menex. 238 E sq., Laws 756 E sq., 712 E, Rep. 417 A–B |
| | 217 | 1296 a | 8 sq. | Laws 744 D |
| | 258 | 1299 a | 25 sqq. | Polit. 260 C sqq. |
| | 260 | | 38 sqq. | Rep. 370 C, 374 A sqq., Laws 846 D sqq. |
| | 286 | 1301 b | 4 sq. | Laws 690 D |
| | 290 | | 26 sq. | — 757 A |
| | | | 29 | — 757 A sqq. |
| | 291 | 1302 a | 2 sqq. | — 757 E |
| | 309 | 1303 a | 25 sq. | — 708 D |
| | 322 | b | 28 sq. | — 792 C |
| | 336 | 1304 b | 22 sqq. | Rep. 565 A sqq. |
| | 358 | 1306 a | 19–31 | — 551 D sq. |
| | 371 | 1307 a | 17 sq. | Gorg. 483 C |
| | 376 | | 40 sqq. | Phaedr. 262 A, Rep. 424 B–E |
| | 379 | b | 30 sqq. | Rep. 424 B–E |
| | 406 | 1309 b | 18 sqq. | Laws 701 E, Rep. 562 |
| | | | 20 sqq. | Rep. 562 B |
| | 409 | 1310 a | 12 sqq. | — 552 E, Laws 793, 870 A |
| | | | 34 sqq. | Laws 715 D |
| | 415 | b | 12 sqq. | Rep. 568 E sq. |
| | 438 | 1312 a | 26 sqq. | Symp. 208 C sq. |
| | 442 | b | 19 sq. | Rep. 567 C sq. |
| | 446 | 1313 a | 19 sqq. | Laws 690 D–E, 691 D sqq. |
| | 447 | | 25 sqq. | — 691 D sqq. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4. 456 | 1313 b | 18 sqq. | Rep. 567 A |
| 459 | | 28 sq. | — 566 E |
| 477 | 1315 b | 8 sqq. | — 580 A |
| 494 | 1317 a | 41 sqq. | — 562 B sq. |
| 507 | 1318 b | 1 sqq. | Laws 663 E |
| 518 | 1319 a | 22 sqq. | — 695 A |
| 539 | 1320 b | 33 sqq. | Rep. 556 E |
| 549 | 1321 b | 14 sqq. | — 371 B |
| 557 | 1322 a | 5 sqq. | Crito 50 B |

ii. ISOCRATES.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2. 122 sq. | 1253 a | 9 sqq. | Nicocl. § 5 sqq., De Antid. §§ 253-257 |
| 155 | 1255 a | 14 | Philip. § 15 |
| 177 sq. | 1256 b | 23 sqq. | Panath. § 163 |
| 228 | 1260 b | 33 sqq. | De Antid. § 83 |
| 375 | 1274 a | 14 sq. | — § 316 sqq. |
| 3. 190 | 1279 a | 10 sqq. | Areop. § 24 sq. |
| 447 | 1333 b | 38 sqq. | Panath. § 219 sq. |
| 448 | 1334 a | 8 sqq. | De Pace § 96 |
| 4. 204 | 1294 b | 18 sqq. | Areop. § 61, Nicocl. § 24 |
| 334 | 1304 b | 20 sqq. | De Pace §§ 108, 122 sq. |
| 340 | 1305 a | 7 sqq. | — § 54 sq., Philip. § 140 |
| 409 | 1310 a | 12 sqq. | Areop. § 40 sqq. |
| 420 | b | 40 sqq. | Ad Nicocl. § 16 |
| 454 | 1313 b | 6 sqq. | Paneg. § 151 |
| 460 | | 29 sqq. | Hel. § 33, De Pace § 112 |
| 468 | 1314 b | 21 sq. | Ad Nicocl. §§ 11, 24 |
| 477 | 1315 b | 8 sqq. | Hel. § 34 |
| 512 | 1319 a | 2 sqq. | Ad Nicocl. § 16 |
| 535 | 1320 a | 39 sq. | Areop. § 32 |

iii. XENOPHON.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2. 162, 164 | 1255 b | 20 sqq., 33 | Oecon. 13. 5, 21. 10 |
| 3. 172 | 1277 b | 24 sq. | — 7. 25 |
| 210 | 1281 a | 11 sqq. | Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq. |
| 300 | 1287 b | 26 sqq. | Cyrop. 8. 2. 10–12 |
| 344 | 1326 a | 32 sqq. | — 8. 7. 22 |
| 365 | 1327 b | 25 sqq. | — 1. 1. 4 |
| 414 | 1331 a | 31 sqq. | — 1. 2. 3 sq. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4. 198 | 1294 a 3 sq. | Oecon. 9. 14 | |
| 258 | 1299 a 25 sqq. | Mem. 3. 9. 11 | |
| 260 | 38 sqq. | Cyrop. 2. 1. 21 | |
| 446 | 1313 a 21 sqq. | Rep. Lac. 15. 8 | |
| 460 | b 29 sqq. | Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, Hiero 3. 7 sqq., 1. 38 | |
| 472 | 1315 a 6 sqq. | Hiero 9. 3 | |
| 475 | 37 sq. | — 6. 5 | |
| 542 | 1321 a 19 sq. | Cyrop. 2. 1. 8? | |

iv. HOMER.

The reminiscences of Homer noticed by me are more doubtful, but possible reminiscences of the Iliad are pointed out in 2. 257, 3. 214, 273, 295, 301, 343, 379, 436 (compare also 2. 5. 1263 a 11 sqq. with Il. 1. 165–168), and of the Odyssey in 2. 239, 3. 177.

v. Reminiscences of the writings of the following authors also seem to occur in the Politics:—

Aeschines 4. 198, 255? (see also 4. 214)
Aeschylus 4. 460
Aristophanes 4. 179, 510? (see also 3. 214 sq.)
Democritus 3. 489
Ephorus 2. 347–350, 4. 219
Eubulus, the comic poet, 4. 462
Euripides 2. 358?, 3. 459, 4. 211, 391, 460?, 461
Herodotus 3. 326, 4. 461 (see also 3. 150 sq., 4. 208)
Hippias of Elis 4. 297 sq.
Hippocrates 3. 401, 473, 483, 532 (compare also 1. 8. 1256 a 32 sqq. with Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. 1. p. 556 Kühn, foot)
Melanippides 3. 556
Pratinas 3. 542
Solon 3. 169, 228, 350, 4. 139?, 290, 391, 408
Telestes 3. 556:

and reminiscences of sayings ascribed to

Alcibiades 2. 337
Anacharsis 3. 522
Epaminondas 3. 523
the Lacedaemonians 3. 525
Pelopidas 3. 423
the Pythagoreans 2. 142 sq.:

of other sayings 3. 556, 4. 321, 507: of proverbs 3. 238, 417. 461?, 598, 4. 226?, 290?

Reminiscences may also occur, though this is more doubtful, of the writings of

Anaxandrides 3. 201, 397
Antiphanes 2. 252
Archilochus 4. 465 (quoted 3. 368)
Eupolis 3. 429 sq.
Heraclitus 2. 153 (quoted 4. 474)
Lysias 3. 150, 4. 334
Phrynichus, the comic poet, 2. 120
Pindar 2. 131, 153, 157, 3. 399, 4. 182
Theognis 4. 226, 297, 321, 391
Thucydides 2. 308, 3. 525, 4. 294, 402, 416,

and of sayings ascribed to Aristides 4. 403, Aristippus, 2. 287, Socrates, 3. 217, 431, and Themistocles, 4. 403.

# ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOLS. I, II, AND III.

## VOL. I.

P. 15, line 14, *for* παμπολλοὶ *read* πάμπολλοι.

P. 20, eleven lines from foot of page, *for* compounds formed *read* things constituted.

P. 34, line 14. A. Schmekel (Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, p. 375) takes the reference in the words 'docti homines' (Cic. De Rep. 1. 24. 38) to be to Aristotle, while C. Hinze (Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, p. 50 sq.) takes it to be to Panaetius.

P. 148, line 9, *for* Hecuba *read* Helen.

P. 236, lines 15–27. See as to the two arguments here summarized the explanatory notes on 3. 4. 1276 b 37 and 1277 a 5 (vol. iii. pp. 157–159).

P. 237, five lines from foot of page, *for* from *read* after, *and dele* first.

P. 242, line 1 sq. As to this recapitulation, however, see note on 3. 5. 1278 a 34 (vol. iii. p. 182).

P. 243, line 8 sq. I have given a slightly different translation of this sentence in the explanatory note on 3. 6. 1278 b 8 (vol. iii. p. 184 sq.).

P. 264, six lines from foot of page, 'his disciple Dicaearchus'. See however below on vol. ii. pp. xiii and xiv.

P. 270, note 1. In the quotation from 3. 16. 1287 b 6 *for* ὥστε *read* ὥστ' εἰ (see critical note on 1287 b 6).

P. 272, line 1, *for* compensation *read* return (see vol. iii. p. 282 sq.).

P. 278, lines 17–20, add a reference to Diod. 16. 92. 5 and 95. 1, and Stob. Floril. 98. 70.

P. 286, note. The term 'mortal god' is borrowed by Hobbes from Aristotle: see Cic. De Fin. 2. 13. 40, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et ad agendum esse natum quasi mortalem deum (Aristot. Fragm. 48. 1483 b 15: Rose², Fragm. 61).

P. 290, line 14, *for* leadership *read* rule.

P. 297, note 2. Mr. Shute's essay 'On the history of the process by which the Aristotelian writings arrived at their present form' (Clarendon Press, 1888) has been published since my first and second volumes appeared. See p. 164 sqq. of the essay.

P. 299, note 1, first column, last line but two, *for* 80 *read* 81.

P. 324, note 1. See critical note on 1331 b 4 (vol. iii. p. 112).

P. 325, in the quotation from Ion of Chios (Fragm. 63 Nauck), *after* εἶτ' *add* ἂν.

P. 348, note 1, lines 1–2, *read* We find this many-sidedness and versatility more often realized, etc.

P. 363, lines 21–24. See however vol. iii. p. 540.

P. 366, line 1 sqq. See as to the passage here summarized the critical note on 1341 b 19–26 (vol. iii. p. 126 sq.).

P. 366, last line, *for* The melodies also *read* Just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies. (See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 15 in vol. iii. p. 566 sq.)

P. 366, note 1, and p. 369, note. See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 17–34 (vol. iii. p. 571 sq.)

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P. 513, fourteen lines from foot of page, 'from each tribe or section of the State'. Probably rather 'from the γνώριμοι and δῆμος': see the explanatory note on 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 21.

P. 519, note, second column, line 4, *add* For other statements in this chapter inconsistent with statements made elsewhere in the Politics, see vol. iv. pp. 441, 485 sq.

P. 541, last line but one, 'worth or' should perhaps be omitted: see the explanatory note on 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 34.

P. 566, seven lines from foot of page, *for* nor again where a wealthy majority rules over a minority of poor *read* nor again an oligarchy where the rich rule, because they are in a majority, over a minority of poor. (See critical note on 1290 b 15 and explanatory note on 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 14.)

P. 573, line 18. 'This agrees sufficiently well with the account of aristocracy in the passage before us'. I have changed my opinion as to this, and now distinguish the aristocracy of the Third Book from that of the Fourth (old Seventh): see above, p. xxxvi, and vol. iv. p. ix.

P. 575, end of Appendix E, *after* Aristotle's? *add* It should not, however, escape notice that if this part of c. 10 (1329 a 40–b 35) is an interpolation, it is an interpolation of old date, for the author of the epitome of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics which is preserved in the Eclogae of Stobaeus

(2. 6. 17) seems to have had it before him when he says of the distribution of functions in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book of the Politics between the young, the elders, and the old, *ταύτην δ' ἀρχαίαν εἶναι πάνυ τὴν διάταξιν, Αἰγυπτίων πρώτων καταστησαμένων, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐχ ἧττον*, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of c. 10.

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## VOL. II.

Pp. xii–xvi. So far as the question has been investigated at present, it seems likely that neither Polybius nor Cicero had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics, and that any resemblances traceable in their teaching to that of the Politics are due to their use of a work by an authority—probably Panaetius—who had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics. See A. Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, pp. 47–85 and 374–379, C. Hinze, Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, pp. 11–21 and 29–55, and Sus.[4], vol. i, p. 660 sq.

P. xiii, last line but two, and p. xiv, note 3. See however as to Dicaearchus C. Hinze, *op. cit.* p. 23 sqq., where a different view is taken as to the probable subject of the *Τριπολιτικός* of Dicaearchus.

P. xiv, note 1. See Mr. Shute's essay, p. 40 sq.

P. xvii, line 19, *after* the Politics *add* See also the explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 19 as to Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12.

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P. xix, line 20, *after* 1333 a 30 *add* (see also explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 38).

P. xx, four lines from foot of page. For the term *πρῶτοι λόγοι* cp. De Part. An. 4. 5. 682 a 2 sq. and Isocr. De Antid. § 71.

P. xxviii, line 8, *after περὶ add τῆς*.

P. xxix, line 1, *after* 1338 a 32 sqq.: *add* 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 10 sq.:.

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P. xl, line 5, *after* the Seventh *add* In one MS. of Pliny's Natural History (the Pollingensis) 'the first eighteen Books are wrongly numbered' (*Class. Rev.* 7. 452).

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P. lvi, line 21, *after* 1269 a 18 *read* $M^a P^1$ add *τις* before *κινήσας*: $\Pi^2$ are probably right in reading simply *κινήσας*, which was the reading of Γ also (see vol. iii. p. xxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).

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P. lvii, *dele* lines 1–5 (see critical note on 1339 a 29).

P. 15, last line, *for* *γάρ read* *γὰρ*.

P. 26, nine lines from foot of page. Should τοὺς be added before ἀμφισ-βητοῦντας? See vol. iii. p. 315.

P. 28, line 9, *for* ἤθεσι *read* ἔθεσι (see *Class. Rev.* 7. 307).

P. 54, fourteen lines from foot of page, *for* γενέσθαι νομοθέτην *read* νομοθέτην γενέσθαι.

P. 61, line 17, *after* Latin Translation *add* unless indeed, which is more probable, he copied the annotations from the MS. before him.

P. 76, eighteen lines from foot of page, *read* ὀρθοπραγεῖν.

P. 76, last line but one, *after* τοὺς ἀπόρους) *add* In Demosth. Phil. 3. 54 Σ has λοιδορίας φόνου (*l.* φθόνου) σκώμματος where other MSS. have λοιδορίας ἢ φθόνου ἢ σκώμματος.

P. 78, eleven lines from foot of page, *after* 23. *add* **22.** ἐκ om. $\Pi^1$.

P. 80, line 19, for αποθεν *read* απωθεν.

P. 80, three lines from foot of page, *before* Almost *add* See vol. iii. p. xvii.

P. 81, twenty-one lines from foot of page, *dele* rightly—note). See above on p. 28.

P. 82, line 19, end of note on 1264 a 8, *add* Sus.$^{3a}$ reads φρατρίας, not φατρίας.

P. 84, twenty lines from foot of page, *after* rightly *add* but see explanatory note on 1283 b 4.

P. 85, last line but two, *after* **35.** *add* ἐκλιπεῖν $\Pi^2$: ἐκλείψειν $M^a$ $P^1$: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *derelinquere* which reading he found in his text. See critical note on 1270 a 21.

P. 86, five lines from foot of page, *after* § 77 *add* (ed. 2, § 694 sqq.).

P. 86, last line but one, *before* **12.** *add* **6.** ἢ after ἐπιορκεῖν om. $\Gamma M^b$, ἢ ταῦτα om. $L^a$ pr. $P^1$ (corrected in $P^1$ in paler ink than the MS.). ἐτίθει δὲ νόμῳ $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: ἔτι δὲ νόμον ἐτίθει $\Pi^1$ Sus.

P. 87, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* render it *add* **23.** γίνεσθαί $\Pi^2$ Bekk. Sus.: γενέσθαι $M^a$ $P^1$ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *fieri*).

P. 87, four lines from foot of page, *for* (perhaps ... 1340 b 24) *read* (= ποιήσας: see above, p. xxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).

P. 87, last line, *read* in.

P. 88, line 10, *after* Vet. Int. *add* **6.** περραιβοῖς $\Pi^2$ Bekk.: περαιβοῖς $\Pi^1$ Sus.: see *Class. Rev.* 7. 307 sq.

P. 92, line 22, *after* here *add* It is, however, so used in Eurip. Fragm. 796 Nauck (ed. 2).

P. 101, line 5. Τῆς τοιαύτης may possibly refer forward and mean τῆς πολιτικῆς: see the explanatory note on 1337 b 6.

P. 104, line 16. At the end of the note *add* For τὰ πράγματα φύμενα cp. Plato, Laws 757 D, τὴν νῦν φυομένην κατοικίζειν πόλιν, and Aristot. Poet. 14. 1453 b 5, τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα.

P. 106, last line, *after* here *add* As to διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν cp. c. 5. 1254 b 12 and Plut. Pelop. c. 24, ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ κυριώτατος νόμος τῷ σώζεσθαι δεομένῳ τὸν σώζειν δυνάμενον ἄρχοντα κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδίδωσι.

P. 114, thirteen lines from foot of page, *before* Plato *add* Παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκας may possibly be added because ὁμογάλακτες standing by itself might be taken to refer only to children, and not to grandchildren also.

P. 114, ten lines from foot of page. It is probably from Panaetius that Cicero derives the views expressed in De Offic. 1. 17. 54: see C. Hinze, Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, p. 50.

P. 115, thirteen lines from foot of page. The passage referred to as 7. 13. 11 is probably 6 (4). 13. 11. 1297 b 24 sqq.

P. 118, line 14, end of note, *add* Cp. also Xenophanes, Fragm. 5, 6 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 101 sq.).

P. 118, seventeen lines from foot of page, *add* In illustration of ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν cp. Strabo, p. 336 *sub fin.*—337.

P. 123, five lines from foot of page, *add* 12. μέχρι γὰρ τούτου κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cp. Περὶ μακροβιότητος 6. 467 a 20 and [Plato,] Epinomis 978 C.

P. 128, twenty-one lines from foot of page, *after* 29. *add* For ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός cp. Plut. Publicola, c. 6, οὐδέτερον δὲ μικρὸν οὐδ' ἀνθράπινον, ἀλλ' ἢ θεῖον ἢ θηριῶδες. See also Plut. Aristid. c. 6 *sub fin.* and De Profect. in Virt. c. 1 *sub fin.*

P. 131, ten lines from foot of page, *for* The ellipse—πᾶσα μεταλλευτικὴ *read* Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, ἕτερον (sc. δικαστήριον) ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει, where περὶ ταῦτα must apparently be supplied before ὅσα.

P. 133, seventeen lines from foot of page, *after* χρῆσιν *add* and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 16.

P. 138, twelve lines from foot of page. Prof. Bywater points out (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Band ii. p. 504), no doubt rightly, that the article is used before Ἡφαίστου because the Hephaestus of Homer's Iliad (18. 376) is referred to. It should be noticed, however, that in the Politics the article is almost always prefixed to the names of gods and goddesses. The phrase νὴ Δία is the only exception I remember.

P. 147, line 17, *after* cp. *add* Plato, Polit. 289 B, τὰ δὲ περὶ ζῴων κτῆσιν τῶν ἡμέρων, πλὴν δούλων κ.τ.λ.

P. 159, twelve lines from foot of page, *add* 37 sq. See explanatory note on 1275 b 21, and cp. Diod. 17. 77. 3 and Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6 (vol. iii. p. 605 Kühn), δύο δὲ μεγάλων μεγάλα καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα γίνεται.

P. 164, line 15, end of note, *add* Cp. Soph. Philoct. 138 sqq. and Manil. Astron. 5. 739 sqq. (where atque omnia iusta priorum should perhaps be read).

P. 169, three lines from foot of page, *before* Their *add* and Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, c. 18 Kuehlewein (vol. i. p. 556 Kühn), μένουσι δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον χρόνον, ὅσον ἂν ἀποχρῇ αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κτήνεσιν ὁ χόρτος· ὁκόταν δὲ μηκέτι, ἐς ἑτέρην χώρην ἔρχονται.

P. 171, line 5, *before* Giph. *add* Vet. Int. 'quicunque quidem sponte natam habent elaborationem':

P. 171, line 9, *after* betreiben' *add* J. C. Wilson, 'the industries of which spring up of themselves', a rendering which resembles that of Vet. Int.

P. 171, line 11, *for* vita *read* ἐργασία.

P. 171, line 22, end of note, *after* c. 12 *add* I am not disposed to be dogmatic in support of Victorius' interpretation of the rare word αὐτόφυτος in the passage before us, but I still incline to think that it is right. See for J. C. Wilson's view *Class. Rev.* 10 (1896), p. 187 and *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* 11. 260 sq. The meaning of αὐτόφυτος may be studied in Pindar, Pyth. 3. 47, where

it seems to mean 'self-engendered' ('self-caused', as Liddell and Scott, not 'sponte natus', as Boeckh): cp. Polyb. 11. 25. 2 Hultsch, τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων γινόμενα φύματα καὶ νόσους. Its meaning is still clearer in Dio Cass. 44. 37. 2. Here αὐτόφυτος is contrasted with ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου and explained by ἐκ παρασκευῆς συγγενοῦς, and it seems to mean 'self-bred', 'self-engendered', i. e. engendered by the stock of which the person comes ('bon chien chasse de race'). Ἑτερόφυτον δένδρον is 'a grafted tree', i. e. a tree not self-engendered (Theophrast. ap. Julian, Epist. 24, referred to by Liddell and Scott). Cp. also the use of αὐτοφυής in Plato, Laws 794 A, where it is explained by ἃς ἐπειδὰν ξυνέλθωσιν αὐτοὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρίσκουσι. If αὐτόφυτος in the passage before us meant 'springing up of itself', we should expect that exchange (ἀλλαγή), if not carried too far, would be described by Aristotle as αὐτόφυτος, for he says in 1. 9. 1257 a 18 sq. that exchange not carried beyond a certain point is necessary. Yet he nowhere describes the necessary kind of exchange as αὐτόφυτος.

P. 172, after line 13, *add* οἱ μὲν νομαδικὸν ἅμα καὶ λῃστρικόν. That these lives were often conjoined we see from Strabo, p. 511.

P. 172, nine lines from foot of page, *after* 1216 a 7 *add* Cp. also [Plato,] Axiochus 366 D, οὐ κατὰ μὲν τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν τὸ νήπιον κλαίει;

P. 172, next line, *add* 10. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. [Plato,] Menex. 237 E, and [Demosth.] Or. Fun. c. 5, πάντα γὰρ τὰ τίκτοντα ἅμα καὶ τροφὴν τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως φέρει.

P. 179, sixteen lines from foot of page, *after* συνέστηκεν *dele* and in... 1253 b 3).

P. 181, line 10, *after* 3. *add* ἔστι δ' οὔτε κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hist. An. 1. 13. 493 a 33, οἱ δ' ὄρχεις οὔτε ταὐτὸ σαρκὶ οὔτε πόρρω σαρκός, and 2. 12. 504 b 11 sq.

P. 187, end of note on τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων, *add* For the account of χρηματιστική here given cp. Plato, Gorg. 452 C, where the χρηματιστής claims to be πλούτου δημιουργός.

P. 188, line 12, *before* Eryxias *add* the saying of Solon to Croesus reported in Diod. 9. 27. 2, of Plato, Rep. 521 A and Laws 742 E, and of.

P. 193, line 8, *add* 12. ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν. Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Laws 962 A.

P. 203, lines 3–5. I prefer to the interpretation of this passage given here that given by Sus., and independently with greater fullness and clearness by J. C. Wilson in *Class. Rev.* 10 (1896), p. 184 sqq. and *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* 11. 246 sqq. and 12. 50 sqq. The latter explains ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς by ὅσα μέρη χρηματιστικῆς χρηματίζεται ἀπὸ γῆς, comparing Oecon. 1. 1343 a 26, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ γεωργικὴ προτέρα καὶ δεύτεραι ὅσαι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἷον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη τοιαύτη, and translates the whole passage 'all the forms of acquisition (or all the industries) which make their profit from minerals and from things growing from the earth which, though not edible (or fruits), are still useful.' One difficulty in connexion with this rendering should be noticed. In the short phrase ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων the words ἀπὸ γῆς occur twice, and one would expect them to be used in the same sense in both places, but in the first place we have to translate them 'from minerals' (i.e. from rock, metal, soil, sand, etc.) and in the second 'from the earth' (i.e. from soil, but not from rock, metal, or sand). We need not make too much of this difficulty,

but it seems to me to exist. It appears also to be implied, which we hardly expect, that agriculture *οὐ χρηματίζεται ἀπὸ γῆς*, though it obviously derives food from that source (Oecon. 1. 1343 a 30 sqq.: cp. Plut. Numa, c. 16, where *γεωργία* is described as *ὁ ἀπὸ γῆς βίος*), but this is implied in Oecon. 1. 1343 a 26 sqq. also, so that this passage is open to the same objection.

P. 203, line 5, *after* 1256 b 26 *add* and cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, *ἕτερον* (sc. *δικαστήριον*) *ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει*, where we have to supply *περὶ ταῦτα* or something equivalent before *ὅσα*.

P. 203, last line but one. I have here taken *λωβῶνται* in *τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται* as passive and *τὰ σώματα* as the nom. to it, but it is more likely that *λωβῶνται* is middle, and that the words should be construed, 'men injure their bodies'.

P. 206, lines 10–12, *dele* *ἀλλὰ μὴν*—1339 a 29.

P. 209, twenty-two lines from foot of page, *after* *τὸν οἰκονόμον* *add* Cp. (with J. C. Wilson) Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 593, Anm. 1.

P. 209, twenty-one lines from foot of page, *after* 1253 b 4 sq. *add* for though, as Sus. has pointed out, it has not been said there or in any preceding passage that the rule of the husband over the wife is a political rule and the rule of the father over the child a kingly rule, it has nevertheless been implied in c. 3. 1253 b 4 sqq. that these two kinds of rule are two and not one. Aristotle perhaps adds *ἀλλὰ . . . βασιλικῶς* somewhat unguardedly in his eagerness to explain at once *how* the one kind of rule differs from the other. A similar inexactness of reference occurs in 1. 5. 1254 b 3, *ὥσπερ λέγομεν* (see also explanatory notes on 1312 b 34 and 1321 b 5), and it is not, I think, necessary to suppose (with Sus.) a lacuna before the words *καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* These words, as Vict. has seen, are closely connected with what precedes. See J. C. Wilson's remarks in *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* 12. 52 sqq.

P. 210, lines 16–20. Perhaps it is better (with Sepulveda) to supply *τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ* with *συνέστηκε* than to take *συνέστηκε* as impersonal, as I have here done.

P. 213, line 17, *after* quoted *add* Cp. also 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 3, *ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1169 b 10, *εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν*, and see explanatory note on Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 11.

P. 217, line 11, *after* Cp. *add* Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 4. 3. p. 722. 12 Bekker, *τὸν λόγον τῆς ἁπάντων συστάσεως, οἷον εὐθέως τοῦ τε σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς*, and.

P. 219, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* *ἀρχιτέκτονας* *add* and Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 12, *οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ὀργάνου τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὗ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ χρῆται πρὸς τὸ ἔργον*.

P. 223, line 13, *after* with him *add* Cp. Athen. Deipn. 262 b, *ταύτας γὰρ* (sc. *τὰς λιχνείας*) *ὑπερορῶσιν* (*οἱ δοῦλοι*) *οὐ μόνον διὰ φόβον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ διδασκαλίαν, οὐ τὴν ἐν Δουλοδιδασκάλῳ Φερεκράτους, ἀλλὰ ἐθισθέντες*.

P. 223, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* *πείθεσθαι* *add* and Xen. De Re Equestri 8. 13. I incline now to follow Stahr, not Bonitz, in his interpretation of *λόγος* in this passage.

P. 238, lines 3–5. Prof. Robinson Ellis adds other Greek examples to those given by me—Xen. Oecon. 6. 14, *τοὺς ἔχοντας τὸ σεμνὸν ὄνομα τοῦτο τὸ καλὸς*

τε κἀγαθός, and 6. 15, προσέκειτο τὸ καλὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ—and supplies me with closer Latin parallels—Ovid, Met. 15. 96,

At vetus illa aetas cui fecimus Aurea nomen,

and Plin. Epist. 3. 2, cum dico princeps ('where J. E. B. Mayor has a learned note'). See Prof. Ellis' commentary on Catull. lxxxvi. 3 (ed. 2).

P. 239, ten lines from foot of page, *for* is probably *read* may be.

P. 239, seven lines from foot of page, *after* p. 79) *add* But Hecataeus and others had written γῆς περίοδοι (Bywater).

P. 242, eighteen lines from foot of page, *after* εἰς *dele* 3. 4 . . . ταὐτά, and.

P. 243, eight lines from foot of page, *add* 26. εἰς τοὺς φύλακας and 27. ἐς ἐκείνους. 'We often find εἰς used of movement to persons, for instance in De Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 20 and Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 26, 27' (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 33).

P. 248, lines 16–20, *for* but ἤθεσι . . . χρωμένων *read* probably rightly: see my remarks on the passage in *Class. Rev.* 7. 307.

P. 254, line 16. I do not feel sure that Sus. intended to render καί by 'gerade', and I doubt whether it can bear this meaning here. *Perhaps* καί means simply 'also', and the sense is 'since we see that those also quarrel who own property in common, as well as owners of several property, and indeed that the former quarrel more than the latter', etc.

P. 254, line 25, *after* p. 54. 2 *add* See as to these cases of undivided property Dio Chrys. Or. 38, 2. 151 R. Cp. Lucan, De Bell. Civ. 1. 84,

Tu causa malorum
Facta tribus dominis communis, Roma.

P. 255, line 18, *after* 36. *add* πλῆθος ὄν, not οὖσαν, though τὴν πόλιν is to be supplied: cp. Plato, Cratyl. 418 E and Stallbaum's note, and see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Gerth, § 369. 3.

P. 256, nine lines from foot of page, *add* τοῖς δ' οὐ χρῶνται γινώσκοντες. Cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 145, πολλὰ γιγνώσκοντες ὀρθῶς ὑμεῖς οὐ διὰ τέλους αὐτοῖς χρῆσθε.

P. 267, twenty lines from foot of page, end of note on 1265 a 12, *add* This was proverbial: cp. Demosth. Prooem. 42, p. 1450, ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ οἰκεῖ ἰδίᾳ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἅπαντ' ὀρθῶς πράττειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ κοινῇ.

P. 267, line 26. I have here taken τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος as an 'anticipatory accusative', but it may be, as Prof. R. Ellis points out, the direct subject of λανθάνειν.

P. 269, twenty-three lines from foot of page, *after* using property *add* Cp. also Cic. De Offic. 1. 27. 96, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat *cum specie* quadam liberali.

P. 269, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* μετριότης *add* See *Class. Rev.* 7. 309.

P. 270, line 20, *after* § 41. 4 *add* (ed. 2. § 216).

P. 271, line 4, *after* 1335 b 22 sq. *add* Τέκνα must be supplied with τελέων from τεκνοποιίαν (see Bon. Ind. 239 a 39 sqq.).

P. 275, last line but four, and p. 277, line 9, 'checked by an approach to the principle of the lot'. See below on p. 335, last line.

P. 283, twenty lines from foot of page, *after* given *add* (see explanatory note on 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 31).

P. 293, line 5, *after* name *add* See Sandys' note on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 28, l. 20, *τὴν βιωβελίαν*.

P. 293, line 13, *after* κ.τ.λ. *add* and Demosth. Prooem. 5. p. 1422, *ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ δοκιμάζειν ὀρθῶς ἅπαντ' ἐστὶ μηδὲν οἴεσθαι πρότερον γιγνώσκειν πρὶν μαθεῖν*, and Prooem. 18. p. 1430.

P. 298, line 10, *after* 1326 a 32) *add* Hippodamus' wish to be learned about Nature as a whole reminds us of the similar teaching of Hippocrates referred to in Plato, Phaedrus 270 C. See also Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 7. 1102 a 19.

P. 304, line 7, *after* *κοινωνεῖν* *add* See, however, vol. iii. p. xvii.

P. 307, last line, *after* *εἴη* *add* Or perhaps admirers of Lacedaemonian customs: cp. [Plato,] Hippias Maior 284 B, *οὐ γὰρ πάτριον, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λακεδαιμονίοις κινεῖν τοὺς νόμους*. See R. Hirzel, *Ἄγραφος νόμος*, p. 72. 2.

P. 308, line 20, *after* e.g. *dele* in 3. 9 . . . *σχεδὸν γάρ*, and.

P. 309, line 26. *Μαρτύρων τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγενῶν* is probably intended to be emphasized by hyperbaton, the words *ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον* being interposed after *μαρτύρων*: see vol. iii. Appendix B.

P. 314, line 5 sqq. It is likely that the Polities were written, not before, as I have implied here, but after, the Politics.

P. 316, nineteen lines from foot of page, *after* *τὴν γῆν* *add* 40. For the change of construction in *τὰς γαστνώσας πόλεις . . . μηδεμίαν* cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 15 sqq., where see note.

P. 318, line 8. Prof. R. Ellis much prefers Victorius' way of taking the passage, 'We ought to think that a city approximates to a division into equal halves as divided into men and women'.

P. 319, line 2, *after* *Σαυρομάται* *add* Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 122 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 460), *ταῖς δὲ γυναιξὶ* (*Σαυρομάται*) *πάντα πείθονται ὡς δεσποίναις*, Strabo, p. 165, as to the Cantabri, and Plut. Cato Censor, c. 8, as to the Romans.

P. 323, line 5 sq. See above on p. 314, line 5 sqq.

P. 334, line 10, *for* According to Plutarch *read* We read of Agesilaus in Plut. Ages. c. 4, *ὁσάκις δὲ τύχοι καθήμενος ἐν τῷ βασιλικῷ θώκῳ καὶ χρηματίζων, ἐπιοῦσι τοῖς ἐφόροις ὑπεξανίστατο*.

P. 334, line 25, *after* 1266 b 23 *add* Contrast the view of Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 29, *ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων κατάστασις οὐκ ἄνεσις ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐπίτασις τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ δοκοῦσα πρὸς τοῦ δήμου γεγονέναι σφοδροτέραν ἐποίησε τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν*.

P. 335, last line. It has been pointed out by Mr. J. Solomon (*Class. Rev.* 3. 295: see Susemihl, Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, 1891, Bericht über Aristoteles, etc., für 1887–1890, p. 124) that this expression of Plato refers not to the ephorate, as Stallbaum and others have thought, but to the kingship.

P. 338, line 3, *before* For *add* Mimnermus had said of old age (Fragm. 5 Bergk),

*βλάπτει δ' ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ νόον ἀμφιχυθέν.*

Cp. Herondas 1. 67 sq. and Hdt. 3. 134.

P. 339, note on 1271 a 14. I am inclined still to read *τούτῳ*, but to interpret it in a slightly different way from that in which I have interpreted it in

this note. Is not *τούτῳ = τῷ φιλοτίμους κατασκευάζειν τοὺς πολίτας*? Cp. Demosth. Prooem. 4. p. 1421, *οὔτ' εἰωθα μακρολογεῖν οὔτ' ἂν . . . νῦν ἐχρησάμην τούτῳ*, and Plut. De Virtute Morali, c. 12, *ταῦτα δ' ἀμέλει καὶ οἱ νομοθέται συνιδόντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ ζῆλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους*.

P. 350, fourteen lines from foot of page, *add* 38. *τὰς δ' ἔφυσεν*. 'Ceos is called by Bacchylides (2. 8) *Εὐξαντὶς νᾶσος*, a title hitherto unknown, but evidently implying a claim to have been colonized by the son of Minos' (Kenyon, Poems of Bacchylides, p. xxvii).

P. 355, twelve lines from foot of page, *after* *ἔνδεια add* Hippocr. De Morbis 4 (vol. ii. p. 335 Kühn), *εἰ ἄνθρωπος ὀλίγα ἐσθίει καὶ ὀλίγα πίνει, εὐθέμιον τούτῳ νοῦσον ἐπάγει*.

P. 358, line 4, *for* of *read* ascribed to.

P. 359, line 19, *after* *στάσιν*) *add* Cp. also Plut. Cato Minor, c. 45, where Cato says of Pompey, *αὐτὸς δὲ τῇ πόλει παρακάθηται στάσεις ἀγωνοθετῶν ἐν ταῖς παραγγελίαις καὶ θορύβους μηχανώμενος, ἐξ ὧν οὐ λέληθε δι' ἀναρχίας μοναρχίαν ἑαυτῷ μνηστευόμενος*, and Justin 16. 4. 6.

P. 361, four lines from foot of page, *dele* c. 12. 1274 a 2.

P. 362, five lines from foot of page, *dele* the parenthesis, 'cp. . . . changes', and see critical note on 1299 b 27.

P. 366, nineteen lines from foot of page, *for* all magistracies *read* all magistracies empowered to try cases.

P. 371, note on 1273 b 19. I incline now to adopt the reading *τῷ πλουτίζειν*.

P. 373, fifteen lines from foot of page, *for* as he found them *read* in existence.

P. 374, nineteen lines from foot of page, note on 1274 a 2. *Τὸν δῆμον καταστῆσαι* probably means not 'set up the demos', as I have interpreted it in this note, but 'set up the democracy' (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 22, *οἱ τὸν δῆμον καθιστάντες*).

P. 375, line 10. As to the meaning of the expression *τὰ Μηδικά*, see vol. iii. p. 554.

P. 376, line 18, *for* The fact . . . 1537 a 20 sqq.) *read* See *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 7. l. 9 sqq.

P. 379, line 4, *after* latter *add* and which represented the Chalcidian Charondas as a disciple of Zaleucus, the lawgiver of the Italian Locri, a not too friendly rival of the Chalcidic colonies of Italy and Sicily.

P. 384, line 3, *after* 155 E *add* 'In inscriptions of the Attic period there is no trace of an exception to this rule' (Prof. Bywater, *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* 2. 504). See on this subject Sus.[1], vol. i, p. 682.

P. 384, thirteen lines from foot of page, *add* 23. *ἐγένετο δὲ κ.τ.λ.* We notice that one and the same lawgiver gave laws to all the Thraceward Chalcidians—an early indication of the tendency to unity which they afterwards displayed in grouping themselves round Olynthus—and that this lawgiver was a citizen of Rhegium, itself a colony of Chalcis.

## VOL. III.

P. xix, end of note, *add* and in 1312 a 11, 18 all the MSS. have *τοῖς μονάρχοις*. In 1295 a 13 also $M^a$ $P^1$ have *μόναρχοι* with $\Pi^2$.

P. 11, line 1, colon in place of full stop.

P. 11, line 17, colon in place of full stop.

P. 21, line 9, *for* τοῦτ *read* τοῦτ'.

P. 37, line 13, *dele* comma.

P. 89, line 1, for *ac si* read *ac si utique.*

P. 91, line 4, after *ὑπερέχοντας add* See on the subject of this note vol. iii. Appendix C.

P. 93, last line, *for* have *read* sometimes show. See vol. iii. Appendix C.

P. 100, last line, *for* ἐχθοοῖς *read* ἐχθροῖς.

P. 101, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* Musurus *add* See critical note on 1311 a 36–39.

P. 104, line 17, *after* δύο? *add* Yet compare 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 37, where we have λέγουσι δὲ τέτταρας, not τὰς τέτταρας.

P. 105, eleven lines from foot of page, *after* in place of it *add* (with Madvig, Adversaria Critica, 1. 468 sq.).

P. 117, line 5, *after* ἐπιχωριάζεται *add* In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 34, however, Vet. Int. renders ἐπεχωρίασεν by *devenit*, if the text is correct.

P. 126, line 20, *for* ἑλλανοκράτας *read* ἑλλανοκράτεις (see vol. iv. p. 431).

P. 126, line 21, *after* -*as add* and -*εις*.

P. 144, seven lines from foot of page, *read* κτίσαντες.

P. 156, three lines from foot of page. This is one of several passages in which it is doubtful which word in the sentence is the subject and which the predicate. Among these passages are the following—3. 6. 1278 b 11, 3. 7. 1279 a 26 sq., 3. 13. 1283 b 42 sqq. I have followed most of the translators and commentators in the view I have taken on this question in my notes on these passages, but there is much to be said for the opposite view, and I do not feel sure that I am right. In 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι, the word πολῖται seems to be the predicate (see also 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 5 sq.); yet in 3. 1. 1275 a 22 sq., where τὸν ἁπλῶς πολίτην is taken up in πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ., πολίτης is clearly the subject of the sentence (see also 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7 sq.).

P. 186, line 4, Sus. supplies πολιτείαις, not πόλεσι, with ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς, perhaps rightly (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 33 sq.).

P. 189, fifteen lines from foot of page, *dele* comma.

P. 191, line 4, *after* Hdt. 1. 97. 2 *add* and Plato, Rep. 347 A–D.

P. 191, three lines from foot of page, *after* conduct *add* (This remark is borrowed from Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 19, 'Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects', etc.).

P. 196, seven lines from foot of page, *after* preferred *add* The next ἀπορία is whether the version of justice put forward by the partisans of oligarchy and democracy is satisfactory. This ἀπορία is discussed in c. 9.

P. 199, line 12, *after* προστιθέναι *add* For ἀφαιροῦσι cp. Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς 2. 471 a 6, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφαιροῦσι.

P. 204, line 18, *for* Cf. *read* Cp.

P. 206, seventeen lines from foot of page, *dele* Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36.

P. 210, line 6, *after* force *add* comma.

P. 212, twelve lines from foot of page, *before* 40. *add* 39. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος. Cp. Περὶ μακροβιότητος 2. 465 a 19, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερος λόγος.

P. 220, line 10, *after* the true one *add* A distinction is, in fact, drawn in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8 sqq. between αἱρετοί and κληρωτοὶ ἐκ προκρίτων.

P. 238, line 15, *after* πέτεσθαι *add* Cp. Aristoph. Eq. 384 sq.

P. 258, eight lines from foot of page, *add* In Nymphis, Fragm. 15 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 15) we read Παυσανίας . . . τὰ τῆς Σπάρτης ἐξελθὼν νόμιμα.

P. 260, eleven lines from foot of page, *after* Kingship? *add* It would seem from Diod. 15. 60. 5 that the office of the ταγός might be so classed.

P. 264, eight lines from foot of page, see above on p. 260.

P. 267, seventeen lines from foot of page, *for* Ἐπιμενης *read* Ἐπιμένης.

P. 272, line 19, *after* 31 sqq. *add* In this passage Aristotle is speaking of Kingship in both πόλεις and ἔθνη (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 35), whereas in the passage before us he seems to refer only to Kingships in πόλεις (cp. 1285 b 13, τὰ κατὰ πόλιν, and 16, ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, and also c. 15. 1286 b 7–10).

P. 272, six lines from foot of page, *for* τόν *read* τὸν.

P. 288 (and p. 418), page-heading, *after* NOTES *add* full stop.

P. 301, eleven lines from foot of page, *after* rule) *add* and Polyb. 6. 2. 14 Hultsch.

P. 308, line 2, *for* ὑπαρχόντων *read* ὑπαρχόντων.

P. 312, line 1, *for* περι *read* περὶ.

P. 317, twelve lines from foot of page, *after* Protag. 323 D sq. *add* and Seneca, Epist. 123, nemo est casu bonus.

P. 318, line 11, *before* latter *add* the.

P. 342, line 6. Perhaps it is more likely that Megalopolis was founded in B.C. 370 than in B.C. 369. See Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 319, note 5 (Part 2, c. 78), and Frazer, Pausanias 4. 307.

P. 345, line 8, end of note, *add* Cp. also Plin. Epist. 1. 20. 5.

P. 362, eighteen lines from foot of page, *for* θομοειδεῖς *read* θυμοειδεῖς.

P. 363, twenty-two lines from foot of page, *after* τούτων *add* and Περὶ αἰσθήσεως 2. 439 a 5, ἔστω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διωρισμένα.

P. 370, five lines from foot of page, *after* military duties *add* and provides in the Laws (see vol. i. p. 446) that the Nomophylakes are not to remain in office after they have attained seventy years of age.

P. 385, line 5, *for* διεξελθόν *read* διεξελθών.

P. 386, seven lines from foot of page, *after* other laws also *add* For τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινές cp. Plut. Solon, c. 12, τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Μεγακλέους.

P. 387, three lines from foot of page, 'all other'. It is possible that τὰ ἄλλα means here 'other things than τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας (30)', and not, as I have taken these words to mean, 'other things than syssitia and the division into classes'.

P. 414, line 17, *after* Greece *add* But Aristotle's main object is to place the gymnasium of the elders in the immediate neighbourhood, and under the eye, of the chief magistrates. It must, therefore, be situated, like the agora, under the hill on which the chief magistrates dwell.

P. 418, eighteen lines from foot of page, *after* contracts *add* at any rate those which were made in the agora.

P. 428, line 3, *after* θάνατον *add* For the thought cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 b 35 sqq.

P. 428, line 18, *after* 116 b 8 sqq. *add* and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 3 sq.

P. 433, thirteen lines from foot of page, *for* ἀκούοντεν *read* ἀκούοντες.

P. 434, line 4, *for* βελτιστε *read* βέλτιστε.

P. 475, line 11, *after* 1. 254) *add* In Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως 1. 467 b 11, ἅμα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀναπνοῆς ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν· ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν ζῴων (cp. Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς 1. 470 b 9 sqq.) διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ μὴ ζῆν, and 21. 480 b 12, 19 sq., Aristotle seems to make some concessions to this view.

P. 483, ten lines from foot of page, *after* life *add* Cp. also Περὶ ὕπνου 3. 457 a 3 sqq.

P. 487, nineteen lines from foot of page. My rendering of γίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. is that of the translators generally, but it would be possible to translate the words, 'for in a way exercise results to the bodies [of the children]'. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 3, γίγνεται κατάλυσις, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 30, γίγνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι.

P. 491, nine lines from foot of page, *before* Compare *add* and Frazer, Pausanias 2. 492.

P. 497, twenty lines from foot of page. We need not perhaps interpret διῃρῆσθαι so strictly as to infer from it, as I have done here, that Aristotle intended the education of his future citizens to be carried on beyond twenty-one, though it is on other grounds not improbable that he did so.

P. 500, line 12, *for* ἐικῇ *read* εἰκῇ.

P. 500, line 20, *after* 1366 a 36 sqq. *add* and see explanatory note on 1258 a 10.

P. 505, line 1, *for* εμάνθανον *read* ἐμάνθανον.

P. 507, line 2, *after* 1319 b 19 sqq. *add* Cp. also Thuc. 8. 89. 3 (τῷ τοιούτῳ . . . ἐν ᾧπερ).

P. 507, twelve lines from foot of page, *after* μάθησιν *add* comma.

P. 509, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* himself *add* (cp. Athen. Deipn. 18 a sq.).

P. 509, last line but one, *for* ἂν *read* ἄν.

P. 524, line 2, *after* c. 34. l. 4 *add* and c. 48. l. 16, ταῖς ἀ[γορ]αῖς.

P. 524, line 7, *for* μη *read* μὴ.

P. 525, nine lines from foot of page, *after* fifteen *add* As to light and heavy gymnastic exercises see Frazer, Pausanias 4. 103.

P. 535, line 4, *after* 503 a 23 sqq. *add* Περὶ ὕπνου 1. 454 a 26, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλῃ τὸν χρόνον ᾧ δύναται χρόνῳ τι ποιεῖν.

P. 545, seventeen lines from foot of page, *for* Muller *read* Müller.

P. 548, three lines from foot of page, *dele* the first comma.

P. 557, line 11, *for* τῃ *read* τῇ.

P. 559, four lines from foot of page, *add* As to rhythm and melody see Abert, Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik, pp. 53–56.

P. 575, nineteen lines from foot of page, *read* 5½.

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